implies

Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: Here, she did not drink but in the case of breaking the calf’s neck they did break it. Rav said, she did drink. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would not drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the end say: “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rav say, she would drink? Rebbi Joḥanan said, she would not drink. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan. “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the first statement say: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rebbi Joḥanan say, she would not drink? They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel, the Mishnah talks about those whose testimony is invalid. They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel: The Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What does it mean, “the Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous”? He said to him, so says Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: This entire chapter [deals with the case that] he had declared his jealousy and she went to a secluded place. She went to a secluded place by the testimony of two [witnesses]. If one of them said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion and about impurity. After the time of seclusion, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw that she did not become impure while in the secluded place, how do you treat this? As a testimony which, if part of the testimony is thrown out, the entire testimony is thrown out, or does one accept the remainder of the testimony? They said in the name of Rebbi Abba Mari: Even he who says, if part of it is thrown out, all is thrown out, here one accepts the remainder of the testimony, since the matter has feet to stand on.

Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Joḥanan: Here, she did not drink but in the case of breaking the calf’s neck they did break it. Rav said, she did drink. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would not drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the end say: “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rav say, she would drink? Rebbi Joḥanan said, she would not drink. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan. “If two [witnesses] say, she became impure, but one witness says, she did not become impure, she would not drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. He explains it for those whose testimony is invalid. But if for those whose testimony is invalid, does not the first statement say: “If one [witness] says, she became impure, but two [witnesses] say, she did not become impure, she would drink.” That implies that if one witness was against another single witness, she would drink. How could Rebbi Joḥanan say, she would not drink? They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel, the Mishnah talks about those whose testimony is invalid. They said in the name of Rebbi Samuel: The Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What does it mean, “the Mishnah speaks about another rendez-vous”? He said to him, so says Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: This entire chapter [deals with the case that] he had declared his jealousy and she went to a secluded place. She went to a secluded place by the testimony of two [witnesses]. If one of them said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion and about impurity. After the time of seclusion, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw her that she became impure while in the secluded place, there [is testimony] about the seclusion but not about impurity. If there were three [witnesses]. One said, I saw that she did not become impure while in the secluded place, how do you treat this? As a testimony which, if part of the testimony is thrown out, the entire testimony is thrown out, or does one accept the remainder of the testimony? They said in the name of Rebbi Abba Mari: Even he who says, if part of it is thrown out, all is thrown out, here one accepts the remainder of the testimony, since the matter has feet to stand on.

HALAKHAH: “The priest anointed for war,” etc. Why the priest anointed for war? Because it is written “he shall speak”? But about the reading of the Šema‘ it is written: “You shall speak about them,” and it may be recited in any language. But because it is written there “saying”. But for the declaration of tithes it is written “saying” and it may be recited in any language! Rebbi Ḥaggai said, it says here “to come close” and it says there, “the Levitic Cohanim shall come close;” since “coming close” there implies [recitation in] the holy language, so also “coming close” here implies [recitation in] the holy language. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who says, these are expressions of additions. Following Rebbi Ismael who says, these are double expressions? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, it says here “to come close” and it says there, “Moses shall come close to the mist”, since “coming close” there implies [recitation in] the holy language, so also “coming close” here implies [recitation in] the holy language.

HALAKHAH: “The priest anointed for war,” etc. Why the priest anointed for war? Because it is written “he shall speak”? But about the reading of the Šema‘ it is written: “You shall speak about them,” and it may be recited in any language. But because it is written there “saying”. But for the declaration of tithes it is written “saying” and it may be recited in any language! Rebbi Ḥaggai said, it says here “to come close” and it says there, “the Levitic Cohanim shall come close;” since “coming close” there implies [recitation in] the holy language, so also “coming close” here implies [recitation in] the holy language. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who says, these are expressions of additions. Following Rebbi Ismael who says, these are double expressions? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, it says here “to come close” and it says there, “Moses shall come close to the mist”, since “coming close” there implies [recitation in] the holy language, so also “coming close” here implies [recitation in] the holy language.

HALAKHAH: “The priest anointed for war,” etc. Why the priest anointed for war? Because it is written “he shall speak”? But about the reading of the Šema‘ it is written: “You shall speak about them,” and it may be recited in any language. But because it is written there “saying”. But for the declaration of tithes it is written “saying” and it may be recited in any language! Rebbi Ḥaggai said, it says here “to come close” and it says there, “the Levitic Cohanim shall come close;” since “coming close” there implies [recitation in] the holy language, so also “coming close” here implies [recitation in] the holy language. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who says, these are expressions of additions. Following Rebbi Ismael who says, these are double expressions? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, it says here “to come close” and it says there, “Moses shall come close to the mist”, since “coming close” there implies [recitation in] the holy language, so also “coming close” here implies [recitation in] the holy language.

HALAKHAH: “The priest anointed for war,” etc. Why the priest anointed for war? Because it is written “he shall speak”? But about the reading of the Šema‘ it is written: “You shall speak about them,” and it may be recited in any language. But because it is written there “saying”. But for the declaration of tithes it is written “saying” and it may be recited in any language! Rebbi Ḥaggai said, it says here “to come close” and it says there, “the Levitic Cohanim shall come close;” since “coming close” there implies [recitation in] the holy language, so also “coming close” here implies [recitation in] the holy language. That follows Rebbi Aqiba who says, these are expressions of additions. Following Rebbi Ismael who says, these are double expressions? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, it says here “to come close” and it says there, “Moses shall come close to the mist”, since “coming close” there implies [recitation in] the holy language, so also “coming close” here implies [recitation in] the holy language.

Why does the verse say, “who built”? This excludes him whose house collapsed and he rebuilt it. (Rebbi Yose said, this implies that one who remarries his divorcee does not return.) One could think that somebody who builds a house outside the Land would return; the verse said, “and he did not inaugurate it,” meaning where there is an obligation of inauguration; this excludes cases where there is no obligation of inauguration. If he received prepaid rent, it is as if he inaugurated it; if [the rent is payable] only after twelve months, it is as if he had not inaugurated it. If he locked it, if it contains valuables for which one usually stops working, it is as if he inaugurated it; otherwise, it is as if he had not inaugurated it.

HALAKHAH: “Who became betrothed”. Not only a young man who married a young woman. From where even a young man who married a widow, a widower who married a young woman, a widower who married a widow? From where? The verse says, “a woman”, of any kind. Why does the verse say, “new”? That excludes him who remarries his divorcee. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that one who marries a sheram does not return since he has no religious obligation to live with her.

It supports him because he says it is all praise, as Rebbi Joḥanan said, Joḥanan the High Priest sent and checked in all localities of Israel and found that they separated only Great Heave. But First and Second Tithes some were separating and some did not. He said, since [omitting] First Tithe is a deadly sin and [omitting] Second Tithe [implies] the sin of ṭevel, a person should give a name to heave and heave of the tithe and give them to the Cohen; Second Tithe he exchanges for coins. About the remaining tithe of the poor, he who has a claim on another person must bring proof.

The word of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi implies some are censure and some praise. Since Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya, Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Tanḥum, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, originally tithe was split into three parts. One third to his acquaintances among Cohanim and Levites, one third to the public treasury, one third to the poor and the fellows in Jerusalem. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, a person who went to court in Jerusalem, up to three letters he paid for himself, from there on from the public treasury. When Eleazar ben Paḥora and Judah ben Pakora came, they took it by force and it would have been in his hand to stop this but he did not but disestablished the declaration of tithes, and this is for censure. But the arousers for praise and the hitters for praise.

HALAKHAH: “After the earlier prophets died, Urim and Tummim stopped.” Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: These are Samuel and David. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana in the name of Rav: These are Gad and Nathan. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar Isaac in the name of Rav: These are Jeremiah and Barukh. The word of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi implies that these are Jeremiah and Barukh. For Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, “it was when he asked God in the days of Zacariah who understood God’s visions.”

Rebbi Abba bar Cohen said before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Jacob bar Idi: A man may not [preliminarily] marry on a Friday. That means, to make an engagement feast. This implies that the preliminary marriage itself is permitted. Samuel says, even on the Ninth of Ab a preliminary marriage is permitted, lest another forestall him. The argument of Samuel seems inverted. There, he says, “God puts singles in a house, etc.,” “To rise on scales; they all are of vapor!” And there, he says so? That means, that he should not forestall him in prayer. Even so, it would not be permanent.

HALAKHAH: “A virgin, a widow, a divorcee after final marriage,” etc. Who is a virgin after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, any who entered the bridal chamber but her witnesses testify that she had no sexual relations. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if a man married a woman under the presumption that she was a virgin and she turned out not to be a virgin, that is not an erroneous acquisition to deprive her of the ketubah of a mina. If a man married a woman under the presumption that she never had illegitimate sex and she turned out that she had illegitimate sex, that is not an erroneous acquisition to deprive her of the ketubah of a mina.

Rebbi Eleazar said to him: Is not the dough widow qualified but her daughter is disqualified? He said to him, whoever declares her to be qualified, declares her daughter to be qualified. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, did he not say “whoever declares her to be qualified”? This implies that there is another who disqualifies! Who declares qualified? Rebbi Meïr. Who disqualifies? The rabbis. As we have stated: What is qualified dough, anyone about whom there is [no suspicion of descent from] a desecrated, a bastard, or a Gibeonite. Rebbi Meïr says, the daughter of any woman not tainted with one of these is qualified for thepriesthood. But about a family in which a disability had disappeared, Rebbi Meïr says he checks up to four mothers and marries, but the Sages say, he checks forever.

The word of Rebbi Zera implies that a child of unknown paternity is qualified, for Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: Is it the same for families? He said to him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: There, for families, but here for sanctified food in the country. The word of Rebbi Samuel ben [Rav] Isaac implies that a child of unknown paternity is disqualified, for Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac asked: Does this mean that a child of unknown paternity is does not exist following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, only following Rebbi Joshua? He turned around and said, a child of unknown paternity is possible following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, if she remains silent. And even if you say that she talks, if she said that she does not know.

The word of Rebbi Zera implies that a child of unknown paternity is qualified, for Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: Is it the same for families? He said to him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: There, for families, but here for sanctified food in the country. The word of Rebbi Samuel ben [Rav] Isaac implies that a child of unknown paternity is disqualified, for Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac asked: Does this mean that a child of unknown paternity is does not exist following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, only following Rebbi Joshua? He turned around and said, a child of unknown paternity is possible following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, if she remains silent. And even if you say that she talks, if she said that she does not know.

Should one follow the majority, and most women are married as virgins. Say then that she was married as a virgin! This implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. There, we have stated: “If an ox gored a cow and one finds her fetus beside her.” Do most cows have miscarriages? Say therefore that the goring induced the miscarriage. Rebbi Abbahu said, this implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. Rebbi Abun said, in one case they applied a majority argument, as Rebbi Aḥa stated: If a camel was in heat among camels and one finds one of them dead, I am saying that the one in heat bit it.

Should one follow the majority, and most women are married as virgins. Say then that she was married as a virgin! This implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. There, we have stated: “If an ox gored a cow and one finds her fetus beside her.” Do most cows have miscarriages? Say therefore that the goring induced the miscarriage. Rebbi Abbahu said, this implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. Rebbi Abun said, in one case they applied a majority argument, as Rebbi Aḥa stated: If a camel was in heat among camels and one finds one of them dead, I am saying that the one in heat bit it.

And even a minor. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Even a minor, even a relative. Even an underage relative? Let us hear from the following: Ḥananiah from Cartes was kidnapped, he, his son, and his wife. They came before Rebbi Ḥanina who did not receive them. They came before Rebbi Joshua ben Levi who received them. This implies, even an underage relative.

HALAKHAH: “One who says, I seduced X’s daughter,” etc. Rebbi Isaac asked: Would he have to pay the slave’s value on his own testimony? What is his problem? Are the entire 30 [šeqel] a fine or is only the excess over his value a fine? If you say, the entire 30 [šeqel] are a fine, he does not pay. If you say, the excess over his value is a fine, he pays. There, we have stated: “‘Your ox killed my slave’! The other said, ‘he did not kill’. ‘I want you to swear’ and he said ‘Amen’, he is free.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it if he killed a slave afflicted with boils. He said to him, what does it say afterwards? “‘Your ox killed my son’! The other said, ‘he did not kill’. ‘I want you to swear’ and he said ‘Amen’, he is obligated.” Why do you not explain it that he was afflicted with boils, then he would be free. Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it following him who says “he shall pay the redemption of his person”, the one’s who caused the damage. He said to him, if following him who says “he shall pay the redemption of his person”, the one’s who caused the damage, everything is a fine. Can one say to him, be also in the clear with Heaven? Let us hear from the following: It happened that Rabban Gamliel knocked out his slave Tebi’s tooth. He came to Rebbi Joshua and said to him, I found a reason to free my slave Tebi. He said to him, what do you have in your hand? Fines can be imposed only by witnesses! Could they not say to him, do your duty before Heaven? That means one does not tell him, do your duty before Heaven! Rebbi Gamliel ben Avina asked before Rebbi Mana: Does Rabban Gamliel follow him who said, it is permitted to manumit? He said to him, the story in itself implies that it is forbidden to manumit since, otherwise, he could have freed him immediately!

It is written: “If a man takes a wife, comes to her, and hates her.” He is not guilty unless he marries her definitively, has intercourse, and accuses her not to be a virgin. “He puts a libel on her”; I could think even if she spoiled a dish? It says here “a libel” and it says later “a libel”. Since “a libel” later implies whoring, so also here it means whoring. Since “a libel” later implies from the place of virginity, so also here? From where if he came upon her otherwise? The verse says, “and he calumniates her”, in any way. “He said, I took this wife and came to her,” that excludes assignations; “I took”, to exclude the one waiting for her levir; “I took”, to exclude the preliminarily married one.

It is written: “If a man takes a wife, comes to her, and hates her.” He is not guilty unless he marries her definitively, has intercourse, and accuses her not to be a virgin. “He puts a libel on her”; I could think even if she spoiled a dish? It says here “a libel” and it says later “a libel”. Since “a libel” later implies whoring, so also here it means whoring. Since “a libel” later implies from the place of virginity, so also here? From where if he came upon her otherwise? The verse says, “and he calumniates her”, in any way. “He said, I took this wife and came to her,” that excludes assignations; “I took”, to exclude the one waiting for her levir; “I took”, to exclude the preliminarily married one.

HALAKHAH: “If she decided to bring him 1’000 denars,” etc. Why did they say for money, one and one half times, and for estimations less one fifth? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, one estimates the will of the woman that she wants to use her vessels and depreciates them by a fifth. One estimates the will of the man to use it in trade and to make them one and one half. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that nobody has the right to sell his wife’s vessels. Example: Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Yasa, and Rebbi Immi went to appraise for Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina’s daughter. They said to [the groom]: Deduct a fifth and double. He said to them, he deducts a fifth and does not double.

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if the father proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he [made it conditional], could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ban Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if the father proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he [made it conditional], could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ban Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

HALAKHAH: “The following one forces to divorce: Those smitten with boils,” etc. “The meqammeṣ.” This is the dung collector; but some say it is the tanner. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the Mishnah implies that this is the dung collector since we have stated: “The meqammeṣ and the tanner.” “The brass refiner.” Samuel said, that is the one who smelts brass from its ore.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he did not take her in. But if he took her in, nobody can lose his rights by these expressions. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is the word of Rebbi Ḥiyya: He who says that “my hands are removed from this field, my feet are removed from this field,” did not say anything. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does a Mishnah imply that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions? Did we not state there: “If somebody was married to two wives when he sold a field and the first one wrote for the buyer: I have no claims on you, the second one can take it away from the buyer’s hands,” this implies, not the first one. He said to him, that text itself implies that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions, but here the second wife cannot take anything away from the first, and why can the first one not take it away from the buyer’s hands? For she writes to him: For any complaint I shall have regarding this field, I shall have nothing against you.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he did not take her in. But if he took her in, nobody can lose his rights by these expressions. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is the word of Rebbi Ḥiyya: He who says that “my hands are removed from this field, my feet are removed from this field,” did not say anything. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does a Mishnah imply that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions? Did we not state there: “If somebody was married to two wives when he sold a field and the first one wrote for the buyer: I have no claims on you, the second one can take it away from the buyer’s hands,” this implies, not the first one. He said to him, that text itself implies that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions, but here the second wife cannot take anything away from the first, and why can the first one not take it away from the buyer’s hands? For she writes to him: For any complaint I shall have regarding this field, I shall have nothing against you.

Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

HALAKHAH: “If a widow’s ketubah was 200,” etc. We understand worth a mina for 200 or worth 200 for a mina. In any case, she made the orphans lose a mina. [If it was worth] a mina [and she sold it] for 200, would the sale not be invalidated as erroneous buy? Explain it that the property increased in value. Rebbi Abin said, this supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, real estate buys are never under the laws of overcharging. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if the transaction was excessive, it comes under the law of overcharging. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “The following do not fall under the laws of overcharging: Slaves, securities, real estate, and redemptions.” He explains it, unless it was excessive. If he redeemed what was worth a mina by 200, Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is not redeemed, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is redeemed. A baralta disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: If he said, this toga instead of this donkey, the latter becomes profane. And its end disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is necessary to compute the value. Rebbi Yose said, the baraita itself implies that it is necessary to compute the value. Where do they disagree? To bring [a sacrifice to atone for] larceny. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he has to bring a sacrifice for larceny; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he does not have to bring a sacrifice for larceny.

HALAKHAH: “If the judges estimated one sixth too little or too much,” etc. As you say for a private person, in real estate up to one third, in movables up to one sixth. And similarly, for Temple property, in real estate up to one sixth, in movables up to [one in] twelve. There, we have stated: “The estimation for orphans is thirty days, the estimation for Temple property sixty days, and one publicly announces mornings and evenings.” And why thirty? In order to empower the orphans. Why should they not announce longer? Up to thirty days you empower the orphans, more than that you diminish their power. Why do you not say that for Temple property? Temple property is different because each offer made is firm. Then they should announce forever! If suffices for the Temple that it should be twice that of a private person. Rebbi Yudan said, since you say that Temple property is different because each offer made is firm, this implies that if they find their estimation they do not continue but close the deal.

“He pays her in coin of the Land of Israel.” This implies that the coins of the land of Israel are the best of all countries. This supports him who says that a woman’s ketubah is from the words of the Torah, against Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, as it was stated: A woman’s ketubah is from the words of the Torah. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, a woman’s ketubah is only an institution of the Soferim.

HALAKHAH: “Indeterminate oaths are interpreted restrictively,” etc. They wanted to say, salted for preservation, not short-term salted. Rebbi Yudan said, since we have stated: “this is for me like salted meat, like libation wine,” this imples that short-term salted is called “salted”. What is short-term salted? As it was stated: “He puts the limbs on the salt and turns them over.” Rebbi Abba Mari said, there is a difference, for if he leaves them there, they become salted meat. But which text says it? As Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, “one who takes olives from the vat dips each single one in salt and eats it.” That implies that short-term salted is called “salted”.

HALAKHAH: “Four kinds of vows did the Sages dissolve,” etc. Do not the Sages permit all kinds of vows? It is written: “Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes.” He referred the paragraph to the heads of the tribes that they should dissolve the people’s vows. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: “He shall not profane his word.” He cannot profane his word; this implies that others can profane his words. Who is that? That is the Sage who dissolves the vow. Ḥananiah the nephew of Rebbi Joshua said, “I swore and I shall keep it.” Sometimes I keep it. Rebbi Joshua said, “What I swore in my rage:” In my rage I swore; I change my mind.

HALAKHAH: “One who makes a vow away from the seafaring men,” etc. That you should not say, not from those who go from Acco to Jaffa but those who frequently take to the sea. “From the dwellers on dry land he is forbidden the seafaring men,” not only those who go from Acco to Jaffa but even those who frequently take to the sea. But did he not make a vow regarding the dwellers on dry land? This implies that the seafaring men are part of the dwellers on dry land. If he made a vow away from the seafaring men after thirty days but [a certain mariner] became a land dweller, there is a dispute between Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba. For Rebbi Ismael says, after the vow, and Rebbi Aqiba says, after the prohibition. And about children it is a problem.

HALAKHAH: “ ‘From the salted’ he is forbidden only salted fish,” etc. They wanted to say, salted for preservation, not short-term salted. Rebbi Yudan said, since we have stated: “this is for me like salted meat, like libation wine,” this imples that short-term salted is called “salted”. What is short-term salted? As it was stated: “He puts the limbs on the salt and turns them over.” Rebbi Abba Mari said, there is a difference, for if he left them there, they would become salted meat. But which text says it? As Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Zabda said, “one who takes olives from the vat dips each single one in salt and eats it.” This implies that short-term salted is called “salted”.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody vows not to eat dates,” etc. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? The name of its father is called over it. What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra? The name of its descendant is called over it. It is reasonable that Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra should agree with Rebbi Yose but Rebbi Yose would not agree with Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra should agree with Rebbi Yose: The name of its descendant, so certainly also the name of its father. Rebbi Yose would not agree with Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: He says only, the name of its father. This implies: not the name of its descendant.

HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine today,’ ” etc. This implies that he is permitted at nightfall. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage? It is not usual that a man should say to another in the evening, I did not eat until evening. Would he say, yesterday? Refer to the following and it does disagree: It is not usual that a man should say to another in the morning, I did not eat in the evening. Would he say, the same day? Does the following not disagree? This day from this week, or this week from this day? What is the difference between “this day” and “today”? That is, following the opinion that in matters of vows one follows common usage. But here, one follows the opinion that in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, it is the way of people to say to another, bear with me this day.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody was importuning his neighbor that he should eat at his place,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if one brings his neighbor to swear that he will not eat, this one may eat of that neighbor.

(As) we have stated there: “One sells a synagogue only conditionally”. So far if it was built as a synagogue. How is the situation if the building was first built for profane use and then dedicated? Let us hear from the following: “A qônām that I shall not enter this house and it was turned into a synagogue.” That implies that if it was built as a courtyard and afterwards was dedicated that it becomes holy. How? When does it become holy, immediately or when it is used? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody makes a chest for a Torah scroll, or wrappings for a Torah scroll, before they were used for a Torah scroll they may be used for private use; after they were used for a Torah scroll they may not be used for private use.” Since these were made for holy use but became holy only when used, that which was built as a courtyard not so much more? What is the status of those if they were made for profane use and then dedicated? They become holy.

HALAKHAH: “If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband,” etc. They wanted to say that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband. Let us hear from the following: “The way of learned people is that, before his daughter left his house, he told her: ‘Any vows which you had vowed in my house are dissolved’.” This implies that if the father had dissolved his part and died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.

May one appoint Elders for selected topics? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi appointed Rav to invalidate vows and to see stains. After his death, [Rav] asked his son for [permission to see] defects of firstlings. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he gave him everything: To sit in judgment alone, to invalidate vows, to see stains, and to see outside blemishes. After his death, [Rav] asked his son for [permission to see] hidden defects. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Even though you say, one appoints Elders for selected topics, only if he is competent for everything. As the following: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi ordained all his students, but he was sorry about one who had a defect in his eye and he could not ordain him; so he ordained him for selected topics. That implies that one who is competent in one thing has to be competent in everything, and one who is not competent in everything cannot be declared competent in one thing.

Any expressions can be used for nezirut except the expression qorban. Any expressions can be used for qorban except the expression nezirut. If he said about a bunch of grapes, “I am locked away from you, I am separated from you, I am prevented from you, I am nazir from you,” he is a nazir. “It is for me qorban,” he only forbade it for himself as qorban. If he said about a loaf of bread, “I am locked away from it, I am separated from it, I am prevented from it, it is qorban for me,” he only forbade it for himself as qorban. “I am nazir from it,” he is a nazir. “Prevented” implies both nezirut and qorban. If somebody said about a bunch of grapes, “I am prevented from it,” if he wanted to eat it, one tells him, is it not holy for its money’s worth? If he redeemed it, one tells him, are you not a nazir?

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.

HALAKHAH: ““I shall be a nazir if a son is born to me,” etc. It is obvious that the end of a day is counted as a full [day]. Is the start of a day counted as a full day? Is that not the Mishnah: “after 70 [days], he reduces to 70,” not even a part? This implies that the start of a day is counted as a full day.

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ at the end. Rebbi Simeon says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ for every item.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, [Rebbi Simeon implies] if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the baraita supports the colleagues: “A woman made a vow as nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I;’ if the first’s husband heard and told her, ‘it is permitted to you,’ the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. Rebbi Simeon says, if she said, my intention was only to be like her, in her state, the second also is permitted.” Because she said “to be like her, in her state;” therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state,” the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where there was no original nezirut, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? When Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest, if he attaches: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ at the end. Rebbi Simeon says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ for every item.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, [Rebbi Simeon implies] if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the baraita supports the colleagues: “A woman made a vow as nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I;’ if the first’s husband heard and told her, ‘it is permitted to you,’ the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. Rebbi Simeon says, if she said, my intention was only to be like her, in her state, the second also is permitted.” Because she said “to be like her, in her state;” therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state,” the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where there was no original nezirut, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? When Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest, if he attaches: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Joshua,” etc. There, we have stated: “Two are impure from the dead, one is impure for seven days and one is impure by the impurity of evening. Three are impure from the dead, two are impure for seven days and one is impure until nightfall. Four are impure from the dead, three are impure for seven days and one is impure until nightfall. How is it for two? Any person who touches a corpse is impure for seven days; a person who touches him is impure until nightfall,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: All are biblically [impure] for heave, but for entering the Sanctuary only the second impure who touched the first impure. What is the reason? “A person who would be impure and did not purify himself;” anybody needing purification is guilty for entering the Sanctuary; anybody not needing purification is not guilty for entering the Sanctuary. They objected: But a person who touches objects which touched a corpse needs purification, but is he the second? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, for impurity of a person from a person, not for impurity of a person from objects. The statement of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya [implies that] only the first is guilty. Since [for impurity of] a person from a person only the first is guilty, so here the first is guilty. Rebbi Yose said, only if he immersed himself. That is a statement of Rebbi, since Rebbi said, all impure persons remain impure until the are immersed in water.

Rav Ḥisda said, [the Mishnah] implies that it is permitted to remove a corpse of obligation. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, explain it if the burial was unauthorized or subject to question. Should one not be afraid that it might be a corpse of obligation? Rebbi Ze‘ira thinks that corpses of obligation are infrequent. “It turns out that there are three kinds of burials. A grave which is found one removes; after removal the place is impure and forbidden for use. A known grave may not be removed; but if it was removed the place is pure and permitted for use. A grave which endangers the public is removed; after removal the place is impure and forbidden for use.” Rebbi Abba bar Cohen instructed in Kefar Aqabia that its place is permitted for use. Does he disagree? There if it preceded the village, here if the village preceded it. It was stated: “A grave surrounded by a village on three sides can be removed,” on two sides, some Tannaïm state that one removes it, some state that one may not remove it. Rav Ḥisda said, he who says that one removes it, if it is within slightly more than 70 cubits. He who says that one does not remove it, if it is outside slightly more than 70 cubits. He who says that one removes it, if [the village] is built in the form of a Γ. He who says that one does not remove it, if [the village] is built in the form of a ה. “All kinds of graves may be removed except the graves of a king or a prophet. They said to him, were not the graves of David’s sons removed but the graves of the sons of Ḥulda were in Jerusalem and nobody ever touched them to remove them. Rebbi Aqiba told them, is that a proof? A duct was there and the impurity exited from there horizontally into the Qidron valley.”

Rebbi Yose asked: If he said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”? Let us hear from the following: “If one said ‘it was written before me’ and another ‘it was signed before me’, it is invalid.” That is, because one said, “it was written before me” and another, “it was signed before me”; this implies that if one said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”, it is valid. Rav Ḥisda asked: half of an institution and half as biblical decree? If he said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”? Let us hear from the following: “If one said ‘it was written before me’ and another ‘it was signed before me’, it is invalid.” That is, because one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”; this implies that if one said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband for an hour,” it is valid.

Rebbi Yose asked: If he said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”? Let us hear from the following: “If one said ‘it was written before me’ and another ‘it was signed before me’, it is invalid.” That is, because one said, “it was written before me” and another, “it was signed before me”; this implies that if one said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”, it is valid. Rav Ḥisda asked: half of an institution and half as biblical decree? If he said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband between writing and signing”? Let us hear from the following: “If one said ‘it was written before me’ and another ‘it was signed before me’, it is invalid.” That is, because one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”; this implies that if one said, “it was written and signed before me, but it was in the sole possession of the husband for an hour,” it is valid.

Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The Mishnah speaks of the heirs in priesthood and Levitic status. But concerning the poor, the poor has no inheritance. Bar Qappara stated: No person is immune from this; if not he then his son, if not his son then his grandson. This means, he can change the terms. Can the creditor change the terms? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody lends money to a first rich and then poor person he cannot separate for him, for one does not separate for what was lost and the poor acquired what is in his hand.” This implies that the creditor cannot change the terms.

HALAKHAH: “If a slave was kidnapped and ransomed,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Ḥizqiah: It would be logical that even as a slave he should not have to serve. And why did they say, he has to serve? That a slave should not run away to the kidnappers. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita implies this: “His master pays his ransom and frees him.” They said that only about his master, not anybody else. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: It would be logical that even as a free person he should have to serve. Why did they say that he does not have to serve? Not to damage the reputations of free persons. Rebbi Yose said, but it is so: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in any case he shall serve; just as Israel are obligated to ransom free persons so they are obligated to ransom slaves.” The first Tanna is of the opinion that they are obligated to ransom free persons but they are not obligated to ransom slaves. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.

“If somebody stole a log and used it in building. The House of Shammai say, he has to tear down the entire building and return it. But the House of Hillel say, for the benefit of repenting sinners, that he has to pay its full value.” Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? If he stole it planed, but if he stole and planed it himself, he owes him money. If he stole and planed it on the spot, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody appropriates another person’s ruin and rebuilds it without prermission, one appraises it and his hand is weak. If he wants to take his logs and stones, one does not listen to him.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It was asked in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: If somebody stores his bundle in somebody else’s ruin and wants to take it from there, does one not listen to him? He had not heard that Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because of civilisation. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. We would have thought that they disagree only in the Land, but not outside the Land. Since Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, because of civilisation, this implies that there is no difference between the Land and outside the Land. If he wants to take [the value of] his logs and stones, what is the rule? One tells him, wait until he dwells in it. Samuel said, one pays him immediately.

HALAKHAH: “The following was said for communal peace,” etc. The saying of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai implies that it is of the words of the Torah, for Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “Moses wrote this Torah and gave it to the Cohanim, the Levites (etc.)” and afterwards “to all the Elders of Israel.” The saying of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi implies that it is of their words, as Rebbi Joshua said, never did I recite the benediction before a Cohen and I did not allow an Israel to do it before him. The saying of Rebbi Ḥanina implies that it is of their words, as Rebbi Ḥanina said, in a city of only Cohanim, an Israel reads first because of communal peace.

HALAKHAH: “The following was said for communal peace,” etc. The saying of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai implies that it is of the words of the Torah, for Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “Moses wrote this Torah and gave it to the Cohanim, the Levites (etc.)” and afterwards “to all the Elders of Israel.” The saying of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi implies that it is of their words, as Rebbi Joshua said, never did I recite the benediction before a Cohen and I did not allow an Israel to do it before him. The saying of Rebbi Ḥanina implies that it is of their words, as Rebbi Ḥanina said, in a city of only Cohanim, an Israel reads first because of communal peace.

HALAKHAH: “The following was said for communal peace,” etc. The saying of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai implies that it is of the words of the Torah, for Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “Moses wrote this Torah and gave it to the Cohanim, the Levites (etc.)” and afterwards “to all the Elders of Israel.” The saying of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi implies that it is of their words, as Rebbi Joshua said, never did I recite the benediction before a Cohen and I did not allow an Israel to do it before him. The saying of Rebbi Ḥanina implies that it is of their words, as Rebbi Ḥanina said, in a city of only Cohanim, an Israel reads first because of communal peace.

Rebbi Aḥa and Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Simai: In a city of only Cohanim, all of them lift their hands. For whom do they recite the blessing? For their brothers to the North and South. Who answers after them? Women and children. Abbaie bar Benjamin stated: People who stand behind the Cohanim are not included in the blessing. For those in front of them, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that even an iron wall does not interrupt. Those who stand to their side? Let us hear from the following: “If he intended to sprinkle before himself but sprinkled behind himself, behind himself but sprinkled before himself; his sprinkling is invalid. Before himself but sprinkled sideways, his sprinkling is valid.” This implies that those who stand to their side are included in the blessing. Rav Ḥisda said, it is necessary that the organizer be an Israel. Rav Ḥisda said, if there was one Cohen, he says “Cohen.” For two, he says “Cohanim.” But Rav Huna said, even for one he says “Cohanim” since he only calls the tribe, lest you say, probably person X is an adulterer or a murderer, and he shall bless us? The Holy, praise to Him, said: Who blesses you? Am not I blessing you? As it was said: “They shall put My name over the Children of Israel and I shall bless them.”

HALAKHAH: “A woman who said, accept my bill of divorce for me,” etc. Two say that she appointed in their presence and two say that in their presence he received and tore it. But if he agrees, the agent should be able to be added. Explain it, it he was a relative. This implies that a relative can act as agent.

As the following: Ganiba was lead out to be executed. He said, One should give money to Rebbi Abuna from the wine of Kefar Panaya. They did not give him; they were considering what Rav said, “an heir is like the buyer of encumbered property.” Just as a loan before witnesses cannot be collected from encumbered property, so it cannot be collected from heirs. If they did not give it as payment of a debt, they should have given as a gift! They were considering what Rebbi Eleazar said, for Rebbi Eleazar asked: Does his gift follow the rules of the gift of a sick person? Rebbi Ze‘ira brought Rebbi Isaac from Atosha who stated for him: A gift is like a bill of divorce. Rebbi Abba said to him, perhaps like bills of divorce which one cannot deliver if not delivered during his lifetime, so a gift is not called a gift if not delivered during his lifetime? He said to him, here comes the rabbi with sophistication to let Rebbi Abuna lose money! You cannot, for we have stated there: “Give a mina to X; then he died. One shall give after death.” Following Rebbi Simeon. For Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees, they should give him, as Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A loan before witnesses can be collected from the heirs on condition that they inherited real estate. Rebbi Yose said, that is, if somebody was with him until the moment of his death. But if he goes in and out, I am saying that already he gave him. The word of Rebbi Ḥanina implies that it was not given since Rebbi Ḥanina reported this fact: Levi Parisa was going from place to place when Ganiba’s relatives came to eat with him. He said, the money should be given to Rebbi Abuna; they started quarelling with him.

If it was doubtful whether he jumped or the wind pushed him? Let us hear from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if he fell down immediately, it is a bill of divorce; if he fell after some time it is no bill of divorce. But is “immediately” not a case of doubt whether he jumped or the wind pushed him? This implies that in case of doubt whether he jumped or the wind pushed him, it is a bill of divorce.

Another argument: “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden. Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, the practice follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said it never is a bill of divorce unless he declares at the moment of delivery: “This is your bill of divorce.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yannai: There is not even a hint of invalidity on her. Cahana said, this implies that they did not worry. If they did worry, might he not have said “you are permitted to any man” when it was still in her hand? Rebbi Aḥa said, this implies that they did worry. If they did not worry, could he not divorce by any power he has to divorce?

Rebbi Joḥanan said, the practice follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said it never is a bill of divorce unless he declares at the moment of delivery: “This is your bill of divorce.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yannai: There is not even a hint of invalidity on her. Cahana said, this implies that they did not worry. If they did worry, might he not have said “you are permitted to any man” when it was still in her hand? Rebbi Aḥa said, this implies that they did worry. If they did not worry, could he not divorce by any power he has to divorce?

HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.

The word of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya implies that Gentiles have no divorce, as Rebbi Ḥiyya stated in this matter: A Gentile who divorced his wife, who herself then went and married another, when the latter divorced her and then both of them converted, I do not read for them: “Her first husband who had divorced her cannot return to marry her.” It was stated in this matter: A case came before Rebbi and he approved.

“She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce,” as it is written: “He shall write her a bill of divorce.” “Or the husband’s death,” as it is written: “Or if the latter husband dies.” So far, if the latter one dies, [what about] the death of the former? Since the latter’s death releases her, even though his death does not cause a complete release, it is only logical that the former’s death should release her since his death will cause a complete release. Rebbi Ḥuna said, the verse implies that death releases, as it is written: “If brothers live together and one of them dies childless, etc.” Therefore, if he had a child, death releases. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if you would say that death does not release, how could we find a widow for a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah for a common priest? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, explain it for a sister-in-law.

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead. “If he definitively will substitute, if he himself will dissolve.” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority.

Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead. “If he definitively will substitute, if he himself will dissolve.” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority.

If she was preliminarily married with agreement but definitively married without agreement, may she eat heave? Rav said, she does eat; but Samuel said, she may not eat. Rebbi Mana said, Rav’s reason is that if she was preliminarily married with agreement, the permanence of the status quo implies the assumption that he definitively married her with agreement. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav’s reason is that by the earlier Mishnah, a preliminarily married daughter of an Israel may eat heave. What is the difference between them? Her earnings. According to Rebbi Mana, for Rav her earnings belong to her husband; according to Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, for Rav her earnings belong to her father. If she should die, who inherits from her? According to Rebbi Mana, for Rav her husband inherits; according to Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, for Rav her father inherits if she dies. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun stated, for Rav her husband inherits if she dies. If she was preliminarily married without agreement and definitively married without agreement, may she eat heave? Samuel said, she does eat. Come and see: If she was preliminarily married with agreement and definitively married without agreement, Samuel says that she may not eat; here he says she may eat? Samuel treats her as an orphan.

“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

“One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman, but Rebbi Simeon permits it.” That disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar in two respects. If during its lifetime, it disagrees following the rabbis; if after breaking the neck, it disagrees following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Explain it that it died. If he broke its neck, it is forbidden for usufruct, but Rebbi Simeon permits it. “Breaking the neck, breaking the neck.” Since “breaking the neck” mentioned there implies that one has to break its neck, bury it, and it is forbidden for usufruct, so “breaking of the neck” mentioned here implies that one has to break its neck, [bury it,] and it is forbidden for usufruct. Following Rebbi Eleazar it is understandable. He permits during its lifetime; he needs an argument to forbid it after the breaking of the neck. Following Rebbi Joḥanan it is difficult. If it is forbidden during its lifetime, not so much more after breaking of its neck? There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of the rabbis: It is needed following the rabbis, lest you say that since the Torah combined the breaking of its neck with its redemption, and its redemption makes it profane, so also the breaking of its neck should make it profane. Do we find anything whose lifting makes profane and which is forbidden for usufruct? They objected: There is ṭevel containing the tithe of the poor which becomes totally profane by its lifting; but Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna said in the name of Rebbi: A person eating produce which is ṭevel for the tithe of the poor is guilty of a deadly sin. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: So the rabbis answer Rebbi Simeon: Do we find anything that needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct? He replied to them: There is the first-born human who needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct.

“One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman, but Rebbi Simeon permits it.” That disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar in two respects. If during its lifetime, it disagrees following the rabbis; if after breaking the neck, it disagrees following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Explain it that it died. If he broke its neck, it is forbidden for usufruct, but Rebbi Simeon permits it. “Breaking the neck, breaking the neck.” Since “breaking the neck” mentioned there implies that one has to break its neck, bury it, and it is forbidden for usufruct, so “breaking of the neck” mentioned here implies that one has to break its neck, [bury it,] and it is forbidden for usufruct. Following Rebbi Eleazar it is understandable. He permits during its lifetime; he needs an argument to forbid it after the breaking of the neck. Following Rebbi Joḥanan it is difficult. If it is forbidden during its lifetime, not so much more after breaking of its neck? There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of the rabbis: It is needed following the rabbis, lest you say that since the Torah combined the breaking of its neck with its redemption, and its redemption makes it profane, so also the breaking of its neck should make it profane. Do we find anything whose lifting makes profane and which is forbidden for usufruct? They objected: There is ṭevel containing the tithe of the poor which becomes totally profane by its lifting; but Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna said in the name of Rebbi: A person eating produce which is ṭevel for the tithe of the poor is guilty of a deadly sin. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: So the rabbis answer Rebbi Simeon: Do we find anything that needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct? He replied to them: There is the first-born human who needs redemption and is permitted for usufruct.

Samuel said, in our poverty, she needs a bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the Mishnah [said], “after your levir has given you ḥalîṣah”; but if he said, “after your levir has died,” she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: A one-day-old girl can be preliminarily married by money; a girl of three years and one day can be preliminarily married by intercourse.” Rebbi Mana said, the Mishnah implies this: “Similarly, if somebody say to another, if your wife have a daughter, she shall be preliminarily married to me, he did not say anything,” because she does not exist. Therefore, if she does exist, she is preliminarily married.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody says to a woman,” etc. Rebbi Yossi said, it is reasonable that Rebbi Meïr not disagree in this case. Rebbi Mana said, the entire series implies that he disagrees. Since there, where they are all older and younger, you say that Rebbi Meïr disagrees, so here, where all are old compared to young or young compared to old, he certainly disagrees.

“It was stated in the name of Rebbi Meïr: It can happen that a man and a woman give birth to five nations. How is this? [A Gentile] had a male and a female slave who had children: these are Gentiles. If one of them became Jewish, one is a proselyte and one a Gentile. If their master converted and converted them as slaves, [any children] are slaves.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this implies that if a Gentile had intercourse with a slave girl, the child is a slave. “If he manumitted the slave girl and she had a son, the child is a bastard. If afterwards he manumitted the slave and he begat a child, he is a freed slave.” “It can happen that a man sells his father to pay his mother’s ketubah. How is this? Somebody has a male and a female slave and they have a son. He manumitted the female slave, married her, and willed all his property to her son. That is one who sells his father to pay his mother’s ketubah.”

Rav Huna said that in the days of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah they tried to include them. Rebbi Abbahu inverts the wording: In the days of Rebbi Eleazar they said, who could purify the altar’s part? That implies that Joshua excluded them. He excluded them only as disqualified for marriage. If you would say, disqualified (because of sins) then the rapist of a Gibeonite girl should not have to pay the fine, but we have stated: The rapist of a Gibeonite girl has to pay the fine.” Rebbi Eleazar said, he cursed them as a snake, as it is said: “But now you are cursed.” And it is written: “The people of Israel said to the Ḥiwwite.” But were they Ḥiwwites? They acted like the snake which said, I know that the Holy One, praise to Him, did say “because on the day you eat from it, you will die a death.” I shall go and trick them so that they eat and will be punished and I shall inherit the earth for myself. So these people acted; they said, we know that the Holy One, praise to Him, said to Israel: “You shall certainly ban them, the Hittite, the Emorite, and the Perizite, as the Eternal, your God, has commanded you” And it is written: “You shall not conclude a covenant with them.” We shall go and trick them that they conclude a covenant with us. As you take it, if they kill us, they violate their oath. If they let us live, they violated the [divine] decision. In any case, they will be punished and we shall inherit the Land.

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that a family in the South had a bad reputation. Rebbi sent Romanus to investigate them. He investigated and found that a grandmother had been converted at less than three years and a day of age, and he declared them fit for the priesthood. Rav Hoshaia said, he declared them fit following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, here it is everybody’s opinion since Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Ada bar Ahava, Rebbi Judan brings it in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The child of an adult is fit since it is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. (Lev. 21:13) “But he shall take a wife in her virginity.” Any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment is a positive commandment. Analogously, (Lev. 21:14) “only a virgin from amidst his people he shall take as wife,” not a proselyte. Is any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment a positive commandment? Rebbi Hoshaia objected: But the second generation of an Egyptian is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment! Rebbi Hoshaia turned around and said, a positive commandment for Israel cannot be compared to a positive commandment for Cohanim. A positive commandment for Israel implies a prohibition for everybody. A positive commandment for Cohanim implies a prohibition for Cohanim but a permission for Levites and Israel.

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It happened that a family in the South had a bad reputation. Rebbi sent Romanus to investigate them. He investigated and found that a grandmother had been converted at less than three years and a day of age, and he declared them fit for the priesthood. Rav Hoshaia said, he declared them fit following Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, here it is everybody’s opinion since Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Ada bar Ahava, Rebbi Judan brings it in the name of Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The child of an adult is fit since it is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment. (Lev. 21:13) “But he shall take a wife in her virginity.” Any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment is a positive commandment. Analogously, (Lev. 21:14) “only a virgin from amidst his people he shall take as wife,” not a proselyte. Is any prohibition deduced from a positive commandment a positive commandment? Rebbi Hoshaia objected: But the second generation of an Egyptian is a prohibition deduced from a positive commandment! Rebbi Hoshaia turned around and said, a positive commandment for Israel cannot be compared to a positive commandment for Cohanim. A positive commandment for Israel implies a prohibition for everybody. A positive commandment for Cohanim implies a prohibition for Cohanim but a permission for Levites and Israel.

HALAKHAH: “How is the tooth notorious,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it refers to the first part. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it refers to all. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted. There, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is responsible. And here, he says so? They said, there in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia; but here, in his own name. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, is it free [from payment]. Rebbi Joḥanan’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is obligated. Not only if the walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down or one which is lying down kicks the walking one. If a walking [animal] kicks a walking one? Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is free [from payment]. But in the case of one lying down against one walking or one who was walking against one walking, it is obligated. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: It always is free. What is Rebbi Hoshaia’s reason; is there no “horn” in the public domain? Rav said, if it stood still and ate from heaped produce, [it is obligated]. Since the leniency for “tooth” is in case it ate walking from the standing; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the one standing still. Ilfai said: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is obligated. Since the leniency for “tooth” is that it ate walking {from the standing} [from the walking]; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the walking one.

HALAKHAH: “How is the tooth notorious,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it refers to the first part. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it refers to all. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted. There, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is responsible. And here, he says so? They said, there in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia; but here, in his own name. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, is it free [from payment]. Rebbi Joḥanan’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is obligated. Not only if the walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down or one which is lying down kicks the walking one. If a walking [animal] kicks a walking one? Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is free [from payment]. But in the case of one lying down against one walking or one who was walking against one walking, it is obligated. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: It always is free. What is Rebbi Hoshaia’s reason; is there no “horn” in the public domain? Rav said, if it stood still and ate from heaped produce, [it is obligated]. Since the leniency for “tooth” is in case it ate walking from the standing; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the one standing still. Ilfai said: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is obligated. Since the leniency for “tooth” is that it ate walking {from the standing} [from the walking]; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the walking one.

Rebbi Joḥanan said: A person put down a stone and his load in the public domain, a second person stumbled over it while he held a flask in his hand. Whether he stumbled over the stone and hit the ground or hit the stone and stumbled over the ground, [the first] has to pay damages to the person but is free from damages to the flask. The statement of Rebbi Joḥanan implies that for “pit” damages one is free from damages to vessels. But if he hit it in walking, he has to pay even for the flask.

HALAKHAH: “He who pours out water in the public domain,” etc. Rav Huna said, when he was falling to the ground. But if his garments were dirtied, one is liable. Rav said, even if his garments were dirtied, he is not liable. The word of Rav implies one is not liable for ‘pit’ damages of vessels.

Ḥizqiah said, only if he turned it over to acquire. The word of Ḥizqiah implies that movables can be acquired by turning them over. But could they be acquired by dragging? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, this is reasonable for pillars and hard hides. But soft hides one does not acquire unless one lifts them up.

Abba bar Rab Huna said: This implies that somebody who hit another person’s animal which as a consequence went and did damage is responsible for the damage caused.

HALAKHAH: “A bull gored a cow”, etc. Do all cows have miscarriages? Should we follow the majority of cases? This implies that in criminal cases and in money matters one does not apply a majority argument. Rebbi Yose said, in another case they applied a majority argument in criminal cases and in money matters, as Rebbi Aḥa stated: “If a camel was in heat among camels and one finds one of them dead, I am saying that certainly the one in heat killed it.”

HALAKHAH: “If a potter put his pots,” etc. If he put his pots in a private courtyard without permission and a bull came from another place and broke them, he is not liable. If it was hurt by them, he is not liable. This implies that ‘horn’ is not liable in a courtyard which belongs to neither party.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody put his produce in a private courtyard,” etc. If he put his produce in a private courtyard without permission and a bull came from another place and ate them, he is not liable. If it was hurt by them, he is not liable. This implies that the ‘tooth’ is not liable in a courtyard which belongs to neither party.

Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: Practice follows Rebbi. Rav Ze‘ira said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Jeremiah said, everybody agrees that in a house, if he tells him, “put it in,” [he implies] “and I shall watch it.” Everybody agrees that on a field, if he tells him, “put it in,” [he implies] “and you watch it.” Where do they disagree? In a courtyard. Rebbi says, a courtyard is like a field, but the Sages say, a courtyard is like a house. There, we have stated: If somebody assembles sheaves in another person’s field without permission.” [R. Isaac said,] sheaves on a field are like vessels in a house? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by one which has a lock.

Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: Practice follows Rebbi. Rav Ze‘ira said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Jeremiah said, everybody agrees that in a house, if he tells him, “put it in,” [he implies] “and I shall watch it.” Everybody agrees that on a field, if he tells him, “put it in,” [he implies] “and you watch it.” Where do they disagree? In a courtyard. Rebbi says, a courtyard is like a field, but the Sages say, a courtyard is like a house. There, we have stated: If somebody assembles sheaves in another person’s field without permission.” [R. Isaac said,] sheaves on a field are like vessels in a house? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by one which has a lock.

HALAKHAH: “A person convicted of theft on the testimony of two witnesses,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this implies that a perjured witness is not disqualified by the court but is disqualified by himself. Explain it by warning, as it was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, when has this been said? For two testimonies with two warnings. But for one testimony and one warning any testimony which is partially disqualified is totally disqualified.” What does it mean that if it is partially disqualified it is totally disqualified? If they were standing and testifying against him on then tenth of Nisan that he had stolen an ox on the first of Nisan. He slaughtered or sold on the tenth of Nisan. They were shown to be perjured on the fifteenth of Nisan. Any testimony which they delivered between the tenth and the fifteenth of Nisan is retroactively disqualified. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, explain it if they deliver their testimony in one group and you cannot infer anything, as we have stated: “They were the first and they were the later [witnesses]. If they were shown to be perjured at first, there is nothing. At the second time, there is one testimony. At the third time, there are two testimonies.” And how is that if they give testimony in one group, you cannot infer anything? It comes only based on multiple testimony.

Rebbi Justus ben Rebbi Matton asked: If somebody redeems a string of dry figs from the Temple treasurer, does it become ṭevel for tithes? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked: Did we not state about him who “stole, dedicated it, and afterwards slaughtered or sold”? As you say there, the one who dedicates is not like a seller, so one who redeems is not like a buyer. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implies that selling is like redeeming. They said, he has the choice of redeeming and eating it.