My LORD’s Biblem
437 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
MISHNAH: One opens about festive days and Sabbaths. In earlier times, they said that these days are permitted but the rest forbidden, until Rebbi Aqiba came and taught that a vow which was partially voided is totally voided. How is this? ‘A qônām that I shall not benefit any one of you,’ if one was permitted, all are permitted. ‘That I shall not benefit this one and this one and this one,’ if the first one becomes permitted, all are permitted; if the last one becomes permitted, he is permitted and the others are prohibited. ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one, a qorbān for that one’; each single one needs a separate opening. ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine, for wine is bad for the intestines.’ If they told him, but old [wine] is good for the intestines, old [wine] was permitted; not only old wine is permitted but all wines. ‘A qônām that I shall not taste onion, for onion is bad for the heart.’ If they told him, but the rural kind is good for the heart, rural [onion] was permitted; not only rural is permitted but all onions. It happened that Rebbi Meїr permitted all onions to him.
MISHNAH: ‘A qônām that I shall not marry the ugly Miss X, and she is beautiful, black and she is white, short and she is tall, he is permitted. Not because she was ugly and became beautiful, black and she became white, short and she became tall, but because the vow was erroneous. It happened that one made a vow renouncing benefit from his sister’s daughter. They brought her to Rebbi Ismael’s house and gave her a beauty treatment. Rebbi Ismael asked him, did you make your vow about this one? He said no, and Rebbi Ismael dissolved it. At that moment, Rebbi Ismael cried and said, the daughters of Israel are beautiful, but poverty disfigures them.
HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not marry the ugly Miss X,’ ” etc. He made her a golden eye, a golden tooth. So he said to him, acquire what is on her.
Rebbi Ze‘ira explained the Mishnah: “These are the vows which he can dissolve: Matters connected with mortification. [E. g.], ‘if I wash, if I do not wash; if I shall wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels.’ Rebbi Yose said, these are not vows of mortification” but vows between him and her. “The following are vows of mortification” following Rebbi Yose. For example, “she said, all produce of the world is qônām for me, he may dissolve.” The rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Vows between him and her are only dissolved as long as she is married to him. Rebbi Yose says, both vows of mortification and vows between him and her, if he dissolved them they are permanently dissolved. That means, the rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Rebi Yose says, if he dissolves vows between him and her, they are permanently dissolved. What is the difference between them? If she said, any benefit from me shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Why can he not dissolve that? Because she did not say, any benefit from my body shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila, both of them say: That is the essence of vows between him and her. In the opinion of Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shall dissolve it since maybe he would divorce her, then she would be forbidden to return to him.”
Rebbi Ze‘ira explained the Mishnah: “These are the vows which he can dissolve: Matters connected with mortification. [E. g.], ‘if I wash, if I do not wash; if I shall wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels.’ Rebbi Yose said, these are not vows of mortification” but vows between him and her. “The following are vows of mortification” following Rebbi Yose. For example, “she said, all produce of the world is qônām for me, he may dissolve.” The rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Vows between him and her are only dissolved as long as she is married to him. Rebbi Yose says, both vows of mortification and vows between him and her, if he dissolved them they are permanently dissolved. That means, the rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Rebi Yose says, if he dissolves vows between him and her, they are permanently dissolved. What is the difference between them? If she said, any benefit from me shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Why can he not dissolve that? Because she did not say, any benefit from my body shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila, both of them say: That is the essence of vows between him and her. In the opinion of Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shall dissolve it since maybe he would divorce her, then she would be forbidden to return to him.”
Rebbi Ze‘ira explained the Mishnah: “These are the vows which he can dissolve: Matters connected with mortification. [E. g.], ‘if I wash, if I do not wash; if I shall wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels.’ Rebbi Yose said, these are not vows of mortification” but vows between him and her. “The following are vows of mortification” following Rebbi Yose. For example, “she said, all produce of the world is qônām for me, he may dissolve.” The rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Vows between him and her are only dissolved as long as she is married to him. Rebbi Yose says, both vows of mortification and vows between him and her, if he dissolved them they are permanently dissolved. That means, the rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Rebi Yose says, if he dissolves vows between him and her, they are permanently dissolved. What is the difference between them? If she said, any benefit from me shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Why can he not dissolve that? Because she did not say, any benefit from my body shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila, both of them say: That is the essence of vows between him and her. In the opinion of Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shall dissolve it since maybe he would divorce her, then she would be forbidden to return to him.”
We understand “if I wash”. “If I do not wash”? Let her wash! Rebbi Mana said, if she said: “Any benefit from me shall be qônām for you after I shall have washed myself, if I ever wash myself.” Why should he not dissolve for her? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, only when she said, “any benefit from my body shall be qônām for you after I shall have washed myself.” Why can he not force? Did not Rebbi Huna say, [if she vowed] any benefit from me [shall be forbidden] to you, he forces her and sleeps with her. Any benefit from you [shall be forbidden] to me, he has to dissolve. There is a difference because it is a benefit for him and her. Rebbi Abba Mari said, If I wash [today], I shall not wash forever. If I wear jewellery [today], I shall not wear jewellery forever. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Nasa: If I wash I shall not wear jewellery; if I wear jewellery I shall not wash.
We understand “if I wash”. “If I do not wash”? Let her wash! Rebbi Mana said, if she said: “Any benefit from me shall be qônām for you after I shall have washed myself, if I ever wash myself.” Why should he not dissolve for her? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, only when she said, “any benefit from my body shall be qônām for you after I shall have washed myself.” Why can he not force? Did not Rebbi Huna say, [if she vowed] any benefit from me [shall be forbidden] to you, he forces her and sleeps with her. Any benefit from you [shall be forbidden] to me, he has to dissolve. There is a difference because it is a benefit for him and her. Rebbi Abba Mari said, If I wash [today], I shall not wash forever. If I wear jewellery [today], I shall not wear jewellery forever. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Nasa: If I wash I shall not wear jewellery; if I wear jewellery I shall not wash.
MISHNAH: The following are vows of mortification. If she said, all produce of the world is qônām for me, he may dissolve. The produce of this province [is qônām] for me, he can buy for her from another province. The produce of this grocery store [is qônām] for me, he cannot dissolve. If he can get the necessities of life only from that grocery, he may dissolve, the words of Rebbi Yose.
MISHNAH: The following are vows of mortification. If she said, all produce of the world is qônām for me, he may dissolve. The produce of this province [is qônām] for me, he can buy for her from another province. The produce of this grocery store [is qônām] for me, he cannot dissolve. If he can get the necessities of life only from that grocery, he may dissolve, the words of Rebbi Yose.
MISHNAH: The following are vows of mortification. If she said, all produce of the world is qônām for me, he may dissolve. The produce of this province [is qônām] for me, he can buy for her from another province. The produce of this grocery store [is qônām] for me, he cannot dissolve. If he can get the necessities of life only from that grocery, he may dissolve, the words of Rebbi Yose.
HALAKHAH: Samuel said, if she said, all produce of the world is qônām for me; if there was grain heaped in the grain container, he may buy for her from that. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “the produce of the people of this province [is qônām] for me, if there were strangers selling there, he can buy from them.
HALAKHAH: Samuel said, if she said, all produce of the world is qônām for me; if there was grain heaped in the grain container, he may buy for her from that. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “the produce of the people of this province [is qônām] for me, if there were strangers selling there, he can buy from them.
It is written: “Every vow and every oath of prohibition to mortify a person.” For example, [a qônām] if I would taste peppers, if I would taste rolls. Not only if that kind is available now; even if that kind is not available now, perhaps he might bring her some later on. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If there were two pieces before them, one nice and one not nice. If she desired the nice one and made a vow to forbid herself the less nice one, he may dissolve that. Why can he dissolve? The colleagues say, because of her mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because of his mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Samuel: A man can dissolve all vows except if she says, any benefit from me shall [be qônām] for X. That means he can dissolve: Any benefit from X shall [be qônām] for me. But did we not state: “The produce of this grocery store [is qônām] for me, he cannot dissolve.” Explain that following Rebbi Yose and they disagree with him, for we did state there: “If he can get the necessities of life only from that grocer, he may dissolve.” Rebbi Yose said, because he gives him credit, he delivers to him. Rebbi Mana said, because he gives him good quality produce.
It is written: “Every vow and every oath of prohibition to mortify a person.” For example, [a qônām] if I would taste peppers, if I would taste rolls. Not only if that kind is available now; even if that kind is not available now, perhaps he might bring her some later on. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If there were two pieces before them, one nice and one not nice. If she desired the nice one and made a vow to forbid herself the less nice one, he may dissolve that. Why can he dissolve? The colleagues say, because of her mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because of his mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Samuel: A man can dissolve all vows except if she says, any benefit from me shall [be qônām] for X. That means he can dissolve: Any benefit from X shall [be qônām] for me. But did we not state: “The produce of this grocery store [is qônām] for me, he cannot dissolve.” Explain that following Rebbi Yose and they disagree with him, for we did state there: “If he can get the necessities of life only from that grocer, he may dissolve.” Rebbi Yose said, because he gives him credit, he delivers to him. Rebbi Mana said, because he gives him good quality produce.
It is written: “Every vow and every oath of prohibition to mortify a person.” For example, [a qônām] if I would taste peppers, if I would taste rolls. Not only if that kind is available now; even if that kind is not available now, perhaps he might bring her some later on. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If there were two pieces before them, one nice and one not nice. If she desired the nice one and made a vow to forbid herself the less nice one, he may dissolve that. Why can he dissolve? The colleagues say, because of her mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because of his mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Samuel: A man can dissolve all vows except if she says, any benefit from me shall [be qônām] for X. That means he can dissolve: Any benefit from X shall [be qônām] for me. But did we not state: “The produce of this grocery store [is qônām] for me, he cannot dissolve.” Explain that following Rebbi Yose and they disagree with him, for we did state there: “If he can get the necessities of life only from that grocer, he may dissolve.” Rebbi Yose said, because he gives him credit, he delivers to him. Rebbi Mana said, because he gives him good quality produce.
It is written: “Every vow and every oath of prohibition to mortify a person.” For example, [a qônām] if I would taste peppers, if I would taste rolls. Not only if that kind is available now; even if that kind is not available now, perhaps he might bring her some later on. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If there were two pieces before them, one nice and one not nice. If she desired the nice one and made a vow to forbid herself the less nice one, he may dissolve that. Why can he dissolve? The colleagues say, because of her mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because of his mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Samuel: A man can dissolve all vows except if she says, any benefit from me shall [be qônām] for X. That means he can dissolve: Any benefit from X shall [be qônām] for me. But did we not state: “The produce of this grocery store [is qônām] for me, he cannot dissolve.” Explain that following Rebbi Yose and they disagree with him, for we did state there: “If he can get the necessities of life only from that grocer, he may dissolve.” Rebbi Yose said, because he gives him credit, he delivers to him. Rebbi Mana said, because he gives him good quality produce.
MISHNAH: ‘A qônām that I shall not have benefit from people’ he cannot dissolve, and she may benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and peah. ‘A qônām that priests and Levites can have no benefit from me’; they may take forcibly. ‘These priests and these Levites can have no benefit from me;’ others may take.
MISHNAH: ‘A qônām that I shall not have benefit from people’ he cannot dissolve, and she may benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and peah. ‘A qônām that priests and Levites can have no benefit from me’; they may take forcibly. ‘These priests and these Levites can have no benefit from me;’ others may take.
HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not have benefit from people,’ etc. Rebbi Yoḥanan said, so is the Mishnah: “And she may benefit from gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and peah.”. It was stated: “And the tithe of the poor.” The tithe of the poor is not listed here. The tithe of the poor is given as acquisition; these by abandoning.
MISHNAH: 4: ‘A qônām that I shall not work according to the wishes of my father, or your father, or my brother, or your brother,’ he cannot dissolve. ‘According to your wish,’ he does not have to dissolve. Rebbi Aqiba says, he has to dissolve, maybe she works more than the required minimum. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he shall dissolve since maybe he would divorce her, then she would be forbidden to return to him.
HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not work according to the wishes of my father,’ etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody dedicates his wife’s work, she works and eats. The excess? Rebbi Meїr says, it is dedicated; Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, it is profane.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree about the excess over five tetradrachmas. He explains it in the case of one who supports his wife with food but does not give her an obolus for her needs, as we stated: “If he does not give her an obolus for her needs, what she earns is hers”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they disagree about the excess left after [the husband’s] death; for he explains it if he does not support her with food. But if he supports her with food, everybody agrees that it became dedicated. And here, he cannot dissolve! Rebbi Meїr says. he does not have to dissolve. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, hers. Rebbi Aqiba said, hers. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, his.
HALAKHAH: “If she said, a qônām that I shall not taste these figs and grapes,” etc. Even if he heard and remained silent, even if he heard and confirmed.
MISHNAH: If she said, a qônām that I shall not taste these figs and grapes, if he confirmed for the figs he confirmed everything. If he dissolved for figs it is not dissolved unless he also dissolves for grapes. If she said, a qônām that I shall not taste these figs, that I shall not taste these grapes; these are two vows.
MISHNAH: If she said, a qônām that I shall not taste these figs and grapes, if he confirmed for the figs he confirmed everything. If he dissolved for figs it is not dissolved unless he also dissolves for grapes. If she said, a qônām that I shall not taste these figs, that I shall not taste these grapes; these are two vows.
HALAKHAH: Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, even partially. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, totally, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, totally, “he shall dissolve it”, even partially. The Mishnah follows him who said, “he shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. As we have stated: “If he confirmed for the figs he confirmed everything. If he dissolved for figs it is not dissolved unless he also dissolves for grapes.” If she said, a qônām that I shall not taste a fig nor a grape berry, that is a matter of difference between Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Ismael says, the vow decides, and Rebbi Aqiba says, the prohibition decides.
HALAKHAH: Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, even partially. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, totally, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, totally, “he shall dissolve it”, even partially. The Mishnah follows him who said, “he shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. As we have stated: “If he confirmed for the figs he confirmed everything. If he dissolved for figs it is not dissolved unless he also dissolves for grapes.” If she said, a qônām that I shall not taste a fig nor a grape berry, that is a matter of difference between Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Ismael says, the vow decides, and Rebbi Aqiba says, the prohibition decides.
HALAKHAH: Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, even partially. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, totally, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, totally, “he shall dissolve it”, even partially. The Mishnah follows him who said, “he shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. As we have stated: “If he confirmed for the figs he confirmed everything. If he dissolved for figs it is not dissolved unless he also dissolves for grapes.” If she said, a qônām that I shall not taste a fig nor a grape berry, that is a matter of difference between Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Ismael says, the vow decides, and Rebbi Aqiba says, the prohibition decides.
HALAKHAH: Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, even partially. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, totally, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, totally, “he shall dissolve it”, even partially. The Mishnah follows him who said, “he shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. As we have stated: “If he confirmed for the figs he confirmed everything. If he dissolved for figs it is not dissolved unless he also dissolves for grapes.” If she said, a qônām that I shall not taste a fig nor a grape berry, that is a matter of difference between Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Ismael says, the vow decides, and Rebbi Aqiba says, the prohibition decides.
HALAKHAH: Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, even partially. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, totally, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, totally, “he shall dissolve it”, even partially. The Mishnah follows him who said, “he shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. As we have stated: “If he confirmed for the figs he confirmed everything. If he dissolved for figs it is not dissolved unless he also dissolves for grapes.” If she said, a qônām that I shall not taste a fig nor a grape berry, that is a matter of difference between Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Ismael says, the vow decides, and Rebbi Aqiba says, the prohibition decides.
MISHNAH: ‘A qônām that I shall not take any benefit from my father, or your father, if I shall do anything for you.’ ‘[A qônām] that I shall not have any benefit from you if I shall do anything for my father, or for your father.’ These he can dissolve.
MISHNAH: ‘A qônām that I shall not take any benefit from my father, or your father, if I shall do anything for you.’ ‘[A qônām] that I shall not have any benefit from you if I shall do anything for my father, or for your father.’ These he can dissolve.
HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not take any benefit from my father, or your father,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Nathan says, he cannot dissolve, but the Sages say, he can dissolve. Why can he dissolve? The colleagues say, because of his mortification. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila say, because of her mortification.
“ ‘I have to bring birds’, Rebbi Meïr says, he is a nazir, but the Sages say, he is not a nazir.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, because of substitutes of substitutes: “Until his hair became mighty as an eagle’s and his fingernails like those of birds.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, because an impure nazir brings birds. Does he bring birds? He brings turtledoves or young pigeons. There are some Tannaïm who state that all pure birds are called צפור, and there are some Tannaïm who state that all birds, whether pure or impure, are called צפור. He who says that all pure birds are called צפור, “you may eat any pure bird.” He who says that all birds, whether pure or impure, are called צפור, “say to any winged bird. “What is the rabbi’s reason? He is like somebody offering birds for the upkeep of the Temple. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? He is like somebody offering a reparation sacrifice for the upkeep of the Temple. What is the difference between them? If somebody says, “I take upon myself to bring a reparation sacrifice.” In the opinion of Rebbi Meïr he is a nazir since one cannot bring a reparation sacrifice for the upkeep of the Temple. In the opinion of the rabbis he is a nazir since an impure nazir brings a reparation sacrifice.
“ ‘I have to bring birds’, Rebbi Meïr says, he is a nazir, but the Sages say, he is not a nazir.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, because of substitutes of substitutes: “Until his hair became mighty as an eagle’s and his fingernails like those of birds.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, because an impure nazir brings birds. Does he bring birds? He brings turtledoves or young pigeons. There are some Tannaïm who state that all pure birds are called צפור, and there are some Tannaïm who state that all birds, whether pure or impure, are called צפור. He who says that all pure birds are called צפור, “you may eat any pure bird.” He who says that all birds, whether pure or impure, are called צפור, “say to any winged bird. “What is the rabbi’s reason? He is like somebody offering birds for the upkeep of the Temple. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? He is like somebody offering a reparation sacrifice for the upkeep of the Temple. What is the difference between them? If somebody says, “I take upon myself to bring a reparation sacrifice.” In the opinion of Rebbi Meïr he is a nazir since one cannot bring a reparation sacrifice for the upkeep of the Temple. In the opinion of the rabbis he is a nazir since an impure nazir brings a reparation sacrifice.
Some Tannaïm state: “One separates matted hair.” Some Tannaïm state: “One does not separate.” Rav Ḥisda said, the one who states that one separates, for healthy [hair]; the one who states that one does not separate, for weak [hair].
Some Tannaïm state: “One separates matted hair.” Some Tannaïm state: “One does not separate.” Rav Ḥisda said, the one who states that one separates, for healthy [hair]; the one who states that one does not separate, for weak [hair].
HALAKHAH: A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: “If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it.” A verse [states] that “roasted” is called “cooked”: “They cooked the pesaḥ”, etc. If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, “as is the rule”. A Mishnah states that scalded is called cooked: “Is one who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food permitted roasted and scalded food”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. What is the difference between them? ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine on Tabernacles.’ In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is forbidden on the last day of the holiday. In the opinion of Rebbi Joshia, is he permitted? Rebbi Joshia also agrees that he is prohibited. Rebbi Joshia said it only for restrictions.
The corpse of obligation acquired its place, four cubits even in a field of saffron, for on this condition did Joshua distribute the Land to Israel. When is this? If he found it in the field. But if he found it on the road, he buries it either to the right or to the left of the road. A fallow and a ploughed field, he buries it in the fallow field. A ploughed and a sown field, he buries it in the ploughed field. A vineyard and a sown field, he buries it in the sown field. A vineyard and an orchard, some Tannaïm state, he buries it in the vineyard; some Tannaïm state, he buries it in the orchard. He who says, he buries it in the vineyard but not in the orchard, because of a tent over the corpse. He who says, he buries it in the orchard but not in the vineyard because of the preparation of the grape harvest. If he switched, Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: He transgressed “do not defile your land.” If both were fallow, or ploughed, or sown, he buries in the one he chooses.
The corpse of obligation acquired its place, four cubits even in a field of saffron, for on this condition did Joshua distribute the Land to Israel. When is this? If he found it in the field. But if he found it on the road, he buries it either to the right or to the left of the road. A fallow and a ploughed field, he buries it in the fallow field. A ploughed and a sown field, he buries it in the ploughed field. A vineyard and a sown field, he buries it in the sown field. A vineyard and an orchard, some Tannaïm state, he buries it in the vineyard; some Tannaïm state, he buries it in the orchard. He who says, he buries it in the vineyard but not in the orchard, because of a tent over the corpse. He who says, he buries it in the orchard but not in the vineyard because of the preparation of the grape harvest. If he switched, Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: He transgressed “do not defile your land.” If both were fallow, or ploughed, or sown, he buries in the one he chooses.
A Cohen and a Levite, the Levite shall defile himself. A Levite and an Israel, the Israel shall defile himself. No, is not the Levite like the Israel? Rebbi Abin said, it was taught in the time of the platform. The Sages agree with Rebbi Eliezer that between a High Priest and a nazir, the nazir shall defile himself but not the High Priest. Rebbi Eliezer agrees with the Sages that between a High Priest and a nazir, the nazir shall defile himself but not the High Priest. Think of it, if his father sanctified him from birth. The one is from the Torah, the other is not from the Torah. Rebbi Huna in the name of Rav Joseph: Rebbi Eliezer parallels the House of Shammai. As the House of Shammai say, between holy and frequent the holy has precedence, so Rebbi Eliezer says, between holy and frequent the holy has precedence. A nazir for 30 days and a nazir for 100, the nazir for 30 days shall defile himself. A nazir for 100 days and a nazir forever, the nazir for 100 days shall defile himself. A nazir forever, and a nazir of neziriot, some Tannaïm state, the nazir forever shall defile himself; but some Tannaïm state, the nazir of neziriot shall defile himself. He who says, the nazir forever shall defile himself but not the nazir of neziriot, since he shaves more frequently. He who says, the nazir of neziriot shall defile himself but not the nazir forever, since he brings more sacrifices. If he switched, it should be as Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: He transgressed “do not defile your land.” Here it is the same.
A Cohen and a Levite, the Levite shall defile himself. A Levite and an Israel, the Israel shall defile himself. No, is not the Levite like the Israel? Rebbi Abin said, it was taught in the time of the platform. The Sages agree with Rebbi Eliezer that between a High Priest and a nazir, the nazir shall defile himself but not the High Priest. Rebbi Eliezer agrees with the Sages that between a High Priest and a nazir, the nazir shall defile himself but not the High Priest. Think of it, if his father sanctified him from birth. The one is from the Torah, the other is not from the Torah. Rebbi Huna in the name of Rav Joseph: Rebbi Eliezer parallels the House of Shammai. As the House of Shammai say, between holy and frequent the holy has precedence, so Rebbi Eliezer says, between holy and frequent the holy has precedence. A nazir for 30 days and a nazir for 100, the nazir for 30 days shall defile himself. A nazir for 100 days and a nazir forever, the nazir for 100 days shall defile himself. A nazir forever, and a nazir of neziriot, some Tannaïm state, the nazir forever shall defile himself; but some Tannaïm state, the nazir of neziriot shall defile himself. He who says, the nazir forever shall defile himself but not the nazir of neziriot, since he shaves more frequently. He who says, the nazir of neziriot shall defile himself but not the nazir forever, since he brings more sacrifices. If he switched, it should be as Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: He transgressed “do not defile your land.” Here it is the same.
Do stillbirths generate “decay”? For him who says that their blood induces impurity by a quartarius they generate “decay”; for him who says that their blood does not induce impurity by a quartarius, do they generate “decay”? Let us hear from the following: “Why is the dust from small heaps impure? Because women bury there their stillbirths.” Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Mattaniah, said: Would it not be reasonable otherwise, that lepers bury their limbs there? You must say that it is because of “decay”, not because a bone the size of a lentil, since it was stated: “If he took some dust from it and replaced it, [the small heap] is pure.” Explain it following Tannaïm, as it was stated: If one removed it, it remains impure; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel declares it pure.
Rav Ḥisda said, [the Mishnah] implies that it is permitted to remove a corpse of obligation. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, explain it if the burial was unauthorized or subject to question. Should one not be afraid that it might be a corpse of obligation? Rebbi Ze‘ira thinks that corpses of obligation are infrequent. “It turns out that there are three kinds of burials. A grave which is found one removes; after removal the place is impure and forbidden for use. A known grave may not be removed; but if it was removed the place is pure and permitted for use. A grave which endangers the public is removed; after removal the place is impure and forbidden for use.” Rebbi Abba bar Cohen instructed in Kefar Aqabia that its place is permitted for use. Does he disagree? There if it preceded the village, here if the village preceded it. It was stated: “A grave surrounded by a village on three sides can be removed,” on two sides, some Tannaïm state that one removes it, some state that one may not remove it. Rav Ḥisda said, he who says that one removes it, if it is within slightly more than 70 cubits. He who says that one does not remove it, if it is outside slightly more than 70 cubits. He who says that one removes it, if [the village] is built in the form of a Γ. He who says that one does not remove it, if [the village] is built in the form of a ה. “All kinds of graves may be removed except the graves of a king or a prophet. They said to him, were not the graves of David’s sons removed but the graves of the sons of Ḥulda were in Jerusalem and nobody ever touched them to remove them. Rebbi Aqiba told them, is that a proof? A duct was there and the impurity exited from there horizontally into the Qidron valley.”
How far does one importune him? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Miasha bar Jeremiah: Up to 40 cubits. If he checked twenty and found, he checks another ten. If he checked twenty and found, he checks another ten. Some Tannaïm state: If he checked ten and found, he checks another ten. If he checked ten and found, he checks another ten.
HALAKHAH: “One writes with anything,” etc. “He shall write”, not engrave. “He shall write”, not dropping points. “He shall write”, not pouring. “He shall write”, not engrave; some Tannaïm state, he even may engrave. Rav Ḥisda said, he who says not to engrave, if the writing stands out as on a denar. He who says even to engrave, as on a writing tablet. “He shall write”, not dropping points; Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom and Rebbi Mattaniah: One said, if he did not connect the points; the other said, even if he connected the points. “He shall write”, not pouring. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, those Orientals are very sophisticated. If one of them wants to write a secret letter to another, he writes with juice of gall-nuts. The recipient pours ink without gall over it, which is absorbed at the place of the writing. If one did that on the Sabbath, what? There, we have stated: “Writing on top of writing is not prosecutable.” Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both said, only if he wrote ink on ink or vermilion on vermilion. But if he wrote ink on vermilion or vermilion on ink, he is guilty. Rebbi Isaac bar Mesharshia in the name of the rabbis from there: He is doubly guilty, once for erasing and once for writing.
What is the status of her intercourse? Some Tannaïm state, her intercourse is certain, but some Tannaïm state, her intercourse is in doubt. According to him who says that her intercourse is certain, he brings a “hung” sacrifice. According to him who says that her intercourse is in doubt, if [the husband] dies, he is free; if [the husband] does not die, he brings a purification sacrifice.
What is the status of her intercourse? Some Tannaïm state, her intercourse is certain, but some Tannaïm state, her intercourse is in doubt. According to him who says that her intercourse is certain, he brings a “hung” sacrifice. According to him who says that her intercourse is in doubt, if [the husband] dies, he is free; if [the husband] does not die, he brings a purification sacrifice.
We stated: “After he wrote it for her.” Some Tannaïm state “after he delivered it to her.” He who says “after he wrote it for her” supports the House of Shammai; he who says “after he delivered it to her” supports the House of Hillel.
“He regains his autonomy by years.” Some Tannaїm state: He may be sold for less than six [years], but he cannot be sold for more than six. But some Tannaïm state: He may not be sold for less than six [years] or more than to [year] seven. Rebbi Jeremiah said, the reason of that Tanna: Sometimes he is sold two or three years before the Jubilee; then the Jubilee arrives and frees him automatically.
“He regains his autonomy by years.” Some Tannaїm state: He may be sold for less than six [years], but he cannot be sold for more than six. But some Tannaïm state: He may not be sold for less than six [years] or more than to [year] seven. Rebbi Jeremiah said, the reason of that Tanna: Sometimes he is sold two or three years before the Jubilee; then the Jubilee arrives and frees him automatically.
“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.
Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.
Why did we not state: By important limbs that do not regenerate? Rebbi Joḥanan ben Marius said, because of the disagreement. Some Tannaīm state that he needs a bill of manumission; some Tannaīm state that he does not need a bill of manumission.
Why did we not state: By important limbs that do not regenerate? Rebbi Joḥanan ben Marius said, because of the disagreement. Some Tannaīm state that he needs a bill of manumission; some Tannaīm state that he does not need a bill of manumission.
“But the Sages say, small animals are taken possession of by drawing near.” What is the reason of the rabbis? “Draw near and take for yourselves small animals for your families.” As Rav Jehudah sent to ask: By what means is possession of large animals established? He answered, by handing over; and asked, is that not the Mishnah? There are Tannaïm who switch the attributions. Rav Jehudah asked Rebbi Eleazar: If a firstborn became “torn” within thirty days? He answered, he is as if dead and free from the five tetradrachmas of a son. Rav Jehudah sent and asked Rebbi Eleazar: A placenta which was delivered partially today and partially tomorrow? He answered, for pure blood she counts from the first day, for impure blood from the second day. Rebbi Mattaniah said, that is, if no child was produced with it. But if there was a child, both for pure and impure blood she counts only from the moment of birth of the child.
Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for oath? Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?
Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for oath? Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?
Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for oath? Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?
Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to curse and oath, so also all who have to swear are under curse and oath, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to curse and oath, but no others who have to swear are under curse and oath, can you infer for rollover only but not for oath? Some Tannaïm state: Since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. Some Tannaïm state: This one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen. They wanted to say, the one who said, since this one is subject to Amen, Amen, so also all who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, is understandable. The one who said, this one is subject to Amen, Amen, but no others who have to swear are under Amen, Amen, did one not infer rollover of oaths from the suspected wife? Can you infer for rollover only but not for Amen, Amen?
“Except ‘do not destroy’, ‘do not shear,’ and ‘do not become impure for the dead’.” Issy says, also because of “do not make a bald spot.” What is the reason? “They shall not make a bald spot.” One subject to the rules of the beard is subject to the rules of the bald spot; women who have no beard are free from the rules of the bald spot. And also from the following: “sons,” not daughters. Rebbi Eleazar said, women are obligated by the rules of the bald spot. What is the reason? “For you are a holy people for the Eternal, your God.” Both men and women. How does Rebbi Eleazar explain “sons”? When they do the will of the Holy One, praise to Him, they are called sons, but when they do not do the will of the Holy One, praise to Him, they are not called sons. Rav was ordering his students, there came Rav Hamnuna ordering the colleagues: Order you wives not to tear out their hair when standing by a deceased, that they should not make a bald spot. What is a bald spot? There are Tannaïm who stated: Any size. There are Tannaïm who state: The size of a peeled grain. The one who says, any size, because the meaning of “bald spot” is of any size. The one who says, a peeled grain, for it is said here “to make a bald spot”, and it says there, a bald spot. Since “bald spot” mentioned there means in the size of a peeled grain, here also it means the size of a peeled grain. Rebbi Yose bar Mamal: A Cohenet is permitted to leave the Land. What is the reason? “Say to the Cohanim,” not to the Cohanot. If it were otherwise, what would we say? Since she is included in the decision, she may not leave. If you say so, you push aside the paragraph of impurities.
“Except ‘do not destroy’, ‘do not shear,’ and ‘do not become impure for the dead’.” Issy says, also because of “do not make a bald spot.” What is the reason? “They shall not make a bald spot.” One subject to the rules of the beard is subject to the rules of the bald spot; women who have no beard are free from the rules of the bald spot. And also from the following: “sons,” not daughters. Rebbi Eleazar said, women are obligated by the rules of the bald spot. What is the reason? “For you are a holy people for the Eternal, your God.” Both men and women. How does Rebbi Eleazar explain “sons”? When they do the will of the Holy One, praise to Him, they are called sons, but when they do not do the will of the Holy One, praise to Him, they are not called sons. Rav was ordering his students, there came Rav Hamnuna ordering the colleagues: Order you wives not to tear out their hair when standing by a deceased, that they should not make a bald spot. What is a bald spot? There are Tannaïm who stated: Any size. There are Tannaïm who state: The size of a peeled grain. The one who says, any size, because the meaning of “bald spot” is of any size. The one who says, a peeled grain, for it is said here “to make a bald spot”, and it says there, a bald spot. Since “bald spot” mentioned there means in the size of a peeled grain, here also it means the size of a peeled grain. Rebbi Yose bar Mamal: A Cohenet is permitted to leave the Land. What is the reason? “Say to the Cohanim,” not to the Cohanot. If it were otherwise, what would we say? Since she is included in the decision, she may not leave. If you say so, you push aside the paragraph of impurities.
Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead. “If he definitively will substitute, if he himself will dissolve.” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority.
Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: “ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma after thirty [days].’ Even if she spent it within the thirty [days], she is preliminarily married; also Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar will agree to this.” What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was not given for preliminary marriage, while this was given from the start for preliminary marriage. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Then even if a peruṭah’s worth was not left, she should be preliminarily married! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “Be preliminarily married to me by the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meïr said that anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber, so Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says here, anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber. For he explains it to be for a loan when the lender said, buy wheat for me, but he bought barley for him. That is difficult: can one pay for a preliminary marriage with robbed money? Rebbi Yose asked: One understands that a person may invest a peruṭah to gain a denar; would he invest a peruṭah to gain a perutah? Some Tannaïm state: One may preliminarily marry with a robbed item; some Tannaïm state: One cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item. Rebbi Mana said, the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has a chance to recoup from her hand. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has no chance to remove from her hand. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner gave up hope to recover. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner did not give up hope to recover.
Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: “ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma after thirty [days].’ Even if she spent it within the thirty [days], she is preliminarily married; also Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar will agree to this.” What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was not given for preliminary marriage, while this was given from the start for preliminary marriage. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Then even if a peruṭah’s worth was not left, she should be preliminarily married! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “Be preliminarily married to me by the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meïr said that anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber, so Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says here, anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber. For he explains it to be for a loan when the lender said, buy wheat for me, but he bought barley for him. That is difficult: can one pay for a preliminary marriage with robbed money? Rebbi Yose asked: One understands that a person may invest a peruṭah to gain a denar; would he invest a peruṭah to gain a perutah? Some Tannaïm state: One may preliminarily marry with a robbed item; some Tannaïm state: One cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item. Rebbi Mana said, the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has a chance to recoup from her hand. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has no chance to remove from her hand. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner gave up hope to recover. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner did not give up hope to recover.
“If she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The Elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, it would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, because the Elder uproots the vow from its start. Why did they forbid a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. What is the reason of him who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children became bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
“If she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The Elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, it would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, because the Elder uproots the vow from its start. Why did they forbid a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. What is the reason of him who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children became bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
“If she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The Elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and he dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, it would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage, because the Elder uproots the vow from its start. Why did they forbid a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. What is the reason of him who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children became bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.
“Here you have money that your slave shall become acquired by me after thirty days.” Some Tannaïm stated: The first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: The second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. Some Tannaïm stated: Neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: Both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. He who says, the first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “if he dies in his possession.” He who says, the second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “for he is his money.” He who says, both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, the first because of “if he dies in his possession,” the second because of “for he is his money.” He who says, neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, for he is not the first’s money and does not die in the possession of the second.
“Here you have money that your slave shall become acquired by me after thirty days.” Some Tannaïm stated: The first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: The second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. Some Tannaïm stated: Neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: Both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. He who says, the first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “if he dies in his possession.” He who says, the second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “for he is his money.” He who says, both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, the first because of “if he dies in his possession,” the second because of “for he is his money.” He who says, neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, for he is not the first’s money and does not die in the possession of the second.
“Here you have money that your slave shall become acquired by me after thirty days.” Some Tannaïm stated: The first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: The second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. Some Tannaïm stated: Neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: Both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. He who says, the first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “if he dies in his possession.” He who says, the second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “for he is his money.” He who says, both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, the first because of “if he dies in his possession,” the second because of “for he is his money.” He who says, neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, for he is not the first’s money and does not die in the possession of the second.
“Here you have money that your slave shall become acquired by me after thirty days.” Some Tannaïm stated: The first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: The second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”. Some Tannaïm stated: Neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. But some Tannaïm stated: Both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”. He who says, the first [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “if he dies in his possession.” He who says, the second [owner] is subject to “a day or two”, “for he is his money.” He who says, both first and second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, the first because of “if he dies in his possession,” the second because of “for he is his money.” He who says, neither the first nor the second [owners] are subject to “a day or two”, for he is not the first’s money and does not die in the possession of the second.
“As daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen she may eat heave.” Some Tannaïm state: She may not eat heave. Rebbi Hila said, the one who says that she may eat heave refers to the case that the second man is a Cohen, but the one who says that she may not eat heave refers to the case that the second man is not a Cohen.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says, this my son is a bastard, he cannot be believed,” etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody said, this is my son, he is to be believed.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: To give him, but not to take from him. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah: “Even if both of them say about the fetus in her belly that he is a bastard, they cannot be believed”? Maybe it was said following Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah said, they can be believed; Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: To give him, but not to take from him. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, still it is a baraita: “For he has to recognize the firstborn, the son of the hated one.” If they maintained that he was his son but at the moment of his death he said that he was not his son, he cannot be believed. That he was not his son but at the moment of his death he said that he was his son, he is believed. Some Tannaïm state on the first case that he is believed. Rebbi Ḥisqiah, Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Huna: If they maintained that he was from his slave girl, he is believed. If he was standing next to the customs collectors and said, he is my son, but later he said, he is my slave, he is believed. He is my slave, but later he said, he is my son, he is not believed. Some Tannaïm state, he is believed. Rebbi Mana said, because of those Samaritans who use their sons as slaves.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says, this my son is a bastard, he cannot be believed,” etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody said, this is my son, he is to be believed.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: To give him, but not to take from him. Rebbi Yose said, is that not the Mishnah: “Even if both of them say about the fetus in her belly that he is a bastard, they cannot be believed”? Maybe it was said following Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah said, they can be believed; Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: To give him, but not to take from him. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, still it is a baraita: “For he has to recognize the firstborn, the son of the hated one.” If they maintained that he was his son but at the moment of his death he said that he was not his son, he cannot be believed. That he was not his son but at the moment of his death he said that he was his son, he is believed. Some Tannaïm state on the first case that he is believed. Rebbi Ḥisqiah, Rebbi Zeriqan in the name of Rebbi Huna: If they maintained that he was from his slave girl, he is believed. If he was standing next to the customs collectors and said, he is my son, but later he said, he is my slave, he is believed. He is my slave, but later he said, he is my son, he is not believed. Some Tannaïm state, he is believed. Rebbi Mana said, because of those Samaritans who use their sons as slaves.
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
HALAKHAH: “For a dog or a kid goat which jumped from a roof,” etc. There are Tannaïm who state: “jumped”. There are Tannaïm who state: “fell”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, so is the Mishnah: “jumped”. But “fell” does not apply.
HALAKHAH: “For a dog or a kid goat which jumped from a roof,” etc. There are Tannaïm who state: “jumped”. There are Tannaïm who state: “fell”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, so is the Mishnah: “jumped”. But “fell” does not apply.
HALAKHAH: “Two potters were walking one behind the other,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Does one give time to the first to get up? Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Joḥanan to give time to the first to stand up. But it is reasonable otherwise from the second one onwards, does one give time to the second to stand up? Let us hear from the following: “Potters were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. They are liable for damage to humans but not liable for damage to vessels. But if they (damaged) [warned] one another, none are liable. Donkey drivers were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. Donkeys were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell: even 100, all are liable.” Some Tannaïm state, none are liable. Rebbi La said, he who says ‘liable’, if their owner let them lie down. He who says ‘not liable’, if they fell, since animals are not responsible for accidents. “If the feet of a donkey were bad, one is not allowed to step over him. [ ]” What does it mean, ‘to step over him?’ They step on his body and pass by. “If one was free, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the free one. One unloaded, the other one loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were loaded or both unloaded, let them agree between themselves. Two carriages or two ships, one empty, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were unloaded or loaded, let them agree between themselves.” “The person entering the bath house gives precedence to the person leaving; the person leaving the toilet gives precedence to the person entering.”
HALAKHAH: “A bull which was rubbing itself against a wall,” etc. “A man who kills any human soul,” to include a hit which is potentially deadly. Some Tannaïm state, even if it is not deadly. Rebbi La said, even if it is deadly but a third person came and killed, the killer is guilty. “And it killed a man or a woman,” just as a man lets his sons inherit his injury claims, so a woman lets her sons inherit her injury claims. But does not a man inherit from his wife? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, so did Rebbi Hoshaiah, the father of the Mishnah, explain: One teaches here about weregilt which is due after death.
If somebody sells a bull to another person and it turns out to be goring. Rav said, it is an acquisition in error, but Samuel says, he can tell him: I sold it to you to be slaughtered. “He shall give weregilt for his person.” Some Tannaїm state: The attacker’s person. Some Tannaїm state: The person suffering the damage. Following him who said, the person suffering the damage, [assume] the first one injured him fatally and then the second came and kept him in confusion. If you say that damages are fully required, the first one pays damages and the second pays the weregilt. If you say that damages are not fully required, the first one pays weregilt but the second is not liable. Following him who said, the attacker’s person, if you say that damages are fully required, the first one pays weregilt and the second is not liable. If you say that damages are not fully required, neither one is liable.
If somebody sells a bull to another person and it turns out to be goring. Rav said, it is an acquisition in error, but Samuel says, he can tell him: I sold it to you to be slaughtered. “He shall give weregilt for his person.” Some Tannaїm state: The attacker’s person. Some Tannaїm state: The person suffering the damage. Following him who said, the person suffering the damage, [assume] the first one injured him fatally and then the second came and kept him in confusion. If you say that damages are fully required, the first one pays damages and the second pays the weregilt. If you say that damages are not fully required, the first one pays weregilt but the second is not liable. Following him who said, the attacker’s person, if you say that damages are fully required, the first one pays weregilt and the second is not liable. If you say that damages are not fully required, neither one is liable.
Some Tannaĩm state: וְלִיבָּה. Some Tannaïm state: וְנִיבָּה. He who says וְלִיבָּה. As it is written, “in the flaming fire”. He who says וְנִיבָּה, “it was in my heart like burning fire.”
Some Tannaĩm state: וְלִיבָּה. Some Tannaïm state: וְנִיבָּה. He who says וְלִיבָּה. As it is written, “in the flaming fire”. He who says וְנִיבָּה, “it was in my heart like burning fire.”
MISHNAH: If somebody says to his son: A qônām that you cannot enjoy anything from me, when he dies he can inherit from him. During my lifetime and after my death, when he dies he cannot inherit from him but should give it to his sons or his brothers, and if he has nothing he may take a loan; the creditors come and make themselves paid.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says to his son: A qônām that you cannot enjoy anything from me,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah said, look what we did state here: “If somebody says to his son, ‘a qônām that you can not enjoy anything from me,’ if he dies, the son inherits; ‘during my lifetime and after my death,’ if he dies, he cannot inherit.” Did we not state, ‘during my lifetime’, he inherits; ‘after my death’, he inherits, ‘during my lifetime and after my death’, he cannot inherit? What is the difference between the one who says it one by one and the one who says it by twos? Rav Jeremiah and Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina both say, ‘a qônām that I shall not enter this house during my lifetime and after my death’, since he said “this house”, he forbade it on himself during lifetime and after death. Rebbi Yose said, we have stated in Neziqin what we did not state in Nedarim: ‘A qônām that I cannot enjoy these my properties during my lifetime and after my death,’ from the moment he said “these” he forbade them to himself during his lifetime and after his death.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says to his son: A qônām that you cannot enjoy anything from me,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah said, look what we did state here: “If somebody says to his son, ‘a qônām that you can not enjoy anything from me,’ if he dies, the son inherits; ‘during my lifetime and after my death,’ if he dies, he cannot inherit.” Did we not state, ‘during my lifetime’, he inherits; ‘after my death’, he inherits, ‘during my lifetime and after my death’, he cannot inherit? What is the difference between the one who says it one by one and the one who says it by twos? Rav Jeremiah and Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina both say, ‘a qônām that I shall not enter this house during my lifetime and after my death’, since he said “this house”, he forbade it on himself during lifetime and after death. Rebbi Yose said, we have stated in Neziqin what we did not state in Nedarim: ‘A qônām that I cannot enjoy these my properties during my lifetime and after my death,’ from the moment he said “these” he forbade them to himself during his lifetime and after his death.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says to his son: A qônām that you cannot enjoy anything from me,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah said, look what we did state here: “If somebody says to his son, ‘a qônām that you can not enjoy anything from me,’ if he dies, the son inherits; ‘during my lifetime and after my death,’ if he dies, he cannot inherit.” Did we not state, ‘during my lifetime’, he inherits; ‘after my death’, he inherits, ‘during my lifetime and after my death’, he cannot inherit? What is the difference between the one who says it one by one and the one who says it by twos? Rav Jeremiah and Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina both say, ‘a qônām that I shall not enter this house during my lifetime and after my death’, since he said “this house”, he forbade it on himself during lifetime and after death. Rebbi Yose said, we have stated in Neziqin what we did not state in Nedarim: ‘A qônām that I cannot enjoy these my properties during my lifetime and after my death,’ from the moment he said “these” he forbade them to himself during his lifetime and after his death.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says to his son: A qônām that you cannot enjoy anything from me,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah said, look what we did state here: “If somebody says to his son, ‘a qônām that you can not enjoy anything from me,’ if he dies, the son inherits; ‘during my lifetime and after my death,’ if he dies, he cannot inherit.” Did we not state, ‘during my lifetime’, he inherits; ‘after my death’, he inherits, ‘during my lifetime and after my death’, he cannot inherit? What is the difference between the one who says it one by one and the one who says it by twos? Rav Jeremiah and Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina both say, ‘a qônām that I shall not enter this house during my lifetime and after my death’, since he said “this house”, he forbade it on himself during lifetime and after death. Rebbi Yose said, we have stated in Neziqin what we did not state in Nedarim: ‘A qônām that I cannot enjoy these my properties during my lifetime and after my death,’ from the moment he said “these” he forbade them to himself during his lifetime and after his death.
HALAKHAH: “If one says to two people, I robbed,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Here if they complain, there if they are silent. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Here, if witnesses know; there, if no witnesses know. Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Here if he swore; there if he did not swear. There, they say in the name of Rav: Here if he swore; there if he did not swear. Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say, he should have kept silent and not confessed. Rebbi Yasa wanted to say, he should have kept silent and not have sworn. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he swore, he should have appointed an officer of the court. Rebbi Joḥanan seems to say, an officer of the court determined that one was a robber, not a court which determined that one was robbed. Other Tannaїm stated, a court which determined that one was robbed, [as it was stated, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, a court which determined that one was robbed,] not a court which determined that one was a robber. Rebbi Ila said, we also have stated that the rules are identical for robbery, intercourse, and loan. Everbody agrees about the deposit mentioned in the Mishnah, from the following: “If he said to two people, I robbed a mina from one of you but I do not know which one of you it was.”
“If he rented a donkey and it developed eye trouble,” it was stumbling. “Or it was taken to government service.” There are Tannaїm who state, government service is like death; but there are Tannaїm who state, he tells him, here is your property before you. He who stated, government service is like death, if he can find an accomodation; he who says, he tells him, here is your property before you, if he cannot find an accomodation.
“If he rented a donkey and it developed eye trouble,” it was stumbling. “Or it was taken to government service.” There are Tannaїm who state, government service is like death; but there are Tannaїm who state, he tells him, here is your property before you. He who stated, government service is like death, if he can find an accomodation; he who says, he tells him, here is your property before you, if he cannot find an accomodation.
HALAKHAH: “He who sells a village,” etc. It was stated: “He who sells a village. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he who sells a village sold the steward but did not sell the administrator. But if he said to him, ‘it and all it contains’? Even if he said to him, ‘it and all it contains’. In neither case did he sell ŝirah and its dependencies, and hard rocks hewn from it, and preserves of wild animals, birds, and fish.” Ŝirah means outlying houses, dependencies are hamlets. Its part in ocean or river, there are Tannaїm who state, it is sold, and there are Tannaїm who state, it is not sold. Rav Ḥisda said, he who says, it is sold, as long as it is within its domain; he who says, it is not sold, if it is not within its domain.
HALAKHAH: “He who sells a village,” etc. It was stated: “He who sells a village. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he who sells a village sold the steward but did not sell the administrator. But if he said to him, ‘it and all it contains’? Even if he said to him, ‘it and all it contains’. In neither case did he sell ŝirah and its dependencies, and hard rocks hewn from it, and preserves of wild animals, birds, and fish.” Ŝirah means outlying houses, dependencies are hamlets. Its part in ocean or river, there are Tannaїm who state, it is sold, and there are Tannaїm who state, it is not sold. Rav Ḥisda said, he who says, it is sold, as long as it is within its domain; he who says, it is not sold, if it is not within its domain.
HALAKHAH: “He who says, this is my son, is to be believed,” etc. If it was the general belief that he was his son, but at the moment of his death he said, he is not my son, or about one not his son he said, he is my son, he is believed. If he stood near the toll collector and said, he is my son and then changed and said, he is my slave, he is believed. He is my slave, and then said, he is my son, he cannot be believed. Some Tannaïm state, he is to be believed. Rebbi Mana said, for example those Nabateans who particularly use their sons as slaves.
HALAKHAH: “But the Sages say, on the Sabbath, his words are confirmed,” etc. Some Tannaїm state it inversely. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, so is the Mishnah: if they said that for the Sabbath, so much more for weekdays. Some Tannaїm state it inversely. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, so is the Mishnah: if they said that for an underage person, so much more for an adult.
HALAKHAH: “But the Sages say, on the Sabbath, his words are confirmed,” etc. Some Tannaїm state it inversely. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, so is the Mishnah: if they said that for the Sabbath, so much more for weekdays. Some Tannaїm state it inversely. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, so is the Mishnah: if they said that for an underage person, so much more for an adult.
Rebbi Jonathan said, from there the great Synhedrion of all of Israel. The minister of the executioners took Seraiah the Chief Priest and Zephania the priest, these are two. And seven men from the king’s entourage, this makes nine. And sixty men from the People of the Land, this makes seventy minus one. And from the city one eunuch, this makes seventy. There are Tannaïm who state seventy-one: The chief executioner took … the three guards of the threshhold, and seven men from the king’s entourage, and sixty men from the People of the Land, and from the city he took one eunuch, this makes seventy-one. And why is he called a eunuch? Because he transposes practice.
lt was stated: If the Synhedrion saw the killer. Some Tannaïm state: two of them become witnesses and testify before the rest of them. There are Tannaïm who state that they all are witnesses and have to go and testify before other [judges]. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Zeˋira: As they differ here, so they differ about testimony for the New Moon.