invalidate

These are the shreds which invalidate circumcision: flesh that covers the greater part of the corona; and he may not eat terumah. And if he is chubby, he must repair it for appearance sake. If one circumcises but does not uncover the circumcision, it is as though he has not circumcised.

A woman whose husband had gone to a country beyond the sea and they came and told her, “Your husband died”, married, and then her husband returned: She must leave this one and that one, and she also requires a get from this one and that one. She has no ketubah, no usufruct, no support money or worn clothes, neither from this one nor from that one. If she has taken anything from this one or that one, she must return it. The child from this one or that one is a mamzer. Neither this one nor that one may impurify himself for her. Neither this one and that one has a claim to whatever she may find, nor what she makes with her hands, nor to invalidate her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israelite, she becomes disqualified from marrying a priest; if the daughter of a Levite, from the eating of tithe; and if the daughter of a priest, from the eating of terumah. Neither the heirs of this one nor the heirs of that one are entitled to inherit her ketubah. And if [the husbands] die, the brother of the one and the brother of the other must perform halitzah, but may not contract yibbum. Rabbi Yose said: her ketubah remains a charge upon the estate of her first husband. Rabbi Elazar said: the first husband is entitled to whatever she may find, and what she makes with her hands, and also has the right to invalidate her vows. Rabbi Shimon said: intercourse or halitzah with the brother of the first husband exempts her rival, and the child from him is not a bastard. If she married without an authorization, she may return to him.

A woman whose husband had gone to a country beyond the sea and they came and told her, “Your husband died”, married, and then her husband returned: She must leave this one and that one, and she also requires a get from this one and that one. She has no ketubah, no usufruct, no support money or worn clothes, neither from this one nor from that one. If she has taken anything from this one or that one, she must return it. The child from this one or that one is a mamzer. Neither this one nor that one may impurify himself for her. Neither this one and that one has a claim to whatever she may find, nor what she makes with her hands, nor to invalidate her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israelite, she becomes disqualified from marrying a priest; if the daughter of a Levite, from the eating of tithe; and if the daughter of a priest, from the eating of terumah. Neither the heirs of this one nor the heirs of that one are entitled to inherit her ketubah. And if [the husbands] die, the brother of the one and the brother of the other must perform halitzah, but may not contract yibbum. Rabbi Yose said: her ketubah remains a charge upon the estate of her first husband. Rabbi Elazar said: the first husband is entitled to whatever she may find, and what she makes with her hands, and also has the right to invalidate her vows. Rabbi Shimon said: intercourse or halitzah with the brother of the first husband exempts her rival, and the child from him is not a bastard. If she married without an authorization, she may return to him.

If the get was dated by an unfit kingship, by the empire of Medea, by the empire of Greece, by the building of the Temple or by the destruction of the Temple, Or if being in the east he wrote “in the west”, or being in the west he wrote “in the east”, She must leave this one and that one, and she also requires a get from this one and that one. She has no ketubah, no usufruct, no support money or worn clothes, neither from this one nor from that one. If she has taken anything from this one or that one, she must return it. The child from this one or that one is a mamzer. Neither this one nor that one may impurify himself for her. Neither this one and that one has a claim to whatever she may find, nor what she makes with her hands, nor to invalidate her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israelite, she becomes disqualified from marrying a priest; if the daughter of a Levite, from the eating of tithe; and if the daughter of a priest, from the eating of terumah. Neither the heirs of this one nor the heirs of that one are entitled to inherit her ketubah. And if [the husbands] die, the brother of the one and the brother of the other must perform halitzah, but may not contract yibbum. If his name or her name or the name of his town or the name of her town was wrongly given, she must leave both husbands and all the above consequences apply to her.

Cases concerning property [are decided] by three [judges]. This [litigant] chooses one and this [litigant] chooses one and then the two of them choose another, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “The two judges choose the other judge.” This [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, and this [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid and experts, he cannot invalidate them. This [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses and this [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid, he cannot invalidate them.

Cases concerning property [are decided] by three [judges]. This [litigant] chooses one and this [litigant] chooses one and then the two of them choose another, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “The two judges choose the other judge.” This [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, and this [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid and experts, he cannot invalidate them. This [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses and this [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid, he cannot invalidate them.

Cases concerning property [are decided] by three [judges]. This [litigant] chooses one and this [litigant] chooses one and then the two of them choose another, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “The two judges choose the other judge.” This [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, and this [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid and experts, he cannot invalidate them. This [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses and this [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid, he cannot invalidate them.

Cases concerning property [are decided] by three [judges]. This [litigant] chooses one and this [litigant] chooses one and then the two of them choose another, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “The two judges choose the other judge.” This [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, and this [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid and experts, he cannot invalidate them. This [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses and this [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid, he cannot invalidate them.

Cases concerning property [are decided] by three [judges]. This [litigant] chooses one and this [litigant] chooses one and then the two of them choose another, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “The two judges choose the other judge.” This [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, and this [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid and experts, he cannot invalidate them. This [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses and this [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid, he cannot invalidate them.

Cases concerning property [are decided] by three [judges]. This [litigant] chooses one and this [litigant] chooses one and then the two of them choose another, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “The two judges choose the other judge.” This [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, and this [litigant] can invalidate this one’s judge, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid and experts, he cannot invalidate them. This [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses and this [litigant] may invalidate this one’s witnesses, according to Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say: “When is this so? When they bring proof against them that they are relatives or otherwise invalid; but if they are valid, he cannot invalidate them.

All unfit persons who slaughtered, their slaughtering is valid, for slaughtering is valid [even when performed] by non-priests, and by women, and by slaves, and by the unclean, even in the case of most-holy sacrifices, provided that unclean [persons] do not touch the flesh. Therefore they invalidate [the sacrifice] by an [illegitimate] intention. And in all of these cases, if they received the blood [in order to eat the sacrifice] after the prescribed time, or outside of the prescribed place, if there remains [in the animal] life-blood, a fit person should go back and receive the blood.

Which is the place [for the offering] of the sacrifices? Most holy sacrifices are slaughtered on the north [side of the altar]. The bullock and the goat of Yom Kippur are [done] at the north, and the receiving of their blood is [performed] with ministering vessels at the north, and their blood requires sprinkling between the poles [of the ark], on the curtain, and on the golden altar. [The omission of] a single application of [the blood] invalidates [them]. He [the priest] would pour out the remainders of the blood on the western base of the outer altar, but if he did not pour it out, he did not invalidate [the sacrifice].

As for the bullocks which were burnt and the goats which were burnt, their slaughtering is [done] at the north, and the reception of their blood is [done] at the north, and their blood requires sprinkling on the veil, and on the golden altar; [The omission of] a single one of these applications invalidates [the sacrifice]. He [the priest] pours the remainder of the blood on the western base of the altar; but if he did not pour it out, he did not invalidate [the sacrifice]. Both of these were burnt at the ash pit.

Regarding the seven branches of the menorah, the [absence of] one invalidates the others. Regarding the seven lamps on it, the [absence of] one invalidates the others. Regarding the two portions of Scripture in the mezuzah, the [absence of] one invalidates the other; indeed even one letter can invalidate the whole. Regarding the four portions of Scripture in the tefillin, the [absence of] one invalidates the others; indeed even one letter can invalidate the whole. Regarding the four fringes, the [absence of] one invalidates the others, since the four together form one mitzvah. Rabbi Ishmael says: the four are four separate mitzvot.

Regarding the seven branches of the menorah, the [absence of] one invalidates the others. Regarding the seven lamps on it, the [absence of] one invalidates the others. Regarding the two portions of Scripture in the mezuzah, the [absence of] one invalidates the other; indeed even one letter can invalidate the whole. Regarding the four portions of Scripture in the tefillin, the [absence of] one invalidates the others; indeed even one letter can invalidate the whole. Regarding the four fringes, the [absence of] one invalidates the others, since the four together form one mitzvah. Rabbi Ishmael says: the four are four separate mitzvot.

The [absence of the] blue [in the tzitzit] does not invalidate the white, neither does the [absence of the] white invalidate the blue. The [absence of the] hand-tefillin does not invalidate the head-tefillin, neither does the [absence of the] head-tefillin invalidate the hand-tefillin. The [absence of the] fine flour and the oil does not invalidate the wine, neither does the [absence of the] wine invalidate them. The [omission of one of the] sprinklings [of the blood] on the outer altar does not invalidate the rest.

The [absence of the] blue [in the tzitzit] does not invalidate the white, neither does the [absence of the] white invalidate the blue. The [absence of the] hand-tefillin does not invalidate the head-tefillin, neither does the [absence of the] head-tefillin invalidate the hand-tefillin. The [absence of the] fine flour and the oil does not invalidate the wine, neither does the [absence of the] wine invalidate them. The [omission of one of the] sprinklings [of the blood] on the outer altar does not invalidate the rest.

The [absence of the] blue [in the tzitzit] does not invalidate the white, neither does the [absence of the] white invalidate the blue. The [absence of the] hand-tefillin does not invalidate the head-tefillin, neither does the [absence of the] head-tefillin invalidate the hand-tefillin. The [absence of the] fine flour and the oil does not invalidate the wine, neither does the [absence of the] wine invalidate them. The [omission of one of the] sprinklings [of the blood] on the outer altar does not invalidate the rest.

The [absence of the] blue [in the tzitzit] does not invalidate the white, neither does the [absence of the] white invalidate the blue. The [absence of the] hand-tefillin does not invalidate the head-tefillin, neither does the [absence of the] head-tefillin invalidate the hand-tefillin. The [absence of the] fine flour and the oil does not invalidate the wine, neither does the [absence of the] wine invalidate them. The [omission of one of the] sprinklings [of the blood] on the outer altar does not invalidate the rest.

The [absence of the] blue [in the tzitzit] does not invalidate the white, neither does the [absence of the] white invalidate the blue. The [absence of the] hand-tefillin does not invalidate the head-tefillin, neither does the [absence of the] head-tefillin invalidate the hand-tefillin. The [absence of the] fine flour and the oil does not invalidate the wine, neither does the [absence of the] wine invalidate them. The [omission of one of the] sprinklings [of the blood] on the outer altar does not invalidate the rest.

The [absence of the] blue [in the tzitzit] does not invalidate the white, neither does the [absence of the] white invalidate the blue. The [absence of the] hand-tefillin does not invalidate the head-tefillin, neither does the [absence of the] head-tefillin invalidate the hand-tefillin. The [absence of the] fine flour and the oil does not invalidate the wine, neither does the [absence of the] wine invalidate them. The [omission of one of the] sprinklings [of the blood] on the outer altar does not invalidate the rest.

The [absence of the] blue [in the tzitzit] does not invalidate the white, neither does the [absence of the] white invalidate the blue. The [absence of the] hand-tefillin does not invalidate the head-tefillin, neither does the [absence of the] head-tefillin invalidate the hand-tefillin. The [absence of the] fine flour and the oil does not invalidate the wine, neither does the [absence of the] wine invalidate them. The [omission of one of the] sprinklings [of the blood] on the outer altar does not invalidate the rest.

The [absence of either the] bullocks or the rams or the lambs does not invalidate the others. Rabbi Shimon says: if they had [money enough to buy] many bullocks but not [enough for] the drink-offerings, they should bring one bullock and its drink-offerings and should not offer them all without drink-offerings.

The [absence of the] bull, or the rams, or the lambs or the goat does not invalidate the bread, neither does the [absence of the] bread invalidate them. The [absence of the] bread invalidates the lambs, but the [absence of the] lambs does not invalidate the bread, the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Shimon b. Nanas said: it is not so, but rather the [absence of the] lambs invalidates the bread, while the [absence of the] bread does not invalidate the lambs; for so we find that when the Israelites were in the wilderness for forty years they offered the lambs without the bread, therefore now too they may offer the lambs without the bread. Rabbi Shimon said: the halakhah is according to the words of Ben Nanas but not for the reason he stated; for every offering stated in the Book of Numbers was offered in the wilderness, but not every offering stated in the book of Leviticus was offered in the wilderness; however, when they came into the land of Israel they offered both kinds. Why then do I say that the lambs may be offered without the bread? Because the lambs render themselves permissible without the bread, whereas bread without lambs, there is nothing that renders it permissible.

The [absence of the] bull, or the rams, or the lambs or the goat does not invalidate the bread, neither does the [absence of the] bread invalidate them. The [absence of the] bread invalidates the lambs, but the [absence of the] lambs does not invalidate the bread, the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Shimon b. Nanas said: it is not so, but rather the [absence of the] lambs invalidates the bread, while the [absence of the] bread does not invalidate the lambs; for so we find that when the Israelites were in the wilderness for forty years they offered the lambs without the bread, therefore now too they may offer the lambs without the bread. Rabbi Shimon said: the halakhah is according to the words of Ben Nanas but not for the reason he stated; for every offering stated in the Book of Numbers was offered in the wilderness, but not every offering stated in the book of Leviticus was offered in the wilderness; however, when they came into the land of Israel they offered both kinds. Why then do I say that the lambs may be offered without the bread? Because the lambs render themselves permissible without the bread, whereas bread without lambs, there is nothing that renders it permissible.

The [absence of the] bull, or the rams, or the lambs or the goat does not invalidate the bread, neither does the [absence of the] bread invalidate them. The [absence of the] bread invalidates the lambs, but the [absence of the] lambs does not invalidate the bread, the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Shimon b. Nanas said: it is not so, but rather the [absence of the] lambs invalidates the bread, while the [absence of the] bread does not invalidate the lambs; for so we find that when the Israelites were in the wilderness for forty years they offered the lambs without the bread, therefore now too they may offer the lambs without the bread. Rabbi Shimon said: the halakhah is according to the words of Ben Nanas but not for the reason he stated; for every offering stated in the Book of Numbers was offered in the wilderness, but not every offering stated in the book of Leviticus was offered in the wilderness; however, when they came into the land of Israel they offered both kinds. Why then do I say that the lambs may be offered without the bread? Because the lambs render themselves permissible without the bread, whereas bread without lambs, there is nothing that renders it permissible.

The [absence of the] bull, or the rams, or the lambs or the goat does not invalidate the bread, neither does the [absence of the] bread invalidate them. The [absence of the] bread invalidates the lambs, but the [absence of the] lambs does not invalidate the bread, the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Shimon b. Nanas said: it is not so, but rather the [absence of the] lambs invalidates the bread, while the [absence of the] bread does not invalidate the lambs; for so we find that when the Israelites were in the wilderness for forty years they offered the lambs without the bread, therefore now too they may offer the lambs without the bread. Rabbi Shimon said: the halakhah is according to the words of Ben Nanas but not for the reason he stated; for every offering stated in the Book of Numbers was offered in the wilderness, but not every offering stated in the book of Leviticus was offered in the wilderness; however, when they came into the land of Israel they offered both kinds. Why then do I say that the lambs may be offered without the bread? Because the lambs render themselves permissible without the bread, whereas bread without lambs, there is nothing that renders it permissible.

The [absence of the] daily offerings (tamidin) does not invalidate the additional offerings (musafin), neither does [the absence of] the additional offerings invalidate the daily offerings, neither does the absence of [one of the] additional offerings invalidate the other additional offerings. Even though they did not offer the [tamid] lamb in the morning they must offer [the lamb] towards evening. Rabbi Shimon said: When is this so? Only when they had acted under constraint or in error, but if they acted deliberately and did not offer the lamb in the morning they may not offer [the lamb] towards evening. If they did not burn the incense in the morning they burn it towards evening. Rabbi Shimon said: all of it was burned towards evening. For the golden altar was dedicated only by the incense of spices. And the altar for the olah by the daily offering of the morning, And the table only by the showbread on Shabbat, And the menorah only by [the kindling of] seven lamps towards evening.

The [absence of the] daily offerings (tamidin) does not invalidate the additional offerings (musafin), neither does [the absence of] the additional offerings invalidate the daily offerings, neither does the absence of [one of the] additional offerings invalidate the other additional offerings. Even though they did not offer the [tamid] lamb in the morning they must offer [the lamb] towards evening. Rabbi Shimon said: When is this so? Only when they had acted under constraint or in error, but if they acted deliberately and did not offer the lamb in the morning they may not offer [the lamb] towards evening. If they did not burn the incense in the morning they burn it towards evening. Rabbi Shimon said: all of it was burned towards evening. For the golden altar was dedicated only by the incense of spices. And the altar for the olah by the daily offering of the morning, And the table only by the showbread on Shabbat, And the menorah only by [the kindling of] seven lamps towards evening.

The [absence of the] daily offerings (tamidin) does not invalidate the additional offerings (musafin), neither does [the absence of] the additional offerings invalidate the daily offerings, neither does the absence of [one of the] additional offerings invalidate the other additional offerings. Even though they did not offer the [tamid] lamb in the morning they must offer [the lamb] towards evening. Rabbi Shimon said: When is this so? Only when they had acted under constraint or in error, but if they acted deliberately and did not offer the lamb in the morning they may not offer [the lamb] towards evening. If they did not burn the incense in the morning they burn it towards evening. Rabbi Shimon said: all of it was burned towards evening. For the golden altar was dedicated only by the incense of spices. And the altar for the olah by the daily offering of the morning, And the table only by the showbread on Shabbat, And the menorah only by [the kindling of] seven lamps towards evening.

If the horns or the hoofs of the [red] cow are black they are chopped off. The eye ball, the teeth and the tongue cause do not invalidate the [red] cow. One that is dwarf-like is valid. If there was on it an extra digit and it was cut off: Rabbi Judah says that it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon says: wherever, if removed, no red hair grows in its place is it invalid.

If he burned it without wood, or with any kind of wood, and even if only with straw or stubble, it is valid. If he flayed it and cut up, it is valid. If he slaughtered it with the intention of eating its flesh or drinking its blood, it is valid. Rabbi Eliezer rules: no intention can invalidate the red cow.

All that require immersion in water according to the words of the scribes defile consecrated things and invalidate terumah to be unfit, but they are permitted to unconsecrated food and second tithe, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages forbid second tithe. After immersion [but before the sun sets] he is permitted to all these. And if he entered the sanctuary, whether before or after his immersion, he incurs no guilt.

In the case of a trough in a rock: One may not fill up [the hatat waters] from it, nor may the [hatat waters] be consecrated in it, nor may one sprinkle from it. And it does not require a tightly stopped-up covering, And it does not invalidate the mikveh. If it was a vessel and had been joined to the ground with lime: One may fill up the hatat waters from it and the hatat waters may be consecrated in it, and one may sprinkle from it, And it requires a tightly stopped-up covering; And it invalidates the mikveh invalid. If a hole was made in it below or at the side so that it could not contain water in however small a quantity, it is valid. And how large must the hole be? Like the tube of a water-skin. Rabbi Yehudah ben Batera said: it happened in the case of the trough of Yehu in Jerusalem that there was a hole in it like the tube of a water-skin, all the pure things in Jerusalem were made using it. But Bet Shammai sent and broke it down, for Bet Shammai say: [it remains a vessel] unless the greater part of it is broken down.

These invalidate the mikveh and do not raise it up to [the required quantity]: Drawn water, whether clean or unclean, water that has been used for pickling or for boiling, and grape-skin wine before it becomes vinegar. How do they make the mikveh invalid and do not raise it up [the required quantity]? If a mikveh contained forty seahs less a kortov, and a kortov of these fell into it, it does not raise it up [the required quantity]; And if there were three logs of any of these, they would invalidate the mikveh. But other liquids, and the juice of fruits, brine, and liquid in which fish has been pickled, and grape-skin wine that has fermented sometimes raise it up to [the required quantity] and sometimes do not raise it up. How so? If a mikveh contained forty seahs less one, and a seah of any of these fell in it, it does not raise it up to [the required quantity]. But if the mikveh contained forty seahs and a se'ah of any of these was put in and one seah was removed, the mikveh is still valid.

These invalidate the mikveh and do not raise it up to [the required quantity]: Drawn water, whether clean or unclean, water that has been used for pickling or for boiling, and grape-skin wine before it becomes vinegar. How do they make the mikveh invalid and do not raise it up [the required quantity]? If a mikveh contained forty seahs less a kortov, and a kortov of these fell into it, it does not raise it up [the required quantity]; And if there were three logs of any of these, they would invalidate the mikveh. But other liquids, and the juice of fruits, brine, and liquid in which fish has been pickled, and grape-skin wine that has fermented sometimes raise it up to [the required quantity] and sometimes do not raise it up. How so? If a mikveh contained forty seahs less one, and a seah of any of these fell in it, it does not raise it up to [the required quantity]. But if the mikveh contained forty seahs and a se'ah of any of these was put in and one seah was removed, the mikveh is still valid.

So we find that Rebbi Meïr disagreed with the Sages and did not act upon his opinion. We have stated: One rubs olentia on a sick person on the Sabbath; but only if it was mixed with oil and wine before Sabbath eve. But if he did not mix it before Sabbath eve it is forbidden. We have stated: Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said: Rebbi Meïr did allow to mix wine and oil and to rub it onto a sick persion on Sabbath. When he fell sick, we wanted to prepare the same for him but he did not let us do it. We said to him: Our teacher, are you going to invalidate your words when your life is in danger? He said to us: even though I am lenient for others, I am stringent for myself because my colleagues disagree with me.

A forgotten flask deposited in a litter, a chest, or a chassis that later was found is forbidden. If he checked and afterwards put it in it is permitted. A case came before Rebbi, where it was seen uncovering and covering. He said, because of that evil one should we invalidate all covers? Rebbi Mana said, it is reasonable that in that case itself was forbidden.

“Afterwine before it fermented cannot be bought with tithe money and invalidates a miqweh; after it fermented it may be bought with tithe money and does not invalidate a miqweh.” Our Mishnah follows Rebbi Jehudah as we have stated there: “If someone makes after-wine and pours in a measured amount of water, if he found the same amount he is free. Rebbi Jehudah declares him obligated.” Rebbi Abbahu said, sometimes in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, sometimes in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if it fermented. Rebbi Yose said, it is the opinion of everybody since even salt water may be bought with tithe money.

And who permitted it? Rebbi and his court permitted it. At three places is Rebbi Jehudah the Prince called “our teachers,” in divorce documents, oil, and a sole. They should have called him “a permissive court”, for any court which permits three [previously forbidden] things is called “permissive court.” Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ismael said, his court disagreed with him about bills of divorce.Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Did we not state, “for no court may invalidate the words of another court unless it be greater in wisdom and numbers”? And Rebbi and his court permit what Daniel and his companions forbade? Rebbi Joḥanan follows his own opinion, for Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Ṣadoq, I have a tradition that any restrictive edict passed by a court which is not accepted by the majority of the public is not an edict. They checked and found in the matter of the edict about oil and did not find that a majority of the public followed it.

Samuel said, they taught this only about the eighteen. Therefore, other than the eighteen even a lesser [court] may abolish. They objected, is there not the Sabbatical year? This is not of the eighteen items, and Rebbi Joḥanan (said it) and asked about it. Rebbi Krispedai in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rabban Gamliel and his court abolished the prohibitions of the first two terms. Rebbi (Jonathan) [Joḥanan] asked. Did we not state, “for no court may invalidate the words of another court unless it be greater in wisdom and numbers”? There came Rav Abun, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: they taught this only about other [decrees] than the eighteen. Therefore, the eighteen even a greater one cannot abolish, because they fought for it with their lives. Rebbi Mana said, this makes it reasonable that it is not so; since this is a case of force it is invalid. They objected, is there not oil which is of the eighteen? And Rebbi (Jonathan) [Joḥanan] objected! Rav Cahana the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba; Rebbi Aḥa bent it in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Oil, they abolished what was abolished.

It was stated: One rubs olentia on a sick person on the Sabbath; but only if it was mixed with oil and wine before Sabbath eve. But if he did not mix it before Sabbath eve it is forbidden. It was stated: Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said: Rebbi Meїr did allow to mix wine and oil and to rub it onto a sick person on Sabbath. When he fell sick, we wanted to prepare the same for him but he did not let us do it. We said to him: Our teacher, are you going to invalidate your words when your life is in danger? He said to them: even though I did say so, I never intended to transgress the words of my colleagues.

If he finished he can return only for fibers which would invalidate the circumcision. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose, even if he finished he may even return for fibers which do not invalidate the circumcision. Which [statement of] Rebbi Yose? That which we stated there: “Rebbi Yose says, if the first day of Tabernacles falls on a Sabbath, if he forgot and took the lulav out into the public domain he is not liable because he took it out with permission.” Does the same hold for a knife for circumcision, the same for (circumcision) [unleavened bread]? Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose, even if he finished he may even return for fibers which do not invalidate the circumcision, this implies the same even for a knife for circumcision, the same for (circumcision) [unleavened bread].

If he finished he can return only for fibers which would invalidate the circumcision. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose, even if he finished he may even return for fibers which do not invalidate the circumcision. Which [statement of] Rebbi Yose? That which we stated there: “Rebbi Yose says, if the first day of Tabernacles falls on a Sabbath, if he forgot and took the lulav out into the public domain he is not liable because he took it out with permission.” Does the same hold for a knife for circumcision, the same for (circumcision) [unleavened bread]? Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose, even if he finished he may even return for fibers which do not invalidate the circumcision, this implies the same even for a knife for circumcision, the same for (circumcision) [unleavened bread].

If he finished he can return only for fibers which would invalidate the circumcision. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose, even if he finished he may even return for fibers which do not invalidate the circumcision. Which [statement of] Rebbi Yose? That which we stated there: “Rebbi Yose says, if the first day of Tabernacles falls on a Sabbath, if he forgot and took the lulav out into the public domain he is not liable because he took it out with permission.” Does the same hold for a knife for circumcision, the same for (circumcision) [unleavened bread]? Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose, even if he finished he may even return for fibers which do not invalidate the circumcision, this implies the same even for a knife for circumcision, the same for (circumcision) [unleavened bread].

MISHNAH: The following are the fibers which invalidate a circumcision: the flesh which covers most of the corona; then he could not eat heave. If he was fat one corrects him because of the bad impression. If he circumcised but did not uncover the circumcision it is as if he did not circumcise.

HALAKHAH: “The following are the fibers which invalidate a circumcision.” Rebbi Avuna in the name of Rav Jeremiah: If it covers most of the height of the corona. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, if it covers most of the top of the corona. Rebbi Tebi in the name of Samuel: One checks at the time of an erection.

“If he circumcised but did not uncover the circumcision it is as if he did not circumcise.” It was stated: He is subject to divine extirpation. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: That is to say if there is no time left [in the day] to correct it. But if there is time left [in the day] to correct, he corrects without hesitation. It was stated: As long as he is occupied with the circumcision, he may return both to fibers which invalidate the circumcision as also to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Once he has stopped, he may return only to fibers which invalidate the circumcision. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Which [statement of] Rebbi Yose? That which we had stated there: “Rebbi Yose said, if the first day of Tabernacles falls on a Sabbath and somebody forgot [that it was the Sabbath] and took the palm branch into the public domain he is not liable since he took it out with permission.” Is it the same for the knife of circumcision, for a mazzah? Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision, that means the same holds for the knife of circumcision, for a mazzah.

“If he circumcised but did not uncover the circumcision it is as if he did not circumcise.” It was stated: He is subject to divine extirpation. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: That is to say if there is no time left [in the day] to correct it. But if there is time left [in the day] to correct, he corrects without hesitation. It was stated: As long as he is occupied with the circumcision, he may return both to fibers which invalidate the circumcision as also to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Once he has stopped, he may return only to fibers which invalidate the circumcision. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Which [statement of] Rebbi Yose? That which we had stated there: “Rebbi Yose said, if the first day of Tabernacles falls on a Sabbath and somebody forgot [that it was the Sabbath] and took the palm branch into the public domain he is not liable since he took it out with permission.” Is it the same for the knife of circumcision, for a mazzah? Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision, that means the same holds for the knife of circumcision, for a mazzah.

“If he circumcised but did not uncover the circumcision it is as if he did not circumcise.” It was stated: He is subject to divine extirpation. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: That is to say if there is no time left [in the day] to correct it. But if there is time left [in the day] to correct, he corrects without hesitation. It was stated: As long as he is occupied with the circumcision, he may return both to fibers which invalidate the circumcision as also to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Once he has stopped, he may return only to fibers which invalidate the circumcision. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Which [statement of] Rebbi Yose? That which we had stated there: “Rebbi Yose said, if the first day of Tabernacles falls on a Sabbath and somebody forgot [that it was the Sabbath] and took the palm branch into the public domain he is not liable since he took it out with permission.” Is it the same for the knife of circumcision, for a mazzah? Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision, that means the same holds for the knife of circumcision, for a mazzah.

“If he circumcised but did not uncover the circumcision it is as if he did not circumcise.” It was stated: He is subject to divine extirpation. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: That is to say if there is no time left [in the day] to correct it. But if there is time left [in the day] to correct, he corrects without hesitation. It was stated: As long as he is occupied with the circumcision, he may return both to fibers which invalidate the circumcision as also to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Once he has stopped, he may return only to fibers which invalidate the circumcision. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Which [statement of] Rebbi Yose? That which we had stated there: “Rebbi Yose said, if the first day of Tabernacles falls on a Sabbath and somebody forgot [that it was the Sabbath] and took the palm branch into the public domain he is not liable since he took it out with permission.” Is it the same for the knife of circumcision, for a mazzah? Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision, that means the same holds for the knife of circumcision, for a mazzah.

“If he circumcised but did not uncover the circumcision it is as if he did not circumcise.” It was stated: He is subject to divine extirpation. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: That is to say if there is no time left [in the day] to correct it. But if there is time left [in the day] to correct, he corrects without hesitation. It was stated: As long as he is occupied with the circumcision, he may return both to fibers which invalidate the circumcision as also to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Once he has stopped, he may return only to fibers which invalidate the circumcision. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Which [statement of] Rebbi Yose? That which we had stated there: “Rebbi Yose said, if the first day of Tabernacles falls on a Sabbath and somebody forgot [that it was the Sabbath] and took the palm branch into the public domain he is not liable since he took it out with permission.” Is it the same for the knife of circumcision, for a mazzah? Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision, that means the same holds for the knife of circumcision, for a mazzah.

It was stated: “Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, Cohanim, Levites, Israel, and song invalidate the sacrifice.” Rebbi Abbin in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar: The entire congregationwere bowing down, these are Israel, and the song was sung, these are the Levites, and the trumpets were trumpeting, these are the Cohanim, everything up to the end of the elevation offering, all are indispensable for the sacrifice. Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Eleazar understood it from here: And I gave the Levites to Aaron and his sons from the midst of the Children of Israel, these are the Levites, to work the service of the Children of Israel in the Tent of Meeting, these are the Cohanim, and to atone for the Children of Israel, that is the song, so there shall be no plague when the Children of Israel approach the Sanctuary, these are Israel.

It was stated: “The blood of the daily sacrifice and its limbs precede the Pesaḥ, and the Pesaḥ the incense, and the incense the trimming of the lights.” There are Tannaim who state: “The blood of the daily sacrifice and its limbs precede the incense, and the incense the Pesaḥ, and the Pesaḥ the trimming of the lights, so that the libations of the daily sacrifice should be accompanying it.” There is nothing preceding the daily morning sacrifice and nothing later than the daily evening sacrifice except Pesaḥ and incense on Passover Eve. “ From where that nothing should precede the daily morning sacrifice? The verse says, on it ˋolah. And from where that nothing should invalidate the daily evening sacrifice? The verse says, on it šelamim. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, it is not written here he arranges on it ˋolah but he arranges on it the ˋolah, that no elevation offering precede the daily morning sacrifice. It was stated: Rebbi Ismael the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa says, people lacking expiation bring their expiatory sacrifices after the daily evening sacrifice to enable them to immerse themselves and eat their Pesaḥ in the evening. Rebbi Yudan said, that is, for a rich sufferer from skin disease. But a poor sufferer from skin disease, does he not bring a bird? Said Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon, does he not bring a reparation sacrifice?

HALAKHAH: From where that he must slaughter it for its purpose? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: And you shall say, a Pesaḥ slaughter it is; to imply that if he slaughtered it for the purpose of Pesaḥ it is Pesaḥ, otherwise it is not Pesaḥ. From where the remainder of its actions? You shall make [a Pesaḥ], that all its actions shall be for the purpose of Pesaḥ. But then also the burning of its parts? The verse says, slaughter But then also the burning of its parts? The verse says, slaughter. Since slaughter is particular in that it invalidates expiation, this excludes the burning of its parts which does not invalidate expiation.

From where for purification offerings? He shall slaughter it as purification offering. From where the remainder of its actions? [He]shall make one as purification offering. But then also the burning of its parts? The verse says, he shall slaughter. Since slaughter is particular in that it invalidates expiation, this excludes the burning of its parts which does not invalidate expiation.

From where that a purification sacrifice must be for the name of its owner? Rebbi Jeremiah said, the Cohen shall make the purification offering and expiate for the one who purifies himself from his impurity. Rebbi Yose said to him, but then also the burning of its parts? The verse says, and expiate. Since pouring is particular in that it invalidates expiation, this excludes the burning of its parts which does not invalidate expiation.

From where that a Pesaḥ must be in the name of its owner? Is it not a logical argument? Since a purification sacrifice, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does not invalidate it, needs to be in the name of the owner, Pesaḥ, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does invalidate it, is it not logical that it needs to be in the name of its owner? No. If you are saying about purification sacrifice which is most holy, would you say that about Pesaḥ which is a simple sanctum? Rebbi Yose said, did you not argue about intent? The Torah insisted about intent for Pesaḥ more than for purification sacrifice. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: Do we infer this from the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease? But is not the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease separate for something new? And one cannot infer from anything which is separate for something new. He told him, from where do you infer that it be invalid if not for its purpose? Not from the following verse, he shall slaughter it as purification sacrifice, and it is written: this is the doctrine of the purification sacrifice. There is one doctrine for all purification sacrifices. But from the place where it is being inferred, there it permits inferences.

From where that a Pesaḥ must be in the name of its owner? Is it not a logical argument? Since a purification sacrifice, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does not invalidate it, needs to be in the name of the owner, Pesaḥ, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does invalidate it, is it not logical that it needs to be in the name of its owner? No. If you are saying about purification sacrifice which is most holy, would you say that about Pesaḥ which is a simple sanctum? Rebbi Yose said, did you not argue about intent? The Torah insisted about intent for Pesaḥ more than for purification sacrifice. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: Do we infer this from the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease? But is not the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease separate for something new? And one cannot infer from anything which is separate for something new. He told him, from where do you infer that it be invalid if not for its purpose? Not from the following verse, he shall slaughter it as purification sacrifice, and it is written: this is the doctrine of the purification sacrifice. There is one doctrine for all purification sacrifices. But from the place where it is being inferred, there it permits inferences.

Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: If a person could construct an equal cut by himself, he could make a creeping animal causing impurity in a tent and a corpse causing impurity in the volume of a lentil, by explaining textile, leather; textile, leather. So if a creeping animal is in a person’s hand, even if he immerses himself in the waters of the Siloam, or in waters of a primeval ocean, he never can achieve purity. If he throws it away, immediately he becomes pure. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: A person may use an equal cut to confirm what he has learned; nobody may use an equal cut to invalidate what he has learned. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: A person may argue de minore ad majus by himself; a person may not argue an equal cut by himself. Therefore one can contradict an argument de minore ad majus; one cannot contradict an equal cut.

If he finished he can return only for fibers which would invalidate the circumcision. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose, even if he finished he may even return for fibers which do not invalidate the circumcision. Which [statement of] Rebbi Yose? That which we stated, “Rebbi Yose says, if the first day of Tabernacles falls on a Sabbath, if he forgot and took the lulav out into the public domain he is not liable because he took it out with permission.” Does the same hold for a knife for circumcision, the same for unleavened bread? Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose, even if he finished he may even return for fibers which do not invalidate the circumcision; this implies the same even for a knife for circumcision, the same for unleavened bread.

If he finished he can return only for fibers which would invalidate the circumcision. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose, even if he finished he may even return for fibers which do not invalidate the circumcision. Which [statement of] Rebbi Yose? That which we stated, “Rebbi Yose says, if the first day of Tabernacles falls on a Sabbath, if he forgot and took the lulav out into the public domain he is not liable because he took it out with permission.” Does the same hold for a knife for circumcision, the same for unleavened bread? Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose, even if he finished he may even return for fibers which do not invalidate the circumcision; this implies the same even for a knife for circumcision, the same for unleavened bread.

If he finished he can return only for fibers which would invalidate the circumcision. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose, even if he finished he may even return for fibers which do not invalidate the circumcision. Which [statement of] Rebbi Yose? That which we stated, “Rebbi Yose says, if the first day of Tabernacles falls on a Sabbath, if he forgot and took the lulav out into the public domain he is not liable because he took it out with permission.” Does the same hold for a knife for circumcision, the same for unleavened bread? Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose, even if he finished he may even return for fibers which do not invalidate the circumcision; this implies the same even for a knife for circumcision, the same for unleavened bread.

The colleagues say, the words of Rebbi Yose are that a positive commandment pushes aside a prohibition. Rebbi Yose told them, it is not from this but as Rebbi Ila said and as is stated there: “This was the usage in Jerusalem, a person goes to the synagogue with his lulav in his hand, goes to visit the sick with his lulav in his hand. he recites the shema` and prays with his lulav in his hand. To lift his hands or to read in the Torah, he hands it to another person. If he put it down on the floor it is forbidden to move it.” Rebbi Abun said, this implies that it is forbidden for usufruct. It was stated: One moves fragrant wood to let a sick person smell it on the Sabbath. The rabbis of Caesarea are saying, one may wave the myrtle branch for a sick person on the Sabbath. Does the same hold for a knife for circumcision, the same for unleavened bread? Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose, even if he finished he may return for fibers which do not invalidate the circumcision; this implies the same even for a knife for circumcision, the same for unleavened bread.

It was stated: “Rebbi Simeon said, Cohanim, Levites, Israel, and song invalidate the sacrifice.” Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar: The entire congregation were bowing down, these are Israel, and the song was sung, these are the Levites, and the trumpets were trumpeting, these are the Cohanim, everything up to the end of the elevation offering, all are indispensable for the sacrifice. Rebbi Tanḥuma in the name of Rebbi Eleazar understood it from here: And I gave the Levites to Aaron and his sons from the midst of the Children of Israel, these are the Levites, to work the service of the Children of Israel in the Tent of Meeting, these are the Cohanim, and to atone for the Children of Israel, that is the song, so there shall be no plague when the Children of Israel approach the Sanctuary, these are Israel.

May one appoint Elders for selected topics? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi appointed Rav to invalidate vows and to see stains. After his death, he asked his son for {permission to judge} defects of firstlings. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he gave him everything: To sit in judgment alone, to invalidate vows, to see stains, and to see outside blemishes. After his death, he asked his son for {permission to judge} hidden defects. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Even though you say, one appoints Elders for selected topics, only if he is competent for everything. As the following: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi ordained all his students, but he was sorry about one who (had a defect in his) [had a running] eye and he could not ordain him; could he not have ordained him for selected topics? That implies (that one who is competent in one thing has to be competent in everything, even for one thing he is not competent) [one who is competent in everything is competent in one thing but one who is not competent in everything cannot be declared competent in one thing.]

May one appoint Elders for selected topics? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi appointed Rav to invalidate vows and to see stains. After his death, he asked his son for {permission to judge} defects of firstlings. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he gave him everything: To sit in judgment alone, to invalidate vows, to see stains, and to see outside blemishes. After his death, he asked his son for {permission to judge} hidden defects. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Even though you say, one appoints Elders for selected topics, only if he is competent for everything. As the following: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi ordained all his students, but he was sorry about one who (had a defect in his) [had a running] eye and he could not ordain him; could he not have ordained him for selected topics? That implies (that one who is competent in one thing has to be competent in everything, even for one thing he is not competent) [one who is competent in everything is competent in one thing but one who is not competent in everything cannot be declared competent in one thing.]

HALAKHAH: “All these free their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from ḥalîṣah and levirate, etc.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. But we hold in case she says “I cannot stand marriage”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

HALAKHAH: “All these free their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from ḥalîṣah and levirate, etc.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. But we hold in case she says “I cannot stand marriage”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

There, we have stated: “These are the fibers which invalidate the circumcision.” Rebbi Avina in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: If it covers most of the height of the corona. Rebbi Yose ben Yose said, if it covers most of the top of the corona. Rebbi Tebi in the name of Samuel: One checks at the time of an erection. “If he circumcised and did not fold back, it is as if he did not circumcise.” It was stated: He is subject to divine extirpation. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: That is to say if there is no time left in the day to correct it. But if there is time left in the day to correct, he corrects without hesitation.

It was stated: As long as he is occupied with the circumcision, he may return both to fibers which invalidate the circumcision as also to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Once he has stopped, he may return only to fibers which invalidate the circumcision. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Which [statement of] Rebbi Yose? That which we had stated there: “Rebbi Yose said, if the first day of Tabernacles falls on a Sabbath and somebody forgot [that it was the Sabbath] and took the palm branch into the public domain he is free [from punishment] since he took it out with permission.” Is it the same for the knife of circumcision, for a maṣṣah? Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision, that means the same holds for the knife of circumcision, for a maṣṣah.

It was stated: As long as he is occupied with the circumcision, he may return both to fibers which invalidate the circumcision as also to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Once he has stopped, he may return only to fibers which invalidate the circumcision. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Which [statement of] Rebbi Yose? That which we had stated there: “Rebbi Yose said, if the first day of Tabernacles falls on a Sabbath and somebody forgot [that it was the Sabbath] and took the palm branch into the public domain he is free [from punishment] since he took it out with permission.” Is it the same for the knife of circumcision, for a maṣṣah? Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision, that means the same holds for the knife of circumcision, for a maṣṣah.

It was stated: As long as he is occupied with the circumcision, he may return both to fibers which invalidate the circumcision as also to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Once he has stopped, he may return only to fibers which invalidate the circumcision. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Which [statement of] Rebbi Yose? That which we had stated there: “Rebbi Yose said, if the first day of Tabernacles falls on a Sabbath and somebody forgot [that it was the Sabbath] and took the palm branch into the public domain he is free [from punishment] since he took it out with permission.” Is it the same for the knife of circumcision, for a maṣṣah? Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision, that means the same holds for the knife of circumcision, for a maṣṣah.

It was stated: As long as he is occupied with the circumcision, he may return both to fibers which invalidate the circumcision as also to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Once he has stopped, he may return only to fibers which invalidate the circumcision. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Which [statement of] Rebbi Yose? That which we had stated there: “Rebbi Yose said, if the first day of Tabernacles falls on a Sabbath and somebody forgot [that it was the Sabbath] and took the palm branch into the public domain he is free [from punishment] since he took it out with permission.” Is it the same for the knife of circumcision, for a maṣṣah? Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision, that means the same holds for the knife of circumcision, for a maṣṣah.

It was stated: As long as he is occupied with the circumcision, he may return both to fibers which invalidate the circumcision as also to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Once he has stopped, he may return only to fibers which invalidate the circumcision. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Which [statement of] Rebbi Yose? That which we had stated there: “Rebbi Yose said, if the first day of Tabernacles falls on a Sabbath and somebody forgot [that it was the Sabbath] and took the palm branch into the public domain he is free [from punishment] since he took it out with permission.” Is it the same for the knife of circumcision, for a maṣṣah? Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision, that means the same holds for the knife of circumcision, for a maṣṣah.

What is the reason of the House of Shammai? The husband she may repudiate since she married him with her consent. The levir to whom she was given by an act of God she cannot repudiate. What is the reason of the House of Hillel? If she can repudiate the principal, so much more the levir! Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. If she says, I can stand marriage with you but not with your brother? Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

What is the reason of the House of Shammai? The husband she may repudiate since she married him with her consent. The levir to whom she was given by an act of God she cannot repudiate. What is the reason of the House of Hillel? If she can repudiate the principal, so much more the levir! Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. If she says, I can stand marriage with you but not with your brother? Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

According to Rebbi Eliezer, may she repudiate him and collect a fine from him? According to Rebbi Joshua, may she repudiate him and collect a fine from another man? May she repudiate this one and invalidate her bill of divorce, a desecrated or a bastard? Rebbi Isaac asked, may she repudiate and return to her father’s food? It is obvious that she does not return to her husband’s food since he writes for her: “You shall live in my house and be fed from my property,” and she is not in his house. Therefore, the only question is, may she repudiate and return to her father’s food?

Rebbi Joḥanan said: The tertiary comes because of the reptile but it is (forbidden) [permitted] to turn it into heave. They asked before him: Even for Rebbi Aqiba? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Even following Rebbi Aqiba. And why? The ṭevul yom makes invalid, secondary impurity makes invalid. Just as the ṭevul yom does not invalidate profane food that it could not be turned into heave, so secondary impurity does not invalidate profane food that it could not be turned into heave. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The tertiary comes because of the reptile, and it is (forbidden) [permitted] to turn it into heave but (permitted) [forbidden] to turn it into sacrificial food. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: It defiles sacrifices and you say so? He said to him, because of the distinction. Rebbi Samuel ben Rebbi Isaac said, the source of its impurity is the distinction. Rebbi Yose said, why does it defile sacrifices? Because of the distinction. Rebbi Yudan said, even for the rabbis who say that there is no tertiary in profane food, why is it forbidden? It defiles sacrifices because of the distinction. Rebbi Yose said to him, do we not need to hear this from a great personality?

Rebbi Joḥanan said: The tertiary comes because of the reptile but it is (forbidden) [permitted] to turn it into heave. They asked before him: Even for Rebbi Aqiba? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Even following Rebbi Aqiba. And why? The ṭevul yom makes invalid, secondary impurity makes invalid. Just as the ṭevul yom does not invalidate profane food that it could not be turned into heave, so secondary impurity does not invalidate profane food that it could not be turned into heave. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The tertiary comes because of the reptile, and it is (forbidden) [permitted] to turn it into heave but (permitted) [forbidden] to turn it into sacrificial food. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: It defiles sacrifices and you say so? He said to him, because of the distinction. Rebbi Samuel ben Rebbi Isaac said, the source of its impurity is the distinction. Rebbi Yose said, why does it defile sacrifices? Because of the distinction. Rebbi Yudan said, even for the rabbis who say that there is no tertiary in profane food, why is it forbidden? It defiles sacrifices because of the distinction. Rebbi Yose said to him, do we not need to hear this from a great personality?

HALAKHAH: “If she decided to bring him money,” etc. “If she decided to bring him 500 denars by appraisal, he makes it 400. If he did not do that but made it 1’000; if she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, he deducts five denars for each tetradrachma, but he cannot touch the addition. If she decided to bring him 500 denars in coin, he makes it 750. If he did not do that but made them 1’000; if she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, he deducts six denars for each tetradrachma, but he cannot touch the addition. If she decided to bring him 1’000 zuz, he must turn them into fifteen minas. If he did not do that but wrote over to her a field worth 12 minas in place of the 1’000 zuz. If she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, one does not decrease for a virgin to less than 200 and for a widow to less than a mina.” Here, you say, he deducts. But there, you say, he does not deduct. Here, if she invalidated part of it, there if she did not invalidate part of it. Here, you say, he touches the addition but there, you say, he does not touch the addition. Here, he added but did not subtract; there, he subtracted but did not add. It was stated: Both for appraisal and for coin. Why for appraisal? Corresponding to what he subtracts, corresponding to what what he adds, corresponding to what she brings.

Rebbi Yasa asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Is our Mishnah from Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, since Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, any obstacle that is not from her side does not invalidate the bill of divorce? He said to him, here it is different because of opening the vow. Rebbi Yose said, but do we not deal with vows which do not need dissolution by a Sage? Rebbi Jonah said, we deal not only with one who made his vow dependent on something. So far it is if he wants to give him something. But in the case that he does not want to give to him, he can say, I wanted only to examine you; but since I saw that it gives you pain, it is as if I had received.

May one appoint Elders for selected topics? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi appointed Rav to invalidate vows and to see stains. After his death, [Rav] asked his son for [permission to see] defects of firstlings. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he gave him everything: To sit in judgment alone, to invalidate vows, to see stains, and to see outside blemishes. After his death, [Rav] asked his son for [permission to see] hidden defects. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Even though you say, one appoints Elders for selected topics, only if he is competent for everything. As the following: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi ordained all his students, but he was sorry about one who had a defect in his eye and he could not ordain him; so he ordained him for selected topics. That implies that one who is competent in one thing has to be competent in everything, and one who is not competent in everything cannot be declared competent in one thing.

May one appoint Elders for selected topics? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi appointed Rav to invalidate vows and to see stains. After his death, [Rav] asked his son for [permission to see] defects of firstlings. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he gave him everything: To sit in judgment alone, to invalidate vows, to see stains, and to see outside blemishes. After his death, [Rav] asked his son for [permission to see] hidden defects. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Even though you say, one appoints Elders for selected topics, only if he is competent for everything. As the following: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi ordained all his students, but he was sorry about one who had a defect in his eye and he could not ordain him; so he ordained him for selected topics. That implies that one who is competent in one thing has to be competent in everything, and one who is not competent in everything cannot be declared competent in one thing.

If he was born on the eightieth day, he eliminates ten. If he was born on the ninetieth day, he eliminates twenty. If he finished his nezirut and came to complete his son’s nezirut and became impure within the first ten days, he eliminates everything. Within the last twenty days? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rab and Rebbi Joḥanan both say, he eliminates thirty. Rebbi Samuel said, he eliminates seven only. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Joḥanan think that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical with substantial eliminating? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if Rebbi Joḥanan thought that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical to substantial eliminating, why would he say that he eliminates thirty? Should he not invalidate everything? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Explain it if he was born on a day unsuitable to bring a sacrifice. Think of it, if he was born in the night, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the night caused it. Think of it, if he was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave when [the son] was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave before his son was born, he celebrates one shaving for both. If he had dedicated his sacrifices but did not manage to shave before his son was born. There, they say that he celebrates one shaving for both. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shaves and then shaves a second time. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “They asked Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai: Assume that he was both a nazir and a sufferer from scale disease, may he shave once and have it counted for his nezirut and his scale disease? He said to them: If he shaved to remove hair, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves to remove hair whereas the sufferer from scale disease shaves to have hair grow. They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave to remove hair. (They said to him. If both of them shaved before the sprinkling of the blood, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before the sprinkling of the blood and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after the sprinkling of the blood! They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave before the sprinkling of the blood!) He said to them, if both shaved before they immerse themselves in water, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before he immerses himself in water and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after he immerses himself in water. They said to him, the matter is settled. It cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, it cannot be counted for the days of his count. It cannot be counted for purification; it cannot be counted for impurity. That is, if he was a nazir and sufferer from scale disease. But if he was a nazir and nazir, he may shave once for both.” What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? He explains that they disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody says, ‘I am a nazir’,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Eliezer learned from the sufferer from skin disease, for whom we find seven days between shaving and shaving. Why does he not learn from the impure nazir? The sufferer from skin disease shaves repeatedly; the impure nazir does not shave repeatedly. The rabbis from Caesarea say, they disagree explicitly: Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Eliezer learned from the sufferer from skin disease; Rebbi Eleazar says, Rebbi Eliezer learned from the impure nazir. What difference does it make for Rebbi Eliezer whether the vow for nazir was implicit rather than explicit? If the vow for nazir was implicit, he does not invalidate if he tears his hair out, and his seventh day is counted for him; if the vow for nazir was explicit, he invalidates if he tears his hair out and his seventh day is not counted for him.

HALAKHAH: ““I am a nazir for 100 days,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The reason of Rebbi Eliezer: “This is the teaching for the nazir on the day of his fulfilling;” if he becomes impure on the day of his fulfilling, one gives him the teaching for the nazir. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he becomes impure in those days, what is their status, to be given the teaching for the nazir? Rebbi Shammai said, he is obligated by the teaching for the nazir if he becomes impure on the day of his fulfilling, and for one who becomes impure on the day of his fulfilling the seventh day is not counted. Rebbi Mana asked: If he becomes impure at fulfilling, why should he invalidate 30, should he not invalidate only seven? But if somebody became impure after fulfilling, the seventh day is counted for him.

HALAKHAH: ““I am a nazir for 100 days,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The reason of Rebbi Eliezer: “This is the teaching for the nazir on the day of his fulfilling;” if he becomes impure on the day of his fulfilling, one gives him the teaching for the nazir. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he becomes impure in those days, what is their status, to be given the teaching for the nazir? Rebbi Shammai said, he is obligated by the teaching for the nazir if he becomes impure on the day of his fulfilling, and for one who becomes impure on the day of his fulfilling the seventh day is not counted. Rebbi Mana asked: If he becomes impure at fulfilling, why should he invalidate 30, should he not invalidate only seven? But if somebody became impure after fulfilling, the seventh day is counted for him.

“They shall fall away, for his vow of nazir is impure.” From here that the days of impurity fall away. Then should he invalidate? He invalidates only the days of [impurity of] the dead. Why should they not be counted? If you say that days in which he causes [impurity to] couch and seat are counted, days in which he does not cause [impurity to] couch and seat are certainly counted! What did you see to say that they are not counted? Rebbi [] said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “For a wild growth of his head’s hair”. Days of hair growth are counted, days preparing for shaving are not counted. So far in his days of counting; in the days of his definite status? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “Please do not let her be like a corpse.” Since the days of a corpse are not counted, the days of quarantine are not counted. A student quoted this saying cf Rebbi Joḥanan’s before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, who did not accept it. He said to him: Here, you call it quarantine, but there, you want to call it absolute; you cannot do that. For Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “Please do not let her be like a corpse; let her be quarantined.” Just as the days of the dead are seven, so the days of quarantine are seven.

Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.

Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.

Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.

Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.

Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.

Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody sent a bill of divorce to his wife,” etc. This disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said that a person invalidates the agent appointed by him by a declaration. He explains it by the stringency of the rules of incest. If he appointed an agent to deliver the bill of divorce, the latter has to deliver it in the presence of two [witnesses]; the agent is not counted as one of the two. If another agent went to invalidate the bill of divorce, he has to invalidate it in the presence of two [witnesses] and the agent is counted as one of the two. If he met him on the road and asked him, what about the bill of divorce I gave you? He answered, I delivered it to her. While they were talking there, he dropped it. He said, did you not tell me that you delivered it to her? He explained, I delivered it to her and she said, keep it for me. What? Can he be believed since it is in his power to divorce, or can he not be believed because it is in his hand? If the agent fell sick, how do you treat this? By the rules of divorces or the rules of preliminary marriages? By the rules of divorces one can divorce through the agency of anybody. By the rules of preliminary marriages one cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody sent a bill of divorce to his wife,” etc. This disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said that a person invalidates the agent appointed by him by a declaration. He explains it by the stringency of the rules of incest. If he appointed an agent to deliver the bill of divorce, the latter has to deliver it in the presence of two [witnesses]; the agent is not counted as one of the two. If another agent went to invalidate the bill of divorce, he has to invalidate it in the presence of two [witnesses] and the agent is counted as one of the two. If he met him on the road and asked him, what about the bill of divorce I gave you? He answered, I delivered it to her. While they were talking there, he dropped it. He said, did you not tell me that you delivered it to her? He explained, I delivered it to her and she said, keep it for me. What? Can he be believed since it is in his power to divorce, or can he not be believed because it is in his hand? If the agent fell sick, how do you treat this? By the rules of divorces or the rules of preliminary marriages? By the rules of divorces one can divorce through the agency of anybody. By the rules of preliminary marriages one cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody.

If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.

If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.

The following is the way of contracting: One witness for the groom and one witness for the bride; these two together select a third in order to have two witnesses for each side. That is, if not both of them agree. But if both of them agree, both may invalidate the preliminary marriage. As, e. g., “if he said, I copulated, but she says, I was not copulated with. Even if he changed his story and then said, I did not copulate, he cannot be believed since from the start he had said, I copulated. But if from the start he said that he had not copulated, the two together can uproot the presumption.” If there was one witness for the groom, one witness for the bride, and the groom signed personally: Rebbi Abbahu said, it is a symphōn, Rebbi Abba said, it is preliminary marriage, for I am saying that he did not really intend a symphōn but thought that it would permit her sister to him.