divorce

A Mishnah disagrees with him who says that he who may take may acquire, since we have stated: “Give this divorce document to my wife …,” because he may receive the divorce document of his minor daughter. “And the document of manumission to my slave …,” since he may receive his own document of manumission. But did we not state: “Receive this divorce document for my wife or bring this divorce document to my wife; if he wants to change his mind … he may not do so.” Is a slave empowered to bring a divorce document? Explain it by different cases.

A Mishnah disagrees with him who says that he who may take may acquire, since we have stated: “Give this divorce document to my wife …,” because he may receive the divorce document of his minor daughter. “And the document of manumission to my slave …,” since he may receive his own document of manumission. But did we not state: “Receive this divorce document for my wife or bring this divorce document to my wife; if he wants to change his mind … he may not do so.” Is a slave empowered to bring a divorce document? Explain it by different cases.

A Mishnah disagrees with him who says that he who may take may acquire, since we have stated: “Give this divorce document to my wife …,” because he may receive the divorce document of his minor daughter. “And the document of manumission to my slave …,” since he may receive his own document of manumission. But did we not state: “Receive this divorce document for my wife or bring this divorce document to my wife; if he wants to change his mind … he may not do so.” Is a slave empowered to bring a divorce document? Explain it by different cases.

A Mishnah disagrees with him who says that he who may take may acquire, since we have stated: “Give this divorce document to my wife …,” because he may receive the divorce document of his minor daughter. “And the document of manumission to my slave …,” since he may receive his own document of manumission. But did we not state: “Receive this divorce document for my wife or bring this divorce document to my wife; if he wants to change his mind … he may not do so.” Is a slave empowered to bring a divorce document? Explain it by different cases.

A Mishnah disagrees with him who says that he who may take may acquire, since we have stated: “Give this divorce document to my wife …,” because he may receive the divorce document of his minor daughter. “And the document of manumission to my slave …,” since he may receive his own document of manumission. But did we not state: “Receive this divorce document for my wife or bring this divorce document to my wife; if he wants to change his mind … he may not do so.” Is a slave empowered to bring a divorce document? Explain it by different cases.

HALAKHAH: It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, even if he specified, from X, he is not trustworthy, unless he said, you buy and I will pay.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him, as we have stated there: “Receive my bill of divorce at such and such a place; she may eat heave until the bill of divorce reaches that place. Rebbi Eleazar prohibits her immediately.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? I say that he found it behind the door. It turns out that Rebbi Eleazar is like Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Yose is like Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Yose says more than Rebbi Eleazar; does not Rebbi Eleazar agree that if she says to him, do not accept it except at such and such a place, that she continues eating until the bill of divorce reaches that place? But here, even if he says, only from X, he is not trustworthy, except if he said, you buy and I will pay.

HALAKHAH: It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, even if he specified, from X, he is not trustworthy, unless he said, you buy and I will pay.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him, as we have stated there: “Receive my bill of divorce at such and such a place; she may eat heave until the bill of divorce reaches that place. Rebbi Eleazar prohibits her immediately.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? I say that he found it behind the door. It turns out that Rebbi Eleazar is like Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Yose is like Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Yose says more than Rebbi Eleazar; does not Rebbi Eleazar agree that if she says to him, do not accept it except at such and such a place, that she continues eating until the bill of divorce reaches that place? But here, even if he says, only from X, he is not trustworthy, except if he said, you buy and I will pay.

HALAKHAH: It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, even if he specified, from X, he is not trustworthy, unless he said, you buy and I will pay.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? I say that he found someone close by and bought from him, as we have stated there: “Receive my bill of divorce at such and such a place; she may eat heave until the bill of divorce reaches that place. Rebbi Eleazar prohibits her immediately.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? I say that he found it behind the door. It turns out that Rebbi Eleazar is like Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Yose is like Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Yose says more than Rebbi Eleazar; does not Rebbi Eleazar agree that if she says to him, do not accept it except at such and such a place, that she continues eating until the bill of divorce reaches that place? But here, even if he says, only from X, he is not trustworthy, except if he said, you buy and I will pay.

Rebbi Yose said, I questioned before Samuel: But with bills of divorce, thought is not written and his action cannot prove his intention! As we have stated: “Everybody is permitted to write a bill of divorce, even an insane person, a deaf-mute, and a minor.” Rebbi Huna said, if a sane person directs him. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, is that (Deut. 24:1,3): “he writes for her”, for her personally? Rebbi Yose came back and said, there one person writes and another person divorces. But here, the same person thinks and takes heave. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there, if he would write himself and divorce, would that not be a divorce? But here, he thinks and takes heave.

Rebbi Yose said, I questioned before Samuel: But with bills of divorce, thought is not written and his action cannot prove his intention! As we have stated: “Everybody is permitted to write a bill of divorce, even an insane person, a deaf-mute, and a minor.” Rebbi Huna said, if a sane person directs him. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, is that (Deut. 24:1,3): “he writes for her”, for her personally? Rebbi Yose came back and said, there one person writes and another person divorces. But here, the same person thinks and takes heave. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there, if he would write himself and divorce, would that not be a divorce? But here, he thinks and takes heave.

Rebbi Yose said, I questioned before Samuel: But with bills of divorce, thought is not written and his action cannot prove his intention! As we have stated: “Everybody is permitted to write a bill of divorce, even an insane person, a deaf-mute, and a minor.” Rebbi Huna said, if a sane person directs him. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, is that (Deut. 24:1,3): “he writes for her”, for her personally? Rebbi Yose came back and said, there one person writes and another person divorces. But here, the same person thinks and takes heave. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there, if he would write himself and divorce, would that not be a divorce? But here, he thinks and takes heave.

Rebbi Yose said, I questioned before Samuel: But with bills of divorce, thought is not written and his action cannot prove his intention! As we have stated: “Everybody is permitted to write a bill of divorce, even an insane person, a deaf-mute, and a minor.” Rebbi Huna said, if a sane person directs him. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, is that (Deut. 24:1,3): “he writes for her”, for her personally? Rebbi Yose came back and said, there one person writes and another person divorces. But here, the same person thinks and takes heave. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there, if he would write himself and divorce, would that not be a divorce? But here, he thinks and takes heave.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One disagrees with this Tanna. They say, does not a Mishnah disagree: “If he became deaf-mute or insane, he may never divorce.” Why can he not write and have others fulfill his written instructions? They upheld it, if he is illiterate. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected, does not a baraita disagree: “If he wrote himself, or he told the scribe to write and the witnesses to sign, even though the scribe wrote, the witnesses signed, they gave him [the document] and he in turn gave it to her, it is no divorce.” Rebbi Assi said, complete the sentence and there is no disgreement: “it is no divorce unless they hear his voice.” But even if he gave a sign with his head you say it is invalid, here also it is invalid. Rebbi Mana said, it is valid: hearing the voice has the same status as seeing him nod his head!

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One disagrees with this Tanna. They say, does not a Mishnah disagree: “If he became deaf-mute or insane, he may never divorce.” Why can he not write and have others fulfill his written instructions? They upheld it, if he is illiterate. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected, does not a baraita disagree: “If he wrote himself, or he told the scribe to write and the witnesses to sign, even though the scribe wrote, the witnesses signed, they gave him [the document] and he in turn gave it to her, it is no divorce.” Rebbi Assi said, complete the sentence and there is no disgreement: “it is no divorce unless they hear his voice.” But even if he gave a sign with his head you say it is invalid, here also it is invalid. Rebbi Mana said, it is valid: hearing the voice has the same status as seeing him nod his head!

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One disagrees with this Tanna. They say, does not a Mishnah disagree: “If he became deaf-mute or insane, he may never divorce.” Why can he not write and have others fulfill his written instructions? They upheld it, if he is illiterate. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected, does not a baraita disagree: “If he wrote himself, or he told the scribe to write and the witnesses to sign, even though the scribe wrote, the witnesses signed, they gave him [the document] and he in turn gave it to her, it is no divorce.” Rebbi Assi said, complete the sentence and there is no disgreement: “it is no divorce unless they hear his voice.” But even if he gave a sign with his head you say it is invalid, here also it is invalid. Rebbi Mana said, it is valid: hearing the voice has the same status as seeing him nod his head!

Rebbi Yudan said, there, if he said I did such and such, here, if he says do such and such. Rebbi Benjamin ben Levi inquired: If he has understanding for the past, he should have understanding for the future; ifhe has no understanding for the past, he would not have understanding for the future! Rebbi Eudaimon said, here we deal with a mute; there is no agency for a mute. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, we deal with a sane person. Why is there no divorce? Because I say, he was occupied with his documents. We also stated so: “When was this said? When he explained it in his regular state. But if he was paralyzed by sickness, once is enough.”

“It sometimes he is insane [when he is sometimes healthy he is normal in all regards], when he is insane he is insane in all regards, when healthy he is normal in all regards.” A case came before Samuel who said, when he is of sound mind he should deliver the divorce document; one must investigate following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish; as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, when he is of even mind; that is as Samuel [acted]. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, only if he is of sound mind he may deliver the divorce document; (Is. 38:16) “make me healthy and let me live!”

“It sometimes he is insane [when he is sometimes healthy he is normal in all regards], when he is insane he is insane in all regards, when healthy he is normal in all regards.” A case came before Samuel who said, when he is of sound mind he should deliver the divorce document; one must investigate following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish; as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, when he is of even mind; that is as Samuel [acted]. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, only if he is of sound mind he may deliver the divorce document; (Is. 38:16) “make me healthy and let me live!”

HALAKHAH: “A woman who was eating heave,” etc. It is acceptable, “your husband died.” “He divorced you?” The rabbis say, this follows the old Mishnah, according to which the betrothed daughter of an Israel eats heave and her father accepts her divorce document. Rebbi Eliezer says, you may even say following the later Mishnah; explain it that she said to him, bring my divorce document from place X and usually that should have taken him ten days to deliver to her but he found a galloping horse and brought it to her in five days. Rebbi Eliezer cannot follow Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar forbids her immediately.” Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree that if she said, bring my divorce document from place X, that she may eat heave until the document arrives at that place? Rebbi Ḥaninah said, when she said to him, bring my divorce document from place X, it is as if she had said to him, it shall become a divorce document only after ten days. What she ate, she ate with permission.

HALAKHAH: “A woman who was eating heave,” etc. It is acceptable, “your husband died.” “He divorced you?” The rabbis say, this follows the old Mishnah, according to which the betrothed daughter of an Israel eats heave and her father accepts her divorce document. Rebbi Eliezer says, you may even say following the later Mishnah; explain it that she said to him, bring my divorce document from place X and usually that should have taken him ten days to deliver to her but he found a galloping horse and brought it to her in five days. Rebbi Eliezer cannot follow Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar forbids her immediately.” Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree that if she said, bring my divorce document from place X, that she may eat heave until the document arrives at that place? Rebbi Ḥaninah said, when she said to him, bring my divorce document from place X, it is as if she had said to him, it shall become a divorce document only after ten days. What she ate, she ate with permission.

HALAKHAH: “A woman who was eating heave,” etc. It is acceptable, “your husband died.” “He divorced you?” The rabbis say, this follows the old Mishnah, according to which the betrothed daughter of an Israel eats heave and her father accepts her divorce document. Rebbi Eliezer says, you may even say following the later Mishnah; explain it that she said to him, bring my divorce document from place X and usually that should have taken him ten days to deliver to her but he found a galloping horse and brought it to her in five days. Rebbi Eliezer cannot follow Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar forbids her immediately.” Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree that if she said, bring my divorce document from place X, that she may eat heave until the document arrives at that place? Rebbi Ḥaninah said, when she said to him, bring my divorce document from place X, it is as if she had said to him, it shall become a divorce document only after ten days. What she ate, she ate with permission.

HALAKHAH: “A woman who was eating heave,” etc. It is acceptable, “your husband died.” “He divorced you?” The rabbis say, this follows the old Mishnah, according to which the betrothed daughter of an Israel eats heave and her father accepts her divorce document. Rebbi Eliezer says, you may even say following the later Mishnah; explain it that she said to him, bring my divorce document from place X and usually that should have taken him ten days to deliver to her but he found a galloping horse and brought it to her in five days. Rebbi Eliezer cannot follow Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar forbids her immediately.” Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree that if she said, bring my divorce document from place X, that she may eat heave until the document arrives at that place? Rebbi Ḥaninah said, when she said to him, bring my divorce document from place X, it is as if she had said to him, it shall become a divorce document only after ten days. What she ate, she ate with permission.

HALAKHAH: “A woman who was eating heave,” etc. It is acceptable, “your husband died.” “He divorced you?” The rabbis say, this follows the old Mishnah, according to which the betrothed daughter of an Israel eats heave and her father accepts her divorce document. Rebbi Eliezer says, you may even say following the later Mishnah; explain it that she said to him, bring my divorce document from place X and usually that should have taken him ten days to deliver to her but he found a galloping horse and brought it to her in five days. Rebbi Eliezer cannot follow Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar forbids her immediately.” Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree that if she said, bring my divorce document from place X, that she may eat heave until the document arrives at that place? Rebbi Ḥaninah said, when she said to him, bring my divorce document from place X, it is as if she had said to him, it shall become a divorce document only after ten days. What she ate, she ate with permission.

MISHNAH: If [somebody] took from [another] tithe in the value of a tetradrachma and did not pay to redeem it until it became worth two, he gives him a tetradrachma, gains a tetradrachma, and the Second Tithe is his. If [somebody] took from [another] tithe in the value of two and did not pay to redeem it until it became worth one tetradrachma, he gives him a tetradrachma of profane money and a tetradrachma of his Second Tithe [money]. If he is a vulgar, he gives him from his demay. If somebody redeemed Second Tithe and did not give it a name, Rebbi Yose says it is sufficient, Rebbi Jehudah says he has to be explicit. If a man was talking with a woman about her bill of divorce or her preliminary marriage and gave her [the valuable for] preliminary marriage and did not spell it out, Rebbi Yose says it is sufficient, Rebbi Jehudah says he has to be explicit.

How must he be explicit? “This is your bill of divorce, or this is for your preliminary marriage,” and here: “This is for redemption of Second Tithe.”

Rebbi Zeïra, Ḥiyya bar Abun, Abba bar Taḥlifa, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, when do they differ? If they thought about other things but if they still were on the same subject, it is a bill of divorce.

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi follows Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Nathan Rebbi Jehudah, as we have stated there: “I cannot accept that you accept it for her, but here you have it and give it to her, if he wants to take it back, he may take it back.” The Mishnah is Rebbi’s, as it was stated: “If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he said to him, your wife said, accept my bill of divorce for me. ‘Bring it to her, give it to her, acquire it for her, receive it for her’, if he wants to take it back, he may not take it back, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Nathan says, ‘bring it to her, give it to her,’ if he wants to take it back, he may take it back; ‘acquire it for her, receive it for her’, if he wants to take it back, he may not take it back.” Rebbi says, in any of these cases he may not take it back except if he says, “I cannot accept that you accept it for her, but give it to her.” It is difficult for Rebbi, “here you have it from my word”, if he wants to take it back, he may not take it back. It is difficult for Rebbi Nathan, “here you have it from her word”, if he wants to take it back, he may not take it back. Rebbi Ḥuna said, he becomes his and her agent. Assi said, everywhere we have stated “his and her agent”, she is divorced and not divorced. He said to him, what do you have in your hand, did not Rebbi Zeïra, Ḥiyya bar Abun, Abba bar Taḥlifa, say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, when do they differ? If they thought about other things but if they still were at the same theme, it is a bill of divorce.

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi follows Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Nathan Rebbi Jehudah, as we have stated there: “I cannot accept that you accept it for her, but here you have it and give it to her, if he wants to take it back, he may take it back.” The Mishnah is Rebbi’s, as it was stated: “If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he said to him, your wife said, accept my bill of divorce for me. ‘Bring it to her, give it to her, acquire it for her, receive it for her’, if he wants to take it back, he may not take it back, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Nathan says, ‘bring it to her, give it to her,’ if he wants to take it back, he may take it back; ‘acquire it for her, receive it for her’, if he wants to take it back, he may not take it back.” Rebbi says, in any of these cases he may not take it back except if he says, “I cannot accept that you accept it for her, but give it to her.” It is difficult for Rebbi, “here you have it from my word”, if he wants to take it back, he may not take it back. It is difficult for Rebbi Nathan, “here you have it from her word”, if he wants to take it back, he may not take it back. Rebbi Ḥuna said, he becomes his and her agent. Assi said, everywhere we have stated “his and her agent”, she is divorced and not divorced. He said to him, what do you have in your hand, did not Rebbi Zeïra, Ḥiyya bar Abun, Abba bar Taḥlifa, say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, when do they differ? If they thought about other things but if they still were at the same theme, it is a bill of divorce.

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi follows Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Nathan Rebbi Jehudah, as we have stated there: “I cannot accept that you accept it for her, but here you have it and give it to her, if he wants to take it back, he may take it back.” The Mishnah is Rebbi’s, as it was stated: “If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he said to him, your wife said, accept my bill of divorce for me. ‘Bring it to her, give it to her, acquire it for her, receive it for her’, if he wants to take it back, he may not take it back, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Nathan says, ‘bring it to her, give it to her,’ if he wants to take it back, he may take it back; ‘acquire it for her, receive it for her’, if he wants to take it back, he may not take it back.” Rebbi says, in any of these cases he may not take it back except if he says, “I cannot accept that you accept it for her, but give it to her.” It is difficult for Rebbi, “here you have it from my word”, if he wants to take it back, he may not take it back. It is difficult for Rebbi Nathan, “here you have it from her word”, if he wants to take it back, he may not take it back. Rebbi Ḥuna said, he becomes his and her agent. Assi said, everywhere we have stated “his and her agent”, she is divorced and not divorced. He said to him, what do you have in your hand, did not Rebbi Zeïra, Ḥiyya bar Abun, Abba bar Taḥlifa, say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, when do they differ? If they thought about other things but if they still were at the same theme, it is a bill of divorce.

Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Is it the same for a gift? Can a person appoint an agent for something that is not his? He said to him, there the Torah gave her the right to a bill of divorce and she appoints an agent to receive what rightfully is hers. Can you say in regard to a gift that a person can appoint an agent for something that is not his? In addition, from what Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan said, if somebody said to give a gift to another and he wants to take it back, he may take it back. Rebbi Yose stood near to Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi and said to him, is that a just “yes”? They said, at the moment he said it, it was a just yes.

The following Mishnah disagrees with him who says that he who may take may acquire, since we have stated: “Give this divorce document to my wife,” because he may receive the divorce document of his minor daughter. “And the document of manumission to my slave,” since he may receive his own document of manumission. But did we not state: “Receive this divorce document for my wife or bring this divorce document to my wife; if he wants to change his mind … he may do so.” Is a slave empowered to bring a divorce document? Explain it by different cases contained in the Mishnah.

The following Mishnah disagrees with him who says that he who may take may acquire, since we have stated: “Give this divorce document to my wife,” because he may receive the divorce document of his minor daughter. “And the document of manumission to my slave,” since he may receive his own document of manumission. But did we not state: “Receive this divorce document for my wife or bring this divorce document to my wife; if he wants to change his mind … he may do so.” Is a slave empowered to bring a divorce document? Explain it by different cases contained in the Mishnah.

The following Mishnah disagrees with him who says that he who may take may acquire, since we have stated: “Give this divorce document to my wife,” because he may receive the divorce document of his minor daughter. “And the document of manumission to my slave,” since he may receive his own document of manumission. But did we not state: “Receive this divorce document for my wife or bring this divorce document to my wife; if he wants to change his mind … he may do so.” Is a slave empowered to bring a divorce document? Explain it by different cases contained in the Mishnah.

The following Mishnah disagrees with him who says that he who may take may acquire, since we have stated: “Give this divorce document to my wife,” because he may receive the divorce document of his minor daughter. “And the document of manumission to my slave,” since he may receive his own document of manumission. But did we not state: “Receive this divorce document for my wife or bring this divorce document to my wife; if he wants to change his mind … he may do so.” Is a slave empowered to bring a divorce document? Explain it by different cases contained in the Mishnah.

The following Mishnah disagrees with him who says that he who may take may acquire, since we have stated: “Give this divorce document to my wife,” because he may receive the divorce document of his minor daughter. “And the document of manumission to my slave,” since he may receive his own document of manumission. But did we not state: “Receive this divorce document for my wife or bring this divorce document to my wife; if he wants to change his mind … he may do so.” Is a slave empowered to bring a divorce document? Explain it by different cases contained in the Mishnah.

Ḥizqiah asked: Less than that, is it as if torn out? If he worshipped it, is it forbidden? Does one write on it women’s bills of divorce? They say, Ḥizqiah retracted this. Rebbi Jonah said: Ḥizqiah retracted because Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai, if it is [thick] like a tenter’s needle it is certain that it is three years old.

And who permitted it? Rebbi and his court permitted it. At three places is Rebbi Jehudah the Prince called “our teachers,” in divorce documents, oil, and a sole. They should have called him “a permissive court”, for any court which permits three [previously forbidden] things is called “permissive court.” Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ismael said, his court disagreed with him about bills of divorce.Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Did we not state, “for no court may invalidate the words of another court unless it be greater in wisdom and numbers”? And Rebbi and his court permit what Daniel and his companions forbade? Rebbi Joḥanan follows his own opinion, for Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Ṣadoq, I have a tradition that any restrictive edict passed by a court which is not accepted by the majority of the public is not an edict. They checked and found in the matter of the edict about oil and did not find that a majority of the public followed it.

And who permitted it? Rebbi and his court permitted it. At three places is Rebbi Jehudah the Prince called “our teachers,” in divorce documents, oil, and a sole. They should have called him “a permissive court”, for any court which permits three [previously forbidden] things is called “permissive court.” Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ismael said, his court disagreed with him about bills of divorce.Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Did we not state, “for no court may invalidate the words of another court unless it be greater in wisdom and numbers”? And Rebbi and his court permit what Daniel and his companions forbade? Rebbi Joḥanan follows his own opinion, for Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Ṣadoq, I have a tradition that any restrictive edict passed by a court which is not accepted by the majority of the public is not an edict. They checked and found in the matter of the edict about oil and did not find that a majority of the public followed it.

Is there no difference, whether according to his opinion or that of the rabbis, only if it came to rest from a public domain into a private domain? In Rebbi’s opinion, even if it did not come to rest; in the rabbis’ opinion, only if it came to rest. For Rebbi Abba bar Ḥuna said in the name of Rav: Rebbi declared liable only for a private domain which was roofed. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implies, even if it was not roofed, for Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only if it descended to within the partitions. Rebbi Immi asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does the Mishnah follow Rebbi, since Rebbi considers partitions as solidly filled up? He said to him, it is everybody’s opinion. Could one not object that Rebbi said, if it is roofed? And you say, it is not roofed? What is the difference between bills of divorce and the Sabbath? Rebbi Ila said, about the Sabbath it is written: You shall not do any work; it may make itself automatically. But here he shall deliver into her hand, into her domain.

MISHNAH: One may use anything for laths, even living things; Rebbi Meїr forbids this. And it makes impure because of a cover stone, but Rebbi Meїr declares it pure. One writes on it divorce documents but Rebbi Yose the Galilean disqualifies.

“A person who is half slave and half freedman may not eat of his master’s.” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a man who is half slave and half freedman preliminarily married a woman, one disregards his preliminary marriage. It is the same for divorce. Samuel says, one takes notice of his divorce. Samuel’s statement parallels Rebbi Jehudah’s, as we have stated, “One who kidnapped a person half slave and half free Rebbi Jehudah declares punishable but the Sages make him not prosecutable.”

“A person who is half slave and half freedman may not eat of his master’s.” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a man who is half slave and half freedman preliminarily married a woman, one disregards his preliminary marriage. It is the same for divorce. Samuel says, one takes notice of his divorce. Samuel’s statement parallels Rebbi Jehudah’s, as we have stated, “One who kidnapped a person half slave and half free Rebbi Jehudah declares punishable but the Sages make him not prosecutable.”

“From where that just as one prepares another Cohen in his stead for maybe a disability will happen to him, so one preliminarily marries to him another wife in case something happen to his wife, as it is said, and he atone for himself and for his house; his house is his wife, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Yose said to him, in that case there is no end to it, maybe not only this wife but also the other wife would die.” Rebbi Mana said, before you question Rebbi Jehudah, question Rebbi Jehudah, question the rabbis! Maybe an emission would happen both to this Cohen and to the other Cohen. Emissions are frequent, death is not frequent. They decided about what is frequent, but did not decide about what is infrequent. We find that Rebbi Jehudah said, death is frequent; that is what we have stated there: “Rebbi Jehudah says, one also prepares for him another wife, maybe his wife would die.” There we have stated: “One who brings a bill of divorce and left him old or sick, delivers to her under the presumption that the man be alive.” There you are saying, death is infrequent, and here you are saying, death is frequent. There it is a private matter, here a public act. Is one more restrictive in public acts, as we have stated: “Rebbi Jehudah says, there was no horn for nests in Jerusalem because of mixing, maybe one of them would die and it would turn out that money of purification sacrifices that must be left to die is mixed up in the offering.” Could he not preliminarily marry her yesterday? And he atone for himself and for his house; but not for two houses. Rebbi Gamliel bar Inyani asked before Rebbi Mana: Is he not like one who acquires something on the Sabbath? He answered him, it is because they permitted Sabbath restriction in the Sanctuary. Rebbi Mana said, this implies that those who marry a widow must take her in when it is still daytime, lest he be like someone who acquires on the Sabbath.

MISHNAH: And the following one writes on the holiday: Preliminary marriage documents of women, bills of divorce, and receipts, wills, gifts, prozbol, letters of estimation, and letters of provisions, documents of ḥaliṣah, and repudiation, and documents of selections, and court decisions, and private letters.

HALAKHAH: Is he not sorry? Rebbi Ze`ira said, since he decided to divorce he is not sorry.

There came a case before Rebbi Yose. He said: One should examine her breasts. How? Following Rebbi Jehudah! Since Rebbi Jehudah said, until the black covers most. Is not that what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, between maidenhood and adulthood thare are only six months, and Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, one does not act on this? This means during that period. But after that period one acts. But in this case where there was a doubt whether the black covered most or the black did not cover most, I force him to give a bill of divorce. When the black covers most one does not touch a bill of divorce.

There came a case before Rebbi Yose. He said: One should examine her breasts. How? Following Rebbi Jehudah! Since Rebbi Jehudah said, until the black covers most. Is not that what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, between maidenhood and adulthood thare are only six months, and Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, one does not act on this? This means during that period. But after that period one acts. But in this case where there was a doubt whether the black covered most or the black did not cover most, I force him to give a bill of divorce. When the black covers most one does not touch a bill of divorce.

“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and one who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, i. e., he who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and that a woman receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and the child of the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and the child of the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai says unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel, one said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed its own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.

What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah.

What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah.

What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah.

What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah.

MISHNAH: If somebody gave qiddushin to one of two sisters but he does not know to which one of them, he gives a bill of divorce to each. If he died and has one brother, that one has to perform ḥalîṣah with both sisters. If he had two [brothers], one performs ḥalîṣah and one may marry in levirate. If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody gave qiddushin to one of two sisters but he does not know to which one of them, he gives a bill of divorce to each. If he died and has one brother, that one has to perform ḥalîṣah with both sisters.” Everywhere else you say “there cannot be ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah” but here you say so? There if it is certain, here one is in doubt. “If he had two [brothers], one performs ḥalîṣah and one may marry in levirate.” Everywhere else you say, in any case one asks him to perform the levirate one does not say perform ḥalîṣah; but here you say so? There if it is certain, here one is in doubt. “If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them.”

MISHNAH: If two [men] gave qiddushin to two sisters and neither of them knows to which one he gave his, each one of them gives two bills of divorce. If they died and each one had a brother, each [brother] performs ḥalîṣah with both [sisters]. If one had one [brother] but the other had two, the single one performs ḥalîṣah with both [sisters], but of the two brothers one performs ḥalîṣah and the other may marry in levirate. If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them.

MISHNAH: The obligation of levirate is on the oldest [brother] but if a younger one got the start on him, he acquired. If somebody is accused in matters of a slave woman and she was manumitted, or of a Gentile and she converted, he should not marry her but if he married her one does not remove her from him. If somebody is accused in matters of a married woman and she was forcibly divorced from [her husband], even if he married her he must divorce her.

“If somebody is accused in matters of a slave woman and she was manumitted, or of a Gentile and she converted, he should not marry her but if he married her one does not remove her from him.” If he agreed lawfully not to marry her and [nevertheless] married her, she is forcibly removed from him. If he divorced her, may he take her back? If you would say that, would you not defame her children? “If somebody is accused in matters of a married woman,” Rav said, that is, he was accused by witnesses. Rebbi Yose asked, if he was accused by witnesses, is that what was stated: If he divorced her, even if he married her, he must divorce her? If somebody else divorced her, he can keep her! If he was accused by witnesses, even if somebody else divorced her, he must divorce her! But that is what we deal with: If he was accused not by witnesses, if somebody else divorced her, he may keep her.

“If somebody is accused in matters of a slave woman and she was manumitted, or of a Gentile and she converted, he should not marry her but if he married her one does not remove her from him.” If he agreed lawfully not to marry her and [nevertheless] married her, she is forcibly removed from him. If he divorced her, may he take her back? If you would say that, would you not defame her children? “If somebody is accused in matters of a married woman,” Rav said, that is, he was accused by witnesses. Rebbi Yose asked, if he was accused by witnesses, is that what was stated: If he divorced her, even if he married her, he must divorce her? If somebody else divorced her, he can keep her! If he was accused by witnesses, even if somebody else divorced her, he must divorce her! But that is what we deal with: If he was accused not by witnesses, if somebody else divorced her, he may keep her.

MISHNAH: If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says “it was written and signed in my presence”, he shall not marry the wife. “He died”, “I killed him”, or “we killed him”, he shall not marry the wife. Rebbi Jehudah said, “I killed him”, the wife cannot be married, “we killed him”, the wife can be married.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case. What means, one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In qiddushin, the same holds. “ I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I gave her qiddushin,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry the wife.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “ This one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says, I gave her qiddushin. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betroth her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says. I gave her qiddushin and one of them jumped the gun and married her. But if he said, I gave her qiddushin and married her, and another one comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case. What means, one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In qiddushin, the same holds. “ I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I gave her qiddushin,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry the wife.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “ This one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says, I gave her qiddushin. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betroth her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says. I gave her qiddushin and one of them jumped the gun and married her. But if he said, I gave her qiddushin and married her, and another one comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case. What means, one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In qiddushin, the same holds. “ I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I gave her qiddushin,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry the wife.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “ This one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says, I gave her qiddushin. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betroth her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says. I gave her qiddushin and one of them jumped the gun and married her. But if he said, I gave her qiddushin and married her, and another one comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case. What means, one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In qiddushin, the same holds. “ I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I gave her qiddushin,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry the wife.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “ This one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says, I gave her qiddushin. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betroth her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says. I gave her qiddushin and one of them jumped the gun and married her. But if he said, I gave her qiddushin and married her, and another one comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case. What means, one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In qiddushin, the same holds. “ I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I gave her qiddushin,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry the wife.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “ This one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says, I gave her qiddushin. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betroth her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says. I gave her qiddushin and one of them jumped the gun and married her. But if he said, I gave her qiddushin and married her, and another one comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way.

MISHNAH: There are four brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters. If those married to the sisters died, [the sisters] have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If [the remaining brothers] jumped the gun and married, they must divorce them. Rebbi Eliezer said, the House of Shammai say, they shall keep them, but the House of Hillel say, they have to divorce.

MISHNAH: There are four brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters. If those married to the sisters died, [the sisters] have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If [the remaining brothers] jumped the gun and married, they must divorce them. Rebbi Eliezer said, the House of Shammai say, they shall keep them, but the House of Hillel say, they have to divorce.

There, we have stated: “If a brother gave qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If [one of the] brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to send away his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.” It says only: If the sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him. But if his wife died, his sister-in-law is forbidden to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Sages hold that for anything induced by a cause, if the cause is removed the prohibition is removed. But for Rebbi Eliezer, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains.

What if there is a co-wife? Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Avina: It is an inference de minore ad majus. If the Sages gave a co-wife to the sister of a woman with whom one performed ḥalîṣah, which is rabbinic, here, where there is the prohibition of sisters, not so much more? It is obvious that the rule of co-wives applies to his daughter. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Avina: One has stated there, “if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed; if the sisters performed ḥalîṣah, the co-wives were not freed.” But as you say, if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed, so it should be that even if the sisters performed ḥalîṣah, the co-wives should be freed. But it must follow Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri, since Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, come and let us institute that the co-wife perform ḥalîṣah without being admitted to levirate. Did they institute that? Was it not stated: They did not manage to institute this before the time became unsuitable. But it must follow the House of Shammai since the House of Shammai permit the co-wives to the brothers. Rebbi Phineas said to Rebbi Yose: If it follows the House of Shammai, even if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sistersshould not be freed! But we have stated: Rebbi Eliezer said, the House of Shammai say, they shall keep them, but the House of Hillel say, they have to divorce. There are two Tannaïm interpreting the House of Shammai, one said if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed, the other one said if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were not freed.

It was stated: “Abba Shaul says, the House of Hillel made this easy.” Is that a criticism? It is a praise, since people were saying, what is the prohibition here? It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Simeon: “If they jumped the gun and married, they should keep them.” But that is only if they had intercourse at the same time. In the opinion of Abba Shaul it is permitted to have intercourse without asking. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon only if he transgressed and had intercourse. If the first [brother] married and had intercourse, he tells the second also to have intercourse. If that one did not have intercourse, the first [brother] is forbidden to have intercourse a second time; maybe one of them will die and it turns out that he had intercourse with the sister of his sister-in-law. It was stated: If the second [brother] died, the first one had to divorce his wife with a bill of divorce and his brother’s wife by ḥalîṣah. Even if the second one died? Does this not follow Rebbi Simeon? But Rebbi Simeon frees the second [sister] from ḥalîṣah and levirate! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I confirmed this: Any sister-in-law who was to be freed by ḥalîṣah will never be permitted without ḥalîṣah.

It was stated: “Abba Shaul says, the House of Hillel made this easy.” Is that a criticism? It is a praise, since people were saying, what is the prohibition here? It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Simeon: “If they jumped the gun and married, they should keep them.” But that is only if they had intercourse at the same time. In the opinion of Abba Shaul it is permitted to have intercourse without asking. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon only if he transgressed and had intercourse. If the first [brother] married and had intercourse, he tells the second also to have intercourse. If that one did not have intercourse, the first [brother] is forbidden to have intercourse a second time; maybe one of them will die and it turns out that he had intercourse with the sister of his sister-in-law. It was stated: If the second [brother] died, the first one had to divorce his wife with a bill of divorce and his brother’s wife by ḥalîṣah. Even if the second one died? Does this not follow Rebbi Simeon? But Rebbi Simeon frees the second [sister] from ḥalîṣah and levirate! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I confirmed this: Any sister-in-law who was to be freed by ḥalîṣah will never be permitted without ḥalîṣah.

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

MISHNAH: Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters and the third is a bachelor. One of the sisters’ husbands died; the bachelor “bespoke” her; then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce, and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. That is what people say, he is unlucky with his wife and with his brother’s wife.

MISHNAH: In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. What is a questionable divorce? If [the divorce document] was written in his handwriting but without witnesses, or there are witnesses but no date, or there is a date but only one witness, these are questionable divorces.

MISHNAH: In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. What is a questionable divorce? If [the divorce document] was written in his handwriting but without witnesses, or there are witnesses but no date, or there is a date but only one witness, these are questionable divorces.

HALAKHAH: “In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate,” etc. There really is no questionable divorce here. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. And here, if he threw the divorce document to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that is a questionable divorce.

HALAKHAH: “In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate,” etc. There really is no questionable divorce here. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. And here, if he threw the divorce document to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that is a questionable divorce.

HALAKHAH: “In all cases in which there were questionable qiddushin or divorces, the [co-wives] must perform ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate,” etc. There really is no questionable divorce here. What are questionable qiddushin? If he threw the betrothal gift to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that are questionable qiddushin. And here, if he threw the divorce document to her and there is a doubt whether it fell closer to him or to her, that is a questionable divorce.

It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents can be collected only from unincumbered property, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect. Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed, he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership. Rebbi Abun said, because it is invalid. So far, if the old man took the loan and [later] the old man mortgaged. But if the old man took the loan and [later] the son mortgaged, can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun said, and was it not stated: The same holds for bills of divorce. Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid.

MISHNAH: If somebody marries his sister-in-law but she turned out to have been pregnant and gave birth. If the child is alive, [the levir] has to divorce her and they must bring a sacrifice. If the child is not alive, he may keep her. If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated to bring a reparation offering for an uncertain case.

MISHNAH: If somebody marries his sister-in-law but she turned out to have been pregnant and gave birth. If the child is alive, [the levir] has to divorce her and they must bring a sacrifice. If the child is not alive, he may keep her. If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated to bring a reparation offering for an uncertain case.

Rav said, in any case where the true fact can never be established, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them, and then a raven ate the other. Since he cannot ascertain the true fact, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for this doubt. But if the raven ate first and then he ate, since he could have ascertained the true fact, one has to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. But did not Rav say, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet? Even though Rav said, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet, he agrees here that he could have ascertained the true fact. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “As Rebbi Eleazar says, one must bring a reparation offering for the doubt of suet.” What does Rav do with that? They disagree with the words of Rebbi Eleazar. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “If there were both a piece of profane [meat] and a piece of sacrificial [meat], he ate one of them and it is not known which one, he brings a reparation offering for the doubt. If he [then] ate the second piece, he brings a reparation offering for a certain transgression. If he ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second, each one brings a reparation offering for the doubt.” One understands that the first brings a reparation offering for the doubt. Why the second? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the piece was large, he ate half of it and left the other half. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt.” Here it is impossible to ascertain the true fact and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt! Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before us. Since he could just have touched her and then separated, he could have known whether it is his or the other’s, it is as if he could have ascertained the true fact!

HALAKHAH: “If he married her, she is his wife in every respect”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah.” At the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.

MISHNAH: If a brother gave qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him wait until your older brother has acted. If [one of the] brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry. If the levir died, he has to remove himself from his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.

Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah is suspicious about a child. Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. Could you say that Rebbi Meїr is not suspicious about bills of divorce, as we have stated: “Those that had received qiddushin can be married.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Gedula: The one who repudiates does not have to wait three months; the one who leaves by a bill of divorce needs to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Me‘ir since Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Jeremiah: A woman who has been raped does not have to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Yose, since Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. It was stated: The proselyte, the captive, and the slave woman who were redeemed, or converted, or freed, have to wait three months, the words of Rebbi Judah. Rebbi Yose says, they do not have to wait. Their blood, Rebbi Jehudah says, makes impure 24 hours retroactively; Rebbi Yose says, from its moment onwards. Rebbi said, the words of Rebbi Judah are reasonable for the blood, and the words of Rebbi Yose for the child. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu said, my father had a case and he asked Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Yasa, and Rebbi Immi, and they instructed him following Rebbi Yose for the child. For if it were not so, what could we say? Between Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Yose, practice does not follow Rebbi Yose? But because Rebbi said, “they are reasonable”. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, every time Rebbi taught “they are reasonable”, the disagreement is unresolved except in the case of the fig cake where each party to the controversy accepts the opposition’s argument. Rebbi Yose said, I stated a difficulty before Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu: Even if it is certain that they had sex? He said to him, is a normal Gentile not like one who had sex? Simeon bar Abba said, there came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan and he instructed following Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Eleazar was sorry about this; he said, one disregards the anonymous [Mishnah] and follows an isolated opinion! He found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He understood that following Rebbi Simeon, he found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He said, the old man certainly understands the chapters about bills of divorce.

Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah is suspicious about a child. Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. Could you say that Rebbi Meїr is not suspicious about bills of divorce, as we have stated: “Those that had received qiddushin can be married.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Gedula: The one who repudiates does not have to wait three months; the one who leaves by a bill of divorce needs to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Me‘ir since Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Jeremiah: A woman who has been raped does not have to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Yose, since Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. It was stated: The proselyte, the captive, and the slave woman who were redeemed, or converted, or freed, have to wait three months, the words of Rebbi Judah. Rebbi Yose says, they do not have to wait. Their blood, Rebbi Jehudah says, makes impure 24 hours retroactively; Rebbi Yose says, from its moment onwards. Rebbi said, the words of Rebbi Judah are reasonable for the blood, and the words of Rebbi Yose for the child. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu said, my father had a case and he asked Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Yasa, and Rebbi Immi, and they instructed him following Rebbi Yose for the child. For if it were not so, what could we say? Between Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Yose, practice does not follow Rebbi Yose? But because Rebbi said, “they are reasonable”. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, every time Rebbi taught “they are reasonable”, the disagreement is unresolved except in the case of the fig cake where each party to the controversy accepts the opposition’s argument. Rebbi Yose said, I stated a difficulty before Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu: Even if it is certain that they had sex? He said to him, is a normal Gentile not like one who had sex? Simeon bar Abba said, there came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan and he instructed following Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Eleazar was sorry about this; he said, one disregards the anonymous [Mishnah] and follows an isolated opinion! He found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He understood that following Rebbi Simeon, he found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He said, the old man certainly understands the chapters about bills of divorce.

Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah is suspicious about a child. Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. Could you say that Rebbi Meїr is not suspicious about bills of divorce, as we have stated: “Those that had received qiddushin can be married.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Gedula: The one who repudiates does not have to wait three months; the one who leaves by a bill of divorce needs to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Me‘ir since Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Jeremiah: A woman who has been raped does not have to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Yose, since Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. It was stated: The proselyte, the captive, and the slave woman who were redeemed, or converted, or freed, have to wait three months, the words of Rebbi Judah. Rebbi Yose says, they do not have to wait. Their blood, Rebbi Jehudah says, makes impure 24 hours retroactively; Rebbi Yose says, from its moment onwards. Rebbi said, the words of Rebbi Judah are reasonable for the blood, and the words of Rebbi Yose for the child. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu said, my father had a case and he asked Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Yasa, and Rebbi Immi, and they instructed him following Rebbi Yose for the child. For if it were not so, what could we say? Between Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Yose, practice does not follow Rebbi Yose? But because Rebbi said, “they are reasonable”. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, every time Rebbi taught “they are reasonable”, the disagreement is unresolved except in the case of the fig cake where each party to the controversy accepts the opposition’s argument. Rebbi Yose said, I stated a difficulty before Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu: Even if it is certain that they had sex? He said to him, is a normal Gentile not like one who had sex? Simeon bar Abba said, there came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan and he instructed following Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Eleazar was sorry about this; he said, one disregards the anonymous [Mishnah] and follows an isolated opinion! He found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He understood that following Rebbi Simeon, he found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He said, the old man certainly understands the chapters about bills of divorce.

Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah is suspicious about a child. Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. Could you say that Rebbi Meїr is not suspicious about bills of divorce, as we have stated: “Those that had received qiddushin can be married.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Gedula: The one who repudiates does not have to wait three months; the one who leaves by a bill of divorce needs to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Me‘ir since Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Jeremiah: A woman who has been raped does not have to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Yose, since Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. It was stated: The proselyte, the captive, and the slave woman who were redeemed, or converted, or freed, have to wait three months, the words of Rebbi Judah. Rebbi Yose says, they do not have to wait. Their blood, Rebbi Jehudah says, makes impure 24 hours retroactively; Rebbi Yose says, from its moment onwards. Rebbi said, the words of Rebbi Judah are reasonable for the blood, and the words of Rebbi Yose for the child. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu said, my father had a case and he asked Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Yasa, and Rebbi Immi, and they instructed him following Rebbi Yose for the child. For if it were not so, what could we say? Between Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Yose, practice does not follow Rebbi Yose? But because Rebbi said, “they are reasonable”. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, every time Rebbi taught “they are reasonable”, the disagreement is unresolved except in the case of the fig cake where each party to the controversy accepts the opposition’s argument. Rebbi Yose said, I stated a difficulty before Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu: Even if it is certain that they had sex? He said to him, is a normal Gentile not like one who had sex? Simeon bar Abba said, there came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan and he instructed following Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Eleazar was sorry about this; he said, one disregards the anonymous [Mishnah] and follows an isolated opinion! He found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He understood that following Rebbi Simeon, he found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He said, the old man certainly understands the chapters about bills of divorce.

Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah is suspicious about a child. Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. Could you say that Rebbi Meїr is not suspicious about bills of divorce, as we have stated: “Those that had received qiddushin can be married.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Gedula: The one who repudiates does not have to wait three months; the one who leaves by a bill of divorce needs to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Me‘ir since Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Jeremiah: A woman who has been raped does not have to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Yose, since Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. It was stated: The proselyte, the captive, and the slave woman who were redeemed, or converted, or freed, have to wait three months, the words of Rebbi Judah. Rebbi Yose says, they do not have to wait. Their blood, Rebbi Jehudah says, makes impure 24 hours retroactively; Rebbi Yose says, from its moment onwards. Rebbi said, the words of Rebbi Judah are reasonable for the blood, and the words of Rebbi Yose for the child. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu said, my father had a case and he asked Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Yasa, and Rebbi Immi, and they instructed him following Rebbi Yose for the child. For if it were not so, what could we say? Between Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Yose, practice does not follow Rebbi Yose? But because Rebbi said, “they are reasonable”. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, every time Rebbi taught “they are reasonable”, the disagreement is unresolved except in the case of the fig cake where each party to the controversy accepts the opposition’s argument. Rebbi Yose said, I stated a difficulty before Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu: Even if it is certain that they had sex? He said to him, is a normal Gentile not like one who had sex? Simeon bar Abba said, there came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan and he instructed following Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Eleazar was sorry about this; he said, one disregards the anonymous [Mishnah] and follows an isolated opinion! He found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He understood that following Rebbi Simeon, he found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He said, the old man certainly understands the chapters about bills of divorce.

Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah is suspicious about a child. Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. Could you say that Rebbi Meїr is not suspicious about bills of divorce, as we have stated: “Those that had received qiddushin can be married.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Gedula: The one who repudiates does not have to wait three months; the one who leaves by a bill of divorce needs to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Me‘ir since Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Jeremiah: A woman who has been raped does not have to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Yose, since Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. It was stated: The proselyte, the captive, and the slave woman who were redeemed, or converted, or freed, have to wait three months, the words of Rebbi Judah. Rebbi Yose says, they do not have to wait. Their blood, Rebbi Jehudah says, makes impure 24 hours retroactively; Rebbi Yose says, from its moment onwards. Rebbi said, the words of Rebbi Judah are reasonable for the blood, and the words of Rebbi Yose for the child. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu said, my father had a case and he asked Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Yasa, and Rebbi Immi, and they instructed him following Rebbi Yose for the child. For if it were not so, what could we say? Between Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Yose, practice does not follow Rebbi Yose? But because Rebbi said, “they are reasonable”. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, every time Rebbi taught “they are reasonable”, the disagreement is unresolved except in the case of the fig cake where each party to the controversy accepts the opposition’s argument. Rebbi Yose said, I stated a difficulty before Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu: Even if it is certain that they had sex? He said to him, is a normal Gentile not like one who had sex? Simeon bar Abba said, there came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan and he instructed following Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Eleazar was sorry about this; he said, one disregards the anonymous [Mishnah] and follows an isolated opinion! He found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He understood that following Rebbi Simeon, he found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He said, the old man certainly understands the chapters about bills of divorce.

Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah is suspicious about a child. Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. Could you say that Rebbi Meїr is not suspicious about bills of divorce, as we have stated: “Those that had received qiddushin can be married.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Gedula: The one who repudiates does not have to wait three months; the one who leaves by a bill of divorce needs to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Me‘ir since Rebbi Meїr is suspicious about bills of divorce. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Jeremiah: A woman who has been raped does not have to wait three months. This supports Rebbi Yose, since Rebbi Yose is suspicious about bills of divorce and a child. It was stated: The proselyte, the captive, and the slave woman who were redeemed, or converted, or freed, have to wait three months, the words of Rebbi Judah. Rebbi Yose says, they do not have to wait. Their blood, Rebbi Jehudah says, makes impure 24 hours retroactively; Rebbi Yose says, from its moment onwards. Rebbi said, the words of Rebbi Judah are reasonable for the blood, and the words of Rebbi Yose for the child. Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu said, my father had a case and he asked Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Yasa, and Rebbi Immi, and they instructed him following Rebbi Yose for the child. For if it were not so, what could we say? Between Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Yose, practice does not follow Rebbi Yose? But because Rebbi said, “they are reasonable”. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, every time Rebbi taught “they are reasonable”, the disagreement is unresolved except in the case of the fig cake where each party to the controversy accepts the opposition’s argument. Rebbi Yose said, I stated a difficulty before Rebbi Ḥanina ben Rebbi Abbahu: Even if it is certain that they had sex? He said to him, is a normal Gentile not like one who had sex? Simeon bar Abba said, there came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan and he instructed following Rebbi Yose. Rebbi Eleazar was sorry about this; he said, one disregards the anonymous [Mishnah] and follows an isolated opinion! He found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He understood that following Rebbi Simeon, he found that Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it in the name of Rebbi Meїr. He said, the old man certainly understands the chapters about bills of divorce.

The woman who performs ḥalîṣah counts from the moment of death. The one who leaves by a bill of divorce counts from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Ḥanina said, from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the moment of writing. Rav and Samuel, Rav like Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel like Rebbi Joḥanan. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you, since you say from the moment of delivery, about what are you suspicious? Because in the meantime she was alone with him! Then one should worry about an old bill of divorce! Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan: According to you, since you say from the moment of writing, if there were two bills of divorce, one written now and one later, and both delivered on the same day. This one you prohibit and that one you permit! What Rav objected to Samuel, Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan. What Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel objected to Rav. Practice: She counts from the time of writing if he never was alone with her.

The woman who performs ḥalîṣah counts from the moment of death. The one who leaves by a bill of divorce counts from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Ḥanina said, from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the moment of writing. Rav and Samuel, Rav like Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel like Rebbi Joḥanan. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you, since you say from the moment of delivery, about what are you suspicious? Because in the meantime she was alone with him! Then one should worry about an old bill of divorce! Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan: According to you, since you say from the moment of writing, if there were two bills of divorce, one written now and one later, and both delivered on the same day. This one you prohibit and that one you permit! What Rav objected to Samuel, Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan. What Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel objected to Rav. Practice: She counts from the time of writing if he never was alone with her.

The woman who performs ḥalîṣah counts from the moment of death. The one who leaves by a bill of divorce counts from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Ḥanina said, from the moment of delivery of her bill. Rebbi Joḥanan said, from the moment of writing. Rav and Samuel, Rav like Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel like Rebbi Joḥanan. Samuel objected to Rav: According to you, since you say from the moment of delivery, about what are you suspicious? Because in the meantime she was alone with him! Then one should worry about an old bill of divorce! Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan: According to you, since you say from the moment of writing, if there were two bills of divorce, one written now and one later, and both delivered on the same day. This one you prohibit and that one you permit! What Rav objected to Samuel, Rebbi Ḥanina objected to Rebbi Joḥanan. What Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Ḥanina, Samuel objected to Rav. Practice: She counts from the time of writing if he never was alone with her.

MISHNAH: He who takes back his divorcee, or marries the woman with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, or marries a relative of the woman with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, has to divorce her and any child is a bastard, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. But the Sages say, it is not a bastard. But they agree that the child of one who marries a relative of his divorcee is a bastard.

MISHNAH: Rabban Gamliel says, there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce, no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, no copulation after copulation, and no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah. But the Sages say, there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce and “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, but nothing after copulation or after ḥalîṣah.

MISHNAH: Rabban Gamliel says, there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce, no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, no copulation after copulation, and no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah. But the Sages say, there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce and “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, but nothing after copulation or after ḥalîṣah.

MISHNAH: Rabban Gamliel says, there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce, no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, no copulation after copulation, and no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah. But the Sages say, there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce and “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, but nothing after copulation or after ḥalîṣah.

MISHNAH: Rabban Gamliel says, there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce, no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, no copulation after copulation, and no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah. But the Sages say, there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce and “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, but nothing after copulation or after ḥalîṣah.

Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?