acquires

It is by this means, by taking up into itself the noblest elements, that the soul is established in purity, and having fixed its aim on piety, the noblest goal of all, it uses this as its infallible guide and so acquires a definite purpose.

All classes and conditions of men will rise from the dead in the state of the perfect form of Christ, about thirty-three years of age, even as our Redeemer rose from the grave. We shall rise with all our limbs perfect, and with the same constitutions, without addition or diminution. Some say that the hair and nails and prepuce will rise, and some say they will not; as if they were superfluous for the completion of the nature of man. Some say concerning the resurrection that a likeness only will rise, without parts and without the ■composition of the limbs of man; a mere similitude of hands and feet and hardness of bones. Others say that the whole man will be cast into one crystalline substance, and that all his parts will be mingled together; and they do not grant him an ordered arrangement of composition. Others say that the vessels which are inside the belly, such as the bowels, liver, etc., will not rise; but they err and stray from the truth, and do not understand that if one of the parts of the body perish, it is not perfect. For Paul shewed plainly and laid down an example of the resurrection in the grain of wheat: just as that grows up entire with its glory, without any portion of it having perished, even so we; for the whole man shall rise with all his limbs and parts, and ordered in his composition as now, only having acquired purification from the humours. And this is not surprising, that if an earthen vessel acquires firmness and lightness when it goes into the fiery furnace, without any change taking place in its shape or form, but is lightened of its heaviness and density, whilst it preserves its shape uninjured; so also should the Holy Spirit burn us in the furnace of the resurrection and drive, forth from us all the foul material of the present (life), and clothe us with incorruptibility. ‘ It is sown an animal body; it rises a spiritual We shall neither see nor hear with all our bodily members, although some men have thought that the whole man will be sight and hearing; but we shall carry out action with these same usual limbs, if it happen to be necessary; although we shall not there need speech and conversation with one another, because each other’s secrets will be revealed to us.

If he does not recognize [any tree or fence], or if he is not familiar with the halakhah, and said, “Let my present position be my Shabbat place”, his position acquires for him the right of movement two thousand cubits in any direction. In a circle, the words of Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus. But the sages say: the distances are square, in the shape of a square tablet, so that he may gain the area of the corners.

A man may give a ma’ah to a shopkeeper or a baker in order to acquire a share in the eruv, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. The sages say: his money acquires no share for him They agree that in the case of all other men his money may acquire [an eruv for him], Since they do not prepare an eruv except with one’s consent. Rabbi Judah says: To what does this apply? To Shabbat border eruvin, but in the case of courtyard eruvin they prepare an eruv with his consent and without his consent, since they confer a benefit on a person in his absence but they do not confer a disability on a person except in his presence.

If a man says to his children, “Behold, I am going to slaughter the pesah on behalf of whichever of you goes up first to Jerusalem,” as soon as the first has put his head and the greater part of his body [into Jerusalem] he has acquired his portion, and he acquires it on behalf of his brothers with him. One may always register for it as long as there is as much as an olive’s worth for each one [registered]. They may register and withdraw their hands from it until it has been slaughtered; Rabbi Shimon says: until the blood is sprinkled.

He who performs halitzah with his yevamah, behold he is regarded as one of the other brothers in respect of inheritance. If the father was living, the estate belongs to the father. He who marries his yevamah acquires his brother’s estate. R. Judah said: in either case, if the father was living the estate belongs to the father. He who performs halitzah with his yevamah, he is forbidden to marry her relatives and she is forbidden to marry his relatives: He is forbidden to marry her mother, her mother’s mother and her father’s mother; her daughter, her daughter’s daughter and her son’s daughter; and also her sister while she is alive. The other brothers are permitted. She is forbidden to marry his father and his father’s father; his son and his son’s son; his brother and his brother’s son. A man is permitted to marry the relative of the rival of his halutzah but is forbidden to marry the rival of the relative of his halutzah.

If a woman came into the possession of property before she was betrothed, Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that she may sell it or give it away and her act is legally valid. If she came into the possession of property after she was betrothed, Bet Shammai says: she may sell it, and Beth Hillel says: she may not sell it. Both agree that if she had sold it or given it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Judah said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also acquire her property?” If she came into the possession of property after she was married, both agree that, even if she had sold it or given it away, the husband may seize it from the buyers. [If she came into possession] before she married and then she married, Rabban Gamaliel says: if she sold it or gave it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Hanina ben Akavya said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also gain acquires her property?” He replied, “We are embarrassed with regard to her new possessions and you wish to roll over on us her old ones as well?”

If a woman came into the possession of property before she was betrothed, Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that she may sell it or give it away and her act is legally valid. If she came into the possession of property after she was betrothed, Bet Shammai says: she may sell it, and Beth Hillel says: she may not sell it. Both agree that if she had sold it or given it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Judah said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also acquire her property?” If she came into the possession of property after she was married, both agree that, even if she had sold it or given it away, the husband may seize it from the buyers. [If she came into possession] before she married and then she married, Rabban Gamaliel says: if she sold it or gave it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Hanina ben Akavya said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also gain acquires her property?” He replied, “We are embarrassed with regard to her new possessions and you wish to roll over on us her old ones as well?”

If a woman came into the possession of property before she was betrothed, Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that she may sell it or give it away and her act is legally valid. If she came into the possession of property after she was betrothed, Bet Shammai says: she may sell it, and Beth Hillel says: she may not sell it. Both agree that if she had sold it or given it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Judah said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also acquire her property?” If she came into the possession of property after she was married, both agree that, even if she had sold it or given it away, the husband may seize it from the buyers. [If she came into possession] before she married and then she married, Rabban Gamaliel says: if she sold it or gave it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Hanina ben Akavya said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also gain acquires her property?” He replied, “We are embarrassed with regard to her new possessions and you wish to roll over on us her old ones as well?”

If his brother left money, land shall be bought with it and he enjoys the usufruct. Rabbi Meir says, the land is to be valued as to how much it is worth with the produce and how much without the produce, and with the difference land should be bought and the husband is entitled to the usufruct. [If the his brother left] produce that was detached from the ground, land shall be bought [out of the proceeds] and he enjoys the usufruct. The Sages say: produce attached to the ground belongs to the husband but that which is detached from the ground belongs to the first person who takes it: [If it was] produce attached to the ground: If he [seized it] first he acquires ownership; and if she [seized it] first land shall be bought with it and he enjoys the usufruct. If he married her she is his wife in every respect save that her ketubah remains a debt on her first husband’s estate.

If he left produce that was detached from the ground, whoever seizes it first acquires possession. If the wife took possession of more than the amount of her ketubah, or a creditor of more than the value of his debt, the balance: Rabbi Tarfon says: it should be given to the one who is under the greatest disadvantage. Rabbi Akiva says: we do not show mercy in a matter of law. Rather it shall be given to the heirs, for whereas all the others must take an oath the heirs need not take any oath.

If a woman waits for a yavam, whether for one or for two [yevamim]: Rabbi Eliezer says: he can annul [her vows]. Rabbi Joshua says: [only if she waits] for one, but not for two. Rabbi Akiva says: neither for one nor for two. Rabbi Eliezer said: if a man can annul the vows of a woman whom he himself acquired, isn’t it logical that can he annul those of a woman bequeathed to him by Heaven! Rabbi Akiva said to him: No! If you speak of a woman whom he himself acquires, that is because others have no rights in her; will you say [the same] of a woman given to him by Heaven, in whom others too have rights! Rabbi Joshua said to him: Akiva, your words apply to two yevamim; but what will you answer if there is only one yavam? He (Rabbi Akiva) said to him (Rabbi Joshua): the yevamah is not as completely acquired to the yavam as a betrothed girl is to her [betrothed] husband.

A woman is acquired in three ways and acquires herself in two: She is acquired by money, by document, or by intercourse. “By money”: Bet Shammai says: a denar or the equivalent of a denar; Bet Hillel says: a perutah or the equivalent of a perutah. And how much is a perutah? An eighth of an Italian issar. And she acquires herself by divorce or by her husband's death. A yevamah is acquired by intercourse. And she acquires herself by halitzah or by the yavam’s death.

A woman is acquired in three ways and acquires herself in two: She is acquired by money, by document, or by intercourse. “By money”: Bet Shammai says: a denar or the equivalent of a denar; Bet Hillel says: a perutah or the equivalent of a perutah. And how much is a perutah? An eighth of an Italian issar. And she acquires herself by divorce or by her husband's death. A yevamah is acquired by intercourse. And she acquires herself by halitzah or by the yavam’s death.

A woman is acquired in three ways and acquires herself in two: She is acquired by money, by document, or by intercourse. “By money”: Bet Shammai says: a denar or the equivalent of a denar; Bet Hillel says: a perutah or the equivalent of a perutah. And how much is a perutah? An eighth of an Italian issar. And she acquires herself by divorce or by her husband's death. A yevamah is acquired by intercourse. And she acquires herself by halitzah or by the yavam’s death.

A Hebrew slave is acquired by money and by document; And acquires himself by years, by Jubilee, and by deduction from the purchase price. A Hebrew maidservant is greater in that she acquires herself by ‘signs [of physical maturity]’. He whose ear is bored is acquired by boring, and acquires himself by Jubilee or his master's death.

A Hebrew slave is acquired by money and by document; And acquires himself by years, by Jubilee, and by deduction from the purchase price. A Hebrew maidservant is greater in that she acquires herself by ‘signs [of physical maturity]’. He whose ear is bored is acquired by boring, and acquires himself by Jubilee or his master's death.

A Hebrew slave is acquired by money and by document; And acquires himself by years, by Jubilee, and by deduction from the purchase price. A Hebrew maidservant is greater in that she acquires herself by ‘signs [of physical maturity]’. He whose ear is bored is acquired by boring, and acquires himself by Jubilee or his master's death.

A Canaanite slave is acquired by money, deed, or by possession, And acquires himself by money through the agency of others, and by document through his own agency, the words of Rabbi Meir. The Sages say: by money, through his own agency, and by document, through the agency of others, providing that the money comes from others.

If a man saw lost property and fell upon it and someone else came along and seized it, he that seized it acquired it. If a man saw people running [in his field] after lost property [such as] a deer with a broken leg, or pigeons that couldn’t fly, and he said, “My field acquires [them] for me”, he has acquired them. But if the deer was running normally or the pigeons flying, and he said, “My field acquires [them] for me”, he has said nothing.

If a man saw lost property and fell upon it and someone else came along and seized it, he that seized it acquired it. If a man saw people running [in his field] after lost property [such as] a deer with a broken leg, or pigeons that couldn’t fly, and he said, “My field acquires [them] for me”, he has acquired them. But if the deer was running normally or the pigeons flying, and he said, “My field acquires [them] for me”, he has said nothing.

Gold acquires silver, but silver does not acquire gold. Copper acquires silver, but silver does not acquire copper. Bad coins acquire good coins but good coins do not acquire bad coins. An unminted coin acquires a minted coin, but a minted coin does not acquire an unminted coin. Movable property acquires coined money, but coined money does not acquire movable property. This is the general rule: movable property acquires other movable property.

Gold acquires silver, but silver does not acquire gold. Copper acquires silver, but silver does not acquire copper. Bad coins acquire good coins but good coins do not acquire bad coins. An unminted coin acquires a minted coin, but a minted coin does not acquire an unminted coin. Movable property acquires coined money, but coined money does not acquire movable property. This is the general rule: movable property acquires other movable property.

Gold acquires silver, but silver does not acquire gold. Copper acquires silver, but silver does not acquire copper. Bad coins acquire good coins but good coins do not acquire bad coins. An unminted coin acquires a minted coin, but a minted coin does not acquire an unminted coin. Movable property acquires coined money, but coined money does not acquire movable property. This is the general rule: movable property acquires other movable property.

Gold acquires silver, but silver does not acquire gold. Copper acquires silver, but silver does not acquire copper. Bad coins acquire good coins but good coins do not acquire bad coins. An unminted coin acquires a minted coin, but a minted coin does not acquire an unminted coin. Movable property acquires coined money, but coined money does not acquire movable property. This is the general rule: movable property acquires other movable property.

Gold acquires silver, but silver does not acquire gold. Copper acquires silver, but silver does not acquire copper. Bad coins acquire good coins but good coins do not acquire bad coins. An unminted coin acquires a minted coin, but a minted coin does not acquire an unminted coin. Movable property acquires coined money, but coined money does not acquire movable property. This is the general rule: movable property acquires other movable property.

He used to say: The more flesh, the more worms; The more property, the more anxiety; The more wives, the more witchcraft; The more female slaves, the more lewdness; The more slaves, the more robbery; [But] the more Torah, the more life; The more sitting [in the company of scholars], the more wisdom; The more counsel, the more understanding; The more charity, the more peace. If one acquires a good name, he has acquired something for himself; If one acquires for himself knowledge of Torah, he has acquired life in the world to come.

He used to say: The more flesh, the more worms; The more property, the more anxiety; The more wives, the more witchcraft; The more female slaves, the more lewdness; The more slaves, the more robbery; [But] the more Torah, the more life; The more sitting [in the company of scholars], the more wisdom; The more counsel, the more understanding; The more charity, the more peace. If one acquires a good name, he has acquired something for himself; If one acquires for himself knowledge of Torah, he has acquired life in the world to come.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob said: he who performs one commandment acquires for himself one advocate, and he who commits one transgression acquires for himself one accuser. Repentance and good deeds are a shield against punishment. Rabbi Yochanan Hasandlar said: every assembly which is for the sake of heaven, will in the end endure; and every assembly which is not for the sake of heaven, will not endure in the end.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob said: he who performs one commandment acquires for himself one advocate, and he who commits one transgression acquires for himself one accuser. Repentance and good deeds are a shield against punishment. Rabbi Yochanan Hasandlar said: every assembly which is for the sake of heaven, will in the end endure; and every assembly which is not for the sake of heaven, will not endure in the end.

All sloping [parts] of ‘tents’ are reckoned like ‘tents.' A ‘tent’ [whose sides] sloped downwards and finished off one fingerbreadth [from the ground]: If there is uncleanness in the ‘tent’, vessels beneath the slope become unclean. If there is uncleanness beneath the slope, vessels in the ‘tent’ become unclean. If there is uncleanness within, a person who touches [the tent] from the inside acquires a seven [days’] defilement, but from the outside, a defilement [lasting till] evening. If there had been uncleanness outside, a person who touches the ‘tent’ from the outside acquires a seven [days’] defilement, but from the inside, a defilement [lasting till] evening. If there was [a portion of uncleanness] the size of half an olive [touching it] from inside and half an olive from the outside, a person who touches [the ‘tent’] either from within or without acquires a defilement [lasting till] evening. If a part [of the ‘tent’ side] trailed along the ground, when there is uncleanness beneath or above [this part], the uncleanness cleaves upwards and downwards. [In the case of] a ‘tent’ erected in an upper story, with a portion [of its side] trailing over the hatch between the house and the upper story: Rabbi Yose says it does protect. Rabbi Shimon says: it does not protect unless it put up in the usual manner of erecting tents.

All sloping [parts] of ‘tents’ are reckoned like ‘tents.' A ‘tent’ [whose sides] sloped downwards and finished off one fingerbreadth [from the ground]: If there is uncleanness in the ‘tent’, vessels beneath the slope become unclean. If there is uncleanness beneath the slope, vessels in the ‘tent’ become unclean. If there is uncleanness within, a person who touches [the tent] from the inside acquires a seven [days’] defilement, but from the outside, a defilement [lasting till] evening. If there had been uncleanness outside, a person who touches the ‘tent’ from the outside acquires a seven [days’] defilement, but from the inside, a defilement [lasting till] evening. If there was [a portion of uncleanness] the size of half an olive [touching it] from inside and half an olive from the outside, a person who touches [the ‘tent’] either from within or without acquires a defilement [lasting till] evening. If a part [of the ‘tent’ side] trailed along the ground, when there is uncleanness beneath or above [this part], the uncleanness cleaves upwards and downwards. [In the case of] a ‘tent’ erected in an upper story, with a portion [of its side] trailing over the hatch between the house and the upper story: Rabbi Yose says it does protect. Rabbi Shimon says: it does not protect unless it put up in the usual manner of erecting tents.

All sloping [parts] of ‘tents’ are reckoned like ‘tents.' A ‘tent’ [whose sides] sloped downwards and finished off one fingerbreadth [from the ground]: If there is uncleanness in the ‘tent’, vessels beneath the slope become unclean. If there is uncleanness beneath the slope, vessels in the ‘tent’ become unclean. If there is uncleanness within, a person who touches [the tent] from the inside acquires a seven [days’] defilement, but from the outside, a defilement [lasting till] evening. If there had been uncleanness outside, a person who touches the ‘tent’ from the outside acquires a seven [days’] defilement, but from the inside, a defilement [lasting till] evening. If there was [a portion of uncleanness] the size of half an olive [touching it] from inside and half an olive from the outside, a person who touches [the ‘tent’] either from within or without acquires a defilement [lasting till] evening. If a part [of the ‘tent’ side] trailed along the ground, when there is uncleanness beneath or above [this part], the uncleanness cleaves upwards and downwards. [In the case of] a ‘tent’ erected in an upper story, with a portion [of its side] trailing over the hatch between the house and the upper story: Rabbi Yose says it does protect. Rabbi Shimon says: it does not protect unless it put up in the usual manner of erecting tents.

A girl of the age of three years and one day may be betrothed by intercourse and if a yavam had intercourse with her, he acquires her thereby. One can be liable for adultery with her; And she defiles the one who had intercourse with her so that he in turn conveys uncleanness to a couch underneath as to a cover above. If she was married to a priest, she may eat terumah. If any of the disqualified men have relations with her he disqualifies her from the priesthood. If any of the forbidden relatives found in the Torah had relations with her he is to be executed on her account, but she is exempt [from the penalty]. If she was younger than this age, intercourse with her is like putting a finger in the eye.

If a boy the age of nine years and one day had relations with his yevamah, he acquires her thereby; But he cannot divorce her until he is of majority age. He contracts uncleanness through intercourse with a menstruant so that he in turn conveys uncleanness to a couch underneath as to a cover above. He disqualifies a woman from the priesthood. But he doesn't give her the right to eat terumah. He renders a beast invalid for the altar, and it is stoned on his account. If he had intercourse with any of the forbidden relations mentioned in the Torah, she is to be executed on his account, but he is exempt from punishment.

King Monobaz distributed all his property to the poor. His relatives sent to him: Your forefathers added to what they had and to what their forefathers had, and you wasted yours and that of your forefathers. He said to them, that is correct! My forefathers locked it up in the earth, I locked it up in Heaven, as it is said (Ps. 85:12): “Truth will sprout from the earth, but charity will gaze from Heaven.” My fathers locked up treasures that bring no interest, but I locked up treasures that bring interest as it is said (Is. 3:10): “Say to the giver of charity that he did a good deed, that they will eat the fruits of their intentions.” My forefathers collected in a place over which a (human) hand rules, but I collected in a place over which no hand rules, as it is said (Ps. 97:2): “Charity and truth are the foundations of His throne.” My forefathers collected money but I collected souls, as it is said (Prov. 11:30): “He who acquires souls is wise.” My forefathers collected for others but I collected for myself, as it is said (Deut. 24:13): “Charity will be your property.” My forefathers collected in this world but I collected for the future world, as it is said (Prov. 10:2): “But charity will save from death.” And does he not die? But that he should not die an eternal death in the future world.

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Abba Cohen Bar Dalaia: A person acquires a find within four cubits of himself. What is the reason? (1Chr. 22:14) “Look, in my poverty I prepared for the House of the Eternal 100’000 kikkar of gold, 1’000’000 kikkar of silver, bronze and iron unweighed because it was so much, I prepared wood and stones, and you should add to them.”

From where that gleanings in doubt are gleanings? Rebbi Samuel ben Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: “Poor and rich, justify him” in his gifts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Bar Qappara: (Ex. 23:6) “Do not bend the lawsuit of your destitute.” In his lawsuit, you may not bend, but you may bend for him in his gifts. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he acquires in this case, as Rebbi instructed us (Lev. 19:10, 23:22): “abandon,” put something before him of your own. Rebbi La said, it is written (Deut. 24:19–21): “It shall be the sojourner’s, the orphan’s, and the widow’s;” give him both from yours and from his!

It was stated: “One may say to his worker: Here you have a denar, use it for food, here you have a denar, use it for drink, and not be worried about either the Sabbatical year, tithes, or wine for libations. But if he told him, go and buy yourself a loaf and I shall give you the money, go and buy yourself a reviït of wine and I shall give you the money, he has to worry because of the Sabbatical year, tithes, and wine used for libations.” Rebbi Zeïra said, the grocer becomes the plenipotentiary of the employer to let the worker acquire. Rebbi Hila said, the worker acquired for the employer from the grocer and then acquires it himself. What is the difference between them? If the grocer was deaf-mute. According to Rebbi Zeïra, he does not have to worry because a deaf-mute cannot become a plenipotentiary; according to Rebbi Hila, he has to worry.

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yose said, this means that it is forbidden to acquire a wife with Sabbatical money. For if it is not so, what is the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl?

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yose said, this means that it is forbidden to acquire a wife with Sabbatical money. For if it is not so, what is the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl?

Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody wanted to change his mind after he had promised a gift to another person, he may change his mind. Rebbi Yose was with Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi; he said to him: Is that just no (Lev. 19:36) “and just yes?” He said, when he said it, it was a just yes. Rav disagrees since Rav said, when I tell my family to give a gift to somebody, I never change my mind. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “ Where did they say that movables are acquired by being drawn close? In the public domain or in a courtyard which is not their joint property. In the domain of the buyer, when the deal was accepted; in the domain of the seller one never acquires until either he lift it up or he draw and remove everything from the prior owner’s property. In the domain of a depositary he cannot acquire unless he gave permission or rented their place out to him.” What does Rav do with this? One is if he was standing with him, the other if he was not standing with him. Rav disagrees since Rav said, when I tell my family to give a gift to somebody, I never change my mind. You should know because somebody had given surety on salt; it rose in price. He came before Rav who said, either he should give corresponding to the surety or he should be given up to “Him who made pay”. The arguments of Rav are contradictory. There he says, when I tell my family to give a gift to somebody, I never change my mind and here he says so? There it is for a legal rule; what Rav did himself was a measure of piety.

Rebbi Jeremiah said, who is the Tanna of “one does not sell it”? Rebbi Meїr! But for Rebbi Jehudah it should be logical that it be permitted to be sold, by an argument a minore ad majus: If it is permitted to sell Sabbatical produce with which one may not liquidate one’s debts, it is logical that it should be permitted to sell Second Tithe since with it one may liquidate one’s debts. We find that one may liquidate one’s debts with Second Tithe, following what we stated: “If he took from him tithe worth one tetradrachma and did not come to exchange it until it was worth two.” Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference since from the start the value of Second Tithe was due. If he had owed before, it would be an argument. Rebbi Yudan said, a Mishnah said that it is forbidden to sell it, as we stated there: “If intentional, he married, if in error, he did not marry.” If you say that he may sell it, he should be able to use it for marriage but anything he may not sell he may not use for marriage. But did we not state: “One does not buy slaves, real estate, and unclean animals from Sabbatical money. If he bought them, he has to eat their worth.” Rebbi Yose said, this means that it is forbidden to acquire a wife with Sabbatical money. Otherwise, what is the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Zeïra, Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Ila, everybody agrees because of these arguments. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, everybody agrees that all should need the enclosures.

Rebbi Jeremiah said, who is the Tanna of “one does not sell it”? Rebbi Meїr! But for Rebbi Jehudah it should be logical that it be permitted to be sold, by an argument a minore ad majus: If it is permitted to sell Sabbatical produce with which one may not liquidate one’s debts, it is logical that it should be permitted to sell Second Tithe since with it one may liquidate one’s debts. We find that one may liquidate one’s debts with Second Tithe, following what we stated: “If he took from him tithe worth one tetradrachma and did not come to exchange it until it was worth two.” Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference since from the start the value of Second Tithe was due. If he had owed before, it would be an argument. Rebbi Yudan said, a Mishnah said that it is forbidden to sell it, as we stated there: “If intentional, he married, if in error, he did not marry.” If you say that he may sell it, he should be able to use it for marriage but anything he may not sell he may not use for marriage. But did we not state: “One does not buy slaves, real estate, and unclean animals from Sabbatical money. If he bought them, he has to eat their worth.” Rebbi Yose said, this means that it is forbidden to acquire a wife with Sabbatical money. Otherwise, what is the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Zeïra, Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Ila, everybody agrees because of these arguments. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, everybody agrees that all should need the enclosures.

“Rebbi Jehudah said, when is this? When the ship touches ground.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, Rebbi Jehudah follows his opinion since Rebbi Jehudah exempts water, as it has no consistency. Rebbi Abin said, it is more reasonable to assume his opinion changed; if the ship does not touch ground, would it not be as if the ship touched ground? If the ship does not touch ground, its tithes are of practice; one tithes from it for a flower pot without hole and from a flower pot without hole for it, as it was stated: “The tithes from a flower pot without hole are of practice, its heave does not create dema‘ and one does not owe a fifth for it.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If somebody acquires a flower pot with a hole in Syria, even if he did not acquire the earth under it or the ground on which it stands, he acquired it to be obligated for tithes and the Sabbatical, even if it sits on two pegs. Even Rebbi Jehudah will agree with this. What is the difference between this case and that of a ship? A ship rises and falls, this [flower pot] rests in its place.

There we have stated: “A flask which had been immersed on the same day and [they filled it] from an amphora with ṭevel tithe, if he said that this shall be heave of the tithe after nightfall then it is heave of the tithe. If he said this is eruv, he did not say anything.” Rebbi Jonah said, Rebbi Ḥama bar (Aqiba) [Uqba] asked, is this Mishnah not following Rebbi Eliezer, since Rebbi Eliezer said, one does not make an eruv for a person after nightfall? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: There it is everybody’s opinion. But here he acquires a place for Sabbath rest for two days while it still is a working day. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked, if it was Thursday and he said, this should acquire for me a place for Sabbath rest, in Rebbi Eliezer’s opinion he acquired, in (Rav’s) [the rabbis’] opinion did he not acquire? Rebbi Yose said, why can a person not make an eruv from holiday to Sabbath? Because a person makes an eruv from Sabbath eve to the Sabbath. But here, since he can make an eruv from Sabbath eve to the Sabbath, he may make an eruv even from Thursday to the Sabbath. “Rebbi Eliezer said to them, do you not agree with me that if he used a loaf to make an eruv for the first day, that he may use a loaf to make an eruv for the second day, that if he ate it on the first day it is an eruv for the first day but is not an eruv for the second? Therefore these are two sanctities. They answered him, do you not agree with us that a person does not make a new eruv on a holiday? Therefore it is one sanctity.”

HALAKHAH: Paragraph. “Rebbi Aqiba told them, do you not agree with me,” etc. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. The one who acquires rest in a fore-court has it easier than one who puts his eruv in a fore-court. He who acquires rest in a fore-court walks in its entirety and outside of it 2’000 cubits. He who puts his eruv in a fore-court only has 2’000 cubits from the place of his eruv. Rebbi Zeˋira asked: If one said, rest should be acquired for me in the fore-court? Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel said, this is the disagreement of Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Meïr is of the opinion, the main point of an eruv is by a loaf. If he puts his eruv in a fore-court he only has 2’000 cubits from the place of his eruv. Rebbi Jehudah said, the main point of an eruv is by his feet. If he said, rest should be acquired for me in the fore-court, he walks in its entirety and outside of it 2’000 cubits.

HALAKHAH: Paragraph. “Rebbi Aqiba told them, do you not agree with me,” etc. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. The one who acquires rest in a fore-court has it easier than one who puts his eruv in a fore-court. He who acquires rest in a fore-court walks in its entirety and outside of it 2’000 cubits. He who puts his eruv in a fore-court only has 2’000 cubits from the place of his eruv. Rebbi Zeˋira asked: If one said, rest should be acquired for me in the fore-court? Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel said, this is the disagreement of Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Meïr is of the opinion, the main point of an eruv is by a loaf. If he puts his eruv in a fore-court he only has 2’000 cubits from the place of his eruv. Rebbi Jehudah said, the main point of an eruv is by his feet. If he said, rest should be acquired for me in the fore-court, he walks in its entirety and outside of it 2’000 cubits.

MISHNAH: If one says to his children, I am going to slaughter the Pesaḥ in the name of whoever of you will come first to Jerusalem. When the first of them entered with his head and most of his body, he acquired his part and acquires for his siblings with him. Forever one subscribes to it as long as there is the volume of an olive for each participant. One subscribes to it or cancels until it has been slaughtered; Rebbi Simeon says until the blood is poured.

“From where that just as one prepares another Cohen in his stead for maybe a disability will happen to him, so one preliminarily marries to him another wife in case something happen to his wife, as it is said, and he atone for himself and for his house; his house is his wife, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yose said to him, in that case there is no end to it, maybe not only this wife but also the other wife would die.” Rebbi Mana said, before you question Rebbi Jehudah, question Rebbi Jehudah, question the rabbis! Maybe an emission would happen both to this Cohen and to the other Cohen. Emissions are frequent, death is not frequent. They decided about what is frequent, but did not decide about what is infrequent. We find that Rebbi Jehudah said, death is frequent; that is what we have stated there: “Rebbi Jehudah says, one also prepares for him another wife, maybe his wife would die.” There we have stated: “One who brings a bill of divorce and left him old or sick, delivers to her under the presumption that the man be alive.” There you are saying, death is infrequent, and here you are saying, death is frequent. There it is a private matter, here a public act. Is one more restrictive in public acts, as we have stated: “Rebbi Jehudah says, there was no horn for nests in Jerusalem because of mixing, maybe one of them would die and it would turn out that money of purification sacrifices that must be left to die is mixed up in the offering.” Could he not preliminarily marry her yesterday? And he atone for himself and for his house; but not for two houses. Rebbi Gamliel bar Inyani asked before Rebbi Mana: Is he not like one who acquires something on the Sabbath? He answered him, it is because they permitted Sabbath restriction in the Sanctuary. Rebbi Mana said, this implies that those who marry a widow must take her in when it is still daytime, lest he be like someone who acquires on the Sabbath.

“From where that just as one prepares another Cohen in his stead for maybe a disability will happen to him, so one preliminarily marries to him another wife in case something happen to his wife, as it is said, and he atone for himself and for his house; his house is his wife, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yose said to him, in that case there is no end to it, maybe not only this wife but also the other wife would die.” Rebbi Mana said, before you question Rebbi Jehudah, question Rebbi Jehudah, question the rabbis! Maybe an emission would happen both to this Cohen and to the other Cohen. Emissions are frequent, death is not frequent. They decided about what is frequent, but did not decide about what is infrequent. We find that Rebbi Jehudah said, death is frequent; that is what we have stated there: “Rebbi Jehudah says, one also prepares for him another wife, maybe his wife would die.” There we have stated: “One who brings a bill of divorce and left him old or sick, delivers to her under the presumption that the man be alive.” There you are saying, death is infrequent, and here you are saying, death is frequent. There it is a private matter, here a public act. Is one more restrictive in public acts, as we have stated: “Rebbi Jehudah says, there was no horn for nests in Jerusalem because of mixing, maybe one of them would die and it would turn out that money of purification sacrifices that must be left to die is mixed up in the offering.” Could he not preliminarily marry her yesterday? And he atone for himself and for his house; but not for two houses. Rebbi Gamliel bar Inyani asked before Rebbi Mana: Is he not like one who acquires something on the Sabbath? He answered him, it is because they permitted Sabbath restriction in the Sanctuary. Rebbi Mana said, this implies that those who marry a widow must take her in when it is still daytime, lest he be like someone who acquires on the Sabbath.

Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.

Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for qiddushin of a woman. Just as qiddushin acquire completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.”

Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for qiddushin of a woman. Just as qiddushin acquire completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.”

Both the rabbis and Rebbi Simeon agree to the following. According to the rabbis, the aspect which “bespeaking” acquires is forbidden in the co-wife, the aspect which “bespeaking” does not acquire is permitted in the co-wife; therefore, the latter has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. According to Rebbi Simeon, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are permitted. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second one permitted. Out of doubt, she has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. What is the difference between them? If he slept with the second one. In the opinion of the rabbis, an incestuous intercourse because he had “bespoken”. Therefore, if he had not “bespoken” she may have levirate and there is no candidacy at all. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I explained that following what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. He had in her an interest of candidacy. When she died, the candidacy was eliminated. And here, when he died, the candidacy was eliminated.

Both the rabbis and Rebbi Simeon agree to the following. According to the rabbis, the aspect which “bespeaking” acquires is forbidden in the co-wife, the aspect which “bespeaking” does not acquire is permitted in the co-wife; therefore, the latter has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. According to Rebbi Simeon, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are permitted. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second one permitted. Out of doubt, she has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. What is the difference between them? If he slept with the second one. In the opinion of the rabbis, an incestuous intercourse because he had “bespoken”. Therefore, if he had not “bespoken” she may have levirate and there is no candidacy at all. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I explained that following what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. He had in her an interest of candidacy. When she died, the candidacy was eliminated. And here, when he died, the candidacy was eliminated.

HALAKHAH: “If there were two brothers, one of them died”, etc. Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, and you say so? May one permit levirate with the “bespoken” woman? One should suspect that “bespeaking” does not acquire; then he would be guilty because of “wife of his brother who did not live in his world.” Can the “bespoken” one perform ḥalîṣah? Should one not suspect that “bespeaking” does acquire; then the second {widow] is a candidate for [the third brother]. It must be that Rebbi Simeon refers to the first case.

What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah.

Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Sheshet: There, one stated: The words of Rebbi Simeon are that both are forbidden. This is difficult. If “bespeaking” acquires, are not both permitted? This is a question of acquiring not by “bespeaking” but by candidacy. This is difficult. If candidacy acquires, both are permitted. If candidacy does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second permitted. Maybe candidacy for Rebbi Simeon is like “bespeaking” for the rabbis. Just as the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, candidacy acquires but leaves a remainder. This is difficult. That aspect which is acquired by candidacy implies a prohibition of an equal part of the co-wife, that part which is not acquired by candidacy implies permission of an equal aspect of the co-wife! Shammai said, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions? What does he mean? As Rebbi Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya, the aspect acquired in any sister-in-law which is not totally inside [the family] is considered to be under the incest prohibition and an incest prohibition frees her co-wife.

Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Sheshet: There, one stated: The words of Rebbi Simeon are that both are forbidden. This is difficult. If “bespeaking” acquires, are not both permitted? This is a question of acquiring not by “bespeaking” but by candidacy. This is difficult. If candidacy acquires, both are permitted. If candidacy does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second permitted. Maybe candidacy for Rebbi Simeon is like “bespeaking” for the rabbis. Just as the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, candidacy acquires but leaves a remainder. This is difficult. That aspect which is acquired by candidacy implies a prohibition of an equal part of the co-wife, that part which is not acquired by candidacy implies permission of an equal aspect of the co-wife! Shammai said, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions? What does he mean? As Rebbi Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya, the aspect acquired in any sister-in-law which is not totally inside [the family] is considered to be under the incest prohibition and an incest prohibition frees her co-wife.

Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Sheshet: There, one stated: The words of Rebbi Simeon are that both are forbidden. This is difficult. If “bespeaking” acquires, are not both permitted? This is a question of acquiring not by “bespeaking” but by candidacy. This is difficult. If candidacy acquires, both are permitted. If candidacy does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second permitted. Maybe candidacy for Rebbi Simeon is like “bespeaking” for the rabbis. Just as the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, candidacy acquires but leaves a remainder. This is difficult. That aspect which is acquired by candidacy implies a prohibition of an equal part of the co-wife, that part which is not acquired by candidacy implies permission of an equal aspect of the co-wife! Shammai said, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions? What does he mean? As Rebbi Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya, the aspect acquired in any sister-in-law which is not totally inside [the family] is considered to be under the incest prohibition and an incest prohibition frees her co-wife.

Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Sheshet: There, one stated: The words of Rebbi Simeon are that both are forbidden. This is difficult. If “bespeaking” acquires, are not both permitted? This is a question of acquiring not by “bespeaking” but by candidacy. This is difficult. If candidacy acquires, both are permitted. If candidacy does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second permitted. Maybe candidacy for Rebbi Simeon is like “bespeaking” for the rabbis. Just as the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, candidacy acquires but leaves a remainder. This is difficult. That aspect which is acquired by candidacy implies a prohibition of an equal part of the co-wife, that part which is not acquired by candidacy implies permission of an equal aspect of the co-wife! Shammai said, is this kind of argument applicable to incest prohibitions? What does he mean? As Rebbi Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya, the aspect acquired in any sister-in-law which is not totally inside [the family] is considered to be under the incest prohibition and an incest prohibition frees her co-wife.

HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. Do the House of Shammai follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely? If they would follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, in case he had divorced the “bespoken” widow, she would not need ḥalîṣah! But Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the House of Shammai agree that if he divorced the “bespoken”, she needs ḥalîṣah! It must be they follow Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. If they would follow Rebbi Simeon, in any case, if “bespeaking” acquires, nothing follows it. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, why “his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”? Maybe “bespeaking” for the House of Shammai is like candidacy for Rebbi Simeon in the interpretation of the rabbis there. As the rabbis there say, “bespeaking” acquires and leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, [candidacy] acquires and leaves a remainder. Rebbi Simeon says, no candidacy can come after a candidacy, so the House of Shammai say here, no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”.

HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. Do the House of Shammai follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely? If they would follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, in case he had divorced the “bespoken” widow, she would not need ḥalîṣah! But Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the House of Shammai agree that if he divorced the “bespoken”, she needs ḥalîṣah! It must be they follow Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. If they would follow Rebbi Simeon, in any case, if “bespeaking” acquires, nothing follows it. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, why “his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”? Maybe “bespeaking” for the House of Shammai is like candidacy for Rebbi Simeon in the interpretation of the rabbis there. As the rabbis there say, “bespeaking” acquires and leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, [candidacy] acquires and leaves a remainder. Rebbi Simeon says, no candidacy can come after a candidacy, so the House of Shammai say here, no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”.

HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. Do the House of Shammai follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely? If they would follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, in case he had divorced the “bespoken” widow, she would not need ḥalîṣah! But Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the House of Shammai agree that if he divorced the “bespoken”, she needs ḥalîṣah! It must be they follow Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. If they would follow Rebbi Simeon, in any case, if “bespeaking” acquires, nothing follows it. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, why “his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”? Maybe “bespeaking” for the House of Shammai is like candidacy for Rebbi Simeon in the interpretation of the rabbis there. As the rabbis there say, “bespeaking” acquires and leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, [candidacy] acquires and leaves a remainder. Rebbi Simeon says, no candidacy can come after a candidacy, so the House of Shammai say here, no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”.

HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. Do the House of Shammai follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely? If they would follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, in case he had divorced the “bespoken” widow, she would not need ḥalîṣah! But Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the House of Shammai agree that if he divorced the “bespoken”, she needs ḥalîṣah! It must be they follow Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. If they would follow Rebbi Simeon, in any case, if “bespeaking” acquires, nothing follows it. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, why “his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”? Maybe “bespeaking” for the House of Shammai is like candidacy for Rebbi Simeon in the interpretation of the rabbis there. As the rabbis there say, “bespeaking” acquires and leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, [candidacy] acquires and leaves a remainder. Rebbi Simeon says, no candidacy can come after a candidacy, so the House of Shammai say here, no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”.

HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. Do the House of Shammai follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely? If they would follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, in case he had divorced the “bespoken” widow, she would not need ḥalîṣah! But Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the House of Shammai agree that if he divorced the “bespoken”, she needs ḥalîṣah! It must be they follow Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. If they would follow Rebbi Simeon, in any case, if “bespeaking” acquires, nothing follows it. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, why “his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”? Maybe “bespeaking” for the House of Shammai is like candidacy for Rebbi Simeon in the interpretation of the rabbis there. As the rabbis there say, “bespeaking” acquires and leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, [candidacy] acquires and leaves a remainder. Rebbi Simeon says, no candidacy can come after a candidacy, so the House of Shammai say here, no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”.

HALAKHAH: “Of three brothers, two are married to two sisters,” etc. Both the rabbis and Rebbi Simeon will agree in this case. For the rabbis, the part of the co-wife parallel to that which “bespeaking” acquired [in the widow] is forbidden. Also, the part of the co-wife parallel to that which “bespeaking” did not acquire [in the widow] is [still] forbidden. Therefore, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. Following Rebbi Simeon, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are permitted. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first is forbidden but the second permitted. Because of the doubt, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.

Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses; Rebbi Eleazar said, one cannot transfer benefits to fetuses. Rebbi Yose said, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. That is the Mishnah, “if somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” as you say here, retroactively ḥalîṣah did not touch her, so retroactively the child is a son and receives the benefit. There, we have stated: “If somebody says, if my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a mina, if she gave birth to a male, [the male baby] will take a mina. If a female, 200 [drachmae], if she gave birth to a female, that one will take 200.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is only for his son, but not for any other. Rebbi Yasa said, even any other. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, only from a sick person, but not a healthy one; only movables but not real estate. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. “ If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his estate, then it became known that he had a son overseas or that [his wife] was pregnant, everybody is required to return [what he took].” What does Rebbi Eleazar do with this? There is a difference because it is his child. The second part [of the Mishnah] disagrees with Samuel in the interpretation of Rebbi Yose: “If they returned everything and then the son died or she had a miscarriage, anybody who takes first after that acquires it.” The first group did not acquire. Even at the beginning they should not have acquired! Did not Rebbi Yose say, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. He was not living! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, because of abandoning. The rabbis of Caesarea, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Abba bar Natan: Rebbi Natan changed his mind because of that Mishnah: “If a male, a mina, if a female, 200.” Is a female in this situation not like an outsider? Bar Qappara stated: “On transfers benefit to a one day old.”

MISHNAH: He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance and, if there is a father, the property goes to the father. He who marries his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property. Rebbi Jehudah says, in any case if there is a father, the property goes to the father.

HALAKHAH: “He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance,” etc. That one should not say, ḥalîṣah is freeing, intercourse is freeing; just as you say, “he who marries his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property,” so he who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property. Therefore, it is necessary to say “he is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance”.

HALAKHAH: “He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance,” etc. That one should not say, ḥalîṣah is freeing, intercourse is freeing; just as you say, “he who marries his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property,” so he who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property. Therefore, it is necessary to say “he is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance”.

Rav Jehudah said in the name of Samuel: He who “bespeaks” his sister-in-law does not acquire his brother’s property. Even the House of Shammai agree to that; even Rebbi Simeon agrees to that, but not Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh. As Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh said, “bespeaking” acquires the sister-in-law totally. If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one and came to the other. As you take it, either by “bespeaking” he acquires or by intercourse he acquires. Rebbi Yose said, since he cannot keep either one, he did not acquire his brother’s property.

Rav Jehudah said in the name of Samuel: He who “bespeaks” his sister-in-law does not acquire his brother’s property. Even the House of Shammai agree to that; even Rebbi Simeon agrees to that, but not Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh. As Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh said, “bespeaking” acquires the sister-in-law totally. If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one and came to the other. As you take it, either by “bespeaking” he acquires or by intercourse he acquires. Rebbi Yose said, since he cannot keep either one, he did not acquire his brother’s property.

Rav Jehudah said in the name of Samuel: He who “bespeaks” his sister-in-law does not acquire his brother’s property. Even the House of Shammai agree to that; even Rebbi Simeon agrees to that, but not Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh. As Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh said, “bespeaking” acquires the sister-in-law totally. If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one and came to the other. As you take it, either by “bespeaking” he acquires or by intercourse he acquires. Rebbi Yose said, since he cannot keep either one, he did not acquire his brother’s property.

Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.

Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for qiddushin of a woman. Just as qiddushin acquire completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.”

Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for qiddushin of a woman. Just as qiddushin acquire completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.”

Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?

Since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, does he say similarly that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Simeon says, there is nothing after copulation if it is primary. Therefore, if it is secondary, there is something afterwards. That must deal with copulation after a bill of divorce. For if it were copulation after “bespeaking”, what could you say? If “bespeaking” acquired, there is nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse will acquire and there is nothing after that. So we must speak about copulation after a bill of divorce. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially.

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.

Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.

HALAKHAH: “How? If he ‘bespoke’,” etc. In the opinion of Rebbi, what about his “bespeaking”, may a nine-year-old “bespeak”? The intercourse of an adult is final; his “bespeaking” partially acquires. The intercourse of a minor is final; does his “bespeaking” partially acquire? What is the difference between his intercourse and his “bespeaking”? But some want to formulate: What is the difference between “bespeaking” of an adult and “bespeaking” of a minor? Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.

HALAKHAH: “How? If he ‘bespoke’,” etc. In the opinion of Rebbi, what about his “bespeaking”, may a nine-year-old “bespeak”? The intercourse of an adult is final; his “bespeaking” partially acquires. The intercourse of a minor is final; does his “bespeaking” partially acquire? What is the difference between his intercourse and his “bespeaking”? But some want to formulate: What is the difference between “bespeaking” of an adult and “bespeaking” of a minor? Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody comes to his sister-in-law,” etc. We have stated: “Even if he is in error and she acts criminally, or he does it criminally but she is in error.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Even if both act in error, even if both act criminally. They wanted to say, a hearing person who is competent acquires both if he has the intention and if he does not have the intention but the deaf-mute, who is not competent, should acquire only if he has the intention. It was found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Both the deaf-mute and the insane who copulated acquired [the widow] and freed the co-wives.

Also the House of Shammai agree, also Rebbi Simeon agrees but not Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely.

“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of R. Joḥanan who will explain this for allotments it is understandable; since he acquires by allotment he makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.

HALAKHAH: Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like a bill of divorce of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.

Because no blessing is written for creatures? Could she have been married on the Sabbath if a blessing were written for creatures? But was it not stated: “A man should not first have sexual relations on the Sabbath, for he makes a wound.” It must follow “others”, for “others permit it.” But “others” permit only when he is already married, for before he was married he had no right to what she finds, what she earns, and to dissolve her vows. After he married her, he has the right to receive what she finds or earns, and to dissolve her vows. If you say so, he is like someone who acquires on the Sabbath. Rebbi Mana said, this means that those who marry a widow must take her in when it is still daytime on Friday, that he should not be like someone who acquires on the Sabbath.