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The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:41

HALAKHAH: “From encumbered property, how is that?” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody disputes a court document, he is not trustworthy. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him: Is that not the Mishnah? “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah”! Rebbi Joḥanan said to him: Babylonian, after I removed the clay from the pearl, you say to me: Is that not the Mishnah? Rav said, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she produces she collects. He changed his mind and said, she collects even at a place where one writes a ketubah; let anyone powerful object to this! Rebbi Yose objected: Was it not stated: She might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, and collect a second time? If those died. Are there not witnesses? Bring them! They went overseas. Is there not an agreement? Is there no registrar of agreements? There is a registrar of agreements; as you say, if a document is lost, one writes a replacement. This is what one says, if the ketubah was lost, one writes a new one. Rebbi Abba objected: Was it not stated, she might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, wait until he dies, and collect a second time? Rebbi Yose bar Abun said to him: Would she not have to prove that she lived with him until he died?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:4

Ben Azay says, the heirs of the first say to the heirs of the second: If you are creditors, take what is yours and leave; otherwise let us split evenly between yourselves and us. Rebbi Aqiba said to him: Biblical inheritance “jumped” on the sons of the second; they take their mother’s ketubah and come back to split. Rebbi Mana said, they disagree if there is an excess denar. But if there is no excess denar, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree with Ben Nanas that both parties split evenly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said to him, a situation which was stated without disagreement you turn into a disagreement. They must disagree if there is no excess denar. But if there is an excess denar even Ben Nanas agrees with Rebbi Aqiba that biblical inheritance “jumped” on the sons of the second; they take their mother’s ketubah and come back to split.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:8

HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two women,” etc. That refers to what Rebbi Immi said, that a man should be induced to give generously to his daughter. If that is so, then even if there is no excess denar? Rebbi Abun said, in case you can uphold their words with the words of the Torah, you uphold their words with the words of the Torah. But in case you cannot uphold their words with the words of the Torah, you disregard their words and uphold the words of the Torah.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:10

At which point in time does one appraise? The students of Rebbi Mana say, at the end. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said to them, are you not those who speak in the name of your teacher, “that is necessary if they did not yet divide the estate”? But one assesses from the first moment!

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:12

HALAKHAH: “If the estate contained expected property,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, they disagree about the basic claim of the two ketubot. Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. But for the excess denar everybody agrees that it is movable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everybody agrees about the basic claim of the two ketubot that it must be real estate. Where do they disagree? About the excess denar, where Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rav: But in Syria they routinely collect from bronze and bedspreads. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only from bedspreads of that night. Rav Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The people in Arabia routinely collect from camels and spices. Similarly, only from spices of that night? Rebbi Ḥuna’s widow collected from movables following her place’s custom.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 10:16

“Similarly, if three who invested together lost or gained they would split in this manner.” Rebbi Eleazar said: You say that in case the tetradrachma lost or added value. But for earnings or losses they split evenly. That is difficult! One gave 100 denars and the other gave ten, and you say so? The colleagues say, he may say to him, by my contribution the merchandise rose. So far, if they ran after little merchandise. If there was much merchandise? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, he may say to him, by the time you sold one piece, I am selling ten. That is, at a nearby place. If it was far away? Rebbi Hila said, he may say to him, by the time you go and return once, I am going and returning ten times. There, we have stated: “If [the ox] gored an ox worth 200, the last one takes 100, the one before him 50, and the two first ones a gold denar.” Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi [Ze‘ira]: The same holds for earnings. Rebbi Yose said, the statement of Rebbi Ze‘ira disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yudan: Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree if they contracted between themselves that each can take according to his contribution? Oxen are as if contracted. He turned around and said, they disagree explicitly: Rebbi Eleazar said, if nothing was said, they split evenly; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if nothing was said, each takes according to his contribution.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 11:11

Rebbi Abbahu quoted in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: At the start one sells for sustenance of twelve months but one gives her sustenance for 30 days. Why should they sell for the sustenance of 12 months? Not to disadvantage the woman. Why do they give her sustenance for 30 days? If you said otherwise, you would act in detriment of the orphans, as it was stated: If a widow took possession even of 1’000 zuz for her sustenance, one does not take it away from her. What could one say to her? “Show what is in your hands!” The students of Rebbi Mana said to her, “show what is in your hands.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said to them, since in the end she will have to swear about anything in her hands, one says to her, let it be so.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:14

Rebbi dwelt in Sepphoris seventeen years and applied to himself (Gen. 47:28): “Jacob lived in Egypt seventeen years,” Jehudah lived in Sepphoris seventeen years. Of these he suffered from toothache for thirteen years. {Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, all these thirteen years no woman lying-in died in the Land of Israel and no pregnant woman had a miscarriage in the Land of Israel.} Why did he have a toothache? Once he saw a calf to be slaughtered when it bellowed and said to him, Rebbi, save me! He said to it, for that you were created. At the end, how was he healed? He saw them killing a burrow of rats. He said to them, let them live, it is written (Ps. 145:9) “His mercy extends to all His creatures.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:15

Rebbi was very meek and said, all a man might ask from me I am ready to do, except what the Elders of Bathyra did for my ancestor: they divested themselves and appointed him. If Rav Huna, the Head of the Diaspora, came here I would let him sit higher than myself since he is from the tribe of Judah and I am from Benjamin, he is from the male line and I am from the female. Once, the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya visited him and said, Rav Huna is outside. The face of Rebbi became saffron-colored. He [R. Ḥiyya] said to him, it is his coffin. He [Rebbi] said to him, go outside and look who wants you there. He stepped outside and did not find anybody; he understood that he [Rebbi] was angry with him. He did not visit him again for thirty days. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, in those thirty days did Rav learn from him [R. Ḥiyya] the principles of Torah. At the end of thirteen years and thirty days, Elijah visited him [Rebbi] in the likeness of the older Rebbi Ḥiyya. He said to him, how does my lord feel? He said to him, one tooth hurts me. He said to him, show it to me. He showed it to him, he put his finger on it and it was healed. The next day, the older Rebbi Ḥiyya came to him and asked him, how does Rebbi feel, what is with that tooth? He said to him, from the moment that you put your finger on it, it was healed. At that moment, he said, woe on you, lying-in women of the Land of Israel, woe on you, pregnant women of the Land of Israel! He [R. Ḥiyya] said to him, that was not me. From that moment on, he [Rebbi] treated him with honor. When he [Rebbi] went to the assembly hall, he said, may the older Rebbi Ḥiyya come inside. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose asked, closer than me? He said, beware! The older Rebbi Ḥiyya inside, and Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose innermost. Rebbi used to state the praises of the older Rebbi Ḥiyya before Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose. {Once, he [R. Ismael ben R. Yose] saw him [R. Ḥiyya] in the bathhouse and he did not show him reverence. He [R. Ismael ben R. Yose] said to him [Rebbi], is that the one of whom you state praises? He said, what did he do to you? He said, I saw him in the bathhouse and he did not show me reverence.} He [Rebbi] said to him [R. Ḥiyya], why did you do that? He said to him, so much should come over me if I realized that I was washing myself, at that time my eyes were occupied with the allegorical interpretation of the entire book of Psalms. From that moment on, he [Rebbi] appointed two students to accompany him [R. Ḥiyya] because of the danger.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 12:29

Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not only that she claims, but even if she mentions [her claims], as we have stated there: “If she died, her heirs can mention her ketubah for up to 25 years.” He tells you more: Even if she let 25 years minus one day go by before claiming, and then claimed, one gives her another 25 years.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:10

Rebbi Joshua ben Levi says, nobody is held responsible for his neighbor except for annona and head-tax. Rav said, anything for which one is held responsible for one’s neighbor has to be repaid. The strength of Rav is from the following: “He who appropriated a field and oppressors took it.” He did not hear that Rebbi Joḥanan said, they exacted a fine from a robber. Rebbi Abin asked, what is greater? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, and Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Julianus both said in the name of Samuel; one said, it is like annona and head-tax; the other said, it is not like annona and head-tax.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:13

Who is the Tanna of “the gain should be given to the sacred fund”? Rebbi Meïr! For Rebbi Meïr said, one commits sacrilege with prohibitions. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands? Let us hear from the following: “If he said, this loaf shall be dedicated, if he or another person ate it, they committed sacrilege; therefore, it can be redeemed. But if he said, it is for me [as if dedicated], if he ate it he committed sacrilege on goodwill but others would not commit sacrilege.” He said only, if he ate it. Therefore, to warm his hands is permitted. The students of Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: That is if he said I shall not eat it nor taste it; if he forbade only eating to himself. But the question was, if somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:13

Who is the Tanna of “the gain should be given to the sacred fund”? Rebbi Meïr! For Rebbi Meïr said, one commits sacrilege with prohibitions. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands? Let us hear from the following: “If he said, this loaf shall be dedicated, if he or another person ate it, they committed sacrilege; therefore, it can be redeemed. But if he said, it is for me [as if dedicated], if he ate it he committed sacrilege on goodwill but others would not commit sacrilege.” He said only, if he ate it. Therefore, to warm his hands is permitted. The students of Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: That is if he said I shall not eat it nor taste it; if he forbade only eating to himself. But the question was, if somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 13:23

Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free. And why did we state: “Rabban Gamliel obligates him”? This comes to tell you the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he obligates people. Rebbi Abbahu [supported] that of Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, the Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is obligated. Rav followed Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went with another to court before Rav. He started claiming from him barley, wheat and spelt. Rav told him, charge him with anything you have to charge, and in the end he will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free, did we not state “if he sued him for vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? If he is obligated for vessels about vessels, not so much more vessels for real estate? What does he do with it? He explains it, to transfer an oath to him. But did we not state: If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil, and the defendant admits [that he owes him] vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for oil and he admitted vessels, everybody agrees that what he admitted does not refer to the claim, for Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna said in the name of Rav: The Mishnah deals with the case that he sued for vessels full of oil; the ones are full, the others empty. One understands vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abun formulates it as oil bucket. Can one not ask him in the end? If he lost his speech.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:10

“That I will not eat from yours, that I will not taste from yours.” Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah. One catches him because of a handle for qorbān. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, if he said, I shall not eat from you, does one catch him because of a handle of an oath? Rebbi Yose said, people usually say “handle of an axe”, do they ever say “axe of a handle”?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 1:26

“Like a sheep.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, like the sheep of the daily offering. There, they say, like the young of a purification offering. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like our father Abraham’s ram. What Rebbi Ḥiyya stated supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Like a sheep which never suckled. Following the opinions of the rabbis there, one could state: Like the Temple courtyard. Rebbi Abin said, following the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish one could state: Like the sacrifices on the altar. Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, following Rebbi Joḥanan one could state: Like the cleansing of the inner altar and the candelabra.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 2:10

HALAKHAH: “A vow inside a vow is possible,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: An oath, an oath, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat, an oath that I shall not eat. If he ate, he is guilty only once.” Because he said this. Therefore, if he had not said this, he would be guilty for each of the oaths. Avime the brother of Ḥefa said, I studied vows, I studied oaths. Ḥefa wanted to examine him: There were five loaves before him and he said, an oath that I shall not eat this loaf. Then he said, these two loaves. Then he said, these three loaves. Then he said, these four loaves. Then he said, these five loaves. Then he ate the first, what are the rules? He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. He said to him, he is guilty only once. From the moment he mentioned “oath” about it, he made it like carcass meat. From there on he is as if he wanted to apply oaths to prohibitions, but no oath can be applied to prohibitions. He examined him a second time. There were five loaves and he said, an oath about these five loaves. Then he said, these four. Then he said, these three. Then he said, these two. Then he said, this single one. Then he ate all of them? He said to him, he is guilty only once. He said to him, he is guilty for each [oath] separately. If somebody had said, an oath that I shall not eat five, and he ate four, would he be free from punishment? Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable following Ḥefa’s brother in the last case, following Ḥefa in the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 3:13

Ḥizqiah said, he who swears that two are two is whipped for a vain oath. Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: One who saw rain falling and said: “O Lord, inundate with much water”, is whipped for a vain oath. Rebbi Onias, Rebbi Jacob bar Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman: 24 city councils were in Judea and they all were destroyed because of true vain oaths, as it is written: “For the vain did I hit your sons.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:3

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Because it is as if he gave him money to buy a loaf with. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Then is it forbidden to borrow money from him, for it is as if he gave him money to buy a loaf with? Rebbi Abina said, Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: That jewellery on them, is it forbidden to lend to them?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:6

Rebbi Joshua ben Levi says, nobody is held responsible for his neighbor except for annona and head-tax. Rav said, anything for which one is held responsible for one’s neighbor has to be repaid. The strength of Rav is from the following: “He who appropriated a field and oppressors took it.” He did not hear that Rebbi Joḥanan said, they exacted a fine from a robber. Rebbi Abin asked, (who was the father of) Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, and Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Julianus both said in the name of Samuel; one said, it is like annona and head-tax; the other one said, it is not like annona and head-tax.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:9

Who is the Tanna of “the gain should be given to the sacred fund”? Rebbi Meïr! For Rebbi Meïr said, one commits sacrilege with prohibitions. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands? Let us hear from the following: “If he said, this loaf shall be dedicated, if he or another person ate it, they committed sacrilege; therefore, it can be redeemed. But if he said, it is for me [as if dedicated], if he ate it he committed sacrilege on goodwill but others would not commit sacrilege.” He said only, if he ate it. Therefore, to warm his hands is permitted. The students of Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: That is if he said I shall not eat it nor taste it; if he forbade only eating to himself. But the question was, if somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 4:9

Who is the Tanna of “the gain should be given to the sacred fund”? Rebbi Meïr! For Rebbi Meïr said, one commits sacrilege with prohibitions. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands? Let us hear from the following: “If he said, this loaf shall be dedicated, if he or another person ate it, they committed sacrilege; therefore, it can be redeemed. But if he said, it is for me [as if dedicated], if he ate it he committed sacrilege on goodwill but others would not commit sacrilege.” He said only, if he ate it. Therefore, to warm his hands is permitted. The students of Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: That is if he said I shall not eat it nor taste it; if he forbade only eating to himself. But the question was, if somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:4

Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Partners can acquire one from the other and are responsible for damages inflicted by one on the other. Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, if he said, collect and acquire. But if they were collected he does not acquire unless he moves.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:12

HALAKHAH: “ “I am ḥerem for you”, etc. ‘A qônām that I shall not have any usufruct from you and anyone I would ask about you’, he has to ask about the first but not the second. Some Tannaïm state: He has to ask both about the first and the second. Samuel the son of Rebbi Joseph ben Rebbi Abun said, that follows the one who said “after the prohibition”. But for the one who said “after the vow”, a vow which is partially invalid is totally invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 5:21

“Rabbi Joḥanan said, it is obvious that this one was learned.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is what happened: Jonathan ben Uzziel’s father vowed not to let him have any usufruct from him and in his will gave his part to Shammai. What did Shammai do? He sold some, gave some to the sacred fund, gave him the remainder as a gift, and said: He who wants to attack this gift, let him first get back [the merchandise] from the buyers and from the sacred fund; after that he can get [the remainder] back from this one.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:4

May one who made a vow not to have anything cooked be permitted smoked? May he be permitted fried? May he be permitted anything cooked in the hot springs of Tiberias? The rabbis of Caesarea asked: Is anything smoked forbidden because of Gentile cooking? Is it forbidden because of cooking on the Sabbath? Is it forbidden because of meat and milk? Does it cause ṭevel for tithes? If somebody made a vow not to have anything smoked, is he permitted cooked? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of the House of Rav Assi: Ḥabiṣ is unproblematic as Gentile cooking and is acceptable as eruv tavšīlīn. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Huna: Anything which can be eaten raw is unproblematic as Gentile cooking and is acceptable as eruv tavšīlīn.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:33

“When they sanctified the year at Usha, on the first day Rebbi Ismael, the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Baroqa, led and recited following the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, we did not follow this at Jabneh. On the second day, Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Yose the Galilean led and recited following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, this we did follow at Jabneh.” But does this not mean that they sanctified it on the first and the second day? Rebbi Zeїra in the name of Rav Ḥisda: That year was disorganized. What is “the first, the second”? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav: The first year, the second year! But was it not stated: the first day, the second day?

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 6:38

Rebbi Hoshaia, when he received witnesses at Kallirhoë, used to say to them: You should know the importance of the testimony that comes from your mouth, how much rent money depends on your mouths. Rebbi Abuna said, if it is so, it is even a matter of criminal law. If somebody sleeps with a girl three years and one day old, he is stoned. The Court decided to lengthen, if he sleeps with her he is not stoned. Rebbi Abun said: “I am calling to Almighty God, to the God who decides with me.” If a girl is three years and one day old, if the Court decided to lengthen, her hymen repairs itself, otherwise it does not repair itself.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 7:11

HALAKHAH: “One who made a vow to abstain from garments,” etc. One who made a vow to abstain from clothing is permitted sack-cloth, carpet, and goat’s hair cloth, leather apron, and bandages. He is forbidden fascia and belt. One who vows to abstain from clothing is forbidden all kinds of clothing but permitted these. Rebbi Jeremiah said, Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: If one said, a qônām, that I shall not wear a garment, that I shall not cover myself with clothing? Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, if he said, a qônām for anything that is generally used to cover oneself and a derivative of it is generally used to cover oneself; generally he is permitted the derivative; if he made a vow to abstain from the derivative he is permitted the material itself. What is an example? For example, sheepskin. For anything that is generally used to cover oneself but no derivative of it is generally used to cover oneself; if he vowed about it, he is permitted the derivative; if he made a vow to abstain from the derivative he is forbidden the material itself. What is an example? For example, goatskin. And anything that is generally not used to cover oneself but a derivative of it is generally used to cover oneself; if he vowed about it, he intended only the derivative. What is an example? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, for example raw cotton.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 7:19

HALAKHAH: “One who vows not to use a town,” etc. From where that the suburbs of a town are like the town? It is written, “it happened when Joshua was in Jericho.” How could he have been in Jericho? Is it not written that “Jericho was closed and besieged,” and you say so? Rebbi Judan bar Shalom said, he was in a suburb. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: It happened in Jericho.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:30

May one appoint Elders for selected topics? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi appointed Rav to invalidate vows and to see stains. After his death, [Rav] asked his son for [permission to see] defects of firstlings. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he gave him everything: To sit in judgment alone, to invalidate vows, to see stains, and to see outside blemishes. After his death, [Rav] asked his son for [permission to see] hidden defects. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Even though you say, one appoints Elders for selected topics, only if he is competent for everything. As the following: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi ordained all his students, but he was sorry about one who had a defect in his eye and he could not ordain him; so he ordained him for selected topics. That implies that one who is competent in one thing has to be competent in everything, and one who is not competent in everything cannot be declared competent in one thing.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 10:32

May one permit wearing a coat? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One permits wearing a coat. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi permitted wearing a coat. Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: At a place where one does not wear a toga. Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, for easy vows.

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:3

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the husband dissolves both vows and oaths. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he dissolves vows but not oaths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish also disagree about the vows submitted to the Elder. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Elder permits both vows and oaths. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Elder permits vows, the Elder does not permit oaths. That of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish parallels that of Issi (Assi). A person came before Rebbi Yasa to have his vow permitted. He asked him, what did you swear? He answered, ὢ πόποι Israel, that she should not enter my house. He said to him, ὢ πόποι Israel, she shall not enter your house!

Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim 11:8

We understand “if I wash”. “If I do not wash”? Let her wash! Rebbi Mana said, if she said: “Any benefit from me shall be qônām for you after I shall have washed myself, if I ever wash myself.” Why should he not dissolve for her? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, only when she said, “any benefit from my body shall be qônām for you after I shall have washed myself.” Why can he not force? Did not Rebbi Huna say, [if she vowed] any benefit from me [shall be forbidden] to you, he forces her and sleeps with her. Any benefit from you [shall be forbidden] to me, he has to dissolve. There is a difference because it is a benefit for him and her. Rebbi Abba Mari said, If I wash [today], I shall not wash forever. If I wear jewellery [today], I shall not wear jewellery forever. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Nasa: If I wash I shall not wear jewellery; if I wear jewellery I shall not wash.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 1:4

“I shall be”. Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: When he saw nezirim pass by. If he said “beautiful”, what is the rule? Does he ridicule them or [does he mean] “I shall be like them”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Samuel: Certainly, I shall be like them.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 1:12

“I am a nazir and a nazir;” he is two times a nazir, for he could have said, “ “I am a nazir.” “I am a nazir,nazir,” two. “I am a nazir, once, and repeated,” he is four times a nazir. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, “as they”, eight. “Like they,” sixteen. Following Symmachos: “Tetragon, four; trigon, three; digon, two.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 1:13

“I am” is a handle for nezirut, “I am obligated” is a handle for qorban. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah: one catches him because of a handle for qorbān. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, if he said, I shall not eat from you, does one catch him because of a handle of an oath? Rebbi Yose said, people usually say “an oath that I shall not eat from yours;” do they ever say “that I shall not eat from yours, an oath”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, people usually say “handle of an axe”; do they ever say “axe of a handle”?

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 1:14

“I did not vow as a nazir,” he is permitted. “I already had been a nazir,” he is forbidden. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Avina, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If somebody says, I am like ‘orlah juice, he did not say anything. The colleagues say, that follows Rebbi Simeon in a disagreement. As we have stated there: “If somebody said, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate carcass or torn meat, abominations or crawling things, he is guilty. But Rebbi Simeon declares him free from prosecution.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if it is an inclusive statement. But if it is a detailed statement, everybody agrees that no oath can be applied to prohibitions. And here, we consider an inclusive statement. Rebbi Yudan said, one is about vows, the other about oaths. Vows can be applied to prohibitions but no oaths can be applied to prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 1:21

HALAKHAH: “An unspecified nezirut is for thirty days,” etc. Bar Qappara said “ιʼεʼιʼεʼ” is thirty. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: Corresponding to the 29 times that in the Chapter about the nazir in the Torah is written “vow, nazir, to vow as nazir”. Are they not 30? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one has to be removed for its definition. In the opinion of Bar Qappara, if he shaved on the 30th day, he did not fulfill his obligation. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he shaved on the 30th day, he fulfilled his obligation. Some want to understand it from here: “To let his head’s hair grow wildly.” How much is a hair growth? 30 days. Some want to understand it from here: “She shall cry for her father and her mother the days of a month.” Since “days” mentioned there are 30, so also “days” mentioned here. Some want to understand it from here: “The prior days shall fall, for his nezirut is impure.” The days which became permitted, which Moses and his court had permitted, and that is no less than 30 days. Some want to understand it from here: “Until the days are fulfilled”. How much are full days? 30 days. Then if he shaved on the 30th day, he did not fulfill his obligation! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, “days” are written defectively יָמִם, with a letter י missing.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 1:26

Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav: If somebody sets a term to his state of nazir, one does not allow him to shave. And it was stated thus: “I am a nazir all my days, I am a nazir in perpetuity; 100 years, or 200 years, he is not a nazir in perpetuity.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 2:25

HALAKHAH: “If his wife had a miscarriage,” etc. Should one not be afraid that he might have been viable? Rebbi Joḥanan said, [the Mishnah] is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, any doubt of nezirut is permitted. It was said to him that Rebbi Jehudah said so only for the end; but for the start even Rebbi Jehudah will agree. What is beginning and what is end? Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbu Abun said: Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac disagreed: Everybody agrees that “I do not know whether I made a vow of nazir or not,” is at the beginning, “whether it was for 30 or 50 days”, is at the end. Where do they disagree? If it was once or twice. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba considered it the end, Rebbi Samuel considered it the beginning. Rebbi Mana: The problem for Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac about one or two times is whether it is the beginning or the end.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 3:5

HALAKHAH: “If somebody vowed two neziriot,” etc. If he finished his first period of nezirut and started to lean on the second, when they did not find an opening for the first while they found an opening for the second, the second can be used for the first. Where do we hold? If he said, “I am a nazir twice,” a vow which is partially annulled is totally annulled. If he said, “I am a nazir for these 30 days and those 30 days,” in this case the second cannot be used for the first. But we must hold that he said, “I am a nazir and nazir.” If he said, “these are for nezirut.” But if he said, “these are for my nezirut; those are for the other nezirut,” in this case the second cannot be used for the first. Rebbi Eleazar said, if he finished the first nezirut, as soon as he brought a sacrifice and shaved, the first is credited for the second. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa commanded the colleagues: If you hear anything formulated by Rebbi Eleazar, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees: not unless he brings all his sacrifices, following the rabbis; but following Rebbi Simeon even if he brings only one sacrifice. If he dedicated both together, he has only one in his hand. If he dedicated each of them separately or brought each of them for the other, he did not acquit himself [of his obligation]. This means that as far as holiness goes, they became holy. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “His sacrifice to the Eternal for his nezirut,” i. e., that his vow of nazir should precede his sacrifice, rather than that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir. It is different, because he still is in nezirut. One understands the second for the first. The first for the second? Rebbi Jehudah said, this supports Rebbi Eleazar. But did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa command the colleagues: If you hear anything formulated by Rebbi Eleazar, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees; not unless he brings all his sacrifices. They wanted to say, following the rabbis. But here, we hold with Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Explain it for his nezirut and the nezirut he pledged for his son. In that, the second can be used for the first. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, did we not argue about one who said, “I am a nazir”? He really should be a nazir only once. You were severe with him and obligated him to be a nazir twice. Is it not enough that you were severe with him and obligated him to be a nazir twice, that now you say, he has nothing in his hands?

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 3:16

Rebbi Yose said, what is his problem? Of a pure nazir. But for an impure nazir, it is obvious to him that they cannot be combined. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: Is that not an argument of “so much more”? Since for days which are counted neither for his nor for his son’s nezirut, you say that they are combined, days which are counted for his and for his son’s nezirut, it would only be logical that they should be combined! Rebbi Mana said, there he is not in a state to receive a warning, but here he is in a state to receive a warning. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Since you say there about Rebbi Eliezer, at the start only if he has something to omit; at the end even if he has nothing to omit? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is that not a Mishnah? “If he became impure on day 101, he invalidated 30; Rebbi Eliezer said, he invalidated only seven.” He said, we hear that he invalidates; did we hear that he brings a sacrifice?

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 3:18

HALAKHAH: “If somebody vowed,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph and Rebbi Joḥanan disagreed. One said, Rebbi Jehudah follows the House of Shammai. But the other said, Rebbi Jehudah thinks that she never became impure. If you say, Rebbi Jehudah follows the House of Shammai, should he not have stated 30 days and forteen years? One does not state months while reporting years.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 3:20

HALAKHAH: “If two groups of witnesses,” etc. Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that five contains two, and that he has to be a nazir for two periods. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that the testimonies contradict one another and there is no nezirut. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four, five. Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent in what he said, since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that refer [to] the facts, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Eliezer concedes in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to that of her companion. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:20

It was stated: They need neither bread nor foreleg. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Do well-being sacrifices which are brought after death need bread? He turned around and said, is it not the same during his lifetime, do they not come for nothing? You say, they need bread, and here they need bread. Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya that well-being sacrifices which are brought after dissolution do not need bread. What is the difference between death and dissolution? In the case of death, they already were prepared to need bread; In the case of dissolution, they never were prepared to need bread. It was stated: There is a reparation sacrifice after dissolution; there is no reparation sacrifice after death. If she died, her reparation sacrifice is not offered, since there is no reparation sacrifice after death. If he dissolved for her, her reparation sacrifice is offered since that reparation sacrifice does not come for nothing.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:20

It was stated: They need neither bread nor foreleg. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Do well-being sacrifices which are brought after death need bread? He turned around and said, is it not the same during his lifetime, do they not come for nothing? You say, they need bread, and here they need bread. Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya that well-being sacrifices which are brought after dissolution do not need bread. What is the difference between death and dissolution? In the case of death, they already were prepared to need bread; In the case of dissolution, they never were prepared to need bread. It was stated: There is a reparation sacrifice after dissolution; there is no reparation sacrifice after death. If she died, her reparation sacrifice is not offered, since there is no reparation sacrifice after death. If he dissolved for her, her reparation sacrifice is offered since that reparation sacrifice does not come for nothing.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:22

Rav Ḥisda said, a nazir’s leftover bread shall be left to decay. Rebbi Yose said, that is correct. You cannot sacrifice it by itself since (reparation sacrifices) cannot be brought alone. You cannot sacrifice it together with another nazir’s since no nazir sacrifices without bread. Therefore, it was necessary to say that a nazir’s leftover bread shall be left to decay. They wanted to say, the same rule applies to his leftover bread as to his leftover wine offering. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, his leftover wine offering is most holy; it should be given to donation accounts. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, Samuel, Rav Ḥisda, and Rebbi Eleazar, all three said the same. Rav Ḥisda, as quoted here. Samuel, as Rebbi Yasa said, when I still was there, I heard the voice of Rav Jehudah asking our teacher Samuel: If he designated his sheqel and died? He said, it should be given as donation. The leftover of his tenth of an epha: Rebbi Joḥanan said, he should bring it to the Dead Sea; Rebbi Eleazar said, it should be given as donation.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:22

Rav Ḥisda said, a nazir’s leftover bread shall be left to decay. Rebbi Yose said, that is correct. You cannot sacrifice it by itself since (reparation sacrifices) cannot be brought alone. You cannot sacrifice it together with another nazir’s since no nazir sacrifices without bread. Therefore, it was necessary to say that a nazir’s leftover bread shall be left to decay. They wanted to say, the same rule applies to his leftover bread as to his leftover wine offering. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, his leftover wine offering is most holy; it should be given to donation accounts. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, Samuel, Rav Ḥisda, and Rebbi Eleazar, all three said the same. Rav Ḥisda, as quoted here. Samuel, as Rebbi Yasa said, when I still was there, I heard the voice of Rav Jehudah asking our teacher Samuel: If he designated his sheqel and died? He said, it should be given as donation. The leftover of his tenth of an epha: Rebbi Joḥanan said, he should bring it to the Dead Sea; Rebbi Eleazar said, it should be given as donation.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:24

An animal is not subject to the rules of the non-designated at the beginning, but it is subject to the rules of the non-designated at the end. Money is subject to the rules of the non-designated at the beginning, but it is not subject to the rules of the non-designated at the end. Money is subject to the rules of the non-designated at the beginning, as we have stated: “If he had money not designated, it should be given as donation.” An animal is subject to the rules of the non-designated at the end, as we have stated: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if he brought three animals but did not explain.” They are subject to the rules of the non-designated at the beginning, as we have stated: “ ‘These are for my purification offering, the remainder is for the rest of my nezirut’, when he died. One commits larceny about all but one cannot commit larceny about a part.” It is not subject to the rules of the non-designated at the end, when he brought money and redeemed it for an animal. If he designated a donkey, it is as if he designated money. If he designated an ox, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Ḥiyya ben Julianus, both speak in Shammai’s name. One says, he is like one who designates money; the other says, he is like one who designates an animal.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:26

HALAKHAH: “If one of the bloods was sprinkled for her,” etc. He dissolves for her because of her hair. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It is a decision of Scripture: “He dissolved her vows,” he dissolves what is on her. Whenever he dissolves her vow, he dissolves what is on her. Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion, after she was transferred from the prohibition to the positive commandment. The rabbis say, “afterwards, the nazir shall drink wine,” after all these actions. Rebbi Simeon says, even after a single action. Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi (Bevai). “When has this been said? If she shaves in purity. But if she shaves in impurity, he may dissolve since he can say, I cannot stand an unseemly wife.” Therefore, shaving in purity does not make her unseemly. Who holds that shaving does not make unseemly? Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, even Rebbi thinks so: “Rebbi says, he may dissolve even if she shaves [in purity], since he can say, I cannot stand a shorn wife.” Should he not say, I cannot stand an unseemly and shorn wife? Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi (Jehudah) said that only for the purification sacrifice, since a purification sacrifice would be invalid if not in her name. That means, as long as it is alive it is surrendered to Heaven only by slaughter.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 4:26

HALAKHAH: “If one of the bloods was sprinkled for her,” etc. He dissolves for her because of her hair. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It is a decision of Scripture: “He dissolved her vows,” he dissolves what is on her. Whenever he dissolves her vow, he dissolves what is on her. Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion, after she was transferred from the prohibition to the positive commandment. The rabbis say, “afterwards, the nazir shall drink wine,” after all these actions. Rebbi Simeon says, even after a single action. Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi (Bevai). “When has this been said? If she shaves in purity. But if she shaves in impurity, he may dissolve since he can say, I cannot stand an unseemly wife.” Therefore, shaving in purity does not make her unseemly. Who holds that shaving does not make unseemly? Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, even Rebbi thinks so: “Rebbi says, he may dissolve even if she shaves [in purity], since he can say, I cannot stand a shorn wife.” Should he not say, I cannot stand an unseemly and shorn wife? Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi (Jehudah) said that only for the purification sacrifice, since a purification sacrifice would be invalid if not in her name. That means, as long as it is alive it is surrendered to Heaven only by slaughter.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 5:9

There, we have stated: “The public sale of orphans’ property goes on for 30 days, the public sale of Temple property goes on for 30 days, and they are publicly announed mornings and evenings.” Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Eliezer is afraid of trickery, Rebbi Joshua is not afraid of trickery. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai and Rebbi Joshua the House of Hillel. Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say, a person may ask about his dedication; could he say that he does not have to vow usufruct? Rebbi Joshua follows the House of Hillel, since the House of Hillel say, a person may not ask about his dedication; could he say that he has to vow usufruct? In any case, could not a man ask about his vow of usufruct? Rebbi Joshua agrees that a guarantor must execute a vow of usufruct. What does Rebbi Joshua say about a gift? Since he gives voluntarily, he does not have to vow usufruct, or since [the recipient’s] power is small and [the donor] may change his mind, does he have to vow usufruct? Let us hear from the following: The husband of a relative of Rebbi Ḥaggai owed on a document. The creditor came and foreclosed. The case came before Rebbi Aḥa, who said, he owes a vow of usufruct. Rebbi Yose said, he does not have to vow usufruct. The colleagues said before Rebbi Aḥa [and] Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Aḥa say it correctly? Since if he takes her back, does not the creditor come and foreclose? Rebbi Yose said to them, she turns it into jewelry or keeps it as additions to her dowry. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, by Moses! Rebbi Yose says it correctly. It was executed following Rebbi Aḥa.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 5:10

There, you say: “It shall leave and graze with the herd.” And here, you say so? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there he asked about his vow of nazir. Because of the vow of nazir did his sacrifices become profane.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:7

Rebbi [Yose] said to the colleagues: You should know that Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree: If somebody split a limb from a living animal and ate it, everybody agrees that he is free from prosecution. Where do they disagree? If he split it in his mouth before he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan considers his mouth as inside, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish considers his mouth as outside. They asked him, what do you say? He answered them, I informed you that mighty mountains disagree, and you ask this? If it is so, even if he split it outside and then ate, he should be guilty! Why? That is how one eats. If somebody split an ant in his mouth and ate it, that is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Maisha asked Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he split a grape in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered, there it is something for which there is a prohibition and impurity. In a circumstance in which its impurity disappeard, its prohibition disappeared. But here is a prohibition and no impurity. Rebbi Abba ben Rebbi Mamal asked: If he split an olive-sized bit of mazzah in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, in the other cases, his palate did not enjoy an olive sized bit. The rabbis of Caesarea said that Rebbi Nisa asked: If he split in his mouth pomegranate berries which are ‘orlah and ate them, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Where do we hold? If because of fluids, we already did state: “Nothing makes impure as a drink except what comes from olives and grapes.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it if he swallowed them.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:11

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Ḥiya bar Yosef objected before Rebbi Joḥanan: Take, for example, meat in milk, where he did not taste the forbidden thing itself and you say that he is whipped! He accepted that. What is meant by: he accepted that? Rebbi Ḥiya bar Abun said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Like a person who listens to the argument of the opposing party he accepted it.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:19

What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? If one ate half the volume of an olive of seeds and peels from one grape berry, in Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah’s opinion he is guilty, in the rabbis’ opinion he is not prosecutable. What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? If he ate the volume of an olive of peels and seeds from two grape berries, in Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah’s opinion he is guilty only once, in the rabbis’ opinion he is guilty twice. Rebbi Abun said, it turns out that Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah holds with Rebbi Jehudah, if he ate the volume of an olive of two זגים and their חרצנים?

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:24

You say about a pure nazir that most of his hair hinders him. If he shaved a third but did not manage to finish until everything grew again: Is it sufficient that he shave the remainder or does he have to shave everything? You say about an impure nazir that two hairs hinder or two hairs make him start again. Similarly, for a pure nazir, do two hairs hinder him or two hairs make him start again? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, so it is, and it was stated: “Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah said in the name of Rebbi Simeon, just as two hairs hinder him, so two hairs cause him to start again.”

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:44

Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav: He puts it into the sauce. What is the reason? “He puts it into the fire,” the sacrifice also into the fire.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 6:56

HALAKHAH: Is it counted for him and his shaving? If you would say that it is not counted for him and his shaving, then his sacrifices count for nothing. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Following Rebbi Simeon, may he shave for his holiday well-being offerings? Is that not the Mishnah? “Rebbi Simeon says, that sacrifice is not counted for him but the others are counted for him.” When he slaughtered them are they not like voluntary well-being offerings? This means that he may shave for voluntary well-being offerings following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, Rav Ada bar Aḥawa and Rebbi Joḥanan. For Rav Ada bar Aḥawa it is problematic, but for Rebbi Joḥanan it is obvious.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:42

Rebbi Illa said: He himself, who touched the corpse, is guilty. He said it and gave its reason: “who became impure,” that refers to the impurity of a human. But is there not a third? As Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, for impurity of a person from a person a man is guilty for impurity in the Sanctuary. They objected: If objects touch the corpse, a human the objects, and objects the human. For impurity of a person from a person, not for impurity of a person from objects. Rebbi Zeriqa in the name of Rav Hamnuna: The Tanna there disagrees with Rebbi Illa: “For an object made half of cement־earth and half of dung one is not guilty for coming to the Sanctuary” Because it is half of earth and half of dung; but if it were totally of earth, one would be guilty. Who is guilty? Not the one who touches it? Is he not the second who touches the first? Rebbi Phineas said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he threw it. He answered him, about him who threw it we stated: For washing his body he is subject to extirpation, for washing his garments to the forty. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yose, do we not have the Mishnah in support of that first Tanna, as is stated: “Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Joshua: For any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary, but for any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary.” For the first, for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary; for the second, for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is needed from what comes from the corpse: For a quartarius of blood or a quarter qab of bones, for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary; for half a log of blood and half a qab of bones, for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary. Rebbi Jeremiah said, we were of the opinion that they disagree about a sacrifice, but one whips even the third, even the fourth. Rebbi Yose from Sidon stated before Rebbi Jeremiah in opposition to Rebbi Jeremiah: “For any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary, but for any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Yannai, Rebbi Joḥanan: It is needed from what comes from the corpse: For a quartarius of blood or a quarter qab of bones, for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty; for half a log of blood and half a qab of bones, for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 7:42

Rebbi Illa said: He himself, who touched the corpse, is guilty. He said it and gave its reason: “who became impure,” that refers to the impurity of a human. But is there not a third? As Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, for impurity of a person from a person a man is guilty for impurity in the Sanctuary. They objected: If objects touch the corpse, a human the objects, and objects the human. For impurity of a person from a person, not for impurity of a person from objects. Rebbi Zeriqa in the name of Rav Hamnuna: The Tanna there disagrees with Rebbi Illa: “For an object made half of cement־earth and half of dung one is not guilty for coming to the Sanctuary” Because it is half of earth and half of dung; but if it were totally of earth, one would be guilty. Who is guilty? Not the one who touches it? Is he not the second who touches the first? Rebbi Phineas said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he threw it. He answered him, about him who threw it we stated: For washing his body he is subject to extirpation, for washing his garments to the forty. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yose, do we not have the Mishnah in support of that first Tanna, as is stated: “Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Joshua: For any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary, but for any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary.” For the first, for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary; for the second, for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is needed from what comes from the corpse: For a quartarius of blood or a quarter qab of bones, for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary; for half a log of blood and half a qab of bones, for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary. Rebbi Jeremiah said, we were of the opinion that they disagree about a sacrifice, but one whips even the third, even the fourth. Rebbi Yose from Sidon stated before Rebbi Jeremiah in opposition to Rebbi Jeremiah: “For any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary, but for any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Yannai, Rebbi Joḥanan: It is needed from what comes from the corpse: For a quartarius of blood or a quarter qab of bones, for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty; for half a log of blood and half a qab of bones, for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:13

If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:14

“What is a grave of the abyss? A corpse buried in stubble, straw, dust, or pebbles. But if it was buried in water, a dark spot, or rock crevasses, it does not create a grave of the abyss.” The principle: Any place from where it can be removed creates a grave of the abyss; any place from where it cannot be removed does not create a grave of the abyss. Can stubbles and straw not be removed? Does the Mishnah not follow Rebbi Yose, since Rebbi Yose said, straw said to be disregarded is disregarded. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: It is everybody’s opinion. What Rebbi Yose said, if he mixed it with dust. “There is straw which is treated like dust and dust which is treated like straw. Straw not to be removed is like dust; dust to be removed is like straw.” In the House of Rebbi Yannai they said: If he covered it with mats it is disregarded. Come and see: If he [filled] it with mats it is not disregarded, if he covered it with mats it is disregarded. If he filled it with branches of date palms it is problematic. Rebbi Zeriqan, Rebbi Immi, in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Even thin sheets.

Jerusalem Talmud Nazir 9:17

Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said that Bar Piqa asked Rebbi: So far in a cave that had a ceiling. Even in a cave without ceiling? Does Bar Piqa think that if there is a doubt regarding floating impurity, it is pure? Rebbi told him, Bar Piqa remains in his stupidity: No case of doubt regarding floating impurity is declared pure except a reptile; but a corpse is like something fixed in place. As it was stated: “Anything thrown is pure in case of a doubt except an olive-sized piece from a corpse, [and] also those covers which induce impurity on bottom and top.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:2

HALAKHAH: “Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from overseas,” etc. This is difficult. If somebody brings a gift document from overseas,would you require him to say, it was written and signed before me? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce. Rebbi Joḥanan said, that is a leniency lest she sit abandoned. Is that a leniency? It is only a restriction, for if he does not say to her, it was written and signed before me, you do not permit her to remarry. Rebbi Yose said, the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was written and signed before me, makes it easy for her at the end. For if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void. Rebbi Mana wanted to say, a protest other than the text of the bill. But is a protest about the text of the bill a protest which has no validity? Even for a protest which has validity, said Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, since you say that the reason for the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was signed before me, is to make it easy for her at the end, that if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void; this means that there is no difference whether it is a protest not about the text of the bill or about the body of the bill, a protest which has no validity, or a protest which does have validity! But should you worry that maybe be gave the bill to disqualified witnesses to sign? Rebbi Abun said, he is not suspect to damage her before Heaven. Before the court he is suspect to damage her. But since he knows that if he comes and protests his protest is void, he will choose qualified witnesses to sign.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:2

HALAKHAH: “Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from overseas,” etc. This is difficult. If somebody brings a gift document from overseas,would you require him to say, it was written and signed before me? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce. Rebbi Joḥanan said, that is a leniency lest she sit abandoned. Is that a leniency? It is only a restriction, for if he does not say to her, it was written and signed before me, you do not permit her to remarry. Rebbi Yose said, the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was written and signed before me, makes it easy for her at the end. For if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void. Rebbi Mana wanted to say, a protest other than the text of the bill. But is a protest about the text of the bill a protest which has no validity? Even for a protest which has validity, said Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, since you say that the reason for the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was signed before me, is to make it easy for her at the end, that if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void; this means that there is no difference whether it is a protest not about the text of the bill or about the body of the bill, a protest which has no validity, or a protest which does have validity! But should you worry that maybe be gave the bill to disqualified witnesses to sign? Rebbi Abun said, he is not suspect to damage her before Heaven. Before the court he is suspect to damage her. But since he knows that if he comes and protests his protest is void, he will choose qualified witnesses to sign.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:4

Only if he says, it was written before me during the day and signed during the day; only if he says, it was written before me especially for her and signed expressly for her. It was asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does he have to know the names of the witnesses at the moment of their signing? He said to them, did the Gentiles Luciani sign it? And you say so? A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “All bills of divorce coming from overseas are valid even if their names sound Gentile since Jews outside the Land of Israel bear Gentile names.” He said only, outside the Land; therefore not in the Land of Israel. What about this? Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Issi: unless he writes, at a Jewish place. If there is no Jewish place, in the synagogue. If there is no synagogue, he assembles there ten people. Rebbi Abun said, it would be better to certify the signatures than to assemble there ten people. What about this? Even in a Jewish store.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 1:7

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Abba bar Ḥana: Two who brought a bill of divorce do not have to declare: It was written before us and signed before us. Rebbi Yose ben Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They have to. He himself who brought the bill of divorce does not have to deliver the bill in the presence of two [witnesses] in order to declare her a divorcee in the presence of two. “If he gave her the bill, took it from her, and threw it into the sea or into a river. If later he says to her that it was an empty papyrus or a paid bond, he cannot be believed to disqualify her.” Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he cannot disqualify her, who can? He said to him, since she was declared a divorcee in the presence of two [witnesses], he cannot be believed to disqualify her. If he gave her a bill of divorce which was found to be invalid, they forced him to give her a replacement. This case came before the rabbis and they declared it valid. Did we not say, he cannot be believed to disqualify her? There, the flaw was not proved; here the flaw was proved. As the following: Ḥinena, the son of Rebbi Asi, was a medical doctor and threw a bill of divorce to his wife. She cried. Her neighbor came, grabbed it from her, and gave her an empty papyrus. The case came before the rabbis and they took it into account. But did not Rebbi Yasa say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If the designation was checked and found to be based on [the testimony of] women or children, the designation is invalid? There, the designation was not mentioned. But here the name “bill of divorce” was mentioned. And some want to say, if he asserted that it was a valid bill of divorce, but she cried, her neighbor came, grabbed it from her, and gave her an empty papyrus.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:4

Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Abun asked: If he said “it was written and one witness signed before me,” and two testify about the signature of the second witness. Rebbi Immi the Babylonian said, nothing can be more valid than this. Rebbi Abba did not say so but: If he said “it was written and one witness signed before me, and I am the second witness.” He is like a party interested in his testimony.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:14

“This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give it to me,” is invalid. “On condition that you return it to me,” is valid. Is that not the prior case? Rebbi Yose said, after you went to court. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, “after you have acquired all the rights for which it was made, return it to me.” Similar to that: Etrogim were scarce over there. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob gave an etrog to his son and said to him, if you have acquired it and fulfilled its obligation, return it to me.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:27

HALAKHAH: “Also those women who cannot be believed if they say that [a woman’s] husband died,” etc. Would you believe her if it was written but not signed [in her presence]? If she did not say ‘it was written in my presence, it was signed in my presence’, would you permit her to remarry? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that parallels what Rebbi Abun said, he is not suspect to damage her before Heaven. Before the court he is suspect to damage her. But since he knows that if he comes and protests, his protest is void, he will choose qualified witnesses to sign.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 2:27

HALAKHAH: “Also those women who cannot be believed if they say that [a woman’s] husband died,” etc. Would you believe her if it was written but not signed [in her presence]? If she did not say ‘it was written in my presence, it was signed in my presence’, would you permit her to remarry? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that parallels what Rebbi Abun said, he is not suspect to damage her before Heaven. Before the court he is suspect to damage her. But since he knows that if he comes and protests, his protest is void, he will choose qualified witnesses to sign.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:6

Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 3:9

What is “the good order”? Rebbi Sabbatai in the name of Ḥizqiah: Because of the good order of Jewish women, lest they frequently be divorced. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac asked Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: It is valid, and you say so? If it were invalid, then [the explanation] would be acceptable. Rebbi Abun said, for the good order of the scribe, that his livelihood be guaranteed.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:8

There, we have stated: “One writes a bill of divorce for a man even if his wife is not with him, and a receipt for a woman even if her husband is not with her, and the husband pays the fee.” Rebbi Abba said, he has to know both of them. Rebbi La said, he has to know the husband for the bill of divorce and the wife for her receipt. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi [ ]: Think of it, if he brought another woman and divorced by means of her. He said to him, let the witnesses come and testify. But did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say that they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been cross-examined in court? There, if they said, we did not sign at all. But here if they say, we signed this but not that. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Abba: “In earlier times, his name and her name and the names of his and her towns could change.” If he knows them, why would he change their names? There are people who know others by sight but do not know their names. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Ilai: “Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that one should write Mr. X and all his names, Mrs. Y and all her names, because of the public good.” The Mishnah about one who is forced to divorce, Rebbi Ila speaks about one who divorces on his initiative; some want to say if he divorces at another place.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:18

If [the master] blinded [the slave’s] two eyes simultaneously, or broke two of his teeth simultaneously, the slave thereby obtains his freedom. One after the other, he obtains his freedom from the first [injury] and [the master] has to pay for the second. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Following the opinion that [the master] does not have to write a bill of manumission for him. But following the opinion that [the master] has to write a bill of manumission for him, can you say that he has to pay him? Not only does this apply to one who gains his freedom for a tooth or an eye, from where also that he may gain his freedom by a cap, or הרנירק טיאונוס, or the king’s freedom? The verse says, “he shall send him to freedom”, in any way. What is the status of his children? The children of him who leaves for a tooth or an eye are slaves, the children of him who leaves by the loss of hope are free. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is unreasonable; it is the other way around. The children of one who leaves for a tooth or an eye are free because the Torah freed him. The children of one who leaves by the loss of hope are slaves because the Torah did not free him.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:10

If there is only best quality, one collects from the best quality, [only] average quality one collects from average quality, [only] worst quality one collects from worst quality. Best and average, torts are assessed from best quality, creditors and a woman’s ketubah from average. Average and worst, torts and creditors are assessed from average, a woman’s ketubah from worst. If his best quality was like everybody’s best quality, it is best quality. If his average quality was like everybody’s average quality, it is average quality. If his worst quality was like everybody’s worst quality, it is worst quality. If his best quality was like everybody’s average? Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Ila asked: Let us hear from the following: Average and worst, torts and creditors are assessed from average, a woman’s ketubah from worst. But just as you need in the case that you have best and average quality, torts push creditors to the average, so in this case, of average and worst quality, should not torts push creditors to the worst quality? Rebbi Yose bar Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: Explain it that he had best quality which he sold, and the creditors were already pushed to average quality.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:13

HALAKHAH: “One cannot collect for usufruct,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only a document on which interest is due, and some say, also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Yannai said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattaniah said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, it depends on the collection. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should be eager to marry her. Some say, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated: If the son took his father’s place, one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there about an adult orphan, here about an underage orphan.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:16

If [Reuben] robbed a field from Simeon and sold it to Levi, then Simeon came and foreclosed it from Levi; then Levi collects from Reuben’s encumbered property and Simeon collects the usufruct from Levi’s free property. If Levi in the meantime improved [the property], Levi collects the capital from Reuben’s encumbered property and the improvement from Simeon’s free property. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan said, only if a third party’s buying preceded the improvement by this one. But if the improvement by this one preceded a third party’s buying, Levi can collect the capital even from Simeon’s encumbered property. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan said: With usufruct one proceeds in the same way. If he spent four denars and the improvement is worth six, Levi collects four denars from Reuben’s encumbered property and another two from Simeon’s free property. Rebbi Abin in the name of the rabbis there: Since he did not enter with permission, his hand is weak against Simeon. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of the rabbis there: Since he entered with permission, his hand is strong against Reuben.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:44

Rav said, I was of the voters. There is no difference between a quarter in real estate or a quarter in money. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, real estate for a denar a γραμμάριον, in money a quarter is a tremis.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:52

Following the opinion of the rabbis there it is acceptable since there, they say in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: One to whom one gives a nut and he throws it away, a pebble and he keeps it, what is found in his hand is as if found on a garbage heap; a nut and he keeps it, a pebble and he throws it away, what is robbed from him is robbed because of communal peace; a nut or a pebble he takes, hides them, and produces them later, what is robbed from him is total robbery. He can acquire for himself but not for others. Rav Huna said, just as he can acquire for himself so he can acquire for others. Everybody agrees that his gift is not a gift since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “If a man give.” The gift of a man is a gift, but the gift of a minor is no gift, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, robbing from him is not clear unless he grew two pubic hairs. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that is, to recover from him by a law suit, but to have to bring a sacrifice for [a false] oath only if he grew two pubic hairs. But following the rabbis here, Rebbi Yose asked that even for himself he should not be able to acquire since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “A man to his neighbor”, until he be like his neighbor. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac explained it by the method of the artless. As we have stated there: “For underage children, their buying is buying and their selling selling, for movables.” But did we not state there: “He cannot make them acquire through his minor son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is like his hand.” The rabbis of Caesarea say, here a minor with knowledge, there a minor without knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:8

If [the husband] said to [another person]: Bring my wife’s bill of divorce, or her daughter’s, or her sister’s, then he went and delivered it to her, it is no divorce. But if [the other] said: Give a bill of divorce to his wife, and [the husband] said, here is my wife’s bill of divorce, or her daughter’s, or her sister’s, and he went and gave it to her, it is a divorce. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Avin in the name of Rebbi Shammai: These are Rebbi’s words. But the Sages say, only if she says, it should be mine in your hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody had an attack of seizures”, etc. The symptoms of an insane person: One who goes out in the night, stays overnight in a graveyard, tears his clothing, and destroys what one gives to him. Rebbi Huna said, only if all of that is in him since otherwise I say that one who goes out in the night is a man-dog; he who stays overnight in a graveyard burns incense to spirits, he who tears up his clothing is [a choleric person], and he who destroys what one gives to him is a Cynic. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even only one of these symptoms is proof. Rebbi Abun said, what Rebbi Joḥanan said, even only one of these by itself is reasonable for him who destroys what one gives to him; even the greatest idiot does not destroy all one gives to him. The one attacked by seizures does not exhibit any of these signs. What is one attacked by seizures? Rebbi Yose said, a decrepit one. There came a case before Rebbi Yose of a weaver who, when one gave him red on black he was exerting himself, black on red he was exerting himself. This is the cordiacus described by the Sages.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:4

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even while he is suffering an attack of seizures, one writes the bill of divorce and delivers it to his wife. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, when he regains his sanity. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems to be inverted, since they disagreed: If he became deaf-mute, or insane, or became an apostate, or the Court ruled that fat may be eaten, Rebbi Joḥanan said, his sacrifice of purification is pushed aside, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, his sacrifice of purification is not pushed aside. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi (Joḥanan) [Aḥa] switches traditions, to avoid that a word of Rebbi Joḥanan contradict his own word. For Rebbi Samuel bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One sprinkles the blood of a purification sacrifice or a reparation sacrifice for a person terminally ill. The rabbis of Caesarea said, Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Yasa, one follows the one, the other follows the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:9

Rebbi Yudan said, there, if he said I did such and such, here, if he says do such and such. Rebbi Benjamin ben Levi inquired: He should have understanding for the future if he has understanding for the past; (if he has no understanding for the past,) he would not have understanding for the future! Rebbi Abba Mari said, here we deal with a mute; there is no agency for a mute. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, we deal with a sane person. Why is there no divorce? Because I say, he was occupied with his documents. We also stated thus: “When was this said? When he was paralyzed while being healthy. But if he was paralyzed by a prior sickness, once is enough.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:12

Rebbi Abun said, what means “in my poverty?” That there is no wealth before Him Who commanded and the world came into existence! Another explanation: בְּעוֹנְיִי “in my deprivation,” because he fasted and donated the price of his meal to Heaven.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:32

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man may send away his wife with an old bill of divorce,” they say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man shall not divorce his wife unless he found in her a matter of immorality,” thy say that she is dirty in his eyes and he is not suspected of having relations with her, therefore she does not need a second bill of divorce from him.. Since the House of Hillel say, “even if she spoiled his food”, they say that she is not dirty in his eyes, he is suspected of having relations with her, and she needs a second bill of divorce from him’.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:3

After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:10

Rebbi Mana said: He has to be careful not to say “וְדִין”. Rebbi Mana asked: “You are on your own”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one must say: “You are a free person, you are on your own.” The Mishnah said so: “You are a free person, you are on your own.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:14

It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents can be collected only from unincumbered property, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. [But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect. Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed,] he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership. Rebbi Abina said, because it is invalid And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abin asked, so far, if the old man took the loan [and the old man mortgaged. But if the old man took the loan and the son mortgaged,] can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun asked, was it not stated: The same holds for bills of divorce? Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:19

There, we have stated: “A judicial oath, for a claim of two silver pieces and a judicial acknowlegdment of a peruṭah. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolus, but the House of Hillel say, two obols.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolus. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say, “money” is a peruṭah, but here, they say that “money” is two obols. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The house of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said: “She leaves gratis, without silver.” Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, “without silver”? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolus and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left, and at the end of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolus, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:19

There, we have stated: “A judicial oath, for a claim of two silver pieces and a judicial acknowlegdment of a peruṭah. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolus, but the House of Hillel say, two obols.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolus. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say, “money” is a peruṭah, but here, they say that “money” is two obols. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The house of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said: “She leaves gratis, without silver.” Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, “without silver”? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolus and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left, and at the end of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolus, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:21

“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:21

“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:27

“She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce,” as it is written: “He shall write her a bill of divorce.” “Or the husband’s death,” as it is written: “Or if the latter husband dies.” So far, if the latter one dies, [what about] the death of the former? Since the latter’s death releases her, even though his death does not cause a complete release, it is only logical that the former’s death should release her since his death will cause a complete release. Rebbi Ḥuna said, the verse implies that death releases, as it is written: “If brothers live together and one of them dies childless, etc.” Therefore, if he had a child, death releases. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if you would say that death does not release, how could we find a widow for a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah for a common priest? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, explain it for a sister-in-law.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:40

From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:50

Is Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah of the opinion that the “allotment” discussed here is preliminary marriage by biblical standards? Rebbi Abun said, it turns out that Rebbi Yose ben Rebi Jehudah agrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. As it was stated: By the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. Just as Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon equates loan and deposit, so Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah equates “allotment” and loan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:54

“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:55

Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked before me: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.