baraita

Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: If a holiday falls on a Friday, one eats making Sabbath after the holiday like the holiday. Rebbi Ze`ira said, a baraita states this: The eve of Passover is like Passover, the day of slaughter is like Pentecost. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, we also stated more than this: “Rebbi Jehudah says, also not if the holiday was over on Thursday since the priests are not free.”

“A woman does adorn herself on the holiday.” The following are women’s adornments: She braids, and puts on kohl, and combs her hair, and removes hair and fingernails, and moves a grating instrument over her face. Rebbi Yudan the father of Rebbi Mattaniah said, the baraita is in clean language.

HALAKHAH: In the House of Rebbi Yannai they said, “normally”, he fills his needle. “Staples”, stitch by stitch. Rebbi Joḥanan said, “normally”, stitch by stitch. “Staples”, he jumps. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: The cobblers are stapling on the holiday. If you would say stitch by stitch, that is what they are doing professionally. But we must hold that they sew irregularly. Who is an individual and who is a professional? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, one who matches seams is a professional, but any who does not match seams is an individual. Rebbi Simon said, the Mishnah refers to those who sew pockets.

“Any preserves of which one can eat on the holiday one makes.” Therefore not preserves of which one cannot eat on the holiday. Rebbi Abba said, this you are saying if they would not spoil. But things apt to spoil are permitted. It was stated: One may not go out and collect greenery which is not usually eaten on the holiday and sell it on the market. Rav Hoshaia said, if you would say so you would permit professional work on the holiday. But did not Rebbi Abba say, this you are saying if they would not spoil; but things apt to spoil are permitted? The baraita if he collected it on the holiday; what Rebbi Abba said if he collected it on the eve of the holiday.

Text of Scribe If we had stated but Rebbi Hiyya had not stated, we would have said, we only said if he repeatedly had turned them over, but if he turned then over once everybody agrees that it is forbidden. Therefore our Mishnah needs the statement of Rebbi Hiyya. Or if Rebbi Hiyya had stated but not we, we would have said that we only said if he turned them over once. But if he repeatedly turned them over, everybody agrees that it is permitted. Therefore there is need for our Mishnah and need for the baraita of Rebbi Hiyya. Text of Venice editor If we had stated but Rebbi Hiyya had not stated, we would have said, we only said if he had turned them over only once, but if he turned then over repeatedly everybody agrees that it is permitted. Therefore our Mishnah needs the statement of Rebbi Hiyya. Or if Rebbi Hiyya had stated but not we, we would have said that we only said if he turned them over repeatedly. But if he turned them over only once, everybody agrees that it is forbidden. Therefore there is need for our Mishnah and need for the baraita of Rebbi Hiyya.

Text of Scribe If we had stated but Rebbi Hiyya had not stated, we would have said, we only said if he repeatedly had turned them over, but if he turned then over once everybody agrees that it is forbidden. Therefore our Mishnah needs the statement of Rebbi Hiyya. Or if Rebbi Hiyya had stated but not we, we would have said that we only said if he turned them over once. But if he repeatedly turned them over, everybody agrees that it is permitted. Therefore there is need for our Mishnah and need for the baraita of Rebbi Hiyya. Text of Venice editor If we had stated but Rebbi Hiyya had not stated, we would have said, we only said if he had turned them over only once, but if he turned then over repeatedly everybody agrees that it is permitted. Therefore our Mishnah needs the statement of Rebbi Hiyya. Or if Rebbi Hiyya had stated but not we, we would have said that we only said if he turned them over repeatedly. But if he turned them over only once, everybody agrees that it is forbidden. Therefore there is need for our Mishnah and need for the baraita of Rebbi Hiyya.

It was stated: All these for whom they said that they shave on a holiday are permitted to shave during the thirty days of mourning. There are Tannaim who state, forbidden. [There are Tannaim who state, permitted.] Rav Ḥisda said, he who said permitted, if there happened to be a holiday; he who said forbidden, if there was no holiday. A baraita disagrees with Rav Ḥisda. If his mournings immediately followed one another he can lighten with a knife or coarse shears but not with scissors. But the second mourning relative to the first should be considered as an act of God and he should be permitted. Therefore it only was said for the honor of the holiday. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked, one understands the first Seven days. Within Thirty? Rebbi Ḥanania the colleague of the rabbis asked: Did we not state, these are the matters which are forbidden to the mourner during all Seven? If he would be forbidden during Thirty days, within Seven not so much more? It could not have been said except if mournings immediately followed one another. Does this imply that he is permitted? Rebbi Mattania said, he who said “forbidden”, as usual with scissors.

Rebbi Yose explains the baraita: “Unleavened it must be eaten”. Since it was permitted before it was dedicated, if one wants to eat it, he eats, not to eat, he does not eat. When he dedicated it became forbidden. When the fistful was brought it became permitted again; should one think it returned to its prior permission? If he wants to eat it, he eats, not to eat, he does not eat? The verse states “unleavened it must be eaten” as commandment. Similarly, “her levir shall come upon her” as a commandment. Since she was permitted before she was married to his brother, if he wanted to bring her into his house, he could bring her, not to bring her into his house, he would not bring her. When she was married to his brother she became forbidden. When his brother died childless she became permitted again. Should one think she returned to her prior permission, if he wanted to bring her into his house, he could bring her, not to bring her into his house, he would not bring her? The verse states “her levir shall come upon her” as commandment.

Rebbi Huna explains the baraita: “Unleavened it must be eaten”. Since it was permitted before it was dedicated, if one wants to eat it leavened, he eats it, unleavened, he eats it. The verse states “unleavened it should be eaten” as commandment. Similarly, “her brother-in-law shall come upon her” as commandment. Since she was permitted before she was married to his brother, if he wanted to bring her into his house because of her shapeliness, he could bring her, because of her money, he could bring her. When she was married to his brother she became forbidden. When his brother died childless she became permitted again. Should one think she returned to her prior permission, if he wanted to bring her into his house because of her shapeliness, he could bring her, because of her money, he could bring her? The verse states “her levir shall come upon her” as commandment.

HALAKHAH: “How do they free their co-wives? If a man’s daughter or one of the incest-prohibited women,”, etc. That is the baraita: “If a woman could repudiate but did not do so, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but cannot be married in levirate.”

Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita contradict Rav? “A person’s stepson’s wife is permitted to him but the latter’s daughter is forbidden.” Is his stepdaughter not forbidden to him? The stepson is the corresponding male but his wife is permitted!

Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses; Rebbi Eleazar said, one cannot transfer benefits to fetuses. Rebbi Yose said, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. That is the Mishnah, “if somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” as you say here, retroactively ḥalîṣah did not touch her, so retroactively the child is a son and receives the benefit. There, we have stated: “If somebody says, if my wife gives birth to a male, he shall take a mina, if she gave birth to a male, [the male baby] will take a mina. If a female, 200 [drachmae], if she gave birth to a female, that one will take 200.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is only for his son, but not for any other. Rebbi Yasa said, even any other. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, only from a sick person, but not a healthy one; only movables but not real estate. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. “ If a proselyte died and Jews plundered his estate, then it became known that he had a son overseas or that [his wife] was pregnant, everybody is required to return [what he took].” What does Rebbi Eleazar do with this? There is a difference because it is his child. The second part [of the Mishnah] disagrees with Samuel in the interpretation of Rebbi Yose: “If they returned everything and then the son died or she had a miscarriage, anybody who takes first after that acquires it.” The first group did not acquire. Even at the beginning they should not have acquired! Did not Rebbi Yose say, even though Samuel said, one can transfer benefits to fetuses, he agrees that most of [the fetus’s] head and body must come out alive. He was not living! Rebbi Isaac bar Eleazar said, because of abandoning. The rabbis of Caesarea, R. Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Abba bar Natan: Rebbi Natan changed his mind because of that Mishnah: “If a male, a mina, if a female, 200.” Is a female in this situation not like an outsider? Bar Qappara stated: “On transfers benefit to a one day old.”

Rav said, in any case where the true fact can never be established, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them, and then a raven ate the other. Since he cannot ascertain the true fact, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for this doubt. But if the raven ate first and then he ate, since he could have ascertained the true fact, one has to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. But did not Rav say, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet? Even though Rav said, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet, he agrees here that he could have ascertained the true fact. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “As Rebbi Eleazar says, one must bring a reparation offering for the doubt of suet.” What does Rav do with that? They disagree with the words of Rebbi Eleazar. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “If there were both a piece of profane [meat] and a piece of sacrificial [meat], he ate one of them and it is not known which one, he brings a reparation offering for the doubt. If he [then] ate the second piece, he brings a reparation offering for a certain transgression. If he ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second, each one brings a reparation offering for the doubt.” One understands that the first brings a reparation offering for the doubt. Why the second? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the piece was large, he ate half of it and left the other half. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt.” Here it is impossible to ascertain the true fact and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt! Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before us. Since he could just have touched her and then separated, he could have known whether it is his or the other’s, it is as if he could have ascertained the true fact!

Rav said, in any case where the true fact can never be established, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them, and then a raven ate the other. Since he cannot ascertain the true fact, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for this doubt. But if the raven ate first and then he ate, since he could have ascertained the true fact, one has to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. But did not Rav say, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet? Even though Rav said, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet, he agrees here that he could have ascertained the true fact. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “As Rebbi Eleazar says, one must bring a reparation offering for the doubt of suet.” What does Rav do with that? They disagree with the words of Rebbi Eleazar. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “If there were both a piece of profane [meat] and a piece of sacrificial [meat], he ate one of them and it is not known which one, he brings a reparation offering for the doubt. If he [then] ate the second piece, he brings a reparation offering for a certain transgression. If he ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second, each one brings a reparation offering for the doubt.” One understands that the first brings a reparation offering for the doubt. Why the second? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the piece was large, he ate half of it and left the other half. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt.” Here it is impossible to ascertain the true fact and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt! Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before us. Since he could just have touched her and then separated, he could have known whether it is his or the other’s, it is as if he could have ascertained the true fact!

HALAKHAH: “If he married her, she is his wife in every respect”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah.” At the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, everywhere one taught anonymous Mishnaiot, it follows the rabbis unless one’s teacher explains it [differently]. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, all anonymous Mishnaiot follow Rebbi Meїr unless one’s teacher explains it [differently]. Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Yasa, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees, only he saw that most anonymous Mishnaiot follow Rebbi Meїr. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What kind of teacher? The teacher of the baraita or the teacher of study? Does not the story of Rebbi Eleazar imply, the teacher of the baraita? “Following Rebbi Simeon, he found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He said, the old man certainly understands his chapters.” We have to say that he received instruction from the teacher of the baraita when he understood that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, everywhere one taught anonymous Mishnaiot, it follows the rabbis unless one’s teacher explains it [differently]. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, all anonymous Mishnaiot follow Rebbi Meїr unless one’s teacher explains it [differently]. Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Yasa, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees, only he saw that most anonymous Mishnaiot follow Rebbi Meїr. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What kind of teacher? The teacher of the baraita or the teacher of study? Does not the story of Rebbi Eleazar imply, the teacher of the baraita? “Following Rebbi Simeon, he found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He said, the old man certainly understands his chapters.” We have to say that he received instruction from the teacher of the baraita when he understood that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, everywhere one taught anonymous Mishnaiot, it follows the rabbis unless one’s teacher explains it [differently]. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, all anonymous Mishnaiot follow Rebbi Meїr unless one’s teacher explains it [differently]. Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Yasa, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees, only he saw that most anonymous Mishnaiot follow Rebbi Meїr. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What kind of teacher? The teacher of the baraita or the teacher of study? Does not the story of Rebbi Eleazar imply, the teacher of the baraita? “Following Rebbi Simeon, he found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He said, the old man certainly understands his chapters.” We have to say that he received instruction from the teacher of the baraita when he understood that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr.

May she eat heave? Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: It is reasonable that she should eat if she was eating during her husband’s lifetime; otherwise she may not eat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she eats even if she did not eat before. Rebbi Yose said, even if she was only able to eat. There is a baraita in support of either one. There is a baraita supporting Samuel: A hearing daughter of an Israel who married a deaf-mute Cohen does not eat heave. If he died and she came before the levir, if he is hearing, she eats, deaf-mute does not eat. There is a baraita supporting Rebbi Joḥanan: A hearing daughter of an Israel who became engaged to a hearing Cohen, who did not manage to bring her to the bridal chamber before he became deaf-mute or before she became deaf-mute, does not eat heave. If he died and she came before a levir she eats even if he is deaf-mute. In this He increased the power of the levir over that of the husband since the deaf-mute levir enables her to eat, but the deaf-mute husband does not enable her to eat.

May she eat heave? Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: It is reasonable that she should eat if she was eating during her husband’s lifetime; otherwise she may not eat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she eats even if she did not eat before. Rebbi Yose said, even if she was only able to eat. There is a baraita in support of either one. There is a baraita supporting Samuel: A hearing daughter of an Israel who married a deaf-mute Cohen does not eat heave. If he died and she came before the levir, if he is hearing, she eats, deaf-mute does not eat. There is a baraita supporting Rebbi Joḥanan: A hearing daughter of an Israel who became engaged to a hearing Cohen, who did not manage to bring her to the bridal chamber before he became deaf-mute or before she became deaf-mute, does not eat heave. If he died and she came before a levir she eats even if he is deaf-mute. In this He increased the power of the levir over that of the husband since the deaf-mute levir enables her to eat, but the deaf-mute husband does not enable her to eat.

May she eat heave? Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: It is reasonable that she should eat if she was eating during her husband’s lifetime; otherwise she may not eat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she eats even if she did not eat before. Rebbi Yose said, even if she was only able to eat. There is a baraita in support of either one. There is a baraita supporting Samuel: A hearing daughter of an Israel who married a deaf-mute Cohen does not eat heave. If he died and she came before the levir, if he is hearing, she eats, deaf-mute does not eat. There is a baraita supporting Rebbi Joḥanan: A hearing daughter of an Israel who became engaged to a hearing Cohen, who did not manage to bring her to the bridal chamber before he became deaf-mute or before she became deaf-mute, does not eat heave. If he died and she came before a levir she eats even if he is deaf-mute. In this He increased the power of the levir over that of the husband since the deaf-mute levir enables her to eat, but the deaf-mute husband does not enable her to eat.

HALAKHAH: “A widow [married] to a High Ptiest,” etc. From where that a priest who married a wife or bought slaves enables them to eat heave? The verse says “and if a priest buys a person as his money’s acquisition,” etc. From where that if his wife bought slaves, and her slaves [bought] slaves, that they may eat heave? The verse says “and if a priest buys a person as his money’s acquisition,” etc. Also his acquisition which bought an acquisition enables him to eat. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The baraita speaks about a slave who acquired slaves within the power of his master. But if a slave acquired slaves on condition that his master have no power over them, they are his property. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. If a slave acquired slaves on condition that his master have no power over them and he died, the first person who comes can grab them. In that case, [that slave] is not his property’s property.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.

It was stated: If she brought them when they were small, she takes them when they are lads. If she brought him two vessels. If one of them was worth the value of her marriage contract, she takes it for her marriage contract. If one and a half was the value of her marriage contract, [disagreement of] Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman bar Jacob. One of them said, he pays for the second vessel and takes it; the other one says, she pays for the second vessel and takes it. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana said before Rebbi Immi, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Even if one was worth one and a half times the value of her marriage contract, she pays for the second vessel and takes it, because it is unthinkable that others should use her vessels. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: A baraita says so: If she brought them for their monetary value, she takes them for their monetary value.

Rebbi Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: The daughter of an Ammonite convert is enabled, the daughter of an Ammonite woman convert is disabled. Rebbi Joḥanan told him: Babylonian, you crossed three rivers on your way and got lost! But both the daughter of an Ammonite convert and the daughter of an Ammonite woman convert are enabled. Rebbi Yosa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The statement is needed only if her mother was from Israel. That you should not say, since her mother was desecrated, so the daughter is desecrated. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, she is enabled even for the High Priest. What is the reason? “In his peoples”. A people divided into two peoples, the males are forbidden but their females permitted. Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish did not say so, but the daughter of an Ammonite convert is disabled since she comes from a disabled drop. Rebbi Joḥanan said, we have stated thus: Of Gentiles married unconverted, the males are permanently forbidden but their females are immediately permitted. If they converted, the males are permanently forbidden but their females are permitted after three generations. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of [Rebbi] Aḥa: A baraita states this: From where can you say that if one of any of the families of the earth cohabited with a Canaanite woman and she gave birth to a son, that you may buy him as a slave? The verse says, “whom they will father in your land,” not from those who dwell in your land.

Rebbi Yose said: All the time Rebbi Hila told me, state in your baraita that he inherits from her and defiles himself for her. We have also stated so: A man defiles himself for his qualified wife but does not become defiled for his disqualified wife.

A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was betrothed, and two are saying, she was not betrothed, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was betrothed and divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others would come and identify the man who was betrothed to her.

A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says.

If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two would say, X ate fat, and two would say, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not be married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

HALAKHAH: “They came and told her, your son died,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” They only said, “there is no bastard from a sister-in-law,” therefore she must leave. And we have stated, “she must leave”. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, she must leave.

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

The following is obvious: If a person younger than twenty years of age developed two pubic hairs, he becomes a man retroactively. Older than twenty years of age, he becomes a man from that point into the future. Where do they disagree? If he is twenty. Samuel said, he becomes a man retroactively. Rav said, he becomes a man from that point into the future. A baraita disagrees with both of them: The castrate cannot become a rebellious son since he has no pubic hair. Should one not warn him, maybe he will develop two pubic hairs within the next three months? Following him who says, one does not accept conditional warnings. Our Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: Does it make no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twelve years and one day old, if by then he did not grow two pubic hairs, he becomes a man retroactively? Could you say: If he did grow two pubic hairs between the ages of nine years and one day until twelve years and one day, he becomes a man retroactively? Similarly, if he is older than twenty years of age and did not grow two pubic hairs, he becomes a man from that point into the future. How does Samuel handle this? He explains it: soon after he turns twenty.

“A wooden sandal.” The colleagues in the name of Rav: If only the edges are wooden. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: If only the bottom of the sole is wooden. There, they say in the name of Rav: If only the loops are wooden. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even if it is entirely of wood it is valid. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “ A straw sandal becomes impure by being stepped on and a woman may use it for ḥalîṣah, the words of Rebbi Aqiba, but the Sages do not agree about impurity by being stepped on.”

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Aqiba said, when I left the country for Nahardea for the intercalation of the year, Nehemiah from Badala found me,” etc. If it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”; Rebbi Jeremiah said, one lets his wife remarry; Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, one does not let his wife remarry. A baraita supports the one, a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Jeremiah: “By the mouth of witnesses,” not on basis of their writings, not on the word of a translator, not on the testimony of a single witness.” Today, does one not let remarry on the testimony of a single witness? Therefore also one lets remarry on basis of their writings and on the word of a translator. A baraita supports Rebbi Abun bar Cahana: The power of witnesses is greater than the power of a document and the power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses. Since if witnesses say, “X died, X was killed”, one lets his wife remarry but if it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”, one does not let his wife remarry. The power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses, since if somebody gives a loan before witnesses, he can foreclose only from unincumbered property; by a document, he can foreclose from mortgaged property.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Aqiba said, when I left the country for Nahardea for the intercalation of the year, Nehemiah from Badala found me,” etc. If it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”; Rebbi Jeremiah said, one lets his wife remarry; Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, one does not let his wife remarry. A baraita supports the one, a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Jeremiah: “By the mouth of witnesses,” not on basis of their writings, not on the word of a translator, not on the testimony of a single witness.” Today, does one not let remarry on the testimony of a single witness? Therefore also one lets remarry on basis of their writings and on the word of a translator. A baraita supports Rebbi Abun bar Cahana: The power of witnesses is greater than the power of a document and the power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses. Since if witnesses say, “X died, X was killed”, one lets his wife remarry but if it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”, one does not let his wife remarry. The power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses, since if somebody gives a loan before witnesses, he can foreclose only from unincumbered property; by a document, he can foreclose from mortgaged property.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Aqiba said, when I left the country for Nahardea for the intercalation of the year, Nehemiah from Badala found me,” etc. If it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”; Rebbi Jeremiah said, one lets his wife remarry; Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, one does not let his wife remarry. A baraita supports the one, a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Jeremiah: “By the mouth of witnesses,” not on basis of their writings, not on the word of a translator, not on the testimony of a single witness.” Today, does one not let remarry on the testimony of a single witness? Therefore also one lets remarry on basis of their writings and on the word of a translator. A baraita supports Rebbi Abun bar Cahana: The power of witnesses is greater than the power of a document and the power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses. Since if witnesses say, “X died, X was killed”, one lets his wife remarry but if it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”, one does not let his wife remarry. The power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses, since if somebody gives a loan before witnesses, he can foreclose only from unincumbered property; by a document, he can foreclose from mortgaged property.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Aqiba said, when I left the country for Nahardea for the intercalation of the year, Nehemiah from Badala found me,” etc. If it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”; Rebbi Jeremiah said, one lets his wife remarry; Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, one does not let his wife remarry. A baraita supports the one, a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Jeremiah: “By the mouth of witnesses,” not on basis of their writings, not on the word of a translator, not on the testimony of a single witness.” Today, does one not let remarry on the testimony of a single witness? Therefore also one lets remarry on basis of their writings and on the word of a translator. A baraita supports Rebbi Abun bar Cahana: The power of witnesses is greater than the power of a document and the power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses. Since if witnesses say, “X died, X was killed”, one lets his wife remarry but if it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”, one does not let his wife remarry. The power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses, since if somebody gives a loan before witnesses, he can foreclose only from unincumbered property; by a document, he can foreclose from mortgaged property.

“It was hidden from her husband’s eyes”, that excludes the blind man who has no eyes. It is the same for the blind man and the blind woman. This baraita follows Rebbi Jehudah who frees him from all obligations in the Torah.

There, it was stated: “The following flour offerings have a handful taken and the remainders are eaten.” Rebbi Abba bar Mamal and Rebbi [Samuel] bar Rav Isaac were sitting together. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked from Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: From where [do we know that] the remainders of the ‘Omer offering are eaten? He said to him: Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “Offering of, offering of.” Since “offering of” mentioned there is from barley, so also “offering of” mentioned here is from barley. Since the remainders of the offering of the suspected wife are eaten, so the remainders of the ‘Omer offering are eaten. Rebbi (Aqiba) said: After they got up, Rebbi Abba bar Mamal was standing with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him: Look, how he made your question fly away! From where [do we know that] the remainders of the offering of the suspected wife are eaten? Rebbi Ze‘ira brought Rebbi Isaac Aṭoshiyya, who stated for him: “Any flour offering mixed with oil”. Where do we hold? If about mixed wheat flour, it already had been said. So if it does not refer to mixed wheat flour, apply it to mixed barley flour. Another [baraita] states: “Or dry”. Where do we hold? If about dry wheat flour, it already had been said. So if it does not refer to dry wheat flour, apply it to dry barley flour. Rebbi Yose said, we deal with mixed wheat flour and dry wheat flour, and it was said for a purpose. “[It] shall belong to all sons of Aaron, to each man as to his brother.” A man takes his part even if he is blemished. A minor does not take a part even if he is unblemished. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said: Because the Torah added a detail in one case, can you add that in every case? But “remembrance, remembrance”. “You shall bring,” to include the ‘Omer flour offering in presentations. “He shall present it,” to include the suspected wife’s flour offering in presentations. It is written after that: “What is left from the offering is most holy for Aaron and his sons.”

HALAKHAH: It is written: “The policemen shall add.” This expression “shall add” only means an addition. Like a man who says, I am adding to the words of my teacher. It was stated: The latter [words] are additions. Rebbi Yose said, there are two Tannaïm. He who said, “I am adding to the words of my teacher,” both the first and the later declarations both he and his teacher said. He who said, the later ones are additions, the first [declarations] both he and his teacher said, but the later ones he said but not his teacher. Rebbi Mana said, there is only one Tanna. The first [declarations] both he and his teacher said, but the later ones he said but not his teacher. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: He hears a sentence from the Cohen and tells it to the people in all languages. But its end disagrees with Rebbi Mana: He adds a final word of his own. If you say so, it does not disagree at all with Rebbi Yose, as it was stated: The first [declarations] both he and his teacher said, but the later ones he said but not his teacher.

Rebbi Eleazar explains the reason given in the Mishnah, that if he has a complaint about virginity he can quickly go to court. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Since the time of danger they used to marry on Tuesdays and the Sages did not object; about Monday one does not listen to him, but if it was because of a danger it is permitted. What is “because of a danger”? because of sorcery. What is the difference between Monday and Tuesday? One who waits one day cannot be compared to one who waits two days. Why not let him wait two days? That his acquisition should not be sweet for him. Why should his acquisition not be sweet for him? One cannot tolerate it, since Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. Could we not suspect that she was raped? A rape is public knowledge. And even if you suspect that she was raped, there is no other doubt. There is a doubt whether she was raped or whether she was [willingly] opened. From the words of the Torah one has to be stringent. Rebbi Yose said, if you suspect that she was raped, there are two doubts. There is a doubt whether she was raped or whether she was [willingly] opened; there is a doubt whether it happened after she was preliminarily married or before. From the words of the Torah, with two doubts one has to be lenient.

One agrees that she should not be married either Friday or Saturday night. Not on Friday, for the honor of the Sabbath. Not Saturday night: The colleagues say, because of the exertion; Rebbi Yose says, for the honor of the Sabbath. A baraita supports the colleagues: Why did they say, a virgin is married on Wednesday? That a man should prepare for his needs three consecutive days.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshia: Practice follows Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer since two form a majority against one. Rebbi Yose asked: If it is practice, why two? And if two, why practice? Would that mean if Rebbi Joḥanan would hold with Rebbi Joshua that practice would not follow Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer but Rebbi Joshua? What about it? It is a testimony for which a woman in empowered. They wanted to say, when does Rebbi Joshua disagree with these rabbis? At a place where most are disabling, but at a place where most are qualified, even Rebbi Joshua will agree. There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: There is disagreement even at a place where most are qualified. Does Rebbi Joshua think that immorality runs after the disabling? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita stated that even qualified people whore, as it was stated: Even the most pious man cannot be appointed guardian for illicit sex.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: We understand that, since it said “if there is no case of murder, a fine shall be imposed”, that if it is a case of murder, you shall take life for life? Why does the verse say, it is a case of murder? To add the case of premeditation and warning. Rebbi Yose said, is that not a Mishnah, “for anybody committing a capital crime does not pay cash”, that it deals not only with cases of error. Ḥizqiah said, one states a baraita: “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money.

So far payments that are consequences of sexual relations. If somebody injured her, blinded one of her eyes, cut off one of her hands, broke one of her legs? To whom does he pay, to her or to her father? Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays to her father; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he pays to her. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is of the opinion that her earnings belong to her even before she becomes an adult. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only after she comes of age. Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: They disagree before she comes of age, but after she is an adult everybody agrees that all belongs to her. A baraita supports either one of them. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody injures somebody else’s daughter or son, the payments for the son must be given immediately; those for the daughter shall be held as property value. Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Judah the father of Rebbi Mattaniah, said that some state it so that beginning and end support Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If somebody injures his own underage daughter, diminution of value belong to her and he is free from paying for shame and diminution of value. If others injure her, diminution of values belong to her, the rest shall be transformed into property value, but payments for shame and diminution of value belong to her father.

So far payments that are consequences of sexual relations. If somebody injured her, blinded one of her eyes, cut off one of her hands, broke one of her legs? To whom does he pay, to her or to her father? Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays to her father; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he pays to her. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is of the opinion that her earnings belong to her even before she becomes an adult. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only after she comes of age. Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: They disagree before she comes of age, but after she is an adult everybody agrees that all belongs to her. A baraita supports either one of them. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody injures somebody else’s daughter or son, the payments for the son must be given immediately; those for the daughter shall be held as property value. Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Judah the father of Rebbi Mattaniah, said that some state it so that beginning and end support Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If somebody injures his own underage daughter, diminution of value belong to her and he is free from paying for shame and diminution of value. If others injure her, diminution of values belong to her, the rest shall be transformed into property value, but payments for shame and diminution of value belong to her father.

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If the father brought witnesses to prove the perjury of the husband’s witnesses; but the father’s witnesses were proven perjurers, is he flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas by the judgment of three and the witnesses are stoned by the judgment of 23? He said to him, if the father’s witnesses are not proven perjurers, is not the husband flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas by the judgment of three and the witnesses are stoned by the judgment of 23? Rebbi Ze‘ira is of the opinion that there are two different proceedings. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: There is only one proceeding. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Abbahu: “To the town’s Elders”, that is a court of three members; “to the gate”, that is a court of 23. He explains it following Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr says that he is flogged and pays. There, we have stated: “The seducer, the rapist, and the calumniator [are judged] by three [judges], the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages say, the calumniator by 23 since it is a potential capital case.” Rebbi Mana said, they disagree about the preliminarily married adolescent. Rebbi Meïr says, she loses her ketubah in a court of three and is stoned by a court of 23; but the Sages say, at the same place which sentences her to be stoned she loses her ketubah. But in the case of the calumniator, everybody agrees that by the court in which the witnesses are stoned, the husband is flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said to him, would they differ where it was not stated? But they differ about the calumniator! Rebbi Meïr says, he is flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas by the judgment of three and the witnesses are stoned by the judgment of 23; but the rabbis say, by the court in which the witnesses are stoned, the husband is flogged and pays 100 tetradrachmas. But by the case of the preliminarily married adolescent, everybody agrees that at the same place which sentences her to be stoned she loses her ketubah. [It turns out that Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun follows Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Mana [follows] Rebbi Abbahu].

HALAKHAH: “She always remains in the father’s power,” etc. Not only to the bridal chamber but to a house where the bridal chamber is. In which way? A banquet hall and a bedroom, the bridal chamber being the bedroom, and she entered the banquest hall. In which respect? Rebbi Eleazar said, to inherit from her. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, to dissolve her vows. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even though Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, to dissolve her vows, he agrees that he does not actually dissolve them until she enters the bridal chamber. Rebbi Huna said, a baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “To whore in her father’s house,” that excludes the case that the father’s emissaries entrusted her to the husband’s emissaries, after which she should not be stoned but strangled.

HALAKHAH: ““The female children you will have by me,” etc. Rav Ḥisda said, if they became adults, they lost the support. If they married, they lost their dowries. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “If they became adults without being married or were married without being adults, they lost their support but not their dowries.” Rebbi Abin in the name of Hila: They all agree on the following: If a widow sues the heirs, she says I did not receive my ketubah, but the heirs say you received your ketubah. Before she remarried, the burden of proof is on the heirs that she received her ketubah. After she remarried, the burden of proof is on her that she had not received her ketubah. But did we not state: “If an orphan was married off by her mother or her brother and they wrote her [a dowry of] 150 zuz, after she grows up she can extract from them.” The reason, because she was underage. Therefore, a grown up gave up her claim. Explain it that she had received partial payment. Did not Rebbi Avina say in the name of Rebbi Assi: If a firstborn took as a simple [brother], this is prima facie evidence that he gave up his claim. Still, if she had received part payment. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this one did not take anything from his primogeniture. There came a case before Rebbi Mana, who wanted to act following Rav Ḥisda. Rebbi Ḥananiah said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “if they became adults without being married or were married without being adults, they lost their support but not their dowries”? He said to him: I quoted a tradition, you quoted a Baraita. Let the tradition be disregarded before the Baraita.

HALAKHAH: ““The female children you will have by me,” etc. Rav Ḥisda said, if they became adults, they lost the support. If they married, they lost their dowries. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “If they became adults without being married or were married without being adults, they lost their support but not their dowries.” Rebbi Abin in the name of Hila: They all agree on the following: If a widow sues the heirs, she says I did not receive my ketubah, but the heirs say you received your ketubah. Before she remarried, the burden of proof is on the heirs that she received her ketubah. After she remarried, the burden of proof is on her that she had not received her ketubah. But did we not state: “If an orphan was married off by her mother or her brother and they wrote her [a dowry of] 150 zuz, after she grows up she can extract from them.” The reason, because she was underage. Therefore, a grown up gave up her claim. Explain it that she had received partial payment. Did not Rebbi Avina say in the name of Rebbi Assi: If a firstborn took as a simple [brother], this is prima facie evidence that he gave up his claim. Still, if she had received part payment. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this one did not take anything from his primogeniture. There came a case before Rebbi Mana, who wanted to act following Rav Ḥisda. Rebbi Ḥananiah said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “if they became adults without being married or were married without being adults, they lost their support but not their dowries”? He said to him: I quoted a tradition, you quoted a Baraita. Let the tradition be disregarded before the Baraita.

Rebbi Ḥanin stated in the name of Rebbi Samuel: Both for women about whom they said that they have ketubah as also those about whom they said they leave without ketubah, as the minor, the secondarily prohibited, and the she-ram, did they speak about a mina or 200 [zuz]? But even if the ketubah was a thousand denars, she loses, but she takes her existing rags. But the one who leaves because of a bad reputation loses everything. Can she take her paraphernalia? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, she takes. Rebbi Hila said, she does not take. Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yasa, Rebbi Abba bar Cohen mention it in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel: Both women about whom they said that they leave without ketubah, did they speak about the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz]? But even if the ketubah was a thousand denars, she loses. Rebbi Simon said, Rebbi Joḥanan: All the Mishnaiot are connected to this baraita. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yasa: About which baraita? Of Rebbi Ḥanin from Samuel? He said to him, it is everybody’s opinion. And Rebbi Ḥiyya formulated so: “Women who infringe upon the law lose everything.

Rebbi Ḥanin stated in the name of Rebbi Samuel: Both for women about whom they said that they have ketubah as also those about whom they said they leave without ketubah, as the minor, the secondarily prohibited, and the she-ram, did they speak about a mina or 200 [zuz]? But even if the ketubah was a thousand denars, she loses, but she takes her existing rags. But the one who leaves because of a bad reputation loses everything. Can she take her paraphernalia? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, she takes. Rebbi Hila said, she does not take. Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yasa, Rebbi Abba bar Cohen mention it in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel: Both women about whom they said that they leave without ketubah, did they speak about the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz]? But even if the ketubah was a thousand denars, she loses. Rebbi Simon said, Rebbi Joḥanan: All the Mishnaiot are connected to this baraita. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yasa: About which baraita? Of Rebbi Ḥanin from Samuel? He said to him, it is everybody’s opinion. And Rebbi Ḥiyya formulated so: “Women who infringe upon the law lose everything.

“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.

HALAKHAH: “If she inherited after she was definitively married,” etc. We did state: She may sell or give away and it is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: She should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid. ”Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, that is not what Rabban Gamliel gave as answer, but the following was his argument: No, if you have an argument about a preliminarily married one, where he has rights neither to what she finds, nor to her handiwork, nor to dissolve her vows, what can you say about a definitively married one where he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows? Let the proof be the case of one who [inherited] before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, in which case he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows, and you admit to us that she should not sell or give away. He said to them, I agree that she should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid..” There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, is not Rabban Gamliel’s an isolated opinion? One cannot rely on it. A baraita supports him and disagrees with him: ”Our teachers took up the case again, voted, and instructed about property which she inherited before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, that she should not sell or give away, and if she sold or gave away it is invalid.” It disagrees that the sale is invalid. It agrees that our teachers took up the case again, instructed, and voted. Before they voted, they did not disagree with him.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Simeon differentiates between properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, properties known to the husband are real estate, those not known to the husband are movables. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, properties known to the husband are those she inherited in the presence of the husband, those not known to the husband are those she inherited while her husband was overseas. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: The following are properties not known to the husband, what she inherited while her husband was overseas.

HALAKHAH: “If she inherited old vines or olive trees,” etc. Rav Abun in the name of the rabbis there: The Mishnah deals with the case that she inherited olive trees but not their ground, vines but not their ground. But if she inherited olive trees with their ground, vines with their ground, she does not have to sell since her father’s house’s glory still exists. But the rabbis here say, even if she inherited olive trees with their ground, vines with their ground, did she not inherit the value of the olive grove, did she not inherit the value of the vineyard? A baraita supports the rabbis there: “ ‘I am selling you the vineyard’, this is a valid sale even if there are no vines since he sells him [the real estate] by description. ‘I am selling you the grove’, this is a valid sale even if there are no trees since he sells him [the real estate] by description.”

HALAKHAH: “If somebody invests in his wife’s properties,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: Even if he ate only one basket of dates. Assi said, that is, if the investment is greater than the increase in value. But if the increase in value is greater than the investment, one gives him the increase in value. A baraita disagrees with Assi: “In all cases one evaluates it as for a sharecropper.” The baraita disagrees about planting; what Assi said was about a building. The baraita disagrees about planting, is that what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: Even if he ate only one basket of dates. He said to him, in one case if he ate, in the other if he did not eat.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody invests in his wife’s properties,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: Even if he ate only one basket of dates. Assi said, that is, if the investment is greater than the increase in value. But if the increase in value is greater than the investment, one gives him the increase in value. A baraita disagrees with Assi: “In all cases one evaluates it as for a sharecropper.” The baraita disagrees about planting; what Assi said was about a building. The baraita disagrees about planting, is that what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: Even if he ate only one basket of dates. He said to him, in one case if he ate, in the other if he did not eat.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody invests in his wife’s properties,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: Even if he ate only one basket of dates. Assi said, that is, if the investment is greater than the increase in value. But if the increase in value is greater than the investment, one gives him the increase in value. A baraita disagrees with Assi: “In all cases one evaluates it as for a sharecropper.” The baraita disagrees about planting; what Assi said was about a building. The baraita disagrees about planting, is that what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: Even if he ate only one basket of dates. He said to him, in one case if he ate, in the other if he did not eat.

HALAKHAH: “He should not say to her ‘here is your ketubah’”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah.” In the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.

If she sold produce connected to the ground: Rav Aḥa said, as if she sold harvested [produce]; Rebbi Yose said, as if she sold a tenth of the ground. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, she cannot sell the produce. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Rebbi Immi asked: If another person had written [real estate] over to her, would he not receive the revenue? If he himself wrote, not so much more! He said only “wrote over”, but not “sold”. What is the difference between one who writes and one who sells? He tried to find a reason to hide food from the wife.

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

It was stated: If an heir’s father held a compromised promissory note, the son collects without swearing. In that the son’s power is greater than the father’s, since the son collects without swearing while the father can collect only by swearing. Rebbi Eleazar said, nevertheless he has to execute an heir’s oath, “that our father did not charge us, that our father did not tell us, that we did not find a document among our father’s documents that this note was paid.” Rebbi Hoshaia asked, does the baraita follow the House of Shammai? For the House of Shammai say, “she collects her ketubah and does not drink.” Rebbi Yose said, there the reason of the House of Shammai is: Bring my husband and I shall drink! But here, it would be in order that even his father would not have to swear. They instituted a rule that he has to swear. They instituted that for him, but not for his son. When he died, you put his son on the biblical rule.

HALAKHAH: “If a widow’s ketubah was 200,” etc. We understand worth a mina for 200 or worth 200 for a mina. In any case, she made the orphans lose a mina. [If it was worth] a mina [and she sold it] for 200, would the sale not be invalidated as erroneous buy? Explain it that the property increased in value. Rebbi Abin said, this supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, real estate buys are never under the laws of overcharging. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if the transaction was excessive, it comes under the law of overcharging. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “The following do not fall under the laws of overcharging: Slaves, securities, real estate, and redemptions.” He explains it, unless it was excessive. If he redeemed what was worth a mina by 200, Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is not redeemed, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is redeemed. A baralta disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: If he said, this toga instead of this donkey, the latter becomes profane. And its end disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is necessary to compute the value. Rebbi Yose said, the baraita itself implies that it is necessary to compute the value. Where do they disagree? To bring [a sacrifice to atone for] larceny. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he has to bring a sacrifice for larceny; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he does not have to bring a sacrifice for larceny.

Rebbi Yose said: All the time my teacher Rebbi Hila told me, state in your baraita that he inherits from her and defiles himself for her. We have also stated so: A man defiles himself for his qualified wife but does not become defiled for his disqualified wife.

It is written: “Behold, I taught you laws and rules.” Just as I did it for free, so you have to do it for free. One could think the same is true for Bible and translations? The verse says laws and rules. You have to teach laws and rules for free; you do not have to teach Bible and translations for free. But do we not see that the baraita teachers take their fees? Rebbi Yudan, the son of Rebbi Ismael, said: They take payment for lost time.

So far, if he abandoned it for a longer period of time. But if he abandoned only for a short time? Let us hear from the following: “If he abandoned his field, he may cancel his action during three days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it says only “three days”. Therefore, after three days he may not cancel his action. Rebbi Simeon Dayana stated before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Even after three he may cancel his action. He said to him, since you say after three days, is it the same after three or after many? A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “About when is this said? If he abandoned in an unspecified way. But if he said: My field shall be abandoned one day, one week, one month, one year, a sabbatical period, as long as nobody took it over, either he or another person, he may cancel. But after somebody acquired it, either he or somebody else, he cannot cancel.” This means that short or long periods are the same. It also means that they were not worried about dishonesty. This means that a person may abandon and reacquire. That obviously answers Rebbi Zeïra’s question, since Rebbi Zeira had said, are short and long times the same?

A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaninah: “A vow that no Cohanim or Levites should have any advantage from me, they should take against his will.” He explains it about a person who says, I cannot possibly give them any gifts. You should know that this is so, since we have stated: “These Cohanim and Levites should [not] have any advantage from me, let others take.” A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “An Israel can say to another Israel, here you have a tetradrachma and give this firstling to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.” He explains, if he already wanted to give it to two [Cohanim] and that daughter’s son was one of them; then one said, here you have a tetradrachma and give it whole to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.

Rav said: “I am a nazir for 30 days and one day,” he is a nazir twice since he could have said “31 days”. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “I shall be a nazir [and] one day, I shall be a nazir [and] one hour, I shall be a nazir one and a half times, he is a nazir two times.” What could he have said, “30, and an hour”? A baraita disagrees with the rabbis: Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba did not disagree about one who said, “I am a nazir 30 days and one day,” that he is a nazir only once. Where do they disagree? About one who said, “I am a nazir 30 days and in addition one day,” where Rebbi Ismael said, he is a nazir twice, but Rebbi Aqiba said, he is a nazir only once.

If he was born on the eightieth day, he eliminates ten. If he was born on the ninetieth day, he eliminates twenty. If he finished his nezirut and came to complete his son’s nezirut and became impure within the first ten days, he eliminates everything. Within the last twenty days? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rab and Rebbi Joḥanan both say, he eliminates thirty. Rebbi Samuel said, he eliminates seven only. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Joḥanan think that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical with substantial eliminating? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if Rebbi Joḥanan thought that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical to substantial eliminating, why would he say that he eliminates thirty? Should he not invalidate everything? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Explain it if he was born on a day unsuitable to bring a sacrifice. Think of it, if he was born in the night, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the night caused it. Think of it, if he was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave when [the son] was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave before his son was born, he celebrates one shaving for both. If he had dedicated his sacrifices but did not manage to shave before his son was born. There, they say that he celebrates one shaving for both. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shaves and then shaves a second time. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “They asked Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai: Assume that he was both a nazir and a sufferer from scale disease, may he shave once and have it counted for his nezirut and his scale disease? He said to them: If he shaved to remove hair, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves to remove hair whereas the sufferer from scale disease shaves to have hair grow. They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave to remove hair. (They said to him. If both of them shaved before the sprinkling of the blood, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before the sprinkling of the blood and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after the sprinkling of the blood! They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave before the sprinkling of the blood!) He said to them, if both shaved before they immerse themselves in water, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before he immerses himself in water and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after he immerses himself in water. They said to him, the matter is settled. It cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, it cannot be counted for the days of his count. It cannot be counted for purification; it cannot be counted for impurity. That is, if he was a nazir and sufferer from scale disease. But if he was a nazir and nazir, he may shave once for both.” What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? He explains that they disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.

If he is still there, Rebbi Joḥanan said, one warns him about everything for every possible leaving, and he is whipped. Rebbi Eleazar said, he does not accept [warning] unless he leaves and returns. Rebbi Abba said: So did Rebbi Joḥanan answer Rebbi Eleazar: Is it not written, “he shall not come” and “he may not defile himself”? He said to him, if they warned him because of “he shall not come”, he is whipped; because of “he shall not defile himself” he is not whipped. Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Joḥanan learned from prostrating, as we have stated there: “If he prostrated himself or stayed there long enough to prostrate himself.” Rebbi Mattaniah said, we thought that was where they do disagree? About lashes, but not about a sacrifice. Since Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Joḥanan learned from prostrating, that means that lashes and sacrifices are one and the same. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A nazir who drank wine the entire day is guilty only once.” He explains it, that his throat was never empty. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he was defiling himself for the dead the entire day, he is guilty only once.” He explains it about one who waits before every leaving, who is whipped. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: If a Cohen was standing in a cemetery and they were handing another corpse to him, could he accept? The verse says, “the husband shall be defiled for his family.” If he accepted it, I could think that he was guilty. The verse says, “to be profaned”. One who adds impurity to the impurity; that excludes him who does not add impurity to his impurity. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Neḥemiah said, “to be profaned”, that excludes him who does not add impurity to his impurity, lest he say, because I became defiled for my father I may go and collect the bones of X. “To be profaned”, at the time of death; Rebbi said, also “in their death.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree. It follows that Rebbi Simeon bar Abba follows Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. When Simeon bar Abba was dying, he said, this should be taken out here, that should be taken out there.

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ at the end. Rebbi Simeon says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ for every item.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, [Rebbi Simeon implies] if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the baraita supports the colleagues: “A woman made a vow as nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I;’ if the first’s husband heard and told her, ‘it is permitted to you,’ the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. Rebbi Simeon says, if she said, my intention was only to be like her, in her state, the second also is permitted.” Because she said “to be like her, in her state;” therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state,” the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where there was no original nezirut, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? When Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest, if he attaches: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.

There, we have stated: “Leftovers for nezirim are for nezirim; what is left over from a nazir is for donation.” Rav Ḥisda said, only if his purification offering was presented last. But if his well-being offering waspresented last, what is left over is for a well-being offering. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if his well-being offering was presented last, it is a general rule for a nazir that his leftover be for donation. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “The following are undesignated monies: any which contain money for purification offerings that should die. Even if he designated money for purification offerings that should die, it remains undesignated.” A baraita supports Rav Ḥisda: “This is for my purification offering and the rest for my nezirut. Then he died. One commits larceny with all of them but not with part of them.” It does not say, when he died it should be given for donation.

There, we have stated: “Leftovers for nezirim are for nezirim; what is left over from a nazir is for donation.” Rav Ḥisda said, only if his purification offering was presented last. But if his well-being offering waspresented last, what is left over is for a well-being offering. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if his well-being offering was presented last, it is a general rule for a nazir that his leftover be for donation. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “The following are undesignated monies: any which contain money for purification offerings that should die. Even if he designated money for purification offerings that should die, it remains undesignated.” A baraita supports Rav Ḥisda: “This is for my purification offering and the rest for my nezirut. Then he died. One commits larceny with all of them but not with part of them.” It does not say, when he died it should be given for donation.

There, we have stated: “Leftovers for nezirim are for nezirim; what is left over from a nazir is for donation.” Rav Ḥisda said, only if his purification offering was presented last. But if his well-being offering waspresented last, what is left over is for a well-being offering. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if his well-being offering was presented last, it is a general rule for a nazir that his leftover be for donation. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “The following are undesignated monies: any which contain money for purification offerings that should die. Even if he designated money for purification offerings that should die, it remains undesignated.” A baraita supports Rav Ḥisda: “This is for my purification offering and the rest for my nezirut. Then he died. One commits larceny with all of them but not with part of them.” It does not say, when he died it should be given for donation.

There, we have stated: “Leftovers for nezirim are for nezirim; what is left over from a nazir is for donation.” Rav Ḥisda said, only if his purification offering was presented last. But if his well-being offering waspresented last, what is left over is for a well-being offering. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if his well-being offering was presented last, it is a general rule for a nazir that his leftover be for donation. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “The following are undesignated monies: any which contain money for purification offerings that should die. Even if he designated money for purification offerings that should die, it remains undesignated.” A baraita supports Rav Ḥisda: “This is for my purification offering and the rest for my nezirut. Then he died. One commits larceny with all of them but not with part of them.” It does not say, when he died it should be given for donation.

It has been stated: 300 nezirim came in the days of Rebbi Simeon ben Shetaḥ. For 150 of them he found an opening, for 150 of them he did not find an opening. He came to king Yannai and said to him: There are here 300 nezirim who need 900 sacrifices. You should give half of them from your side, I shall give half from my side. The king sent him 450 animals. An informer went around and said that the other one had not given anything from his own money. King Yannai heard about it and got angry. Simeon ben Shetaḥ heard and fled. After some time, important people from the Persian empire came to king Yannai. They said to him: We remember that there was an old man who gave us a rabbinic discourse. They said to him, send and bring him! He sent and gave him his word; he came and sat between king and queen. He said to him, why did you trick me? He said, I did not trick you; you with your money and I with my learning, as it is written (Eccl. 7:12) “In the shadow of wisdom, in the shadow of money.” He said to him, why did you disappear? He said to him, I heard that my lord was angry with me and I wanted to fulfill the verse (Is. 26:20) “Hide a little bit until the rage passes;” he used about himself (Eccl. 7:12): “Knowledge is an advantage, wisdom lets its possessor live.” He said to him, why did you sit between king and queen? He said to him, it is written in the book of Ben Sirach: “Esteem it and it will raise you and seat you among princes.” He said, bring him a cup that he may recite Grace. They brought him a cup and he said: “Let us give praise for the food that Yannai and his company ate.” He said to him, what should I say, “for the food that we did not eat?” He said, bring him something that he may eat. They brought, he ate and recited: “For the food that we ate.” Rebbi Yoḥanan said, his colleagues disagree with Simeon ben Shetaḥ. Rebbi Jeremiah said, about the first action; Rebbi Abba said, about the second action. Rebbi Jeremiah seems to contradict himself! There he wondered about it and here it is obvious for him! He wondered following the Sages; it is obvious to him following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. We have stated about this: If one came, was lying on a couch, and dipped with them, even if he did not eat grain the volume of an olive one ‘invites’ with him, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan: One never ‘invites’ anyone unless he has eaten grain the volume of an olive. But did we not formulate, “two [eating] bread and one [eating] vegetable, then one ‘invites’?” This baraita follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

“Fresh”, to include unripe berries. “Fresh”, to include the flower. The baraita follows Rebbi Yose, since Rebbi Yose said, the flower is forbidden for the nazir because it is a fruit. It is possible to eat a bunch of grapes and to be guilty in reference to “grapes, fresh or dried, he shall not eat.” If he soaked it for soaking, pressed it for wine, and they warned him about “anything that comes from the wine-vine”, etc.

Rebbi Ila said before Rebbi Yose: For whipping one, for hindering two, to start again three. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: “If he cropped any, he is guilty.” Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, Rebbi Yasa explains it by a little bit from each one. A baraita disagrees with Samuel: A person may tear out two hairs and have violated four prohibitions: As a nazir, as a sufferer from sking disease, on a holiday, because of jaw stripping. We have enumerated the prohibitions; but with regard to whippings, one even whips for one.

Rebbi Ila said before Rebbi Yose: For whipping one, for hindering two, to start again three. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: “If he cropped any, he is guilty.” Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, Rebbi Yasa explains it by a little bit from each one. A baraita disagrees with Samuel: A person may tear out two hairs and have violated four prohibitions: As a nazir, as a sufferer from sking disease, on a holiday, because of jaw stripping. We have enumerated the prohibitions; but with regard to whippings, one even whips for one.

HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”

HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”

HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”

Only if he says, it was written before me during the day and signed during the day; only if he says, it was written before me especially for her and signed expressly for her. It was asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does he have to know the names of the witnesses at the moment of their signing? He said to them, did the Gentiles Luciani sign it? And you say so? A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “All bills of divorce coming from overseas are valid even if their names sound Gentile since Jews outside the Land of Israel bear Gentile names.” He said only, outside the Land; therefore not in the Land of Israel. What about this? Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Issi: unless he writes, at a Jewish place. If there is no Jewish place, in the synagogue. If there is no synagogue, he assembles there ten people. Rebbi Abun said, it would be better to certify the signatures than to assemble there ten people. What about this? Even in a Jewish store.

“ ‘Give this mina to X,’ then he died. If the heirs want to hinder [the delivery] they are powerless. It is unnecessary to say that it is so if he said, acquire for him, if he said, accept by my orders.” Rebbi Abba barMamal said, this baraita refers to a sick person. If he is sick, does he not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him? Rebbi Mana said, I confirmed this by what Rebbi Abba bar Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: They treated verbal instructions by a sick person as if they were written and delivered. But only if he died from that sickness, not if he recovered, he did not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him.

Rebbi Immi said, where do they disagree? If the document is presented by him personally. But if it is presented by another person, even the rabbis will agree that it is valid. Rebbi Ḥananiah agrees with Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, where do they disagree? If the document is presented by another person. But if it is presented by him personally, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree that it is invalid. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected to Rebbi Immi: If the document is presented by him personally, does Rebbi Jehudah declare it valid even in the first case? Rebbi Immi brought his father-in-law Rebbi Jonah who stated for him: If one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”, it is invalid, but Rebbi Jehudah declares it valid. Rebbi Abin said, the formulation of a baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: In that case, Rebbi Jehudah declares it valid. But it is difficult following Rebbi Ze‘ira: If the document is presented by another person, that is when they do not treat the messenger as two. When do they treat him as two? When he testifies to both writing and signing.

Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.

Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.

Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.