criminally

Rebbi Ismael did formulate: In the Torah there are forbidden matters and permitted matters. There are easy parts and severe parts. But in the words of the Sages all are severe. You can realize that this is so since we have stated (Mishnah Sanhedrin 11:5): “If he says there is no obligation of Tefillin against the words of the Torah he is not criminally liable. If he says that Tefillin have five sections, to add to the words of the Sages, he is guilty.” Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Ada, in the name of Rebbi Tanḥum the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya: The words of the Sages carry more weight than those of the prophets, since it is written (Micah 2:6): “Do not preach, they preach; Do not preach to those, that shame does not reach you.” And it is written (Micah 2:11) “I shall preach to you for wine and liquor.” The relation of prophet and scholar can be compared to the case of a king who sent two of his palmatars to a province. About one of them he wrote, if he does not show you my seal and σημαντήθιον, do not believe him. About the other one he wrote, even if he does not show you my seal, believe him without seal and σημαντήθιον. So about a prophet is written (Deut. 13:2) “He gives you a sign or miracle.” But here it is written (Deut. 17:11): “According to the teachings that they will teach you”.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, the company was asking, where are we holding? If it was lost and found before propitiation, whether it was for its purpose or not for its purpose it is qualified and sent to grazing. If it was lost and found after propitiation, whether for its purpose or not for its purpose, it is disqualified as well-being offering. But we confirmed it when the owner became impure or acted criminally and already pushed to the Second Pesaḥ. For its purpose, he is not liable and it is disqualified. Not for its purpose, he is liable and it is qualified. There they are saying in the name of Rav Ḥisda: If its year was completed between First and Second. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan : When the time for its propitiation was passed. “If a Pesaḥ whose time had passed was slaughtered for its purpose at its time, or that he slaughtered another one for its purpose at its time, Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies and Rebbi Joshua qualifies. Rebbi Eliezer disqualifies since he is like one who slaughters a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice. Rebbi Joshua qualifies since he is like one who slaughters a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ.” Since its time is passed, there is no difference whether he slaughtered a Pesaḥ for the purpose of a well-being sacrifice or he slaughtered a well-being sacrifice for the purpose of a Pesaḥ. In the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, if its year was completed between First and Second. In the opinion of Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan , when the time for its propitiation was passed.

MISHNAH: He comes to his bull; his bull was standing between the Temple Hall and the altar, its head to the South and its face to the West, and the Cohen standing in the East with his face to the West. He leans his hands on it and confesses, and thus he was saying: “Please Hashem, I acted criminally, I offended, I sinned before You, I and my house. Please Hashem, please atone the criminal acts, and the offenses, and the sins, by which I offended, acted criminally, and sinned before You, I and my house, as is written in the Torah of Your servant Moses, because on that day He will atone for you, etc.” They answer him: “Praised be the glory of His Kingdom forever and ever” He comes to the Eastern part of the courtyard, North of the altar; the executive officer to his right and the head of the serving family to his left. There were two he-goats, and an um was there with two lots in it. They were of boxwood but Ben Gamia made them from gold; he was remembered for praise.

MISHNAH: He comes to his bull; his bull was standing between the Temple Hall and the altar, its head to the South and its face to the West, and the Cohen standing in the East with his face to the West. He leans his hands on it and confesses, and thus he was saying: “Please Hashem, I acted criminally, I offended, I sinned before You, I and my house. Please Hashem, please atone the criminal acts, and the offenses, and the sins, by which I offended, acted criminally, and sinned before You, I and my house, as is written in the Torah of Your servant Moses, because on that day He will atone for you, etc.” They answer him: “Praised be the glory of His Kingdom forever and ever” He comes to the Eastern part of the courtyard, North of the altar; the executive officer to his right and the head of the serving family to his left. There were two he-goats, and an um was there with two lots in it. They were of boxwood but Ben Gamia made them from gold; he was remembered for praise.

[It was stated: “How does he confess? “I acted criminally, I rebelled, I sinned;’ and it says, He forgives crime, rebellion, and sin; and it says, and he shall confess over it all crimes of the Children of Israel, etc., the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, criminal acts are intentional crimes, offenses are rebellions, sins are inadvertent actions. After he confesses about criminal acts he turns around and confesses about inadvertent acts? But he confesses as follows: Please Hashem, I sinned, I acted criminally, I rebelled before You, I and my house (etc..) [and the sons of Aaron. As is written in the Torah of Moses as follows, for on that day he shall, etc. They, answer him: “Praised be the glory of His Kingdom forever and ever”.] And so we find that confessors do confess. David said, we and our fathers sinned, we acted criminally and we led to bad behavior. His son Solomon said, [we sinned,] we acted criminally, behaved badly. Daniel said, we sinned, we actedcriminally, we led to bad behavior, and we rebelled. Also he was confessing thus: I sinned, I acted criminally, I rebelled before You. What means this which Moses said, He forgives crime, rebellion, and sin; and it says, and he shall confess over it all crimes of the Children of Israel, etc.? But since he confesses to criminal rebellious acts, it is as if they were inadvertent sins before Him.”

[It was stated: “How does he confess? “I acted criminally, I rebelled, I sinned;’ and it says, He forgives crime, rebellion, and sin; and it says, and he shall confess over it all crimes of the Children of Israel, etc., the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, criminal acts are intentional crimes, offenses are rebellions, sins are inadvertent actions. After he confesses about criminal acts he turns around and confesses about inadvertent acts? But he confesses as follows: Please Hashem, I sinned, I acted criminally, I rebelled before You, I and my house (etc..) [and the sons of Aaron. As is written in the Torah of Moses as follows, for on that day he shall, etc. They, answer him: “Praised be the glory of His Kingdom forever and ever”.] And so we find that confessors do confess. David said, we and our fathers sinned, we acted criminally and we led to bad behavior. His son Solomon said, [we sinned,] we acted criminally, behaved badly. Daniel said, we sinned, we actedcriminally, we led to bad behavior, and we rebelled. Also he was confessing thus: I sinned, I acted criminally, I rebelled before You. What means this which Moses said, He forgives crime, rebellion, and sin; and it says, and he shall confess over it all crimes of the Children of Israel, etc.? But since he confesses to criminal rebellious acts, it is as if they were inadvertent sins before Him.”

[It was stated: “How does he confess? “I acted criminally, I rebelled, I sinned;’ and it says, He forgives crime, rebellion, and sin; and it says, and he shall confess over it all crimes of the Children of Israel, etc., the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, criminal acts are intentional crimes, offenses are rebellions, sins are inadvertent actions. After he confesses about criminal acts he turns around and confesses about inadvertent acts? But he confesses as follows: Please Hashem, I sinned, I acted criminally, I rebelled before You, I and my house (etc..) [and the sons of Aaron. As is written in the Torah of Moses as follows, for on that day he shall, etc. They, answer him: “Praised be the glory of His Kingdom forever and ever”.] And so we find that confessors do confess. David said, we and our fathers sinned, we acted criminally and we led to bad behavior. His son Solomon said, [we sinned,] we acted criminally, behaved badly. Daniel said, we sinned, we actedcriminally, we led to bad behavior, and we rebelled. Also he was confessing thus: I sinned, I acted criminally, I rebelled before You. What means this which Moses said, He forgives crime, rebellion, and sin; and it says, and he shall confess over it all crimes of the Children of Israel, etc.? But since he confesses to criminal rebellious acts, it is as if they were inadvertent sins before Him.”

[It was stated: “How does he confess? “I acted criminally, I rebelled, I sinned;’ and it says, He forgives crime, rebellion, and sin; and it says, and he shall confess over it all crimes of the Children of Israel, etc., the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, criminal acts are intentional crimes, offenses are rebellions, sins are inadvertent actions. After he confesses about criminal acts he turns around and confesses about inadvertent acts? But he confesses as follows: Please Hashem, I sinned, I acted criminally, I rebelled before You, I and my house (etc..) [and the sons of Aaron. As is written in the Torah of Moses as follows, for on that day he shall, etc. They, answer him: “Praised be the glory of His Kingdom forever and ever”.] And so we find that confessors do confess. David said, we and our fathers sinned, we acted criminally and we led to bad behavior. His son Solomon said, [we sinned,] we acted criminally, behaved badly. Daniel said, we sinned, we actedcriminally, we led to bad behavior, and we rebelled. Also he was confessing thus: I sinned, I acted criminally, I rebelled before You. What means this which Moses said, He forgives crime, rebellion, and sin; and it says, and he shall confess over it all crimes of the Children of Israel, etc.? But since he confesses to criminal rebellious acts, it is as if they were inadvertent sins before Him.”

[It was stated: “How does he confess? “I acted criminally, I rebelled, I sinned;’ and it says, He forgives crime, rebellion, and sin; and it says, and he shall confess over it all crimes of the Children of Israel, etc., the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, criminal acts are intentional crimes, offenses are rebellions, sins are inadvertent actions. After he confesses about criminal acts he turns around and confesses about inadvertent acts? But he confesses as follows: Please Hashem, I sinned, I acted criminally, I rebelled before You, I and my house (etc..) [and the sons of Aaron. As is written in the Torah of Moses as follows, for on that day he shall, etc. They, answer him: “Praised be the glory of His Kingdom forever and ever”.] And so we find that confessors do confess. David said, we and our fathers sinned, we acted criminally and we led to bad behavior. His son Solomon said, [we sinned,] we acted criminally, behaved badly. Daniel said, we sinned, we actedcriminally, we led to bad behavior, and we rebelled. Also he was confessing thus: I sinned, I acted criminally, I rebelled before You. What means this which Moses said, He forgives crime, rebellion, and sin; and it says, and he shall confess over it all crimes of the Children of Israel, etc.? But since he confesses to criminal rebellious acts, it is as if they were inadvertent sins before Him.”

MISHNAH: He tied a shiny strip on the head of the he-goat to be sent away and put it next to its departure gate, and on the one to be slaughtered around the place of its slaughter. He came to his bull a second time, leaned both his hands on it and confessed, and thus he was saying: “Please Hashem, I acted criminally, I offended, I sinned before You, I and my house, and the Sons of Aaron, your holy people. Please Hashem, please atone the criminal acts,” etc.

MISHNAH: He came to the he-goat to be sent away and leaned on it with both his hands and confessed. And thus he was saying: “Please Hashem, they acted criminally, offended, sinned before You, Your people, the House of Israel. Please Hashem, please atone the criminal acts,” etc.

HALAKHAH: Bar Qappara stated, “they acted criminally, offended, sinned,” in order not to mention the shame of Israel.

Samuel said, a person who sinned against his neighbor has to tell him, I offended you. If he accepts it, it is good. Otherwise he brings people and appeases him in their presence. That is what is written, being straight with men, he shall form a row of men, and say, I sinned, and straightforward I acted criminally, and I was careless. If he acts in this manner, the verse says about him, He delivered his soul from perdition, and his life enjoys light. If he died, one has to appease him on his grave and say, I offended you.

MISHNAH: If somebody comes to his sister-in-law, whether in error, or criminally, or under duress, or willingly, even if he is in error and she acts criminally, or he does it criminally but she is in error, or he is under duress but she is not, or she is under duress but he is not, whether he touched or completed, he acquired her and there is no difference between intercourse and intercourse.

MISHNAH: If somebody comes to his sister-in-law, whether in error, or criminally, or under duress, or willingly, even if he is in error and she acts criminally, or he does it criminally but she is in error, or he is under duress but she is not, or she is under duress but he is not, whether he touched or completed, he acquired her and there is no difference between intercourse and intercourse.

MISHNAH: If somebody comes to his sister-in-law, whether in error, or criminally, or under duress, or willingly, even if he is in error and she acts criminally, or he does it criminally but she is in error, or he is under duress but she is not, or she is under duress but he is not, whether he touched or completed, he acquired her and there is no difference between intercourse and intercourse.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody comes to his sister-in-law,” etc. We have stated: “Even if he is in error and she acts criminally, or he does it criminally but she is in error.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Even if both act in error, even if both act criminally. They wanted to say, a hearing person who is competent acquires both if he has the intention and if he does not have the intention but the deaf-mute, who is not competent, should acquire only if he has the intention. It was found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Both the deaf-mute and the insane who copulated acquired [the widow] and freed the co-wives.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody comes to his sister-in-law,” etc. We have stated: “Even if he is in error and she acts criminally, or he does it criminally but she is in error.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Even if both act in error, even if both act criminally. They wanted to say, a hearing person who is competent acquires both if he has the intention and if he does not have the intention but the deaf-mute, who is not competent, should acquire only if he has the intention. It was found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Both the deaf-mute and the insane who copulated acquired [the widow] and freed the co-wives.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody comes to his sister-in-law,” etc. We have stated: “Even if he is in error and she acts criminally, or he does it criminally but she is in error.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Even if both act in error, even if both act criminally. They wanted to say, a hearing person who is competent acquires both if he has the intention and if he does not have the intention but the deaf-mute, who is not competent, should acquire only if he has the intention. It was found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Both the deaf-mute and the insane who copulated acquired [the widow] and freed the co-wives.

There is a rule about the slaughterer which does not apply to the seller and to the seller which does not apply to the slaughterer, for he who slaughters on the Sabbath is criminally liable but he who sells on the Sabbath cannot be prosecuted. Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael said, we find a case of sale for which one is criminally liable on the Sabbath. Think of it, if somebody said to another: tear something off from this ground to acquire, did he not acquire? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the tearing makes him liable, not the sale.

There is a rule about the slaughterer which does not apply to the seller and to the seller which does not apply to the slaughterer, for he who slaughters on the Sabbath is criminally liable but he who sells on the Sabbath cannot be prosecuted. Rebbi Yannai ben Rebbi Ismael said, we find a case of sale for which one is criminally liable on the Sabbath. Think of it, if somebody said to another: tear something off from this ground to acquire, did he not acquire? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the tearing makes him liable, not the sale.

Rebbi Zeˋira said, it says here “criminal” and it says there “criminal”, the prophet said it criminally. Since about “criminal” used there, the verse speaks about a false prophet, also about “criminal” used here, the verse speaks about a false prophet. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, it says here “spoke” and it says there, that the prophet would speak in the Eternal’s name. Since about “spoke” used there, the verse speaks about a false prophet, also about “spoke” used here, the verse speaks about a false prophet.

“He who rapes or seduces [a relative of] a married woman is [criminally] liable.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one stated this for marriage. If he married a woman and then raped her mother, he is [criminally] liable. If he married a woman and then seduced her daughter, he is [criminally] liable.

“He who rapes or seduces [a relative of] a married woman is [criminally] liable.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one stated this for marriage. If he married a woman and then raped her mother, he is [criminally] liable. If he married a woman and then seduced her daughter, he is [criminally] liable.

“He who rapes or seduces [a relative of] a married woman is [criminally] liable.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, one stated this for marriage. If he married a woman and then raped her mother, he is [criminally] liable. If he married a woman and then seduced her daughter, he is [criminally] liable.

It is written, the genitals of a woman and her daughter you shall not uncover, and it is written, if a man take a woman and her mother, it is taboo. Everywhere is written lying with, but here is written taking, to teach you that he cannot be [criminally] liable for the second woman unless she be taken by him. Or maybe he is [criminally] liable only by marriage? We already said that there is no valid incestuous marriage. But is it not written: Nobody may marry his father’s wife, and he should not uncover his father’s garment’s corner? This comes to tell that she was permitted to him before his father married her. But is it not written: If a man take his brother’s wife? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before his brother married her. This is understood by levirate. But is it not written: You should not take a woman in addition to her sister? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before he married her sister. This is understood after her sister’s death. But is it not written: A man who would take his sister, his father’s daughter or his mother’s daughter, it is ḥesed? That you should not say that Cain married his sister, Abel married his sister, it is charitable, I was charitable with the first generations so the world could be inhabited; I said, the world was built on ḥesed. But is it not written: Widow, divorcee, and desecrated, these he shall not take? This comes to tell you that if he became betrothed to her, the betrothal is valid.

It is written, the genitals of a woman and her daughter you shall not uncover, and it is written, if a man take a woman and her mother, it is taboo. Everywhere is written lying with, but here is written taking, to teach you that he cannot be [criminally] liable for the second woman unless she be taken by him. Or maybe he is [criminally] liable only by marriage? We already said that there is no valid incestuous marriage. But is it not written: Nobody may marry his father’s wife, and he should not uncover his father’s garment’s corner? This comes to tell that she was permitted to him before his father married her. But is it not written: If a man take his brother’s wife? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before his brother married her. This is understood by levirate. But is it not written: You should not take a woman in addition to her sister? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before he married her sister. This is understood after her sister’s death. But is it not written: A man who would take his sister, his father’s daughter or his mother’s daughter, it is ḥesed? That you should not say that Cain married his sister, Abel married his sister, it is charitable, I was charitable with the first generations so the world could be inhabited; I said, the world was built on ḥesed. But is it not written: Widow, divorcee, and desecrated, these he shall not take? This comes to tell you that if he became betrothed to her, the betrothal is valid.

They asked before Rebbi Abbahu: If [a man] copulated with a woman, she had a daughter, and after that he came and copulated with the latter. Is he [criminally] liable about her because of a woman and her daughter, her daughter’s daughter, and her son’s daughter? He said to them, they are relatives, it is taboo, all because of taboo.

What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? A man may not take his father’s wife, and he should not uncover his father’s wing; that is his rape victim. How do the rabbis explain “his father’s wing”? There, they say and they do not know the origin of the tradition, that refers to a wing which is in need of his father. Would he not anyhow be [criminally] liable for her because of “his father’s wife”? Rebbi Hila said, because of forewarning; if he was warned because of his father’s wife he will be whipped, and because of his father’s wing he will be whipped. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about whipping. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about sacrifice. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about all other men that he is free. Rebbi Jehudah agrees that if he marries her preliminarily that the preliminary marriage is legally valid.

MISHNAH: A murderer who attacked someone with a stone or an iron, or forced him under water or into fire so he could not escape from there and died, is [criminally] liable. If he pushed him into water or fire and he could have escaped from there by himself but died, he is not [criminally] liable. If he provoked a dog or a snake against him, he is not [criminally] liable. If he let a snake bite him, Rebbi Jehudah declares him [criminally] liable but for the Sages he is not [criminally] liable.

MISHNAH: A murderer who attacked someone with a stone or an iron, or forced him under water or into fire so he could not escape from there and died, is [criminally] liable. If he pushed him into water or fire and he could have escaped from there by himself but died, he is not [criminally] liable. If he provoked a dog or a snake against him, he is not [criminally] liable. If he let a snake bite him, Rebbi Jehudah declares him [criminally] liable but for the Sages he is not [criminally] liable.

MISHNAH: A murderer who attacked someone with a stone or an iron, or forced him under water or into fire so he could not escape from there and died, is [criminally] liable. If he pushed him into water or fire and he could have escaped from there by himself but died, he is not [criminally] liable. If he provoked a dog or a snake against him, he is not [criminally] liable. If he let a snake bite him, Rebbi Jehudah declares him [criminally] liable but for the Sages he is not [criminally] liable.

MISHNAH: A murderer who attacked someone with a stone or an iron, or forced him under water or into fire so he could not escape from there and died, is [criminally] liable. If he pushed him into water or fire and he could have escaped from there by himself but died, he is not [criminally] liable. If he provoked a dog or a snake against him, he is not [criminally] liable. If he let a snake bite him, Rebbi Jehudah declares him [criminally] liable but for the Sages he is not [criminally] liable.

MISHNAH: A murderer who attacked someone with a stone or an iron, or forced him under water or into fire so he could not escape from there and died, is [criminally] liable. If he pushed him into water or fire and he could have escaped from there by himself but died, he is not [criminally] liable. If he provoked a dog or a snake against him, he is not [criminally] liable. If he let a snake bite him, Rebbi Jehudah declares him [criminally] liable but for the Sages he is not [criminally] liable.

MISHNAH: If somebody injures another person by a stone or with his fist and they expected him to die, but he got better and only afterwards deteriorated and died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not liable since it is not unsubstantiated.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody injures another person,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not [criminally] liable but the Sages declare him [criminally] liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other one is executed because of him? But even if he dies according to the first estimation, he cannot be prosecuted. What is the rabbi’s reason? If he does not die but is bedridden. Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they did not estimate that he would die. If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is [criminally] liable. But if they estimated that he would die? If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: But he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? “But he got better and only afterwards deteriorated and died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” For him who said, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, does he have to pay? For him who said, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay, one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would live but he died, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. This implies that the estimate was wrong. If you would say, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay, he should pay from the first moment. A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would die but he lived, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.” That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody injures another person,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not [criminally] liable but the Sages declare him [criminally] liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other one is executed because of him? But even if he dies according to the first estimation, he cannot be prosecuted. What is the rabbi’s reason? If he does not die but is bedridden. Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they did not estimate that he would die. If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is [criminally] liable. But if they estimated that he would die? If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: But he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? “But he got better and only afterwards deteriorated and died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” For him who said, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, does he have to pay? For him who said, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay, one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would live but he died, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. This implies that the estimate was wrong. If you would say, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay, he should pay from the first moment. A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would die but he lived, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.” That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody injures another person,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not [criminally] liable but the Sages declare him [criminally] liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other one is executed because of him? But even if he dies according to the first estimation, he cannot be prosecuted. What is the rabbi’s reason? If he does not die but is bedridden. Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they did not estimate that he would die. If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is [criminally] liable. But if they estimated that he would die? If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: But he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? “But he got better and only afterwards deteriorated and died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” For him who said, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, does he have to pay? For him who said, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay, one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would live but he died, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. This implies that the estimate was wrong. If you would say, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay, he should pay from the first moment. A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would die but he lived, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.” That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody injures another person,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not [criminally] liable but the Sages declare him [criminally] liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other one is executed because of him? But even if he dies according to the first estimation, he cannot be prosecuted. What is the rabbi’s reason? If he does not die but is bedridden. Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they did not estimate that he would die. If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated. Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is [criminally] liable. But if they estimated that he would die? If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: But he has to pay for his disability and the medical costs. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? “But he got better and only afterwards deteriorated and died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Neḥemiah declares him not liable since it is not unsubstantiated.” For him who said, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, does he have to pay? For him who said, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay, one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would live but he died, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. This implies that the estimate was wrong. If you would say, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay, he should pay from the first moment. A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would die but he lived, from when does one count for him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.” That means, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. But if you say, it was an erroneous estimation, he has to pay until [the victim] dies.

MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

MISHNAH: If one intended to kill an animal but he killed a human, a Non-Jew but he killed a Jew, a stillborn but he killed a viable baby, he is not criminally liable. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it would not have been enough to kill but it went on his heart where it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his heart where it would have been enough to kill but it went on his hips where it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone big whom it would not have been enough to kill but it went on somebody small whom it was enough to kill and he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone small whom it would have been enough to kill but it went on somebody big whom it was not enough to kill but he died, he cannot be prosecuted. If one intended to hit someone on his hips where it was enough to kill but it went on his heart and he died; [or] if one intended to hit someone big and it was enough to kill but it went on somebody small and he died; he is [criminally] liable. Rebbi Simeon says, even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

Rebbi Simeon says, those of the House of Rebbi state: even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable. The House of Rebbi follows Rebbi Nathan, as it was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: If one was standing next to a group of people and said, I am intending to kill one of you. Even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

Rebbi Simeon says, those of the House of Rebbi state: even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable. The House of Rebbi follows Rebbi Nathan, as it was stated in the name of Rebbi Nathan: If one was standing next to a group of people and said, I am intending to kill one of you. Even if he intended to kill one person but killed another, he is not criminally liable.

MISHNAH: If a murderer was mixed up with others, none of them are criminally liable. Rebbi Jehudah says, one keeps them in jail. Any condemned to death who were mixed up with others shall be executed by the easier way. Those to be stoned with those to be burned, Rebbi Simeon says they shall be stoned because burning is more painful, but the Sages say they shall be burned since stoning is more painful. Rebbi Simeon told them, if burning were not more painful it would not have been prescribed for a Cohen’s daughter who committed adultery. They answered him, if stoning were not more painful, it would not have been prescribed for the blasphemer and those who worship strange cults. Those to be slain with those to be strangled, Rebbi Simeon says by the sword, but the Sages say by strangulation.

Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Jehudah. One said, they were exiles only when they were uncircumcised. The other said, they were exiled only when they were bastards. He who says uncircumcised, for circumcision and commandments. But he who says bastards, from their fathers. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Israel was exiled only after they formed 24 heretical sects. What is the reason? Son of man, I am sending you to the Children of Israel, to rebellious peoples who rebelled against Me. It is not written “to a rebellious people” but to rebellious peoples who rebelled against Me; they and their fathers have acted criminally against Me up to this day. Rebbi Berekhia and Rebbi Ḥelbo in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman. Israel was exiled to three diasporas: one inside the river Sanbation, one to Daphne of Antiochia, and one on whom the Cloud descended and covered them. Just as they were exiled to three diasporas, so the tribes of Reuben, Gad, and half the tribe of Manasse were exiled into three diasporas. What is the reason? You went in the way of your sister and I gave her cup into your hand. So when they return, they will return from three diasporas. What is the reason? To tell the prisoners, leave, those who were exiled inside the river Sanbation; those in darkness, become visible, those upon whom the Cloud descended and covered them; on the roads they are grazing and on all plains is their pasturage, those who were exiled to Daphne of Antiochia.

MISHNAH: The Elder who rebels against the Court, as it is said: If a law case is too difficult for you, whether blood and blood, or case and case, etc. Three courts were there, one at the entrance of the Temple Mount, one at the entrance of the Temple courtyard, and one in the ashlar hall. They come to the one at the entrance to the Temple Mount and he says, so I argued and so my colleagues argued, so I taught and so my colleague taught. If they had heard it, they tell them; otherwise they come to the one at the entrance of the Temple courtyard and he says, so I argued and so my colleagues argued, so I taught and so my colleagues taught. If they had heard it, they tell them; otherwise these and those come to the Supreme Court in the ashlar hall, for from there instruction goes out to all of Israel as it is said, from that place which the Eternal will choose. If he returned to his town, repeated and taught as was his custom, he cannot be prosecuted. If he instructed to act, he is punishable, as it is said, but the man who would act criminally etc. He is not punishable unless he instruct to act. A student who instructed to act cannot be prosecuted; it turns out that his severity is his leniency.