ira

If there were two daughters and one son; the first one took a tenth of the estate, but the son died before the second could take her tenth. Rebbi Ḥanina was of the opinion that the second takes a tenth of the estate and the rest they divide equally among themselves. Rebbi Joḥanan told him that in this case there was nothing else to provide for her, but here she may sell from the remainder and provide for herself! Rebbi Tebi in the name of Rebbi Joshia: The reason of Rebbi Ḥanina: If she can collect from encumbered real estate, from what lies before her not so much more? Rebbi Joḥanan sticks to his opinion, since Rebbi Ze‘ira said that Rebbi Joḥanan does not collect. Who collects? Rebbi Ḥanina [and Rebbi Hila] collect. Rebbi Yasa was appointed custodian of orphans’ property. There were orphan [girls] who asked to be provided for. He brought the case before Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim. Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim said, is it not better to provide for them from their father’s estate rather than from charity? Rebbi Eleazar said to him: If such a case came before our teachers, our teachers would not touch it; would we act? Rebbi Yose said, I shall give to them, and if some orphans get up and complain, I would give it to them. Even so, they saw and did not complain. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yose: How do you decide in practical cases? He said to him, following Rebbi Ḥanina. And so an actual case was decided following Rebbi Ḥanina. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Hila: One considers the estate as if it were dry.

If there were two daughters and one son; the first one took a tenth of the estate, but the son died before the second could take her tenth. Rebbi Ḥanina was of the opinion that the second takes a tenth of the estate and the rest they divide equally among themselves. Rebbi Joḥanan told him that in this case there was nothing else to provide for her, but here she may sell from the remainder and provide for herself! Rebbi Tebi in the name of Rebbi Joshia: The reason of Rebbi Ḥanina: If she can collect from encumbered real estate, from what lies before her not so much more? Rebbi Joḥanan sticks to his opinion, since Rebbi Ze‘ira said that Rebbi Joḥanan does not collect. Who collects? Rebbi Ḥanina [and Rebbi Hila] collect. Rebbi Yasa was appointed custodian of orphans’ property. There were orphan [girls] who asked to be provided for. He brought the case before Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim. Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim said, is it not better to provide for them from their father’s estate rather than from charity? Rebbi Eleazar said to him: If such a case came before our teachers, our teachers would not touch it; would we act? Rebbi Yose said, I shall give to them, and if some orphans get up and complain, I would give it to them. Even so, they saw and did not complain. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yose: How do you decide in practical cases? He said to him, following Rebbi Ḥanina. And so an actual case was decided following Rebbi Ḥanina. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Hila: One considers the estate as if it were dry.

”If they died, others should inherit.” Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person can transfer property rights in any language except with an expression of inheritance? One does not have here “they shall inherit” but “they shall take”. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: Do they not differ here in matters of a gift? If somebody signed over all his property to two persons at the same time; to one he wrote in the language of gift but to the other in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Eleazar said, since the one acquired in the language of gift, the other one acquired in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it seems that one did acquire in the language of gift but the other did not acquire in the language of inheritance Rebbi Phineas said, there came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah: Practice follows Rebbi Eleazar since Rebbi Eleazar stated a docrine but Rebbi Joḥanan said only “it seems”. Rebbi Samuel said, but did not Rebbi Meïr say that and it does not seem reasonable; is that nothing? Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say in the name of Rebbi Assi: Carded firstling wool becomes insignificant in a plurality. Rebbi Ḥiyya the Sepphorean brought before Rebbi Ammi a pound in eight but the latter refused to rule since had not Rebbi Assi said, is that not a Mishnah? “If somebody weaves the length of a sîṭ of firstling’s wool in a cloth, the cloth must be burned, of hair of a nazir or firstling donkey in sackcloth, the sackcloth must be burned”? The following Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote any expression of gift either at the start, or in the middle, or at the end, his instructions are valid.” There, to one person in an expression of gift and to one an expression of inheritance. But here to each one both in the language of gift and the language of inheritance Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: But does he not prejudice the rights of others? He said to him, if there are no brothers. But does he not prejudice the rights of his paternal uncles? Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel: A person prefers the good of his house over his relatives.

He could appoint a provider, as the following: “X is forbidden any profit from me by a vow and I do not know what to do.” Let him appoint a provider! A woman has the right to say, it is impossible for me to be provided for by anybody other than my husband. But did we not state: “If somebody provides for his wife through a third party.” There, if she accepted it; here, if she did not accept it. If she did not accept it then he should not appoint even for one day! She continues with him for one month, perhaps he will find an opening for his vow. Samuel says, if he vowed for thirty days. But if he vowed forever, he shall divorce immediately and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Avina in the name of Rav: Even if he vowed forever, she continues with him for one month, perhaps he will find an opening for his vow.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not go to her father’s house,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they stated there: If he made her make a vow that she should not wash in the bathhouse, in walled cities one week, in villages two weeks. That she should not wear shoes, in villages three months, in walled cities 24 hours.

Rebbi Ḥanin stated in the name of Rebbi Samuel: Both for women about whom they said that they have ketubah as also those about whom they said they leave without ketubah, as the minor, the secondarily prohibited, and the she-ram, did they speak about a mina or 200 [zuz]? But even if the ketubah was a thousand denars, she loses, but she takes her existing rags. But the one who leaves because of a bad reputation loses everything. Can she take her paraphernalia? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, she takes. Rebbi Hila said, she does not take. Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yasa, Rebbi Abba bar Cohen mention it in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel: Both women about whom they said that they leave without ketubah, did they speak about the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz]? But even if the ketubah was a thousand denars, she loses. Rebbi Simon said, Rebbi Joḥanan: All the Mishnaiot are connected to this baraita. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yasa: About which baraita? Of Rebbi Ḥanin from Samuel? He said to him, it is everybody’s opinion. And Rebbi Ḥiyya formulated so: “Women who infringe upon the law lose everything.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no obligation of vows on her,” etc. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house,” etc. We have stated defects. Which vows? Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Yoṣadaq: If she vowed not to eat, or not to drink wine, or not to wear dyed garments. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the fine linen garments which come from Bet She‘an have the status of dyed garments. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he said to her, “on condition that you have no obligation of vows on you.” But if he said, “on condition that you have no obligation of any vow on you,” then even if she made a vow not to eat carob fruit it is a vow.

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if the father proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he [made it conditional], could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ban Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

HALAKHAH: “If a man developed defects,” etc. Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah, “if he had.” But if they developed newly, one forces him to divorce. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah about a kopeaḥ, and he forced him. It turns out that following Rav if he did not become so, following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel if he became so. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Which [statement of] Rebbi Meïr? The former or the later? If the former, until she made a condition. If the later, even if he made a condition it is nothing. But this Mishnah turns out following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; does “the following one forces to divorce” [follows] the rabbis? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if it was a major defect, e. g., blind in one eye, amputated of one of his hands, lame in one of his legs, immediately he shall divorce and pay the ketubah.” This Mishnah turns out following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; “the following one forces to divorce” [follows] the rabbis.

HALAKHAH: “The following one forces to divorce: Those smitten with boils,” etc. “The meqammeṣ.” This is the dung collector; but some say it is the tanner. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the Mishnah implies that this is the dung collector since we have stated: “The meqammeṣ and the tanner.” “The brass refiner.” Samuel said, that is the one who smelts brass from its ore.

HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid.” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.

HALAKHAH: “He should not say to her ‘here is your ketubah’”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah.” In the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.

Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna said: A betrothed woman who died does not have a ketubah since she was not permitted to marry outside. That you should not say [the case] should be considered as if he divorced her and she should have a ketubah; therefore it was necessary to say that she does not have a ketubah.

Simeon ben Sheṭaḥ decreed three things: That a person should use his wife’s ketubah in his business dealings. And that children have to go to school. Also, he decreed impurity for glass ware. But did not Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna say in the name of Rav Jeremiah: Yose ben Yo‘ezer from Ṣereda and Yose ben Joḥanan from Jerusalem decreed impurity for Gentile lands and glass ware; Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Jehudah bar Ṭabbai? Rebbi Jonah said, Jehudah bar Ṭabbai and Simeon ben Sheṭaḥ decreed on metal vessels; Hillel and Shammai decreed on the purity of hands. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Levi: That was the current practice; they forgot it, but the later ones got up and agreed to the opinion of the earlier ones to teach you that everything the Court insists on will come to be in the end just as Moses was told on Sinai; as Rebbi Mana said (Deut. 32:47): “For it is not an empty word, from you,” if it is empty it is from you because you do not exert yourself about it. “Because it is your life,” when is it your life? At the time that you exert yourself!

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he did not take her in. But if he took her in, nobody can lose his rights by these expressions. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is the word of Rebbi Ḥiyya: He who says that “my hands are removed from this field, my feet are removed from this field,” did not say anything. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does a Mishnah imply that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions? Did we not state there: “If somebody was married to two wives when he sold a field and the first one wrote for the buyer: I have no claims on you, the second one can take it away from the buyer’s hands,” this implies, not the first one. He said to him, that text itself implies that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions, but here the second wife cannot take anything away from the first, and why can the first one not take it away from the buyer’s hands? For she writes to him: For any complaint I shall have regarding this field, I shall have nothing against you.

Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” and she inherited properties afterwards, what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: From his rights you can infer his obligations. If he had not written to her, would it make any difference, would he not receive its yield? That means, from his rights you can infer his obligations. Rebbi Levi bar Ḥaita asked: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties which you shall inherit in the future,” what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence?

Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” and she inherited properties afterwards, what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: From his rights you can infer his obligations. If he had not written to her, would it make any difference, would he not receive its yield? That means, from his rights you can infer his obligations. Rebbi Levi bar Ḥaita asked: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties which you shall inherit in the future,” what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence?

If she sold produce connected to the ground: Rav Aḥa said, as if she sold harvested [produce]; Rebbi Yose said, as if she sold a tenth of the ground. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, she cannot sell the produce. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Rebbi Immi asked: If another person had written [real estate] over to her, would he not receive the revenue? If he himself wrote, not so much more! He said only “wrote over”, but not “sold”. What is the difference between one who writes and one who sells? He tried to find a reason to hide food from the wife.

If she sold produce connected to the ground: Rav Aḥa said, as if she sold harvested [produce]; Rebbi Yose said, as if she sold a tenth of the ground. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, she cannot sell the produce. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Rebbi Immi asked: If another person had written [real estate] over to her, would he not receive the revenue? If he himself wrote, not so much more! He said only “wrote over”, but not “sold”. What is the difference between one who writes and one who sells? He tried to find a reason to hide food from the wife.

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Rebbi Justinus had a case and he asked the rabbis who told him, leave you properties. He asked Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, who told him, enter your properties. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Who are those rabbis? What about Rav, Rebbi Joḥanan, and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He said to him, Rebbi Justinus’s rabbis.

Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If the brothers divided [the inheritance], the widow is supported by them. For you should not say, they should be considered as if they had sold the properties and the widow would not be supported by these, since it is obvious that if they sold, they sold their own property.

Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Abbahu: It is written: “If the Jubilee will happen for the Children of Israel.” If the institution of the Jubilee exists, inheritances return; if the institution of the Jubilee does not exist, inheritances do not return. It is the opposite way, it comes to tell you that even if the institution of the Jubilee exists and inheritances return, inheritance by biblical law does not return!

HALAKHAH: “If somebody died and left a wife,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, the weakest in his claim. For example, one lent before witnesses, the other lent on a mortgage document; it should be given to the one who lent before witnesses. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the weakest in his body. Think about it, if he is rich, like those of the family Andreas. Rebbi Aḥa said, the weakest in his body and poor. As the following: They gave to a relative of Rebbi Samuel bar Abba as the weakest. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish brought slaves of Rebbi Jehuda the Prince and took it away from her. Rebbi Joḥanan was leaning on Rebbi Simeon bar Abba and said, what was done with that poor woman? He said to him, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish brought slaves of Rebbi Jehuda the Prince and took it away from her. Was he justified in doing this? Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should we say that Rebbi Joḥanan follows his doctrine and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish his own? Since they disagree: Everybody agrees that if they err in arguments, one does not reverse. In the words of the Torah, one reverses. Where do they disagree? If one errs in a Mishnah, for Rebbi Joḥanan says, an error in Mishnah is like an error in arguments, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, an error in Mishnah is like an error in words of the Torah. What is said of the Mishnah is also said of words of the Elders.

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna in the name of Rav: At a place where one writes ketubah documents, if he says I wrote, but she says you did not write, the burden of proof is on her to prove that he did not write. But at a place where one does not write ketubah documents, if he says I wrote, but she says you did not write, the burden of proof is on him to prove that he wrote.

“Similarly, if three who invested together lost or gained they would split in this manner.” Rebbi Eleazar said: You say that in case the tetradrachma lost or added value. But for earnings or losses they split evenly. That is difficult! One gave 100 denars and the other gave ten, and you say so? The colleagues say, he may say to him, by my contribution the merchandise rose. So far, if they ran after little merchandise. If there was much merchandise? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, he may say to him, by the time you sold one piece, I am selling ten. That is, at a nearby place. If it was far away? Rebbi Hila said, he may say to him, by the time you go and return once, I am going and returning ten times. There, we have stated: “If [the ox] gored an ox worth 200, the last one takes 100, the one before him 50, and the two first ones a gold denar.” Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi [Ze‘ira]: The same holds for earnings. Rebbi Yose said, the statement of Rebbi Ze‘ira disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yudan: Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree if they contracted between themselves that each can take according to his contribution? Oxen are as if contracted. He turned around and said, they disagree explicitly: Rebbi Eleazar said, if nothing was said, they split evenly; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if nothing was said, each takes according to his contribution.

“Similarly, if three who invested together lost or gained they would split in this manner.” Rebbi Eleazar said: You say that in case the tetradrachma lost or added value. But for earnings or losses they split evenly. That is difficult! One gave 100 denars and the other gave ten, and you say so? The colleagues say, he may say to him, by my contribution the merchandise rose. So far, if they ran after little merchandise. If there was much merchandise? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, he may say to him, by the time you sold one piece, I am selling ten. That is, at a nearby place. If it was far away? Rebbi Hila said, he may say to him, by the time you go and return once, I am going and returning ten times. There, we have stated: “If [the ox] gored an ox worth 200, the last one takes 100, the one before him 50, and the two first ones a gold denar.” Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi [Ze‘ira]: The same holds for earnings. Rebbi Yose said, the statement of Rebbi Ze‘ira disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yudan: Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree if they contracted between themselves that each can take according to his contribution? Oxen are as if contracted. He turned around and said, they disagree explicitly: Rebbi Eleazar said, if nothing was said, they split evenly; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if nothing was said, each takes according to his contribution.

“Similarly, if three who invested together lost or gained they would split in this manner.” Rebbi Eleazar said: You say that in case the tetradrachma lost or added value. But for earnings or losses they split evenly. That is difficult! One gave 100 denars and the other gave ten, and you say so? The colleagues say, he may say to him, by my contribution the merchandise rose. So far, if they ran after little merchandise. If there was much merchandise? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, he may say to him, by the time you sold one piece, I am selling ten. That is, at a nearby place. If it was far away? Rebbi Hila said, he may say to him, by the time you go and return once, I am going and returning ten times. There, we have stated: “If [the ox] gored an ox worth 200, the last one takes 100, the one before him 50, and the two first ones a gold denar.” Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi [Ze‘ira]: The same holds for earnings. Rebbi Yose said, the statement of Rebbi Ze‘ira disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yudan: Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree if they contracted between themselves that each can take according to his contribution? Oxen are as if contracted. He turned around and said, they disagree explicitly: Rebbi Eleazar said, if nothing was said, they split evenly; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if nothing was said, each takes according to his contribution.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said that Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila say that they differ about sustenance. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may demand sustenance. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, one says to him, divorce her! And you say so? They wanted to say, for him who says they differ about the conditions attached to a ketubah, Rebbi Joḥanan said, she has the ketubah stipulations. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, everybody agrees that she cannot claim support since they even punished her heirs, so much more herself. But for him who says that they differ about sustenance, it follows that they do not differ about the stipulations of a ketubah. They fined her, but did not fine her heirs.

Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥananel in the name of Rav; Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Abba bar Jeremiah: Practice follows Ḥanan in his two statements; practice does not follow Admon in his seven statements. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqula: In every case in which Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement, practice follows him.

Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥananel in the name of Rav; Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Abba bar Jeremiah: Practice follows Ḥanan in his two statements; practice does not follow Admon in his seven statements. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqula: In every case in which Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement, practice follows him.

Rav Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥananel in the name of Rav; Ze‘ira in the name of Abba bar Jeremiah: Ḥanan made two statements, practice follows him; Admon made seven statements, practice does not follow him. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqula: In every case in which Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement, practice follows him.

Rav Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥananel in the name of Rav; Ze‘ira in the name of Abba bar Jeremiah: Ḥanan made two statements, practice follows him; Admon made seven statements, practice does not follow him. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqula: In every case in which Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement, practice follows him.

Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free. And why did we state: “Rabban Gamliel obligates him”? This comes to tell you the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he obligates people. Rebbi Abbahu [supported] that of Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, the Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is obligated. Rav followed Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went with another to court before Rav. He started claiming from him barley, wheat and spelt. Rav told him, charge him with anything you have to charge, and in the end he will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free, did we not state “if he sued him for vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? If he is obligated for vessels about vessels, not so much more vessels for real estate? What does he do with it? He explains it, to transfer an oath to him. But did we not state: If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil, and the defendant admits [that he owes him] vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for oil and he admitted vessels, everybody agrees that what he admitted does not refer to the claim, for Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna said in the name of Rav: The Mishnah deals with the case that he sued for vessels full of oil; the ones are full, the others empty. One understands vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abun formulates it as oil bucket. Can one not ask him in the end? If he lost his speech.

“As vows of the wicked, he vowed as nazir, a sacrifice, and an oath.” Samuel said, the Mishnah speaks about several cases, either as nazir, or a sacrifice, or an oath. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, he is a nazir in all three of them. Rebbi Abin said, if somebody wants to explain that of Rebbi Ze‘ira, it is such: There was before him a bunch of grapes and another person came and said, there is an oath on me, then there is an oath on him. Another person came and said, that is qorbān for me, it is qorbān for him. Another person came and said, there is an oath on me, then there is an oath on him. Another person came and said, what these three said is on me, does it not turn out that this one is obligated for qorbān and oath?

“As vows of the wicked, he vowed as nazir, a sacrifice, and an oath.” Samuel said, the Mishnah speaks about several cases, either as nazir, or a sacrifice, or an oath. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, he is a nazir in all three of them. Rebbi Abin said, if somebody wants to explain that of Rebbi Ze‘ira, it is such: There was before him a bunch of grapes and another person came and said, there is an oath on me, then there is an oath on him. Another person came and said, that is qorbān for me, it is qorbān for him. Another person came and said, there is an oath on me, then there is an oath on him. Another person came and said, what these three said is on me, does it not turn out that this one is obligated for qorbān and oath?

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: May a person bind himself by a word which has both a profane and a sacral meaning? Did we not state קוֹנָס? Its name is קונסה. Did we not state שְּׁבוּתָה? Its name is שְׁפוּתָה. But did not Bar Qappara state ḥeres? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that is a name relating to the High One: “If He commands the sun: would it not shine?”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, these are Gentile words, like those Nabateans who say khaspa for ḥaspa. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable in other places, but in a place where the nazir is called naziq, do I say that a nazir of people with speech defects should not be a nazir?

Do the Sages permit all kinds of vows? “Four kinds of vows did the Sages dissolve”! Rebbi Eleazar in the name of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya: Those do not need the permission of a Sage. Rav and Samuel both say that these need the permission of a Sage. Issy objected: Did we not find an opening for vows from there only? Samuel said to him, bind a rope on it. A Mishnah disagrees with Issy: “This one also can dissolve his vow without asking a Sage.” He explains it, that all vows need an opening from another place but these have their openings in themselves. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that is, if they do not insist. But if they did insist they need the permission of a Sage. If one did insist but the other did not insist, since this one’s is invalid, the other one’s also should be invalid. A student of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus said [after] Rebbi Yudan: If one asked a tetradrachma, one was ready to give him three, and another one said a sheqel. (Does he insist?) Since he renounces one denar for this one he may renounce another one for the other one and give it to him for two.

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Because it is as if he gave him money to buy a loaf with. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Then is it forbidden to borrow money from him, for it is as if he gave him money to buy a loaf with? Rebbi Abina said, Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: That jewellery on them, is it forbidden to lend to them?

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Because it is as if he gave him money to buy a loaf with. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Then is it forbidden to borrow money from him, for it is as if he gave him money to buy a loaf with? Rebbi Abina said, Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: That jewellery on them, is it forbidden to lend to them?

HALAKHAH: “Also he can separate his heave” etc. If somebody fixes the harvest of another person without the latter’s knowledge, who receives the goodwill from the tithes? Rebbi Abbahu says, the one who does the fixing. Rebbi Ze‘ira says, the owner of the produce. Rebbi Ze‘ira is consistent since Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, if somebody gave the sacrifice of a nazir or of a [healed] person afflicted with skin disease, the person purged makes (heave). The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “Also he can separate his heave and tithes with his knowledge.” Explain it, that [it was stipulated] that the other should not get the goodwill.

HALAKHAH: “Also he can separate his heave” etc. If somebody fixes the harvest of another person without the latter’s knowledge, who receives the goodwill from the tithes? Rebbi Abbahu says, the one who does the fixing. Rebbi Ze‘ira says, the owner of the produce. Rebbi Ze‘ira is consistent since Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, if somebody gave the sacrifice of a nazir or of a [healed] person afflicted with skin disease, the person purged makes (heave). The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “Also he can separate his heave and tithes with his knowledge.” Explain it, that [it was stipulated] that the other should not get the goodwill.

HALAKHAH: “Also he can separate his heave” etc. If somebody fixes the harvest of another person without the latter’s knowledge, who receives the goodwill from the tithes? Rebbi Abbahu says, the one who does the fixing. Rebbi Ze‘ira says, the owner of the produce. Rebbi Ze‘ira is consistent since Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, if somebody gave the sacrifice of a nazir or of a [healed] person afflicted with skin disease, the person purged makes (heave). The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “Also he can separate his heave and tithes with his knowledge.” Explain it, that [it was stipulated] that the other should not get the goodwill.

Rebbi Ze‘ira said, from their words [we can deduce] whether he may feed his slaves or may not feed his slave. They wanted to say that he who says “the pure animal’s soul is Heaven’s but its body is his,” and this one, because her body and soul is Heaven’s, he may feed his slave. And he who says, since he could sell it to Gentiles or feed it to the dogs, since this one’s body is his but he cannot sell her to Gentiles nor feed her to the dogs, he may feed his slave. It was found stated: He may feed his slave.

So far, if he abandoned it for a longer period of time. But if he abandoned only for a short time? Let us hear from the following: “If he abandoned his field, he may cancel his action during three days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it says only “three days”. Therefore, after three days he may not cancel his action. Rebbi Simeon Dayana stated before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Even after three he may cancel his action. He said to him, since you say after three days, is it the same after three or after many? A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “About when is this said? If he abandoned in an unspecified way. But if he said: My field shall be abandoned one day, one week, one month, one year, a sabbatical period, as long as nobody took it over, either he or another person, he may cancel. But after somebody acquired it, either he or somebody else, he cannot cancel.” This means that short or long periods are the same. It also means that they were not worried about dishonesty. This means that a person may abandon and reacquire. That obviously answers Rebbi Zeïra’s question, since Rebbi Zeira had said, are short and long times the same?

So far, if he abandoned it for a longer period of time. But if he abandoned only for a short time? Let us hear from the following: “If he abandoned his field, he may cancel his action during three days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it says only “three days”. Therefore, after three days he may not cancel his action. Rebbi Simeon Dayana stated before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Even after three he may cancel his action. He said to him, since you say after three days, is it the same after three or after many? A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “About when is this said? If he abandoned in an unspecified way. But if he said: My field shall be abandoned one day, one week, one month, one year, a sabbatical period, as long as nobody took it over, either he or another person, he may cancel. But after somebody acquired it, either he or somebody else, he cannot cancel.” This means that short or long periods are the same. It also means that they were not worried about dishonesty. This means that a person may abandon and reacquire. That obviously answers Rebbi Zeïra’s question, since Rebbi Zeira had said, are short and long times the same?

So far, if he abandoned it for a longer period of time. But if he abandoned only for a short time? Let us hear from the following: “If he abandoned his field, he may cancel his action during three days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it says only “three days”. Therefore, after three days he may not cancel his action. Rebbi Simeon Dayana stated before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Even after three he may cancel his action. He said to him, since you say after three days, is it the same after three or after many? A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “About when is this said? If he abandoned in an unspecified way. But if he said: My field shall be abandoned one day, one week, one month, one year, a sabbatical period, as long as nobody took it over, either he or another person, he may cancel. But after somebody acquired it, either he or somebody else, he cannot cancel.” This means that short or long periods are the same. It also means that they were not worried about dishonesty. This means that a person may abandon and reacquire. That obviously answers Rebbi Zeïra’s question, since Rebbi Zeira had said, are short and long times the same?

“Both are forbidden to put a grindstone or an oven up there, or to raise chickens there.” This is needed for Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, for what he states about “partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another.” Because they mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another, does this imply that if they had not made vows not to have usufruct from one another, they would be presumed to concede one to the other? Rebbi Jeremiah said, partners have the custom to concede one to the other in these matters. There, we have stated: “The following establish presumption of ownership.” Rebbi Eleazar said, if somebody raises chickens in a courtyard in which he does not dwell, this establishes presumption of ownership. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. As you look at it, if he had the right to raise them, he raised them. If he had no right to raise them, he established a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Benaiah: Partners can veto any activity of the other party in a courtyard except for washing, for the honor of the daughters of Israel. Rebbi Mattaniah said, that is, at a place where women wash, but not at a place where men wash. And what you say except for washing in the courtyard [applies to] the entire courtyard except for the four cubits of that party where one cannot hinder anything. But if the place was at an incline, one can veto even within the four cubits of another party since one might say to him, you pour out and it flows down to my place. It was stated: The place of an oven or a hearth does not establish a presumption of ownership, but roofing of any size on top of them establishes a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, only if the wall is useful for the oven.

It was stated: Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says: If he said, ‘a qônām that I shall not taste a fish’, he is forbidden large ones and permitted small ones. ‘Fishes I shall not taste,’ he is forbidden large and small ones. ‘Fish I shall not taste,’ he is forbidden only sardines. What is small and what is large? This is as Rebbi Ze‘ira said, from any fish less than a litra which I eat, I am tasting sardines. Here, it is the same.

“He is permitted fish cake”; therefore not if it is not ground. Rebbi Jeremiah said, Ze‘ira asked: Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan who said, in matters of vows one follows common usage It is not the way of people that if a man says to his neighbor, sell me a fish, that he should sell him a sardine. Rebbi Abin understood it from the last clause, “if somebody vows not to eat fish cake he is permitted fish fluid and brine,” therefore not if it is not ground? Rebbi [Jeremiah] said, Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan who said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. It is not the way of people that if a man says to his neighbor, sell me a טְרִי, that he sells him a צַחְנָא. There, they call צַחְנָה טְרִית.

“He is permitted fish cake”; therefore not if it is not ground. Rebbi Jeremiah said, Ze‘ira asked: Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan who said, in matters of vows one follows common usage It is not the way of people that if a man says to his neighbor, sell me a fish, that he should sell him a sardine. Rebbi Abin understood it from the last clause, “if somebody vows not to eat fish cake he is permitted fish fluid and brine,” therefore not if it is not ground? Rebbi [Jeremiah] said, Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan who said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. It is not the way of people that if a man says to his neighbor, sell me a טְרִי, that he sells him a צַחְנָא. There, they call צַחְנָה טְרִית.

It was stated: “One intercalates for a year neither in a Sabbatical nor in the year after the Sabbatical; but if they intercalated it is intercalated.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Abbahu said: That means, as long as Rebbi did not permit to buy vegetables for importation into the Land. But since Rebbi permitted to buy vegetables for importation into the Land there is no difference between the Sabbatical and the remaining years of the Sabbatical cycle.

HALAKHAH: “One who made a vow to abstain from garments,” etc. One who made a vow to abstain from clothing is permitted sack-cloth, carpet, and goat’s hair cloth, leather apron, and bandages. He is forbidden fascia and belt. One who vows to abstain from clothing is forbidden all kinds of clothing but permitted these. Rebbi Jeremiah said, Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: If one said, a qônām, that I shall not wear a garment, that I shall not cover myself with clothing? Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, if he said, a qônām for anything that is generally used to cover oneself and a derivative of it is generally used to cover oneself; generally he is permitted the derivative; if he made a vow to abstain from the derivative he is permitted the material itself. What is an example? For example, sheepskin. For anything that is generally used to cover oneself but no derivative of it is generally used to cover oneself; if he vowed about it, he is permitted the derivative; if he made a vow to abstain from the derivative he is forbidden the material itself. What is an example? For example, goatskin. And anything that is generally not used to cover oneself but a derivative of it is generally used to cover oneself; if he vowed about it, he intended only the derivative. What is an example? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, for example raw cotton.

The words of Rebbi Joḥanan imply that one may fast for hours, for Rebbi Joḥanan said, I shall fast until I finish studying this chapter, until I finish studying this text. The words of Rebbi Jonah imply that one may fast for hours, for Rebbi Jonah was in Tyre when he heard that Rebbi Yose’s son had died. Even though he had eaten cheese and drunk water, he finished that day fasting. The words of Rav imply that one may fast for hours, for Rav said, one may borrow his fast day and pay back. Samuel said to him, is that a vow? If he had vowed to fast but forgot and ate the volume of an olive, he lost his fast day. Rebbi Abba in the name of the rabbis there: That is, if he said simply “a day”. But if he said “this day”, he has to continue fasting until the end. He spoke only of eating; that excludes tasting. Rebbi Abba Ḥasida in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Tasting does not create obligations of benediction, robbery, nor of demay, nor of the interruption of a fast day.

A private person who committed himself for a fast day, eats and drinks after nightfall. But if he said a public fast day, he eats and drinks only during daytime. If he made a vow to fast and it turned out to fall on Sabbath days or holidays, he is whipped but does not need permission from a Sage. If he made a vow to fast and it turned out to fall on days written in the Scroll of Fasts, Rebbi Ḥizqia and Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: One said, he fasts but does not finish, but the other one said, he is whipped but does not need permission from a Sage. That is, you say that before the scroll of fasts was abolished. But when the Scroll of Fasts was abolished, all this was abolished. Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Joḥanan both say that the Scroll of Fasts was abolished. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, the Scroll of Fasts was abolished. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and stating: “It happened that they decreed a fast day at Lod during Ḥanukka. Rebbi Eliezer went and had a haircut, Rebbi Joshua went and took a hot bath. Rebbi Joshua said to them, go and fast for what you fasted.” And you say, the Scroll of Fasts was abolished? Rebbi Abba said, even though you say that the Scroll of Fasts was abolished, Ḥanukka and Purim were not abolished. The acts of the rabbis imply that the Scroll of Fasts was abolished: Rebbi Jonathan fasted on the day before New Year’s Day. Rebbi Abin fasted on the day before Tabernacles. Rebbi Ze‘ira fasted 300 fast days, and some say 900 fast days and did not care about the Scroll of Fasts. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa told the scribes: If a woman comes to ask you, tell her that one may fast any day except Sabbaths, holidays, New Moons, the intermediary days of holidays, Ḥanukka, and Purim.

HALAKHAH: “ ‘Until Passover’, he is forbidden,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: The opinion of Rebbi Yose seems to be inverted. There, he says “until all the elder possibilities are exhausted, until all the younger possibilities are exhausted,” and here, he says so? He said to him: Since Ben Azai and Ben Zoma died, the perseverers disappeared; no perseverer was there until Jeremiah appeared. Rebbi Abba, son of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, said, why does he needle him? Did not Rebbi Eleazar already ask before Rebbi Joḥanan, the opinion of Rebbi Yose seems to be inverted? He said to him, it is not inverted, the Mishnah is inverted, for in the House of Rebbi they stated: “ ‘Until before Passover’, Rebbi Meїr says, until it passed, Rebbi Yose says, until it comes.” We ask “until before”, and you say so? He said to him, this is a Nabatean expression, “much before Passover”. Rebbi Abin said, everybody agrees that he is permitted on Passover. Where do they disagree? The day before Passover. One of them says, until it comes, the other until it passed.

HALAKHAH: “ ‘Until the rains,’ ” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: If one said ‘until the rain’, is he forbidden until another rainfall came down? There, we have stated: “One who said, I take upon me [the obligation to bring] wood, should not bring less that two cut logs.” Rebbi Yose the important said that Rebbi Abba bar Mamai asked, if he said, I take upon me [the obligation to bring] to bring wood, does he bring one cut log? Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah explains that each one is a separate sacrifice, as we have stated there: “Two in whose hands are two cut logs.” In order to increase the number of logs.

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The first case also is in dispute. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree when it was undetermined. Where do we hold? If each one of them said, because of my honor, everybody agrees that he is forbidden. If one of them said, because of my honor, and the other said, I said it in your honor, everybody agrees he is permitted. But we hold if it is undetermined. Rebbi says, undetermined is as if [every] one said, because of my honor. But the Sages say, undetermined is as if one said, because of my honor, and the other said, I said it in your honor.

Rebbi Jeremiah said, what you say is only that there are changed circumstances before the matter is discussed. The force of Rebbi Yose is from the following: “That was the error of Naḥum the Mede.” What was his error? That he found them an opening by changed circumstances. “Naḥum the Mede said to them: ‘Would you have made a vow to become nezirim if you had known that the Temple would be destroyed at some future time?’ ” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the following he should have said to them: Did you not know that the earlier prophets had prophesied while the Temple was standing that eventually it would be destroyed? Then there are no changed circumstances. Rebbi Hila said, still it is changed circumstances. They could have said to him, we knew it, but it seemed to us that this referred to the far future: “The vision he sees is for many years; for faraway times he prophesies.” It turns out that Rebbi Jeremiah parallels Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Yose parallels Rebbi Hila.

Rebbi Jeremiah said, what you say is only that there are changed circumstances before the matter is discussed. The force of Rebbi Yose is from the following: “That was the error of Naḥum the Mede.” What was his error? That he found them an opening by changed circumstances. “Naḥum the Mede said to them: ‘Would you have made a vow to become nezirim if you had known that the Temple would be destroyed at some future time?’ ” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the following he should have said to them: Did you not know that the earlier prophets had prophesied while the Temple was standing that eventually it would be destroyed? Then there are no changed circumstances. Rebbi Hila said, still it is changed circumstances. They could have said to him, we knew it, but it seemed to us that this referred to the far future: “The vision he sees is for many years; for faraway times he prophesies.” It turns out that Rebbi Jeremiah parallels Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Yose parallels Rebbi Hila.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Meïr says, there are things like changed circumstances”. Samuel says, because of an erroneous vow; the dog was already dead, the snake had already been killed. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, because he is like someone who makes his vow dependent on something: A qônām that I shall have no benefit from this man as long as he wears black garments. If he wore white, he would be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: That one does not need the permission of a Sage.

“Maybe he would become poor”. Are these not changed circumstances? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, poverty is frequent. As the following: A man had a lawsuit against a rich man. He wanted to be judged before Rav; Rav sent for [the rich man], who said: For this one I should come to court? If all the camels of Arabia came they could not carry all the leather sacks containing my mortgages! [Rav] heard this and said, what does this one pride himself with what is not his! There should be depreciation of it! Immediately there came a royal decree that he and his property should belong to the treasury. He [the rich man] came before Rav and said to him, pray for me that my personality could be restored. He prayed, and it was restored to him.

Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah, Jeremiah bar Abba, in the name of Rebbi Samuel: Three who know how to find an opening may permit like an Elder. They thought, at a place where no Elder was available. The rabbis of Caesarea: Even at a place of an Elder. They said before Rebbi Yasa: Rav Huna is “head of tribes”. Who are the heads of tribes? Rav Huna is head of the heads of tribes.

Rebbi Ze‘ira explained the Mishnah: “These are the vows which he can dissolve: Matters connected with mortification. [E. g.], ‘if I wash, if I do not wash; if I shall wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels.’ Rebbi Yose said, these are not vows of mortification” but vows between him and her. “The following are vows of mortification” following Rebbi Yose. For example, “she said, all produce of the world is qônām for me, he may dissolve.” The rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Vows between him and her are only dissolved as long as she is married to him. Rebbi Yose says, both vows of mortification and vows between him and her, if he dissolved them they are permanently dissolved. That means, the rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Rebi Yose says, if he dissolves vows between him and her, they are permanently dissolved. What is the difference between them? If she said, any benefit from me shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Why can he not dissolve that? Because she did not say, any benefit from my body shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila, both of them say: That is the essence of vows between him and her. In the opinion of Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shall dissolve it since maybe he would divorce her, then she would be forbidden to return to him.”

Rebbi Ze‘ira explained the Mishnah: “These are the vows which he can dissolve: Matters connected with mortification. [E. g.], ‘if I wash, if I do not wash; if I shall wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels.’ Rebbi Yose said, these are not vows of mortification” but vows between him and her. “The following are vows of mortification” following Rebbi Yose. For example, “she said, all produce of the world is qônām for me, he may dissolve.” The rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Vows between him and her are only dissolved as long as she is married to him. Rebbi Yose says, both vows of mortification and vows between him and her, if he dissolved them they are permanently dissolved. That means, the rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Rebi Yose says, if he dissolves vows between him and her, they are permanently dissolved. What is the difference between them? If she said, any benefit from me shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Why can he not dissolve that? Because she did not say, any benefit from my body shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila, both of them say: That is the essence of vows between him and her. In the opinion of Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shall dissolve it since maybe he would divorce her, then she would be forbidden to return to him.”

Rebbi Ze‘ira explained the Mishnah: “These are the vows which he can dissolve: Matters connected with mortification. [E. g.], ‘if I wash, if I do not wash; if I shall wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels.’ Rebbi Yose said, these are not vows of mortification” but vows between him and her. “The following are vows of mortification” following Rebbi Yose. For example, “she said, all produce of the world is qônām for me, he may dissolve.” The rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Vows between him and her are only dissolved as long as she is married to him. Rebbi Yose says, both vows of mortification and vows between him and her, if he dissolved them they are permanently dissolved. That means, the rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Rebi Yose says, if he dissolves vows between him and her, they are permanently dissolved. What is the difference between them? If she said, any benefit from me shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Why can he not dissolve that? Because she did not say, any benefit from my body shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila, both of them say: That is the essence of vows between him and her. In the opinion of Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shall dissolve it since maybe he would divorce her, then she would be forbidden to return to him.”

“If I wash, if I do not wash.” It was stated: “If I wash, if I do not wash; if I wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels”, these are vows of mortification. Both according to Rebbi Ze‘ira or according to Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yose seems to contradict his own opinion, as it was stated: “A water source belonging to the townspeople, between them and outsiders, they have precedence over outsiders. Between outsiders and their animals, the outsiders have precedence over their animals. Their washing and the lives of outsiders, their washing has precedence over the lives of outsiders.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, who is the Tanna who said that washing is a necessity for survival? Rebbi Yose! As it was stated: “One may use it neither for steeping nor for washing. But Rebbi Yose permits it for washing.” The opinions of Rebbi Yose are contradictory. There he says, washing oneself is not a necessity of life. And here, he says washing one’s garments is a necessity of life! Rebbi Mana said, a person might put off washing himself but nobody puts off washing his clothes.

It is written: “Every vow and every oath of prohibition to mortify a person.” For example, [a qônām] if I would taste peppers, if I would taste rolls. Not only if that kind is available now; even if that kind is not available now, perhaps he might bring her some later on. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If there were two pieces before them, one nice and one not nice. If she desired the nice one and made a vow to forbid herself the less nice one, he may dissolve that. Why can he dissolve? The colleagues say, because of her mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because of his mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Samuel: A man can dissolve all vows except if she says, any benefit from me shall [be qônām] for X. That means he can dissolve: Any benefit from X shall [be qônām] for me. But did we not state: “The produce of this grocery store [is qônām] for me, he cannot dissolve.” Explain that following Rebbi Yose and they disagree with him, for we did state there: “If he can get the necessities of life only from that grocer, he may dissolve.” Rebbi Yose said, because he gives him credit, he delivers to him. Rebbi Mana said, because he gives him good quality produce.

It is written: “Every vow and every oath of prohibition to mortify a person.” For example, [a qônām] if I would taste peppers, if I would taste rolls. Not only if that kind is available now; even if that kind is not available now, perhaps he might bring her some later on. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If there were two pieces before them, one nice and one not nice. If she desired the nice one and made a vow to forbid herself the less nice one, he may dissolve that. Why can he dissolve? The colleagues say, because of her mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because of his mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Samuel: A man can dissolve all vows except if she says, any benefit from me shall [be qônām] for X. That means he can dissolve: Any benefit from X shall [be qônām] for me. But did we not state: “The produce of this grocery store [is qônām] for me, he cannot dissolve.” Explain that following Rebbi Yose and they disagree with him, for we did state there: “If he can get the necessities of life only from that grocer, he may dissolve.” Rebbi Yose said, because he gives him credit, he delivers to him. Rebbi Mana said, because he gives him good quality produce.

HALAKHAH: “ ‘T knew that there are vows,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the reason of Rebbi Meïr: It is a subterfuge. He wants her to make vows so he can divorce her. That is not so, he could have divorced her on the first occasion.

HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not take any benefit from my father, or your father,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Nathan says, he cannot dissolve, but the Sages say, he can dissolve. Why can he dissolve? The colleagues say, because of his mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila say, because of her mortification.

“Naziq,naziaḥ,paziq”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are expressions chosen by earlier generations and nobody has the right to add to them. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: raziaḥ,haziaḥ? Rebbi Shila said, also to expressions chosen by earlier secondary ones nobody has the right to add. But did not Bar Qappara state ḥeres? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that is a name relating to the High One: “If He commands the sun: would it not shine?”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, these are Gentile words, like those Nabateans who say khaspa for ḥaspa. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable in other places, but in a place where the nazir is called naziq, do I say that a nazir of people with speech defects should not be a nazir?

“I did not vow as a nazir,” he is permitted. “I already had been a nazir,” he is forbidden. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Avina, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: If somebody says, I am like ‘orlah juice, he did not say anything. The colleagues say, that follows Rebbi Simeon in a disagreement. As we have stated there: “If somebody said, an oath that I shall not eat, but he ate carcass or torn meat, abominations or crawling things, he is guilty. But Rebbi Simeon declares him free from prosecution.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if it is an inclusive statement. But if it is a detailed statement, everybody agrees that no oath can be applied to prohibitions. And here, we consider an inclusive statement. Rebbi Yudan said, one is about vows, the other about oaths. Vows can be applied to prohibitions but no oaths can be applied to prohibitions.

From here, “if his hair became heavy”: Rebbi. For Rebbi Jeremiah said in the name of Rebbi Immi: The words of Rebbi: A nazir in perpetuity shaves once in twelve months. The words of the Sages: A nazir in perpetuity sometimes shaves every thirty days, sometimes once in twelve months. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Assi: It says so: “I am a nazir like the hair on my head, like the dust of the earth, or like the sand of the sea. He is a nazir in perpetuity and shaves every thirty days. Rebbi says, this one does not shave every thirty days,” but once in twelve months. “Who is one who shaves every thirty days? If he says, I am obligated for nezirut like the hair on my head, like the dust of the earth, or like the sand of the sea.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they differ if it was not made explicit. Where do we hold? If he says, “the fullness of my hair”, everybody agrees that he shaves once every thirty days. If he says, “the number of the hairs on my head,” everybody agrees that he shaves after twelve months. But we must hold that he says “like hair”. Rebbi says, “the fullness of my hair”. But the rabbis say, he means “the number of the hairs on my head.” And here, why? Why did the man not make the vow? He only encourages himself to avoid prohibitions. In addition, from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah added: If he said, like that which is collected in the fig harvest, or like sheaves in a Sabbatical year, or like stars in the sky, he is a nazir in perpetuity and shaves every thirty days.” Could you say that Rebbi Jehudah follows the rabbis? He holds with Rebbi, as Rebbi Jehudah added: “Absalom was a nazir in perpetuity and shaved every twelve months.” What is the reason? Because of nezirut. But that would mean for the rabbis that he shaved every thirty days; that is what we have stated: “I am a nazir the house full, or a chest full. One checks him out.” It was stated on that: He shaves every thirty days. But here he said, he shaved every twelve months.

HALAKHAH: “If a cup of wine was prepared,” etc. The Mishnah applies if he is not used to it; but if he is used to it, that is what we have stated: “It happened that a cup of wine was prepared for a woman who already was drunk when she said, “I am a nazir [abstaining] from it”. The Sages said that she only intended to say, “it shall be qorban for me.” Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: It is not even an expression of qorban. Why? Because one can neither use an expression of nezirut for qorban nor an expression of qorban for nezirut.

HALAKHAH: The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr says, one has to double one’s stipulation. It follows everybody’s opinion; one tells him: Watch and keep discipline. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr or Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema, as it was stated: “This is your bill of divorce, on condition that you not fly in the air, that you not cross the Sea on your feet, that is a bill of divorce. On condition that you fly in the air, that you cross the Sea on your feet, that is no bill of divorce; Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema said, it is a bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you should realize that he seeks a subterfuge for the bill of divorce, since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied. What is Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema’s reason? Since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied, it is as if the condition attached to the bill of divorce were satisfied.

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.

HALAKHAH: “ “I am a nazir and a nazir when a son is born to me,” etc. Rebbi Yose asked: If he said, “I am a nazir for these 30 days and those 30 days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana: Is that not the Mishnah? “He interrupts his own, counts for his son, and then finishes for himself.” Not even if his wife is in the process of giving birth? He said to him, his nezirut is not comparable to his son’s nezirut, but to the case that he said, “I am already a nazir and a nazir after twenty days.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina both say: If he finished his nezirut, his son’s nezirut cannot start for him before he was shaving with a sacrifice. About a nazir who became impure, the opinions of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seem contradictory. There, he says, if a person impure by the impurity of the dead made a vow of nazir, his seventh day is counted. If a nazir becomes impure, his seventh day is not counted. In our case, is he not like a person impure by the impurity of the dead, who made a vow of nazir? And is not the seventh day counted for a person impure by the impurity of the dead, who made a vow of nazir? Would this obligate him to bring a sacrifice for his impurity? But if a nazir who becomes impure, his seventh day is not counted; does it not obligate him to bring a sacrifice for his impurity? And here, because he is obligated to bring a sacrifice (of impurity), the seventh day is [not] counted for him.

If he was born on the eightieth day, he eliminates ten. If he was born on the ninetieth day, he eliminates twenty. If he finished his nezirut and came to complete his son’s nezirut and became impure within the first ten days, he eliminates everything. Within the last twenty days? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rab and Rebbi Joḥanan both say, he eliminates thirty. Rebbi Samuel said, he eliminates seven only. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Joḥanan think that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical with substantial eliminating? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if Rebbi Joḥanan thought that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical to substantial eliminating, why would he say that he eliminates thirty? Should he not invalidate everything? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Explain it if he was born on a day unsuitable to bring a sacrifice. Think of it, if he was born in the night, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the night caused it. Think of it, if he was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave when [the son] was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave before his son was born, he celebrates one shaving for both. If he had dedicated his sacrifices but did not manage to shave before his son was born. There, they say that he celebrates one shaving for both. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shaves and then shaves a second time. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “They asked Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai: Assume that he was both a nazir and a sufferer from scale disease, may he shave once and have it counted for his nezirut and his scale disease? He said to them: If he shaved to remove hair, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves to remove hair whereas the sufferer from scale disease shaves to have hair grow. They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave to remove hair. (They said to him. If both of them shaved before the sprinkling of the blood, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before the sprinkling of the blood and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after the sprinkling of the blood! They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave before the sprinkling of the blood!) He said to them, if both shaved before they immerse themselves in water, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before he immerses himself in water and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after he immerses himself in water. They said to him, the matter is settled. It cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, it cannot be counted for the days of his count. It cannot be counted for purification; it cannot be counted for impurity. That is, if he was a nazir and sufferer from scale disease. But if he was a nazir and nazir, he may shave once for both.” What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? He explains that they disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.

If he was born on the eightieth day, he eliminates ten. If he was born on the ninetieth day, he eliminates twenty. If he finished his nezirut and came to complete his son’s nezirut and became impure within the first ten days, he eliminates everything. Within the last twenty days? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rab and Rebbi Joḥanan both say, he eliminates thirty. Rebbi Samuel said, he eliminates seven only. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Yose: Does Rebbi Joḥanan think that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical with substantial eliminating? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if Rebbi Joḥanan thought that eliminating by a shaving knife is identical to substantial eliminating, why would he say that he eliminates thirty? Should he not invalidate everything? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Explain it if he was born on a day unsuitable to bring a sacrifice. Think of it, if he was born in the night, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the night caused it. Think of it, if he was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave when [the son] was born on the Sabbath, is that not unsuitable to bring a sacrifice? It is suitable; the Sabbath caused it. If he had finished his nezirut but did not manage to shave before his son was born, he celebrates one shaving for both. If he had dedicated his sacrifices but did not manage to shave before his son was born. There, they say that he celebrates one shaving for both. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shaves and then shaves a second time. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “They asked Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai: Assume that he was both a nazir and a sufferer from scale disease, may he shave once and have it counted for his nezirut and his scale disease? He said to them: If he shaved to remove hair, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves to remove hair whereas the sufferer from scale disease shaves to have hair grow. They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave to remove hair. (They said to him. If both of them shaved before the sprinkling of the blood, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before the sprinkling of the blood and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after the sprinkling of the blood! They said to him, if it cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, should it not be counted for the days of his count? Both of them shave before the sprinkling of the blood!) He said to them, if both shaved before they immerse themselves in water, you would be correct. But the nazir shaves before he immerses himself in water and the sufferer from scale disease shaves after he immerses himself in water. They said to him, the matter is settled. It cannot be counted for the days of his completeness, it cannot be counted for the days of his count. It cannot be counted for purification; it cannot be counted for impurity. That is, if he was a nazir and sufferer from scale disease. But if he was a nazir and nazir, he may shave once for both.” What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? He explains that they disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.

HALAKHAH: ““I am a nazir for 100 days,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The reason of Rebbi Eliezer: “This is the teaching for the nazir on the day of his fulfilling;” if he becomes impure on the day of his fulfilling, one gives him the teaching for the nazir. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he becomes impure in those days, what is their status, to be given the teaching for the nazir? Rebbi Shammai said, he is obligated by the teaching for the nazir if he becomes impure on the day of his fulfilling, and for one who becomes impure on the day of his fulfilling the seventh day is not counted. Rebbi Mana asked: If he becomes impure at fulfilling, why should he invalidate 30, should he not invalidate only seven? But if somebody became impure after fulfilling, the seventh day is counted for him.

HALAKHAH: ““I am a nazir for 100 days,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The reason of Rebbi Eliezer: “This is the teaching for the nazir on the day of his fulfilling;” if he becomes impure on the day of his fulfilling, one gives him the teaching for the nazir. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he becomes impure in those days, what is their status, to be given the teaching for the nazir? Rebbi Shammai said, he is obligated by the teaching for the nazir if he becomes impure on the day of his fulfilling, and for one who becomes impure on the day of his fulfilling the seventh day is not counted. Rebbi Mana asked: If he becomes impure at fulfilling, why should he invalidate 30, should he not invalidate only seven? But if somebody became impure after fulfilling, the seventh day is counted for him.

If he is still there, Rebbi Joḥanan said, one warns him about everything for every possible leaving, and he is whipped. Rebbi Eleazar said, he does not accept [warning] unless he leaves and returns. Rebbi Abba said: So did Rebbi Joḥanan answer Rebbi Eleazar: Is it not written, “he shall not come” and “he may not defile himself”? He said to him, if they warned him because of “he shall not come”, he is whipped; because of “he shall not defile himself” he is not whipped. Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Joḥanan learned from prostrating, as we have stated there: “If he prostrated himself or stayed there long enough to prostrate himself.” Rebbi Mattaniah said, we thought that was where they do disagree? About lashes, but not about a sacrifice. Since Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Joḥanan learned from prostrating, that means that lashes and sacrifices are one and the same. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A nazir who drank wine the entire day is guilty only once.” He explains it, that his throat was never empty. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he was defiling himself for the dead the entire day, he is guilty only once.” He explains it about one who waits before every leaving, who is whipped. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: If a Cohen was standing in a cemetery and they were handing another corpse to him, could he accept? The verse says, “the husband shall be defiled for his family.” If he accepted it, I could think that he was guilty. The verse says, “to be profaned”. One who adds impurity to the impurity; that excludes him who does not add impurity to his impurity. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Neḥemiah said, “to be profaned”, that excludes him who does not add impurity to his impurity, lest he say, because I became defiled for my father I may go and collect the bones of X. “To be profaned”, at the time of death; Rebbi said, also “in their death.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree. It follows that Rebbi Simeon bar Abba follows Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. When Simeon bar Abba was dying, he said, this should be taken out here, that should be taken out there.

Rebbi Yose said, what is his problem? Of a pure nazir. But for an impure nazir, it is obvious to him that they cannot be combined. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: Is that not an argument of “so much more”? Since for days which are counted neither for his nor for his son’s nezirut, you say that they are combined, days which are counted for his and for his son’s nezirut, it would only be logical that they should be combined! Rebbi Mana said, there he is not in a state to receive a warning, but here he is in a state to receive a warning. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Since you say there about Rebbi Eliezer, at the start only if he has something to omit; at the end even if he has nothing to omit? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is that not a Mishnah? “If he became impure on day 101, he invalidated 30; Rebbi Eliezer said, he invalidated only seven.” He said, we hear that he invalidates; did we hear that he brings a sacrifice?

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ at the end. Rebbi Simeon says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ for every item.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, [Rebbi Simeon implies] if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the baraita supports the colleagues: “A woman made a vow as nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I;’ if the first’s husband heard and told her, ‘it is permitted to you,’ the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. Rebbi Simeon says, if she said, my intention was only to be like her, in her state, the second also is permitted.” Because she said “to be like her, in her state;” therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state,” the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where there was no original nezirut, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? When Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest, if he attaches: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.

There, we have stated: “Leftovers for nezirim are for nezirim; what is left over from a nazir is for donation.” Rav Ḥisda said, only if his purification offering was presented last. But if his well-being offering waspresented last, what is left over is for a well-being offering. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if his well-being offering was presented last, it is a general rule for a nazir that his leftover be for donation. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “The following are undesignated monies: any which contain money for purification offerings that should die. Even if he designated money for purification offerings that should die, it remains undesignated.” A baraita supports Rav Ḥisda: “This is for my purification offering and the rest for my nezirut. Then he died. One commits larceny with all of them but not with part of them.” It does not say, when he died it should be given for donation.

There, we have stated: “Leftovers for nezirim are for nezirim; what is left over from a nazir is for donation.” Rav Ḥisda said, only if his purification offering was presented last. But if his well-being offering waspresented last, what is left over is for a well-being offering. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if his well-being offering was presented last, it is a general rule for a nazir that his leftover be for donation. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “The following are undesignated monies: any which contain money for purification offerings that should die. Even if he designated money for purification offerings that should die, it remains undesignated.” A baraita supports Rav Ḥisda: “This is for my purification offering and the rest for my nezirut. Then he died. One commits larceny with all of them but not with part of them.” It does not say, when he died it should be given for donation.

There, we have stated: “If somebody says, ‘I undertake [to bring] on a pan’ and he brought in a deep vessel, in a deep vessel and he brought on a pan.” Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This is the House of Shammai’s, since the House of Shammai say, “dedication in error is dedication.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yose: Why do we not explain it according to everybody, if he said, “I said, on a pan”? But if he said, “I undertake [to bring] on a pan,” and then he changed his mind and said, “in a deep vessel”, he fulfilled his duty. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Yasa came in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said, “I undertake [to bring] on a pan or in a deep vessel,” turned around and said, “on a pan”, and turned around and said, “in a deep vessel”? Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Hama in the name of Rebbi Yose: He determines even orally. They thought to say, even holidays determine, even vessels determine.

“That was the error of Naḥum from Media.” What was his error? That he found for them an opening due to changed circumstances. “Naḥum from Media said to them: ‘Would you have made a vow to become nezirim if you had known that the Temple would be destroyed at some future time?’ ” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the following he should have said to them: Did you not know that the prophets already had prophesied that eventually the Temple would be destroyed? Then there are no changed circumstances. Rebbi Hila said, still it is changed circumstances. They could have said to him, we knew it, but it seemed to us that this referred to the distant future: “The vision he sees is for many years.”

Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.

Rebbi [Yose] said to the colleagues: You should know that Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree: If somebody split a limb from a living animal and ate it, everybody agrees that he is free from prosecution. Where do they disagree? If he split it in his mouth before he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan considers his mouth as inside, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish considers his mouth as outside. They asked him, what do you say? He answered them, I informed you that mighty mountains disagree, and you ask this? If it is so, even if he split it outside and then ate, he should be guilty! Why? That is how one eats. If somebody split an ant in his mouth and ate it, that is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Maisha asked Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he split a grape in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered, there it is something for which there is a prohibition and impurity. In a circumstance in which its impurity disappeard, its prohibition disappeared. But here is a prohibition and no impurity. Rebbi Abba ben Rebbi Mamal asked: If he split an olive-sized bit of mazzah in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, in the other cases, his palate did not enjoy an olive sized bit. The rabbis of Caesarea said that Rebbi Nisa asked: If he split in his mouth pomegranate berries which are ‘orlah and ate them, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Where do we hold? If because of fluids, we already did state: “Nothing makes impure as a drink except what comes from olives and grapes.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it if he swallowed them.

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Ḥiya bar Yosef objected before Rebbi Joḥanan: Take, for example, meat in milk, where he did not taste the forbidden thing itself and you say that he is whipped! He accepted that. What is meant by: he accepted that? Rebbi Ḥiya bar Abun said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Like a person who listens to the argument of the opposing party he accepted it.

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

HALAKHAH: It is written: “He has to vow to the Eternal the days of his nezirut,” from the day he brings his sacrifices, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, from the time of his shaving. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hoshaia, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Where do they disagree? If he shaved on the seventh and brought his sacrifices on the eighth. But if he shaved on the eighth and brought his sacrifices on the same day, everybody agrees on the day he brings his sacrifices. Rebbi Yose said, that is, if he immersed himself on the seventh. But if he immersed himself on the eighth, the eighth takes the place of the seventh and the seventh of the eighth; he counts only from that “seventh”. If he became impure and impure again, he brings a sacrifice for each occurrence. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, but following Rebbi this person still stays in impure nezirut. Rebbi Hila said, where do they disagree? To count nezirut in purity. “He has to vow to the Eternal the days of his nezirut and bring.” Rebbi said, until he actually brought. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, even if he was enabled to bring the sacrifice for impurity. Everybody agrees that he brings a sacrifice for impurity. It was stated thus: If he became impure on the seventh, and again impure on the eighth, he brings a sacrifice for each occurrence. In Rebbi Ze‘ira’s opinion, following Rebbi the first sacrifice is superseded and he brings the second; following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah it was not superseded. In Rebbi Hila’s opinion, everybody agrees that nothing is superseded and he brings another.