levir

[This is the procedure in the performance of] the commandment of halitzah: He and his deceased brother’s wife come to the court, and they offer him appropriate advice, for it is said, “Then the elders of his city shall call him and speak to him” (Deut. 25:8). She then says: “My husband’s brother refuses to establish a name for his brother in Israel; he will not perform the duty of a levir (yavam)” (verse. Then he says: “I do not wish to marry her” (verse. [These sayings] were spoken in the holy tongue (Hebrew). “Then his brother’s widow shall go up to him in the presence of the elders, pull the sandal off his foot and spit in his face” (verse spit that the judges can see. “And make this declaration: Thus shall be done to the man who will not build up his brother’s house”. Thus far they used to dictate. When Rabbi Hyrkanus was under the terebinth at Kefar Etam he dictated the reading and completed the entire section, the practice was established to complete the entire section. “And he shall go in Israel by the name of ‘the family of the unsandaled one’” (verse. [The recitation of this verse] is a commandment [to be performed] by the judges and not by the disciples. Rabbi Judah says: it is a commandment incumbent upon all present to cry “[the man] that had his shoe pulled off, [the man] that had his shoe pulled off, [the man] that had his shoe pulled off.”

These are subjects concerning which Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai: A woman who came from overseas and said: “My husband died” may be married again; “My husband died [without children]” she must be married by her husband’s brother (the levir). But Beth Hillel says: “We have heard so only in the case of one who came from the harvesting.” Beth Shammai said to them: “It is the same thing in the case of one who came from the harvesting or who came from the olive-picking or who came from overseas; they mentioned harvesting only because that is how it happened.” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to Beth Shammai. Beth Shammai says: “She may be married again and take her kethubah payment.” But Beth Hillel says: “She may be married again but may not take her kethubah payment.” Beth Shammai said to them: “You have permitted the graver matter of a forbidden marriage, should you not permit the lighter matter of property?” Beth Hillel said to them: “We have found that brothers do not inherit on her statement.” Beth Shammai said to them: “Do we not infer it from her marriage document in which he writes to her ‘That if you be married to another you shall take what is written for you’?” Then Beth Hillel changed their mind and taught according to the opinion of Beth Shammai.

HALAKHAH: “Fifteen [categories of] women free their co-wives”, etc. It is written “unleavened it must be eaten”. Since it was permitted and then forbidden, when it became permitted again should one think it returned to its prior permission? The verse states “unleavened it should be eaten” as commandment. Similarly, “her levir shall come upon her” as a commandment. Since she was permitted and then forbidden, when she became permitted again should one think she returned to her prior permission? The verse states “her levir shall come upon her” as commandment.

HALAKHAH: “Fifteen [categories of] women free their co-wives”, etc. It is written “unleavened it must be eaten”. Since it was permitted and then forbidden, when it became permitted again should one think it returned to its prior permission? The verse states “unleavened it should be eaten” as commandment. Similarly, “her levir shall come upon her” as a commandment. Since she was permitted and then forbidden, when she became permitted again should one think she returned to her prior permission? The verse states “her levir shall come upon her” as commandment.

Rebbi Yose explains the baraita: “Unleavened it must be eaten”. Since it was permitted before it was dedicated, if one wants to eat it, he eats, not to eat, he does not eat. When he dedicated it became forbidden. When the fistful was brought it became permitted again; should one think it returned to its prior permission? If he wants to eat it, he eats, not to eat, he does not eat? The verse states “unleavened it must be eaten” as commandment. Similarly, “her levir shall come upon her” as a commandment. Since she was permitted before she was married to his brother, if he wanted to bring her into his house, he could bring her, not to bring her into his house, he would not bring her. When she was married to his brother she became forbidden. When his brother died childless she became permitted again. Should one think she returned to her prior permission, if he wanted to bring her into his house, he could bring her, not to bring her into his house, he would not bring her? The verse states “her levir shall come upon her” as commandment.

Rebbi Yose explains the baraita: “Unleavened it must be eaten”. Since it was permitted before it was dedicated, if one wants to eat it, he eats, not to eat, he does not eat. When he dedicated it became forbidden. When the fistful was brought it became permitted again; should one think it returned to its prior permission? If he wants to eat it, he eats, not to eat, he does not eat? The verse states “unleavened it must be eaten” as commandment. Similarly, “her levir shall come upon her” as a commandment. Since she was permitted before she was married to his brother, if he wanted to bring her into his house, he could bring her, not to bring her into his house, he would not bring her. When she was married to his brother she became forbidden. When his brother died childless she became permitted again. Should one think she returned to her prior permission, if he wanted to bring her into his house, he could bring her, not to bring her into his house, he would not bring her? The verse states “her levir shall come upon her” as commandment.

Rebbi Huna explains the baraita: “Unleavened it must be eaten”. Since it was permitted before it was dedicated, if one wants to eat it leavened, he eats it, unleavened, he eats it. The verse states “unleavened it should be eaten” as commandment. Similarly, “her brother-in-law shall come upon her” as commandment. Since she was permitted before she was married to his brother, if he wanted to bring her into his house because of her shapeliness, he could bring her, because of her money, he could bring her. When she was married to his brother she became forbidden. When his brother died childless she became permitted again. Should one think she returned to her prior permission, if he wanted to bring her into his house because of her shapeliness, he could bring her, because of her money, he could bring her? The verse states “her levir shall come upon her” as commandment.

It is written: “For anyone who is acting out any of these abominations will be extirpated”. Was not the brother’s wife in the set of all incest prohibitions and was removed from this set by the levirate? Could one say that all other incest prohibitions were removed from this set by levirate? Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: “upon her”, “upon her”: “her levir shall come upon her.” Since with respect to “upon her” which was said there, the verse speaks about paternal brothers, so with respect to “upon her” which was said here, the verse speaks about paternal brothers.

Rebbi Ayvu bar Naggari, Crispus, in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “The dead man’s wife should not be outside, to a strange man.” That is a wife who is a stranger to him. The Torah said, she should not be his wife even in case of a commandment. That being, she should not need ḥalîṣah! Rebbi Jeremiah said: “his sister-in-law, his sister-in-law”, the Torah increased the cases of ḥalîṣah! If from “his sister-in-law, his sister-in-law”, did the Torah not increase the cases of levirate? Rebbi Ismael stated: “My levir refuses”. That is, my levir refused, not that Heaven refused for him. In that case, she should not need ḥalîṣah! That means, the statement of Rebbi Jeremiah is needed, “his sister-in-law, his sister-in-law”, the Torah increased the cases of ḥalîṣah!

Rebbi Ayvu bar Naggari, Crispus, in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “The dead man’s wife should not be outside, to a strange man.” That is a wife who is a stranger to him. The Torah said, she should not be his wife even in case of a commandment. That being, she should not need ḥalîṣah! Rebbi Jeremiah said: “his sister-in-law, his sister-in-law”, the Torah increased the cases of ḥalîṣah! If from “his sister-in-law, his sister-in-law”, did the Torah not increase the cases of levirate? Rebbi Ismael stated: “My levir refuses”. That is, my levir refused, not that Heaven refused for him. In that case, she should not need ḥalîṣah! That means, the statement of Rebbi Jeremiah is needed, “his sister-in-law, his sister-in-law”, the Torah increased the cases of ḥalîṣah!

Rebbi Yudan asked: Following him who says that everybody agrees about the co-wife that he is guilty, if somebody from the market gave qiddushin to one of them and then the levir came and performed ḥalîṣah with her or had intercourse with her, did the qiddushin become invalid? If he performed ḥalîṣah with her companion but then had intercourse with her, were qiddushin validated retroactively? Rebbi Shammai said, did not Rebbi Yannai say the following: More than 30 elders voted, from where that qiddushin have no legal effect on a sister-in-law? The verse says, “the wife of the deceased may not belong to any outside unrelated man”, that she cannot have any existence with another man. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not a Mishnah? “Or after your levir will have performed ḥalîṣah with you, she is not preliminarily married.” And Rebbi Yannai praised him “those who pour out gold from the wallet,” “my son, they should not be removed from your eyes,” “get wise, my son, and make me happy”, “give to the wise that he shall become wiser,” “let the wise listen that he increase in knowledge.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after all these praises I can explain it following Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba said that there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law! But there is one sister-in-law, here are two sisters-in-law. The prohibition of a single sister-in-law is different from that of two sisters-in-law!

Rebbi Yudan asked: Following him who says that everybody agrees about the co-wife that he is guilty, if somebody from the market gave qiddushin to one of them and then the levir came and performed ḥalîṣah with her or had intercourse with her, did the qiddushin become invalid? If he performed ḥalîṣah with her companion but then had intercourse with her, were qiddushin validated retroactively? Rebbi Shammai said, did not Rebbi Yannai say the following: More than 30 elders voted, from where that qiddushin have no legal effect on a sister-in-law? The verse says, “the wife of the deceased may not belong to any outside unrelated man”, that she cannot have any existence with another man. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not a Mishnah? “Or after your levir will have performed ḥalîṣah with you, she is not preliminarily married.” And Rebbi Yannai praised him “those who pour out gold from the wallet,” “my son, they should not be removed from your eyes,” “get wise, my son, and make me happy”, “give to the wise that he shall become wiser,” “let the wise listen that he increase in knowledge.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after all these praises I can explain it following Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba said that there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law! But there is one sister-in-law, here are two sisters-in-law. The prohibition of a single sister-in-law is different from that of two sisters-in-law!

HALAKHAH: “All these free their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from ḥalîṣah and levirate, etc.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. But we hold in case she says “I cannot stand marriage”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

HALAKHAH: “All these free their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from ḥalîṣah and levirate, etc.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. But we hold in case she says “I cannot stand marriage”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Mattaniah said: Explain it when they died without having repudiated since there is a Mishnah: “If a woman could repudiate but did not do so, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but cannot be married in levirate.” So is the Mishnah: “If a woman could repudiate but did not dies, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but cannot be married in levirate.” Rebbi Abba Mari said, you may even say if she still lives; explain it if her father is the only levir.

Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, did not Rebbi Yose say correctly before he changed his mind? Once a man’s daughter is married without being a she-ram, her co-wife is forbidden. If in addition she is a she-ram, does her co-wife become permitted? He said to him, the she-ram is as if non-existent. If there are two sisters-in-law, one a she-ram and one not a she-ram, if the levir comes and performs ḥalîṣah or has intercourse with the first, did he free her companion of anything? That shows that the she-ram is as if non-existent.

“Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. I might think that just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final; the verse says “and act as levir towards her.” This directs the entire paragraph towards levirate. Cohabitation is final, “bespeaking” is not final. Then what is “bespeaking” good for? To forbid her to the brothers.

“Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. I might think that just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final; the verse says “and act as levir towards her.” This directs the entire paragraph towards levirate. Cohabitation is final, “bespeaking” is not final. Then what is “bespeaking” good for? To forbid her to the brothers.

Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.

Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.

Both the rabbis and Rebbi Simeon agree to the following. According to the rabbis, the aspect which “bespeaking” acquires is forbidden in the co-wife, the aspect which “bespeaking” does not acquire is permitted in the co-wife; therefore, the latter has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. According to Rebbi Simeon, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are permitted. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second one permitted. Out of doubt, she has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. What is the difference between them? If he slept with the second one. In the opinion of the rabbis, an incestuous intercourse because he had “bespoken”. Therefore, if he had not “bespoken” she may have levirate and there is no candidacy at all. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I explained that following what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. He had in her an interest of candidacy. When she died, the candidacy was eliminated. And here, when he died, the candidacy was eliminated.

HALAKHAH: “The obligation of levirate is on the oldest [brother] but if a younger one got the start on him, he acquired, etc.” “The obligation of levirate is on the oldest,” since it is said, “the firstborn she will bear shall …”. How do we hold? If about the newborn, the verse should read “he should rise in the name of his dead father.” But it must be that the newborn is a firstborn. In that case, even if he had children and they died before he died, his widow should not be a candidate for levirate! Then the verse should have said, “he never had children”. But if it cannot refer to the newborn; let it refer to the levir, “the obligation of levirate is on the oldest.”

There, we have stated: “If a brother gave qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If [one of the] brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to send away his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.” It says only: If the sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him. But if his wife died, his sister-in-law is forbidden to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Sages hold that for anything induced by a cause, if the cause is removed the prohibition is removed. But for Rebbi Eliezer, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains.

There, we have stated: “If a brother gave qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If [one of the] brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to send away his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.” It says only: If the sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him. But if his wife died, his sister-in-law is forbidden to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But the Sages say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Sages hold that for anything induced by a cause, if the cause is removed the prohibition is removed. But for Rebbi Eliezer, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains.

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

The argument of Rebbi Simeon seems to be inverted. There, he says, “he marries in levirate the one he wants and performs ḥalîṣah with the other,” and here, he says so? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, when I was still there, I learned the reason: There, the candidacy for two brothers-in-law does not interfere and one candidacy can be added to another, but here it is candidacy for one levir and no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”. Rebbi Mattania said, are not sisters different from unrelated women? If you want a difficulty, find it in what Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of RavSheshet: They stated there that Rebbi Simeon forbade both of them. The argument of Rebbi Simeon seems to be inverted. There he says, both are forbidden, and here you says, both are permitted.

MISHNAH: Three brothers are married to three unrelated women. If one of them died, his second brother “bespeaks” her and then dies, these perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate, as it is said: “Her levir shall come to her,” if on her is the candidacy from one brother but not from two. Rebbi Simeon says, he takes in levirate the one he prefers and performs ḥalîṣah with the other.

HALAKHAH: “Three brothers married to three women,” etc. Can a woman waiting for a levir who became available to several brothers-in-law not be married in levirate? Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. One understands that he has to perform ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” because the wife of one [dead husband] is married in levirate, not the wife of two dead. Why can the other one not be married in levirate? Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, of any one you cannot marry in levirate, you cannot marry the co-wife in levirate. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if Rebbi Eleazar formulated this, he formulated what he had heard from me. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah said so: “ A boy at least nine years and one day old who had intercourse with his sister-in-law and when he grew up he married another wife; if he never had intercourse with the first again after he became an adult, the second [wife] may perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate. The first one must perform ḥalîṣah and cannot be married in levirate.” Here you say, she performs ḥalîṣah; there you say, she is married in levirate! Where you say she performs ḥalîṣah, Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Simeon; where you say, she is married in levirate, Rebbi Simeon and the rabbis. Rebbi Abun bar Bisna in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, but only if first he married in levirate and then performed ḥalîṣah. But if he performed ḥalîṣah first, it is forbidden; perhaps “bespeaking” acquired and she was freed by her co-wife’s ḥalîṣah.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody performed ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law but she turns out to have been pregnant,” etc. If he transgressed, but not from the start. That follows the Mishnah: “The widow should not perform ḥalîṣah or have levirate until after three months.” Why can she not have ḥalîṣah immediately? As you take it, if she has a live birth, ḥalîṣah did not affect her. If she has a still birth, she holds ḥalîṣah in her hand. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah, that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood. Rebbi Hoshaiah stated: “My levir refuses.” To the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him one says: perform ḥalîṣah; but to the one to whom one cannot say: perform levirate, to him one cannot say: perform ḥalîṣah! What is the difference between them? If she had been acceptable and was desecrated, e. g., a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who had performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest. According to him who says that she should not need a proclamation for the priesthood; that one, who does not need a proclamation for the priesthood, should have ḥalîṣah. According to him who says that to the one to whom one says: perform levirate, to him does one say: perform ḥalîṣah?

Rebbi Yudan asked: If he performed ḥalîṣah with a pregnant woman and she had a miscarriage? Let us hear from the following: If somebody died and left a pregnant widow, should I think that she must have recourse to her levir? The verse says, “that his name should not be extinguished from Israel,” only one whose name is extinguished. The verse says, “to establish a name in Israel for his brother,” until you know whether there is a live child or not. I could think that the wife of an eunuch should need levirate, the verse says “that his name should not be extinguished from Israel,” only one whose name is not extinguished; this excludes this one whose name was already extinguished.

MISHNAH: If somebody marries his sister-in-law but she turned out to have been pregnant and gave birth. If the child is alive, [the levir] has to divorce her and they must bring a sacrifice. If the child is not alive, he may keep her. If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated to bring a reparation offering for an uncertain case.

If the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s [inheritance]. one says to him, the other one is your father. If the levir comes to take his part in his brother’s [inheritance], one says to him, that one is his son. How is that? They compromise between themselves and split the property of the deceased. One finds, compromise with his brother is loss to the brothers; competition between the brothers is catastrophy for the brothers. If the old man dies, one finds that certain sons and an uncertain grandson come. If the uncertain [son] dies there exists a certain son of his father’s brother and an uncertain mother. If one of the brothers dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain son of a brother. If the mother of the uncertain [son] dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain husband. If first the uncertain [son] dies and after that his mother, a son of the mother’s brother is certain but the husband uncertain. If the levir dies and the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s inheritance, if the first one was poor, they tell him, that one is your father. If he was rich, the tell him, we all are brothers, sons of his brother. Come and let us inherit our father’s part and the part of our father’s brother.

If the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s [inheritance]. one says to him, the other one is your father. If the levir comes to take his part in his brother’s [inheritance], one says to him, that one is his son. How is that? They compromise between themselves and split the property of the deceased. One finds, compromise with his brother is loss to the brothers; competition between the brothers is catastrophy for the brothers. If the old man dies, one finds that certain sons and an uncertain grandson come. If the uncertain [son] dies there exists a certain son of his father’s brother and an uncertain mother. If one of the brothers dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain son of a brother. If the mother of the uncertain [son] dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain husband. If first the uncertain [son] dies and after that his mother, a son of the mother’s brother is certain but the husband uncertain. If the levir dies and the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s inheritance, if the first one was poor, they tell him, that one is your father. If he was rich, the tell him, we all are brothers, sons of his brother. Come and let us inherit our father’s part and the part of our father’s brother.

MISHNAH: If property came to a woman waiting for her levir, the House of Shammai agree with the House of Hillel that she may sell or give away and it is valid. If she dies, what does one do with her ketubah and property that enters and leaves with her? The House of Shammai say, the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs. But the House of Hillel say that all property remains where it is; the ketubah in the hands of the husband’s heirs and property that enters and leaves with her in the hands of her father’s heirs.

HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid. If she dies, what does one do with her ketubah?” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.

HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid. If she dies, what does one do with her ketubah?” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.

HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid. If she dies, what does one do with her ketubah?” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.

HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid. If she dies, what does one do with her ketubah?” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.

HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid. If she dies, what does one do with her ketubah?” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.

HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid. If she dies, what does one do with her ketubah?” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.

HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid. If she dies, what does one do with her ketubah?” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.

HALAKHAH: “He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law,” etc. Because he performed ḥalîṣah with her. Therefore, if he did not perform ḥalîṣah with her but she died, her mother is permitted to him. That is what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. He had in her an interest of candidacy. When she died, the candidacy was eliminated. And here, when he died, the candidacy was eliminated. Rebbi Abun understood it from what follows: “And her sister as long as she is alive, but the brothers are permitted.” Is her sister’s position relative to the brothers not as if she herself had died?

MISHNAH: If a brother gave qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him wait until your older brother has acted. If [one of the] brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry. If the levir died, he has to remove himself from his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.

MISHNAH: If a brother gave qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him wait until your older brother has acted. If [one of the] brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry. If the levir died, he has to remove himself from his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.

HALAKHAH: “If his wife died, her sister is permitted to him,” etc. That means, her mother is forbidden to him. Did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. But since we stated: “If he performed ḥalîṣah with her and she died, her sister is permitted to him,” therefore he stated “her sister.”

HALAKHAH: “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as a wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. I might think that just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final; the verse says “her levir shall come upon her.” This directs the entire paragraph towards levirate. Cohabitation is final, “bespeaking” is not final. Then what is “bespeaking” good for? To forbid her to the brothers.

HALAKHAH: “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as a wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. I might think that just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final; the verse says “her levir shall come upon her.” This directs the entire paragraph towards levirate. Cohabitation is final, “bespeaking” is not final. Then what is “bespeaking” good for? To forbid her to the brothers.

Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.

Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. What is the argument of Rebbi Simeon? “Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. Just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final. Or “her levir shall come upon her”, then she has been acquired by him and “bespeaking” was of no use to her.

HALAKHAH: “How? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law,” etc. That means that a bill of divorce frees more than anything “bespeaking” had acquired. If you would say that a bill of divorce does not free more than “bespeaking” had acquired, the levir could say: My bill of divorce shall not free more than my “bespeaking” had acquired. But then the bill of divorce did not even free what my “bespeaking” had acquired! “Cutting off.” That is no cutting off!

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.

MISHNAH: If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and copulated, or copulated with both of them, or copulated and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and performed ḥaliṣah, nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, whether there are two sisters-in-law and one levir or two levirs with one sister-in-law.

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”

“Her levir shall come upon her”, when he is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when he is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against his will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, when she is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when she is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against her will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in the usual way. “And take her as a wife for himself”, not in the usual way. “And take her in levirate”, even from the side. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in a completed intercourse. “And take her as a wife for himself”, in incomplete intercourse. “And take her in levirate”, even if only touching.

“Her levir shall come upon her”, when he is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when he is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against his will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, when she is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when she is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against her will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in the usual way. “And take her as a wife for himself”, not in the usual way. “And take her in levirate”, even from the side. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in a completed intercourse. “And take her as a wife for himself”, in incomplete intercourse. “And take her in levirate”, even if only touching.

“Her levir shall come upon her”, when he is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when he is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against his will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, when she is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when she is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against her will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in the usual way. “And take her as a wife for himself”, not in the usual way. “And take her in levirate”, even from the side. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in a completed intercourse. “And take her as a wife for himself”, in incomplete intercourse. “And take her in levirate”, even if only touching.

“Her levir shall come upon her”, when he is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when he is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against his will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, when she is aware of it. “And take her as a wife for himself”, when she is not aware of it. “And take her in levirate”, even against her will. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in the usual way. “And take her as a wife for himself”, not in the usual way. “And take her in levirate”, even from the side. “Her levir shall come upon her”, in a completed intercourse. “And take her as a wife for himself”, in incomplete intercourse. “And take her in levirate”, even if only touching.

May she eat heave? Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: It is reasonable that she should eat if she was eating during her husband’s lifetime; otherwise she may not eat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she eats even if she did not eat before. Rebbi Yose said, even if she was only able to eat. There is a baraita in support of either one. There is a baraita supporting Samuel: A hearing daughter of an Israel who married a deaf-mute Cohen does not eat heave. If he died and she came before the levir, if he is hearing, she eats, deaf-mute does not eat. There is a baraita supporting Rebbi Joḥanan: A hearing daughter of an Israel who became engaged to a hearing Cohen, who did not manage to bring her to the bridal chamber before he became deaf-mute or before she became deaf-mute, does not eat heave. If he died and she came before a levir she eats even if he is deaf-mute. In this He increased the power of the levir over that of the husband since the deaf-mute levir enables her to eat, but the deaf-mute husband does not enable her to eat.

May she eat heave? Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: It is reasonable that she should eat if she was eating during her husband’s lifetime; otherwise she may not eat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she eats even if she did not eat before. Rebbi Yose said, even if she was only able to eat. There is a baraita in support of either one. There is a baraita supporting Samuel: A hearing daughter of an Israel who married a deaf-mute Cohen does not eat heave. If he died and she came before the levir, if he is hearing, she eats, deaf-mute does not eat. There is a baraita supporting Rebbi Joḥanan: A hearing daughter of an Israel who became engaged to a hearing Cohen, who did not manage to bring her to the bridal chamber before he became deaf-mute or before she became deaf-mute, does not eat heave. If he died and she came before a levir she eats even if he is deaf-mute. In this He increased the power of the levir over that of the husband since the deaf-mute levir enables her to eat, but the deaf-mute husband does not enable her to eat.

May she eat heave? Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: It is reasonable that she should eat if she was eating during her husband’s lifetime; otherwise she may not eat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she eats even if she did not eat before. Rebbi Yose said, even if she was only able to eat. There is a baraita in support of either one. There is a baraita supporting Samuel: A hearing daughter of an Israel who married a deaf-mute Cohen does not eat heave. If he died and she came before the levir, if he is hearing, she eats, deaf-mute does not eat. There is a baraita supporting Rebbi Joḥanan: A hearing daughter of an Israel who became engaged to a hearing Cohen, who did not manage to bring her to the bridal chamber before he became deaf-mute or before she became deaf-mute, does not eat heave. If he died and she came before a levir she eats even if he is deaf-mute. In this He increased the power of the levir over that of the husband since the deaf-mute levir enables her to eat, but the deaf-mute husband does not enable her to eat.

May she eat heave? Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: It is reasonable that she should eat if she was eating during her husband’s lifetime; otherwise she may not eat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she eats even if she did not eat before. Rebbi Yose said, even if she was only able to eat. There is a baraita in support of either one. There is a baraita supporting Samuel: A hearing daughter of an Israel who married a deaf-mute Cohen does not eat heave. If he died and she came before the levir, if he is hearing, she eats, deaf-mute does not eat. There is a baraita supporting Rebbi Joḥanan: A hearing daughter of an Israel who became engaged to a hearing Cohen, who did not manage to bring her to the bridal chamber before he became deaf-mute or before she became deaf-mute, does not eat heave. If he died and she came before a levir she eats even if he is deaf-mute. In this He increased the power of the levir over that of the husband since the deaf-mute levir enables her to eat, but the deaf-mute husband does not enable her to eat.

HALAKHAH: “Similarly, anybody who comes upon any of the incest-prohibited women,” etc. “He should not take a widow.” Even if under duress? The verse says, “he shall not desecrate his seed in his people.” Even if he touched? The verse does not say לא יחול but לא יחלל, even under duress; לא יחול but לא יחלל, even by touching. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: It says here “taking” and it says there “taking” referring to incest prohibitions. Since regarding “taking” referred to by incest prohibitions He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked, if regarding “taking” referred to by incest prohibitions He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and the child is a bastard, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and treat the child as a bastard. Rebbi Yosa said, for which purpose was “desecrated” written? Is not bastard worse than desecrated? Rebbi Abun bar Bisna came in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal. It says here “taking” and it says there “taking” referring to the woman waiting for the levir. Since regarding “taking” referring to the one waiting for the levir He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and the child is acceptable, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and treat the child as acceptable, since Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said: When he touched, he became guilty because of the desecrated one. When the gland entered, he became guilty for having intercourse. When he ejaculated, he became guilty because of desecrating.

HALAKHAH: “Similarly, anybody who comes upon any of the incest-prohibited women,” etc. “He should not take a widow.” Even if under duress? The verse says, “he shall not desecrate his seed in his people.” Even if he touched? The verse does not say לא יחול but לא יחלל, even under duress; לא יחול but לא יחלל, even by touching. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: It says here “taking” and it says there “taking” referring to incest prohibitions. Since regarding “taking” referred to by incest prohibitions He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked, if regarding “taking” referred to by incest prohibitions He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and the child is a bastard, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and treat the child as a bastard. Rebbi Yosa said, for which purpose was “desecrated” written? Is not bastard worse than desecrated? Rebbi Abun bar Bisna came in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal. It says here “taking” and it says there “taking” referring to the woman waiting for the levir. Since regarding “taking” referring to the one waiting for the levir He treated the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and the child is acceptable, so also regarding “taking” referred to here we should treat the one who touched as equal to the one who completed and treat the child as acceptable, since Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said: When he touched, he became guilty because of the desecrated one. When the gland entered, he became guilty for having intercourse. When he ejaculated, he became guilty because of desecrating.

MISHNAH: The High Priest shall not marry a widow, whether a widow from betrothal or a widow from marriage. He shall not marry an adult; Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon enable the adult. He shall not marry one injured by a piece of wood. If he gave qiddushin and afterwards was elected High Priest, he shall marry her; it happened that Joshua ben Gamla had given qiddushin to Martha bat Boetos when the king appointed him as High Priest and he married her. If a woman was waiting for her Cohen levir when he was elected High Priest, even though he “bespoke” her, he may not marry her. If the brother of a High Priest died, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

MISHNAH: The fetus, the levir, the betrothal, the deaf-and-dumb, and the male nine years and one day old disable but do not enable to eat. If there was a doubt whether or not he had reached nine years and one dayt; whether or not he had grown two pubic hairs; when the house fell on him and his brother’s daughter and it is not known who of them died first, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?

HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?

HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?

“The deaf-and-dumb disables.” Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “The wife of the deaf-and-dumb or the insane immerses herself from her husband’s bosom and eats”? Rebbi Abba Mari and Rebbi Mattaniah, one said, a disqualified deaf-and-dumb, the other said, a deaf-and-dumb levir.

“If he did not know her carnally after he was injured in his testicles or his penis was cut off, they may eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Eleazar’s and Rebbi Simeon’s. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion; there is a difference since he did not add an acquisition to disable. It turns out that this disagreement parallels the other disagreement, since they disagreed: A priestly woman waiting for her levir who became eligible to two priestly levirs. If one of them “bespoke” her but did not have occasion to bring her to the marriage chamber before he became injured in his testicles or his penis was damaged, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, since she is a candidate for disabling intercourse, she is disabled. Rebbi Joḥanan said, when he will copulate. If one of them was qualified but the other disqualified, even Rebbi Joḥanan agrees. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada asked before Rebbi Mana, if the qualified one “bespoke” her? He said to him, the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish.

HALAKHAH: “There exist women permitted to their husbands,” etc. Rebbi Niḥa bar Sava asked before Rebbi Jonah: Why “married”? Even “betrothed”! Why a widow? even a virgin! Are these all? She and her co-wife. I also have others: The co-wife of one suspected of adultery is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. If his brother had slept with the sister of one who had performed ḥalîṣah with him, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. This supports Rebbi Jonah, since Rebbi Jonah said, the groupings of Rebbi are not exhaustive.

HALAKHAH: “There exist women permitted to their husbands,” etc. Rebbi Niḥa bar Sava asked before Rebbi Jonah: Why “married”? Even “betrothed”! Why a widow? even a virgin! Are these all? She and her co-wife. I also have others: The co-wife of one suspected of adultery is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. If his brother had slept with the sister of one who had performed ḥalîṣah with him, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. This supports Rebbi Jonah, since Rebbi Jonah said, the groupings of Rebbi are not exhaustive.

HALAKHAH: “There exist women permitted to their husbands,” etc. Rebbi Niḥa bar Sava asked before Rebbi Jonah: Why “married”? Even “betrothed”! Why a widow? even a virgin! Are these all? She and her co-wife. I also have others: The co-wife of one suspected of adultery is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. If his brother had slept with the sister of one who had performed ḥalîṣah with him, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. This supports Rebbi Jonah, since Rebbi Jonah said, the groupings of Rebbi are not exhaustive.

“If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir.” Did not Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun say in the name of Rav that a proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]? So is the Mishnah: If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav: A proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]. What is the reason? Qualified men are warned against disqualified women and disqualified men against qualified women but not disqualified women against qualified men nor qualified women against disqualified men. Did we not state: “they should not take, should not take”, which teaches that the woman is warned through the man? They wanted to say, qualified women against disqualified women but it is only disqualified women against qualified women. “If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir.” Did not Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun say that a proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]? So is the Mishnah: If a desecrated [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a qualified brother. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav: A proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]. What is the reason? Qualified men are warned against disqualified women but not disqualified women against qualified men nor qualified women against disqualified men. Did we not state: “they should not take, should not take”, which teaches that the woman is warned through the man? They wanted to say, qualified women against disqualified men but it is only disqualified women against qualified men.

“If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir.” Did not Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun say in the name of Rav that a proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]? So is the Mishnah: If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav: A proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]. What is the reason? Qualified men are warned against disqualified women and disqualified men against qualified women but not disqualified women against qualified men nor qualified women against disqualified men. Did we not state: “they should not take, should not take”, which teaches that the woman is warned through the man? They wanted to say, qualified women against disqualified women but it is only disqualified women against qualified women. “If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir.” Did not Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun say that a proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]? So is the Mishnah: If a desecrated [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a qualified brother. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav: A proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]. What is the reason? Qualified men are warned against disqualified women but not disqualified women against qualified men nor qualified women against disqualified men. Did we not state: “they should not take, should not take”, which teaches that the woman is warned through the man? They wanted to say, qualified women against disqualified men but it is only disqualified women against qualified men.

Are these all? There are others: If somebody takes back a woman he divorced after she had been married [to another man], she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. If he slept with the sister of a woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. If a man with injured testicles married a qualified woman, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. This supports Rebbi Jonah, since Rebbi Jonah said, the groupings of Rebbi are not exhaustive.

Are these all? There are others: If somebody takes back a woman he divorced after she had been married [to another man], she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. If he slept with the sister of a woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. If a man with injured testicles married a qualified woman, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. This supports Rebbi Jonah, since Rebbi Jonah said, the groupings of Rebbi are not exhaustive.

Are these all? There are others: If somebody takes back a woman he divorced after she had been married [to another man], she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. If he slept with the sister of a woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. If a man with injured testicles married a qualified woman, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. This supports Rebbi Jonah, since Rebbi Jonah said, the groupings of Rebbi are not exhaustive.

MISHNAH: Secondary prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim. If she is secondarily prohibited to the husband but not to the levir, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. Secondarily prohibited to the levir but not to the husband, she is forbidden to the levir but permitted to the husband. Secondarily prohibited to both of them, she is forbidden to both of them. She may claim neither Ketubah nor usufruct nor upkeep nor wear but the child is qualified and one forces him to divorce her. A widow married to the High Priest, a divorcee of one that performed ḥalîṣah married to a simple priest, a female bastard or a Gibeoness married to an Israel, and Israel woman married to a Gibeonite or a bastard have a claim of Ketubah.

MISHNAH: Secondary prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim. If she is secondarily prohibited to the husband but not to the levir, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. Secondarily prohibited to the levir but not to the husband, she is forbidden to the levir but permitted to the husband. Secondarily prohibited to both of them, she is forbidden to both of them. She may claim neither Ketubah nor usufruct nor upkeep nor wear but the child is qualified and one forces him to divorce her. A widow married to the High Priest, a divorcee of one that performed ḥalîṣah married to a simple priest, a female bastard or a Gibeoness married to an Israel, and Israel woman married to a Gibeonite or a bastard have a claim of Ketubah.

MISHNAH: Secondary prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim. If she is secondarily prohibited to the husband but not to the levir, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. Secondarily prohibited to the levir but not to the husband, she is forbidden to the levir but permitted to the husband. Secondarily prohibited to both of them, she is forbidden to both of them. She may claim neither Ketubah nor usufruct nor upkeep nor wear but the child is qualified and one forces him to divorce her. A widow married to the High Priest, a divorcee of one that performed ḥalîṣah married to a simple priest, a female bastard or a Gibeoness married to an Israel, and Israel woman married to a Gibeonite or a bastard have a claim of Ketubah.

MISHNAH: Secondary prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim. If she is secondarily prohibited to the husband but not to the levir, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. Secondarily prohibited to the levir but not to the husband, she is forbidden to the levir but permitted to the husband. Secondarily prohibited to both of them, she is forbidden to both of them. She may claim neither Ketubah nor usufruct nor upkeep nor wear but the child is qualified and one forces him to divorce her. A widow married to the High Priest, a divorcee of one that performed ḥalîṣah married to a simple priest, a female bastard or a Gibeoness married to an Israel, and Israel woman married to a Gibeonite or a bastard have a claim of Ketubah.

HALAKHAH: “Secondary prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim,” etc. “If she is secondarily, rabbinically, prohibited to the husband but not to the levir, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir.” Does she have Ketubah from the levir? Since she is permitted to him, she has Ketubah, or because the Ketubah is a lien on the estate of her first husband and she was forbidden to him, does she have no Ketubah?

HALAKHAH: “Secondary prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim,” etc. “If she is secondarily, rabbinically, prohibited to the husband but not to the levir, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir.” Does she have Ketubah from the levir? Since she is permitted to him, she has Ketubah, or because the Ketubah is a lien on the estate of her first husband and she was forbidden to him, does she have no Ketubah?

HALAKHAH: “Secondary prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim,” etc. “If she is secondarily, rabbinically, prohibited to the husband but not to the levir, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir.” Does she have Ketubah from the levir? Since she is permitted to him, she has Ketubah, or because the Ketubah is a lien on the estate of her first husband and she was forbidden to him, does she have no Ketubah?

“If she is secondarily prohibited to the levir but not to the husband, she is forbidden to the levir but permitted to the husband.” Does she have Ketubah from the levir? Since she is forbidden to him, she does not have Ketubah, or because the Ketubah is a lien on the estate of her first husband and she was permitted to him, does she have Ketubah?

“If she is secondarily prohibited to the levir but not to the husband, she is forbidden to the levir but permitted to the husband.” Does she have Ketubah from the levir? Since she is forbidden to him, she does not have Ketubah, or because the Ketubah is a lien on the estate of her first husband and she was permitted to him, does she have Ketubah?

“If she is secondarily prohibited to the levir but not to the husband, she is forbidden to the levir but permitted to the husband.” Does she have Ketubah from the levir? Since she is forbidden to him, she does not have Ketubah, or because the Ketubah is a lien on the estate of her first husband and she was permitted to him, does she have Ketubah?

MISHNAH: An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave. An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite, or pregnant from a Levite, or waiting for her Levite levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat tithe. A Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen may not eat either heave or tithe.

MISHNAH: An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave. An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite, or pregnant from a Levite, or waiting for her Levite levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat tithe. A Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen may not eat either heave or tithe.

MISHNAH: An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave. An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite, or pregnant from a Levite, or waiting for her Levite levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat tithe. A Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen may not eat either heave or tithe.

HALAKHAH: “An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen.” “Any pure person in your house may eat it,” but she is not in his house. “From a Cohen”, for the one born in his house; this one is not born in his house. “The one waiting for her Cohen levir,” “any pure person in your house may eat it,” but she is not in his house. “And also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel,” “a daughter of a Cohen when she will belong to an outside man.” One pregnant from an Israel or waiting for an Israel levir: “When she returns to her father’s house,” that excludes the one waiting for her levir, “as in her youth,” that excludes the pregnant one.

HALAKHAH: “An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen.” “Any pure person in your house may eat it,” but she is not in his house. “From a Cohen”, for the one born in his house; this one is not born in his house. “The one waiting for her Cohen levir,” “any pure person in your house may eat it,” but she is not in his house. “And also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel,” “a daughter of a Cohen when she will belong to an outside man.” One pregnant from an Israel or waiting for an Israel levir: “When she returns to her father’s house,” that excludes the one waiting for her levir, “as in her youth,” that excludes the pregnant one.

HALAKHAH: “An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen.” “Any pure person in your house may eat it,” but she is not in his house. “From a Cohen”, for the one born in his house; this one is not born in his house. “The one waiting for her Cohen levir,” “any pure person in your house may eat it,” but she is not in his house. “And also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel,” “a daughter of a Cohen when she will belong to an outside man.” One pregnant from an Israel or waiting for an Israel levir: “When she returns to her father’s house,” that excludes the one waiting for her levir, “as in her youth,” that excludes the pregnant one.

“An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite,” “you and your house” but she is not in his house. “Pregnant from a Levite,” “born in the house,” this one is not born in his house. Rebbi Yose said, is not “born in the house” written only for a Cohen? As you say there, whoever is born lets eat, whoever is not born does not let eat; here also whoever is born lets eat, whoever is not born does not let eat. “Waiting for her Levite levir,” “you and your house,” but he is not in her house. “And also a Levite woman”: “And a daughter of a Cohen when she will belong to an outside man.” Is there not written “daughter of a Cohen”? Rebbi Yose said “daughter”, whether she is a Cohen’s or a Levi’s. The daughter of a Cohen who was married to an Israel may return and eat, the daughter of an Israel who was married to a Cohen may return and not eat. One pregnant from an Israel or waiting for an Israel levir: “When she returns to her father’s house,” that excludes the one waiting for her levir, “as in her youth,” that excludes the pregnant one.

“An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite,” “you and your house” but she is not in his house. “Pregnant from a Levite,” “born in the house,” this one is not born in his house. Rebbi Yose said, is not “born in the house” written only for a Cohen? As you say there, whoever is born lets eat, whoever is not born does not let eat; here also whoever is born lets eat, whoever is not born does not let eat. “Waiting for her Levite levir,” “you and your house,” but he is not in her house. “And also a Levite woman”: “And a daughter of a Cohen when she will belong to an outside man.” Is there not written “daughter of a Cohen”? Rebbi Yose said “daughter”, whether she is a Cohen’s or a Levi’s. The daughter of a Cohen who was married to an Israel may return and eat, the daughter of an Israel who was married to a Cohen may return and not eat. One pregnant from an Israel or waiting for an Israel levir: “When she returns to her father’s house,” that excludes the one waiting for her levir, “as in her youth,” that excludes the pregnant one.

“An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite,” “you and your house” but she is not in his house. “Pregnant from a Levite,” “born in the house,” this one is not born in his house. Rebbi Yose said, is not “born in the house” written only for a Cohen? As you say there, whoever is born lets eat, whoever is not born does not let eat; here also whoever is born lets eat, whoever is not born does not let eat. “Waiting for her Levite levir,” “you and your house,” but he is not in her house. “And also a Levite woman”: “And a daughter of a Cohen when she will belong to an outside man.” Is there not written “daughter of a Cohen”? Rebbi Yose said “daughter”, whether she is a Cohen’s or a Levi’s. The daughter of a Cohen who was married to an Israel may return and eat, the daughter of an Israel who was married to a Cohen may return and not eat. One pregnant from an Israel or waiting for an Israel levir: “When she returns to her father’s house,” that excludes the one waiting for her levir, “as in her youth,” that excludes the pregnant one.

“A Levitic woman betrothed to a Cohen.” “Any pure person in your house may eat it,” but he is not in her house. “From a Cohen”, for the one born in his house; this one is not born in his house. “The one waiting for her Cohen levir,” “any pure person in your house may eat it,” but she is not in his house. “Similarly, the daughter of a Cohen [betrothed] to a Levite should eat neither heave nor tithe.” We understand that she should not eat heave. But tithe any way you take it, if she is a Cohen’s daughter she should eat, if she is a Levite’s wife she should eat. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: [It follows] him who says one does not give tithe to Cohanim. That means, he himself says one gives heave to Cohanim.

Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.