levirate

If a woman was eating terumah, and they came and said to her, “Your husband is dead”, or “He divorced you.” Or, if a slave was eating terumah, and they came and said to him: “Your master is dead”, or “He sold you to an Israelite”, or “He gave you away as a gift”, or “He emancipated you.” So too, if a priest was eating terumah and it became known that he was the son of a divorced woman or a halutzah (a woman released from levirate marriage): Rabbi Eliezer says: they must repay both the value and the fifth. But Rabbi Joshua exempts them [from the added fifth]. If [a priest] was standing and sacrificing on the altar and it became known that he was the son of a divorced woman or a halutzah: Rabbi Eliezer says: all the sacrifices he had offered on the altar are disqualified. But Rabbi Joshua pronounces them valid. If it, however, it became known that he possessed a blemish, his service is disqualified.

And in what ways is he like women? He causes impurity with red discharge, like women; And he must not be secluded with men, like women; And he doesn’t make his brother’s wife liable for yibbum (levirate marriage); And he does not share [in the inheritance] with the sons, like women; And he cannot eat most holy sacrifices, like women. At his birth his mother counts the blood of her impurity like [they do when they give birth to a] girl; And he is disqualified from being a witness, like women. If he had illicit intercourse, he is disqualified from eating terumah, like women.

Every [act] for which one is liable on Shabbat because of mandated rest [shevut], [or] because it is only optional [reshut], [or] even though it is a religious act [mitzvah], he is also liable on Yom Tov. For the following acts he is liable because of shevut: One may not climb a tree, And one may not ride on an animal. And one may not swim in water. And one may not clap hands, nor slap [thighs], nor dance. For the following acts he is liable because they are only optional: One may not judge; And one may not betroth a wife, nor perform halizah, nor perform yibbum [consummate a levirate marriage]. And for the following acts one is liable even though it is a religious act [mitzvah]: One may not dedicate [anything to the Temple], nor vow a personal valuation, nor make a vow of herem, nor set aside terumah or tithes. All these things they [the rabbis said that they are forbidden] on Yom Tov, how much more so [are they forbidden] on Shabbat. There is no difference between Yom Tov and Shabbat except for the preparation of food alone.

One may not marry a woman during the festival, whether a virgin or a widow, nor may one perform levirate marriage, because this is a joy for him. But one may remarry his divorced wife. And a woman may make the adornments [for her wedding] during the festival. Rabbi Judah says: she may not put on lime, as that is a [temporary] disfigurement to her.

The High Priest can judge and be judged; he can testify and others can testify against him. He can perform halitzah for another’s wife and others can perform halitzah for his wife or contract levirate marriage with his widow, but he cannot contract levirate marriage since he is forbidden to marry a widow. If any of his near kin die he may not follow after the bier, rather when the bearers are not visible, he is visible, when they are visible he is not visible, and he may go out with them as far as the city gate, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says, “He may not leave the Temple, as it says, “Nor shall he go out of the Sanctuary”. And when he comforts other mourners the custom is for all of the people to pass by, the one after the other, while the appointed [priest] stands between him and the people. And when he receives comfort from others, all the people say to him, “Let us be your atonement”, and he says to them, “May you be blessed by Heaven.” When they feed him the funeral meal all the people sit around on the ground and he sits on a stool.

The High Priest can judge and be judged; he can testify and others can testify against him. He can perform halitzah for another’s wife and others can perform halitzah for his wife or contract levirate marriage with his widow, but he cannot contract levirate marriage since he is forbidden to marry a widow. If any of his near kin die he may not follow after the bier, rather when the bearers are not visible, he is visible, when they are visible he is not visible, and he may go out with them as far as the city gate, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says, “He may not leave the Temple, as it says, “Nor shall he go out of the Sanctuary”. And when he comforts other mourners the custom is for all of the people to pass by, the one after the other, while the appointed [priest] stands between him and the people. And when he receives comfort from others, all the people say to him, “Let us be your atonement”, and he says to them, “May you be blessed by Heaven.” When they feed him the funeral meal all the people sit around on the ground and he sits on a stool.

The king can neither judge nor be judged, he cannot testify and others cannot testify against him. He may not perform halitzah, nor may others perform halitzah for his wife. He may not contract levirate marriage nor may his brothers contract levirate marriage with his wife. Rabbi Judah says: “If he wished to perform halitzah or to contract levirate marriage his memory is a blessing.” They said to him: “They should not listen to him.” None may marry his widow. Rabbi Judah says: “The king may marry the widow of a king, for so have we found it with David, who married the widow of Saul, as it says, “And I gave you my master’s house and my master’s wives into your embrace” (II Samuel 12:8).

The king can neither judge nor be judged, he cannot testify and others cannot testify against him. He may not perform halitzah, nor may others perform halitzah for his wife. He may not contract levirate marriage nor may his brothers contract levirate marriage with his wife. Rabbi Judah says: “If he wished to perform halitzah or to contract levirate marriage his memory is a blessing.” They said to him: “They should not listen to him.” None may marry his widow. Rabbi Judah says: “The king may marry the widow of a king, for so have we found it with David, who married the widow of Saul, as it says, “And I gave you my master’s house and my master’s wives into your embrace” (II Samuel 12:8).

The king can neither judge nor be judged, he cannot testify and others cannot testify against him. He may not perform halitzah, nor may others perform halitzah for his wife. He may not contract levirate marriage nor may his brothers contract levirate marriage with his wife. Rabbi Judah says: “If he wished to perform halitzah or to contract levirate marriage his memory is a blessing.” They said to him: “They should not listen to him.” None may marry his widow. Rabbi Judah says: “The king may marry the widow of a king, for so have we found it with David, who married the widow of Saul, as it says, “And I gave you my master’s house and my master’s wives into your embrace” (II Samuel 12:8).

[In the case of] four brothers of whom two were married to two sisters, if those married to the sisters died, behold, these should perform halitzah and not enter into levirate marriage (with the brothers-in-law). If they went ahead and married them, they must put them away (divorce them). Rabbi Eliezer says in the name of Beth Shammai: they may keep them. But Beth Hillel say: they must put them away.

A person does not defile [as a corpse] until he dies. Even he is cut up or even if he is about to die, he [still] makes levirate marriage obligatory and exempts from levirate marriage, he feeds [his mother] terumah and disqualifies [his mother] from eating terumah. Similarly in the case of cattle or wild animals, they do not defile until they die. If their heads have been cut off, even though they are moving convulsively, they are unclean, like a lizard's tail, which moves convulsively.

A person does not defile [as a corpse] until he dies. Even he is cut up or even if he is about to die, he [still] makes levirate marriage obligatory and exempts from levirate marriage, he feeds [his mother] terumah and disqualifies [his mother] from eating terumah. Similarly in the case of cattle or wild animals, they do not defile until they die. If their heads have been cut off, even though they are moving convulsively, they are unclean, like a lizard's tail, which moves convulsively.

A girl one day old defiles due to menstruation. A girl ten days old defiles due to zivah. A boy one day old defiles due to zivah, and defiles due to scale disease and due to corpse uncleanness; He subjects [his deceased brother's widow] to yibbum [levirate marriage]; He exempts [his mother] from yibbum, He enables her to eat terumah And he disqualifies her from eating terumah; He inherits and transmits inheritance; He who kills him is guilty of murder, And he counts to his father, to his mother and to all his relatives as a fully grown man.

If a girl has grown two pubic hairs she may perform either halitzah or contract levirate marriage, and she is obligated in all the commandments in the Torah. So too if a boy has grown two pubic hairs, he is obligated in all of the commandments in the Torah. He is fit to become a wayward and rebellious son from the time he has grown two hairs until the time when his beard forms a circle. This refers to the lower, and not to the upper one, but the sages spoke using a euphemism. A girl who has grown two hairs may no longer refuse the marriage. Rabbi Judah says: [she may refuse] until the black [hairs] predominate.

MISHNAH: One is liable on the holiday for everything classified as Sabbath rest, classified as obligatory, classified as meritorious. These are classified as Sabbath rest: One does not climb on a tree, nor ride on an animal, nor sail on water, nor clap the hands in anger, nor clap the hands in joy, nor dance. These are classified as obligatory, one does not judge, nor contract preliminary marriage, nor give ḥaliṣah, nor enter levirate marriage. These are classified as meritorious, one does not dedicate, nor dedicate one’s worth, nor dedicate as herem, nor collect heaves and tithes. All these were said regarding a holiday, so much more regarding the Sabbath. The only difference between holiday and Sabbath is preparation of food.

HALAKHAH: Sabbath rest which is voluntary, and obligation which is meritorious. What is Sabbath rest which is voluntary? One does not climb on a tree, nor rides on an animal, nor sail on water, [nor clap his hands in anger, nor clap his hands in joy, nor dance.] What is obligation which is meritorious? One does not judge, nor contract preliminary marriage, nor give ḥaliṣah, nor enter levirate marriage.

MISHNAH: One does not marry women on a holiday, neither virgins nor widows, nor does one enter into levirate marriage, because it is a joy for him. But he may take back his divorcee, and a woman does adorn herself on the holiday. Rebbi Jehudah says, she may not use lime because it disfigures her.

It was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah: Shaving is forbidden to someone who comes from overseas. Rebbi Jehudah follows his own opinion since Rebbi Jehudah said, it is forbidden to sail on the ocean. Then a Cohen who left for outside the Land and left against the will of the Sages should be forbidden to shave. A Cohen came to Rebbi Ḥanina. He said to him, may one leave for Tyre for as religious obligation, to give ḥaliṣah or to enter levirate marriage? He answered him, this man’s brother left; praised be the Omnipresent Who smote him. And you want to do what he did. Some want to say, so he spoke to him: This man’s brother disdained his mother’s bosom and embraced another’s bosom, and you want to do what he did. Simeon bar Abba came to Rebbi Ḥanina and asked him to write a letter of recommendation so he could leave for his sustenance outside the Land. He said to him, tomorrow I shall go to your forefathers; they would say to me, one desirable plant we had in the Land of Israel and you permitted it to leave the Land.

MISHNAH: Fifteen [categories of] women free their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from ḥalîṣah and levirate forever. They are the following: one’s daughter, his daughter’s daughter and his son’s daughter, his wife’s daughter and her daughter‘s daughter and her son’s daughter, his mother-in-law and his mother-in-law’s mother and his father-in-law’s mother, his sister and his maternat aunt and his wife’s sister, his maternal halfbrother’s wife, the wife of his brother who did not live in his world, and his daughter-in-law.

Does Abba Shaul hold with Rebbi Aqiba? Since Rebbi Aqiba said, there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law! What Rebbi Aqiba said refers to a sister-in-law who whored. What Abba Shaul said refers to his sister-in-law. It comes like Rebbi Yose ben Ḥalaphta since Rebbi Yose ben Ḥalaphta contracted a levirate marriage with his brother’s wife. He ploughed five times and planted five saplings and had intercourse using a bedsheet. These are they: Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Menaḥem ben Rebbi Yose, and Rebbi Ḥalaphta ben Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Eudaimon ben Rebbi Yose.

It is written: “The genitals of your brother’s wife you may not uncover.” One understands both his paternal and his maternal brothers’ wives, both the wife of a brother who lived concurrently with him or onewho did not live concurrently with him, whether he had children or did not have children. She became permitted, excluded from this set, by levirate. Should I think unconditionally? It is said here: “When brothers live together”; and it is said there: “We, your servants, are twelve brothers.” Since the “brothers” mentioned there are paternal brothers, so the “brothers” mentioned here must be paternal brothers.

It is written: “For anyone who is acting out any of these abominations will be extirpated”. Was not the brother’s wife in the set of all incest prohibitions and was removed from this set by the levirate? Could one say that all other incest prohibitions were removed from this set by levirate? Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: “upon her”, “upon her”: “her levir shall come upon her.” Since with respect to “upon her” which was said there, the verse speaks about paternal brothers, so with respect to “upon her” which was said here, the verse speaks about paternal brothers.

It is written: “For anyone who is acting out any of these abominations will be extirpated”. Was not the brother’s wife in the set of all incest prohibitions and was removed from this set by the levirate? Could one say that all other incest prohibitions were removed from this set by levirate? Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: “upon her”, “upon her”: “her levir shall come upon her.” Since with respect to “upon her” which was said there, the verse speaks about paternal brothers, so with respect to “upon her” which was said here, the verse speaks about paternal brothers.

The Torah said: “Do not take a woman in addition to her sister”. Not only her, her co-wife from where? The verse says “to ‘bundle’ together”, not her co-wife nor her co-wife’s co-wife. Not only his wife’s sister, all other incest prohibition from where? Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: A conclusion de minore ad majus. Since his wife’s sister, who is under an incest prohibition which may be lifted after being imposed, nevertheless is prohibited from the levirate, all other women under incest prohibitions which cannot be lifted after being imposed not much more so! Since in the first case the incest prohibition exempts the prohibited co-wife, all other incest prohibitions also exempt their co-wives. This follows Rebbi Aqiba.

Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated an argument de minore ad majus. Since his wife’s sister is particular being under incest prohibition for whose violation one is punished if intentional by extirpation, if in error by an obligation to bring a purification offering, and is barred from the levirate, all other women under incest prohibitions for whose violation one is sanctioned if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation to bring a purification offering, should be barred from the levirate.

Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated an argument de minore ad majus. Since his wife’s sister is particular being under incest prohibition for whose violation one is punished if intentional by extirpation, if in error by an obligation to bring a purification offering, and is barred from the levirate, all other women under incest prohibitions for whose violation one is sanctioned if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation to bring a purification offering, should be barred from the levirate.

What is the difference between them? A widow for the High Priest. For him who says, a woman under an incest prohibition which may be lifted after being imposed, this one, not being permitted after being prohibited, should be barred from the levirate. For him who says, a woman under an incest prohibition for which one is punished if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation to bring a purification offering, is barred from the levirate, in this case since one is not sanctioned if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation of a purification offering, should be permitted for the levirate.

What is the difference between them? A widow for the High Priest. For him who says, a woman under an incest prohibition which may be lifted after being imposed, this one, not being permitted after being prohibited, should be barred from the levirate. For him who says, a woman under an incest prohibition for which one is punished if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation to bring a purification offering, is barred from the levirate, in this case since one is not sanctioned if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation of a purification offering, should be permitted for the levirate.

What is the difference between them? A widow for the High Priest. For him who says, a woman under an incest prohibition which may be lifted after being imposed, this one, not being permitted after being prohibited, should be barred from the levirate. For him who says, a woman under an incest prohibition for which one is punished if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation to bring a purification offering, is barred from the levirate, in this case since one is not sanctioned if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation of a purification offering, should be permitted for the levirate.

Rebbi Ayvu bar Naggari, Crispus, in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “The dead man’s wife should not be outside, to a strange man.” That is a wife who is a stranger to him. The Torah said, she should not be his wife even in case of a commandment. That being, she should not need ḥalîṣah! Rebbi Jeremiah said: “his sister-in-law, his sister-in-law”, the Torah increased the cases of ḥalîṣah! If from “his sister-in-law, his sister-in-law”, did the Torah not increase the cases of levirate? Rebbi Ismael stated: “My levir refuses”. That is, my levir refused, not that Heaven refused for him. In that case, she should not need ḥalîṣah! That means, the statement of Rebbi Jeremiah is needed, “his sister-in-law, his sister-in-law”, the Torah increased the cases of ḥalîṣah!

Levi bar Sisi asked before Rebbi: Should we not state “sixteen women”? One’s mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother. He said to him, it is evident that this person has no brain in his head. And why? He said to him, because of Rebbi Jehudah, because Rebbi Jehudah forbids the one who was raped or seduced by his father. Does Rebbi Jehudah not agree that if [the halfbrother] gave her qiddushin, the preliminary marriage is legally recognized? But because we have stated: “Six incest prohibitions more severe than these; because they are married to others their co-wives are free.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thereupon: “If they may marry his brother without sin their co-wives are freed from ḥalîṣah and levirate.” And among all of them there is only his mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother. Why did we not state this? Because Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it, should we not state it? Certainly we should state it! But because we have stated: “Her sister who also is her sister-in-law either takes ḥalîṣah or accepts the levirate.” We find in all cases that her sister who also is her sister-in-law accepts the levirate except for his mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother.

Levi bar Sisi asked before Rebbi: Should we not state “sixteen women”? One’s mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother. He said to him, it is evident that this person has no brain in his head. And why? He said to him, because of Rebbi Jehudah, because Rebbi Jehudah forbids the one who was raped or seduced by his father. Does Rebbi Jehudah not agree that if [the halfbrother] gave her qiddushin, the preliminary marriage is legally recognized? But because we have stated: “Six incest prohibitions more severe than these; because they are married to others their co-wives are free.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thereupon: “If they may marry his brother without sin their co-wives are freed from ḥalîṣah and levirate.” And among all of them there is only his mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother. Why did we not state this? Because Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it, should we not state it? Certainly we should state it! But because we have stated: “Her sister who also is her sister-in-law either takes ḥalîṣah or accepts the levirate.” We find in all cases that her sister who also is her sister-in-law accepts the levirate except for his mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother.

Levi bar Sisi asked before Rebbi: Should we not state “sixteen women”? One’s mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother. He said to him, it is evident that this person has no brain in his head. And why? He said to him, because of Rebbi Jehudah, because Rebbi Jehudah forbids the one who was raped or seduced by his father. Does Rebbi Jehudah not agree that if [the halfbrother] gave her qiddushin, the preliminary marriage is legally recognized? But because we have stated: “Six incest prohibitions more severe than these; because they are married to others their co-wives are free.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thereupon: “If they may marry his brother without sin their co-wives are freed from ḥalîṣah and levirate.” And among all of them there is only his mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother. Why did we not state this? Because Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it, should we not state it? Certainly we should state it! But because we have stated: “Her sister who also is her sister-in-law either takes ḥalîṣah or accepts the levirate.” We find in all cases that her sister who also is her sister-in-law accepts the levirate except for his mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother.

Rebbi Yudan asked: Following him who said, a man is not guilty for the woman who got ḥalîṣah but he is guilty for the co-wife, ḥalîṣah is freeing; is intercourse freeing? As you say, if he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she became forbidden to the brothers. Similarly, if he had intercourse with her, she became forbidden to the brothers. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If the first husband died, the second brother shall take her in levirate. If the second dies, the third shall take her in levirate! Rebbi Yose said, what do you think? That ḥalîṣah is the same as intercourse? Once he performed ḥalîṣah, the claim of the dead is removed from her retroactively. Retroactively fell on her the prohibition of the dead man regarding the brothers. But if he had intercourse with her, she is his wife. On that did Rebbi Ḥiyya state: If the first husband died, the second brother shall take her in levirate. If the second dies, the third shall take her in levirate.

Rebbi Yudan asked: Following him who said, a man is not guilty for the woman who got ḥalîṣah but he is guilty for the co-wife, ḥalîṣah is freeing; is intercourse freeing? As you say, if he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she became forbidden to the brothers. Similarly, if he had intercourse with her, she became forbidden to the brothers. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If the first husband died, the second brother shall take her in levirate. If the second dies, the third shall take her in levirate! Rebbi Yose said, what do you think? That ḥalîṣah is the same as intercourse? Once he performed ḥalîṣah, the claim of the dead is removed from her retroactively. Retroactively fell on her the prohibition of the dead man regarding the brothers. But if he had intercourse with her, she is his wife. On that did Rebbi Ḥiyya state: If the first husband died, the second brother shall take her in levirate. If the second dies, the third shall take her in levirate.

Rebbi Yudan asked: Following him who said, a man is not guilty for the woman who got ḥalîṣah but he is guilty for the co-wife, ḥalîṣah is freeing; is intercourse freeing? As you say, if he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she became forbidden to the brothers. Similarly, if he had intercourse with her, she became forbidden to the brothers. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If the first husband died, the second brother shall take her in levirate. If the second dies, the third shall take her in levirate! Rebbi Yose said, what do you think? That ḥalîṣah is the same as intercourse? Once he performed ḥalîṣah, the claim of the dead is removed from her retroactively. Retroactively fell on her the prohibition of the dead man regarding the brothers. But if he had intercourse with her, she is his wife. On that did Rebbi Ḥiyya state: If the first husband died, the second brother shall take her in levirate. If the second dies, the third shall take her in levirate.

Rebbi Yudan asked: Following him who said, a man is not guilty for the woman who got ḥalîṣah but he is guilty for the co-wife, ḥalîṣah is freeing; is intercourse freeing? As you say, if he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she became forbidden to the brothers. Similarly, if he had intercourse with her, she became forbidden to the brothers. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If the first husband died, the second brother shall take her in levirate. If the second dies, the third shall take her in levirate! Rebbi Yose said, what do you think? That ḥalîṣah is the same as intercourse? Once he performed ḥalîṣah, the claim of the dead is removed from her retroactively. Retroactively fell on her the prohibition of the dead man regarding the brothers. But if he had intercourse with her, she is his wife. On that did Rebbi Ḥiyya state: If the first husband died, the second brother shall take her in levirate. If the second dies, the third shall take her in levirate.

“Together”, this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: The she-ram and the wife of his brother who did not live in his world were in the paragraph. Why do you see fit to say that the co-wife of the she-ram is permitted but the co-wife of the wife of his brother who did not live in his world is forbidden? He said to him, the she-ram was removed because of another reason: “she will bear”, this excludes the one who cannot have children. Is it not enough that she cannot be eligible for the levirate but you also want to forbid her co-wife? But the wife of his brother who did not live in his world is under an incest prohibition and any incest prohibition frees the co-wife. Assi said, the co-wife of a she-ram is forbidden. The Mishnah disagrees with Assi: “All of these, if they died, or refused, or were divorced, or turned out to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: Assi follows Rebbi Meїr since Rebbi Meїr said, in any case where you cannot take me in levirate you cannot take my co-wife.

“Together”, this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: The she-ram and the wife of his brother who did not live in his world were in the paragraph. Why do you see fit to say that the co-wife of the she-ram is permitted but the co-wife of the wife of his brother who did not live in his world is forbidden? He said to him, the she-ram was removed because of another reason: “she will bear”, this excludes the one who cannot have children. Is it not enough that she cannot be eligible for the levirate but you also want to forbid her co-wife? But the wife of his brother who did not live in his world is under an incest prohibition and any incest prohibition frees the co-wife. Assi said, the co-wife of a she-ram is forbidden. The Mishnah disagrees with Assi: “All of these, if they died, or refused, or were divorced, or turned out to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: Assi follows Rebbi Meїr since Rebbi Meїr said, in any case where you cannot take me in levirate you cannot take my co-wife.

MISHNAH: All these free their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from ḥalîṣah and levirate forever. And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted. But you cannot say about his mother-in-law or his mother-in-law’s mother that they were found to be she-rams or that they had repudiated.

HALAKHAH: “All these free their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from ḥalîṣah and levirate, etc.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. But we hold in case she says “I cannot stand marriage”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

HALAKHAH: “All these free their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from ḥalîṣah and levirate, etc.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. But we hold in case she says “I cannot stand marriage”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Mattaniah said: Explain it when they died without having repudiated since there is a Mishnah: “If a woman could repudiate but did not do so, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but cannot be married in levirate.” So is the Mishnah: “If a woman could repudiate but did not dies, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but cannot be married in levirate.” Rebbi Abba Mari said, you may even say if she still lives; explain it if her father is the only levir.

Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Mattaniah said: Explain it when they died without having repudiated since there is a Mishnah: “If a woman could repudiate but did not do so, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but cannot be married in levirate.” So is the Mishnah: “If a woman could repudiate but did not dies, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but cannot be married in levirate.” Rebbi Abba Mari said, you may even say if she still lives; explain it if her father is the only levir.

HALAKHAH: “How do they free their co-wives? If a man’s daughter or one of the incest-prohibited women,”, etc. That is the baraita: “If a woman could repudiate but did not do so, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but cannot be married in levirate.”

MISHNAH: How are their co-wives permitted if they die? If his daughter or one of the incest-prohibited women was married to his brother who has another wife, if his daughter died and then his brother died her co-wife is permitted. And if a woman could repudiate but did not do so, when she died her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but cannot be married in levirate.

HALAKHAH: “How are their co-wives permitted if they die,” etc. That is the Mishnah: “If a woman could repudiate but did not do so, when she died her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but cannot be married in levirate.”

HALAKHAH: “Six incest prohibitions are more stringent than these since they [concern women who] must be married to others”, etc. In what are they more stringent? Here there is extirpation, there is extirpation. Here there is bastardy, there there is bastardy. What is more stringent? That they cannot be married to the brothers without transgression. And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: For all women who may be married to the brothers without transgression, their co-wives are free from ḥalîṣah and levirate.

MISHNAH: The House of Shammai permit the co-wives to the brothers, but the House of Hillel forbid. If they took ḥalîṣah, the House of Shammai disqualify them for the priesthood but the House of Hillel declare them qualified. If they entered levirate, the House of Shammai declare them qualified but the House of Hillel as disqualified. Even though these forbid and those permit, these declare disqualified and those qualified, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel nor the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai. Regarding all purities and impurities which these were declaring as pure and those as impure, these did not refrain to process pure foods with the help of those.

HALAKHAH: “The House of Shammai permit the co-wives to the brothers,” etc. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Yose in the name ofNehorai: The reason of the House of Shammai, “the outside wife of the deceased shall not belong to a strange man,” the “outer one” should not be another man’s. It turns out that the House of Shammai hold like those Samaritans who perform levirate with the betrothed but remove the married, for they explain “outside” as “the outer one.” How do the House of Shammai confirm “when he has no child”? Rebbi Jacob the Southerner said before Rebbi Yose, “when he has no child” from the married one, “the outer one shall not belong outside to a strange man.” He said to him, will not the Samaritans love you that you confirm their interpretations! Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar stated: I told the learned Samaritans, what did cause you to err? That you did not explain following Rebbi Neḥemiah, since it was stated in the name of Rebbi Neḥemiah: Anything which needs a ל as a prefix but did not get it, we give it a ה at the end, e. g., to the outside חוּצָה, to Se‘ir שְׂעִירָה, to Succoth סוּכּוֹתָה. They objected to Rebbi Neḥemiah, is it not written: “The wicked shall return to the pit לִשְׁאוֹלָה.” Rabba bar Zabda said, to the lowest living space in Sheol.

Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, look how this practice is widespread in Israel! If one upholds the words of the House of Shammai, the child is a bastard following the words of the House of Hillel. If one upholds the words of the House of Hillel, the child is a bastard following the words of the House of Shammai. Come and let us institute that the co-wife perform ḥalîṣah but not be admitted to levirate. It was stated: They did not manage to institute this before the time became unsuitable. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, if it were so, what would one have done with the earlier co-wives who married?

MISHNAH: In which way “the wife of his brother who did not live in his world”? There were two brothers, one of them died, then a brother was born to them, and after that the second brother took his brother’s wife in levirate, and died. The first woman leaves as widow of his brother who did not live in his world and the second one because she is her co-wife. If he had “bespoken” her, the second performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

MISHNAH: In which way “the wife of his brother who did not live in his world”? There were two brothers, one of them died, then a brother was born to them, and after that the second brother took his brother’s wife in levirate, and died. The first woman leaves as widow of his brother who did not live in his world and the second one because she is her co-wife. If he had “bespoken” her, the second performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

HALAKHAH: Why “the wife of his brother who did not live in his world”? “Together”, this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world. Because if it were not so, what would we say? If he died childless, his widow would be forbidden to remarry, for maybe his father would have another son and his widow would then be a candidate for the levirate! Even if [the deceased’s] mother had died, his widow would be forbidden to remarry, [because] maybe the father would go and marry a new wife who could have a son and the widow would then be a candidate for the levirate! Then the verse would have to read: “He has neither father nor son”! One would compare this to the case that he left his widow pregnant; does she not have to wait to know whether the child is viable or not? Here also, should she not have to wait to know whether the child is viable or not? Therefore it was necessary to say “together”; this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world.

HALAKHAH: Why “the wife of his brother who did not live in his world”? “Together”, this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world. Because if it were not so, what would we say? If he died childless, his widow would be forbidden to remarry, for maybe his father would have another son and his widow would then be a candidate for the levirate! Even if [the deceased’s] mother had died, his widow would be forbidden to remarry, [because] maybe the father would go and marry a new wife who could have a son and the widow would then be a candidate for the levirate! Then the verse would have to read: “He has neither father nor son”! One would compare this to the case that he left his widow pregnant; does she not have to wait to know whether the child is viable or not? Here also, should she not have to wait to know whether the child is viable or not? Therefore it was necessary to say “together”; this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world.

“Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. I might think that just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final; the verse says “and act as levir towards her.” This directs the entire paragraph towards levirate. Cohabitation is final, “bespeaking” is not final. Then what is “bespeaking” good for? To forbid her to the brothers.

Both the rabbis and Rebbi Simeon agree to the following. According to the rabbis, the aspect which “bespeaking” acquires is forbidden in the co-wife, the aspect which “bespeaking” does not acquire is permitted in the co-wife; therefore, the latter has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. According to Rebbi Simeon, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are permitted. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second one permitted. Out of doubt, she has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. What is the difference between them? If he slept with the second one. In the opinion of the rabbis, an incestuous intercourse because he had “bespoken”. Therefore, if he had not “bespoken” she may have levirate and there is no candidacy at all. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I explained that following what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. He had in her an interest of candidacy. When she died, the candidacy was eliminated. And here, when he died, the candidacy was eliminated.

Both the rabbis and Rebbi Simeon agree to the following. According to the rabbis, the aspect which “bespeaking” acquires is forbidden in the co-wife, the aspect which “bespeaking” does not acquire is permitted in the co-wife; therefore, the latter has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. According to Rebbi Simeon, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are permitted. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second one permitted. Out of doubt, she has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. What is the difference between them? If he slept with the second one. In the opinion of the rabbis, an incestuous intercourse because he had “bespoken”. Therefore, if he had not “bespoken” she may have levirate and there is no candidacy at all. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I explained that following what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. He had in her an interest of candidacy. When she died, the candidacy was eliminated. And here, when he died, the candidacy was eliminated.

Both the rabbis and Rebbi Simeon agree to the following. According to the rabbis, the aspect which “bespeaking” acquires is forbidden in the co-wife, the aspect which “bespeaking” does not acquire is permitted in the co-wife; therefore, the latter has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. According to Rebbi Simeon, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are permitted. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one is forbidden but the second one permitted. Out of doubt, she has to have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. What is the difference between them? If he slept with the second one. In the opinion of the rabbis, an incestuous intercourse because he had “bespoken”. Therefore, if he had not “bespoken” she may have levirate and there is no candidacy at all. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I explained that following what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. He had in her an interest of candidacy. When she died, the candidacy was eliminated. And here, when he died, the candidacy was eliminated.

MISHNAH: There were two brothers, one of them died and the second took his brother’s widow in levirate; afterwards a brother was born to them, and he died. The first woman leaves as wife of his brother who did not live in his world and the second one as her co-wife. If [the second brother] had bespoken [the widow of the first] when he died, the second performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. Rebbi Simeon says, he may take in levirate any one he wants or performs ḥalîṣah with any one he wants.

MISHNAH: There were two brothers, one of them died and the second took his brother’s widow in levirate; afterwards a brother was born to them, and he died. The first woman leaves as wife of his brother who did not live in his world and the second one as her co-wife. If [the second brother] had bespoken [the widow of the first] when he died, the second performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. Rebbi Simeon says, he may take in levirate any one he wants or performs ḥalîṣah with any one he wants.

MISHNAH: There were two brothers, one of them died and the second took his brother’s widow in levirate; afterwards a brother was born to them, and he died. The first woman leaves as wife of his brother who did not live in his world and the second one as her co-wife. If [the second brother] had bespoken [the widow of the first] when he died, the second performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate. Rebbi Simeon says, he may take in levirate any one he wants or performs ḥalîṣah with any one he wants.

HALAKHAH: “If there were two brothers, one of them died”, etc. Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire, and you say so? May one permit levirate with the “bespoken” woman? One should suspect that “bespeaking” does not acquire; then he would be guilty because of “wife of his brother who did not live in his world.” Can the “bespoken” one perform ḥalîṣah? Should one not suspect that “bespeaking” does acquire; then the second {widow] is a candidate for [the third brother]. It must be that Rebbi Simeon refers to the first case.

What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah.

What does Rebbi Simeon say about the “bespoken” woman? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Simeon says, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” woman, her colleague also needs ḥalîṣah. You say, the cohabitation or the ḥalîṣah of one of them frees her co-wife. However one argues, if “bespeaking” acquires, both are his wives and any one of them becomes free by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, the first one does not need ḥalîṣah, but if he performed ḥalîṣah with the “bespoken” one, the second one also needs ḥalîṣah. Maybe “bespeaking” does not acquire, then ḥalîṣah or levirate do not apply to her. Maybe “bespeaking” does acquire; then she is freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah. What is the difference between them? If he performed ḥalîṣah with the first and cohabited with the second. In the opinion of the rabbis it was an incestuous cohabitation. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon it was not an incestuous cohabitation. If he cohabited both with the first and the second widow, in the opinion of the rabbis with the first it was incest and the second needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, both need a bill of divorce. The first one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps the “bespeaking” did acquire. The second one needs a bill of divorce; perhaps levirate did acquire; if “bespeaking” did acquire, she was freed by her colleague’s ḥalîṣah.

MISHNAH: They formulated a principle about a sister-in-law: Any woman forbidden by an incest prohibition has neither ḥalîṣah nor levirate. If she is forbidden by a commandment prohibition or one of sanctity, she has ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Her sister who is also her sister-in-law has either ḥalîṣah or levirate.

MISHNAH: They formulated a principle about a sister-in-law: Any woman forbidden by an incest prohibition has neither ḥalîṣah nor levirate. If she is forbidden by a commandment prohibition or one of sanctity, she has ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Her sister who is also her sister-in-law has either ḥalîṣah or levirate.

MISHNAH: They formulated a principle about a sister-in-law: Any woman forbidden by an incest prohibition has neither ḥalîṣah nor levirate. If she is forbidden by a commandment prohibition or one of sanctity, she has ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Her sister who is also her sister-in-law has either ḥalîṣah or levirate.

HALAKHAH: “They formulated a principle about a sister-in-law: Any woman forbidden,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira said: When I was still there, we extracted fourteen cases from “her sister which is also her sister-in-law has levirate”, except his daughter. When we came up here, we heard what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, since Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: His daughter from a woman he raped was married to a paternal halfbrother; she also has a maternal sister from a different father married to a second brother who died childless. His daughter is forbidden to him but her sister, who is her sister-in-law, is permitted to him. That is, “her sister which is also her sister-in-law has levirate”.

HALAKHAH: “They formulated a principle about a sister-in-law: Any woman forbidden,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira said: When I was still there, we extracted fourteen cases from “her sister which is also her sister-in-law has levirate”, except his daughter. When we came up here, we heard what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, since Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: His daughter from a woman he raped was married to a paternal halfbrother; she also has a maternal sister from a different father married to a second brother who died childless. His daughter is forbidden to him but her sister, who is her sister-in-law, is permitted to him. That is, “her sister which is also her sister-in-law has levirate”.

MISHNAH: Any [male] who has a brother anywhere makes his brother’s wife a candidate for levirate and he is his brother in every respect, except if he were from a slave woman or a non-Jew.

MISHNAH: Any person who has a child anywhere frees [the child’s] father’s wife from levirate; [the child] would be guilty for wounding or cursing [the father]; he is his child in every respect except if he were from a slave woman or a non-Jew.

MISHNAH: If somebody gave qiddushin to one of two sisters but he does not know to which one of them, he gives a bill of divorce to each. If he died and has one brother, that one has to perform ḥalîṣah with both sisters. If he had two [brothers], one performs ḥalîṣah and one may marry in levirate. If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody gave qiddushin to one of two sisters but he does not know to which one of them, he gives a bill of divorce to each. If he died and has one brother, that one has to perform ḥalîṣah with both sisters.” Everywhere else you say “there cannot be ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah” but here you say so? There if it is certain, here one is in doubt. “If he had two [brothers], one performs ḥalîṣah and one may marry in levirate.” Everywhere else you say, in any case one asks him to perform the levirate one does not say perform ḥalîṣah; but here you say so? There if it is certain, here one is in doubt. “If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them.”

HALAKHAH: “If somebody gave qiddushin to one of two sisters but he does not know to which one of them, he gives a bill of divorce to each. If he died and has one brother, that one has to perform ḥalîṣah with both sisters.” Everywhere else you say “there cannot be ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah” but here you say so? There if it is certain, here one is in doubt. “If he had two [brothers], one performs ḥalîṣah and one may marry in levirate.” Everywhere else you say, in any case one asks him to perform the levirate one does not say perform ḥalîṣah; but here you say so? There if it is certain, here one is in doubt. “If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them.”

MISHNAH: If two [men] gave qiddushin to two sisters and neither of them knows to which one he gave his, each one of them gives two bills of divorce. If they died and each one had a brother, each [brother] performs ḥalîṣah with both [sisters]. If one had one [brother] but the other had two, the single one performs ḥalîṣah with both [sisters], but of the two brothers one performs ḥalîṣah and the other may marry in levirate. If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them.

HALAKHAH: “If two [men] gave qiddushin to two sisters,” etc. It was stated: These rules apply both for Israel and for Cohanim. That is, if ḥalîṣah was performed first and the levirate afterwards. But to perform levirate first is forbidden; maybe his brother will die and it will turn out that he cohabited with the sister of his sister-in-law. Rav Ḥisda said, that means that having relations with the sister of his sister-in-law does not make her unfit for [marriage into] priesthood. Rebbi Yose bar Abba said, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: He who cohabited with the sister of a woman for whom he had performed ḥalîṣah did not make her unfit for [marriage into] priesthood.

HALAKHAH: “If two [men] gave qiddushin to two sisters,” etc. It was stated: These rules apply both for Israel and for Cohanim. That is, if ḥalîṣah was performed first and the levirate afterwards. But to perform levirate first is forbidden; maybe his brother will die and it will turn out that he cohabited with the sister of his sister-in-law. Rav Ḥisda said, that means that having relations with the sister of his sister-in-law does not make her unfit for [marriage into] priesthood. Rebbi Yose bar Abba said, Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: He who cohabited with the sister of a woman for whom he had performed ḥalîṣah did not make her unfit for [marriage into] priesthood.

“If they died and each one had a brother, each [brother] performs ḥalîṣah with both [sisters]. Everywhere else you say “there cannot be ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah” but here you say so? There if it is certain, here one is in doubt. “If one had one [brother] but the other had two, the single one performs ḥalîṣah with both [sisters], but of the two brothers one performs ḥalîṣah and the other may marry in levirate. Everywhere else you say, in any case one asks him to perform the levirate one does not say perform ḥalîṣah; but here you say so? There if it is certain, here one is in doubt. “If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them.”

“If they died and each one had a brother, each [brother] performs ḥalîṣah with both [sisters]. Everywhere else you say “there cannot be ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah” but here you say so? There if it is certain, here one is in doubt. “If one had one [brother] but the other had two, the single one performs ḥalîṣah with both [sisters], but of the two brothers one performs ḥalîṣah and the other may marry in levirate. Everywhere else you say, in any case one asks him to perform the levirate one does not say perform ḥalîṣah; but here you say so? There if it is certain, here one is in doubt. “If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them.”

MISHNAH: If each [of the deceased] had two brothers, one brother of each [of the deceased] performs ḥalîṣah with one [of the sisters] and the other brother takes the other [sister] in levirate. If two [brothers] both performed ḥalîṣah, the other two should not [both] marry in levirate but one of them performs ḥalîṣah and the other one may take in levirate. If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them.

MISHNAH: If each [of the deceased] had two brothers, one brother of each [of the deceased] performs ḥalîṣah with one [of the sisters] and the other brother takes the other [sister] in levirate. If two [brothers] both performed ḥalîṣah, the other two should not [both] marry in levirate but one of them performs ḥalîṣah and the other one may take in levirate. If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them.

MISHNAH: If each [of the deceased] had two brothers, one brother of each [of the deceased] performs ḥalîṣah with one [of the sisters] and the other brother takes the other [sister] in levirate. If two [brothers] both performed ḥalîṣah, the other two should not [both] marry in levirate but one of them performs ḥalîṣah and the other one may take in levirate. If both married without asking, one does not remove [the women] from them.

MISHNAH: The obligation of levirate is on the oldest [brother] but if a younger one got the start on him, he acquired. If somebody is accused in matters of a slave woman and she was manumitted, or of a Gentile and she converted, he should not marry her but if he married her one does not remove her from him. If somebody is accused in matters of a married woman and she was forcibly divorced from [her husband], even if he married her he must divorce her.

HALAKHAH: “The obligation of levirate is on the oldest [brother] but if a younger one got the start on him, he acquired, etc.” “The obligation of levirate is on the oldest,” since it is said, “the firstborn she will bear shall …”. How do we hold? If about the newborn, the verse should read “he should rise in the name of his dead father.” But it must be that the newborn is a firstborn. In that case, even if he had children and they died before he died, his widow should not be a candidate for levirate! Then the verse should have said, “he never had children”. But if it cannot refer to the newborn; let it refer to the levir, “the obligation of levirate is on the oldest.”

HALAKHAH: “The obligation of levirate is on the oldest [brother] but if a younger one got the start on him, he acquired, etc.” “The obligation of levirate is on the oldest,” since it is said, “the firstborn she will bear shall …”. How do we hold? If about the newborn, the verse should read “he should rise in the name of his dead father.” But it must be that the newborn is a firstborn. In that case, even if he had children and they died before he died, his widow should not be a candidate for levirate! Then the verse should have said, “he never had children”. But if it cannot refer to the newborn; let it refer to the levir, “the obligation of levirate is on the oldest.”

HALAKHAH: “The obligation of levirate is on the oldest [brother] but if a younger one got the start on him, he acquired, etc.” “The obligation of levirate is on the oldest,” since it is said, “the firstborn she will bear shall …”. How do we hold? If about the newborn, the verse should read “he should rise in the name of his dead father.” But it must be that the newborn is a firstborn. In that case, even if he had children and they died before he died, his widow should not be a candidate for levirate! Then the verse should have said, “he never had children”. But if it cannot refer to the newborn; let it refer to the levir, “the obligation of levirate is on the oldest.”

HALAKHAH: “The obligation of levirate is on the oldest [brother] but if a younger one got the start on him, he acquired, etc.” “The obligation of levirate is on the oldest,” since it is said, “the firstborn she will bear shall …”. How do we hold? If about the newborn, the verse should read “he should rise in the name of his dead father.” But it must be that the newborn is a firstborn. In that case, even if he had children and they died before he died, his widow should not be a candidate for levirate! Then the verse should have said, “he never had children”. But if it cannot refer to the newborn; let it refer to the levir, “the obligation of levirate is on the oldest.”

MISHNAH: There are four brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters. If those married to the sisters died, [the sisters] have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If [the remaining brothers] jumped the gun and married, they must divorce them. Rebbi Eliezer said, the House of Shammai say, they shall keep them, but the House of Hillel say, they have to divorce.

HALAKHAH: “Four brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. If there were four brothers, two of whom are married to unrelatedwomen, would they not be subject to levirate? There is a difference, since here there is the prohibition of sisters. In that case, they should not need ḥalîṣah from them! Rebbi Mattaniah said, it is because of candidacy and the prohibition of sisters is not clear.

Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Here, you say, if his sister-in-law died, his wife is permitted to him, if his wife died, his sister-in-law is permitted to him, and here you say so? He said to him, I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters. Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters who are sisters-in-law. Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The prohibition of sisters who are sisters-in-law cannot be compared to the prohibition of sisters who are not sisters-in-law. Rebbi Jeremiah said, explain it that the house fell on both [brothers] at the same time. Rebbi Yose asked, did Rebbi Joḥanan say, I do not know the reason for [the rule regarding] sisters who are sisters-in-law if the house fell on both [brothers] at the same time? Only if they died one after the other. They wanted to say, what was the problem of Rebbi Joḥanan? If the second one died, why should the first one not be permitted to him? But if the first one died, the second should be forbidden to him. Rebbi Yudan said, both cases are the same problem for him. And candidacy counts for nothing since if there are three brothers,two of them paternal but not maternal halfbrothers, and two maternal but not paternal halfbrothers. If the paternal halfbrother died first and the second brother had no time to perform ḥalîṣah or levirate before he died, and she became eligible for his maternal halfbrother, may he not take her? This shows that candidacy is nothing, [otherwise] she should be forbidden as the maternal halfbrother’s wife.

What if there is a co-wife? Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Avina: It is an inference de minore ad majus. If the Sages gave a co-wife to the sister of a woman with whom one performed ḥalîṣah, which is rabbinic, here, where there is the prohibition of sisters, not so much more? It is obvious that the rule of co-wives applies to his daughter. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Avina: One has stated there, “if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed; if the sisters performed ḥalîṣah, the co-wives were not freed.” But as you say, if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed, so it should be that even if the sisters performed ḥalîṣah, the co-wives should be freed. But it must follow Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri, since Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, come and let us institute that the co-wife perform ḥalîṣah without being admitted to levirate. Did they institute that? Was it not stated: They did not manage to institute this before the time became unsuitable. But it must follow the House of Shammai since the House of Shammai permit the co-wives to the brothers. Rebbi Phineas said to Rebbi Yose: If it follows the House of Shammai, even if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sistersshould not be freed! But we have stated: Rebbi Eliezer said, the House of Shammai say, they shall keep them, but the House of Hillel say, they have to divorce. There are two Tannaïm interpreting the House of Shammai, one said if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed, the other one said if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were not freed.

It was stated: “Abba Shaul says, the House of Hillel made this easy.” Is that a criticism? It is a praise, since people were saying, what is the prohibition here? It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Simeon: “If they jumped the gun and married, they should keep them.” But that is only if they had intercourse at the same time. In the opinion of Abba Shaul it is permitted to have intercourse without asking. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon only if he transgressed and had intercourse. If the first [brother] married and had intercourse, he tells the second also to have intercourse. If that one did not have intercourse, the first [brother] is forbidden to have intercourse a second time; maybe one of them will die and it turns out that he had intercourse with the sister of his sister-in-law. It was stated: If the second [brother] died, the first one had to divorce his wife with a bill of divorce and his brother’s wife by ḥalîṣah. Even if the second one died? Does this not follow Rebbi Simeon? But Rebbi Simeon frees the second [sister] from ḥalîṣah and levirate! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I confirmed this: Any sister-in-law who was to be freed by ḥalîṣah will never be permitted without ḥalîṣah.

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, her relatives are forbidden to him and his relatives are forbidden to her.” There is a difference here, since he already is available to free himself from her. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law, then his brother marries her sister and dies, she performs ḥalîṣah but cannot have levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Three brothers, two of them are married to two sisters and the third is free. One of the sisters’ husbands died, the free [brother] “bespoke” her, then the second brother died. The House of Shammai say, his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister. The House of Hillel say, he divorces his wife with a bill of divorce (and ḥalîṣah), and his wife’s sister with ḥalîṣah. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is (acquisiton) [freeing]. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it, after her death. Is there no levirate after death? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother gives qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him, wait until your brother has acted. If one of the brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry his wife. If the levir died, he has to remove his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.”. This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, is there anybody who wants to acquire two sisters together? Explain it following Rebbi Eleazar, since Rebbi Eleazar said, if the cause is removed the prohibition remains. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥama, the colleague of the rabbis, objected: Does not a Mishnah disagree with Rav? “Three brothers, two of them married to two sisters or a woman and her daughter or a woman and her daughter’s or her son’s daughter. These perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” There is a difference since the prohibition of a woman and her daughter applies both when she is alive as also after her death. These last two disagree with Rav and one cannot explain them away.

MISHNAH: If one of them was forbidden to one of them by an incest prohibition, that one is forbidden for him but her sister is permitted to him. Both are forbidden to the second [brother]. In case of a commandment prohibition or a holiness prohibition, they have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If one of [the sisters] was forbidden to that one [brother] by an incest prohition and the other [sister] was forbidden to the [other brother] by an incest prohition, the one who is forbidden for one might be permitted to the other and vice-versa. That is what they said, “Her sister who is her sister-in-law can have ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate.”

MISHNAH: If one of them was forbidden to one of them by an incest prohibition, that one is forbidden for him but her sister is permitted to him. Both are forbidden to the second [brother]. In case of a commandment prohibition or a holiness prohibition, they have ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If one of [the sisters] was forbidden to that one [brother] by an incest prohition and the other [sister] was forbidden to the [other brother] by an incest prohition, the one who is forbidden for one might be permitted to the other and vice-versa. That is what they said, “Her sister who is her sister-in-law can have ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate.”