minore

Who is the Tanna of “one does not sell it”? Rebbi Meїr! But for Rebbi Jehudah it should be logical that it be permitted to be sold, by an argument a minore ad majus: If it is permitted to sell heave which is forbidden to lay people, since Second Tithe is permitted to lay people, one should certainly be permitted to sell it. No, if you assert this for heave which does not need an enclosure, what can you imply for Second Tithe which needs an enclosure? First Fruits shall prove it which need an enclosure and one may sell them! No, if you assert this for First Fruits which do not implicate their monetary substitute, what can you imply for Second Heave which implicates its monetary substitute! The Sabbatical shall prove it which implicates its monetary substitute and it is permitted to sell it! Rebbi Yudan said, from this? The sale of Sabbatical produce is its redemption.

Rebbi Jeremiah said, who is the Tanna of “one does not sell it”? Rebbi Meїr! But for Rebbi Jehudah it should be logical that it be permitted to be sold, by an argument a minore ad majus: If it is permitted to sell Sabbatical produce with which one may not liquidate one’s debts, it is logical that it should be permitted to sell Second Tithe since with it one may liquidate one’s debts. We find that one may liquidate one’s debts with Second Tithe, following what we stated: “If he took from him tithe worth one tetradrachma and did not come to exchange it until it was worth two.” Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference since from the start the value of Second Tithe was due. If he had owed before, it would be an argument. Rebbi Yudan said, a Mishnah said that it is forbidden to sell it, as we stated there: “If intentional, he married, if in error, he did not marry.” If you say that he may sell it, he should be able to use it for marriage but anything he may not sell he may not use for marriage. But did we not state: “One does not buy slaves, real estate, and unclean animals from Sabbatical money. If he bought them, he has to eat their worth.” Rebbi Yose said, this means that it is forbidden to acquire a wife with Sabbatical money. Otherwise, what is the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Zeïra, Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Ila, everybody agrees because of these arguments. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, everybody agrees that all should need the enclosures.

HALAKHAH: What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? The first money, not second money. Only because they objected to him by an argument de minore ad majus, he answered in terms of an argument de minore ad majus.

HALAKHAH: What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? The first money, not second money. Only because they objected to him by an argument de minore ad majus, he answered in terms of an argument de minore ad majus.

Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: This is from Rebbi Ismael the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa, as Rebbi Joḥanan stated; “Rebbi Ismael the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said, I could think you could bring spelt, foxtail and oats. But is it not logical: If wheat which is usable for all other cereal offerings is not acceptable for the ‘omer offering, spelt, foxtail and oats which are not usable for any other cereal offerings certainly are not acceptable for the ‘omer offering. No; you might say about barley from which the offering of the straying wife is brought; what can you say about spelt, foxtail and oats which are not usable for the offering of the straying wife? Wheat is excluded by the verse; spelt, foxtail and oats are excluded by a reasoning a minore ad majus.”

It was stated: “Rebbi Simeon says, heave can be lifted in 100 by a conclusion a minore ad majus: If what is forbidden can be lifted from what is forbidden, so much more what is forbidden from what is permitted!” Heave, some Tannaïm state “what is forbidden from what is permitted;” some Tannaïm state “what is permitted from what is permitted.” He who says “what is forbidden from what is permitted”, because heave is forbidden to lay persons. He who says “what is permitted from what is permitted”, because heave is permitted to Cohanim. Some explain it all about Cohanim: He who says “what is forbidden from what is permitted”, in the case of dema‘ by impure heave. He who says “permitted from what is permitted”, in the case of dema‘ by pure heave.

So far following Rebbi Aqiba, following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael, an argument a minore ad majus. If heave which is forbidden to outsiders can be lifted, ‘orlah which is permitted to outsiders, not so much more? No, if you said that about heave whose use is permitted, what can you say about ‘orlah whose use is prohibited! Rebbi Ḥinena: “Fruit, fruit” as equal decision.

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Aqiba said, I asked Rebbi Eliezer: If somebody performs many works on many Sabbaths all of the same category in one period of oblivion, what? Is he liable once for all of them or for each single one separately? He told him, he is liable for each occurrence separately by an argument de minore ad majus. Since for the menstruating woman, which does not entail many ramifications nor many purification sacrifices, he is liable for each single occurrence, for the Sabbath which has many ramifications and many purification sacrifices it is only logical that he be liable for each single occurrence. I told him, no. If you mention the menstruating woman where there are two warnings, for he is warned about a menstruating woman and the menstruating woman is warned about him, what can you say about the Sabbath where there is only one warning? He said to me, one who has intercourse with an underage girl shall prove it, where there is only one warning, but he is liable for each single occurrence. I told him, no. If you mention the underage girl who even though there is no warning now there will be one in the future, what can you say about the Sabbath where there is only one [warning] whether now or in the future. He told me, one having intercourse with an animal shall prove it. I said to him, the animal is like the Sabbath.

HALAKHAH: “How does one participate for domains,” etc. One does not state “one transfers rights.” Why does one not state “one transfers rights”? Samuel said, there we stated that “one transfers rights,” one has to transfer rights; but here, where we did not state “one transfers rights”, one does not have to transfer rights. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad maius. If there, where eruvin of courtyards are a rabbinic institution you are saying that one has to transfer rights, not so much more eruvin of domains which are words of the Torah? Rav follows Rebbi Joḥanan, (and) Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, to treat all domains equally.

It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah says, leavened matter may only be eliminated by burning. It is an argument de minore ad majus. Since piggul and leftover, which are not under an injunction not to be seen and not to be found, only may be disposed of by burning, for leavened matter which is under an injunction not to be seen and not to be found, it is only logical that it only may be disposed by burning. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency, is no argument de minore ad majus. It would imply that if he does not find fire he could sit and not dispose of it. The Torah said, eliminate sour dough from your houses.

It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah says, leavened matter may only be eliminated by burning. It is an argument de minore ad majus. Since piggul and leftover, which are not under an injunction not to be seen and not to be found, only may be disposed of by burning, for leavened matter which is under an injunction not to be seen and not to be found, it is only logical that it only may be disposed by burning. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency, is no argument de minore ad majus. It would imply that if he does not find fire he could sit and not dispose of it. The Torah said, eliminate sour dough from your houses.

It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah says, leavened matter may only be eliminated by burning. It is an argument de minore ad majus. Since piggul and leftover, which are not under an injunction not to be seen and not to be found, only may be disposed of by burning, for leavened matter which is under an injunction not to be seen and not to be found, it is only logical that it only may be disposed by burning. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency, is no argument de minore ad majus. It would imply that if he does not find fire he could sit and not dispose of it. The Torah said, eliminate sour dough from your houses.

Similarly said Rebbi Jehudah, if a woman carries seed and gives birth to a male. What does the verse imply? Since it is said, she shall be impure for seven days,and on the eighth day one shall circumcise, I understand that a live birth makes his mother impure by the impurity of birth. From where that a stillbirth makes his mother impure by the impurity of birth? Rebbi Jehudah said, I am presenting an argument de minore ad majus. Since a live birth, who does not make impure for seven days his mother, and those who come with him, [or who comes with his mother,] into a tent, the stillbirth who makes impure for seven days his mother, and those who come with him, [or who comes with his mother,] into a tent, it is only logical that he should make his mother impure by the impurity of birth. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency is no argument de minore ad majus. As a consequence, since a live birth purifies his mother, also the stillbirth should purify his mother? Since I cannot prove it by an argument de minore ad majus, [therefore} the Torah said a male, to include the stillbirth.

Similarly said Rebbi Jehudah, if a woman carries seed and gives birth to a male. What does the verse imply? Since it is said, she shall be impure for seven days,and on the eighth day one shall circumcise, I understand that a live birth makes his mother impure by the impurity of birth. From where that a stillbirth makes his mother impure by the impurity of birth? Rebbi Jehudah said, I am presenting an argument de minore ad majus. Since a live birth, who does not make impure for seven days his mother, and those who come with him, [or who comes with his mother,] into a tent, the stillbirth who makes impure for seven days his mother, and those who come with him, [or who comes with his mother,] into a tent, it is only logical that he should make his mother impure by the impurity of birth. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency is no argument de minore ad majus. As a consequence, since a live birth purifies his mother, also the stillbirth should purify his mother? Since I cannot prove it by an argument de minore ad majus, [therefore} the Torah said a male, to include the stillbirth.

Similarly said Rebbi Jehudah, if a woman carries seed and gives birth to a male. What does the verse imply? Since it is said, she shall be impure for seven days,and on the eighth day one shall circumcise, I understand that a live birth makes his mother impure by the impurity of birth. From where that a stillbirth makes his mother impure by the impurity of birth? Rebbi Jehudah said, I am presenting an argument de minore ad majus. Since a live birth, who does not make impure for seven days his mother, and those who come with him, [or who comes with his mother,] into a tent, the stillbirth who makes impure for seven days his mother, and those who come with him, [or who comes with his mother,] into a tent, it is only logical that he should make his mother impure by the impurity of birth. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency is no argument de minore ad majus. As a consequence, since a live birth purifies his mother, also the stillbirth should purify his mother? Since I cannot prove it by an argument de minore ad majus, [therefore} the Torah said a male, to include the stillbirth.

Similarly said Rebbi Jehudah, if a woman carries seed and gives birth to a male. What does the verse imply? Since it is said, she shall be impure for seven days,and on the eighth day one shall circumcise, I understand that a live birth makes his mother impure by the impurity of birth. From where that a stillbirth makes his mother impure by the impurity of birth? Rebbi Jehudah said, I am presenting an argument de minore ad majus. Since a live birth, who does not make impure for seven days his mother, and those who come with him, [or who comes with his mother,] into a tent, the stillbirth who makes impure for seven days his mother, and those who come with him, [or who comes with his mother,] into a tent, it is only logical that he should make his mother impure by the impurity of birth. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency is no argument de minore ad majus. As a consequence, since a live birth purifies his mother, also the stillbirth should purify his mother? Since I cannot prove it by an argument de minore ad majus, [therefore} the Torah said a male, to include the stillbirth.

Similarly said Rebbi Jehudah, “you should dwell in huts,” a hut made of anything. For Rebbi Jehudah was saying, it is an argument de minore ad majus that the hut should come only from the Four Kinds. Since the lulav which is not used in nights as in days may come only from the Four Kinds, it is only logical that a hut which is used by nights as well as by days should come only from the Four Kinds. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency is no argument de minore ad majus. As a consequence, if he did not find of the Four Kinds, should he sit without a hut? But the Torah said, “you should dwell in huts,” a hut made of anything. [And so Ezra said, they informed and did proclaim in all cities and in Jerusalem, go to the mountain, etc.]

Similarly said Rebbi Jehudah, “you should dwell in huts,” a hut made of anything. For Rebbi Jehudah was saying, it is an argument de minore ad majus that the hut should come only from the Four Kinds. Since the lulav which is not used in nights as in days may come only from the Four Kinds, it is only logical that a hut which is used by nights as well as by days should come only from the Four Kinds. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency is no argument de minore ad majus. As a consequence, if he did not find of the Four Kinds, should he sit without a hut? But the Torah said, “you should dwell in huts,” a hut made of anything. [And so Ezra said, they informed and did proclaim in all cities and in Jerusalem, go to the mountain, etc.]

Similarly said Rebbi Jehudah, “you should dwell in huts,” a hut made of anything. For Rebbi Jehudah was saying, it is an argument de minore ad majus that the hut should come only from the Four Kinds. Since the lulav which is not used in nights as in days may come only from the Four Kinds, it is only logical that a hut which is used by nights as well as by days should come only from the Four Kinds. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency is no argument de minore ad majus. As a consequence, if he did not find of the Four Kinds, should he sit without a hut? But the Torah said, “you should dwell in huts,” a hut made of anything. [And so Ezra said, they informed and did proclaim in all cities and in Jerusalem, go to the mountain, etc.]

It is written: or cooking cooked in water. I not only have water, from where other fluids? The verse says, cooking cooked, in any way. So far following Rebbi Aqiba; following Rebbi Ismael? An argument de minore ad majus. Since for water which does not mask its taste you are saying it is forbidden, other fluids which mask its taste not so much more?

HALAKHAH: “The following items about the Pesaḥ,” etc. This question left the Elders of Bathyra at a loss. Once the Fourteenth fell on the Sabbath and they did not know whether Pesaḥ pushes aside the Sabbath or not. They said, we have here a Babylonian who served Shemaya and Avtalion and knows whether Pesaḥ pushes aside the Sabbath or not. It is possible that there be hope from him. They sent and called him. The said to him, did you ever hear, if the Fourteenth falls on the Sabbath, whether Pesaḥ pushes aside the Sabbath or not? He told them, do we have only one Pesaḥ which pushes aside the Sabbath every year? Are there not many Pesaḥim which push aside the Sabbath every year? There are Tannaim who state: 100. There are Tannaim who state: 200. There are Tannaim who state: 300. He who says 100, the daily sacrifices of the Sabbath. He who says 200, the daily and additional sacrifices of the Sabbath. He who says 300, the daily and additional sacrifices of the Sabbath, and of holidays, and of New Moons, and of semi-holidays. They told him, already we said, there is hope from you. He started to explain to them by analogy, by an argument de minore ad majus, and by equal cut. By analogy: The daily sacrifice is a public offering and Pesaḥ is a public offering. Since the daily sacrifice as a public offering pushes aside the Sabbath, also Pesaḥ as a public offering pushes aside the Sabbath. By an argument de minore ad majus. Since the daily sacrifice, whose action is not subject to extirpation, pushes aside the Sabbath, it is only logical that Pesaḥ, whose action is subject to extirpation, push aside the Sabbath. By equal cut. It is said about the daily sacrifice, at its fixed time, and it is said about Pesaḥ, at its fixed time. They said to him, we already said, is there hope from a Babylonian? The analogy which you proposed can be answered. No, if you said this about daily sacrifices which are fixed in number, what can you infer for Pesaḥ which is not fixed in number? The argument de minore ad majus which you proposed can be answered. No, if you said this about daily sacrifices which are most holy, what can you infer for Pesaḥ which is a simple sacrifice? Concerning the equal cut which you proposed, nobody can introduce an equal cut by himself.

HALAKHAH: “The following items about the Pesaḥ,” etc. This question left the Elders of Bathyra at a loss. Once the Fourteenth fell on the Sabbath and they did not know whether Pesaḥ pushes aside the Sabbath or not. They said, we have here a Babylonian who served Shemaya and Avtalion and knows whether Pesaḥ pushes aside the Sabbath or not. It is possible that there be hope from him. They sent and called him. The said to him, did you ever hear, if the Fourteenth falls on the Sabbath, whether Pesaḥ pushes aside the Sabbath or not? He told them, do we have only one Pesaḥ which pushes aside the Sabbath every year? Are there not many Pesaḥim which push aside the Sabbath every year? There are Tannaim who state: 100. There are Tannaim who state: 200. There are Tannaim who state: 300. He who says 100, the daily sacrifices of the Sabbath. He who says 200, the daily and additional sacrifices of the Sabbath. He who says 300, the daily and additional sacrifices of the Sabbath, and of holidays, and of New Moons, and of semi-holidays. They told him, already we said, there is hope from you. He started to explain to them by analogy, by an argument de minore ad majus, and by equal cut. By analogy: The daily sacrifice is a public offering and Pesaḥ is a public offering. Since the daily sacrifice as a public offering pushes aside the Sabbath, also Pesaḥ as a public offering pushes aside the Sabbath. By an argument de minore ad majus. Since the daily sacrifice, whose action is not subject to extirpation, pushes aside the Sabbath, it is only logical that Pesaḥ, whose action is subject to extirpation, push aside the Sabbath. By equal cut. It is said about the daily sacrifice, at its fixed time, and it is said about Pesaḥ, at its fixed time. They said to him, we already said, is there hope from a Babylonian? The analogy which you proposed can be answered. No, if you said this about daily sacrifices which are fixed in number, what can you infer for Pesaḥ which is not fixed in number? The argument de minore ad majus which you proposed can be answered. No, if you said this about daily sacrifices which are most holy, what can you infer for Pesaḥ which is a simple sacrifice? Concerning the equal cut which you proposed, nobody can introduce an equal cut by himself.

HALAKHAH: “The following items about the Pesaḥ,” etc. This question left the Elders of Bathyra at a loss. Once the Fourteenth fell on the Sabbath and they did not know whether Pesaḥ pushes aside the Sabbath or not. They said, we have here a Babylonian who served Shemaya and Avtalion and knows whether Pesaḥ pushes aside the Sabbath or not. It is possible that there be hope from him. They sent and called him. The said to him, did you ever hear, if the Fourteenth falls on the Sabbath, whether Pesaḥ pushes aside the Sabbath or not? He told them, do we have only one Pesaḥ which pushes aside the Sabbath every year? Are there not many Pesaḥim which push aside the Sabbath every year? There are Tannaim who state: 100. There are Tannaim who state: 200. There are Tannaim who state: 300. He who says 100, the daily sacrifices of the Sabbath. He who says 200, the daily and additional sacrifices of the Sabbath. He who says 300, the daily and additional sacrifices of the Sabbath, and of holidays, and of New Moons, and of semi-holidays. They told him, already we said, there is hope from you. He started to explain to them by analogy, by an argument de minore ad majus, and by equal cut. By analogy: The daily sacrifice is a public offering and Pesaḥ is a public offering. Since the daily sacrifice as a public offering pushes aside the Sabbath, also Pesaḥ as a public offering pushes aside the Sabbath. By an argument de minore ad majus. Since the daily sacrifice, whose action is not subject to extirpation, pushes aside the Sabbath, it is only logical that Pesaḥ, whose action is subject to extirpation, push aside the Sabbath. By equal cut. It is said about the daily sacrifice, at its fixed time, and it is said about Pesaḥ, at its fixed time. They said to him, we already said, is there hope from a Babylonian? The analogy which you proposed can be answered. No, if you said this about daily sacrifices which are fixed in number, what can you infer for Pesaḥ which is not fixed in number? The argument de minore ad majus which you proposed can be answered. No, if you said this about daily sacrifices which are most holy, what can you infer for Pesaḥ which is a simple sacrifice? Concerning the equal cut which you proposed, nobody can introduce an equal cut by himself.

Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: If a person could construct an equal cut by himself, he could make a creeping animal causing impurity in a tent and a corpse causing impurity in the volume of a lentil, by explaining textile, leather; textile, leather. So if a creeping animal is in a person’s hand, even if he immerses himself in the waters of the Siloam, or in waters of a primeval ocean, he never can achieve purity. If he throws it away, immediately he becomes pure. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: A person may use an equal cut to confirm what he has learned; nobody may use an equal cut to invalidate what he has learned. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: A person may argue de minore ad majus by himself; a person may not argue an equal cut by himself. Therefore one can contradict an argument de minore ad majus; one cannot contradict an equal cut.

Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: If a person could construct an equal cut by himself, he could make a creeping animal causing impurity in a tent and a corpse causing impurity in the volume of a lentil, by explaining textile, leather; textile, leather. So if a creeping animal is in a person’s hand, even if he immerses himself in the waters of the Siloam, or in waters of a primeval ocean, he never can achieve purity. If he throws it away, immediately he becomes pure. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: A person may use an equal cut to confirm what he has learned; nobody may use an equal cut to invalidate what he has learned. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: A person may argue de minore ad majus by himself; a person may not argue an equal cut by himself. Therefore one can contradict an argument de minore ad majus; one cannot contradict an equal cut.

If the public became impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, it only is logical that you should clarify it to its advantage in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him before pouring he should be treated as if he became impure after pouring, that he should not be pushed to the Second Pesaḥ, you restrict him in public, so that if it became known to him after pouring he should be treated as if he became impure before pouring, that he should not be able to eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him before pouring he is treated as impure after pouring, that he should not have to bring a sacrifice of impurity, you treat as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after pouring he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure; he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. [As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case.] If somebody is officiating for the Pesaḥ, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since for the owner [of the Pesaḥ] whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. Since for the owner you clarify to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; what can you say for the officiating where you clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? For you, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought to say, on him, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.

If the public became impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, it only is logical that you should clarify it to its advantage in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him before pouring he should be treated as if he became impure after pouring, that he should not be pushed to the Second Pesaḥ, you restrict him in public, so that if it became known to him after pouring he should be treated as if he became impure before pouring, that he should not be able to eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him before pouring he is treated as impure after pouring, that he should not have to bring a sacrifice of impurity, you treat as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after pouring he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure; he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. [As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case.] If somebody is officiating for the Pesaḥ, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since for the owner [of the Pesaḥ] whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. Since for the owner you clarify to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; what can you say for the officiating where you clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify his position to his disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? For you, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought to say, on him, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.

It was stated: “Only a corpse creates a grave of the abyss.” Therefore, not a carcass_. An argument de minore ad maius. Since a corpse, which does not cause impurity of couch and seat, creates a grave of the abyss, should a carcasss which causes impurity of couch and seat not create a grave of the abyss? Why was it said that only a corpse creates a grave of the abyss? To exclude couch and seat.

There, we have stated: “All sacrifices whose blood was collected by a non-Cohen, a deep mourner, one immersed on this day, missing garments, missing atonement, with unwashed hands or feet, uncircumcised, impure, sitting, standing on utensils, on [an animal, on] another person, disqualified it.” The Southerners say, we hold this for those impure by the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, but impurity of the dead does not desecrate since it was permitted in case of the impurity of the many for the Pesaḥ. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish objected to the Southerners: Since for the owner, where you clarified to his advantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, you clarified to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ, for the officiant, where you clarified to his disadvantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, it is only logical that you should clarify to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ. In addition to what Rebbi stated, “the diadem makes impurity of the blood acceptable but not impurity of the body.” If you want to say that this refers to the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, you cannot, since we have stated, “if the impurity was caused by impurity of the abyss, the diadem makes acceptable.” What are the Southerners doing with this? They explain if for the owner. But did we not state “a nazir”? They explain it for the officiant. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, there is no difference; it is equal for owner or officiant. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is an argument de minore ad maius that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, what can you say about the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, this is an argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are indispensable for him, what can you say about the officiating, for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are not indispensable. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid.

There, we have stated: “All sacrifices whose blood was collected by a non-Cohen, a deep mourner, one immersed on this day, missing garments, missing atonement, with unwashed hands or feet, uncircumcised, impure, sitting, standing on utensils, on [an animal, on] another person, disqualified it.” The Southerners say, we hold this for those impure by the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, but impurity of the dead does not desecrate since it was permitted in case of the impurity of the many for the Pesaḥ. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish objected to the Southerners: Since for the owner, where you clarified to his advantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, you clarified to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ, for the officiant, where you clarified to his disadvantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, it is only logical that you should clarify to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ. In addition to what Rebbi stated, “the diadem makes impurity of the blood acceptable but not impurity of the body.” If you want to say that this refers to the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, you cannot, since we have stated, “if the impurity was caused by impurity of the abyss, the diadem makes acceptable.” What are the Southerners doing with this? They explain if for the owner. But did we not state “a nazir”? They explain it for the officiant. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, there is no difference; it is equal for owner or officiant. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is an argument de minore ad maius that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, what can you say about the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, this is an argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are indispensable for him, what can you say about the officiating, for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are not indispensable. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid.

There, we have stated: “All sacrifices whose blood was collected by a non-Cohen, a deep mourner, one immersed on this day, missing garments, missing atonement, with unwashed hands or feet, uncircumcised, impure, sitting, standing on utensils, on [an animal, on] another person, disqualified it.” The Southerners say, we hold this for those impure by the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, but impurity of the dead does not desecrate since it was permitted in case of the impurity of the many for the Pesaḥ. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish objected to the Southerners: Since for the owner, where you clarified to his advantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, you clarified to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ, for the officiant, where you clarified to his disadvantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, it is only logical that you should clarify to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ. In addition to what Rebbi stated, “the diadem makes impurity of the blood acceptable but not impurity of the body.” If you want to say that this refers to the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, you cannot, since we have stated, “if the impurity was caused by impurity of the abyss, the diadem makes acceptable.” What are the Southerners doing with this? They explain if for the owner. But did we not state “a nazir”? They explain it for the officiant. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, there is no difference; it is equal for owner or officiant. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is an argument de minore ad maius that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, what can you say about the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, this is an argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are indispensable for him, what can you say about the officiating, for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are not indispensable. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid.

There, we have stated: “All sacrifices whose blood was collected by a non-Cohen, a deep mourner, one immersed on this day, missing garments, missing atonement, with unwashed hands or feet, uncircumcised, impure, sitting, standing on utensils, on [an animal, on] another person, disqualified it.” The Southerners say, we hold this for those impure by the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, but impurity of the dead does not desecrate since it was permitted in case of the impurity of the many for the Pesaḥ. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish objected to the Southerners: Since for the owner, where you clarified to his advantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, you clarified to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ, for the officiant, where you clarified to his disadvantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, it is only logical that you should clarify to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ. In addition to what Rebbi stated, “the diadem makes impurity of the blood acceptable but not impurity of the body.” If you want to say that this refers to the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, you cannot, since we have stated, “if the impurity was caused by impurity of the abyss, the diadem makes acceptable.” What are the Southerners doing with this? They explain if for the owner. But did we not state “a nazir”? They explain it for the officiant. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, there is no difference; it is equal for owner or officiant. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is an argument de minore ad maius that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, what can you say about the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, this is an argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are indispensable for him, what can you say about the officiating, for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are not indispensable. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid.

There, we have stated: “All sacrifices whose blood was collected by a non-Cohen, a deep mourner, one immersed on this day, missing garments, missing atonement, with unwashed hands or feet, uncircumcised, impure, sitting, standing on utensils, on [an animal, on] another person, disqualified it.” The Southerners say, we hold this for those impure by the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, but impurity of the dead does not desecrate since it was permitted in case of the impurity of the many for the Pesaḥ. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish objected to the Southerners: Since for the owner, where you clarified to his advantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, you clarified to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ, for the officiant, where you clarified to his disadvantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, it is only logical that you should clarify to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ. In addition to what Rebbi stated, “the diadem makes impurity of the blood acceptable but not impurity of the body.” If you want to say that this refers to the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, you cannot, since we have stated, “if the impurity was caused by impurity of the abyss, the diadem makes acceptable.” What are the Southerners doing with this? They explain if for the owner. But did we not state “a nazir”? They explain it for the officiant. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, there is no difference; it is equal for owner or officiant. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is an argument de minore ad maius that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, what can you say about the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, this is an argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are indispensable for him, what can you say about the officiating, for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are not indispensable. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid.

There, we have stated: “All sacrifices whose blood was collected by a non-Cohen, a deep mourner, one immersed on this day, missing garments, missing atonement, with unwashed hands or feet, uncircumcised, impure, sitting, standing on utensils, on [an animal, on] another person, disqualified it.” The Southerners say, we hold this for those impure by the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, but impurity of the dead does not desecrate since it was permitted in case of the impurity of the many for the Pesaḥ. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish objected to the Southerners: Since for the owner, where you clarified to his advantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, you clarified to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ, for the officiant, where you clarified to his disadvantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, it is only logical that you should clarify to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ. In addition to what Rebbi stated, “the diadem makes impurity of the blood acceptable but not impurity of the body.” If you want to say that this refers to the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, you cannot, since we have stated, “if the impurity was caused by impurity of the abyss, the diadem makes acceptable.” What are the Southerners doing with this? They explain if for the owner. But did we not state “a nazir”? They explain it for the officiant. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, there is no difference; it is equal for owner or officiant. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is an argument de minore ad maius that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, what can you say about the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, this is an argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are indispensable for him, what can you say about the officiating, for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are not indispensable. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid.

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Simon, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi in the name of Bar Pedaya: Piggul and leftovers add together to make hands impure in the amount that exposes to punishment, the volume of an olive. Do they disqualify heave? It is a argument de minore ad majus. If they make hands impure to disqualify heave, they themselves not so much more? This which left what are you doing with it? Does it make hands impure or does it not make hands impure? If you are saying that this which left makes hands impure, would piggul and leftovers not disqualify heave? If you are saying that piggul and leftovers do not disqualify heave, about that which left they did not decide anything. For if it were not so, the outer part would make the inner part impure. Rebbi Abbin said, who holds that something can become impure by [touching] itself? Rebbi Meïr. Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, everything becomes pure by its greater part? When he cut off the greater part, is it not separated? Then it would be touching and be disqualified. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, if he cuts off minimal pieces and throws away.

Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Piggul and leftovers add together to make hands impure in the amount that exposes to punishment, the volume of an olive. Do they disqualify heave? It is a argument de minore ad maius. If they make hands impure to disqualify heave, they themselves not so much more? This which was left, what are you doing with it? Does it make hands impure or does it not make hands impure? If you are saying that this which was left makes hands impure, would piggul and leftovers not disqualify heave? About that which was left they did not decide anything. For if it were not so, the outer part would make the inner part impure. Rebbi Abbin said, who holds that something can become impure by touching itself? Rebbi Meïr. Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say, everything becomes pure by its greater part? When he cut off the greater part, is it not separated? Then it would be touching and be disqualified. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, if he cuts off minimal pieces and throws away.

HALAKHAH: From where the cleaning of the interior altar? Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: He shall throw it next to the altar, to the East, on the place of ashes. It is unnecessary. If to designate [the place], it already is written, next to the altar. If to teach you that it should be put to the East of the ramp, it already is written, to the East. Also he explained, next to the altar, next to the altar. Since in one case it is to the East of the ramp, so in the other case it is to the East of the ramp. From where that it is forbidden for usufruct? Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: to a pure place, that its place shall be pure. Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Rebbi Eleazar did not say so but, from where that the cleaning of the exterior altar is forbidden for usufruct? The verse says, to the place of ashes, that it be its place forever. From where the cleaning of the interior altar? He shall sprinkle on it, he shall burn incense. Since sprinkling is on its body, also burning incense on its body. From where that the interior altar is forbidden for usufruct? An argument de minore ad majus. If from the exterior altar it is forbidden, so much more from the interior.

”You find that by five immersions and ten sanctifications he immerses and sanctifies himself on that day. From where that there are two sanctifications for every immersion? The verse says, and he undressed, and he washed, and he washed, (and he undressed) [and he dressed]. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon said, it is an argument de minore ad majus. Since at a place where he does not need immersion he needs sanctification of hands and legs, here where he needs immersion not so much more that he should need sanctification of hands and legs? Take away your argument. Since there it is once for the entire day, also here it would be once for the entire day. The verse says, and he shall take off the linen garments, why does the verse say, which he wore? Could we ever think that he took off what he was not wearing? Then why does it say, which he wore? It bracketed undressing and dressing. Since dressing needs sanctification of hands and legs, also undressing needs sanctification of hands and legs.” Rebbi Mana said, it is reasonable the opposite way. It bracketed undressing and dressing. Since undressing needs sanctification of hands and legs, also dressing needs sanctification of hands and legs.”

Aaron shall put, if a non-Cohen puts it is qualified. Similarly, if a non-Cohen draws it is disqualified. An argument de minore ad majus. If putting, where Aaron’s sons are mentioned, is qualified if a non-Cohen puts it, drawing, where Aaron’s sons are not mentioned, not so much more? No, it is not necessarily so. Putting on, which is obstructive, if a non-Cohen puts it is qualified. Drawing, which is not obstructive, if a non-Cohen draws it is disqualified. And Rebbi Isaac ben Haqula said in the name of Rebbi Yannai, drawing from the urn is obstructive, putting on is not obstructive. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he establishes even by word of mouth. They thought to say, even one today and one tomorrow. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan who said, even one today and one tomorrow, it is understandable. In the opinion of Rebbi Yannai, why does it say, lots? As meritorious deed. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan : The lot makes it a purification sacrifice, giving it the name does not make it a purification sacrifice. He explains it, if the drawing succeeds. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yannai: If he did not draw lots and did not confess it is qualified, only he missed a meritorious deed.

Simeon the Just served Israel as High Priest for forty years, and in the last year he told them, in this year I am going to die. They asked him, whom shall we appoint in your stead? He told them, there is my son Onias before you. They went and appointed Onias. His brother [Simon] was jealous of him, he went and dressed him in an undershirt and girded him with a belt. He told them, look what this one vowed to his sweetheart: when I shall serve as High Priest I shall wear your undershirt and gird myself with your belt. They investigated and did not find [him]. It is said, he fled to King’s Mountain, from there he fled to Alexandria, based himself there and built there an altar, over which he recited this verse, on that day there will be an altar for the Eternal inside the Land of Egypt. Is that not an argument de minore ad majus? See how this one who fled from prominence went to seek it at the end, if one attained it and lost it not so much more? It was stated, these are the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah said, it was not so but they appointed Simeon; his brother Onias was jealous of him, he went and dressed him in an undershirt and girded him with a belt. He told them, look what this one vowed to his sweetheart etc., as before Is that not an argument de minore ad majus? See how this one who never attained prominence forced Israel to foreign worship, if one attained it and lost it not so much more?

Simeon the Just served Israel as High Priest for forty years, and in the last year he told them, in this year I am going to die. They asked him, whom shall we appoint in your stead? He told them, there is my son Onias before you. They went and appointed Onias. His brother [Simon] was jealous of him, he went and dressed him in an undershirt and girded him with a belt. He told them, look what this one vowed to his sweetheart: when I shall serve as High Priest I shall wear your undershirt and gird myself with your belt. They investigated and did not find [him]. It is said, he fled to King’s Mountain, from there he fled to Alexandria, based himself there and built there an altar, over which he recited this verse, on that day there will be an altar for the Eternal inside the Land of Egypt. Is that not an argument de minore ad majus? See how this one who fled from prominence went to seek it at the end, if one attained it and lost it not so much more? It was stated, these are the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah said, it was not so but they appointed Simeon; his brother Onias was jealous of him, he went and dressed him in an undershirt and girded him with a belt. He told them, look what this one vowed to his sweetheart etc., as before Is that not an argument de minore ad majus? See how this one who never attained prominence forced Israel to foreign worship, if one attained it and lost it not so much more?

Rebbi Shammai asked, if the parts were lost, may one pour the blood for the meat? He had not heard what Rebbi Eleazar had said, since he neither intended as food for humans nor as food for the altar. Rebbi Zakkai stated:A non-Cohen who burned makes garments impure. One only has to ask, is it qualified during nighttime? It is an argument de minore ad majus. Since burning of the parts which is not qualified for a non-Cohen may be done in the night, for these which are qualified for a non-Cohen it is logical that it should be qualified during nighttime.

HALAKHAH: It is written: The glory of the Eternal dwelt on Mount Sinai; the cloud covered it for six days; He called to Moses on the Seventh Day. Moses ascended. The Seventh after the Ten Commandments, the start of the Forty. Moses said to them, I shall be occupied on the Mountain for 40 days. When the fortieth day came and he did not come, immediately the people saw that Moses tarried in descending from the Mountain. When noontime came and he did not come, immediately the people congregated on Aaron and said to him, rise and make us gods which shall go before us, etc. The Eternal said to Moses, descend, for your people corrupted, etc. And Joshua heard the sound of the people in its dealings; he said to Moses, there is sound of war in the camp. Moses said, a man who in the future will rule over 600’000 does not know to distinguish between sound and sound? He said, there is no sound of shouts of strength nor sound of sounds of weakness, a sound of shouts I am hearing. Rebbi Yasa said, a sound of acclaim of foreign worship I am hearing. Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Yasa: There is no generation in which there is not an ounce of the sin of the Calf. It was when he approached the camp that he saw the Calf and fifes. Rebbi Ḥilkiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: From here that a person should not argue from guesses. Moses made an argument de minore ad majus. Since for the pesaḥ sacrifice, which is an isolated obligation, it is said no uncircumcised may eat from it, the Torah in which all commandments are contained not so much more? Moses got angry and he threw the tablets from his hand and broke them below the Mountain. Rebbi Ismael stated, the Holy One, praise to Him, told him to break them, [as it is said,] I shall write on the tablets the words which were on the first tablets luckily you broke. He said to him, you did well that you broke. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: The tablets were six hand-breadths long and three wide. Moses held two hand-breadth, the Holy One, praise to Him two hand-breadth, and two hand-breadths of space were between them. When Israel sinned in that way, the Holy One wanted to seize them from Moses’s hand, but Moses’s hand had the better of it and seized them from Him. That is what the verse praises him at the end and says, and all the strong hand, peace shall be on the hand which had the better on mine. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Abbai: the tablets wanted to fly off but Moses held them, [as is written,] I grabbed the two tablets. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nehemiah, the writing itself flew off. Rebbi Ezra in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi Simon: The tablets were a load of forty seah but the writing was carrying them. When the writing flew off they were too heavy for Moses’s hands, they fell, and broke.

For Torah there is written a benediction before, but no benediction is written after. What is written before it? For I am invoking the name of the Eternal, attribute greatness to our God. For food there is written a benediction after, but no benediction is written before. What is written after it? You will eat and be satiated, then you must praise. From where that which is said about one on the other and vice-versa? Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: The Name is mentioned in both verses as parallel expressions. Just as the Name that is mentioned concerning Torah implies a benediction before, so the Name that is mentioned concerning food implies a benediction before. And just as the Name that is mentioned concerning food implies a benediction after, so the Name that is mentioned concerning Torah implies a benediction after. That follows Rebbi Aqiba. How following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael, an inference de minore ad majus. If food that needs no explicit benediction before, needs a benediction afterwards, regarding Torah which needs a benediction before, it is only logical that it should need a benediction afterwards. That works for Torah; what about food? If Torah which needs no benediction afterwards, needs a benediction before, regarding food which needs a benediction afterwards, it is only logical that it should need a benediction before. Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Nathan say, For he will recite the benediction over the sacrifice and after that the invited guests will eat. Rebbi Nathan said, you shall serve the Eternal, your God, and give praise for your bread and your water; when is it called your bread and your water, before you eat. Rebbi said, if he has to give praise when he ate and is satiated, so much more at a time when he is hungry for food. That is for food, what about Torah? If food, which sustains only temporary life, needs a benediction before and after, Torah, which sustains eternal life, so much more.

Behold the Maker of mountains and Creator of wind, etc. This is one of six verses which Rebbi was reading and crying. Implore the Eternal, all the meek of the Land, etc. Hate evil and love goodness, etc. He shall put dust in his mouth, etc. For all deeds, etc. Samuel said to Saul, why did you irritate me, etc. He said to him, you should not have angered your Creator by me. You made me your idol. Do you not know that just as the worshipper is punished, the worshipped is punished? Not only this but I was thinking that this was the Day of Judgment and I was afraid. And is that not an inference de minore ad majus, if Samuel, the teacher of the Prophets, about whom it is written, all of Israel knew, from Dan to Beer Sheva, etc., was afraid of the Day of Judgment, so we so much more? And this behold the Maker of mountains and Creator of wind, even matters which are not sinful are written for everybody on his writing tablet. And who tells to a person? The breath of his mouth. Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Jabes. The Maker of mountains and Creator of wind. Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Jabes, those Sepphoreans, “chaos” is darkness and murkiness.

HALAKHAH: “If Pentecost falls on a Friday, the House of Shammai are saying that its slaughter-day is after the Sabbath, but the House of Hillel are saying that it has no slaughter-day.” But its day is its slaughter-day. Here the House of Shammai are saying, its slaughter-day is after the Sabbath, and the High Priest (wears) [does not wear] his garments (?)[.] It is an argument de minore ad majus. Since in a time where there are well-being and elevation offerings following the House of Hillel the High Priest does not wear his garments, in a time when there are no well-being and elevation offerings following the House of Shammai, not so much more?

HALAKHAH: Is hand-washing required for profane food? But it must follow Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, since Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, hand-washing is required for profane food. It is everybody’s opinion, so he should separate from heave. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar stated in the name of Rebbi Meïr, hands are first degree impure for profane food and second degree impure for heave. Does Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar follow Rebbi Aqiba, as we have stated there, “if somebody puts his hands into a leprous house, his hands are impure in the first degree, the words of Rebbi Aqiba, but the Sages are saying, his hands are impure in the second degree”? There, it follows the rabbis; what is their reason here? Since you tell him that his hands are impure in the second degree, he will separate from heave. But did they not decide about them because of fluids; then they should be impure in the first degree? It is an argument de minore ad majus. Since the Tevul Yom, which is a word from the Torah, only disqualifies, impure hands, which are from their words, not so much more? Another explanation: Did they not decide about hands only that he should separate from heave? Since you tell him that his hands are impure in the second degree, he will separate from heave.

“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disqualified for heave but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disqualified for heave but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

“Rebbi Yose stated, from where that the fourth degree is disqualified in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disqualified for heave but disqualified for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disqualify for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a Tevul Yom is a counter-example, because he disqualifies in the case of heave but does not disqualify in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says impure, impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says it will be impure, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: Any meat which would touch, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; anything impure, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; shall not be eaten, the endstage of impurity may not be eaten. So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, is it not logical that solid food itself which became impure by a reptile should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food. So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: Any meat which would touch anything impure, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, shall not be eaten, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a tevul yom who is not disqualified for profane food disqualifies heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disqualifies heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

The Torah said: “Do not take a woman in addition to her sister”. Not only her, her co-wife from where? The verse says “to ‘bundle’ together”, not her co-wife nor her co-wife’s co-wife. Not only his wife’s sister, all other incest prohibition from where? Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: A conclusion de minore ad majus. Since his wife’s sister, who is under an incest prohibition which may be lifted after being imposed, nevertheless is prohibited from the levirate, all other women under incest prohibitions which cannot be lifted after being imposed not much more so! Since in the first case the incest prohibition exempts the prohibited co-wife, all other incest prohibitions also exempt their co-wives. This follows Rebbi Aqiba.

Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated an argument de minore ad majus. Since his wife’s sister is particular being under incest prohibition for whose violation one is punished if intentional by extirpation, if in error by an obligation to bring a purification offering, and is barred from the levirate, all other women under incest prohibitions for whose violation one is sanctioned if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation to bring a purification offering, should be barred from the levirate.

What if there is a co-wife? Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Avina: It is an inference de minore ad majus. If the Sages gave a co-wife to the sister of a woman with whom one performed ḥalîṣah, which is rabbinic, here, where there is the prohibition of sisters, not so much more? It is obvious that the rule of co-wives applies to his daughter. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Avina: One has stated there, “if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed; if the sisters performed ḥalîṣah, the co-wives were not freed.” But as you say, if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed, so it should be that even if the sisters performed ḥalîṣah, the co-wives should be freed. But it must follow Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri, since Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, come and let us institute that the co-wife perform ḥalîṣah without being admitted to levirate. Did they institute that? Was it not stated: They did not manage to institute this before the time became unsuitable. But it must follow the House of Shammai since the House of Shammai permit the co-wives to the brothers. Rebbi Phineas said to Rebbi Yose: If it follows the House of Shammai, even if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sistersshould not be freed! But we have stated: Rebbi Eliezer said, the House of Shammai say, they shall keep them, but the House of Hillel say, they have to divorce. There are two Tannaïm interpreting the House of Shammai, one said if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed, the other one said if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were not freed.

So is the Mishnah: “The relative of a co-wife of a person who had ḥalîṣah with him is permitted to him, but the co-wife of a relative of a person who had ḥalîṣah with him is forbidden”. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Avina: It is an inference de minore ad majus. If the Sages gave a co-wife to the sister of a woman for whom he performed ḥalîṣah, which is rabbinic, here, where there is the prohibition of sisters, not so much more?

Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?

Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?

HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Rebbi Abun asked: Should not heave be forbidden to the mourner by an inference de minore ad majus? Since tithe, which is permitted to outsiders, is forbidden to the mourner, should not heave, which is forbidden to outsiders, be forbidden to the mourner? No. If you said it about tithe which needs an enclosure, what can you say about heave which does not need an enclosure? Therefore, since each of them has an aspect missing in the other, they cannot teach an inference from one to the other.

MISHNAH: Ammonites and Moabites are eternally forbidden but their females are immediately permitted. Egyptians and Edomites are forbidden only for three generations, both males and females. Rebbi Simeon said, is it not an argument de minore ad majus? If He permitted the females immediately in a case where the males are eternally forbidden, should we not permit the females in a case where He forbade the males only for three generations? They said to him: If it is practice, we shall accept this; if it is a logical argument, there is a counter-argument. He said to them, in fact, I am declaring practice. Bastards and Gibeonites are eternally forbidden, both males and females.

HALAKHAH: “A congenital castrate priest,” etc. It was stated: He enables her to eat breast and thigh. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he enables her for heave but not for breast and thigh. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there are several arguments de minore ad majus in this matter. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina asked, what means “there are several arguments de minore ad majus in this matter”? He said to him, open your mouth and receive. Rebbi Mana said, he made fun of him. Rebbi Abun said, he gave him an example. “Since she eats heave that never was within the reach of an Israel, is it not logical that she should eat breast and thigh that were within the reach of Israel? Breast and thigh were within the reach of Israel but when they became guilty these were taken from them and given to the priests. I could think, since these were taken from them when they incurred guilt, so they would be given back to them when they acquire merit. The verse says, ‘I gave them to Aaron and his sons for an eternal law;’ since a gift is not returned, so these are not returned.”

HALAKHAH: “A congenital castrate priest,” etc. It was stated: He enables her to eat breast and thigh. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he enables her for heave but not for breast and thigh. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there are several arguments de minore ad majus in this matter. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina asked, what means “there are several arguments de minore ad majus in this matter”? He said to him, open your mouth and receive. Rebbi Mana said, he made fun of him. Rebbi Abun said, he gave him an example. “Since she eats heave that never was within the reach of an Israel, is it not logical that she should eat breast and thigh that were within the reach of Israel? Breast and thigh were within the reach of Israel but when they became guilty these were taken from them and given to the priests. I could think, since these were taken from them when they incurred guilt, so they would be given back to them when they acquire merit. The verse says, ‘I gave them to Aaron and his sons for an eternal law;’ since a gift is not returned, so these are not returned.”

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said the argument is about the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen: Rebbi Joḥanan said, he enables her for heave but not for breast and thigh. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there are several arguments de minore ad majus in this matter. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina asked, what means “there are several arguments de minore ad majus in this matter”? He said to him, open your mouth and receive. Rebbi Mana said, he made fun of him. Rebbi Abun said, he gave him an example. “Since she eats heave that never was within the reach of an Israel, is it not logical that she should eat breast and thigh that were within the reach of Israel? Breast and thigh were within the reach of Israel but when they became guilty these were taken from them and given to the priests. I could think, since these were taken from them when they incurred guilt, so they would be given back to them when they acquire merit. The verse says, ‘I gave them to Aaron the priest and his sons for an eternal law;’ since a gift is not returned, so these are not returned.”

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said the argument is about the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen: Rebbi Joḥanan said, he enables her for heave but not for breast and thigh. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there are several arguments de minore ad majus in this matter. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina asked, what means “there are several arguments de minore ad majus in this matter”? He said to him, open your mouth and receive. Rebbi Mana said, he made fun of him. Rebbi Abun said, he gave him an example. “Since she eats heave that never was within the reach of an Israel, is it not logical that she should eat breast and thigh that were within the reach of Israel? Breast and thigh were within the reach of Israel but when they became guilty these were taken from them and given to the priests. I could think, since these were taken from them when they incurred guilt, so they would be given back to them when they acquire merit. The verse says, ‘I gave them to Aaron the priest and his sons for an eternal law;’ since a gift is not returned, so these are not returned.”

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

“How is that? [A male] nine years and one day old.” “If he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to the brothers. He should be able to allot her to the brothers by an argument de minore ad majus! If he may allot her to his son who may not take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate, should it not be logical that he may allot her to his brother who may take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her [to his son] but may not allot her to the brothers. No. If you would accept the son since he will take [the father’s] place in a field of inheritance, what can you say about his brother who will not take his place in a field of inheritance? Would it be reasonable that he may allot her to him? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to the brothers.

Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah. If there are two prohibitions and one liability to extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation. What is the reason? “On human flesh it may not be rubbed and in its proportions you should not make [a compound] like it.” And it is written: “A man who would compound like it”. Here are two prohibitions and one liability to extirpation. The prohibitions divide the extirpation. This follows Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael said one infers from an argument de minore ad majus but one does not punish from an argument de minore ad majus. Where does he have that from? It comes following what Ḥizqiah stated: “If the daughter of a Cohen is desecrated by whoring.” Why does the verse say, “a man”? To include him who cohabits with his daughter’s daughter from a rape that she should be [under sentence of] burning. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one may even understand this from the warning: “Do not desecrate your daughter.”

Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah. If there are two prohibitions and one liability to extirpation, the prohibitions split the extirpation. What is the reason? “On human flesh it may not be rubbed and in its proportions you should not make [a compound] like it.” And it is written: “A man who would compound like it”. Here are two prohibitions and one liability to extirpation. The prohibitions divide the extirpation. This follows Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael said one infers from an argument de minore ad majus but one does not punish from an argument de minore ad majus. Where does he have that from? It comes following what Ḥizqiah stated: “If the daughter of a Cohen is desecrated by whoring.” Why does the verse say, “a man”? To include him who cohabits with his daughter’s daughter from a rape that she should be [under sentence of] burning. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one may even understand this from the warning: “Do not desecrate your daughter.”

It was stated: “Rebbi Jehudah says, her husband is believed about her by an argument de minore ad majus. Since he is believed about her when she is menstruating, when he would be subject to extirpation because of her, but for this one he is not subject to extirpation because of her, is it not logical that he should be believed about her? They said to him, no. If you mention the menstruating, she will be permitted after being forbidden, what can you say about this one who may not be permitted after being forbidden? And it says, “stolen waters are sweet”. Rebbi Jehudah said to them, it is a decree of the verse: “The man shall bring his wife to the priest”, etc. They said to him, only with witnesses.

There, we have stated: “A hyssop which was used to sprinkle is acceptable [to be used] to purify the sufferer from skin disease.” Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: That [was stated] to exclude the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer, as it was stated: If he sprinkled with it for purifying, it is disqualified for the sufferer from skin disease. If he sprinkled with it for the sufferer from skin disease, it is disqualified for purifying. Rebbi Yose said, would that not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since for the sufferer from skin disease, for whose ceremony use does not disable, if he sprinkled with it for purifying, it is disqualified for the sufferer from skin disease; purifying, for whose ceremony use does disable, if he sprinkled with it for purifying, is it not logical that it should be disqualified for purifying?

It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, from where that the fourth degree is disabled in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disabled for heave but disabled for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disable for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a ṭevul yom is a counterexample, because it is disabled in the case of heave but not disabled in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says “it will be impure”, it makes impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says “it will be impure”, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: “Any meat which would touch”, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; “anything impure”, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; “shall not be eaten”, the endstage of impurity cannot be eaten.

It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, from where that the fourth degree is disabled in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disabled for heave but disabled for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disable for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a ṭevul yom is a counterexample, because it is disabled in the case of heave but not disabled in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says “it will be impure”, it makes impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says “it will be impure”, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: “Any meat which would touch”, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; “anything impure”, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; “shall not be eaten”, the endstage of impurity cannot be eaten.

So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, [is it not logical that solid food, which becomes impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food.] So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “Any meat which would touch anything impure”, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, “shall not be eaten”, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a ṭevul yom who is not disabled for profane food disables heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disables heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

MISHNAH: It would have been logical: Since the first testimony, which does not forbid her permanently, is not confirmed if not from two [witnesses], the last testimony, which forbids her permanently, should reasonably only be confirmed by [witnesses]. The verse says: “There is no witness about her”, any kind of testimony about her. There would now be an argument de minore ad majus for the first testimony! Since the last testimony, which forbids her permanently, is confirmed from a single witness, the first testimony, which does not forbid her permanently, should logically be confirmed from a single witness. The verse says, “for he found out about her a matter of sexual misbehavior,” and further, it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses a matter should be confirmed.”

HALAKHAH: “There would now be an argument de minore ad majus for the first testimony,” etc. Gidul bar Miniamin in the name of Rav: Anywhere they accepted the testimony of a woman parallel to that of a man, a man can contradict a woman and a woman can contradict a man. Then one should state: “A witness says that she became impure, and a woman says that she did not become impure; a woman said that she became impure and a witness said that she did not become impure.” In the House of Rebbi they stated it this way. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Neḥemiah: One follows the majority of the testimonies. How is that? Two women against one woman they considered as if there were two witnesses against one witness. What you say refers to a woman and women. But if there were a hundred women against one [male] witness, they are like one witness.

“If she spent six months for her husband and six months for the levir, she cannot eat heave. Not only six months for the levir but even all the time for the levir except for one day, she cannot eat heave.” The Mishna follows neither the earliest not the last Mishnah, but the intermediate development. As it was stated: First, they were saying that a preliminarily married woman, daughter of an Israel, could eat heave, for they were explaining: “If a Cohen acquires a person, acquistion by money;” for what would be the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? They changed, to say: after twelve months, when he becomes responsible for her upkeep. The court of the later ones said: A woman never eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber. ”Already Rebbi Joḥanan ben Bagbag sent to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis: They say in your name that the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel eats heave. He sent back the following: I had been convinced that you are knowledgeable in the secrets of the Torah, but you do not even know the rules de minore ad majus! Since money can acquire a Gentile slave girl to permit her to eat heave, but she cannot be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, whereas a wife can be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, it is only logical that money can acquire a wife to permit her to eat heave! But what can I do? They said that no woman eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber,” and they supported it by the verse: “Every pure person in your household shall eat it.” Rebbi Yudan said, that is an argument de minore ad majus that can be reversed! Because he could say to him, since a Gentile slave girl can be acquired by active possession to permit her to eat heave, what can you say about a wife who cannot be acquired by active possession? If an argument de minore ad majus can be reversed, the argument is invalid.

“If she spent six months for her husband and six months for the levir, she cannot eat heave. Not only six months for the levir but even all the time for the levir except for one day, she cannot eat heave.” The Mishna follows neither the earliest not the last Mishnah, but the intermediate development. As it was stated: First, they were saying that a preliminarily married woman, daughter of an Israel, could eat heave, for they were explaining: “If a Cohen acquires a person, acquistion by money;” for what would be the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? They changed, to say: after twelve months, when he becomes responsible for her upkeep. The court of the later ones said: A woman never eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber. ”Already Rebbi Joḥanan ben Bagbag sent to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis: They say in your name that the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel eats heave. He sent back the following: I had been convinced that you are knowledgeable in the secrets of the Torah, but you do not even know the rules de minore ad majus! Since money can acquire a Gentile slave girl to permit her to eat heave, but she cannot be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, whereas a wife can be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, it is only logical that money can acquire a wife to permit her to eat heave! But what can I do? They said that no woman eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber,” and they supported it by the verse: “Every pure person in your household shall eat it.” Rebbi Yudan said, that is an argument de minore ad majus that can be reversed! Because he could say to him, since a Gentile slave girl can be acquired by active possession to permit her to eat heave, what can you say about a wife who cannot be acquired by active possession? If an argument de minore ad majus can be reversed, the argument is invalid.

“If she spent six months for her husband and six months for the levir, she cannot eat heave. Not only six months for the levir but even all the time for the levir except for one day, she cannot eat heave.” The Mishna follows neither the earliest not the last Mishnah, but the intermediate development. As it was stated: First, they were saying that a preliminarily married woman, daughter of an Israel, could eat heave, for they were explaining: “If a Cohen acquires a person, acquistion by money;” for what would be the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? They changed, to say: after twelve months, when he becomes responsible for her upkeep. The court of the later ones said: A woman never eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber. ”Already Rebbi Joḥanan ben Bagbag sent to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis: They say in your name that the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel eats heave. He sent back the following: I had been convinced that you are knowledgeable in the secrets of the Torah, but you do not even know the rules de minore ad majus! Since money can acquire a Gentile slave girl to permit her to eat heave, but she cannot be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, whereas a wife can be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, it is only logical that money can acquire a wife to permit her to eat heave! But what can I do? They said that no woman eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber,” and they supported it by the verse: “Every pure person in your household shall eat it.” Rebbi Yudan said, that is an argument de minore ad majus that can be reversed! Because he could say to him, since a Gentile slave girl can be acquired by active possession to permit her to eat heave, what can you say about a wife who cannot be acquired by active possession? If an argument de minore ad majus can be reversed, the argument is invalid.

Reading of Rashba (Novellae ad 49a): Is one who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food permitted a thick dish? Let us hear from the following: “He is forbidden soft dishes and permitted thick ones.” Since a dish which would be forbidden roasted or scalded is permitted as a thick dish, regarding “cooked food” which permits roasted and scalded, is it not logical that he be permitted the thick dish? Are there arguments de minore ad majus in matters of vows? But it must be so: Since a dish which is forbidden roasted or scalded is permitted as a thick dish, the cooked which is permitted roasted or scalded is permitted as a thick dish.

MISHNAH: Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Joshua: For any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary, but for any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary. Rebbi Meïr said, this should not be less than the impurity of a dead reptile! Rebbi Aqiba said, I argued before Rebbi Eliezer: If for a barley-grain sized bone, which does not cause impurity to a human in a tent, a nazir shaves if he touches or carries it, should it not be logical that for a quartarius of blood, which causes impurity to a human in a tent, a nazir should have to shave if he touches or carries it? He said to me, what is that, Aqiba? This is not a place for an argument de minore ad majus! When I came and expounded that before Rebbi Joshua, he said to me, you have a good argument, but that is what they said was practice.

If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.

If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.

It was stated: “Only a corpse creates a grave of the abyss.” Therefore, not a carcass. Would it not be a conclusion de minore ad majus? Since a corpse, which does not cause impurity of couch and seat, creates a grave of the abyss, should a carcasss which causes impurity of couch and seat not create a grave of the abyss? Why was it said that only a corpse creates a grave of the abyss? To exclude couch and seat.

HALAKHAH: “For tort victims one estimates with best quality land,” etc. “By an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.” Rebbi Abba bar Pappaios said before Rebbi Yose, where do we hold? If to qualify as damages, is that not what we stated “his neighbor’s ox” but not the ox of Temple property? If for bodily damages, is that not what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: A private person can claim damages but not the Temple? But we must deal with one who said, I obligate myself to give 100 minas to the Temple, when his ox went and did damage. You should not say, [the Temple] is a creditor and should collect from average quality land. Therefore, it was necessary to say that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land, by an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.”

HALAKHAH: “For tort victims one estimates with best quality land,” etc. “By an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.” Rebbi Abba bar Pappaios said before Rebbi Yose, where do we hold? If to qualify as damages, is that not what we stated “his neighbor’s ox” but not the ox of Temple property? If for bodily damages, is that not what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: A private person can claim damages but not the Temple? But we must deal with one who said, I obligate myself to give 100 minas to the Temple, when his ox went and did damage. You should not say, [the Temple] is a creditor and should collect from average quality land. Therefore, it was necessary to say that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land, by an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.”

If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.

Rebbi Abin said that Ḥisqiah stated: “After he acquires,” which means that she is acquired by money. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the Hebrew slave girl, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by money, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, should be acquired by money? This is proved by the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money but is acquired by intercourse. Therefore you would not be astonished if this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, might not be acquired by money. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money.

“And has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money, can be acquired by intercourse, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by money, should be acquired by intercourse? The Hebrew slave girl proves, who cannot be acquired by intercourse but is acquired by money. You likewise do not wonder that this one, who may be acquired by money, might not be acquired by intercourse. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money; “and has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse.

By a document. Since money which does not send out permits to enter, would it not be logical that a document which sends out should permit to enter? No. If you speak about money which eliminates dedication through redemption, what can you say about a document which does not eliminate dedication through redemption? The argument de minore ad majus is broken and you have to return to Scripture. Therefore, it was necessary to say: “He shall write her a bill of divorce, hand it to her, and send her out of his house. If she left his house and went to be another man’s.” It brackets her being with her leaving. Since her leaving was by a document, so her being is by a document.

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

“If he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother. He should be able to allot her to his brother by an argument de minore ad majus! If he may allot her to his son who may not take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate, should it not be logical that he may allot her to his brother who may take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate? No. If you would accept the son since he will take [the father’s] place in a field of inheritance, what can you say about his brother who will not take his place in a field of inheritance? Would it be reasonable that he may allot her to him? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother.

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.

HALAKHAH: “If a man performs preliminary marriage using ‘orlah, or kilaim of a vineyard,” etc. The first-born of a she-ass, Rebbi Eleazar said, may be used to preliminarily marry a woman; Rebbi Joḥanan said, it may not be used to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The first-born of a she-ass may be used to preliminarily marry a woman by an argument de minore ad majus. Since you say that a firstling, whose prohibition cannot be lifted during its lifetime, can be used to preliminarily marry a woman, this one, whose prohibition can be lifted during its lifetime, not so much more? What is the difference between them? If somebody transgressed and redeemed it without the knowledge of its owner. Rebbi Eleazar said, it is not redeemed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is redeemed. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar and disagrees with him. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: If somebody steals the first-born of another person’s she-ass, he has to pay double restitution. The end disagrees with him: For even though he has no interest in it now he will later. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar: One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Eleazar explained that, after breaking of [the foal’s] neck. For Rebbi Eleazar said, everybody agrees that after its neck was broken it cannot be redeemed.

New paragraph. “Rebbi Meïr says that a man should try to teach his son a clean trade,” etc. What should a man do? A person should try and teach his son an unassuming trade and pray for mercy to Him to Whom riches belong since there is no trade in which poor and rich people are not found, for everything depends on a person’s merit. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Meïr: Did you ever see a lion porter, a (lion) [deer] maker of fig cakes, a fox grocer, a wolf selling pots? And they sustain themselves without pain. Why were they created? Only to serve me, and I was created to serve my Maker. Is it not an argument de minore ad maius? Since they were created to serve me and sustain themselves so without pain, should it not be logical that I, who was created to serve my Maker, should be able to sustain myself without pain? What caused me to have to sustain myself with pain? One has to say, my sins. Because I worsened my deeds and destroyed my sustenance.

MISHNAH: How does one treat the bull of the person causing the damage in the domain of the person sustaining the damage? If it gored, hit, bit, wallowed, or kicked, in the public domain he pays half of the damages. In the domain of the person sustaining the damage, Rebbi Ṭarphon said, full damages; but the Sages say, half damages. Rebbi Tarphon said to them: Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, where one is free, He was restrictive for them in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, when full damages must be paid, and He was restrictive regarding damage by the horn in the public domain, where one has to pay half damages; is it not logical that we should be restrictive in this case in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, that full damages must be paid? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages. He said to them, I do not argue horn from horn, I argue horn from foot! Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, He was restrictive for damage by the horn, when He was restrictive with [damage by] tooth or foot in the domain of the person sustaining the damage; is it not logical that we should be restrictive [in case of damage] by the horn? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages.

MISHNAH: How does one treat the bull of the person causing the damage in the domain of the person sustaining the damage? If it gored, hit, bit, wallowed, or kicked, in the public domain he pays half of the damages. In the domain of the person sustaining the damage, Rebbi Ṭarphon said, full damages; but the Sages say, half damages. Rebbi Tarphon said to them: Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, where one is free, He was restrictive for them in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, when full damages must be paid, and He was restrictive regarding damage by the horn in the public domain, where one has to pay half damages; is it not logical that we should be restrictive in this case in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, that full damages must be paid? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages. He said to them, I do not argue horn from horn, I argue horn from foot! Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, He was restrictive for damage by the horn, when He was restrictive with [damage by] tooth or foot in the domain of the person sustaining the damage; is it not logical that we should be restrictive [in case of damage] by the horn? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages.