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Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not appoint two brothers as providers. Rebbi Yose removed one of two brothers. He came and said before them: There was not anything wrong with Mr. X, only one does not appoint two brothers as providers.

MISHNAH: If someone enters a town, does not know anybody there, and asks: Who is trustworthy here, who tithes? If somebody told him, I am not trustworthy, but Mr. X is trustworthy, he may be believed. If he went and bought there and asked, who is selling old produce here? If the seller said, the one who sent you to me, they may be believed even though they act as if they would do reciprocal favors to each other. Donkey drivers who entered a town and one of them said, my produce is new, my colleague’s is old, mine is not in order, my colleague’s is in order, are not to be believed. Rebbi Jehudah says, they are to be believed.

“Nor with a single one.” Rebbi Abba said, because of the suspicion. That they should not say Mr. X’s sandal was torn and and he put it under his arm pit.

HALAKHAH: “How does he declare his jealousy,” etc. Does this mean only, until she talks with him? That would imply, if she went to a secluded place with him without talking, that going to a secluded place would count for nothing? It comes to tell you more: Even if she talked to him but was not with him in a secluded place, she still is permitted to her house and to eat heave, since the Mishnah uses chaste language: Do not be alone with Mr. X.

MISHNAH: If she was seen speaking to a man and one asked her, what kind of man is this? He is Mr. X, a Cohen; Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer say, she is believed. Rebbi Joshua said, we do not live off her mouth but there is a presumption that she was lying with a Gibeonite and a bastard unless she provides proof of her statement.

MISHNAH: If she was pregnant and one asked her, what kind of fetus is this? He is from Mr. X, a Cohen; Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer say, she is believed. Rebbi Joshua said, we do not live off her mouth but there is a presumption that she is pregnant from a Gibeonite or a bastard unless she provides proof of her statement.

“If he said to her I require that you tell Mr. X what you said to me,” alone, “or I said to you”, alone, “or that she should fill [vessels] and pour them out on garbage heaps, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.” There, they say, like Er’s action, but the rabbis here say, senseless things.

MISHNAH: In addition, Rebbi Eliezer said, one finds an opening in changed circumstances, but the Sages forbid it. How is this? If he said, a qônām that I shall not benefit from Mr. X, who then becomes a public scribe or who marries off his son to one of [the vower’s] relatives, and he said, if I had known that he will become a public scribe or marry off his son to a relative, I would not have vowed; or if he said, a qônām that I shall not enter this house and it was turned into a synagogue and he said, if I had known that it would become a synagogue, I would not have vowed; Rebbi Eliezer permits but the Sages prohibit.

MISHNAH: If they were walking on the road and a person came towards them when one said, “I am a nazir unless he is Mr. X”, and another said, “I am a nazir if it is not he”; “I am a nazir unless one of you is a nazir”, “unless both of you are nezirim”, “unless all of you are nezirim”. The House of Shammai say, they are all nezirim, but the House of Hillel say, only those whose assertions prove wrong are nezirim. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, none of them is a nazir. If he suddenly returned, no one is a nazir. Rebbi Simeon says, one should say: If it was as I said, I am a nazir by obligation, otherwise I am a nazir voluntarily. If one saw a koy and said, “I am a nazir if this is a wild animal”, “I am a nazir if this is not a wild animal”, “I am a nazir if this is a domestic animal”, “I am a nazir if this is a not a domestic animal”, “I am a nazir if this is a wild and domestic animal”, “I am a nazir if this is neither a wild nor a domestic animal”, “I am a nazir if one of you is a nazir”, “if one of you is not a nazir”, “if both of you are nezirim”, then all of them are nezirim.

MISHNAH: If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife or this document of manumission to my slave,” if he wants to change his mind in either case he can retract, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, only for women’s bills of divorce but not for slaves’ documents of manumission because one may bestow benefit on a person in his absence but put a detriment on him only in his presence; for if one chooses not to sustain his slave, he has the right not to do so, but not to sustain his wife he has no right. He said to them, but he disqualifies his slave for heave the same way he disqualifies his wife! They answered him, because he is his property. If one says, “give this bill of divorce to my wife or this document of manumission to my slave” and dies, they shall not be delivered after his death; “give this mina to Mr. X” and dies, they shall deliver it after his death.

“ ‘Give this mina to Mr. X’ and he dies, they shall deliver it after his death”. Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: The Mishnah refers to a sick person.

MISHNAH: Every bill of divorce which was not written for a particular wife is invalid. How? If one was walking in the market and heard the scribes dictating “Mr. X divorces his wife Y from place Z” and said, these are mine and my wife’s names, it is invalid and cannot be used to divorce by. In addition, if he wrote [a bill] to divorce his wife but had second thoughts, and a fellow townsman came and said to him, my name is identical with yours and my wife’s name is identical with your wife’s, it is invalid and cannot be used to divorce by. In addition, if he had two wives with identical names and wrote a document to divorce the older one by, he cannot use it to divorce the younger. In addition, if he said to the scribe: write that I may divorce either one I wish, it is invalid and cannot be used to divorce either one.

Rebbi Ḥanania in the name of Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya, [this is Rebbi’s opinion.] Rebbi Joḥanan said, and it was stated so: “All conditions invalidate a bill of divorce, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, what invalidates orally invalidates in writing, and what does not invalidate orally does not invalidate in writing.” “You are permitted to marry anybody except Mr. X,” because this invalidates orally it invalidates in writing. “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give me 200 zuz”; because this does not invalidate orally it does not invalidate in writing. Rebbi Yudan said, when do they disagree? If he rescinded his condition. But if he did nor rescind his condition, even Rebbi agrees. Otherwise, we would have to say that all conditions which were stated for bills of divorce do not follow Rebbi. Rebbi Ḥinena said, there when he writes “on condition,” here if he gives “on condition.” Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Does this imply that Rebbi does not recognize formulaic texts? He answered him, about whom do you ask? About Rebbi! He follows Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates formulaic texts. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, everybody agrees that all conditions invalidate a bill of divorce. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah and he acted following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Yose said to him, does one neglect Rebbi Joḥanan and act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered him, is Rebbi Joḥanan’s instruction an instruction but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s instruction not an instruction? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, it is not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, but he understood a baraita and acted accordingly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish fights against Rebbi Joḥanan when he disagrees with him only to extract a ruling from him. If he finds a baraita, he depends on it; if he does not find a baraita, he retracts his opinion before Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion.

MISHNAH: In earlier times, he could go to a court at another place and annul [the bill of divorce]; Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that one should not do that because of the public good. In earlier times, his name and her name and the names of his and her towns could change; Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that one should write Mr. X and all his names, Mrs. Y and all her names, because of the public good.

“Mr. X and all his names.” Think of it, if his name was Reuben and he went away under the name of Simeon. But: “I am X and every other name which I have.” “In addition, they said if he had two wives, one in Judea and one in Galilee, and he is known by two names, one in Judea and one in Galilee. He used [his name] in Judea to divorce the one in Galilee and [his name] in Galilee to divorce the one in Judea. Neither one is divorced.” This baraita if he was in Judea and wrote to divorce in Galilee or in Galilee and wrote to divorce in Judea. But if he was in Judea and wrote to divorce in Judea, or in Galilee and wrote to divorce in Galilee, she is divorced. Rebbi Ilai said, according to the rules he has to say: “I am X with every other name which I have in Galilee.” If he was at another place, he can divorce either one he wishes. Rebbi Yose said, one says that if he did it. But to start out he has to follow Rebbi Ilai. Rebbi Abin said, if he is known by (another) name at another place, he has to mention all three.

There, we have stated: “One writes a bill of divorce for a man even if his wife is not with him, and a receipt for a woman even if her husband is not with her, and the husband pays the fee.” Rebbi Abba said, he has to know both of them. Rebbi La said, he has to know the husband for the bill of divorce and the wife for her receipt. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi [ ]: Think of it, if he brought another woman and divorced by means of her. He said to him, let the witnesses come and testify. But did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say that they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been cross-examined in court? There, if they said, we did not sign at all. But here if they say, we signed this but not that. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Abba: “In earlier times, his name and her name and the names of his and her towns could change.” If he knows them, why would he change their names? There are people who know others by sight but do not know their names. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Ilai: “Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that one should write Mr. X and all his names, Mrs. Y and all her names, because of the public good.” The Mishnah about one who is forced to divorce, Rebbi Ila speaks about one who divorces on his initiative; some want to say if he divorces at another place.

MISHNAH: If somebody in divorcing his wife says to her: Herewith you are permitted to any man except Mr. X, Rebbi Eliezer permits but the Sages prohibit. What should he do? He should take the document back from her and deliver it again while saying, herewith you are permitted to any man. If he had written the condition in the document it would be invalid even if he had later erased it.

After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.

After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.

Another argument: “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden. Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated.

Another argument: “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden. Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated.

Another argument: “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden. Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated.

MISHNAH: If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married; divorced, she is divorced, except if there was an excuse. What would be an excuse? Mr. X divorced his wife conditionally, or he threw valuables for preliminary marriage to her and it was doubtful whether it was closer to her than to him; that is an excuse.

“If a caravan was attacked by soldiers and one of its members managed to save something from their hand, he saved equally [for all]; but if they gave him permission, he saved for himself. If donkey-drivers were attacked by robbers and one of theirs managed to save something from their hand, he saved equally [for all]; but if he stipulated with them in court, he saved for himself. If toll collectors forgave to partners, they forgave equally [for all]; but if they indicated, we forgave to Mr. X, what they forgave, they forgave him.”

“But if he wrote in terms of gift, whether at the start, or the middle, or the end, his words are upheld.” Rebbi Hoshaia said: “There shall be given to Mr. X the inheritance I want him to inherit.” “X should inherit the gift I want him to inherit.” “X shall inherit the inheritance which I gave to him.” “Write and give field X to person Y.” Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim brought a case before Rebbi Joḥanan He told them, if it is documentation, then write and deliver. If it is to transfer property, everybody agrees that nobody can transfer property after his death.

MISHNAH: One who says, Mr. X shall inherit from me while he has a daughter, or, my daughter shall inherit from me while he has a son, did not say anything since he stipulated against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqah said, if he said that about anybody who can be his heir, his words stand; about anybody who cannot be his heir, his words do not stand.

HALAKHAH: “One who says, Mr. X shall inherit from me,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said only this about a son among sons or a daughter among daughters, but not a daughter among brothers or a brother among daughters. Rebbi Joḥanan said, practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. Rebbi asked Rebbi Nathan; bar Abba said, so was the question: What is Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa’s reason? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, so was the question: What did they see to say that practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa? He told him, did you not teach us so: “they shall inherit”? So is the Mishnah: “they shall take.” [Rebbi] La said, even following him who said “inherit”, is not the power of the court strengthened? As you say, nobody can transfer property using the language of gift; here he may do it. Similarly, nobody can transfer property using the language of inheritance; here he may do it.

HALAKHAH: “One writes a bill of divorce for a man,” etc. Rebbi Abba said: He has to know both of them. Rebbi La said, he has to know the husband for his bill of divorce and the woman for her receipt. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Abba: “Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that one should write Mr. X and all his names, Mrs. Y and all her names, for the public good.” But even with Rebbi [La] it does not disagree: “In earlier times, his name and her name and the names of his and her towns could change.”

MISHNAH: If somebody paid off part of his debt, deposited his bond with a third party, and told him, if I have not paid him by date x, return the bond to him. If the time has passed while he did not pay, Rebbi Yose says, he shall return it; Rebbi Jehudah says, he shall not return it. If somebody’s bond became illegible, he presents witnesses about it to the court and they confirm for him: The bond of Mr. X, son of Mr. Y, dated from day Z became illegible; U and V were his witnesses.

MISHNAH: If somebody paid off part of his debt, deposited his bond with a third party, and told him, if I have not paid him by date x, return the bond to him. If the time has passed while he did not pay, Rebbi Yose says, he shall return it; Rebbi Jehudah says, he shall not return it. If somebody’s bond became illegible, he presents witnesses about it to the court and they confirm for him: The bond of Mr. X, son of Mr. Y, dated from day Z became illegible; U and V were his witnesses.

MISHNAH: When they have come to a decision, they bring the parties in. The chief judge says, Mr. X, you are not guilty, Mr. X, you are guilty. From where that afterwards, one may not say, I had found for you but my colleagues found you guilty, but what can I do since they were a majority against me? On such a one it was said: The gossip uncovers secrets.

MISHNAH: When they have come to a decision, they bring the parties in. The chief judge says, Mr. X, you are not guilty, Mr. X, you are guilty. From where that afterwards, one may not say, I had found for you but my colleagues found you guilty, but what can I do since they were a majority against me? On such a one it was said: The gossip uncovers secrets.

HALAKHAH: “In civil suits, one who argued for credit,” etc. Rebbi said, if they only miss saying, Mr. X, you are acquitted, or you are convicted; it does not apply to the discussion. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, it also applies to the discussion.

HALAKHAH: They brought in the second,” etc. It was stated: “If they found him innocent, they freed him; otherwise they hold his case over, split into groups of two, eat little and refrain from wine, and discuss during the entire night. The next morning they start early, the beadles of the synagogues come for them. They ask, Mr. X [ben Mr. Y. He says, present.] I was for conviction and I still am for conviction; or I was for acquittal and I still am for acquittal; I was for conviction and now I am for acquittal; one accepts his vote. I was for acquittal and now I am for conviction; argue as before.” It was stated: If one of the judges erred, the clerks of court remind him. If he was for conviction, they tell him, argue as before.

HALAKHAH: They brought in the second,” etc. It was stated: “If they found him innocent, they freed him; otherwise they hold his case over, split into groups of two, eat little and refrain from wine, and discuss during the entire night. The next morning they start early, the beadles of the synagogues come for them. They ask, Mr. X [ben Mr. Y. He says, present.] I was for conviction and I still am for conviction; or I was for acquittal and I still am for acquittal; I was for conviction and now I am for acquittal; one accepts his vote. I was for acquittal and now I am for conviction; argue as before.” It was stated: If one of the judges erred, the clerks of court remind him. If he was for conviction, they tell him, argue as before.

MISHNAH: [Denial] about words of the Sopherim is more serious than about words of the Torah. He who says that there are no phylacteries, to transgress the words of the Torah, is not prosecutable. Five compartments to add to the words of the Sopherim is punishable. One executes him not at the court in his town, nor at the court at Jabneh but one transports him to the Supreme Court in Jerusalem, keeps him until a holiday of pilgrimage, and executes him on the holiday as it is said, the entire people shall see and fear, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Jehudah says, one does not procrastinate in his case but executes him immediately, writes, and sends messengers to all places: Mr. A son of Mr. B was found guilty to be executed by the court.

MISHNAH: [Denial] about words of the Sopherim is more serious than about words of the Torah. He who says that there are no phylacteries, to transgress the words of the Torah, is not prosecutable. Five compartments to add to the words of the Sopherim is punishable. One executes him not at the court in his town, nor at the court at Jabneh but one transports him to the Supreme Court in Jerusalem, keeps him until a holiday of pilgrimage, and executes him on the holiday as it is said, the entire people shall see and fear, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Jehudah says, one does not procrastinate in his case but executes him immediately, writes, and sends messengers to all places: Mr. A son of Mr. B was found guilty to be executed by the court.

MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that Mr. X promised to give me 200 zuz but did not give them to me.” These are not liable since one is liable only for an (oath about) money similar to a deposit. “I am putting an oath on you, that you shall come and testify for me when you know testimony for me.” These are not liable since the oath preceded the testimony. If he stood in the synagogue and said, “I am putting an oath on you, that you shall come and testify for me if you know testimony for me.” These are not liable.