39436 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:32

Rebbi Jeremiah said that Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: Justice protects the one on the straight path. Evil deeds will pursue the sinner. He will watch over the feet of His pious ones. While He makes scoffers targets of scoffing. Fences are made fences and doors doors. Is it so that fences make fences and doors doors? But so it is: Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac: If a person is careful the first, second, and third times not to commit a sin, then the Holy One, praise to Him, will watch over him, as it is said, all this God will do twice, three times with a man. Rebbi Ze`ira said, but only if the person does not revert [to sin]. What is the reason? It does not say the triple thread “will never snap” but rather will not quickly snap. If you work on it, it will split.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:32

Rebbi Jeremiah said that Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: Justice protects the one on the straight path. Evil deeds will pursue the sinner. He will watch over the feet of His pious ones. While He makes scoffers targets of scoffing. Fences are made fences and doors doors. Is it so that fences make fences and doors doors? But so it is: Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac: If a person is careful the first, second, and third times not to commit a sin, then the Holy One, praise to Him, will watch over him, as it is said, all this God will do twice, three times with a man. Rebbi Ze`ira said, but only if the person does not revert [to sin]. What is the reason? It does not say the triple thread “will never snap” but rather will not quickly snap. If you work on it, it will split.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:32

Rebbi Jeremiah said that Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac asked: Justice protects the one on the straight path. Evil deeds will pursue the sinner. He will watch over the feet of His pious ones. While He makes scoffers targets of scoffing. Fences are made fences and doors doors. Is it so that fences make fences and doors doors? But so it is: Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac: If a person is careful the first, second, and third times not to commit a sin, then the Holy One, praise to Him, will watch over him, as it is said, all this God will do twice, three times with a man. Rebbi Ze`ira said, but only if the person does not revert [to sin]. What is the reason? It does not say the triple thread “will never snap” but rather will not quickly snap. If you work on it, it will split.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:33

Rebbi Huna said in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: There is no forgetting before the Holy One, but for Israel He becomes forgetful. What is the reason? As it is said, Who is a Power like You, forgives sin. “He forgets” is written. And so David said, You forgot Your people’s sin.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:33

Rebbi Huna said in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: There is no forgetting before the Holy One, but for Israel He becomes forgetful. What is the reason? As it is said, Who is a Power like You, forgives sin. “He forgets” is written. And so David said, You forgot Your people’s sin.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:34

MISHNAH: Together Israel, Cohanim, and the Anointed Priest. What is the difference between Israel and a Cohen or the Anointed Priest? Only that the blood of the bull atones for Cohanim in matters of the Sanctuary and its sancta. Rebbi Simeon says, just as the blood of the he-goat which is brought inside atones for Israel, so the blood of the bull atones for the Cohanim. Just as the confession of the scapegoat atones for Israel, so the confession of the bull atones for Cohanim.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:35

HALAKHAH: “Together Israel, Cohanim,” etc. But we did not state “the Anointed.” Why did we not state “the Anointed”? If you say that we are discussing things which do not imply the obligation of a sacrifice, it is correct not to state “Anointed”. If you say about things which imply the obligation of a sacrifice, why do we not state “Anointed”? It was found stated “also the Anointed Priest.” This implies that we are discussing things which do not imply the obligation of a sacrifice. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, even if you say, about things which imply the obligation of a sacrifice, if it was done intentionally. As you say, intentionally it needs atoning and the atoning of the Day of Atonement, here also it needs atoning and the atoning of the Day of Atonement.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:35

HALAKHAH: “Together Israel, Cohanim,” etc. But we did not state “the Anointed.” Why did we not state “the Anointed”? If you say that we are discussing things which do not imply the obligation of a sacrifice, it is correct not to state “Anointed”. If you say about things which imply the obligation of a sacrifice, why do we not state “Anointed”? It was found stated “also the Anointed Priest.” This implies that we are discussing things which do not imply the obligation of a sacrifice. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, even if you say, about things which imply the obligation of a sacrifice, if it was done intentionally. As you say, intentionally it needs atoning and the atoning of the Day of Atonement, here also it needs atoning and the atoning of the Day of Atonement.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:36

Shall be stationed alive; this teaches that it the future it is going to die. How long must it live? Up to he will finish from atoning to Sanctuary, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, up to the moment of confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the confession is indispensable. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, the confession is not indispensable. What is the difference between them? If he slaughtered without confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another bull. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another bull. The same holds for the scapegoat. If he sent it without a confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another goat. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another goat. If he confessed, slaughtered, then the blood was spilled. Do you say, does he have to bring another bull and confess a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession? The same holds for the scapegoat; must he cast lots a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:36

Shall be stationed alive; this teaches that it the future it is going to die. How long must it live? Up to he will finish from atoning to Sanctuary, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, up to the moment of confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the confession is indispensable. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, the confession is not indispensable. What is the difference between them? If he slaughtered without confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another bull. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another bull. The same holds for the scapegoat. If he sent it without a confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another goat. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another goat. If he confessed, slaughtered, then the blood was spilled. Do you say, does he have to bring another bull and confess a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession? The same holds for the scapegoat; must he cast lots a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:36

Shall be stationed alive; this teaches that it the future it is going to die. How long must it live? Up to he will finish from atoning to Sanctuary, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, up to the moment of confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the confession is indispensable. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, the confession is not indispensable. What is the difference between them? If he slaughtered without confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another bull. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another bull. The same holds for the scapegoat. If he sent it without a confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another goat. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another goat. If he confessed, slaughtered, then the blood was spilled. Do you say, does he have to bring another bull and confess a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession? The same holds for the scapegoat; must he cast lots a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:36

Shall be stationed alive; this teaches that it the future it is going to die. How long must it live? Up to he will finish from atoning to Sanctuary, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, up to the moment of confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the confession is indispensable. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, the confession is not indispensable. What is the difference between them? If he slaughtered without confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another bull. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another bull. The same holds for the scapegoat. If he sent it without a confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another goat. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another goat. If he confessed, slaughtered, then the blood was spilled. Do you say, does he have to bring another bull and confess a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession? The same holds for the scapegoat; must he cast lots a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:36

Shall be stationed alive; this teaches that it the future it is going to die. How long must it live? Up to he will finish from atoning to Sanctuary, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, up to the moment of confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the confession is indispensable. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, the confession is not indispensable. What is the difference between them? If he slaughtered without confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another bull. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another bull. The same holds for the scapegoat. If he sent it without a confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another goat. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another goat. If he confessed, slaughtered, then the blood was spilled. Do you say, does he have to bring another bull and confess a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession? The same holds for the scapegoat; must he cast lots a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:36

Shall be stationed alive; this teaches that it the future it is going to die. How long must it live? Up to he will finish from atoning to Sanctuary, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, up to the moment of confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the confession is indispensable. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, the confession is not indispensable. What is the difference between them? If he slaughtered without confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another bull. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another bull. The same holds for the scapegoat. If he sent it without a confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another goat. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another goat. If he confessed, slaughtered, then the blood was spilled. Do you say, does he have to bring another bull and confess a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession? The same holds for the scapegoat; must he cast lots a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:36

Shall be stationed alive; this teaches that it the future it is going to die. How long must it live? Up to he will finish from atoning to Sanctuary, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, up to the moment of confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the confession is indispensable. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, the confession is not indispensable. What is the difference between them? If he slaughtered without confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another bull. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another bull. The same holds for the scapegoat. If he sent it without a confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another goat. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another goat. If he confessed, slaughtered, then the blood was spilled. Do you say, does he have to bring another bull and confess a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession? The same holds for the scapegoat; must he cast lots a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:36

Shall be stationed alive; this teaches that it the future it is going to die. How long must it live? Up to he will finish from atoning to Sanctuary, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Simeon says, up to the moment of confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the confession is indispensable. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, the confession is not indispensable. What is the difference between them? If he slaughtered without confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another bull. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another bull. The same holds for the scapegoat. If he sent it without a confession. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, he must bring another goat. In Rebbi Simeon’s opinion, he does not have to bring another goat. If he confessed, slaughtered, then the blood was spilled. Do you say, does he have to bring another bull and confess a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession? The same holds for the scapegoat; must he cast lots a second time or did he do his duty with the first confession?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “The kinds of awareness of impurity,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: It is obvious about the last awareness, until he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Is the same true for the first awareness? Let us hear from the following: Two paths, one impure and one pure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary, left, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, walked on the second one, and entered the Sanctuary; he is liable and he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, we thought that one could say that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said this if he was certain that he was impure, he had forgotten the impurity and entered the Sanctuary. But not if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure, he was oblivious of the Sanctuary and entered the Sanctuary. Since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary: this implies even if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion since a doubt of awareness is awareness. Since at a time when he does not know whether he was impure or pure you say it is certain knowledge, if he knows for certain that he is impure but does not know whether he is liable for a sacrifice then certainly this should be awareness.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “The kinds of awareness of impurity,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: It is obvious about the last awareness, until he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Is the same true for the first awareness? Let us hear from the following: Two paths, one impure and one pure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary, left, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, walked on the second one, and entered the Sanctuary; he is liable and he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, we thought that one could say that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said this if he was certain that he was impure, he had forgotten the impurity and entered the Sanctuary. But not if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure, he was oblivious of the Sanctuary and entered the Sanctuary. Since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary: this implies even if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion since a doubt of awareness is awareness. Since at a time when he does not know whether he was impure or pure you say it is certain knowledge, if he knows for certain that he is impure but does not know whether he is liable for a sacrifice then certainly this should be awareness.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “The kinds of awareness of impurity,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: It is obvious about the last awareness, until he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Is the same true for the first awareness? Let us hear from the following: Two paths, one impure and one pure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary, left, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, walked on the second one, and entered the Sanctuary; he is liable and he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, we thought that one could say that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said this if he was certain that he was impure, he had forgotten the impurity and entered the Sanctuary. But not if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure, he was oblivious of the Sanctuary and entered the Sanctuary. Since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary: this implies even if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion since a doubt of awareness is awareness. Since at a time when he does not know whether he was impure or pure you say it is certain knowledge, if he knows for certain that he is impure but does not know whether he is liable for a sacrifice then certainly this should be awareness.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “The kinds of awareness of impurity,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: It is obvious about the last awareness, until he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Is the same true for the first awareness? Let us hear from the following: Two paths, one impure and one pure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary, left, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, walked on the second one, and entered the Sanctuary; he is liable and he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, we thought that one could say that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said this if he was certain that he was impure, he had forgotten the impurity and entered the Sanctuary. But not if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure, he was oblivious of the Sanctuary and entered the Sanctuary. Since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary: this implies even if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion since a doubt of awareness is awareness. Since at a time when he does not know whether he was impure or pure you say it is certain knowledge, if he knows for certain that he is impure but does not know whether he is liable for a sacrifice then certainly this should be awareness.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “The kinds of awareness of impurity,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: It is obvious about the last awareness, until he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Is the same true for the first awareness? Let us hear from the following: Two paths, one impure and one pure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary, left, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, walked on the second one, and entered the Sanctuary; he is liable and he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, we thought that one could say that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said this if he was certain that he was impure, he had forgotten the impurity and entered the Sanctuary. But not if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure, he was oblivious of the Sanctuary and entered the Sanctuary. Since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary: this implies even if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion since a doubt of awareness is awareness. Since at a time when he does not know whether he was impure or pure you say it is certain knowledge, if he knows for certain that he is impure but does not know whether he is liable for a sacrifice then certainly this should be awareness.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “The kinds of awareness of impurity,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: It is obvious about the last awareness, until he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Is the same true for the first awareness? Let us hear from the following: Two paths, one impure and one pure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary, left, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, walked on the second one, and entered the Sanctuary; he is liable and he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, we thought that one could say that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said this if he was certain that he was impure, he had forgotten the impurity and entered the Sanctuary. But not if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure, he was oblivious of the Sanctuary and entered the Sanctuary. Since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary: this implies even if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion since a doubt of awareness is awareness. Since at a time when he does not know whether he was impure or pure you say it is certain knowledge, if he knows for certain that he is impure but does not know whether he is liable for a sacrifice then certainly this should be awareness.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “The kinds of awareness of impurity,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: It is obvious about the last awareness, until he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Is the same true for the first awareness? Let us hear from the following: Two paths, one impure and one pure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary, left, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, walked on the second one, and entered the Sanctuary; he is liable and he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, we thought that one could say that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said this if he was certain that he was impure, he had forgotten the impurity and entered the Sanctuary. But not if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure, he was oblivious of the Sanctuary and entered the Sanctuary. Since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary: this implies even if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion since a doubt of awareness is awareness. Since at a time when he does not know whether he was impure or pure you say it is certain knowledge, if he knows for certain that he is impure but does not know whether he is liable for a sacrifice then certainly this should be awareness.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:2

HALAKHAH: “The kinds of awareness of impurity,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: It is obvious about the last awareness, until he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Is the same true for the first awareness? Let us hear from the following: Two paths, one impure and one pure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary, left, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, walked on the second one, and entered the Sanctuary; he is liable and he knows that he is liable to bring a sacrifice for it. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, we thought that one could say that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said this if he was certain that he was impure, he had forgotten the impurity and entered the Sanctuary. But not if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure, he was oblivious of the Sanctuary and entered the Sanctuary. Since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is Rebbi Ismael’s who said that he is liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary: this implies even if it was in doubt whether he was impure or pure. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion since a doubt of awareness is awareness. Since at a time when he does not know whether he was impure or pure you say it is certain knowledge, if he knows for certain that he is impure but does not know whether he is liable for a sacrifice then certainly this should be awareness.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:3

In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, if one became impure but it was for him in doubt, would this be for him like forgetting, which makes him liable? Each of them keeps to his opinion, as they disagreed:

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:4

One ate five times the volume of an olive; he separately realized a doubt about each one. Afterwards it became known to him as a certainty. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of sacrifices. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of sacrifices. Rebbi Yose bar Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that for the Anointed Priest the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of purification sacrifice. What is the reason? Like purification offering, like reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt determines the transgression for one who brings a suspended reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt does not determine the transgression for one who does not bring a suspended reparation offering.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:4

One ate five times the volume of an olive; he separately realized a doubt about each one. Afterwards it became known to him as a certainty. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of sacrifices. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of sacrifices. Rebbi Yose bar Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that for the Anointed Priest the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of purification sacrifice. What is the reason? Like purification offering, like reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt determines the transgression for one who brings a suspended reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt does not determine the transgression for one who does not bring a suspended reparation offering.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:4

One ate five times the volume of an olive; he separately realized a doubt about each one. Afterwards it became known to him as a certainty. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of sacrifices. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of sacrifices. Rebbi Yose bar Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that for the Anointed Priest the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of purification sacrifice. What is the reason? Like purification offering, like reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt determines the transgression for one who brings a suspended reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt does not determine the transgression for one who does not bring a suspended reparation offering.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:4

One ate five times the volume of an olive; he separately realized a doubt about each one. Afterwards it became known to him as a certainty. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of sacrifices. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of sacrifices. Rebbi Yose bar Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that for the Anointed Priest the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of purification sacrifice. What is the reason? Like purification offering, like reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt determines the transgression for one who brings a suspended reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt does not determine the transgression for one who does not bring a suspended reparation offering.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:4

One ate five times the volume of an olive; he separately realized a doubt about each one. Afterwards it became known to him as a certainty. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of sacrifices. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of sacrifices. Rebbi Yose bar Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that for the Anointed Priest the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of purification sacrifice. What is the reason? Like purification offering, like reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt determines the transgression for one who brings a suspended reparation offering. The knowledge about his doubt does not determine the transgression for one who does not bring a suspended reparation offering.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:5

The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems to be inverted. There he says, the knowledge about his doubt determines his kind of transgression. But here he says, the knowledge about his doubt does not determine his kind of transgression. There, his reparation offering determines it. Here what do you have?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:6

The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There, he said, if part of the sin was atoned, all of the sin was atoned. And here he says so? Rebbi Joḥanan said this only for the last realization which does not require any sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:6

The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems to be inverted. There, he said, if part of the sin was atoned, all of the sin was atoned. And here he says so? Rebbi Joḥanan said this only for the last realization which does not require any sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:7

Rebbi Joḥanan said: In any case of doubt in the public domain, the doubt has to be resolved as pure, but one does not allow to act. But did we not state: “Any case of doubt which was declared pure for heave is pure for sprinkling water, and in any case where it remains unresolved for heave the sprinkling water is poured out.” There is nothing unresolved for the sprinkling water; either it is genuinely pure or genuinely impure. Rebbi Ze`ira said, the Mishnah deals with a situation not caused by a sacrifice; what Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to a situation caused by a sacrifice. Everybody agrees that if the person transgresses and acted, it is pure. The arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted. There, he says, if he transgresses and acted, it is impure. But here he said, if he transgresses and acted, it is pure. There in a private domain, here in the public domain. But you could even say, there and here in the public domain. The arguments of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish are inverted, the arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted, since they disagreed: A nazir became impure by a grave in the abyss, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the nazir does not shave, but Rebbi Joḥanan said, the nazir has to shave. That is since Rebbi Joḥanan said, a doubt of awareness is awareness, even if the first was because of a crawling animal and the second by a corpse. The first before he converted and the second after he converted. The first before he grew two pubic hairs, the second after he grew them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:7

Rebbi Joḥanan said: In any case of doubt in the public domain, the doubt has to be resolved as pure, but one does not allow to act. But did we not state: “Any case of doubt which was declared pure for heave is pure for sprinkling water, and in any case where it remains unresolved for heave the sprinkling water is poured out.” There is nothing unresolved for the sprinkling water; either it is genuinely pure or genuinely impure. Rebbi Ze`ira said, the Mishnah deals with a situation not caused by a sacrifice; what Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to a situation caused by a sacrifice. Everybody agrees that if the person transgresses and acted, it is pure. The arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted. There, he says, if he transgresses and acted, it is impure. But here he said, if he transgresses and acted, it is pure. There in a private domain, here in the public domain. But you could even say, there and here in the public domain. The arguments of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish are inverted, the arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted, since they disagreed: A nazir became impure by a grave in the abyss, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the nazir does not shave, but Rebbi Joḥanan said, the nazir has to shave. That is since Rebbi Joḥanan said, a doubt of awareness is awareness, even if the first was because of a crawling animal and the second by a corpse. The first before he converted and the second after he converted. The first before he grew two pubic hairs, the second after he grew them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:7

Rebbi Joḥanan said: In any case of doubt in the public domain, the doubt has to be resolved as pure, but one does not allow to act. But did we not state: “Any case of doubt which was declared pure for heave is pure for sprinkling water, and in any case where it remains unresolved for heave the sprinkling water is poured out.” There is nothing unresolved for the sprinkling water; either it is genuinely pure or genuinely impure. Rebbi Ze`ira said, the Mishnah deals with a situation not caused by a sacrifice; what Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to a situation caused by a sacrifice. Everybody agrees that if the person transgresses and acted, it is pure. The arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted. There, he says, if he transgresses and acted, it is impure. But here he said, if he transgresses and acted, it is pure. There in a private domain, here in the public domain. But you could even say, there and here in the public domain. The arguments of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish are inverted, the arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted, since they disagreed: A nazir became impure by a grave in the abyss, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the nazir does not shave, but Rebbi Joḥanan said, the nazir has to shave. That is since Rebbi Joḥanan said, a doubt of awareness is awareness, even if the first was because of a crawling animal and the second by a corpse. The first before he converted and the second after he converted. The first before he grew two pubic hairs, the second after he grew them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:7

Rebbi Joḥanan said: In any case of doubt in the public domain, the doubt has to be resolved as pure, but one does not allow to act. But did we not state: “Any case of doubt which was declared pure for heave is pure for sprinkling water, and in any case where it remains unresolved for heave the sprinkling water is poured out.” There is nothing unresolved for the sprinkling water; either it is genuinely pure or genuinely impure. Rebbi Ze`ira said, the Mishnah deals with a situation not caused by a sacrifice; what Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to a situation caused by a sacrifice. Everybody agrees that if the person transgresses and acted, it is pure. The arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted. There, he says, if he transgresses and acted, it is impure. But here he said, if he transgresses and acted, it is pure. There in a private domain, here in the public domain. But you could even say, there and here in the public domain. The arguments of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish are inverted, the arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted, since they disagreed: A nazir became impure by a grave in the abyss, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the nazir does not shave, but Rebbi Joḥanan said, the nazir has to shave. That is since Rebbi Joḥanan said, a doubt of awareness is awareness, even if the first was because of a crawling animal and the second by a corpse. The first before he converted and the second after he converted. The first before he grew two pubic hairs, the second after he grew them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:7

Rebbi Joḥanan said: In any case of doubt in the public domain, the doubt has to be resolved as pure, but one does not allow to act. But did we not state: “Any case of doubt which was declared pure for heave is pure for sprinkling water, and in any case where it remains unresolved for heave the sprinkling water is poured out.” There is nothing unresolved for the sprinkling water; either it is genuinely pure or genuinely impure. Rebbi Ze`ira said, the Mishnah deals with a situation not caused by a sacrifice; what Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to a situation caused by a sacrifice. Everybody agrees that if the person transgresses and acted, it is pure. The arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted. There, he says, if he transgresses and acted, it is impure. But here he said, if he transgresses and acted, it is pure. There in a private domain, here in the public domain. But you could even say, there and here in the public domain. The arguments of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish are inverted, the arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted, since they disagreed: A nazir became impure by a grave in the abyss, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the nazir does not shave, but Rebbi Joḥanan said, the nazir has to shave. That is since Rebbi Joḥanan said, a doubt of awareness is awareness, even if the first was because of a crawling animal and the second by a corpse. The first before he converted and the second after he converted. The first before he grew two pubic hairs, the second after he grew them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:7

Rebbi Joḥanan said: In any case of doubt in the public domain, the doubt has to be resolved as pure, but one does not allow to act. But did we not state: “Any case of doubt which was declared pure for heave is pure for sprinkling water, and in any case where it remains unresolved for heave the sprinkling water is poured out.” There is nothing unresolved for the sprinkling water; either it is genuinely pure or genuinely impure. Rebbi Ze`ira said, the Mishnah deals with a situation not caused by a sacrifice; what Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to a situation caused by a sacrifice. Everybody agrees that if the person transgresses and acted, it is pure. The arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted. There, he says, if he transgresses and acted, it is impure. But here he said, if he transgresses and acted, it is pure. There in a private domain, here in the public domain. But you could even say, there and here in the public domain. The arguments of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish are inverted, the arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted, since they disagreed: A nazir became impure by a grave in the abyss, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the nazir does not shave, but Rebbi Joḥanan said, the nazir has to shave. That is since Rebbi Joḥanan said, a doubt of awareness is awareness, even if the first was because of a crawling animal and the second by a corpse. The first before he converted and the second after he converted. The first before he grew two pubic hairs, the second after he grew them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:7

Rebbi Joḥanan said: In any case of doubt in the public domain, the doubt has to be resolved as pure, but one does not allow to act. But did we not state: “Any case of doubt which was declared pure for heave is pure for sprinkling water, and in any case where it remains unresolved for heave the sprinkling water is poured out.” There is nothing unresolved for the sprinkling water; either it is genuinely pure or genuinely impure. Rebbi Ze`ira said, the Mishnah deals with a situation not caused by a sacrifice; what Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to a situation caused by a sacrifice. Everybody agrees that if the person transgresses and acted, it is pure. The arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted. There, he says, if he transgresses and acted, it is impure. But here he said, if he transgresses and acted, it is pure. There in a private domain, here in the public domain. But you could even say, there and here in the public domain. The arguments of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish are inverted, the arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted, since they disagreed: A nazir became impure by a grave in the abyss, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the nazir does not shave, but Rebbi Joḥanan said, the nazir has to shave. That is since Rebbi Joḥanan said, a doubt of awareness is awareness, even if the first was because of a crawling animal and the second by a corpse. The first before he converted and the second after he converted. The first before he grew two pubic hairs, the second after he grew them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:7

Rebbi Joḥanan said: In any case of doubt in the public domain, the doubt has to be resolved as pure, but one does not allow to act. But did we not state: “Any case of doubt which was declared pure for heave is pure for sprinkling water, and in any case where it remains unresolved for heave the sprinkling water is poured out.” There is nothing unresolved for the sprinkling water; either it is genuinely pure or genuinely impure. Rebbi Ze`ira said, the Mishnah deals with a situation not caused by a sacrifice; what Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to a situation caused by a sacrifice. Everybody agrees that if the person transgresses and acted, it is pure. The arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted. There, he says, if he transgresses and acted, it is impure. But here he said, if he transgresses and acted, it is pure. There in a private domain, here in the public domain. But you could even say, there and here in the public domain. The arguments of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish are inverted, the arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted, since they disagreed: A nazir became impure by a grave in the abyss, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the nazir does not shave, but Rebbi Joḥanan said, the nazir has to shave. That is since Rebbi Joḥanan said, a doubt of awareness is awareness, even if the first was because of a crawling animal and the second by a corpse. The first before he converted and the second after he converted. The first before he grew two pubic hairs, the second after he grew them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:7

Rebbi Joḥanan said: In any case of doubt in the public domain, the doubt has to be resolved as pure, but one does not allow to act. But did we not state: “Any case of doubt which was declared pure for heave is pure for sprinkling water, and in any case where it remains unresolved for heave the sprinkling water is poured out.” There is nothing unresolved for the sprinkling water; either it is genuinely pure or genuinely impure. Rebbi Ze`ira said, the Mishnah deals with a situation not caused by a sacrifice; what Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to a situation caused by a sacrifice. Everybody agrees that if the person transgresses and acted, it is pure. The arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted. There, he says, if he transgresses and acted, it is impure. But here he said, if he transgresses and acted, it is pure. There in a private domain, here in the public domain. But you could even say, there and here in the public domain. The arguments of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish are inverted, the arguments of Rebbi Joḥanan are inverted, since they disagreed: A nazir became impure by a grave in the abyss, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the nazir does not shave, but Rebbi Joḥanan said, the nazir has to shave. That is since Rebbi Joḥanan said, a doubt of awareness is awareness, even if the first was because of a crawling animal and the second by a corpse. The first before he converted and the second after he converted. The first before he grew two pubic hairs, the second after he grew them.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:9

If he went to immerse himself for a minor impurity and a severe impurity was additional, it does not count for him for the severe impurity. In which respect? If he immersed himself and then entered the Sanctuary he is liable. Therefore not for a severe impurity and a severe impurity was additional. Therefore not for a minor impurity and a minor impurity was additional. If he went to immerse himself for severe impurity and tree limbs and wall extensions were additional are these like severe impurity since Rebbi Joḥanan said that for heave all of them are [impure] from the Torah, or are they like minor impurity since the nazir does not shave because of them?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:10

An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:10

An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:10

An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:10

An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:10

An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:10

An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:10

An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:10

An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:10

An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:10

An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:10

An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:10

An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:10

An androgynus who saw whitish [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary is not liable. If he saw red [effluent] and entered the Sanctuary, he is not liable. If he saw simultaneously whitish and red and entered the Sanctuary, he is liable. There is a Tanna who states: he is not liable. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this is Rebbi Simeon, as it was stated: “Two paths, one pure and one impure. He walked on one of them, entered the Sanctuary on the first one, sprinkled repeatedly, immersed himself, on the second one and entered; he is liable. Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in this case. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah in the name of Rebbi Simeon declares him not liable in all cases.” One understands the androgynus, for whitish [effluent] you declare him to be a woman, for red [effluent] you declare him to be a man. But here there is no known impurity. Rebbi Samuel bar Sosartai said, explain it if he forgot the first. Rebbi Yose asked, where do we hold? If he forgot it forever, it is one path. If he forgot repeatedly, there are two paths. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon parallels Rebbi Eliezer in the interpretation of Ḥizqiah. Just as Rebbi Eliezer said there, until he knows whether he did become impure by a crawling animal or a corpse, so Rebbi Simeon says here, until he knows whether he did become impure by red [effluent] or by whitish. One understands there since he said, a doubt of awareness is awareness. But here, since he saw whitish and red together, it is certain knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:11

Rav Ḥisda asked: What is the situation if he entered the Sanctuary thinking it was a synagogue? Rebbi Yose said, the following is what we are saying: One knew that there exists impurity in the world but he did not know whether one is liable for a sacrifice because of it, that certainly is awareness. But the following is where we hold, if it was clear to him that he was impure but he was oblivious of the Sanctuary, and he entered the Sanctuary. And so if it was clear to him that this was the Sanctuary, he was oblivious of the impurity and entered the Sanctuary.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:12

Rebbi Yose asked: If one ate half the volume of an olive being aware of the Sanctuary but oblivious of impurity and about half the volume of an olive being aware of impurity but oblivious of the Sanctuary; do the oblivions combine?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:14

HALAKHAH: “Whether one entered the courtyard,” etc. Rav said, at the start: David ascended following Gad’s word, that is King and Prophet. Solomon started to build the Temple of the Eternal in Jerusalem, these are Urim and Tummim. And his father David, this is the Synhedrion, ask your father and he will tell you. Song, after them went Hoshaia and the officers. Thanksgiving sacrifices, I put up two thanksgiving sacrifices. Rebbi Samuel bar Rebbi Yudan said, what is written, walking? No, being in procession.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:14

HALAKHAH: “Whether one entered the courtyard,” etc. Rav said, at the start: David ascended following Gad’s word, that is King and Prophet. Solomon started to build the Temple of the Eternal in Jerusalem, these are Urim and Tummim. And his father David, this is the Synhedrion, ask your father and he will tell you. Song, after them went Hoshaia and the officers. Thanksgiving sacrifices, I put up two thanksgiving sacrifices. Rebbi Samuel bar Rebbi Yudan said, what is written, walking? No, being in procession.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:17

HALAKHAH: “If one became impure in the Temple courtyard,” etc. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: One verse says, he defiled the dwelling place of the Eternal, another verse says, he defiled the Sanctuary of the Eternal. Why is this? To state a difference between one who became inside and one who became outside. If he became impure (inside) not unless he bring his head and most of his body inside; if he became impure (outside) not unless he stay for prostrating. If he became impure inside and entered further inside? Let us hear from the following: “If he prostrated himself, or tarried that he could have prostrated himself.” If he tarried, is that not as if he brought his head and most of his body inside, but you are saying, “he tarried that he could have prostrated himself.” And here, not unless he tarried that he could have prostrated himself. How is that? About which of them does he become liable? About the first or the last? The colleagues say, about the first. Rebbi Yose told them, one says to him, leave, and you say about the first? But we must hold about the last.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:17

HALAKHAH: “If one became impure in the Temple courtyard,” etc. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: One verse says, he defiled the dwelling place of the Eternal, another verse says, he defiled the Sanctuary of the Eternal. Why is this? To state a difference between one who became inside and one who became outside. If he became impure (inside) not unless he bring his head and most of his body inside; if he became impure (outside) not unless he stay for prostrating. If he became impure inside and entered further inside? Let us hear from the following: “If he prostrated himself, or tarried that he could have prostrated himself.” If he tarried, is that not as if he brought his head and most of his body inside, but you are saying, “he tarried that he could have prostrated himself.” And here, not unless he tarried that he could have prostrated himself. How is that? About which of them does he become liable? About the first or the last? The colleagues say, about the first. Rebbi Yose told them, one says to him, leave, and you say about the first? But we must hold about the last.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:17

HALAKHAH: “If one became impure in the Temple courtyard,” etc. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: One verse says, he defiled the dwelling place of the Eternal, another verse says, he defiled the Sanctuary of the Eternal. Why is this? To state a difference between one who became inside and one who became outside. If he became impure (inside) not unless he bring his head and most of his body inside; if he became impure (outside) not unless he stay for prostrating. If he became impure inside and entered further inside? Let us hear from the following: “If he prostrated himself, or tarried that he could have prostrated himself.” If he tarried, is that not as if he brought his head and most of his body inside, but you are saying, “he tarried that he could have prostrated himself.” And here, not unless he tarried that he could have prostrated himself. How is that? About which of them does he become liable? About the first or the last? The colleagues say, about the first. Rebbi Yose told them, one says to him, leave, and you say about the first? But we must hold about the last.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:17

HALAKHAH: “If one became impure in the Temple courtyard,” etc. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: One verse says, he defiled the dwelling place of the Eternal, another verse says, he defiled the Sanctuary of the Eternal. Why is this? To state a difference between one who became inside and one who became outside. If he became impure (inside) not unless he bring his head and most of his body inside; if he became impure (outside) not unless he stay for prostrating. If he became impure inside and entered further inside? Let us hear from the following: “If he prostrated himself, or tarried that he could have prostrated himself.” If he tarried, is that not as if he brought his head and most of his body inside, but you are saying, “he tarried that he could have prostrated himself.” And here, not unless he tarried that he could have prostrated himself. How is that? About which of them does he become liable? About the first or the last? The colleagues say, about the first. Rebbi Yose told them, one says to him, leave, and you say about the first? But we must hold about the last.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:18

There, we have stated: “They removed the cup and the censer for him”. About which of them does he become liable? About the first or the last? The colleagues say, about the last. Rebbi Yose told them, one says to him, enter, and you say about the last? But we must hold about the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:19

The measure of prostrating is ten cubits. How is this? If the lengthy path was twenty but the short one ten. He went five. If he went in this direction, five, if in the other, fifteen. Rebbi Yose said, he never becomes liable unless the lengthy path exceed the short one by (ten). How is that? If the lengthy path was thirty but the short one ten. He went five. If he went in this direction, five, if in the other, twenty-five. What is the duration of prostrating? Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: up to a greeting from one person to another. Abba bar Huna in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: up to a greeting from a student to his teacher, “peace be with you, my teacher.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:19

The measure of prostrating is ten cubits. How is this? If the lengthy path was twenty but the short one ten. He went five. If he went in this direction, five, if in the other, fifteen. Rebbi Yose said, he never becomes liable unless the lengthy path exceed the short one by (ten). How is that? If the lengthy path was thirty but the short one ten. He went five. If he went in this direction, five, if in the other, twenty-five. What is the duration of prostrating? Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: up to a greeting from one person to another. Abba bar Huna in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: up to a greeting from a student to his teacher, “peace be with you, my teacher.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:19

The measure of prostrating is ten cubits. How is this? If the lengthy path was twenty but the short one ten. He went five. If he went in this direction, five, if in the other, fifteen. Rebbi Yose said, he never becomes liable unless the lengthy path exceed the short one by (ten). How is that? If the lengthy path was thirty but the short one ten. He went five. If he went in this direction, five, if in the other, twenty-five. What is the duration of prostrating? Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: up to a greeting from one person to another. Abba bar Huna in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: up to a greeting from a student to his teacher, “peace be with you, my teacher.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:19

The measure of prostrating is ten cubits. How is this? If the lengthy path was twenty but the short one ten. He went five. If he went in this direction, five, if in the other, fifteen. Rebbi Yose said, he never becomes liable unless the lengthy path exceed the short one by (ten). How is that? If the lengthy path was thirty but the short one ten. He went five. If he went in this direction, five, if in the other, twenty-five. What is the duration of prostrating? Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: up to a greeting from one person to another. Abba bar Huna in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: up to a greeting from a student to his teacher, “peace be with you, my teacher.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:21

HALAKHAH: “What is the positive commandment about the menstruating woman,” etc. Cahana said, is it impossible that there was knowledge at the beginning and knowledge at the end and oblivion in between? Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon objected before Rebbi Mana: Could that be for the teachers? He told him, we have a problem with those entering and you bring us teachers? What about it? Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, commandments, commandments. Since commandments mentioned there are about fixed-value [offerings], here also about fixed-value [offerings].

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:21

HALAKHAH: “What is the positive commandment about the menstruating woman,” etc. Cahana said, is it impossible that there was knowledge at the beginning and knowledge at the end and oblivion in between? Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon objected before Rebbi Mana: Could that be for the teachers? He told him, we have a problem with those entering and you bring us teachers? What about it? Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, commandments, commandments. Since commandments mentioned there are about fixed-value [offerings], here also about fixed-value [offerings].

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:21

HALAKHAH: “What is the positive commandment about the menstruating woman,” etc. Cahana said, is it impossible that there was knowledge at the beginning and knowledge at the end and oblivion in between? Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon objected before Rebbi Mana: Could that be for the teachers? He told him, we have a problem with those entering and you bring us teachers? What about it? Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, commandments, commandments. Since commandments mentioned there are about fixed-value [offerings], here also about fixed-value [offerings].

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:22

MISHNAH: Rebbi Eliezer says, the crawling animal and he became oblivious, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Aqiba says, and he became oblivious while he was impure, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Ismael says, and he became oblivious, and he became oblivious, two times to make him liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:22

MISHNAH: Rebbi Eliezer says, the crawling animal and he became oblivious, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Aqiba says, and he became oblivious while he was impure, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Ismael says, and he became oblivious, and he became oblivious, two times to make him liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:22

MISHNAH: Rebbi Eliezer says, the crawling animal and he became oblivious, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Aqiba says, and he became oblivious while he was impure, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. Rebbi Ismael says, and he became oblivious, and he became oblivious, two times to make him liable for forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:23

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. There, by which he sinned, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure, in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:23

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. There, by which he sinned, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure, in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:23

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. There, by which he sinned, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure, in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:23

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. There, by which he sinned, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure, in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:23

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. There, by which he sinned, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure, in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 2:23

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says,” etc. Ḥizqiah says, there is disagreement between them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, interpreting the verse is between them; there are Tannaim who state, he is liable for forgetting impurity but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary, and there are Tannain who state, he is liable for forgetting the crawling animal but is not liable for forgetting the Sanctuary. The argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems inverted. There he says, even if he did not know. But here he says, not unless he knew. There, by which he sinned, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, while he was impure, in all cases. Rebbi Ḥinena said, here “by what” is not written. The argument of Rebbi Joshua seems inverted. There he says, while he was impure, not unless he knew by what he became liable. Here, by which he sinned, in any case. How does Rebbi Eliezer uphold by what? This excludes the one who is occupied.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:1

MISHNAH: There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds: An oath that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat; that I ate, or that I did not eat. An oath that I shall not eat, when he ate the most minute amount, he is liable, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. They said to Rebbi Aqiba, where do we find that one who eats the most minute amount should be liable, that this one be liable? He told them, where do we find that a person talks and has to bring a sacrifice; but this one talks and has to bring a sacrifice!

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:1

MISHNAH: There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds: An oath that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat; that I ate, or that I did not eat. An oath that I shall not eat, when he ate the most minute amount, he is liable, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. They said to Rebbi Aqiba, where do we find that one who eats the most minute amount should be liable, that this one be liable? He told them, where do we find that a person talks and has to bring a sacrifice; but this one talks and has to bring a sacrifice!

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds,” etc. One understands “that I shall eat, or that I shall not eat.” “That I ate, or that I did not eat”? Where do we stand? If it is known that he ate and he swore that he did not eat, it is a false oath. But if he was of the opinion that he ate and swore that he did not eat? Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If he is inadvertent for its sacrifice or intentional for its sacrifice. But “I was of the opinion that this is not an oath” is permitted. But it must be that he was intentional in the deed but in error about the sacrifice. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Intentional about fat and in error about the sacrifice, one warns him, he is flogged and has to bring a sacrifice. This is impossible, as Rebbi La said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: So did Rebbi Ismael answer Rebbi Aqiba: Do we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and in oblivion because of blurting? Should not Rebbi Aqiba retort, we find a situation where one is liable if intentional because of a false oath and he brings a sacrifice? But we deal here with the case that he was sure that he ate, and he swore, and it turned out that he had not eaten. Not about him who said that this is not an oath? There, if he says this is not an oath; but here if he knows that this is an oath but he errs because of something else.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:4

Does not the blasphemer have to bring a sacrifice? The colleagues in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: They answered him according to his argument. Following your argument, since you say that the blasphemer does not act, where do we find that somebody talks and brings a sacrifice that this one talks and brings a sacrifice? Rebbi Abba from Carthage asked, is not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s argument inverted? There he said, for Rebbi Aqiba the blasphemer does not act. But here he says, the blasphemer is acting in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Two Tannaïm following the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba. One said, the blasphemer does not act, and the other said, the blasphemer does act.