acquire

They voted in the upper floor of the house of Arius that study precedes action. Rebbi Abbahu dwelt in Caesarea. He sent his son Rebbi Ḥanina to acquire merit in Tiberias. They sent and said to him, he does works of charity. He wrote to him, are there no graves in Caesarea that I sent you to Tiberias? For they already voted in the upper floor of the house of Arius in Lydda that study precedes action. The rabbis of Caesaria say, that is, if there is somebody there who will do it. But if nobody is there who will do it, the action has precedence. Example. Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Yasa, Rebbi Immi, were late in coming to Rebbi Eleazar. He asked them, where have you been? They told him, performing an act of charity. He asked them, where there no others? They answered him, it was a neighbor.

Rebbi Meïr was sitting and preaching in the House of Study of Tiberias when his teacher Elisha passed by riding on a horse on the Sabbath. They came and told him, your teacher is outside. He stopped his sermon and went out to him. He asked him, what did you preach today? He told him, and the Eternal blessed the end etc. He asked him, what did you explain about this? He answered him, and the Eternal added double all that Job had owned; that he doubled his money. He said, woe for those who are lost and not found, your teacher Aqiba did not preach this but, the Eternal blessed the end of Job from his beginning, by the merit of commandments and good works which were in his hand from his beginning. He asked him, and what did you preach further? He told him, the end of a matter is better than the beginning. He asked him, what did you explain about this? For example, a man who had children in his youth but they died, and in his old age they lived; that is the end of a matter is better than the beginning. For example, a man who traded in his youth and lost, and in his old age and gained; that is the end of a matter is better than the beginning. For example, a man who studied Torah in his youth and forgot, in his old age he remembered; that is the end of a matter is better than the beginning. He said, woe for those who are lost and not found, your teacher Aqiba did not preach this but, the end of a matter is good from the beginning, in case it is good from the start, and this applies to me. My father Abuya was one of the leading Jerusalemites. On the day he came to circumcise me he invited all the leading Jerusalemites and sat them in one room, and Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Joshua in another room. After they ate and drank they started to clap with their hands and dance. Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Joshua said, while they are occupied in theirs let us be occupied with ours. They sat occupied with words of the Torah, from the Torah to Prophets, from Prophets to Hagiographs. Fire descended from Heaven and surrounded them. Abuya told them, my teachers! Why do you come to burn down my house? They told him, Heaven forbid! But we were sitting reviewing the words of the Torah, from the Torah to Prophets, from Prophets to Hagiographs, and the words were joyful as at their giving on Sinai. And was the main giving on Sinai not in fire? And the Mountain burns in the fire up to the heart of Heaven. My father Abuya told them, my teachers! If that is the power of Torah, if this son of mine survives I dedicate him to Torah. Because his intent was not for Heaven, it did not succeed with this man. He asked him, and what did you preach further? He told him, it cannot be valued by gold or glass. He asked him, what did you explain about this? He told him, the words of the Torah are as difficult to acquire as golden vessels, and as easy to lose as glass vessels. And like golden and glass vessels when they are broken he can make them vessels as before, also the student of the Sages who forgot his learning can learn it anew. He said to him, this is enough, Meïr, up to here is the Sabbath domain. He asked him, how do you know? He told him, from the horse’s hooves which I continuously counted for 2’000 cubits. He said to him, all that wisdom is in you and you do not repent? He told him, I cannot. He asked him, why? He told him, once I was passing by the Holiest of Holies riding on a horse on the Day of Atonement which fell on a Sabbath and I heard an unembodied voice coming from the Holiest of Holies, saying, return, erring children, except for Elisha ben Abuya who knew My power and rebelled against Me. And all that came to him because he was sitting memorizing in the valley of Genezareth and saw a man climbing to the top of a date palm taking the mother with the chicks and descending safely. The next day he saw another man climbing to the top of a date palm, taking the chicks and sending away the mother. When climbing down he was bitten by a snake, and he died. He said, it is written, sending away you shall send the mother, but the chicks you may take for yourself, so it will be good for you and prolong your days. Where is the good for this one? Where is the prolongation of days of this one? He did not know that Rebbi Jacob had explained it preceding him, so it will be good for you in the future world which is all good, and prolong your days, in the future which is all long. But some are saying, because he saw the tongue of Rebbi Jehudah the baker in the mouth of a dog, oozing blood. He said, is this the Torah and this is its reward? This is the tongue which was delivering the words of the Torah correctly; this is the tongue which occupied itself with Torah all its days; [is this the Torah and this is its reward?] It appears that there is no reward and no resurrection of the dead. But some are saying, when his mother was pregnant with him she passed by pagan temples and smelled of this kind. And this smell was bubbling in her body like the poison of a viper. Later Elisha fell sick. They came and informed Rebbi Meïr, your teacher is sick. He went to visit him and found him sick. He asked him, are you not repenting? He asked, and if one repents, is one accepted? He told him, is it not written, man shall repent up to extinction, one receives up to the extinction of the breath. At that moment Elisha cried, passed away, and died. Rebbi Meïr was happy internally and said, it seems that my teacher passed away repentant. After they buried him, fire descended from Heaven and burned his grave. They came and informed Rebbi Meïr, your teacher’s grave is on fire. He went to visit it and found it burning. What did he do? He took his kaftan and spread it over it. He said, stay for the night, etc. Stay for this world which compares to the night, and it will be in the morning, this is the Future World which is all morning, if the Good One will redeem, this is the Holy One, praise to Him, who is Good, as it is written, the Eternal is good to all, and His mercies are on all His creatures. And if He does not want to redeem you I shall redeem you, living is the Eternal, and it was extinguished. They asked Rebbi Meïr, if they ask you in that World, whom do you want to visit, your father or your teacher? He told them, I shall visit my teacher first and afterwards my father. They said, will they listen to you? He told them, did we not state, “one saves the case of a scroll with the scroll, and the case of phylacteries with the phylacteries”? One saves Elisha Aher by the merit of his Torah. Later his daughters went to take charity from Rebbi. Rebbi decided and said, nobody shall show him grace nor be friendly to his orphans. They told him, Rebbi. Do not look at his deeds, do look at his Torah. At this moment Rebbi cried and decided for them that they be provided for. He said, if this one who toiled in Torah not for Heaven’s sake, see what he produced; one who toils in the Torah for itself not so much more?

Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.

Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for qiddushin of a woman. Just as qiddushin acquire completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.”

Both the rabbis and Rebbi Simeon agree to the following. According to the rabbis, the aspect which “bespeaking” acquires is forbidden in the co-wife, the aspect which “bespeaking” does not acquire is permitted in the co-wife; therefore, the latter has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. According to Rebbi Simeon, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are permitted. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second one permitted. Out of doubt, she has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. What is the difference between them? If he slept with the second one. In the opinion of the rabbis, an incestuous intercourse because he had “bespoken”. Therefore, if he had not “bespoken” she may have levirate and there is no candidacy at all. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I explained that following what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. He had in her an interest of candidacy. When she died, the candidacy was eliminated. And here, when he died, the candidacy was eliminated.

Both the rabbis and Rebbi Simeon agree to the following. According to the rabbis, the aspect which “bespeaking” acquires is forbidden in the co-wife, the aspect which “bespeaking” does not acquire is permitted in the co-wife; therefore, the latter has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. According to Rebbi Simeon, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are permitted. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second one permitted. Out of doubt, she has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. What is the difference between them? If he slept with the second one. In the opinion of the rabbis, an incestuous intercourse because he had “bespoken”. Therefore, if he had not “bespoken” she may have levirate and there is no candidacy at all. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I explained that following what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. He had in her an interest of candidacy. When she died, the candidacy was eliminated. And here, when he died, the candidacy was eliminated.

HALAKHAH: “If there were two brothers, one of them died”, etc. Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, and you say so? May one permit levirate with the “bespoken” woman? One should suspect that “bespeaking” does not acquire; then he would be guilty because of “wife of his brother who did not live in his world.” Can the “bespoken” one perform ḥalîṣah? Should one not suspect that “bespeaking” does acquire; then the second {widow] is a candidate for [the third brother]. It must be that Rebbi Simeon refers to the first case.

HALAKHAH: “If there were two brothers, one of them died”, etc. Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, and you say so? May one permit levirate with the “bespoken” woman? One should suspect that “bespeaking” does not acquire; then he would be guilty because of “wife of his brother who did not live in his world.” Can the “bespoken” one perform ḥalîṣah? Should one not suspect that “bespeaking” does acquire; then the second {widow] is a candidate for [the third brother]. It must be that Rebbi Simeon refers to the first case.

HALAKHAH: “If there were two brothers, one of them died”, etc. Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, and you say so? May one permit levirate with the “bespoken” woman? One should suspect that “bespeaking” does not acquire; then he would be guilty because of “wife of his brother who did not live in his world.” Can the “bespoken” one perform ḥalîṣah? Should one not suspect that “bespeaking” does acquire; then the second {widow] is a candidate for [the third brother]. It must be that Rebbi Simeon refers to the first case.

What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah.

What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah.

What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah.

What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah.

What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah.

What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah.

Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Sheshet: There, one stated: The words of Rebbi Simeon are that both are forbidden. This is difficult. If “bespeaking” acquires, are not both permitted? This is a question of acquiring not by “bespeaking” but by candidacy. This is difficult. If candidacy acquires, both are permitted. If candidacy does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second permitted. Maybe candidacy for Rebbi Simeon is like “bespeaking” for the rabbis. Just as the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, candidacy acquires but leaves a remainder. This is difficult. That aspect which is acquired by candidacy implies a prohibition of an equal part of the co-wife, that part which is not acquired by candidacy implies permission of an equal aspect of the co-wife! Shammai said, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions? What does he mean? As Rebbi Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya, the aspect acquired in any sister-in-law which is not totally inside [the family] is considered to be under the incest prohibition and an incest prohibition frees her co-wife.

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters,” etc. Ulla bar Ismael said, so explained Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah: Rebbi Simeon frees the second one from ḥalîṣah and levirate. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the group asked, would anybody think that a man could acquire two sisters together? Rebbi Ḥanina said before Rebbi Mana and disagreed: Why does Rebbi Simeon free the second one from ḥalîṣah and levirate? He said to him, because nobody thinks that a man could acquire two sisters together. There they said, the words of Rebbi Simeon imply that no candidacy can come after another candidacy. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Only if he sinned and had intercourse. What is the difference? If somebody from the market gave qiddushin to the second sister. Following the rabbis, perfect qiddushin. Following Rebbi Eleazar, suspended qiddushin. When he has intercourse with the first, the qiddushin become valid for the second. If he had intercourse with the second, following the rabbis it is an incestuous act. Following Rebbi Eleazar, it is not an incestuous act. If the first one died, following the rabbis the second is permitted to him.

HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters,” etc. Ulla bar Ismael said, so explained Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah: Rebbi Simeon frees the second one from ḥalîṣah and levirate. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the group asked, would anybody think that a man could acquire two sisters together? Rebbi Ḥanina said before Rebbi Mana and disagreed: Why does Rebbi Simeon free the second one from ḥalîṣah and levirate? He said to him, because nobody thinks that a man could acquire two sisters together. There they said, the words of Rebbi Simeon imply that no candidacy can come after another candidacy. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Only if he sinned and had intercourse. What is the difference? If somebody from the market gave qiddushin to the second sister. Following the rabbis, perfect qiddushin. Following Rebbi Eleazar, suspended qiddushin. When he has intercourse with the first, the qiddushin become valid for the second. If he had intercourse with the second, following the rabbis it is an incestuous act. Following Rebbi Eleazar, it is not an incestuous act. If the first one died, following the rabbis the second is permitted to him.

HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. Do the House of Shammai follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely? If they would follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, in case he had divorced the “bespoken” widow, she would not need ḥalîṣah! But Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the House of Shammai agree that if he divorced the “bespoken”, she needs ḥalîṣah! It must be they follow Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. If they would follow Rebbi Simeon, in any case, if “bespeaking” acquires, nothing follows it. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, why “his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”? Maybe “bespeaking” for the House of Shammai is like candidacy for Rebbi Simeon in the interpretation of the rabbis there. As the rabbis there say, “bespeaking” acquires and leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, [candidacy] acquires and leaves a remainder. Rebbi Simeon says, no candidacy can come after a candidacy, so the House of Shammai say here, no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”.

HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. Do the House of Shammai follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely? If they would follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, in case he had divorced the “bespoken” widow, she would not need ḥalîṣah! But Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the House of Shammai agree that if he divorced the “bespoken”, she needs ḥalîṣah! It must be they follow Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. If they would follow Rebbi Simeon, in any case, if “bespeaking” acquires, nothing follows it. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, why “his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”? Maybe “bespeaking” for the House of Shammai is like candidacy for Rebbi Simeon in the interpretation of the rabbis there. As the rabbis there say, “bespeaking” acquires and leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, [candidacy] acquires and leaves a remainder. Rebbi Simeon says, no candidacy can come after a candidacy, so the House of Shammai say here, no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”.

HALAKHAH: “Of three brothers, two are married to two sisters,” etc. Both the rabbis and Rebbi Simeon will agree in this case. For the rabbis, the part of the co-wife parallel to that which “bespeaking” acquired [in the widow] is forbidden. Also, the part of the co-wife parallel to that which “bespeaking” did not acquire [in the widow] is [still] forbidden. Therefore, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. Following Rebbi Simeon, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are permitted. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first is forbidden but the second permitted. Because of the doubt, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.

HALAKHAH: “Of three brothers, two are married to two sisters,” etc. Both the rabbis and Rebbi Simeon will agree in this case. For the rabbis, the part of the co-wife parallel to that which “bespeaking” acquired [in the widow] is forbidden. Also, the part of the co-wife parallel to that which “bespeaking” did not acquire [in the widow] is [still] forbidden. Therefore, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. Following Rebbi Simeon, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are permitted. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first is forbidden but the second permitted. Because of the doubt, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.

Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses; Rebbi Eleazar said, one cannot transfer benefits to fetuses. Rebbi Yose said, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. That is the Mishnah, “if somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” as you say here, retroactively ḥalîṣah did not touch her, so retroactively the child is a son and receives the benefit. There, we have stated: “If somebody says, if my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a mina, if she gave birth to a male, [the male baby] will take a mina. If a female, 200 [drachmae], if she gave birth to a female, that one will take 200.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is only for his son, but not for any other. Rebbi Yasa said, even any other. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, only from a sick person, but not a healthy one; only movables but not real estate. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. “ If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his estate, then it became known that he had a son overseas or that [his wife] was pregnant, everybody is required to return [what he took].” What does Rebbi Eleazar do with this? There is a difference because it is his child. The second part [of the Mishnah] disagrees with Samuel in the interpretation of Rebbi Yose: “If they returned everything and then the son died or she had a miscarriage, anybody who takes first after that acquires it.” The first group did not acquire. Even at the beginning they should not have acquired! Did not Rebbi Yose say, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. He was not living! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, because of abandoning. The rabbis of Caesarea, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Abba bar Natan: Rebbi Natan changed his mind because of that Mishnah: “If a male, a mina, if a female, 200.” Is a female in this situation not like an outsider? Bar Qappara stated: “On transfers benefit to a one day old.”

Rav Jehudah said in the name of Samuel: He who “bespeaks” his sister-in-law does not acquire his brother’s property. Even the House of Shammai agree to that; even Rebbi Simeon agrees to that, but not Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh. As Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh said, “bespeaking” acquires the sister-in-law totally. If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one and came to the other. As you take it, either by “bespeaking” he acquires or by intercourse he acquires. Rebbi Yose said, since he cannot keep either one, he did not acquire his brother’s property.

Rav Jehudah said in the name of Samuel: He who “bespeaks” his sister-in-law does not acquire his brother’s property. Even the House of Shammai agree to that; even Rebbi Simeon agrees to that, but not Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh. As Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh said, “bespeaking” acquires the sister-in-law totally. If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one and came to the other. As you take it, either by “bespeaking” he acquires or by intercourse he acquires. Rebbi Yose said, since he cannot keep either one, he did not acquire his brother’s property.

Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.

Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for qiddushin of a woman. Just as qiddushin acquire completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.”

Since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, does he say similarly that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Simeon says, there is nothing after copulation if it is primary. Therefore, if it is secondary, there is something afterwards. That must deal with copulation after a bill of divorce. For if it were copulation after “bespeaking”, what could you say? If “bespeaking” acquired, there is nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse will acquire and there is nothing after that. So we must speak about copulation after a bill of divorce. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially.

Since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, does he say similarly that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Simeon says, there is nothing after copulation if it is primary. Therefore, if it is secondary, there is something afterwards. That must deal with copulation after a bill of divorce. For if it were copulation after “bespeaking”, what could you say? If “bespeaking” acquired, there is nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse will acquire and there is nothing after that. So we must speak about copulation after a bill of divorce. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially.

Since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, does he say similarly that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Simeon says, there is nothing after copulation if it is primary. Therefore, if it is secondary, there is something afterwards. That must deal with copulation after a bill of divorce. For if it were copulation after “bespeaking”, what could you say? If “bespeaking” acquired, there is nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse will acquire and there is nothing after that. So we must speak about copulation after a bill of divorce. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially.

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

HALAKHAH: “How? If he ‘bespoke’,” etc. In the opinion of Rebbi, what about his “bespeaking”, may a nine-year-old “bespeak”? The intercourse of an adult is final; his “bespeaking” partially acquires. The intercourse of a minor is final; does his “bespeaking” partially acquire? What is the difference between his intercourse and his “bespeaking”? But some want to formulate: What is the difference between “bespeaking” of an adult and “bespeaking” of a minor? Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody comes to his sister-in-law,” etc. We have stated: “Even if he is in error and she acts criminally, or he does it criminally but she is in error.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Even if both act in error, even if both act criminally. They wanted to say, a hearing person who is competent acquires both if he has the intention and if he does not have the intention but the deaf-mute, who is not competent, should acquire only if he has the intention. It was found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Both the deaf-mute and the insane who copulated acquired [the widow] and freed the co-wives.

“He acquired her and there is no difference between intercourse and intercourse.” What did he acquire? Samuel said, he acquired only the things spelled out in the paragraph: To inherit the deceased’s property, (to be betrothed by a brother), and to permit her co-wife to the outside. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he acquired everything. Rebbi Isaac ben Eleazar said, when do they disagree? If he touched her. But if he completed the intercourse, everybody agrees that he acquired everything. Rebbi Mattaniah said, when do they disagree? If he had intercourse with her still in her father’s house. But if he had intercourse with her still in her husband’s house, everybody agrees that he acquired everything. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah said: If he married her, she is his wife in every respect.

HALAKHAH: “A congenital castrate priest,” etc. It was stated: He enables her to eat breast and thigh. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he enables her for heave but not for breast and thigh. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there are several arguments de minore ad majus in this matter. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina asked, what means “there are several arguments de minore ad majus in this matter”? He said to him, open your mouth and receive. Rebbi Mana said, he made fun of him. Rebbi Abun said, he gave him an example. “Since she eats heave that never was within the reach of an Israel, is it not logical that she should eat breast and thigh that were within the reach of Israel? Breast and thigh were within the reach of Israel but when they became guilty these were taken from them and given to the priests. I could think, since these were taken from them when they incurred guilt, so they would be given back to them when they acquire merit. The verse says, ‘I gave them to Aaron and his sons for an eternal law;’ since a gift is not returned, so these are not returned.”

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said the argument is about the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen: Rebbi Joḥanan said, he enables her for heave but not for breast and thigh. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there are several arguments de minore ad majus in this matter. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina asked, what means “there are several arguments de minore ad majus in this matter”? He said to him, open your mouth and receive. Rebbi Mana said, he made fun of him. Rebbi Abun said, he gave him an example. “Since she eats heave that never was within the reach of an Israel, is it not logical that she should eat breast and thigh that were within the reach of Israel? Breast and thigh were within the reach of Israel but when they became guilty these were taken from them and given to the priests. I could think, since these were taken from them when they incurred guilt, so they would be given back to them when they acquire merit. The verse says, ‘I gave them to Aaron the priest and his sons for an eternal law;’ since a gift is not returned, so these are not returned.”

What is the status of her co-wife? Rav said, her co-wife is forbidden. Rebbi Joḥanan said, her co-wife is forbidden. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, her co-wife is permitted. Rebbi Eleazar said, I looked around at the rabbis here and at the rabbis there and did not find anybody agreeing with me except Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who says, her co-wife is permitted.Rav Hamnuna was sitting before Rav Ada bar Ahava and said, what is the status of her co-wife? He said to him, she is permitted. He asked, divorce? He answered, forbidden. He said, go around. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, it is reasonable following him who said that her co-wife is permitted. But following him who said, her co-wife is forbidden, as you take it: The aspect he acquired in her makes the corresponding aspect forbidden in her co-wife, the aspect he did not acquire in her makes the corresponding aspect permitted in her co-wife! Rebbi Shammai said, does one admit that kind of argument in matters of incest prohibitions? What about it? For any sister-in-law who is not totally outside [the family], the acquired aspect of her belongs to an incest prohibition and an incest prohibition forbids the co-wife.

Rebbi Yose insists on interpreting the contract text. Rebbi Yose explained: In a place where one treats the ketubah as a loan, she collects the entire amount. Where one doubles, she collects only half the amount. Rebbi Eleazar [the caper grower] said, nobody is permitted to buy domesticated or wild animals or birds unless he has food prepared for them. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa insists on interpreting the contract text, since Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa said, a person lending money to another person should not take pledges from him for more than the value of the loan since he writes for him: “It will be paid by the property that came to my hand that I shall acquire corresponding to this [sum].”

HALAKHAH: “The offering of an Israel’s daughter married to a Cohen,” etc. What is the difference between a Cohen and a Cohen’s daughter? “The flour offering of a Cohen’s daughter is eaten, that of a Cohen is not eaten.” For it is written, “any flour offering of a Cohen shall be total, it should not be eaten;” not the Cohen’s daugher’s. Rebbi Abbahu asked before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Is it not written: “If a Cohen acquire a person with his money,” should that apply to a Cohen but not ro a Cohen’s daughter? How is that? “The Cohen anointed in his stead, one of his sons;” one whose son fills his place, that excludes her whose son does not fill her place.

There came a case before Rebbi Ḥanina of a woman whose ketubah was less than 200 zuz, and he said, she should take what he had written for her. He said to Rebbi Mana, sit down and sign. He answered, follow your argument and sign yourself, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in the name of Samuel, by the Temple šeqel? Rebbi Eudaimon of Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: Because of a renunciation. Now, should a woman whose ketubah was for less than 200 [zuz] not hide her ketubah in order to collect by the Temple šeqel? They said in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she presents she collects. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: If a deaf-mute man married a hearing wife, she has no claim for support nor ketubah, but if she died, he inherits from her, for she wanted to connect him with her property, but he could not want to connect her with his property. If a hearing male married a deaf-mute woman, she has a claim to support and ketubah, but if she died, he does not inherit, for he wanted to connect her with his property, but she could not want to connect him with her property. But can a deaf-mute woman acquire and have ketubah? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that at the moment he married her, she was hearing. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, he married her when she was hearing but she turned deaf-mute. In any case, did he not marry her when she was hearing? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that she was deaf-mute and turned hearing; he married her when she was hearing and she turned deaf. That you should not say, because at the start she was deaf-mute she has [no] ketubah, therefore it is necessary to say that she (does not have) [has]. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but since if one has sexual relations with a deaf-mute, is he not liable for a fine? Only if there were no fine would there be no ketubah. Rebbi Yudan said, does that depend on a fine? Look, the adult woman collects no fine but her ketubah is 200, the virgin after marriage collects a fine but her ketubah is a mina!

Rebbi Yose insists on interpreting the contract text. Rebbi Yose explained: In a place where one treats the ketubah as a loan, she collects the entire amount. Where one doubles, she collects only half the amount. Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower insists on interpreting the contract text. Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower explained: nobody is permitted to buy domesticated or wild animals or birds unless he has food prepared for them. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa insists on interpreting the contract text. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa explained: a person lending money to another person should not take pledges except in court; he should not enter [the debtor’s] house to take the pledge, for he writes to him: “It will be paid by the property that came to my hand that I shall acquire corresponding to this [sum].”

It was stated: Just as the husband decides, so the father decides; only that the husband transfers rights in writing but the father only by speech, restricted to those things that can be acquired by speech. What is that? Gidul in the name of Rav: How much are you giving to your son? Such and such. And how much are you giving to your daughter? Such and such. When he preliminarily married her, the daughter acquired among the daughters. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, Gidul found something large and said something small! But it is as follows: How much are you giving to your son? Such and such. How much are you giving to your daughter? Such and such. When he preliminarily married her, the daughter acquired among the daughters and the son among the sons. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, is that something small? Does he not acquire a wife on top of movables with one peruṭa’s worth? But nobody can acquire two wives with one peruṭa’s worth! But cannot a person acquire real estate and several movables with one peruṭa’s worth? For a person can acquire two pieces of real estate with one peruṭa’s worth, but nobody can acquire two wives with one peruṭa’s worth.

It was stated: Just as the husband decides, so the father decides; only that the husband transfers rights in writing but the father only by speech, restricted to those things that can be acquired by speech. What is that? Gidul in the name of Rav: How much are you giving to your son? Such and such. And how much are you giving to your daughter? Such and such. When he preliminarily married her, the daughter acquired among the daughters. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, Gidul found something large and said something small! But it is as follows: How much are you giving to your son? Such and such. How much are you giving to your daughter? Such and such. When he preliminarily married her, the daughter acquired among the daughters and the son among the sons. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, is that something small? Does he not acquire a wife on top of movables with one peruṭa’s worth? But nobody can acquire two wives with one peruṭa’s worth! But cannot a person acquire real estate and several movables with one peruṭa’s worth? For a person can acquire two pieces of real estate with one peruṭa’s worth, but nobody can acquire two wives with one peruṭa’s worth.

It was stated: Just as the husband decides, so the father decides; only that the husband transfers rights in writing but the father only by speech, restricted to those things that can be acquired by speech. What is that? Gidul in the name of Rav: How much are you giving to your son? Such and such. And how much are you giving to your daughter? Such and such. When he preliminarily married her, the daughter acquired among the daughters. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, Gidul found something large and said something small! But it is as follows: How much are you giving to your son? Such and such. How much are you giving to your daughter? Such and such. When he preliminarily married her, the daughter acquired among the daughters and the son among the sons. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, is that something small? Does he not acquire a wife on top of movables with one peruṭa’s worth? But nobody can acquire two wives with one peruṭa’s worth! But cannot a person acquire real estate and several movables with one peruṭa’s worth? For a person can acquire two pieces of real estate with one peruṭa’s worth, but nobody can acquire two wives with one peruṭa’s worth.

It was stated: Just as the husband decides, so the father decides; only that the husband transfers rights in writing but the father only by speech, restricted to those things that can be acquired by speech. What is that? Gidul in the name of Rav: How much are you giving to your son? Such and such. And how much are you giving to your daughter? Such and such. When he preliminarily married her, the daughter acquired among the daughters. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, Gidul found something large and said something small! But it is as follows: How much are you giving to your son? Such and such. How much are you giving to your daughter? Such and such. When he preliminarily married her, the daughter acquired among the daughters and the son among the sons. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, is that something small? Does he not acquire a wife on top of movables with one peruṭa’s worth? But nobody can acquire two wives with one peruṭa’s worth! But cannot a person acquire real estate and several movables with one peruṭa’s worth? For a person can acquire two pieces of real estate with one peruṭa’s worth, but nobody can acquire two wives with one peruṭa’s worth.

It was stated: Just as the husband decides, so the father decides; only that the husband transfers rights in writing but the father only by speech, restricted to those things that can be acquired by speech. What is that? Gidul in the name of Rav: How much are you giving to your son? Such and such. And how much are you giving to your daughter? Such and such. When he preliminarily married her, the daughter acquired among the daughters. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, Gidul found something large and said something small! But it is as follows: How much are you giving to your son? Such and such. How much are you giving to your daughter? Such and such. When he preliminarily married her, the daughter acquired among the daughters and the son among the sons. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, is that something small? Does he not acquire a wife on top of movables with one peruṭa’s worth? But nobody can acquire two wives with one peruṭa’s worth! But cannot a person acquire real estate and several movables with one peruṭa’s worth? For a person can acquire two pieces of real estate with one peruṭa’s worth, but nobody can acquire two wives with one peruṭa’s worth.

Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “How much are you giving to your son? Such and such. How much are you giving to your daughter? Such and such. When he preliminarily married her, the daughter acquired among the daughters and the son among the sons,” but only if it is a first marriage. This follows what Rebbi Ḥanania said: If somebody definitively married off his son in a house, the latter acquired the house, but only if it is a first marriage. Rebbi Hoshaia said, she acquired movables but did not acquire the house. Do they disagree? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: Explain it that his father used it for storage. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It is needed in case what was stored was borrowed from the market. Rebbi Abbahu said, if he said it is loaned, he did not acquire it. There came a case before Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun and he instructed following Rebbi Abbahu. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, essentialy this has no basis but the rabbis build and add to it!

Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “How much are you giving to your son? Such and such. How much are you giving to your daughter? Such and such. When he preliminarily married her, the daughter acquired among the daughters and the son among the sons,” but only if it is a first marriage. This follows what Rebbi Ḥanania said: If somebody definitively married off his son in a house, the latter acquired the house, but only if it is a first marriage. Rebbi Hoshaia said, she acquired movables but did not acquire the house. Do they disagree? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: Explain it that his father used it for storage. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It is needed in case what was stored was borrowed from the market. Rebbi Abbahu said, if he said it is loaned, he did not acquire it. There came a case before Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun and he instructed following Rebbi Abbahu. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, essentialy this has no basis but the rabbis build and add to it!

“If she spent six months for her husband and six months for the levir, she cannot eat heave. Not only six months for the levir but even all the time for the levir except for one day, she cannot eat heave.” The Mishna follows neither the earliest not the last Mishnah, but the intermediate development. As it was stated: First, they were saying that a preliminarily married woman, daughter of an Israel, could eat heave, for they were explaining: “If a Cohen acquires a person, acquistion by money;” for what would be the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? They changed, to say: after twelve months, when he becomes responsible for her upkeep. The court of the later ones said: A woman never eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber. ”Already Rebbi Joḥanan ben Bagbag sent to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis: They say in your name that the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel eats heave. He sent back the following: I had been convinced that you are knowledgeable in the secrets of the Torah, but you do not even know the rules de minore ad majus! Since money can acquire a Gentile slave girl to permit her to eat heave, but she cannot be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, whereas a wife can be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, it is only logical that money can acquire a wife to permit her to eat heave! But what can I do? They said that no woman eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber,” and they supported it by the verse: “Every pure person in your household shall eat it.” Rebbi Yudan said, that is an argument de minore ad majus that can be reversed! Because he could say to him, since a Gentile slave girl can be acquired by active possession to permit her to eat heave, what can you say about a wife who cannot be acquired by active possession? If an argument de minore ad majus can be reversed, the argument is invalid.

“If she spent six months for her husband and six months for the levir, she cannot eat heave. Not only six months for the levir but even all the time for the levir except for one day, she cannot eat heave.” The Mishna follows neither the earliest not the last Mishnah, but the intermediate development. As it was stated: First, they were saying that a preliminarily married woman, daughter of an Israel, could eat heave, for they were explaining: “If a Cohen acquires a person, acquistion by money;” for what would be the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? They changed, to say: after twelve months, when he becomes responsible for her upkeep. The court of the later ones said: A woman never eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber. ”Already Rebbi Joḥanan ben Bagbag sent to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis: They say in your name that the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel eats heave. He sent back the following: I had been convinced that you are knowledgeable in the secrets of the Torah, but you do not even know the rules de minore ad majus! Since money can acquire a Gentile slave girl to permit her to eat heave, but she cannot be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, whereas a wife can be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, it is only logical that money can acquire a wife to permit her to eat heave! But what can I do? They said that no woman eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber,” and they supported it by the verse: “Every pure person in your household shall eat it.” Rebbi Yudan said, that is an argument de minore ad majus that can be reversed! Because he could say to him, since a Gentile slave girl can be acquired by active possession to permit her to eat heave, what can you say about a wife who cannot be acquired by active possession? If an argument de minore ad majus can be reversed, the argument is invalid.

”If they died, others should inherit.” Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person can transfer property rights in any language except with an expression of inheritance? One does not have here “they shall inherit” but “they shall take”. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: Do they not differ here in matters of a gift? If somebody signed over all his property to two persons at the same time; to one he wrote in the language of gift but to the other in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Eleazar said, since the one acquired in the language of gift, the other one acquired in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it seems that one did acquire in the language of gift but the other did not acquire in the language of inheritance Rebbi Phineas said, there came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah: Practice follows Rebbi Eleazar since Rebbi Eleazar stated a docrine but Rebbi Joḥanan said only “it seems”. Rebbi Samuel said, but did not Rebbi Meïr say that and it does not seem reasonable; is that nothing? Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say in the name of Rebbi Assi: Carded firstling wool becomes insignificant in a plurality. Rebbi Ḥiyya the Sepphorean brought before Rebbi Ammi a pound in eight but the latter refused to rule since had not Rebbi Assi said, is that not a Mishnah? “If somebody weaves the length of a sîṭ of firstling’s wool in a cloth, the cloth must be burned, of hair of a nazir or firstling donkey in sackcloth, the sackcloth must be burned”? The following Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote any expression of gift either at the start, or in the middle, or at the end, his instructions are valid.” There, to one person in an expression of gift and to one an expression of inheritance. But here to each one both in the language of gift and the language of inheritance Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: But does he not prejudice the rights of others? He said to him, if there are no brothers. But does he not prejudice the rights of his paternal uncles? Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel: A person prefers the good of his house over his relatives.

”If they died, others should inherit.” Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person can transfer property rights in any language except with an expression of inheritance? One does not have here “they shall inherit” but “they shall take”. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: Do they not differ here in matters of a gift? If somebody signed over all his property to two persons at the same time; to one he wrote in the language of gift but to the other in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Eleazar said, since the one acquired in the language of gift, the other one acquired in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it seems that one did acquire in the language of gift but the other did not acquire in the language of inheritance Rebbi Phineas said, there came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah: Practice follows Rebbi Eleazar since Rebbi Eleazar stated a docrine but Rebbi Joḥanan said only “it seems”. Rebbi Samuel said, but did not Rebbi Meïr say that and it does not seem reasonable; is that nothing? Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say in the name of Rebbi Assi: Carded firstling wool becomes insignificant in a plurality. Rebbi Ḥiyya the Sepphorean brought before Rebbi Ammi a pound in eight but the latter refused to rule since had not Rebbi Assi said, is that not a Mishnah? “If somebody weaves the length of a sîṭ of firstling’s wool in a cloth, the cloth must be burned, of hair of a nazir or firstling donkey in sackcloth, the sackcloth must be burned”? The following Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote any expression of gift either at the start, or in the middle, or at the end, his instructions are valid.” There, to one person in an expression of gift and to one an expression of inheritance. But here to each one both in the language of gift and the language of inheritance Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: But does he not prejudice the rights of others? He said to him, if there are no brothers. But does he not prejudice the rights of his paternal uncles? Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel: A person prefers the good of his house over his relatives.

MISHNAH: If a woman inherited property before she became preliminarily married, the Houses of Shammai and Hillel agree that if she sells or gives it away it is valid. If she inherited after she became preliminarily married, the House of Shammai say she may sell, the House of Hillel say she should not sell, but both of them agree that if she sold or gave it away it is valid. Rebbi Jehudah said: They said before Rabban Gamliel: If he obtained the right to the woman, should he not also acquire the right to the property? He said to them, are we not ashamed about the new [properties] and you want to burden us with the old ones?

Rebbi Phineas asked before Rebbi Yose, why did we not state it with the leniencies of the House of Shammai and the stringencies of the House of Hillel? He said to him, the Mishnaiot apply only to circumstances that are either stringent on both sides or lenient on both sides. But here it is a stringency on one side and a leniency on the other side. But did we not state: “The House of Shammai say, property abandoned to the poor [is abandoned]?” Is this not lenient for the poor and stringent for the householder, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the poor and not stringent for the householder, since he intentionally abandoned it. He said to him, did we not state: “If the sheaf that was near a closure, a stack, cattle, or vessels was forgotten,” is this not lenient for the householder and stringent for the poor, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the householder but not stringent for the poor, because they did not acquire it yet. You may also say here, it is lenient for the woman and not stringent for the husband since he did not yet acquire property rights to it. He said to him, since he became betrothed to her, the inheritance fell to both of them.

Rebbi Phineas asked before Rebbi Yose, why did we not state it with the leniencies of the House of Shammai and the stringencies of the House of Hillel? He said to him, the Mishnaiot apply only to circumstances that are either stringent on both sides or lenient on both sides. But here it is a stringency on one side and a leniency on the other side. But did we not state: “The House of Shammai say, property abandoned to the poor [is abandoned]?” Is this not lenient for the poor and stringent for the householder, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the poor and not stringent for the householder, since he intentionally abandoned it. He said to him, did we not state: “If the sheaf that was near a closure, a stack, cattle, or vessels was forgotten,” is this not lenient for the householder and stringent for the poor, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the householder but not stringent for the poor, because they did not acquire it yet. You may also say here, it is lenient for the woman and not stringent for the husband since he did not yet acquire property rights to it. He said to him, since he became betrothed to her, the inheritance fell to both of them.

MISHNAH: If she inherited property after she was definitively married, both agree that if she sold or gave away the husband retrieves from the hand of the buyers. [If she interited] before she was definitively married and [sold] after she was definitively married, Rabban Gamliel said if she sold or gave away it is valid. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, they said before Rabban Gamliel: If he obtained the right to the woman, did he not also acquire the right to the property? He said to them, are we not ashamed about the new [properties], and you want to burden us with the old ones?

Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

HALAKHAH: “If he left produce taken,” etc. Both Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, if they were collected at a trading place. But if somebody collected it in his house, his house acquired for him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he collected it in his house, his house did not acquire for him. For he thinks that they are his but they are not his. Does from this follow how the owner acquires his produce in a Sabbatical year? Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say, from the moment he put them into his vessel. Rebbi Yose said, even if he put them into his vessel he did not acquire, for he thinks that they are his but they are not his.

HALAKHAH: “If he left produce taken,” etc. Both Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, if they were collected at a trading place. But if somebody collected it in his house, his house acquired for him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he collected it in his house, his house did not acquire for him. For he thinks that they are his but they are not his. Does from this follow how the owner acquires his produce in a Sabbatical year? Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say, from the moment he put them into his vessel. Rebbi Yose said, even if he put them into his vessel he did not acquire, for he thinks that they are his but they are not his.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two wives,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody borrowed from two persons and the second comes and says to him, get up and let us settle, and [the borrower] says, will not in the end the first hear of it and come to foreclose, he [the second lender] may say let us settle, and if he forecloses, he forecloses. If he settled, one may assume that the first will come and foreclose. If he settled with the first, Rebbi Phineas said, such a case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who said, he settled. Rebbi Yose said, did he not write “what I shall acquire”? It happens only with an heir. Rebbi Ḥanina said, even with a creditor it can happen if he did not write “anything I shall acquire”, or if he said, “you shall not be paid except from this.” Rav Mattaniah said, this follows him who said, for ketubah but not for stipulations. But for him who said, for ketubah and for stipulations, does it not return?

HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two wives,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody borrowed from two persons and the second comes and says to him, get up and let us settle, and [the borrower] says, will not in the end the first hear of it and come to foreclose, he [the second lender] may say let us settle, and if he forecloses, he forecloses. If he settled, one may assume that the first will come and foreclose. If he settled with the first, Rebbi Phineas said, such a case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who said, he settled. Rebbi Yose said, did he not write “what I shall acquire”? It happens only with an heir. Rebbi Ḥanina said, even with a creditor it can happen if he did not write “anything I shall acquire”, or if he said, “you shall not be paid except from this.” Rav Mattaniah said, this follows him who said, for ketubah but not for stipulations. But for him who said, for ketubah and for stipulations, does it not return?

Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One stated this only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects forever. Rebbi Abbahu quoted in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she can collect only up to 25 years. This disagreement parallels the following disagreement, as was stated there: “Torts are estimated from choice land, creditor’s claims from average, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable.” Rebbi Jeremiah said to him, this was stated only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz], but a ketubah of 1’000 denar is evaluated in terms of average quality land. But Rebbi Yose said, even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects only from the least valuable land. It turns out that Rebbi Yose follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Jeremiah Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. As we have stated there: “If somebody signs over his property to his sons and signs over some real estate to his wife, she lost her claim to ketubah.” Rav said, if he lets them acquire through her. Samuel says, if he distributes in her presence. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, they stated here a relaxation of the laws of ketubah. Rebbi Abba said, the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina is that it applies not only to a ketubah of a mina or two hundred, but even regarding a ketubah of one thousand denar they proclaimed a relaxation of the laws of ketubah.

Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Partners can acquire one from the other and are responsible for damages inflicted by one on the other. Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, if he said, collect and acquire. But if they were collected he does not acquire unless he moves.

Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Partners can acquire one from the other and are responsible for damages inflicted by one on the other. Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, if he said, collect and acquire. But if they were collected he does not acquire unless he moves.

Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Partners can acquire one from the other and are responsible for damages inflicted by one on the other. Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, if he said, collect and acquire. But if they were collected he does not acquire unless he moves.

HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not marry the ugly Miss X,’ ” etc. He made her a golden eye, a golden tooth. So he said to him, acquire what is on her.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.

Rebbi Aqiba said, the start of my practice before the Sages was the following. Once I was on the road when I found a corpse of obligation; I carried it about four mil to a cemetery and buried it. When I came to Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Joshua and told them, they said to me that every step that you walked is counted against you as if you were shedding blood. I said, if I became guilty when I intended to acquire merit, how much worse is it if I do not intend to acquire merit. From that time on I did not interrupt practicing before Sages. He used to say, anybody who did not practice before Sages deserves the death penalty.

Rebbi Aqiba said, the start of my practice before the Sages was the following. Once I was on the road when I found a corpse of obligation; I carried it about four mil to a cemetery and buried it. When I came to Rebbi Eliezer and Rebbi Joshua and told them, they said to me that every step that you walked is counted against you as if you were shedding blood. I said, if I became guilty when I intended to acquire merit, how much worse is it if I do not intend to acquire merit. From that time on I did not interrupt practicing before Sages. He used to say, anybody who did not practice before Sages deserves the death penalty.

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he wrote it in the Land of Israel, signed it outside the Land, went to deliver it to her outside the Land but did not find her outside the Land, returned and found her in the Land of Israel. He must say, “it was written and signed before me,” because he wrote it in the Land of Israel and signed it outside the Land But if it was written and signed in the Land of Israel, he went to deliver it to her outside the Land but did not find her outside the Land, he need not say, “it was written and signed before me.” If he gave her bill of divorce to her when she said, my courtyard at Acco shall acquire it for me, Rebbi Ḥinena said, it is as if she had a long arm. If she had a long arm, she stretched it out and took it from there, does he not have to say “it was written and signed before me”? Rebbi Abba said, who would deny it?

Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: If a man and his wife held on to a bill of divorce; she says, I acquired it, but he says, you did not acquire. Does this refer to the disagreement between Rebbi and Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel? Since they disagreed: If creditor and borrower both hold on to the bond; the creditor says it is mine; I had lost it. The borrower says, it is mine because I paid it off. The document should be verified by its signatories, the words of Rebbi. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, they should split. Rebbi Eleazar said, everything depends on who actually holds the signatures of the witnesses. Where do they disagree? If it was written lengthwise and both hold part of the signatures of the witnesses. He said to him, it is everybody’s opinion that it is not a bill of divorce if all is in her hand but a thread is in his hand, for it is written: “He shall deliver it into her hand,” not unless all be in her hand.

HALAKHAH: If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife,” etc. Elsewhere you say that “give” means “bring”, but here you say that “give” means “acquire”! So is the Mishnah: “Acquire this bill of divorce for my wife; acquire this document of manumission for my slave.” The formulation of the Mishnah says so: “Because one may bestow benefit on a person in his absence but put a detriment on a person only in his presence.” Rebbi Meïr says, it is a detriment for either of them, but the Sages say it is a benefit for the slave but a detriment for the wife. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if he was the slave of a rich person, would it not be a detriment for the slave? The colleagues said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if she was the wife of a man suffering from boils, would it not be a benefit for the woman? You have only the following: If one sells his slave without the latter’s knowledge, is the sale of the slave not valid? If one divorces his wife without her knowledge, is the divorce valid because she was acquired by him? Rebbi Abin said, he is his property but he disqualifies him for heave.

HALAKHAH: If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife,” etc. Elsewhere you say that “give” means “bring”, but here you say that “give” means “acquire”! So is the Mishnah: “Acquire this bill of divorce for my wife; acquire this document of manumission for my slave.” The formulation of the Mishnah says so: “Because one may bestow benefit on a person in his absence but put a detriment on a person only in his presence.” Rebbi Meïr says, it is a detriment for either of them, but the Sages say it is a benefit for the slave but a detriment for the wife. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if he was the slave of a rich person, would it not be a detriment for the slave? The colleagues said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if she was the wife of a man suffering from boils, would it not be a benefit for the woman? You have only the following: If one sells his slave without the latter’s knowledge, is the sale of the slave not valid? If one divorces his wife without her knowledge, is the divorce valid because she was acquired by him? Rebbi Abin said, he is his property but he disqualifies him for heave.

HALAKHAH: If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife,” etc. Elsewhere you say that “give” means “bring”, but here you say that “give” means “acquire”! So is the Mishnah: “Acquire this bill of divorce for my wife; acquire this document of manumission for my slave.” The formulation of the Mishnah says so: “Because one may bestow benefit on a person in his absence but put a detriment on a person only in his presence.” Rebbi Meïr says, it is a detriment for either of them, but the Sages say it is a benefit for the slave but a detriment for the wife. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if he was the slave of a rich person, would it not be a detriment for the slave? The colleagues said, Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Think of it, if she was the wife of a man suffering from boils, would it not be a benefit for the woman? You have only the following: If one sells his slave without the latter’s knowledge, is the sale of the slave not valid? If one divorces his wife without her knowledge, is the divorce valid because she was acquired by him? Rebbi Abin said, he is his property but he disqualifies him for heave.

“If somebody says, I freed my slave Ṭabi, I shall free him, he is free, he acquired.” Rebbi Inaia in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But only by a document. “He should be freed, Rebbi says, he acquired, but for the Sages he did not acquire. Give this document of manumission, and he died, Rebbi says, he did not acquire but the Sages say, he did acquire; one forces the heirs to fulfill the instructions of the deceased.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If he said, “free him”, Rebbi will agree. If he said, “write and deliver,” the Sages will agree. But we deal with the case that he said “give”. Rebbi says, one who says “give” is like one who said “write and deliver,” but the Sages say, one who says “give” is like one who said “free him”.

“If somebody says, I freed my slave Ṭabi, I shall free him, he is free, he acquired.” Rebbi Inaia in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But only by a document. “He should be freed, Rebbi says, he acquired, but for the Sages he did not acquire. Give this document of manumission, and he died, Rebbi says, he did not acquire but the Sages say, he did acquire; one forces the heirs to fulfill the instructions of the deceased.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If he said, “free him”, Rebbi will agree. If he said, “write and deliver,” the Sages will agree. But we deal with the case that he said “give”. Rebbi says, one who says “give” is like one who said “write and deliver,” but the Sages say, one who says “give” is like one who said “free him”.

“If somebody says, I freed my slave Ṭabi, I shall free him, he is free, he acquired.” Rebbi Inaia in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But only by a document. “He should be freed, Rebbi says, he acquired, but for the Sages he did not acquire. Give this document of manumission, and he died, Rebbi says, he did not acquire but the Sages say, he did acquire; one forces the heirs to fulfill the instructions of the deceased.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If he said, “free him”, Rebbi will agree. If he said, “write and deliver,” the Sages will agree. But we deal with the case that he said “give”. Rebbi says, one who says “give” is like one who said “write and deliver,” but the Sages say, one who says “give” is like one who said “free him”.

“If somebody says, give this mina to X because I owe it to him, bring this mina to X for the pledge which he has from me, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so but he himself is responsible until X receives his due.” Rebbi Ila said, a gift is like a debt. “Give this mina to X, bring this mina to X, give this gift document to X, if he wants to change his mind he can(not) do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should return it to the sender, and if that one had died he should give it to the latter’s heirs.” “Acquire this mina for X, accept this mina for X, acquire this gift document for X, accept this gift document for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should deliver it to his heirs. But if he acquired after [X’s] death he should return it to the sender since nobody can acquire documents after his death.” “If somebody says, this mina is for X, take this mina for X, this mina shall be in your hand for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so” because if somebody acquires for another person it cannot be changed.

“If somebody says, give this mina to X because I owe it to him, bring this mina to X for the pledge which he has from me, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so but he himself is responsible until X receives his due.” Rebbi Ila said, a gift is like a debt. “Give this mina to X, bring this mina to X, give this gift document to X, if he wants to change his mind he can(not) do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should return it to the sender, and if that one had died he should give it to the latter’s heirs.” “Acquire this mina for X, accept this mina for X, acquire this gift document for X, accept this gift document for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should deliver it to his heirs. But if he acquired after [X’s] death he should return it to the sender since nobody can acquire documents after his death.” “If somebody says, this mina is for X, take this mina for X, this mina shall be in your hand for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so” because if somebody acquires for another person it cannot be changed.

“If somebody says, give this mina to X because I owe it to him, bring this mina to X for the pledge which he has from me, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so but he himself is responsible until X receives his due.” Rebbi Ila said, a gift is like a debt. “Give this mina to X, bring this mina to X, give this gift document to X, if he wants to change his mind he can(not) do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should return it to the sender, and if that one had died he should give it to the latter’s heirs.” “Acquire this mina for X, accept this mina for X, acquire this gift document for X, accept this gift document for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should deliver it to his heirs. But if he acquired after [X’s] death he should return it to the sender since nobody can acquire documents after his death.” “If somebody says, this mina is for X, take this mina for X, this mina shall be in your hand for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so” because if somebody acquires for another person it cannot be changed.

“ ‘Give this mina to X,’ then he died. If the heirs want to hinder [the delivery] they are powerless. It is unnecessary to say that it is so if he said, acquire for him, if he said, accept by my orders.” Rebbi Abba barMamal said, this baraita refers to a sick person. If he is sick, does he not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him? Rebbi Mana said, I confirmed this by what Rebbi Abba bar Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: They treated verbal instructions by a sick person as if they were written and delivered. But only if he died from that sickness, not if he recovered, he did not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him.

“ ‘Give this mina to X,’ then he died. If the heirs want to hinder [the delivery] they are powerless. It is unnecessary to say that it is so if he said, acquire for him, if he said, accept by my orders.” Rebbi Abba barMamal said, this baraita refers to a sick person. If he is sick, does he not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him? Rebbi Mana said, I confirmed this by what Rebbi Abba bar Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: They treated verbal instructions by a sick person as if they were written and delivered. But only if he died from that sickness, not if he recovered, he did not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him.

“ ‘Give this mina to X,’ then he died. If the heirs want to hinder [the delivery] they are powerless. It is unnecessary to say that it is so if he said, acquire for him, if he said, accept by my orders.” Rebbi Abba barMamal said, this baraita refers to a sick person. If he is sick, does he not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him? Rebbi Mana said, I confirmed this by what Rebbi Abba bar Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: They treated verbal instructions by a sick person as if they were written and delivered. But only if he died from that sickness, not if he recovered, he did not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him.

If a convert died and Jews plundered his property, if there were slaves, either adult or underage, they gain their freedom. Abba Shaul said, the adults gain their freedom, the minors do not become free. Why? They are no longer property after their owner’s death. Then even adults? Rebbi Abba said, since adults are competent to acquire themselves, they gain their freedom. Minors, who are not competent to acquire for themselves, do not gain their freedom. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, practice follows Abba Shaul. The opinions of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi are contradictory. There, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi and Rebbi Yossi ben Shaul in the name of Rebbi said: A person who has given up hope to recover his slave is not entitled to enslave him. They said, what Rebbi Joshua said about enslaving, if he did not give, he did not give; perhaps practice would be to enslave him, therefore he has to write him a bill of manumission. And here, he says so! We heard that Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi taught us that correctly, perhaps practice follows Abba Shaul. The slave girl of Rabba bar Zuṭra ran away and he gave up hope to recover her. He went to ask Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. They said, he is not entitled to enslave her. How is it to write her a bill of manumission? They said to him, if you wrote, you did the right thing. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose: A slave who married as a free person in the presence of his master gained his freedom. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and formulating: If somebody writes a document of preliminary marriage for his slave or a document of definitive marriage for his girl slave, Rebbi says, they acquired, but the Sages say, they did not acquire. The first Tanna follows Rebbi: he acquired.

If a convert died and Jews plundered his property, if there were slaves, either adult or underage, they gain their freedom. Abba Shaul said, the adults gain their freedom, the minors do not become free. Why? They are no longer property after their owner’s death. Then even adults? Rebbi Abba said, since adults are competent to acquire themselves, they gain their freedom. Minors, who are not competent to acquire for themselves, do not gain their freedom. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, practice follows Abba Shaul. The opinions of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi are contradictory. There, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi and Rebbi Yossi ben Shaul in the name of Rebbi said: A person who has given up hope to recover his slave is not entitled to enslave him. They said, what Rebbi Joshua said about enslaving, if he did not give, he did not give; perhaps practice would be to enslave him, therefore he has to write him a bill of manumission. And here, he says so! We heard that Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi taught us that correctly, perhaps practice follows Abba Shaul. The slave girl of Rabba bar Zuṭra ran away and he gave up hope to recover her. He went to ask Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. They said, he is not entitled to enslave her. How is it to write her a bill of manumission? They said to him, if you wrote, you did the right thing. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose: A slave who married as a free person in the presence of his master gained his freedom. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and formulating: If somebody writes a document of preliminary marriage for his slave or a document of definitive marriage for his girl slave, Rebbi says, they acquired, but the Sages say, they did not acquire. The first Tanna follows Rebbi: he acquired.

If a convert died and Jews plundered his property, if there were slaves, either adult or underage, they gain their freedom. Abba Shaul said, the adults gain their freedom, the minors do not become free. Why? They are no longer property after their owner’s death. Then even adults? Rebbi Abba said, since adults are competent to acquire themselves, they gain their freedom. Minors, who are not competent to acquire for themselves, do not gain their freedom. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, practice follows Abba Shaul. The opinions of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi are contradictory. There, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi and Rebbi Yossi ben Shaul in the name of Rebbi said: A person who has given up hope to recover his slave is not entitled to enslave him. They said, what Rebbi Joshua said about enslaving, if he did not give, he did not give; perhaps practice would be to enslave him, therefore he has to write him a bill of manumission. And here, he says so! We heard that Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi taught us that correctly, perhaps practice follows Abba Shaul. The slave girl of Rabba bar Zuṭra ran away and he gave up hope to recover her. He went to ask Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. They said, he is not entitled to enslave her. How is it to write her a bill of manumission? They said to him, if you wrote, you did the right thing. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose: A slave who married as a free person in the presence of his master gained his freedom. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and formulating: If somebody writes a document of preliminary marriage for his slave or a document of definitive marriage for his girl slave, Rebbi says, they acquired, but the Sages say, they did not acquire. The first Tanna follows Rebbi: he acquired.

The Mishnah is Rebbi Meїr’s, since Rebbi Meїr says that a Gentile may not acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to remove it from tithes; Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, a Gentile may acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to free it from tithes. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The reason of Rebbi Meïr (Lev. 25:46): “You shall transmit them by inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit by the rules of real estate.” This brackets slaves with real estate. Just as you may buy slaves from them but they cannot buy from you, so real estate you may buy from them but they cannot buy from you. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yasa, the following supports Rebbi Meїr (Lev. 25:23): “The land shall not be sold permanently,” absolutely. He said to him, that in itself supports Rebbi Simeon. “It shall not be sold”, because if it was sold, it would be sold absolutely. Rebbi Huna from Sepphoris said, Rebbi Ḥanina instituted in Sepphoris following Rebbi Simeon.