divorcee

A man who remarried his divorced wife, or married his halutzah, or married the relative of his halutzah must divorce her, and the child is a mamzer; the words of Rabbi Akiva. But the Sages say: the child is not a mamzer. They agree that where a man married the relative of his divorcee the child is a mamzer.

[Concerning] relatives of the second degree [of incest laws who are forbidden] by the words of the scribes: [A woman who is] a second degree of kinship to the husband but not a second degree of kinship to the yavam, is forbidden to the husband and permitted to the yavam; [A woman who is] a second degree of kinship to the yavam but not a second degree of kinship to the husband is forbidden to the yavam and permitted to the husband; [A woman who is] a second degree of kinship to the one and to the other is forbidden to the one as well as to the other. She cannot claim her ketubah or usufruct or support money, or her worn clothes. The child is fit [to marry a priest], but the husband is compelled to divorce her. A widow who was married to a high priest, a divorcee or halutzah who was married to an ordinary priest, a mamzer or a netinah who was married to an Israelite, or the daughter of an Israelite who was married to a natin or a mamzer is entitled to her ketubah.

A virgin, who was a widow, a divorcee, or a halutzah from marriage her kethubah is a maneh, and there is no claim of non-virginity upon her. A female proselyte, a woman captive and a woman slave, who have been redeemed, converted, or freed [when they were] more than three years and one day old their kethubah is a maneh, and there is no claim of non-virginity upon her.

“But every vow of a widow and of a divorcee… shall be binding upon her” (Numbers 30:9). How is this so? If she said, “Behold, I will be a nazirite after thirty days”, even if she married within the thirty days, he cannot annul it. If she vows while in her husband’s domain, he can annul [the vow] for her. How is this so? If she said, “Behold, I will be a nazirite after thirty days,” [and her husband annulled it], even though she was widowed or divorced within the thirty days, it is annulled. If she vowed on one day, and he divorced her on the same day and took her back on the same day, he cannot annul it. This is the general rule: once she has gone into her own domain [even] for a single hour, he cannot annul.

The following do not return home: He who built a gatehouse, a portico or a porch; He who planted four fruit trees or five trees which are not fruit-bearing; He who took back his divorced wife. If a high priest married a widow, or an ordinary priest married a divorcee or a halutzah, or an Israelite married a mamzereth or a netinah, or the daughter of an Israelite married a mamzer or a natin, he does not return home. Rabbi Judah says: even he who builds a house upon its [original] foundations does not return home. Rabbi Eliezer says: even he who builds a brick-house in the Sharon does not return home.

“Then the officers shall go on addressing the troops and say, ‘Is there anyone afraid and disheartened’” (Deuteronomy 20:8). Rabbi Akiva says: “afraid and disheartened” is to be understood literally, that he cannot stand in the battle lines and see a drawn sword. Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: “afraid and disheartened” this is the one who is afraid because of the transgressions he has committed; therefore the Torah connected all these [other categories of those who return home] with him that he may return home on their account. Rabbi Yose says: a high priest who married a widow, an ordinary priest who married a divorcee or halutzah, an Israelite who married a mamzeret or netinah, and the daughter of an Israelite who married a mamzer or a natin behold this one is “afraid and disheartened.”

[If he said,] “You are permitted to any man but my father, your father, my brother, your brother, a slave, a Gentile, or anyone to whom she is incapable of being betrothed,” the get is valid. [If he said,] “You are permitted to anyone but (supposing she was a widow) a high priest, or, (supposing she was a divorcee or a halutzah) an ordinary priest, or, (supposing she was a mamzeret or a netinah) a regular Israelite, or (supposing she was an Israelite) a mamzer or a natin, or anyone who is capable of betrothing her even in transgression, the get is invalid.

How do witnesses become liable [to punishment] as perjurers? [If they say:] “We testify that so and so [a priest] is a son of a woman who had [formerly] been divorced or a haluzah,” it is not said that each witness should himself be as if he was born of a divorcee or a haluzah; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so is guilty of [a crime entailing] exile”, it is not said that each witness should himself be exiled; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say:] “We testify that so and so divorced his wife and has not paid her kethubah” seeing that either today or tomorrow he [the husband] will pay her kethubah, the assessment should be made how much a man will be willing to pay [now] for the ownership of her kethubah, on the condition that if she should be widowed or divorced [he will take it over] but if she should die, her husband will inherit her [estate including the kethubah]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so owes his friend one thousand zuz on the condition that he will pay him within thirty days”, while the debtor says “ten years”, the assessment should be made how much a man is willing to pay for the use of a thousand zuz, whether he pays them in thirty days or ten years.

And these are liable to be flogged: One who had relations with his sister, or his father's sister, or his mother's sister, or his wife's sister, or his brother's wife, or his father's brother's wife, or a menstruant; A high priest who marries a widow, an ordinary priest who marries a divorcee or a halutzah; An Israelite who marries a mamzereth or natinah, or an Israelite woman who is married to a mamzer or a natin. In the case of a [woman who is both] a divorcee and a widow [a high priest] is liable on two counts. But in the case of a [woman who is both] a divorcee and a halutzah, an ordinary priest is liable only on one count.

And these are liable to be flogged: One who had relations with his sister, or his father's sister, or his mother's sister, or his wife's sister, or his brother's wife, or his father's brother's wife, or a menstruant; A high priest who marries a widow, an ordinary priest who marries a divorcee or a halutzah; An Israelite who marries a mamzereth or natinah, or an Israelite woman who is married to a mamzer or a natin. In the case of a [woman who is both] a divorcee and a widow [a high priest] is liable on two counts. But in the case of a [woman who is both] a divorcee and a halutzah, an ordinary priest is liable only on one count.

And these are liable to be flogged: One who had relations with his sister, or his father's sister, or his mother's sister, or his wife's sister, or his brother's wife, or his father's brother's wife, or a menstruant; A high priest who marries a widow, an ordinary priest who marries a divorcee or a halutzah; An Israelite who marries a mamzereth or natinah, or an Israelite woman who is married to a mamzer or a natin. In the case of a [woman who is both] a divorcee and a widow [a high priest] is liable on two counts. But in the case of a [woman who is both] a divorcee and a halutzah, an ordinary priest is liable only on one count.

MISHNAH: When they came to a woman who was eating heave and told her your husband died, or he divorced you; similarly a slave who was eating heave when they came and told him your master died, or he sold you to an Israel or gave you as a gift, or made you a free person; similarly a Cohen who was eating heave when it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or the son of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, Rebbi Eliezer obliges them to pay principal and fifth, but Rebbi Joshua frees them. If he was standing on top of the altar and sacrificing when it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or the son of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, Rebbi Eliezer says that all sacrifices he performed on the altar are invalid but Rebbi Joshua declares them valid. If it became known that he has a bodily defect, his work is invalid. All of these, if heave was in their mouths, Rebbi Eliezer says, they should swallow it, Rebbi Joshua says, they should spit it out. If they said to him, you and the heave have become impure, Rebbi Eliezer says, he should swallow it, Rebbi Joshua says, he should spit it out. You or the heave were impure, or if it became known that it was ṭevel, or First Tithe of which its heave had not been taken, or Second Tithe or dedicated [food] that had not been redeemed, or that he tasted the taste of a bed bug in his mouth, he has to spit it out.

MISHNAH: When they came to a woman who was eating heave and told her your husband died, or he divorced you; similarly a slave who was eating heave when they came and told him your master died, or he sold you to an Israel or gave you as a gift, or made you a free person; similarly a Cohen who was eating heave when it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or the son of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, Rebbi Eliezer obliges them to pay principal and fifth, but Rebbi Joshua frees them. If he was standing on top of the altar and sacrificing when it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or the son of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, Rebbi Eliezer says that all sacrifices he performed on the altar are invalid but Rebbi Joshua declares them valid. If it became known that he has a bodily defect, his work is invalid. All of these, if heave was in their mouths, Rebbi Eliezer says, they should swallow it, Rebbi Joshua says, they should spit it out. If they said to him, you and the heave have become impure, Rebbi Eliezer says, he should swallow it, Rebbi Joshua says, he should spit it out. You or the heave were impure, or if it became known that it was ṭevel, or First Tithe of which its heave had not been taken, or Second Tithe or dedicated [food] that had not been redeemed, or that he tasted the taste of a bed bug in his mouth, he has to spit it out.

: Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: This is one of three derivations which are clear from the Torah (Deut. 26:3): “You shall come to the Cohen who will be in those days.” Is there a Cohen now who is not a Cohen after some time? Who is that? That is one who was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he is the son of a divorcee or of one who had performed ḥaliẓah, that his work is valid. Rav said, (Deut. 33:11) “You will want the work of his hands,” that the work of everybody who is of the descendants of Levi is valid.

Rebbi Jacob ben Zavdi asked in the name of Rebbi Isaac: If he was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known to him that he was the son of a divorcee or a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah Moëd, how do you treat him? As if he had died and the homicide might return to his home town, or as if [the latter’s] trial had been concluded when there was no High Priest, when he never could leave from there?

Let us hear from the following: “It happened that the reservoir of Discus at Jabneh was damaged, measured, and found deficient. Rebbi Ṭarphon declared pure and Rebbi Aqiba impure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, the prior status of this miqweh was one of purity; it remains forever in its purity until it becomes known that it is deficient. Rebbi Aqiba said, the prior status of the impure is impurity, he remains forever in his impurity until it becomes known that he is pure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, to what can this be compared? To one who was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, whose work is valid. Rebbi Aqiba said, to what can this be compared? To one who was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he has a bodily defect, whose work is invalid. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to him, how is that, Aqiba? I am comparing this to the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, and you compare it to one with a bodily defect. Let us see to which case it really is similar; if to the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, let us learn from the son of the divorcee, but if to one with a bodily defect, let us learn from the person with a bodily defect. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, the miqweh is invalid because of an inherent defect; the one with a bodily defect is disqualified because of an inherent defect. The son of a divorcee cannot prove anything since he is disqualified because of others. The miqweh is invalid because of itself, the one with a bodily defect is disqualified because of himself; the son of a divorcee cannot prove anything since he is disqualified by the court. They voted on the matter and declared him impure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to Rebbi Aqiba, he who separates himself from you is as if he separated himself from his own life.”

Let us hear from the following: “It happened that the reservoir of Discus at Jabneh was damaged, measured, and found deficient. Rebbi Ṭarphon declared pure and Rebbi Aqiba impure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, the prior status of this miqweh was one of purity; it remains forever in its purity until it becomes known that it is deficient. Rebbi Aqiba said, the prior status of the impure is impurity, he remains forever in his impurity until it becomes known that he is pure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, to what can this be compared? To one who was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, whose work is valid. Rebbi Aqiba said, to what can this be compared? To one who was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he has a bodily defect, whose work is invalid. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to him, how is that, Aqiba? I am comparing this to the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, and you compare it to one with a bodily defect. Let us see to which case it really is similar; if to the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, let us learn from the son of the divorcee, but if to one with a bodily defect, let us learn from the person with a bodily defect. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, the miqweh is invalid because of an inherent defect; the one with a bodily defect is disqualified because of an inherent defect. The son of a divorcee cannot prove anything since he is disqualified because of others. The miqweh is invalid because of itself, the one with a bodily defect is disqualified because of himself; the son of a divorcee cannot prove anything since he is disqualified by the court. They voted on the matter and declared him impure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to Rebbi Aqiba, he who separates himself from you is as if he separated himself from his own life.”

Let us hear from the following: “It happened that the reservoir of Discus at Jabneh was damaged, measured, and found deficient. Rebbi Ṭarphon declared pure and Rebbi Aqiba impure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, the prior status of this miqweh was one of purity; it remains forever in its purity until it becomes known that it is deficient. Rebbi Aqiba said, the prior status of the impure is impurity, he remains forever in his impurity until it becomes known that he is pure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, to what can this be compared? To one who was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, whose work is valid. Rebbi Aqiba said, to what can this be compared? To one who was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he has a bodily defect, whose work is invalid. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to him, how is that, Aqiba? I am comparing this to the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, and you compare it to one with a bodily defect. Let us see to which case it really is similar; if to the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, let us learn from the son of the divorcee, but if to one with a bodily defect, let us learn from the person with a bodily defect. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, the miqweh is invalid because of an inherent defect; the one with a bodily defect is disqualified because of an inherent defect. The son of a divorcee cannot prove anything since he is disqualified because of others. The miqweh is invalid because of itself, the one with a bodily defect is disqualified because of himself; the son of a divorcee cannot prove anything since he is disqualified by the court. They voted on the matter and declared him impure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to Rebbi Aqiba, he who separates himself from you is as if he separated himself from his own life.”

Let us hear from the following: “It happened that the reservoir of Discus at Jabneh was damaged, measured, and found deficient. Rebbi Ṭarphon declared pure and Rebbi Aqiba impure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, the prior status of this miqweh was one of purity; it remains forever in its purity until it becomes known that it is deficient. Rebbi Aqiba said, the prior status of the impure is impurity, he remains forever in his impurity until it becomes known that he is pure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, to what can this be compared? To one who was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, whose work is valid. Rebbi Aqiba said, to what can this be compared? To one who was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he has a bodily defect, whose work is invalid. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to him, how is that, Aqiba? I am comparing this to the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, and you compare it to one with a bodily defect. Let us see to which case it really is similar; if to the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, let us learn from the son of the divorcee, but if to one with a bodily defect, let us learn from the person with a bodily defect. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, the miqweh is invalid because of an inherent defect; the one with a bodily defect is disqualified because of an inherent defect. The son of a divorcee cannot prove anything since he is disqualified because of others. The miqweh is invalid because of itself, the one with a bodily defect is disqualified because of himself; the son of a divorcee cannot prove anything since he is disqualified by the court. They voted on the matter and declared him impure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to Rebbi Aqiba, he who separates himself from you is as if he separated himself from his own life.”

Let us hear from the following: “It happened that the reservoir of Discus at Jabneh was damaged, measured, and found deficient. Rebbi Ṭarphon declared pure and Rebbi Aqiba impure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, the prior status of this miqweh was one of purity; it remains forever in its purity until it becomes known that it is deficient. Rebbi Aqiba said, the prior status of the impure is impurity, he remains forever in his impurity until it becomes known that he is pure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, to what can this be compared? To one who was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, whose work is valid. Rebbi Aqiba said, to what can this be compared? To one who was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he has a bodily defect, whose work is invalid. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to him, how is that, Aqiba? I am comparing this to the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, and you compare it to one with a bodily defect. Let us see to which case it really is similar; if to the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, let us learn from the son of the divorcee, but if to one with a bodily defect, let us learn from the person with a bodily defect. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, the miqweh is invalid because of an inherent defect; the one with a bodily defect is disqualified because of an inherent defect. The son of a divorcee cannot prove anything since he is disqualified because of others. The miqweh is invalid because of itself, the one with a bodily defect is disqualified because of himself; the son of a divorcee cannot prove anything since he is disqualified by the court. They voted on the matter and declared him impure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to Rebbi Aqiba, he who separates himself from you is as if he separated himself from his own life.”

Let us hear from the following: “It happened that the reservoir of Discus at Jabneh was damaged, measured, and found deficient. Rebbi Ṭarphon declared pure and Rebbi Aqiba impure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, the prior status of this miqweh was one of purity; it remains forever in its purity until it becomes known that it is deficient. Rebbi Aqiba said, the prior status of the impure is impurity, he remains forever in his impurity until it becomes known that he is pure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, to what can this be compared? To one who was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, whose work is valid. Rebbi Aqiba said, to what can this be compared? To one who was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he has a bodily defect, whose work is invalid. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to him, how is that, Aqiba? I am comparing this to the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, and you compare it to one with a bodily defect. Let us see to which case it really is similar; if to the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, let us learn from the son of the divorcee, but if to one with a bodily defect, let us learn from the person with a bodily defect. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, the miqweh is invalid because of an inherent defect; the one with a bodily defect is disqualified because of an inherent defect. The son of a divorcee cannot prove anything since he is disqualified because of others. The miqweh is invalid because of itself, the one with a bodily defect is disqualified because of himself; the son of a divorcee cannot prove anything since he is disqualified by the court. They voted on the matter and declared him impure. Rebbi Ṭarphon said to Rebbi Aqiba, he who separates himself from you is as if he separated himself from his own life.”

Rebbi Yose said, this means that if he was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, his work remains valid until he is disqualified by a court. That [also] means that if it was doubtful whether he was impure or had a bodily defect, his work is valid if you can compare him to the son of a divorcee [or] the son of a woman who had given ḥaliẓah. But if you have to compare him to a person with a bodily defect, his work is invalid. But is the case of the miqweh not that of a doubt? Rebbi Ḥanina said, this means that any blemish on the family needs a court [judgment].

Rebbi Yose said, this means that if he was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, his work remains valid until he is disqualified by a court. That [also] means that if it was doubtful whether he was impure or had a bodily defect, his work is valid if you can compare him to the son of a divorcee [or] the son of a woman who had given ḥaliẓah. But if you have to compare him to a person with a bodily defect, his work is invalid. But is the case of the miqweh not that of a doubt? Rebbi Ḥanina said, this means that any blemish on the family needs a court [judgment].

MISHNAH: One does not marry women on a holiday, neither virgins nor widows, nor does one enter into levirate marriage, because it is a joy for him. But he may take back his divorcee, and a woman does adorn herself on the holiday. Rebbi Jehudah says, she may not use lime because it disfigures her.

“But he may take back his divorcee,” because it is [no] joy for him. This you are saying after marriage, but after preliminary marriage it is forbidden.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon agrees in the first case. It was found stated, that also is in disagreement. What is the difference between the first and second cases? In the first case he came and found her forbidden, in the second he came and found her permitted. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, if he found his father’s wife married to an outsider, what does Rebbi Simeon say about her? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Simeon said that only relative to paternal brothers. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked: His maternal halfbrother’s wife which he found married to an outsider, what does Rebbi Simeon say about her? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Simeon said that only relative to paternal brothers. Rebbi Yudan asked, a co-wife of his maternal aunt which he found married to an outsider? Because he came and found her permitted, is she permitted? Rebbi Abin asked, if a divorcee became a widow? You have to say that Rebbi Simeon referred to the first case.

MISHNAH: Commandment prohibition: Secondary prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim. Holiness prohibiton: A widow for the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had ḥalîṣah for a simple priest, a bastard or a Gibeoness to an Israel, a Jewish woman to a Gibeonite or a bastard.

HALAKHAH: Commandment prohibition: Incest prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim; it is a biblical commandment to listen to the words of the Sopherim. And Holiness prohibition: A widow for the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. “These are the commandments,” all commandments are one. “ You should sanctify him, for he brings the bread of your God.” But some do switch: A widow for the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had ḥalîṣah for a simple priest, “you should sanctify him, for he brings the bread of your God.” “These are the commandments,” all commandments are one. And holiness prohibitions, incest prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim.

HALAKHAH: Commandment prohibition: Incest prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim; it is a biblical commandment to listen to the words of the Sopherim. And Holiness prohibition: A widow for the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. “These are the commandments,” all commandments are one. “ You should sanctify him, for he brings the bread of your God.” But some do switch: A widow for the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had ḥalîṣah for a simple priest, “you should sanctify him, for he brings the bread of your God.” “These are the commandments,” all commandments are one. And holiness prohibitions, incest prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” etc. If he transgressed, but not from the start. That follows the Mishnah: “The widow should not perform ḥalîṣah or have levirate until after three months.” Why can she not have ḥalîṣah immediately? As you take it, if she has a live birth, ḥalîṣah did not affect her. If she has a still birth, she holds ḥalîṣah in her hand. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Hoshaiah stated: “My levir refuses.” To the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him one says: perform ḥalîṣah; but to the one to whom one cannot say: perform levirate, to him one cannot say: perform ḥalîṣah! What is the difference between them? If she had been acceptable and was desecrated, e. g., a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest. According to him who says that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood; that one, who does not need a proclamation for the priesthood, should have ḥalîṣah. According to him who says that to the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him does one say: perform ḥalîṣah?

MISHNAH: No sister-in-law should be a party to ḥalîṣah or levirate until after three months. Similarly, no woman should be married or receive qiddushin until after three months, whether virgin or not virgin, widow or divorcee, married or betrothed. Rebbi Jehudah says, those that had been married may receive qiddushin and those that had received qiddushin can be married except those that had received qiddushin in Judea because he is familiar with her. Rebbi Yose said, any woman may receive qiddushin except a widow because of her mourning.

MISHNAH: He who takes back his divorcee, or marries the woman with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, or marries a relative of the woman with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, has to divorce her and any child is a bastard, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. But the Sages say, it is not a bastard. But they agree that the child of one who marries a relative of his divorcee is a bastard.

MISHNAH: He who takes back his divorcee, or marries the woman with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, or marries a relative of the woman with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, has to divorce her and any child is a bastard, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. But the Sages say, it is not a bastard. But they agree that the child of one who marries a relative of his divorcee is a bastard.

HALAKHAH: “He who takes back his divorcee,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He who takes back his divorcee after she had remarried makes her blemished for the priesthood. Without that, is she not blemished for the priesthood? But, she is blemished in that she cannot eat heave. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The daughet of a man who takes back his divorcee after she had remarried is acceptable for the priesthood. What is the reason? “She is an abomination”. She is an abomination, the child is not an abomination.

HALAKHAH: “He who takes back his divorcee,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He who takes back his divorcee after she had remarried makes her blemished for the priesthood. Without that, is she not blemished for the priesthood? But, she is blemished in that she cannot eat heave. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The daughet of a man who takes back his divorcee after she had remarried is acceptable for the priesthood. What is the reason? “She is an abomination”. She is an abomination, the child is not an abomination.

HALAKHAH: “He who takes back his divorcee,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: He who takes back his divorcee after she had remarried makes her blemished for the priesthood. Without that, is she not blemished for the priesthood? But, she is blemished in that she cannot eat heave. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The daughet of a man who takes back his divorcee after she had remarried is acceptable for the priesthood. What is the reason? “She is an abomination”. She is an abomination, the child is not an abomination.

MISHNAH: Similarly, anybody who comes upon any of the incest-prohibited women specified in the Torah, or of the disqualified ones, [i. e.,] a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who had participated in ḥalîṣah for a private Cohen, a bastard or Gibeonite female for an Israel, or an Israel woman for a male bastard or Gibeonite, disqualified her and there is no difference between intercourse and intercourse.

MISHNAH: A widow betrothed to the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had participated in ḥalîṣah to a private Cohen are not permitted to eat heave; Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon declare them able. When they were widowed or divorced, after marriage they are disabled, after betrothal they are enabled.

HALAKHAH: “The High Priest shall not marry a widow,” etc. “A widow he shall not take”, whether from betrothal or from marriage. “A divorcee he shall not take,” whether from betrothal or from marriage.

A sister injured by a piece of wood, Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon say, he shall not defile himself for her, but the Sages say, he must defile himself for her. Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon follow well what they have stated, but the argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “a girl”, not an adult, “a virgin”, not one injured by a piece of wood; and here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. There, “and for his virgin sister”, that excludes the raped and the seduced one. Or maybe I should exclude the one injured by a piece of wood? The verse says, “who had not been a man’s.” Who became [deflowered] through the action of a man, not one who became it through something else. “The close one”, to include the betrothed one. “To him”, to include the adult. The argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “the close one”, to exclude the betrothed one, “to him”, to exclude the divorcee. And here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. “His sister” is always inside [the family] until she leaves; his betrothed is always outside until she enters.

MISHNAH: If a widow [married] to a High Priest, or a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah [married] to a simple priest, brought him slaves as paraphernalia or as mortmain: The slaves of separate property may not eat heave, the slaves of mortmain may eat heave. These are slaves of paraphernalia: If they died, they died as her property, if they increased, they increased as her property. Even though he is responsible for their upkeep, they may not eat heave. These are slaves of mortmain: If they died, they died as his property, if they increased, they increased as his property. Since he guarantees them, they may eat heave.

HALAKHAH: “A slave disables because of intercourse,” etc. From where that the intercourse with a slave disables? Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “If a Cohen’s daughter becomes a widow or a divorcee without issue,” from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. Rebbi Jeremiah objected: But if a widow whored she has no widowhood or divorce and she returns! Rebbi Yose did not say so, but [he held] that the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is reversed. In Giṭṭin he says, why are Samaritans disqualified? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: Because if a Gentile or a slave has intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. In Qiddushin one says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Here he says it in his own name but there he says it in the name of Rebbi Ismael! For also according to the words of the Sages the child is a bastard. Rebbi Ḥizqiah did not say so, but: the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is reversed. In Giṭṭin he says, why are Samaritans disqualified? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: Because if a Gentile or slave has intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. In Qiddushin one says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Here he says, from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. Rebbi Mattaniah said, I went to Seḥora and heard: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Ismael the sons of Jesua: “If a Cohen’s daughter becomes a widow or a divorcee without issue,” from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. And I said, that is correct, there is no bastard, following Rebbi Joshua, for a bastard is only from a woman which is for him under an incest prohibition and for whom one is punished by divine extirpation.

HALAKHAH: “A slave disables because of intercourse,” etc. From where that the intercourse with a slave disables? Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “If a Cohen’s daughter becomes a widow or a divorcee without issue,” from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. Rebbi Jeremiah objected: But if a widow whored she has no widowhood or divorce and she returns! Rebbi Yose did not say so, but [he held] that the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is reversed. In Giṭṭin he says, why are Samaritans disqualified? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: Because if a Gentile or a slave has intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. In Qiddushin one says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Here he says it in his own name but there he says it in the name of Rebbi Ismael! For also according to the words of the Sages the child is a bastard. Rebbi Ḥizqiah did not say so, but: the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is reversed. In Giṭṭin he says, why are Samaritans disqualified? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: Because if a Gentile or slave has intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. In Qiddushin one says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Here he says, from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. Rebbi Mattaniah said, I went to Seḥora and heard: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Ismael the sons of Jesua: “If a Cohen’s daughter becomes a widow or a divorcee without issue,” from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. And I said, that is correct, there is no bastard, following Rebbi Joshua, for a bastard is only from a woman which is for him under an incest prohibition and for whom one is punished by divine extirpation.

If a Cohen had intercourse with a divorcee and had a daughter, and the daughter a daughter, what is her status? Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mana, one said she is qualified, the other said she is disqualified. The one who said she is qualified objected to the one who said she is disqualified: The daughter of a desecrated male is desecrated for the priesthood. Is this one not from an Israel? Why do you declare her disqualified?

MISHNAH: Secondary prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim. If she is secondarily prohibited to the husband but not to the levir, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. Secondarily prohibited to the levir but not to the husband, she is forbidden to the levir but permitted to the husband. Secondarily prohibited to both of them, she is forbidden to both of them. She may claim neither Ketubah nor usufruct nor upkeep nor wear but the child is qualified and one forces him to divorce her. A widow married to the High Priest, a divorcee of one that performed ḥalîṣah married to a simple priest, a female bastard or a Gibeoness married to an Israel, and Israel woman married to a Gibeonite or a bastard have a claim of Ketubah.

There, we have stated: “A forced bill of divorce is valid in Israel; it is invalid from Gentiles.” Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. And Samuel said, publicize in your towns: It is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him, up to 30 days he shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay Ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?

“Any child from either of the men is a bastard.” One understands that the child is a bastard from the second [husband]. Is it a bastard from the first? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, this follows Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says if a man copulates with his wife whom he accuses of infidelity the child is a bastard, if a man takes back his divorcee after she had remarried the child is a bastard. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila, according to everybody the child is acceptable; the status of her bill of divorce is the status of her bastardy. What is the difference between them? If the second one gave her a bill of divorce and then the first one copulated with her. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the child is a bastard following Rebbi Aqiba; in the opinion of Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila, according to everybody the child is acceptable.

Rebbi Bisna in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: A promiscuous priestly woman may eat tithe. Is that not the Mishnah: “the daughter of a Cohen from heave,” this implies that she eats tithe. It may follow him who says that tithe is not given to Cohanim. Rebbi Nasa said, the words of the rabbis disagree, since Rebbi Hila, Simeon ben Yosina, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia said: If a Cohen came upon a divorcee, had a son from her, and died. [If the father died] within thirty days [of the son’s birth], the son must redeem himself. After thirty days, the presumption is that his father redeemed him. If he redeems for others, certainly for his son.

Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.

Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of R. Joḥanan who will explain this for allotments it is understandable; since he acquires by allotment he makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.

“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of R. Joḥanan who will explain this for allotments it is understandable; since he acquires by allotment he makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.

Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.

It is written: “If a man takes a woman and her mother, it is taboo.” Everywhere is written “lying with” but here is written “taking”, to teach you that he cannot be guilty for the second [woman] unless the first one is prepared for him. Or maybe only by marriage? We already said that there is no incestuous marriage. But is it not written: “Nobody may marry his father’s wife, and he should not uncover his father’s garment’s corner”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before his father married her. But is it not written: “If a man take his brother’s wife, it is despicable”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before his brother married her. This is confirmed by levirate. But is it not written: “You should not take a woman in addition to her sister to make her a co-wife”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before he married her sister. This is confirmed after her sister’s death. But is it not written: “A man who would take his sister, his father’s daughter or his mother’s daughter; he sees her genitals and she sees his genitals, it is ḥesed.” Rebbi Avin said, that you should not say that Kain married his sister, Abel married his sister, “it is charitable”, I was charitable with the first generations so the world could be inhabited; “I said, the world was built on ḥesed.” But is it not written: “Widow, divorcee, and desecrated, these he shall not take”? This comes to tell you that if he became betrothed to her that the betrothal is valid.

Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. She is forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥinenah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted to her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.

Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. She is forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥinenah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted to her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.

MISHNAH: A preliminarily married woman or one who waits for her brother-in-law neither drinks nor collects her ketubah, since it is said: “.. who will deviate from under her husband,” which excludes a preliminarily married woman and one who waits for her brother-in-law. A widow [married to] a High Priest, a divorcee or one who received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a female bastard or a Gibeoness to an Israel, or an Israel woman married to a bastard or a Gibeonite, neither drinks nor collects her ketubah.

Why does the verse say, “who built”? This excludes him whose house collapsed and he rebuilt it. (Rebbi Yose said, this implies that one who remarries his divorcee does not return.) One could think that somebody who builds a house outside the Land would return; the verse said, “and he did not inaugurate it,” meaning where there is an obligation of inauguration; this excludes cases where there is no obligation of inauguration. If he received prepaid rent, it is as if he inaugurated it; if [the rent is payable] only after twelve months, it is as if he had not inaugurated it. If he locked it, if it contains valuables for which one usually stops working, it is as if he inaugurated it; otherwise, it is as if he had not inaugurated it.

HALAKHAH: “Who became betrothed”. Not only a young man who married a young woman. From where even a young man who married a widow, a widower who married a young woman, a widower who married a widow? From where? The verse says, “a woman”, of any kind. Why does the verse say, “new”? That excludes him who remarries his divorcee. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that one who marries a sheram does not return since he has no religious obligation to live with her.

MISHNAH: The following do not return: If somebody builds a portico, a covered walkway, or a verandah, or planted four fruit trees or five futile trees, or remarried his divorcee. [In the case of] a widow for the High Priest, a divorcee or one having received ḥalîṣah for an ordinary Cohen, a bastard or Gibeonite girl for an Israel, a Jewish girl for a bastard or a Gibeonite, he would not be returning. Rebbi Jehudah says, also he who rebuilt his house on its foundations would not be returning. Rebbi Eleazar said, also one who built a brick house in the Sharon would not return.

MISHNAH: The following do not return: If somebody builds a portico, a covered walkway, or a verandah, or planted four fruit trees or five futile trees, or remarried his divorcee. [In the case of] a widow for the High Priest, a divorcee or one having received ḥalîṣah for an ordinary Cohen, a bastard or Gibeonite girl for an Israel, a Jewish girl for a bastard or a Gibeonite, he would not be returning. Rebbi Jehudah says, also he who rebuilt his house on its foundations would not be returning. Rebbi Eleazar said, also one who built a brick house in the Sharon would not return.

MISHNAH: “The policemen shall add and say to the people: ‘Who is the man fearful and faint-hearted, let him go and return to his house. Rebbi Aqiba says, “fearful and faint-hearted” in its simple meaning, that he cannot stand in military engagements and see a drawn sword. Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, “fearful and faint-hearted” is one who is fearful because of his sins; therefore the Torah appended him to all of these that he should return because of them. Rebbi Yose said, a widow for the High Priest, a divorcee or one having received ḥalîṣah for an ordinary Cohen, a bastard or Gibeonite girl for an Israel, a Jewish girl for a bastard or a Gibeonite, that is the “fearful and faint-hearted”.

Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Crispus: An adult woman is like an open amphora. That means, not to let her lose her ketubah. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what Rebbi Ḥanina said, since Rebbi Ḥanina said: It happened that a woman was found without virginity and the case came before Rebbi. He said to her, where is it? She said, the stairs in my father’s house were high and it was rubbed off. Rebbi believed her. That means, not to let her lose her ketubah. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated there: “The ketubah sum of a virgin who is a widow, or a divorcee, or one who had received ḥalîṣah, after a preliminary marriage is 200 [zuz], and they are subject to complaints about virginity.” That means, referring to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated there: “One who eats unchaperoned at his father-in-law’s in Judea cannot go to court about virginity since he was alone with her.” That means, referring to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated: “If somebody married a woman and found her not to be a virgin. She says, I was raped after the preliminary marriage and your field was flooded, but he says, no, it was before the preliminary marriage and my acquisition was in error,” that refers to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated: “She says, I was injured by a piece of wood, but he says no, you were trampled on by a man,” that refers to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. All these cases are based on what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful.

HALAKHAH: “A virgin, a widow, a divorcee after final marriage,” etc. Who is a virgin after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, any who entered the bridal chamber but her witnesses testify that she had no sexual relations. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if a man married a woman under the presumption that she was a virgin and she turned out not to be a virgin, that is not an erroneous acquisition to deprive her of the ketubah of a mina. If a man married a woman under the presumption that she never had illegitimate sex and she turned out that she had illegitimate sex, that is not an erroneous acquisition to deprive her of the ketubah of a mina.

Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said, I never testified except once, when I raised a slave to priestly status. Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father; one to the priesthood, the other to levitic status. A person came before Rebbi Hila; he said to him, this is my son and he is a Cohen. He answered him, he is your son but he is no Cohen. Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder said to him, if you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is his son, do not believe him that he is a Cohen. He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Abin said, so he said to him: If you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is a Cohen, do not believe him that he is his son. In that case, he would be unrelated and trustworthy in his testimony! He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Did they not say, Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father? Let us say that Rebbi elevated a brother on the testimony of his brother. You may even say, a son on the testimony of his father, to levitic status.

Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said, I never testified except once, when I raised a slave to priestly status. Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father; one to the priesthood, the other to levitic status. A person came before Rebbi Hila; he said to him, this is my son and he is a Cohen. He answered him, he is your son but he is no Cohen. Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder said to him, if you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is his son, do not believe him that he is a Cohen. He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Abin said, so he said to him: If you believe him that he is his son, believe him that he is a Cohen. If you do not believe him that he is a Cohen, do not believe him that he is his son. In that case, he would be unrelated and trustworthy in his testimony! He answered, he is his son but I say that he is the son of a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah. Did they not say, Rebbi Isaac Ḥaqula and Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi, one raised a brother on the testimony of his brother, the other a son on the testimony of his father? Let us say that Rebbi elevated a brother on the testimony of his brother. You may even say, a son on the testimony of his father, to levitic status.

MISHNAH: If she sold her ketubah entirely or partially, or donated her ketubah to another, entirely or partially, she cannot sell the remainder except under court supervision. But the Sages say, she may sell even four or five times, and may sell for sustenance without court supervision but writes in the document that “I sold for sustenance.” A divorcee may sell only under court supervision.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Just as a man is concerned about his widow’s honor so he has to be concerned about his divorcee’s honor, as Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, “do not hide yourself from your flesh”, that refers to one’s divorcee. Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s wife did mistreat him badly. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah went to him and told him, rabbi, send her away, for she does not treat you with the honor due to you. He said to him, her ketubah is too large for me. He said to him, I shall give you the ketubah and send her away. He gave him the ketubah and he divorced her. She went and married the city treasurer. That one lost his property and became blind. She took him around the town and led him. Once they went around the entire town and nobody gave him anything. He said to her, is there not another neighborhood? She said to him, there is the neighborhood of my divorcer; it is beyond my powers to bring you there. He started hitting her. Rebbi Yose the Galilean passed by and heard them demeaning one another in public. He took them, brought them to one of his houses, and provided them with food all the days of their lives, because “do not hide yourself from your flesh”, that refers to one’s divorcee. Nevertheless they quarelled loudly in the night and her voice was heard saying, the pain she suffered outside her body was easier to bear than that inside her body.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Just as a man is concerned about his widow’s honor so he has to be concerned about his divorcee’s honor, as Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, “do not hide yourself from your flesh”, that refers to one’s divorcee. Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s wife did mistreat him badly. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah went to him and told him, rabbi, send her away, for she does not treat you with the honor due to you. He said to him, her ketubah is too large for me. He said to him, I shall give you the ketubah and send her away. He gave him the ketubah and he divorced her. She went and married the city treasurer. That one lost his property and became blind. She took him around the town and led him. Once they went around the entire town and nobody gave him anything. He said to her, is there not another neighborhood? She said to him, there is the neighborhood of my divorcer; it is beyond my powers to bring you there. He started hitting her. Rebbi Yose the Galilean passed by and heard them demeaning one another in public. He took them, brought them to one of his houses, and provided them with food all the days of their lives, because “do not hide yourself from your flesh”, that refers to one’s divorcee. Nevertheless they quarelled loudly in the night and her voice was heard saying, the pain she suffered outside her body was easier to bear than that inside her body.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Just as a man is concerned about his widow’s honor so he has to be concerned about his divorcee’s honor, as Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, “do not hide yourself from your flesh”, that refers to one’s divorcee. Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s wife did mistreat him badly. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah went to him and told him, rabbi, send her away, for she does not treat you with the honor due to you. He said to him, her ketubah is too large for me. He said to him, I shall give you the ketubah and send her away. He gave him the ketubah and he divorced her. She went and married the city treasurer. That one lost his property and became blind. She took him around the town and led him. Once they went around the entire town and nobody gave him anything. He said to her, is there not another neighborhood? She said to him, there is the neighborhood of my divorcer; it is beyond my powers to bring you there. He started hitting her. Rebbi Yose the Galilean passed by and heard them demeaning one another in public. He took them, brought them to one of his houses, and provided them with food all the days of their lives, because “do not hide yourself from your flesh”, that refers to one’s divorcee. Nevertheless they quarelled loudly in the night and her voice was heard saying, the pain she suffered outside her body was easier to bear than that inside her body.

MISHNAH: Neither the orphan, nor the secondarily prohibited, nor the she-ram may claim ketubah, or usufruct, or sustenance, or depreciation. But if he married her from the start as a she-ram, she has claim to her ketubah. A widow [married] to the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or Gibeonite girl to an Israel, an Israel girl married to a bastard or Gibeonite, have claim to ketubah.

There, we have stated: “A forced bill of divorce is valid in Israel; it is invalid from Gentiles.” Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him, up to 30 days he shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?

MISHNAH: One finds an opening for a man with his own honor and that of his children. One tells him, if you had known that tomorrow one will say of you, it is the habit of this man to divorce his wife, and about your daughters one will say, they are daughters of a divorcee, what did the mother of these do to get herself divorced? If he said, if I had known that it is so I would not have made the vow, then it is dissolved.

MISHNAH: “The vow of a widow or a divorcee, anything she forbids to herself shall be confirmed.” How is that? If she said, I shall be a nazir after thirty days, even if she married within these thirty days he cannot dissolve. If she made the vow under her husband’s authority and he dissolved it, if she had said, I shall be a nazir after thirty days, even if she should become a widow or a divorcee within the next 30 days, it remains dissolved. If she made a vow, was on the same day divorced, and taken back, he cannot dissolve. This is the principle: He cannot dissolve for any one who was on her own for one moment.

MISHNAH: “The vow of a widow or a divorcee, anything she forbids to herself shall be confirmed.” How is that? If she said, I shall be a nazir after thirty days, even if she married within these thirty days he cannot dissolve. If she made the vow under her husband’s authority and he dissolved it, if she had said, I shall be a nazir after thirty days, even if she should become a widow or a divorcee within the next 30 days, it remains dissolved. If she made a vow, was on the same day divorced, and taken back, he cannot dissolve. This is the principle: He cannot dissolve for any one who was on her own for one moment.

HALAKHAH: “The vow of a widow or a divorcee,” etc. This refers to what Rebbi Ismael says, the vow decides; Rebbi Aqiba says, prohibition decides. If vow and prohibition came together? How is that? She said, I shall be a nazir in 30 days. Her husband heard it and did not dissolve. He divorced her and remarried her within the 30 days. Is that when vow and prohibition come together?

If he did not say: “it was written and signed before me”? Should not an Amora have asked this question? He said to him, that is what Rabin ben Rav said: If he brought a bill of divorce, gave it to her, but did not tell her: “It was written and signed before me”? There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan, who said to him, take it from her and say in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” Does Rebbi Joḥanan follow Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce? Can the position of Rebbi Joḥanan be derived from Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar? Would Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar agree that if he told her at the moment of delivery that it was her bill of divorce it would not be a bill of divorce? But here, even if he tells her at the moment of delivery that it is her bill of divorce, it is no bill of divorce unless he tells her in front of two [witnesses]: “It was written and signed before me.” But Rebbi Joḥanan might hold that a woman cannot be believed if she says, I received a bill of divorce from my husband’s agents. But we did state: “The wife herself can bring her bill of divorce.” Would you not have to be afraid that she might have received the bill from a representative of the husband? How is it? The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan is to make her known as divorcee in front of two [witnesses].

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Abba bar Ḥana: Two who brought a bill of divorce do not have to declare: It was written before us and signed before us. Rebbi Yose ben Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They have to. He himself who brought the bill of divorce does not have to deliver the bill in the presence of two [witnesses] in order to declare her a divorcee in the presence of two. “If he gave her the bill, took it from her, and threw it into the sea or into a river. If later he says to her that it was an empty papyrus or a paid bond, he cannot be believed to disqualify her.” Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he cannot disqualify her, who can? He said to him, since she was declared a divorcee in the presence of two [witnesses], he cannot be believed to disqualify her. If he gave her a bill of divorce which was found to be invalid, they forced him to give her a replacement. This case came before the rabbis and they declared it valid. Did we not say, he cannot be believed to disqualify her? There, the flaw was not proved; here the flaw was proved. As the following: Ḥinena, the son of Rebbi Asi, was a medical doctor and threw a bill of divorce to his wife. She cried. Her neighbor came, grabbed it from her, and gave her an empty papyrus. The case came before the rabbis and they took it into account. But did not Rebbi Yasa say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If the designation was checked and found to be based on [the testimony of] women or children, the designation is invalid? There, the designation was not mentioned. But here the name “bill of divorce” was mentioned. And some want to say, if he asserted that it was a valid bill of divorce, but she cried, her neighbor came, grabbed it from her, and gave her an empty papyrus.

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Abba bar Ḥana: Two who brought a bill of divorce do not have to declare: It was written before us and signed before us. Rebbi Yose ben Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They have to. He himself who brought the bill of divorce does not have to deliver the bill in the presence of two [witnesses] in order to declare her a divorcee in the presence of two. “If he gave her the bill, took it from her, and threw it into the sea or into a river. If later he says to her that it was an empty papyrus or a paid bond, he cannot be believed to disqualify her.” Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he cannot disqualify her, who can? He said to him, since she was declared a divorcee in the presence of two [witnesses], he cannot be believed to disqualify her. If he gave her a bill of divorce which was found to be invalid, they forced him to give her a replacement. This case came before the rabbis and they declared it valid. Did we not say, he cannot be believed to disqualify her? There, the flaw was not proved; here the flaw was proved. As the following: Ḥinena, the son of Rebbi Asi, was a medical doctor and threw a bill of divorce to his wife. She cried. Her neighbor came, grabbed it from her, and gave her an empty papyrus. The case came before the rabbis and they took it into account. But did not Rebbi Yasa say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If the designation was checked and found to be based on [the testimony of] women or children, the designation is invalid? There, the designation was not mentioned. But here the name “bill of divorce” was mentioned. And some want to say, if he asserted that it was a valid bill of divorce, but she cried, her neighbor came, grabbed it from her, and gave her an empty papyrus.

Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.

Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.

Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.

Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.

Rebbi Yose the Galilean said: Do we find in the Torah that what is forbidden to one is permitted to the other and what is permitted to one is forbidden for the other? Forbidden to one she is forbidden to everybody;permitted to one is permitted to everybody. Rebbi Aqiba objected: If the one to whom she was prohibited was a Cohen and the divorcer died, would she not be considered a widow for him but a divorcee for all his clan of Cohanim? Where was the Torah more restrictive, for a divorcee or for a widow? The Torah was more restrictive for a divorcee than for a widow. But since a divorcee, where one is more restrictive in all aspects, does not become forbidden with respect to what was permitted by her divorce, would it be logical that the widow should be forbidden from what was permitted her from her aspect of married woman? Even him did the divorce touch. Since both a widow and a divorcee were forbidden even if her aspect of married woman was permitted, with restrictive divorce certainly she should be forbidden even in the aspect that was permitted by her divorce.

MISHNAH: “You are permitted to any man except to my father and your father, to my brother and your brother, to a slave, a Gentile,” or anybody she is unable to contract a preliminary marriage with, it is valid. “You are permitted to any man except as a widow to the High Priest, a divorcee or one having received ḥalȋṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite girl to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a a bastard or a Gibeonite,” or anybody she could contract a preliminary marriage with even if it is sinful, it is invalid. The essence of the bill of divorce: You are herewith permitted to any man. Rebbi Jehudah says: This shall be for you from me a divorce scroll and a letter of abandonment, to enable you to marry any man you desire. The essence of the bill of manumission: You are a free person, you are on your own.

HALAKHAH: “That is how the punctilious in Jerusalem used to write. A forced bill of divorce among Jews is valid, from Gentiles it is invalid”. Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies from the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalȋṣah in the case of a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him for up to 30 days shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?

“She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce,” as it is written: “He shall write her a bill of divorce.” “Or the husband’s death,” as it is written: “Or if the latter husband dies.” So far, if the latter one dies, [what about] the death of the former? Since the latter’s death releases her, even though his death does not cause a complete release, it is only logical that the former’s death should release her since his death will cause a complete release. Rebbi Ḥuna said, the verse implies that death releases, as it is written: “If brothers live together and one of them dies childless, etc.” Therefore, if he had a child, death releases. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if you would say that death does not release, how could we find a widow for a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah for a common priest? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, explain it for a sister-in-law.

“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.

Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked before me: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.

“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.

MISHNAH: In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the father. Who is this? A priestly, or Levitic, or Israel woman married to a Cohen, a Levite, or an Israel. And in any case of a sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the blemished part. Who is this? A widow [married to] a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a Gibeonite or a bastard. In any case where a preliminary marriage with him is impossible but with others is possible, the child is a bastard. Who is this? This is one having sexual relations with any woman forbidden in the Torah because of incest or adultery. And in any case where a preliminary marriage is impossible with anybody, the child follows the mother. Who is this? The child of a slave girl or a Gentile woman.

HALAKHAH: “In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: If a proselyte married a bastard girl, there is no sinful preliminary marriage, but the child follows the blemished part? He answered, everywhere Rebbi taught, he explained: “Who is this? A priestly, or Levitic, or Israel woman married to a Cohen, a Levite, or an Israel.” Rebbi Abin understood this from the second part: (In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the father.) [In any case of a sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the blemished part.] Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: If a proselyte married a bastard girl, there is no sinful preliminary marriage, but the child follows the blemished part? He answered, everywhere Rebbi taught, he explained: “Who is this? A widow [married to] a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a bastard or a Gibeonite.” Could he not have objected to him: In the case of a disqualified priest married to the daughter of an Israel there is no sinful marriage but the child follows the blemished part? In the case of a man taking back his divorcee after she had been remarried, there is (no) sinful marriage but the child is unblemished since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The daughter of a man taking back his divorcee after she had been remarried is enabled for the priesthood. What is the reason? [For she is an abomination,] she is an abomination but her children are not an abomination.

HALAKHAH: “In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: If a proselyte married a bastard girl, there is no sinful preliminary marriage, but the child follows the blemished part? He answered, everywhere Rebbi taught, he explained: “Who is this? A priestly, or Levitic, or Israel woman married to a Cohen, a Levite, or an Israel.” Rebbi Abin understood this from the second part: (In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the father.) [In any case of a sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the blemished part.] Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: If a proselyte married a bastard girl, there is no sinful preliminary marriage, but the child follows the blemished part? He answered, everywhere Rebbi taught, he explained: “Who is this? A widow [married to] a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a bastard or a Gibeonite.” Could he not have objected to him: In the case of a disqualified priest married to the daughter of an Israel there is no sinful marriage but the child follows the blemished part? In the case of a man taking back his divorcee after she had been remarried, there is (no) sinful marriage but the child is unblemished since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The daughter of a man taking back his divorcee after she had been remarried is enabled for the priesthood. What is the reason? [For she is an abomination,] she is an abomination but her children are not an abomination.

HALAKHAH: “In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: If a proselyte married a bastard girl, there is no sinful preliminary marriage, but the child follows the blemished part? He answered, everywhere Rebbi taught, he explained: “Who is this? A priestly, or Levitic, or Israel woman married to a Cohen, a Levite, or an Israel.” Rebbi Abin understood this from the second part: (In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the father.) [In any case of a sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the blemished part.] Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: If a proselyte married a bastard girl, there is no sinful preliminary marriage, but the child follows the blemished part? He answered, everywhere Rebbi taught, he explained: “Who is this? A widow [married to] a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a bastard or a Gibeonite.” Could he not have objected to him: In the case of a disqualified priest married to the daughter of an Israel there is no sinful marriage but the child follows the blemished part? In the case of a man taking back his divorcee after she had been remarried, there is (no) sinful marriage but the child is unblemished since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The daughter of a man taking back his divorcee after she had been remarried is enabled for the priesthood. What is the reason? [For she is an abomination,] she is an abomination but her children are not an abomination.

HALAKHAH: “The daughter of a desecrated priest,” etc. Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rav: Daughter, daughter’s daughter, forever. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “In his clans.” Since by “in his clans” said there males are forbidden and females permitted, so by “in his clans” said here males are forbidden and females permitted. What is the difference between them? A Cohen who came to a divorcee and fathered a son; the son went and fathered a son and a daughter. In the opinion of Rav the son, the son’s daughter, the daughter’s son, and the daughter are forbidden. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan the son’s daughter is forbidden, the daughter’s son is permitted. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “The daughter of an Israel who married a desecrated woman is qualified for the priesthood.” He explains it, a broomstick desecrated one. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “Rebbi Jehudah says, the daughter of a male proselyte is like the daughter of a desecrated priest.” He explains that Rebbi Jehudah only comes to add. If he had said that the daughter of a desecrated priest is like the daughter of a male proselyte, you would have had a point.

If a Cohen had intercourse with a divorcee and fathered a daughter, what is the status of the daughter’s daughter? Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mana, one said she is qualified, the other said she is disqualified. The one who said that she is qualified asked the one who said that she is disqualified: Is the daughter of a male desecrated priest not disqualified? Is the broomstick desecrated one not disqualified? Why is she disqualified?

One marries neither the king’s widow nor his divorcee, because they were secluded to the day of their death, living in widowhood. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This teaches that David had them braided and adorned, and brought them before himself every day and told his evil inclination, you desire something which is forbidden to you; by your life, I shall make you desire what is permitted to you. The rabbis of Caesarea said, they actually were forbidden to him. If a private person’s vessel used by a private person is forbidden for the king’s use, a fortiori the king is forbidden to use the king’s vessels which were used by a private person.

HALAKHAH: “The following ones one saves at the cost of their own persons” etc. “He who pursues another to kill him, whether in a house or on the field one saves at the cost of his own person, both him who pursues another to kill him or him who pursues any of the transgressions in the Torah one saves at the cost of his own person. But if it was a widow for a High Priest, a divorcee or one who had received ḥalîṣah for a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite for an Israel, an Israel woman for a bastard or a Gibeonite, one does not save him at the cost of his own person. If the deed had been done, one does not save him at the cost of his own person. If there are people to save her, one does not save him at the cost of his own person. Rebbi Jehudah says, if she said, let him do it, one does not save at the cost of his own person. For if they would injure him, they through him would come to spill blood.”

It is written, the genitals of a woman and her daughter you shall not uncover, and it is written, if a man take a woman and her mother, it is taboo. Everywhere is written lying with, but here is written taking, to teach you that he cannot be [criminally] liable for the second woman unless she be taken by him. Or maybe he is [criminally] liable only by marriage? We already said that there is no valid incestuous marriage. But is it not written: Nobody may marry his father’s wife, and he should not uncover his father’s garment’s corner? This comes to tell that she was permitted to him before his father married her. But is it not written: If a man take his brother’s wife? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before his brother married her. This is understood by levirate. But is it not written: You should not take a woman in addition to her sister? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before he married her sister. This is understood after her sister’s death. But is it not written: A man who would take his sister, his father’s daughter or his mother’s daughter, it is ḥesed? That you should not say that Cain married his sister, Abel married his sister, it is charitable, I was charitable with the first generations so the world could be inhabited; I said, the world was built on ḥesed. But is it not written: Widow, divorcee, and desecrated, these he shall not take? This comes to tell you that if he became betrothed to her, the betrothal is valid.