borrower

The rich ruleth over the poor, and the borrower is servant to the lender.

And it shall be, as with the people, so with the priest; as with the servant, so with his master; as with the maid, so with her mistress; as with the buyer, so with the seller; as with the lender, so with the borrower; as with the taker of usury, so with the giver of usury to him.

One who borrows a vessel from his neighbor on the eve of Yom Tov, [it is restricted to the same limits] as the feet of the borrower. [But if he borrowed it] on Yom Tov, it is as the feet of the lender. A woman who borrowed from her neighbor spices, water or salt for her dough, these are [restricted to the same limits] as the feet of both them. Rabbi Judah exempts in the case of water, because it is not substantial.

[A scribe] who writes out formulas of bills of divorce must leave blank spaces for the name of the man and the name of the woman and the date. [A scribe who writes] loan documents must leave blank spaces for the name of the lender, the name of the borrower, the amount of money and the date. [A scribe who writes] sale documents must leave blank spaces for the name of the seller, the name of the purchaser, the amount of money, the property and the date; [These spaces must be left blank] because of the “takkanah” (enactment). Rabbi Judah disqualifies all of them. Rabbi Elazar validates all of them valid except divorce documents, as it says, “He writes for her” (Deut 24:1), expressly for her.

Similarly with betrothals and similarly with a debt. If a man’s creditor said to him, “Throw me my debt”, and he threw it to him, if it lands nearer to the creditor, the borrower is credited [with paying back his debt]; if it lands nearer to the borrower, the borrower is still obligated [to repay the money]; if it lands midway, they divide. If she was standing on a roof and he threw it up to her, as soon as it reaches the airspace of the roof, she is divorced. If he was above and she below and he threw it to her, once it has left the space of the roof, [even were it to be immediately] erased or burnt, she is divorced.

Similarly with betrothals and similarly with a debt. If a man’s creditor said to him, “Throw me my debt”, and he threw it to him, if it lands nearer to the creditor, the borrower is credited [with paying back his debt]; if it lands nearer to the borrower, the borrower is still obligated [to repay the money]; if it lands midway, they divide. If she was standing on a roof and he threw it up to her, as soon as it reaches the airspace of the roof, she is divorced. If he was above and she below and he threw it to her, once it has left the space of the roof, [even were it to be immediately] erased or burnt, she is divorced.

Similarly with betrothals and similarly with a debt. If a man’s creditor said to him, “Throw me my debt”, and he threw it to him, if it lands nearer to the creditor, the borrower is credited [with paying back his debt]; if it lands nearer to the borrower, the borrower is still obligated [to repay the money]; if it lands midway, they divide. If she was standing on a roof and he threw it up to her, as soon as it reaches the airspace of the roof, she is divorced. If he was above and she below and he threw it to her, once it has left the space of the roof, [even were it to be immediately] erased or burnt, she is divorced.

If one handed it to an unpaid guardian, or to a borrower, or to a paid guardian, or to a hirer, they take the place of the owners; if the beast was an attested danger he pays full damages, and if it was accounted harmless he pays half damages. If its owner had tied it with a halter, or locked it up properly, but it came out and caused damage, the owner is liable, whether it was an attested danger or accounted harmless, these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: “If it was accounted harmless he is liable, but if it was an attested danger he is exempt, as it says, “and its owner did not guard it”, but this one has been guarded. Rabbi Eliezer says: “Its only guarding is the knife.”

If while he was dragging [a sheep or ox] out it died in the owner’s domain, he is exempt. But if he had lifted it or taken it out of the owner’s domain and it died, he is liable. If he brought it as the firstborn offering for his son, or gave it to his creditor, or to an unpaid guardian, or to a borrower, or to a paid guardian, or to a hirer, and one of them was dragging it away and it died in the owner’s domain, he is exempt. If [one of them] had lifted it up or taken it outside the owner’s domain, he is liable.

If a man found letters of evaluation, or letters of sustenance, or documents of halitzah or refusal, or documents of arbitration or any document drawn out by the court he should return them. If he found documents in a satchel or bag, or a bundle of documents he should return them. How many count as a bundle of documents? Three tied up together. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: [If one found three documents in which] one borrowed from three others, they should be returned to the borrower. But if [one found three documents in which] one loaned to three, they should be returned to the lender. If a man found a document among his documents and he does not know what is its nature, it must be left until Elijah comes. If there were postscripts amongst them, he should do what is stated in the postscript.

If a man rented a cow from his fellow and lent it to another, and it died a natural death, the hirer must swear that it died a natural death and the borrower must repay [its value] to the renter. Rabbi Yose said: “How can this one make business out of his friend’s cow? Rather [the value of the cow] returns to the owner.”

These are the one who transgress a negative commandment: the lender, the borrower, the guarantor, and the witnesses. And the Sages say, “The scribe also.” They transgress the commandment, “You will not give him your money upon interest” (Leviticus 25:37), and “You shall not take usury from him” (Leviticus 25:36) and “You shall not be to him as a creditor” (Exodus 22:24), and “Nor shall you place upon him usury” (ibid.) and “You shall not put a stumbling block before the blind, and you will fear your God, I am the Lord” (Leviticus 19:14).

Those that guard [gathered] produce may eat from it because that is the custom of the land and not because that is the law of the Torah. There are four kinds of guardians: an unpaid guardian, a borrower, a paid guardian and a hirer. An unpaid guardian may take an oath [that he had not been neglectful] in every case [of loss or damage and be free of liability]. A borrower must make restitution in every case. A paid guardian or a hirer may take an oath if the beast was injured, or taken captive or dead, but he must make restitution if it was lost or stolen.

Those that guard [gathered] produce may eat from it because that is the custom of the land and not because that is the law of the Torah. There are four kinds of guardians: an unpaid guardian, a borrower, a paid guardian and a hirer. An unpaid guardian may take an oath [that he had not been neglectful] in every case [of loss or damage and be free of liability]. A borrower must make restitution in every case. A paid guardian or a hirer may take an oath if the beast was injured, or taken captive or dead, but he must make restitution if it was lost or stolen.

If a beast died a natural death this counts as an unavoidable accident [for which a hirer or paid guardian is not liable]. But if he tortured it and it died it does not count as an unavoidable accident [and the hirer and paid guardian would be liable]. If it was led up to the top of a crag and it fell down and died, this does not count as an unavoidable accident. An unpaid guardian may make a stipulation that he will be exempt from taking an oath, and a borrower [may make a stipulation that he will be exempt] from making restitution, and a paid guardian and a hirer [may make a stipulation that they will be exempt] from taking an oath or from making restitution.

If one borrowed a cow and the owner sent it by the hand of his son or his slave or his agent, or by the hand of the borrower’s son or slave or agent and it died [on the way], the borrower is not liable. But if the borrower said, “Send it to me by the hand of my son or my slave or my agent, or by the hand of your son or your slave or your agent”, or if the lender said, “I am sending it to you by the hand of my son or my slave or my agent”, or “by the hand of your son or your slave or your agent”, and the borrower said, “Send it”, and he sent it and it died [on the way], the borrower is liable. So, too, when the cow is returned.

If one borrowed a cow and the owner sent it by the hand of his son or his slave or his agent, or by the hand of the borrower’s son or slave or agent and it died [on the way], the borrower is not liable. But if the borrower said, “Send it to me by the hand of my son or my slave or my agent, or by the hand of your son or your slave or your agent”, or if the lender said, “I am sending it to you by the hand of my son or my slave or my agent”, or “by the hand of your son or your slave or your agent”, and the borrower said, “Send it”, and he sent it and it died [on the way], the borrower is liable. So, too, when the cow is returned.

If one borrowed a cow and the owner sent it by the hand of his son or his slave or his agent, or by the hand of the borrower’s son or slave or agent and it died [on the way], the borrower is not liable. But if the borrower said, “Send it to me by the hand of my son or my slave or my agent, or by the hand of your son or your slave or your agent”, or if the lender said, “I am sending it to you by the hand of my son or my slave or my agent”, or “by the hand of your son or your slave or your agent”, and the borrower said, “Send it”, and he sent it and it died [on the way], the borrower is liable. So, too, when the cow is returned.

If one borrowed a cow and the owner sent it by the hand of his son or his slave or his agent, or by the hand of the borrower’s son or slave or agent and it died [on the way], the borrower is not liable. But if the borrower said, “Send it to me by the hand of my son or my slave or my agent, or by the hand of your son or your slave or your agent”, or if the lender said, “I am sending it to you by the hand of my son or my slave or my agent”, or “by the hand of your son or your slave or your agent”, and the borrower said, “Send it”, and he sent it and it died [on the way], the borrower is liable. So, too, when the cow is returned.

If one borrowed a cow and the owner sent it by the hand of his son or his slave or his agent, or by the hand of the borrower’s son or slave or agent and it died [on the way], the borrower is not liable. But if the borrower said, “Send it to me by the hand of my son or my slave or my agent, or by the hand of your son or your slave or your agent”, or if the lender said, “I am sending it to you by the hand of my son or my slave or my agent”, or “by the hand of your son or your slave or your agent”, and the borrower said, “Send it”, and he sent it and it died [on the way], the borrower is liable. So, too, when the cow is returned.

If one lent one’s fellow, he may exact a pledge from him only with the permission of a court, and he may not enter his house to take the pledge, as it is states, “You shall stand outside” (Deut. 24:1. If the borrower had two utensils, he may take one but must give back the other. And he must give back the pillow at night and the plow during the day. And if the creditor dies he need not return the pledge to his heirs. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “Even to the debtor himself he need only return the pledge within thirty days [of the loan], and after thirty days he may sell it with the consent of the court. A pledge may not be taken from a widow, whether she be rich or poor, as it states, “Do not take the a widow’s garment as a pledge” (Deut. 24:17). If one takes a millstone as a pledge he violates a negative commandment and he is also in violation of both parts [of the millstone], as it states, “Do not take a mill or an upper millstone as a pledge” (Deut. 24:6). And they didn’t say just an upper millstone or a mill but anything that is necessary for food, as it states, “for that would be taking someone’s life as a pledge” (ibid.).

If there were two brothers, one poor and one rich, and their father left them a bath house or an olive press, if the father had made them for hire, the profit is split equally. But if he made them for his own use alone, the rich brother may say to the poor brother, “Buy for yourself slaves and they can wash in the bath house” or “Buy for yourself olives and prepare them in the olive press.” If there were two in the same town, and one’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon and other’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon, neither can bring forth a debt document on the other, and another person cannot bring forth a debt document against them. And if some person finds amongst his documents a document that states, “The [debt] document of Joseph ben Shimon is paid”, both of their [debt] documents are paid. What should they do? They should write their names to the third generation. And if the names are the same through the third generation, they should give themselves a sign. And if their signs are the same, they should write “Cohen”. If a man said to his son, “One of my debt documents is paid and I do not know which one”, then all are deemed to be paid. If two documents were found [amongst his documents] written to the same debtor, then the large one is paid and the small one is not paid. If a man lent money to his fellow on a guarantor’s security, he may not exact payment from the guarantor. But if he had said, “On the condition that I may exact payment from whom I wish”, then he may exact payment from the guarantor. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If the borrower had property, in neither case can he exact payment from the guarantor.” Moreover, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel used to say: “If a man was a guarantor for a woman’s ketubah and her husband divorced her, the husband must vow to derive no further benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of the guarantor and take his wife back again.”

There are four kinds of guardians: an unpaid guardian, a borrower, a paid guardian and a hirer. An unpaid guardian may take an oath [that he had not been neglectful] in every case [of loss or damage and be free of liability]. A borrower must make restitution in every case. A paid guardian or a hirer may take an oath if the beast was injured, or taken captive or dead, but he must make restitution if it was lost or stolen.

There are four kinds of guardians: an unpaid guardian, a borrower, a paid guardian and a hirer. An unpaid guardian may take an oath [that he had not been neglectful] in every case [of loss or damage and be free of liability]. A borrower must make restitution in every case. A paid guardian or a hirer may take an oath if the beast was injured, or taken captive or dead, but he must make restitution if it was lost or stolen.

If he [the owner] said to the borrower, “Where is my ox?” and he replied to him, “It died,” whereas in reality it was injured or captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was injured,” whereas in reality it died or was captured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was captured”, whereas in reality it died or was injured or stolen or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was stolen”, whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or lost; [Or he replied,] “It was lost”, whereas in reality it died or was injured or captured or stolen; [And the owner said,] “I adjure you,” and he said, “Amen,” he is exempt.

Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina, he who leads kilaim by voice will be whipped. We have stated so: “If he led it, if he made it draw, if he called it and it came, he is responsible to pay like a borrower.” But did not Samuel state: “If it was standing outside the Sabbath domain, he called it and it came after him, he is free.” There it comes of its own volition, here it is forced to walk But did we not state: “If he clapped before his [a slave’s] eye and blinded it, before his [a slave’s] ear and made it deaf, he [the slave] does not attain freedom.” Rebbi Eliezer ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yose, there is a difference because he [the slave] could have fled. Know that it is so because we have stated: “If he grabbed him he is guilty.”

MISHNAH: A predated prozbol is valid, postdated it is invalid. Predated documents of indebtedness are invalid, postdated they are valid. If one person borrows from five, one writes a prozbol for each single [creditor]. If five persons borrow from one, he writes only one prozbol for all of them. One writes prozbol only on the basis of real estate. If he has none, [the other party] gives him the right to a minute area of their field. If he had a field mortgaged in town, one writes a prozbol on it. Rebbi Ḥuẓpit says, one writes for a man on his wife’s properties and for orphans on those of the guardians. A bee hive. Rebbi Eliezer says, it is like real estate: one may write a prozbol on it, it is not subject to impurity in its place, and somebody who takes honey from it on the Sabbath is guilty. But the Sages say, it is not like real estate, one may not write a prozbol on it, it is subject to impurity in its place, and somebody who takes honey from it on the Sabbath is not sanctionable. If somebody returns a debt in the Sabbatical, he [the lender] says to him: “I am remitting.” If he [the borrower] says “anyway”, he [the lender] should accept it, for it is said (Deut. 15:2): “This is the word of remission”. Similarly, a homicide exiled to a city of refuge whom the citizens of the town wanted to honor, should say to them: I am a homicide. If they tell him, anyway, he should accept it, for it is said (Deut. 19:4): “This is the word of a homicide.”

Rav said, only if both lender and borrower have real estate. But Rebbi Joḥanan says, if the creditor does but not the borrower, or the borrower but not the lender. If he has no real estate but one who owes him has real estate then one writes him a prozbol. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Even if he has only one stalk in a field, one writes him a prozbol. But did we not state: Partners, sharecroppers, and guardians have no prozbol? They say, there each single stalk is property of the partnership but here it is his.

Rav said, only if both lender and borrower have real estate. But Rebbi Joḥanan says, if the creditor does but not the borrower, or the borrower but not the lender. If he has no real estate but one who owes him has real estate then one writes him a prozbol. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Even if he has only one stalk in a field, one writes him a prozbol. But did we not state: Partners, sharecroppers, and guardians have no prozbol? They say, there each single stalk is property of the partnership but here it is his.

Rav said, only if both lender and borrower have real estate. But Rebbi Joḥanan says, if the creditor does but not the borrower, or the borrower but not the lender. If he has no real estate but one who owes him has real estate then one writes him a prozbol. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Even if he has only one stalk in a field, one writes him a prozbol. But did we not state: Partners, sharecroppers, and guardians have no prozbol? They say, there each single stalk is property of the partnership but here it is his.

There, we have stated: “If somebody borrows a cow and [the lender] sent her to him through his son, his slave, or his agent.” Does this not say that a slave is able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Rebbi Eleazar said, explain it about a Hebrew slave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, you can even explain it for a Canaanite slave, it he told him, open the gate for her and she will go by herself, as we have stated: If he led her, drew her, called her and she followed him, he is required to pay as a borrower.

There, we have stated: “If somebody borrows a cow and [the lender] sent her to him through his son, his slave, or his agent, in case it died he is not liable.” Does this not say that a slave is able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Rebbi Eleazar said, explain it about a Hebrew slave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, you can even explain it for a Canaanite slave, it he told him, open the gate for her and she will go by herself, as we have stated: If he led her, drew her, called her and she followed him, he is required to pay as a borrower. Rebbi Ze`ira understood it from here: “But he cannot make them acquire through his minor son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is not like his hand.” Does this not imply that a slave is not able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Explain it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. But did we not state “his wife”? Rebbi Meïr holds that the hand of the wife is the hand of her husband! Rebbi Ḥananiah said in the name of Rebbi Phineas, explain it following the Tanna who stated: “His wife cannot redeem Second Tithe for him. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, his wife can redeem Second Tithe for him.” For that Tanna, Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master but not the hand of the wife the hand of her husband!

MISHNAH: If one borrows vessels from another person, on holiday eve they are like the feet of the borrower, on the holiday like the feet of the lender. If a woman borrowed from another spices, water, and salt, for her dough, they are like the feet of both of them. Rebbi Jehudah excludes water since it lacks stability.

If somebody claimed a mina, the [defendant] denied it, and the [claimant] produced witnesses that the [defendant] owes him 50 [zuz]. The older Rebbi Ḥiyya said, [the defendant] has to swear about the remainder. Rebbi Joḥanan says, he does not have to swear. The older Rebbi Ḥiyya learned it from two who are grabbing a toga, as we have stated there: “Two are grabbing a toga, one says, I found it, and the other says, I found it.” The one who grabs half of it is as if he brought witnesses that that half belongs to him. The other says, “it belongs to me entirely”, and the fact that he grabs half of it is as if he brought witnesses that this half belongs to him. The one who says, “it belongs to me entirely”, swears that not the entire [toga] is the other’s. But he did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan that this oath is a rabbinic institution, that a man should not see another in the market and tell him, the toga which you are wearing is mine, come and split your toga with me! Rebbi Abin in the name of Rav: My uncle agrees in the case of a document. How is that? He claimed a mina, the [defendant] denied it, and the [claimant] produced a document that the [defendant] owed him 50 [zuz]. He has only fifty. And Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, we can understand it from the following: “‘The amount of … tetradrachmas’ and it was illegible, he owes no less than two. “If it is more, if the lender says five but the borrower says three, Ben Azzay says since he partially agreed to the claim, he has to swear, but the Sages say, what he agreed to is not of the kind which was claimed. Because it was not of the kind which was claimed! Therefore, if it were of the kind which was claimed, he would be obligated. And is it not here that the agreed sum was part of the claim? Everybody agrees that he owes her a mina. But she claimsanother mina from him, to which he does not agree. The burden of proof is on the claimant.

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two wives,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody borrowed from two persons and the second comes and says to him, get up and let us settle, and [the borrower] says, will not in the end the first hear of it and come to foreclose, he [the second lender] may say let us settle, and if he forecloses, he forecloses. If he settled, one may assume that the first will come and foreclose. If he settled with the first, Rebbi Phineas said, such a case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who said, he settled. Rebbi Yose said, did he not write “what I shall acquire”? It happens only with an heir. Rebbi Ḥanina said, even with a creditor it can happen if he did not write “anything I shall acquire”, or if he said, “you shall not be paid except from this.” Rav Mattaniah said, this follows him who said, for ketubah but not for stipulations. But for him who said, for ketubah and for stipulations, does it not return?

Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: If a man and his wife held on to a bill of divorce; she says, I acquired it, but he says, you did not acquire. Does this refer to the disagreement between Rebbi and Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel? Since they disagreed: If creditor and borrower both hold on to the bond; the creditor says it is mine; I had lost it. The borrower says, it is mine because I paid it off. The document should be verified by its signatories, the words of Rebbi. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, they should split. Rebbi Eleazar said, everything depends on who actually holds the signatures of the witnesses. Where do they disagree? If it was written lengthwise and both hold part of the signatures of the witnesses. He said to him, it is everybody’s opinion that it is not a bill of divorce if all is in her hand but a thread is in his hand, for it is written: “He shall deliver it into her hand,” not unless all be in her hand.

Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: If a man and his wife held on to a bill of divorce; she says, I acquired it, but he says, you did not acquire. Does this refer to the disagreement between Rebbi and Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel? Since they disagreed: If creditor and borrower both hold on to the bond; the creditor says it is mine; I had lost it. The borrower says, it is mine because I paid it off. The document should be verified by its signatories, the words of Rebbi. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, they should split. Rebbi Eleazar said, everything depends on who actually holds the signatures of the witnesses. Where do they disagree? If it was written lengthwise and both hold part of the signatures of the witnesses. He said to him, it is everybody’s opinion that it is not a bill of divorce if all is in her hand but a thread is in his hand, for it is written: “He shall deliver it into her hand,” not unless all be in her hand.

MISHNAH: If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce he has to leave space for the man, the woman, and the time. For bonds, he has to leave space for the lender, the borrower, the sum, and the time. For commercial deeds, he has to leave space for the buyer, the seller, the sum, the field, and the time, because of good order. Rebbi Jehudah invalidates all of these. Rebbi Eleazar validates all of them except women’s bills of divorce, for it is said: “He shall write for her”, in her name.

Rebbi Simai preached: “And the man,” that is the agent of the court. For if the creditor enters, he removes the best. If the borrower enters, he removes the worst. How is this? The agent of the court enters and removes from average quality. Rebbi Ismael says, it is a word from the Torah that the creditor should enter, for it is written: “The man whose creditor you are should bring the pledge out for you.” That is, his pledge. His real estate was inferred from his pledge. Since his pledge [is taken] from average quality, also his real estate [is taken] from average quality.

MISHNAH: The same applies for preliminary marriages and for [liquidation of] debts. If he said to him, throw to me what you owe me and he threw it close to the lender, the borrower is acquitted, close to the borrower, the borrower remains obligated, in the middle both of them must share it. If she was standing on top of her roof and he threw it to her, as soon as it reached the roof’s airspace she is divorced. If he was on top and she below, once it left the domain of the roof she is divorced even if it was blotted out or burned.

MISHNAH: The same applies for preliminary marriages and for [liquidation of] debts. If he said to him, throw to me what you owe me and he threw it close to the lender, the borrower is acquitted, close to the borrower, the borrower remains obligated, in the middle both of them must share it. If she was standing on top of her roof and he threw it to her, as soon as it reached the roof’s airspace she is divorced. If he was on top and she below, once it left the domain of the roof she is divorced even if it was blotted out or burned.

MISHNAH: The same applies for preliminary marriages and for [liquidation of] debts. If he said to him, throw to me what you owe me and he threw it close to the lender, the borrower is acquitted, close to the borrower, the borrower remains obligated, in the middle both of them must share it. If she was standing on top of her roof and he threw it to her, as soon as it reached the roof’s airspace she is divorced. If he was on top and she below, once it left the domain of the roof she is divorced even if it was blotted out or burned.

It is obvious that a slave may accept a gift by one third party to another, by a third party to his master, [but] not from his master to himself. From a third party to himself is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the Sages. If one said: Here [I am giving] you this money on condition that your master have no power over it, the slave acquired it and with him his master, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, the slave acquired it [but not] his master. What is the problem? From his master to a third party. Since the slave may receive from a third party for his master, may he receive from his master for a third party? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed a cow and [the lender] sent her to him through his slave, his son, or his agent.” Does this not mean that the slave is able to transfer rights from his master to a third party? Rebbi Eleazar said, explain it for a Hebrew slave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, you have to explain if for a Canaanite slave; explain it that he said, open [the gate] for her and she will come by herself, as we have stated: “If he led her, drew her to himself, called her and she followed him, he is responsible as a borrower.” Rebbi Zeïra understood it from here: “But he cannot make them acquire through his underage son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is not like his hand.” Does this not imply that a slave is not able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Explain it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. But did we not state “his wife”? Rebbi Meïr holds that the hand of the wife is the hand of her husband! Rebbi Ḥananiah said in the name of Rebbi Phineas, explain it following the Tanna who stated: “His wife cannot redeem Second Tithe for him. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, his wife can redeem Second Tithe for him.” For that Tanna, Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master but not the hand of the wife the hand of her husband!

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

We have stated: “Four main categories of damages.” But Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thirteen: Damages, suffering, medical costs, loss of earning power, shame; the unpaid trustee, and the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Say now, what we stated [refers to] responsibility for damages. What Rebbi Ḥiyya stated [refers to] both responsibility for damages and bodily injury. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: How can we state “four main categories”? If everything was said about one bull; let us state “three,” if it was said about three bulls, let us state “five”! But as it is presented in the verse, thus it is presented in the Mishnah.

Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One estimates neither for the thief nor for the robber nor for the borrower but only for damages, and I am saying that even for the borrower one does not estimate, and Abba agrees with me. Who is Abba? Rebbi or Rabba bar Abuha. Rav Ḥisda said, this treats the main event as an accessory. There came Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One estimates neither for the thief nor for the robber nor for the borrower but only for damages, and watchmen fall under the rules of damages.

Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One estimates neither for the thief nor for the robber nor for the borrower but only for damages, and I am saying that even for the borrower one does not estimate, and Abba agrees with me. Who is Abba? Rebbi or Rabba bar Abuha. Rav Ḥisda said, this treats the main event as an accessory. There came Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One estimates neither for the thief nor for the robber nor for the borrower but only for damages, and watchmen fall under the rules of damages.

Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One estimates neither for the thief nor for the robber nor for the borrower but only for damages, and I am saying that even for the borrower one does not estimate, and Abba agrees with me. Who is Abba? Rebbi or Rabba bar Abuha. Rav Ḥisda said, this treats the main event as an accessory. There came Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One estimates neither for the thief nor for the robber nor for the borrower but only for damages, and watchmen fall under the rules of damages.

New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”

Did we not state: “If a bull of a deaf-mute, insane, or underaged person gored, one appoints a guardian for them and receives testimony about them in the presence of the guardian”? So far if testimony was taken in the presence of the owner and he delivered to the guardian. If testimony was taken in the presence of the guardian and he delivered to the owner? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed it with the understanding that it was tame but it turned out to be notorious, the owner pays half of the damages and the borrower pays half of the damages.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Yose’s, since Rebbi Yose said, it remains in its prior state. But if this is Rebbi Yose’s, he should pay in full. If he borrowed it with the understanding that it was tame. But if he borrowed it with the understanding that it was tame, he should not have to pay anything. If he knew that it was apt to gore. It was stated: “If it killed while at the borrower’s, who handed it back to the owners, before judgment was rendered he is not liable, after judgment was rendered he is liable. Rebbi Jacob said, even after judgment was rendered but before it was stoned, he is not liable.”

Did we not state: “If a bull of a deaf-mute, insane, or underaged person gored, one appoints a guardian for them and receives testimony about them in the presence of the guardian”? So far if testimony was taken in the presence of the owner and he delivered to the guardian. If testimony was taken in the presence of the guardian and he delivered to the owner? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed it with the understanding that it was tame but it turned out to be notorious, the owner pays half of the damages and the borrower pays half of the damages.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Yose’s, since Rebbi Yose said, it remains in its prior state. But if this is Rebbi Yose’s, he should pay in full. If he borrowed it with the understanding that it was tame. But if he borrowed it with the understanding that it was tame, he should not have to pay anything. If he knew that it was apt to gore. It was stated: “If it killed while at the borrower’s, who handed it back to the owners, before judgment was rendered he is not liable, after judgment was rendered he is liable. Rebbi Jacob said, even after judgment was rendered but before it was stoned, he is not liable.”

MISHNAH: If it was handed over to an unpaid trustee, or a borrower, or a paid trustee, or a lessee, they entered instead of the owner; a notorious animal pays full damages, a tame one half damages. If he tied it down with a rope and locked it in as he should, if then it broke out and caused damage he is liable whether tame or notorious. Rebbi Jehudah says, for the tame he is liable, for the notorious he is not liable since it was said: “if its owner would not guard it,” but it was guarded. Rebbi Eliezer says, this one can be guarded only by the knife.

It was stated: “It was stolen from the man’s house”, but not from the woman’s house? Is not “his neighbor” only written in respect of the borrower? But one has to say that “he who steals from a thief does not pay [double restitution, nor does the one who slaughters or sells after a thief pay] quadruple or quintuple restitution. If something was stolen which then was stolen from him; [when in the end the stolen object was found, to whom does he pay? To the first owner, to the second, to both of them? If something was stolen which then was stolen from him]; the owners apprehended the second thief who swore to them. If you say that one takes it away from the second, he has to bring a sacrifice for the oath. If you say that one does not take it away from the second, he does not have to bring a sacrifice for his oath. If something was stolen which then was stolen from him and the second thief decides to return it, if you say that he has to return it to the owners, they might not inform the first thief. If you say that he has to return it to the first thief, that one might not inform the owners. What does he have to do? He returns it to the owners in the presence of the thief.

MISHNAH: If he was drawing it to lead it out but it died on the owner’s property, he is not liable. If he lifted it or had led it outside the owner’s property when it died, he is liable. If he gave it for his first-born son, to his creditor, to an unpaid guardian or a borrower, to a paid guardian or a renter, and that person was drawing it to lead it out but it died on the owner’s property, he is not liable. If he lifted it or had led it outside the owner’s property when it died, he is liable.

MISHNAH: One who found letters of appraisal, letters of sustenance, or documents of ḥalîṣah or repudiation, or documents of arbitration, or any other court document, should return them. If he found in a basket or in a box a bundle or joined documents he should return them. How many are joined documents? Three documents connected one to the other. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if one persons borrows from three, he should return it to the borrower; if three persons borrow from one, he should return it to the lender. If he found a document among his documents whose nature was unknown to him, it should lie there until Elijah comes. If it has an agreement attached to it, he should follow the agreement.

MISHNAH: If somebody lease a cow from another person and then lends it out to a third person. If it died a natural death, the lessee shall swear that it died a natural death and the borrower has to pay the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this one treat another person’s cow as his merchandise? But [the value of] the cow shall be returned to its owner.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody lease a cow from another person,” etc. But does he have permission to lend it? Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, unless he received permission from the owners.” Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lease. And here, only if he gave permission to let him be a steward. Rebbi Abbahu asked: If the owners borrowed it and it died of natural causes, should the lessee swear that it died a natural death and the borrower pay the renter? Rebbi Abinna said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. “Rebbi Yose said, how can this one treat another person’s cow as his merchandise? But [the value of] the cow shall be returned to its owner.”

HALAKHAH: “If somebody lease a cow from another person,” etc. But does he have permission to lend it? Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, unless he received permission from the owners.” Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lease. And here, only if he gave permission to let him be a steward. Rebbi Abbahu asked: If the owners borrowed it and it died of natural causes, should the lessee swear that it died a natural death and the borrower pay the renter? Rebbi Abinna said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. “Rebbi Yose said, how can this one treat another person’s cow as his merchandise? But [the value of] the cow shall be returned to its owner.”

HALAKHAH: “If somebody lease a cow from another person,” etc. But does he have permission to lend it? Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, unless he received permission from the owners.” Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lease. And here, only if he gave permission to let him be a steward. Rebbi Abbahu asked: If the owners borrowed it and it died of natural causes, should the lessee swear that it died a natural death and the borrower pay the renter? Rebbi Abinna said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. “Rebbi Yose said, how can this one treat another person’s cow as his merchandise? But [the value of] the cow shall be returned to its owner.”

“A person was transporting from a lowprice place to a highprice one. Another said to him, give it to me, I shall pay you what you would charge at place X. If the responsibility is the giver’s, it is forbidden, but the buyer’s is permitted. A person was transporting a package from place to place. Another said to him, give it to me, I shall pay you what you would charge at place X. If the responsibility is the giver’s, it is forbidden, but the buyer’s is permitted. But donkey drivers who receive from householders obtain produce for a highprice place at lowprice rates.” Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi: At a place where usually they can go and return the same day. Rav Huna said, he becomes his agent. But did one not object to [Rav] Huna: If an agent fell victim to an accident, is he liable? If he was the victim of an accident, he is not liable. Does it not happen that an unpaid trustee accepts to be like a borrower? But did not Rebbi Hoshaia state: Just as he is liable for the entirety, so he is liable for a part! Why does one quote this? There, he would pay a high price, but here he pays at the low rate.

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: There you say that a paid trustee who would be responsible for accidents is forbidden. But here you say that a paid trustee who is responsible for accidents is permitted. Does it not happen that an unpaid trustee agrees to be like a borrower? Rebbi Jeremiah asked: There you say that mortmain belongs to the first, but here you say to the second. Rebbi Yose said, there since the essence belongs to the first, the offspring are counted for the first. But here the essence belongs to the second since the offspring belong to the second.

MISHNAH: Watchmen of produce eat because of local practice but not from the Torah. There are four kinds of keepers: The unpaid trustee and the borrower, the paid keeper and the renter. The unpaid trustee swears about everything, the borrower pays for everything. The paid keeper and the renter swear about the broken, the kidnapped, and the dead but pay for the lost and the stolen.

MISHNAH: Watchmen of produce eat because of local practice but not from the Torah. There are four kinds of keepers: The unpaid trustee and the borrower, the paid keeper and the renter. The unpaid trustee swears about everything, the borrower pays for everything. The paid keeper and the renter swear about the broken, the kidnapped, and the dead but pay for the lost and the stolen.

MISHNAH: One wolf is not an unavoidable accident, two wolves are. Rebbi Jehudah says, in times when wolves appear in packs, even a single wolf is an unavoidable accident. Two dogs are not an unavoidable accident. Yaddua the Babylonian says in the name of Rebbi Meїr: From the same direction it is not an unavoidable accident; from two different directions it is an unavoidable accident Robbers are an unavoidable accident. A lion, and a bear, and a leopard, and a panther, and a snake are unavoidable accidents. When? If they came by themselves. But if he led [the flock] to a place of troops of wild animals or robbers, these are not unavoidable accidents. If [an animal] dies a natural death it is an unavoidable accident. If he tortured it and it died, it is not an unavoidable accident. If it climbed to the top of a cliff and fell, it is an unavoidable accident. If he led it onto the top of a cliff and it fell, it is not an unavoidable accident. The unpaid keeper may stipulate that he be free from swearing, the borrower that he not be liable to pay, the paid keeper and the renter that they not be liable to swear or to pay. The stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid. Any stipulation which follows a prior action is invalid. But any stipulation which it is possible to fulfill at the end and he stipulated it at the start is valid.

MISHNAH: If somebody borrowed a cow and [the lender] sent it through his son, or his slave, or his agent, or through the borrower’s son, or slave, or agent, and it died, he is not liable. If the borrower said, send it to me through my son, or slave, or agent, or through your son, or slave, or agent, or if the lender said, I am going to send it to you through my son, or slave, or agent, or through your son, or slave, or agent, and the borrower said: send! If it died, he is liable. The same holds when he returns it.

MISHNAH: If somebody borrowed a cow and [the lender] sent it through his son, or his slave, or his agent, or through the borrower’s son, or slave, or agent, and it died, he is not liable. If the borrower said, send it to me through my son, or slave, or agent, or through your son, or slave, or agent, or if the lender said, I am going to send it to you through my son, or slave, or agent, or through your son, or slave, or agent, and the borrower said: send! If it died, he is liable. The same holds when he returns it.

MISHNAH: If somebody borrowed a cow and [the lender] sent it through his son, or his slave, or his agent, or through the borrower’s son, or slave, or agent, and it died, he is not liable. If the borrower said, send it to me through my son, or slave, or agent, or through your son, or slave, or agent, or if the lender said, I am going to send it to you through my son, or slave, or agent, or through your son, or slave, or agent, and the borrower said: send! If it died, he is liable. The same holds when he returns it.

Rebbi Idi in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The practice for a knotted one is the following. One writes the lender’s name, and the borrower’s name, the witnesses’ names, and the time. Then one knots it and repeats the text below. But should one not be afraid that maybe he falsifies? Rav Huna said, witnesses never sign below unless they first read in the text above: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.”

MISHNAH: One writes a bill of divorce for a man even though his wife not be present, and a receipt for the wife even though he husband not be present on condition that he know her. The husband pays the fee. One writes a document of indebtedness for the borrower even though the creditor not be present, but one does not write a document of indebtedness for the creditor if the borrower not be present. The borrower pays the fee. One writes a sale contract for the seller even though the buyer not be present, but one does not write a sale contract for the buyer if the seller not be present. The buyer pays the fee. Documents of preliminary and definitive marriage one only writes on the orders of both parties; the groom pays the fee. Documents of share-cropping and leases one only writes on the orders of both parties; the tenant pays the fee. Documents of arbitration and court decisions one only writes on the orders of both parties; both of them pay the fee. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, one writes them in duplicate, one for each party.

MISHNAH: One writes a bill of divorce for a man even though his wife not be present, and a receipt for the wife even though he husband not be present on condition that he know her. The husband pays the fee. One writes a document of indebtedness for the borrower even though the creditor not be present, but one does not write a document of indebtedness for the creditor if the borrower not be present. The borrower pays the fee. One writes a sale contract for the seller even though the buyer not be present, but one does not write a sale contract for the buyer if the seller not be present. The buyer pays the fee. Documents of preliminary and definitive marriage one only writes on the orders of both parties; the groom pays the fee. Documents of share-cropping and leases one only writes on the orders of both parties; the tenant pays the fee. Documents of arbitration and court decisions one only writes on the orders of both parties; both of them pay the fee. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, one writes them in duplicate, one for each party.

MISHNAH: One writes a bill of divorce for a man even though his wife not be present, and a receipt for the wife even though he husband not be present on condition that he know her. The husband pays the fee. One writes a document of indebtedness for the borrower even though the creditor not be present, but one does not write a document of indebtedness for the creditor if the borrower not be present. The borrower pays the fee. One writes a sale contract for the seller even though the buyer not be present, but one does not write a sale contract for the buyer if the seller not be present. The buyer pays the fee. Documents of preliminary and definitive marriage one only writes on the orders of both parties; the groom pays the fee. Documents of share-cropping and leases one only writes on the orders of both parties; the tenant pays the fee. Documents of arbitration and court decisions one only writes on the orders of both parties; both of them pay the fee. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, one writes them in duplicate, one for each party.

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Joḥanan said, the lender can be believed if he said, I lent to you up to the value of the pledge. The Mishnah says, also the borrower can be believed, as we have stated: “He told him, ‘I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth a šeqel,’ but the other one says ‘no, a tetradrachma you loaned me and it was worth a tetradrachma‘; he is not liable.” A person encountered another in the market and said, you owe me two denarii and your pledge is worth two denarii. He answered, I owe you one denar but my pledge is worth two denarii. The case came before the judges of Nahardea. They said, since everybody agrees that it is worth two denarii, he has to bring witnesses on the other [denar]. They had not heard that Rebbi Joḥanan said, the lender can be believed if he said, I lent to you up to the value of the pledge.

Samuel says, the oath does not move away from between them. If the lender swears, he swears and takes. But if the borrower swears, the other will present the pledge. “Who has to swear? The one who holds the pledge.” Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, about the first part: “ ‘You loaned me a tetradrachma on it but it was worth two,’ and the other says ‘no, but I loaned you a tetradrachma and it was worth a tetradrachma;’ he is not liable. ‘You loaned me a tetradrachma on it,’ ” etc. “And the other says, ‘I do not know’.” Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna in the name of Rav: You do not know, the other knows. Rebbi Joshua [the Southerner] asked before Rebbi Jonah: There you say, you do not know, the other knows; but here you say so? There is desecration of an oath, here there is no desecration of an oath.

HALAKHAH: “All who must swear by Torah standards,” etc. One understands from what is said, an oath before the Eternal shall be between them, would we not know that if he does not swear, he has to pay? Why does the verse say, its owner shall take it, and he does not have to pay? But from the moment the owner accepted his oath, he does not have to pay. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is this only following Rebbi Meїr or even following the rabbis? Did not Rebbi Assi say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Meїr is the one who says that out of a negative one understands a positive? Its owner shall take it, and he does not have to pay, therefore if he does not swear, he has to pay. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The unpaid and the paid trustees may stipulate to be like a borrower. Rebbi Ḥanina said, everybody agrees that in the language of the Torah out of a negative one understands a positive; where do they disagree? In everyday speech.

MISHNAH: There are four kinds of keepers: The unpaid trustee and the borrower, the paid keeper, and the renter. The unpaid trustee swears about everything; the borrower pays for everything; the paid keeper and the renter swear about breakage, abduction, and death, but pay for the lost and the stolen.

MISHNAH: There are four kinds of keepers: The unpaid trustee and the borrower, the paid keeper, and the renter. The unpaid trustee swears about everything; the borrower pays for everything; the paid keeper and the renter swear about breakage, abduction, and death, but pay for the lost and the stolen.

It was stated, if it was stolen from the man’s house; not from the borrower’s house. If it was stolen from the man’s house; not from the house of the paid keeper or the renter? Since he is obligated to watch it, it is as if it referred to him; for you may say that there are three paragraphs. The last one about the borrower, the middle one about the paid keeper and the renter, the first one about the unpaid keeper. The borrower who profits from all pays everything. The paid keeper or the renter, because he profits partially and gives partial profit, swears about part and pays part. The unpaid keeper who does not profit at all swears and leaves. What does he swear? I did not commit anything. What is the situation if others know that he did not commit anything? Let us hear from the following: If the thief was found but has nothing with which to pay, may he say to him, swear to me that you were not thinking to take it? Let us hear from the following: If the thief was not found. Therefore, it he was found he is not liable.

It was stated, if it was stolen from the man’s house; not from the borrower’s house. If it was stolen from the man’s house; not from the house of the paid keeper or the renter? Since he is obligated to watch it, it is as if it referred to him; for you may say that there are three paragraphs. The last one about the borrower, the middle one about the paid keeper and the renter, the first one about the unpaid keeper. The borrower who profits from all pays everything. The paid keeper or the renter, because he profits partially and gives partial profit, swears about part and pays part. The unpaid keeper who does not profit at all swears and leaves. What does he swear? I did not commit anything. What is the situation if others know that he did not commit anything? Let us hear from the following: If the thief was found but has nothing with which to pay, may he say to him, swear to me that you were not thinking to take it? Let us hear from the following: If the thief was not found. Therefore, it he was found he is not liable.

It was stated, if it was stolen from the man’s house; not from the borrower’s house. If it was stolen from the man’s house; not from the house of the paid keeper or the renter? Since he is obligated to watch it, it is as if it referred to him; for you may say that there are three paragraphs. The last one about the borrower, the middle one about the paid keeper and the renter, the first one about the unpaid keeper. The borrower who profits from all pays everything. The paid keeper or the renter, because he profits partially and gives partial profit, swears about part and pays part. The unpaid keeper who does not profit at all swears and leaves. What does he swear? I did not commit anything. What is the situation if others know that he did not commit anything? Let us hear from the following: If the thief was found but has nothing with which to pay, may he say to him, swear to me that you were not thinking to take it? Let us hear from the following: If the thief was not found. Therefore, it he was found he is not liable.

For the borrower only the broken is written. From where loss and theft? It is logical. Since the paid keeper and the renter who do not pay for the broken or the dead have to pay for theft and loss, the borrower who pays for the broken or the dead certainly has to pay for theft and loss. It was stated about this: This is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged. From where the abducted? It is said here, it was broken or died; and it is said there, it dies or was broken. Since there the abducted was included, here also the abducted was included. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael follows Rebbi Nathan. Rebbi Nathan says, or, to include the abducted. Or following Rebbi Meïr who said, an equal cut at the place it comes from. Since there one swears for duress, also here one swears for duress. Still following Rebbi Nathan, for Rebbi Nathan said, or it died, to include the abducted one.

For the borrower only the broken is written. From where loss and theft? It is logical. Since the paid keeper and the renter who do not pay for the broken or the dead have to pay for theft and loss, the borrower who pays for the broken or the dead certainly has to pay for theft and loss. It was stated about this: This is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged. From where the abducted? It is said here, it was broken or died; and it is said there, it dies or was broken. Since there the abducted was included, here also the abducted was included. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael follows Rebbi Nathan. Rebbi Nathan says, or, to include the abducted. Or following Rebbi Meïr who said, an equal cut at the place it comes from. Since there one swears for duress, also here one swears for duress. Still following Rebbi Nathan, for Rebbi Nathan said, or it died, to include the abducted one.

Rebbi Yudan asked: If he claimed the claim of a thief and duress? He told him, an armed robber came and took it; does he have to pay double restitution of duress? Rebbi Yose said, if it were so one should state “the paid keeper and the renter;” but we have stated: We do not find that the paid keeper and the renter pay double restitution of duress. On this we have stated, “this is an argument de minore ad majus which is questionable”. Rebbi Ḥanina said, if you say so, should you say, this is an argument de minore ad majus which is questionable, for he can tell him, let us say that the borrower pays double restitution. On this it was stated, this is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged.

It was said, if its owners were with him, he does not have to pay. Does he have to swear? Rebbi Ze`ira said, he swears. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La both are saying, he does not swear. A baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La: “Breakage, abduction, and death for which he is not liable in the cases of the paid keeper and the renter, and the borrower with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; loss and theft where the paid keeper and the renter are liable, is it not that a fortiori the borrower be not liable with the owner but liable without the owner?” For him who says it is obvious that he swears, should he not have to pay? Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: A baraita supports Rebbi Ze`ira. “The borrower, for whom the Torah was restrictive, with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; the paid keeper, for whom the Torah was lenient, a fortiori with the owner should not be liable, without the owner should be liable.” If you are saying, his problem was swearing, he should have stated “the paid keeper and the renter.” That means he only needs it for payment. It is difficult for Rebbi Ze`ira: the borrower swears if the owner was with him; if the owner was not with him he must pay. The unpaid keeper swears, whether the owner was with him or was not with him. You are saying that where the borrower pays the paid keeper swears. Where the paid keeper swears, the unpaid keeper should not be liable. Where the paid keeper pays, the unpaid keeper swears. What do you state about an unpaid keeper when the owner be with him? But some are asking, what do you state about an unpaid and a paid keeper, whether or not the owner be with him? Rebbi Abin said, any word of criminality. Rebbi Mana said, do we not find that the Torah treated loss and theft equally for the borrower? Therefore, we shall treat breakage, abduction, and death equally both for the unpaid and the paid keepers.

It was said, if its owners were with him, he does not have to pay. Does he have to swear? Rebbi Ze`ira said, he swears. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La both are saying, he does not swear. A baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La: “Breakage, abduction, and death for which he is not liable in the cases of the paid keeper and the renter, and the borrower with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; loss and theft where the paid keeper and the renter are liable, is it not that a fortiori the borrower be not liable with the owner but liable without the owner?” For him who says it is obvious that he swears, should he not have to pay? Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: A baraita supports Rebbi Ze`ira. “The borrower, for whom the Torah was restrictive, with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; the paid keeper, for whom the Torah was lenient, a fortiori with the owner should not be liable, without the owner should be liable.” If you are saying, his problem was swearing, he should have stated “the paid keeper and the renter.” That means he only needs it for payment. It is difficult for Rebbi Ze`ira: the borrower swears if the owner was with him; if the owner was not with him he must pay. The unpaid keeper swears, whether the owner was with him or was not with him. You are saying that where the borrower pays the paid keeper swears. Where the paid keeper swears, the unpaid keeper should not be liable. Where the paid keeper pays, the unpaid keeper swears. What do you state about an unpaid keeper when the owner be with him? But some are asking, what do you state about an unpaid and a paid keeper, whether or not the owner be with him? Rebbi Abin said, any word of criminality. Rebbi Mana said, do we not find that the Torah treated loss and theft equally for the borrower? Therefore, we shall treat breakage, abduction, and death equally both for the unpaid and the paid keepers.

It was said, if its owners were with him, he does not have to pay. Does he have to swear? Rebbi Ze`ira said, he swears. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La both are saying, he does not swear. A baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La: “Breakage, abduction, and death for which he is not liable in the cases of the paid keeper and the renter, and the borrower with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; loss and theft where the paid keeper and the renter are liable, is it not that a fortiori the borrower be not liable with the owner but liable without the owner?” For him who says it is obvious that he swears, should he not have to pay? Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: A baraita supports Rebbi Ze`ira. “The borrower, for whom the Torah was restrictive, with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; the paid keeper, for whom the Torah was lenient, a fortiori with the owner should not be liable, without the owner should be liable.” If you are saying, his problem was swearing, he should have stated “the paid keeper and the renter.” That means he only needs it for payment. It is difficult for Rebbi Ze`ira: the borrower swears if the owner was with him; if the owner was not with him he must pay. The unpaid keeper swears, whether the owner was with him or was not with him. You are saying that where the borrower pays the paid keeper swears. Where the paid keeper swears, the unpaid keeper should not be liable. Where the paid keeper pays, the unpaid keeper swears. What do you state about an unpaid keeper when the owner be with him? But some are asking, what do you state about an unpaid and a paid keeper, whether or not the owner be with him? Rebbi Abin said, any word of criminality. Rebbi Mana said, do we not find that the Torah treated loss and theft equally for the borrower? Therefore, we shall treat breakage, abduction, and death equally both for the unpaid and the paid keepers.

It was said, if its owners were with him, he does not have to pay. Does he have to swear? Rebbi Ze`ira said, he swears. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La both are saying, he does not swear. A baraita supports Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi La: “Breakage, abduction, and death for which he is not liable in the cases of the paid keeper and the renter, and the borrower with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; loss and theft where the paid keeper and the renter are liable, is it not that a fortiori the borrower be not liable with the owner but liable without the owner?” For him who says it is obvious that he swears, should he not have to pay? Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: A baraita supports Rebbi Ze`ira. “The borrower, for whom the Torah was restrictive, with the owner is not liable, without the owner is liable; the paid keeper, for whom the Torah was lenient, a fortiori with the owner should not be liable, without the owner should be liable.” If you are saying, his problem was swearing, he should have stated “the paid keeper and the renter.” That means he only needs it for payment. It is difficult for Rebbi Ze`ira: the borrower swears if the owner was with him; if the owner was not with him he must pay. The unpaid keeper swears, whether the owner was with him or was not with him. You are saying that where the borrower pays the paid keeper swears. Where the paid keeper swears, the unpaid keeper should not be liable. Where the paid keeper pays, the unpaid keeper swears. What do you state about an unpaid keeper when the owner be with him? But some are asking, what do you state about an unpaid and a paid keeper, whether or not the owner be with him? Rebbi Abin said, any word of criminality. Rebbi Mana said, do we not find that the Torah treated loss and theft equally for the borrower? Therefore, we shall treat breakage, abduction, and death equally both for the unpaid and the paid keepers.