refers

What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? “ A man may not take his father’s wife,” that refers to his father’s wife; “and he should not uncover his father’s wing,” that is his rape victim. How do the rabbis explain “his father’s wing”? There, they say and they do not know the origin of the tradition, that refers to a wing which leans on his father. Would he not anyhow be guilty for her because of his father’s wife? Rebbi Hila said, because of forewarning, that if he was warned because of his father’s wife, he will be whipped, and because of his father’s wing, he will be whipped. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about whipping. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about sacrifice. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about all other doubtful cases that he is free. Rebbi Jehudah agrees that if he gave her qiddušin that these qiddušin are legally valid.

What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? “ A man may not take his father’s wife,” that refers to his father’s wife; “and he should not uncover his father’s wing,” that is his rape victim. How do the rabbis explain “his father’s wing”? There, they say and they do not know the origin of the tradition, that refers to a wing which leans on his father. Would he not anyhow be guilty for her because of his father’s wife? Rebbi Hila said, because of forewarning, that if he was warned because of his father’s wife, he will be whipped, and because of his father’s wing, he will be whipped. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about whipping. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about sacrifice. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about all other doubtful cases that he is free. Rebbi Jehudah agrees that if he gave her qiddušin that these qiddušin are legally valid.

What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? “Before the Elders’ eyes.” How do the rabbis uphold “before the Elders’ eyes”? That excludes a court of blind people. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems to be inverted. There, he says that the right hand is obligatory, but here, he says that the right hand is not obligatory. Rebbi Yose said, there it is written “the right hand”, the right hand is obl;igatory, but here, where “the right hand” is not written, the right hand is notobligatory. Rebbi Yose from Sidon stated before Rebbi Jeremiah: “His ear”, “his ear”. Since “his ear” mentioned there refers to the right ear, so “his ear” mentioned here means the right ear. It also says “his foot”, “his foot”. He who infers from “his ear”, “his ear” infers from “his foot”, “his foot”; he who does not infer from “his ear”, “his ear” does not infer from “his foot”, “his foot”. But it was stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: “his foot”, “his foot”. That means, there are two statements about the words of Rebbi Eliezer. He who argues from “his ear”, “his ear” argues from “his foot”, “his foot”; he who does not argue from “his ear”, “his ear” does not argue from “his foot”. And this Mishnah accepts neither “his ear”, “his ear” nor “his foot”, “his foot”.

HALAKHAH: “If an underage levir,” etc. It was stated: A claim of non-virginity may be brought within thirty days, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, immediately. Where do we hold? If he copulated, immediately. If he did not copulate, even after a longer delay. But we must hold if it was not spelled out. Rebbi Meїr said, it is credible that a man may hold himself back for thirty days. But the Sages say, a man does not hold himself back even for one day. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: According to Rebbi Meїr, would a man be believed to assert that he held himself back for thirty days in order to make the child fatherless? Let us hear from the following: “If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṣah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṣah with her.” (After thirty days.) And Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Meїr’s. And Rebbi Eleazar said, that refers only to her, but not to her co-wife. As you say there, she is not believed to damage her co-wife, so here, he is not believed to damage his son.

HALAKHAH: “if she says ‘my husband died’,” etc. Gidul bar Miniamin in the name of Rav: Anywhere they accepted the testimony of a woman parallel to that of a man, a man can contradict a woman and a woman can contradict a man. Then one should state: “A witness says that he died, and a woman says that he did not die; a woman said that he died and a witness said that he did not die.” In the House of Rebbi they stated it this way. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Neḥemiah: One follows the majority of the testimonies. How is that? Two women against one woman they considered as if there were two witnesses against one witness. What you say refers to a woman and women. But if there were a hundred women against one [male] witness, they are like one witness.

It is written: “Abijah and his people inflicted a very great slaughter on them.” Rebbi Abba bar Cahana said, he destroyed the face recognition of the men of Israel. That is what is written, “the recognition of their faces testified about them,” etc. That refers to the nose. Rebbi Immi said, he put up guards for three days until appearance was disfigured. That is what is written: “Your widows are more for me than the sand of the oceans.” It was stated in this respect: One testifies only on the appearance of the face with the nose. It is written: “Jeroboam was powerless for the rest of Aijah’s days; the Eternal smote him and he died.” Rebbi Samuel said, you think that this refers to Jeroboam, but it is Abijah. Why was he smitten? Rebbi Joḥanan said, because he insulted Jeroboam in public. That is what is written: “You are a great multitude and with you are the golden calves that Jeroboam made for you as gods.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, because he denigrated his teacher Aḥijah from Shiloh. That is what is written: “And men, rascals, joined him,” that he called Aḥijah from Shiloh a rascal. But the rabbis say, because an idol fell into his hand and he did not destroy it, that is what is written: “Abijah pursued Jeroboam and took from him cities, Beth El and its dependencies …” and it is written: “He set up one in Beth El and one he dedicated in Dan.”

It is written: “Abijah and his people inflicted a very great slaughter on them.” Rebbi Abba bar Cahana said, he destroyed the face recognition of the men of Israel. That is what is written, “the recognition of their faces testified about them,” etc. That refers to the nose. Rebbi Immi said, he put up guards for three days until appearance was disfigured. That is what is written: “Your widows are more for me than the sand of the oceans.” It was stated in this respect: One testifies only on the appearance of the face with the nose. It is written: “Jeroboam was powerless for the rest of Aijah’s days; the Eternal smote him and he died.” Rebbi Samuel said, you think that this refers to Jeroboam, but it is Abijah. Why was he smitten? Rebbi Joḥanan said, because he insulted Jeroboam in public. That is what is written: “You are a great multitude and with you are the golden calves that Jeroboam made for you as gods.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, because he denigrated his teacher Aḥijah from Shiloh. That is what is written: “And men, rascals, joined him,” that he called Aḥijah from Shiloh a rascal. But the rabbis say, because an idol fell into his hand and he did not destroy it, that is what is written: “Abijah pursued Jeroboam and took from him cities, Beth El and its dependencies …” and it is written: “He set up one in Beth El and one he dedicated in Dan.”

They answered on the words of Rebbi Yose ben Jehudah: If so, there is no end to it. If he is believed, he declares his jealousy (before two) [by himself], brings witnesses that she was in a secluded place and disables her from receiving the ketubah. Rebbi Yose said, what business did she have in a secluded place? But it refers to the statement in the Mishnah. Is he believed to declare formally his jealousy and then say that she was in a secluded place and disable her from receiving her ketubah? Rebbi Mana said, even for that other Tanna it is [a] valid [objection], following him who says that he may declare his jealousy in respect to her father or her son. Is he believed to declare his jealousy with respect to her father and her son, can he then bring witnesses that she was in a secluded place with them and disable her from receiving her ketubah? If you ask, what business did she have in a secluded place? The Torah permitted her to be in a secluded place, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai, it is written: “If your brother, your mother’s son, incites you, etc.,” Your daughter, in secret; your mother, in secret; a man may be alone with his mother and dwell with her, with his daughter and dwell with her, with his sister but may not dwell with her.

Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “Flour offering of, flour offering of.” Since “flour offering of” said there is of barley, here also it is of barley. Rebbi Eliezer said, it says here “milky white” and it says in Egypt “milky white”. Since “milky white” mentioned in Egypt refers to barley, here also it refers to barley. Rebbi Aqiba said, it was said to the public, bring first fruits on Passover and bring first fruits on Pentecost. If we find that from the kind a private person brings his obligatory offering the public bring their first fruits on Pentecost. From which kind does the private person bring his obligatory offering? From barley! Also the public should bring only from barley. If you say from wheat, the Two Breads would not be first fruits.

Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “Flour offering of, flour offering of.” Since “flour offering of” said there is of barley, here also it is of barley. Rebbi Eliezer said, it says here “milky white” and it says in Egypt “milky white”. Since “milky white” mentioned in Egypt refers to barley, here also it refers to barley. Rebbi Aqiba said, it was said to the public, bring first fruits on Passover and bring first fruits on Pentecost. If we find that from the kind a private person brings his obligatory offering the public bring their first fruits on Pentecost. From which kind does the private person bring his obligatory offering? From barley! Also the public should bring only from barley. If you say from wheat, the Two Breads would not be first fruits.

From where did they learn rollover of oaths? From the suspected wife: “The woman shall say, Amen, Amen”; Amen from this man, Amen from any other man. That refers to subjects he is able to make her swear about. What about subjects he is not able to make her swear about? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “Amen that I was not deviant preliminarily married and married, waiting for the levir and taken in.” Can he make her swear when she is preliminarily married or waiting for the levir? Nevertheless one rolls over.

“And if the woman was not impure but was pure,” this refers to the one who is pure, not that there came witnesses declaring her impure. “If the woman was not impure but was pure,” this refers to the one who is pure, not one whose merit suspended [punishment] for her. This follows the one who said that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who said that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Rebbi Isaac said, here we deal with one who drank and the water did not test her. It comes to tell you that the water will not test a woman who is forbidden to her house. Rebbi Yudan said, this follows the one who said that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. Why was it not recognized? Because merit suspended for her. “The man will be free of sin,” he should not worry that maybe merit suspended for her. Should I think that she also should not worry? The verse said, “but that woman shall carry her sin”. [This interpretation] follows the one who said that merit suspends and it is not recognizable.

“And if the woman was not impure but was pure,” this refers to the one who is pure, not that there came witnesses declaring her impure. “If the woman was not impure but was pure,” this refers to the one who is pure, not one whose merit suspended [punishment] for her. This follows the one who said that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who said that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Rebbi Isaac said, here we deal with one who drank and the water did not test her. It comes to tell you that the water will not test a woman who is forbidden to her house. Rebbi Yudan said, this follows the one who said that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. Why was it not recognized? Because merit suspended for her. “The man will be free of sin,” he should not worry that maybe merit suspended for her. Should I think that she also should not worry? The verse said, “but that woman shall carry her sin”. [This interpretation] follows the one who said that merit suspends and it is not recognizable.

HALAKHAH: “What is the difference between a man and a woman? A man is dishevelled and with open seams,” etc. “A man”. This refers not only to a man; from where for a woman? The verse says, “afflicted with skin disease,” whether man, or woman, or minor. If it is so, why is “a man” written? For the next theme, “a man is dishevelled and with open seams, no woman is dishevelled and with open seams.”

There, we have stated: “A she-ram, an old woman, or a sterile one neither drinks nor collects her ketubah,” as it is said: “She will be declared innocent and bear seed,” [this refers to] one able to bear seed; it excludes one who is unable to bear seed. They objected, is there not the widow [married to] the High Priest, is she not able to bear seed? There is a difference, since it is written: “He may not desecrate his seed among his people.” There, we have stated: “A bastard disables and enables to eat. How is this?” And here he says so? Rebbi Tanḥuma said, there, “she has no issue” of any kind, but here one requires enabled seed, not disabled seed. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the water only serves to permit her to her house; but about this one one tells him to divorce once she went to a secluded place.

HALAKHAH: “There would now be an argument de minore ad majus for the first testimony,” etc. Gidul bar Miniamin in the name of Rav: Anywhere they accepted the testimony of a woman parallel to that of a man, a man can contradict a woman and a woman can contradict a man. Then one should state: “A witness says that she became impure, and a woman says that she did not become impure; a woman said that she became impure and a witness said that she did not become impure.” In the House of Rebbi they stated it this way. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Neḥemiah: One follows the majority of the testimonies. How is that? Two women against one woman they considered as if there were two witnesses against one witness. What you say refers to a woman and women. But if there were a hundred women against one [male] witness, they are like one witness.

HALAKHAH: “ They are on the other side of the Jordan,” away from the Jordan. “Far away from the road towards the sun’s coming”, the place from where the sun shines. “In the Land of the Canaanite who dwells in the prairie, opposite Gilgal, near the terebinths of guidance.” That refers to Mount Gerizim and Mount Ebal among the Samaritans, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Eleazar said, this does not refer to Mount Gerizim and Mount Ebal of the Samaritans. “They are on the other side of the Jordan,” by the Jordan. “To the West, on the road to sunset,” a place where the sun goes down. “In the Land of the Canaanite,” but there is the Ḥiwwite. “Who dwells in the prairie,” but there it is in the mountains. “Opposite Gilgal,” Gilgal is nowhere there. “Near the terebinths of guidance.” The terebinths of guidance are not there. How does Rebbi Eleazar uphold “Mount Gerizim and Mount Ebal”? They made two elevations and called them Mount Gerizim and Mount Ebal. In the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah, they walked 120 mil on that day. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, they did not move at all.

There, we have stated: The leaning of the hands of the Elders and the breaking of the neck of the calf is done by three [judges]; Rebbi Jehudah says, by five. What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “The Elders shall lean,” two. No court has an even number of members; one adds another one, that makes three. What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? “They shall lean,” two; “the Elders,” two. No court has an even number of members; one adds another one, that makes five. And for the calf whose neck is broken, what is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? “Your Elders, your judges,” two. No court has an even number of members; one adds another one, that makes three. What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? “Your Elders shall go out,” two, “and your judges,” two. No court has an even number of members; one adds, that makes five. Rebbi said, the words of Rebbi Simeon are reasonable for the leaning of the hands and those of Rebbi Jehudah for the breaking of the neck. The words of Rebbi Simeon are reasonable for the leaning of the hands, for he does not refer to “they shall lean”. And those of Rebbi Jehudah for the breaking of the neck, for he does not refer to “they shall go out.” If you would say that the words of Rebbi Jehudah are reasonable for the calf whose neck is broken because he refers to both to “they shall lean” and “they shall go out,” it turns out that you have to say “there shall go out” two, “your Elders” two, “and your judges,” two. No court has an even number of members; one adds another one, that makes seven. How do the rabbis explain “your Elders and your judges”? Your Elders who are your judges. It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says “your Elders,” that is the High Court; “and your judges” these are king and High Priest.

HALAKHAH: Gidul bar Benjamin in the name of Rav: Anywhere they accepted the testimony of a woman parallel to that of a man, a man can contradict a woman and a woman can contradict a man. One should state: “A witness says that he saw the murderer, and a woman says that she did not see; a woman said that he saw and a witness said that he did not see,” as it was stated in the name of Rebbi Neḥemiah: One follows the majority of the testimonies. How is that? Two women against one woman they considered as if there were two witnesses against one witness. What you say refers to a woman and women. But if there were a hundred women against one [male] witness, they are like one witness.

They asked Rebbi Joshua: May a person teach Greek to his son? He said to them, he may teach him at an hour that is neither day nor night as it is written (Jos. 1:8): “You shall meditate about it day and night.” If it is so, a man would be forbidden to teach a profession to his son since it is written: “You shall meditate about it day and night.” But Rebbi Ismael stated (Deut. 30:19): “Choose life!” That refers to a profession. Rebbi Abba, son of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because of informants. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person may teach Greek to his daughter since it is an ornament for her. Simeon bar Abba heard that and said: Because he wants to teach his daughters, he attaches it to Rebbi Joḥanan. It should come over me that I never heard it from Rebbi Joḥanan.

Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Crispus: An adult woman is like an open amphora. That means, not to let her lose her ketubah. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what Rebbi Ḥanina said, since Rebbi Ḥanina said: It happened that a woman was found without virginity and the case came before Rebbi. He said to her, where is it? She said, the stairs in my father’s house were high and it was rubbed off. Rebbi believed her. That means, not to let her lose her ketubah. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated there: “The ketubah sum of a virgin who is a widow, or a divorcee, or one who had received ḥalîṣah, after a preliminary marriage is 200 [zuz], and they are subject to complaints about virginity.” That means, referring to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated there: “One who eats unchaperoned at his father-in-law’s in Judea cannot go to court about virginity since he was alone with her.” That means, referring to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated: “If somebody married a woman and found her not to be a virgin. She says, I was raped after the preliminary marriage and your field was flooded, but he says, no, it was before the preliminary marriage and my acquisition was in error,” that refers to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated: “She says, I was injured by a piece of wood, but he says no, you were trampled on by a man,” that refers to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. All these cases are based on what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful.

Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Crispus: An adult woman is like an open amphora. That means, not to let her lose her ketubah. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what Rebbi Ḥanina said, since Rebbi Ḥanina said: It happened that a woman was found without virginity and the case came before Rebbi. He said to her, where is it? She said, the stairs in my father’s house were high and it was rubbed off. Rebbi believed her. That means, not to let her lose her ketubah. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated there: “The ketubah sum of a virgin who is a widow, or a divorcee, or one who had received ḥalîṣah, after a preliminary marriage is 200 [zuz], and they are subject to complaints about virginity.” That means, referring to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated there: “One who eats unchaperoned at his father-in-law’s in Judea cannot go to court about virginity since he was alone with her.” That means, referring to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated: “If somebody married a woman and found her not to be a virgin. She says, I was raped after the preliminary marriage and your field was flooded, but he says, no, it was before the preliminary marriage and my acquisition was in error,” that refers to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated: “She says, I was injured by a piece of wood, but he says no, you were trampled on by a man,” that refers to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. All these cases are based on what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful.

It was stated: A claim of non-virginity may be brought within thirty days, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, immediately. Where do we hold? If he copulated, immediately. If he did not copulate, even after a longer delay. But we must deal with the case that it was not spelled out. Rebbi Meïr said, it is credible that a man may hold himself back for thirty days. But the Sages say, a man does not hold himself back even for one day. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: According to Rebbi Meïr, would a man be believed to assert that he held himself back for thirty days in order to make the child of unknown paternity? Let us hear from the following: “If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṢah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṢah with her.” And Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s. And Rebbi Eleazar said, that refers only to her, but not to her co-wife. As you say there, she is not believed to damage her co-wife, so here, he is not believed to damage his son.

Nathan bar Hoshiah said, one speaks about an adolescent girl, the other about an adult woman. The adolescent has a fine but nobody is flogged for her; for the adult he is flogged but pays no fine, she cannot be sold; she has no claim for shame and blemish. The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it that she seduced him or remitted [the fine] for him. Nathan bar Hoshaiah thinks that in a case of flogging and payment he pays but is not flogged. Why should he not be flogged and have to pay? (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” You sentence him for one offence but you may not sentence him for two offences. From perjured witnesses. Just as you say there, perjured witnesses pay but are not flogged, here also he pays and is not flogged. Rebbi Jonah said, the reason of Rebbi Nathan bar Hoshaiah: (Deut. 25:2): “For his evil deed.” It refers to one whose flogging frees him from his guilt, excluding one who is told: get up and pay.

According to Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what is between these Tannaïm and those rabbis? Prohibitions without extirpation. Rebbi Judan said, he who sleeps with a bastard girl is between them. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, he who puts fire to the grain stack of his neighbor on a holiday is between them. These Tannaïm think, since there is no extirpation, he pays. Those rabbis think, since there is flogging he does not pay. But then “these are the adolescent girls who can claim a fine” cannot follow the rabbis! Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it according to everybody if it refers to a bastard male who sleeps with a bastard girl.

From where comes this? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “You shall give them as inheritance to your sons to inherit property,” those to your sons and not your daughters to your sons; the verse speaks about the fine. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: They have no right to the fines of the daughter nor to payments for seduction or injuries. When does the fine become due? Rebbi Jonah said, from the first moment; Rebbi Yose said, at the end. Rebbi Yose objected to Rebbi Jonah: Since you say, from the first moment, did we not state: “If there were court proceedings during her father’s lifetime, [the payments] are the father’s; after the father’s death they are the brothers’”? He said to him, that refers to what Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated, “He shall give to the girl; he shall give to the girl’s father.” Rebbi Jonah objected to Rebbi Yose. In your opinion, since you say, at the end, did we not state: “If there were court proceedings before she became an adult, they are the father’s; after she became an adult they belong to herself.” Does an adult have a claim to a fine? He said to him, that refers to what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, as Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “Because he mistreated her,” that includes if she was an adolescent and became an adult. Does it turn out that this disagreement parallels another disagreement, as we have stated there: “If he stole from his father, slaughtered or sold, and afterwards [his father] died, …, he pays fourfold or fivefold”? Rebbi Yose objected to Rebbi Ḥaggai: In your opinion, since you say that it depends on the court proceedings, should one not state: If he stole from his father, slaughtered or sold during his father’s lifetime but did not appear in court until after his father’s death, he pays twofold? But it says fourfold or fivefold! But here, everybody agrees that they belong to herself. The only problem is whether he has to pay to her or to her father.

From where comes this? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “You shall give them as inheritance to your sons to inherit property,” those to your sons and not your daughters to your sons; the verse speaks about the fine. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: They have no right to the fines of the daughter nor to payments for seduction or injuries. When does the fine become due? Rebbi Jonah said, from the first moment; Rebbi Yose said, at the end. Rebbi Yose objected to Rebbi Jonah: Since you say, from the first moment, did we not state: “If there were court proceedings during her father’s lifetime, [the payments] are the father’s; after the father’s death they are the brothers’”? He said to him, that refers to what Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated, “He shall give to the girl; he shall give to the girl’s father.” Rebbi Jonah objected to Rebbi Yose. In your opinion, since you say, at the end, did we not state: “If there were court proceedings before she became an adult, they are the father’s; after she became an adult they belong to herself.” Does an adult have a claim to a fine? He said to him, that refers to what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, as Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “Because he mistreated her,” that includes if she was an adolescent and became an adult. Does it turn out that this disagreement parallels another disagreement, as we have stated there: “If he stole from his father, slaughtered or sold, and afterwards [his father] died, …, he pays fourfold or fivefold”? Rebbi Yose objected to Rebbi Ḥaggai: In your opinion, since you say that it depends on the court proceedings, should one not state: If he stole from his father, slaughtered or sold during his father’s lifetime but did not appear in court until after his father’s death, he pays twofold? But it says fourfold or fivefold! But here, everybody agrees that they belong to herself. The only problem is whether he has to pay to her or to her father.

”The period mentioned in the Torah.” Some Tannaïm state: שְׁאֵר that is intercourse; עוֹנָה that is food. Some Tannaïm state: עוֹנָה that is intercourse; שְׁאֵר that is food. He who said שְׁאֵר is intercourse: “No person to the שְׁאֵר of his flesh;” עוֹנָה is food: “He fed you and made you hunger”. He who said שְׁאֵר is food: “He let rain on them שְׁאֵר like dust”; עוֹנָה that is intercourse, “that you should not deprive my daughters,” that refers to intercourse. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob explains the verse, “her flesh her garment”, that her garment should fit her flesh, that he should not give a young woman clothes of an old woman nor an old woman clothes of a young one. “Her garment her season”, that he should not give summer clothing for the rainy season nor that for the rainy season in summer. From where does he get food? Since he is not permitted to withhold from her things that are not necessities of life, not so much more things that are necessities of life! From where does he get the obligation of periodic intercourse? Since he may not withhold from her things which do not constitute the main reason for marriage, so certainly he may not withhold the things which constitute the main reason for marriage!

HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two women,” etc. The Mishnah refers to ketubah, but for sustenance both are equal. Between ketubah and burial, what has precedence? Between ketubah and a loan attested to by witnesses, what has precedence? Between ketubah and daughters’ dowry, what has precedence? For him who says, one collects for dowry from mortgaged property, daughters’ dowry has precedence. But for him who says, one does not collect for dowry from mortgaged property, daughters’ dowry does not have precedence.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody was married to two women,” etc. That refers to what Rebbi Immi said, that a man should be induced to give generously to his daughter. If that is so, then even if there is no excess denar? Rebbi Abun said, in case you can uphold their words with the words of the Torah, you uphold their words with the words of the Torah. But in case you cannot uphold their words with the words of the Torah, you disregard their words and uphold the words of the Torah.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Just as a man is concerned about his widow’s honor so he has to be concerned about his divorcee’s honor, as Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, “do not hide yourself from your flesh”, that refers to one’s divorcee. Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s wife did mistreat him badly. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah went to him and told him, rabbi, send her away, for she does not treat you with the honor due to you. He said to him, her ketubah is too large for me. He said to him, I shall give you the ketubah and send her away. He gave him the ketubah and he divorced her. She went and married the city treasurer. That one lost his property and became blind. She took him around the town and led him. Once they went around the entire town and nobody gave him anything. He said to her, is there not another neighborhood? She said to him, there is the neighborhood of my divorcer; it is beyond my powers to bring you there. He started hitting her. Rebbi Yose the Galilean passed by and heard them demeaning one another in public. He took them, brought them to one of his houses, and provided them with food all the days of their lives, because “do not hide yourself from your flesh”, that refers to one’s divorcee. Nevertheless they quarelled loudly in the night and her voice was heard saying, the pain she suffered outside her body was easier to bear than that inside her body.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Just as a man is concerned about his widow’s honor so he has to be concerned about his divorcee’s honor, as Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, “do not hide yourself from your flesh”, that refers to one’s divorcee. Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s wife did mistreat him badly. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah went to him and told him, rabbi, send her away, for she does not treat you with the honor due to you. He said to him, her ketubah is too large for me. He said to him, I shall give you the ketubah and send her away. He gave him the ketubah and he divorced her. She went and married the city treasurer. That one lost his property and became blind. She took him around the town and led him. Once they went around the entire town and nobody gave him anything. He said to her, is there not another neighborhood? She said to him, there is the neighborhood of my divorcer; it is beyond my powers to bring you there. He started hitting her. Rebbi Yose the Galilean passed by and heard them demeaning one another in public. He took them, brought them to one of his houses, and provided them with food all the days of their lives, because “do not hide yourself from your flesh”, that refers to one’s divorcee. Nevertheless they quarelled loudly in the night and her voice was heard saying, the pain she suffered outside her body was easier to bear than that inside her body.

There, we have stated: “He heals him in the sense of personal healing but not in the sense of financial healing.” Rebbi Judan and Rebbi Yose. One of them said, here if the vow refers to his body, there if the vow refers to his property. But the other said, here if he has somebody else who can heal him, there if there is nobody else who can heal him. If he has somebody else who can heal him, he should not be able to heal him personally! Not by everybody is a person successfully healed.

There, we have stated: “He heals him in the sense of personal healing but not in the sense of financial healing.” Rebbi Judan and Rebbi Yose. One of them said, here if the vow refers to his body, there if the vow refers to his property. But the other said, here if he has somebody else who can heal him, there if there is nobody else who can heal him. If he has somebody else who can heal him, he should not be able to heal him personally! Not by everybody is a person successfully healed.

Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free. And why did we state: “Rabban Gamliel obligates him”? This comes to tell you the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he obligates people. Rebbi Abbahu [supported] that of Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, the Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is obligated. Rav followed Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went with another to court before Rav. He started claiming from him barley, wheat and spelt. Rav told him, charge him with anything you have to charge, and in the end he will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free, did we not state “if he sued him for vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? If he is obligated for vessels about vessels, not so much more vessels for real estate? What does he do with it? He explains it, to transfer an oath to him. But did we not state: If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil, and the defendant admits [that he owes him] vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for oil and he admitted vessels, everybody agrees that what he admitted does not refer to the claim, for Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna said in the name of Rav: The Mishnah deals with the case that he sued for vessels full of oil; the ones are full, the others empty. One understands vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abun formulates it as oil bucket. Can one not ask him in the end? If he lost his speech.

HALAKHAH: “There are three districts for marriage, Judea, Transjordan, and Galilee.,” etc. The Mishnah refers to the case that he was from Judea and married a woman in Galilee, or from Galilee and married a woman in Judea. But if he was from Judea and married in Judea, or from Galilee and married in Galilee, one forces her to move. ”‘I, x, am from Judea and married a woman in Judea,’ one forces her to move, ‘in Galilee’ one does not force her to move. ‘I, X, am from Galilee and married a woman in Galilee,’ one forces her to move, ‘in Judea’ one does not force her to move. One moves from a mostly Gentile village to a totally Jewish village but not from a totally Jewish village to a mostly Gentile village.”

‘My going [is forbidden] to you, my speech [is forbidden] to you,’ he said nothing. Why? Because he referred the vow to something immaterial. “Vow, vow”. Just as “vow” which was said there refers to something (im-)material, so “vow” said here refers to something (im)material. ‘My eye [is forbidden] to see for you, my ear [is forbidden] to hear you,’ he is forbidden. You say, ‘my hand [is forbidden] to work with you,’ he is forbidden. If he ploughed with him on the ground, what is forbidden to him? Up to the amount of his wages or any improvement of the ground? If he fenced in an oven with him, what is forbidden to him? Up to the amount of his wages or any improvement of the oven?

‘My going [is forbidden] to you, my speech [is forbidden] to you,’ he said nothing. Why? Because he referred the vow to something immaterial. “Vow, vow”. Just as “vow” which was said there refers to something (im-)material, so “vow” said here refers to something (im)material. ‘My eye [is forbidden] to see for you, my ear [is forbidden] to hear you,’ he is forbidden. You say, ‘my hand [is forbidden] to work with you,’ he is forbidden. If he ploughed with him on the ground, what is forbidden to him? Up to the amount of his wages or any improvement of the ground? If he fenced in an oven with him, what is forbidden to him? Up to the amount of his wages or any improvement of the oven?

Ḥizqiah said, if he redeemed them they revert to their sanctity. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he redeemed them they are redeemed. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “These have no redemption.” He explains thus: After they have been cut they do not need redemption. Rebbi Yose said, what Ḥizqiah said refers to the case that he himself redeemed them. But if another person redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them. The argument of Rebbi Yose is switched: There, he says that if [another] redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them, but here, he says that if she was married to another man the qiddušin [of the first] were not removed! All that is questionable for him is if he gave her two peruṭot, one for the moment and one for after he has divorced her, what is the situation?

There, we have stated: “He heals him in the sense of personal healing but not in the sense of financial healing.” Rebbi Judan and Rebbi Yose. One of them said, here if the vow refers to his body, there if the vow refers to his property. But the other one said, here if he has somebody else who can heal him, there if there is nobody else who can heal him. If he has somebody else who can heal him, he should not be able to heal him personally! Not by everybody is a person successfully healed.

There, we have stated: “He heals him in the sense of personal healing but not in the sense of financial healing.” Rebbi Judan and Rebbi Yose. One of them said, here if the vow refers to his body, there if the vow refers to his property. But the other one said, here if he has somebody else who can heal him, there if there is nobody else who can heal him. If he has somebody else who can heal him, he should not be able to heal him personally! Not by everybody is a person successfully healed.

MISHNAH: One who made a vow to abstain from garments is permitted sack-cloth, carpets, and goat’s hair cloth. If he said, a qônām that wool shall not come onto me, he is permitted to cover himself with shorn wool; that linen should not come upon me, he is permitted to cover himself with linen fibers. Rebbi Jehudah says, everything refers to the vow. If he was carrying and sweating and smelling badly, when he said, a qônām that no wool or flax should be on me, he is permitted to wear but forbidden to carry on his back.

HALAKHAH: “If they were importuning him to marry his sister’s daughter,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, this is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “everything refers to the vow.” “And similarly, a man who was about to divorce his wife.” Rebbi Yose said, this is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “everything refers to the vow.”

HALAKHAH: “If they were importuning him to marry his sister’s daughter,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, this is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “everything refers to the vow.” “And similarly, a man who was about to divorce his wife.” Rebbi Yose said, this is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “everything refers to the vow.”

HALAKHAH: “An adolescent girl,” etc. It is written, “if she should be a man’s”. What are we speaking about? If a married one, it already is written “if she vowed in her husband’s house”. If about an unmarried one, it already is written “if she vows a vow to the Eternal”. Why does the verse say, ““if she should be a man’s with her vows on her”? That refers to the preliminarily married adolescent girl whose vows are dissolved by father and husband. So far for vows which she vowed after she was prelinimarily married. Vows which she vowed before she was prelinimarily married? “With her vows on her,” to include the vows which come with her from her father’s house.

HALAKHAH: “The vow of a widow or a divorcee,” etc. This refers to what Rebbi Ismael says, the vow decides; Rebbi Aqiba says, prohibition decides. If vow and prohibition came together? How is that? She said, I shall be a nazir in 30 days. Her husband heard it and did not dissolve. He divorced her and remarried her within the 30 days. Is that when vow and prohibition come together?

“Or I shall be beautiful”. Where do we hold? If he said “beautiful”, is that not the previous case? When he grabs his hair, is that not what we have stated: “I shall be like this one”, following Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina who holds that “I shall be like this one” refers to the case that he is grabbing his hair. But we must hold that he says, “there is nothing more beautiful than this”.

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.

“My mouth [shall be nazir] from wine, my head from shaving, my hand from impurity, my foot from impurity; my head shall be nazir; my liver shall be nezirah,” he is a nazir. “My walking shall be nazir; my talking shall be nazir”; he did not say anything. Why? Because he referred the vow to something on which life depends. “Vow, vow.” Just as “vow” mentioned there refers to something on which life depends, so “vow” mentioned here refers to something on which life depends.

“My mouth [shall be nazir] from wine, my head from shaving, my hand from impurity, my foot from impurity; my head shall be nazir; my liver shall be nezirah,” he is a nazir. “My walking shall be nazir; my talking shall be nazir”; he did not say anything. Why? Because he referred the vow to something on which life depends. “Vow, vow.” Just as “vow” mentioned there refers to something on which life depends, so “vow” mentioned here refers to something on which life depends.

HALAKHAH: “A man can declare his son a nazir,” etc. “A man”. This refers not only to a man; from where for a woman? The verse says, “afflicted with skin disease,” whether man, woman, or minor. If it is so, why is “a man” written? For the next theme, “a man is dishevelled and has open seams, no woman is dishevelled and has open seams.”

“With his lips but not in his mind.” I could think that I exclude him who decides in his mind; the verse says (Lev. 5:4): “To articulate”. But Samuel said, he who decides in his mind is not obligated until he pronounces with his lips. But did we not state: “(Ex. 35:5) Everyone who volunteers in his mind,” that is he who decides in his mind. You say, that is he who decides in his mind, but maybe that is he who pronounces with his lips? When he says (Deut. 23:24): “What comes out from your lips you have to keep,” that speaks about him who pronounces with his lips. Therefore, how can I confirm “every one who volunteers in his mind?” That is he who decides in his mind. What Samuel said refers to a sacrifice.

Rebbi Mana said, lighting fire was mentioned unnecessarily; prostrating oneself was mentioned by necessity to explain about itself since it is not work. This follows what Ḥizqiah stated: “He who sacrifices to powers shall be banned.” Sacrificing was mentioned separately to teach about everything, prostrating oneself to explain about itself since it is not work. Rebbi Jeremiah said, lighting fire was mentioned by necessity, to teach that courts should not sit on the Sabbath. What is the reason? It says here, “in all your settlements” and it says there, “these should be rules of law for your generations, in all your settlements.” Since “settlements” mentioned there refers to courts, “settlements” referred to here also refers to courts. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, even if you say that it was mentioned by necessity, it is as if it were mentioned unnecessarily, and anything mentioned unnecessarily teaches.

Rebbi Mana said, lighting fire was mentioned unnecessarily; prostrating oneself was mentioned by necessity to explain about itself since it is not work. This follows what Ḥizqiah stated: “He who sacrifices to powers shall be banned.” Sacrificing was mentioned separately to teach about everything, prostrating oneself to explain about itself since it is not work. Rebbi Jeremiah said, lighting fire was mentioned by necessity, to teach that courts should not sit on the Sabbath. What is the reason? It says here, “in all your settlements” and it says there, “these should be rules of law for your generations, in all your settlements.” Since “settlements” mentioned there refers to courts, “settlements” referred to here also refers to courts. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, even if you say that it was mentioned by necessity, it is as if it were mentioned unnecessarily, and anything mentioned unnecessarily teaches.

HALAKHAH: “An unspecified nezirut is thirty days,” etc. It is written: “A shaving knife shall not pass over his head;” therefore, if it did pass, he is guilty. “His head’s hair grows wildly;” how much means growing hair? 30 days. {That refers to an impure nazir. A pure nazir? “He has to shave his head on the day be becomes pure.” Why does the verse say: “On the seventh day he shall shave all his hair”? That shows that he shaves a second time.} “He shaves,” all, not in part. From here that if he left two hairs, he [did] nothing. “A shaving knife shall not pass over his head.” Not only a shaving knife, from where to treat a cropper and scissors like a shaving knife? The verse says, “shall not pass over his head.” That means not only a shaving knife; all methods of removal are understood. From here that he starts again only for a [shaving knife].

May a (person) [Cohen] defile himself in honor of the public? It is stated: When there are two acceptable roads, one long and pure, the other one short and impure: If the public was walking on the long one, he goes on the long one; otherwise, he goes on the short one in honor of the public. That refers to impurity by their words; also for impurity that is from the words of the Torah? From what Rebbi Zeïra said, so great is the honor of the public that it temporarily pushes aside a prohibition, that means even impurity that is from the words of the Torah.

“In truth;” Rebbi Eliezer said that every place where they stated “in truth,” refers to practice going back to Moses on Mount Sinai.

Rebbi Illa said: He himself, who touched the corpse, is guilty. He said it and gave its reason: “who became impure,” that refers to the impurity of a human. But is there not a third? As Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, for impurity of a person from a person a man is guilty for impurity in the Sanctuary. They objected: If objects touch the corpse, a human the objects, and objects the human. For impurity of a person from a person, not for impurity of a person from objects. Rebbi Zeriqa in the name of Rav Hamnuna: The Tanna there disagrees with Rebbi Illa: “For an object made half of cement־earth and half of dung one is not guilty for coming to the Sanctuary” Because it is half of earth and half of dung; but if it were totally of earth, one would be guilty. Who is guilty? Not the one who touches it? Is he not the second who touches the first? Rebbi Phineas said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it if he threw it. He answered him, about him who threw it we stated: For washing his body he is subject to extirpation, for washing his garments to the forty. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yose, do we not have the Mishnah in support of that first Tanna, as is stated: “Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Joshua: For any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary, but for any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary.” For the first, for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary; for the second, for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is needed from what comes from the corpse: For a quartarius of blood or a quarter qab of bones, for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary; for half a log of blood and half a qab of bones, for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary. Rebbi Jeremiah said, we were of the opinion that they disagree about a sacrifice, but one whips even the third, even the fourth. Rebbi Yose from Sidon stated before Rebbi Jeremiah in opposition to Rebbi Jeremiah: “For any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty if entering the Sanctuary, but for any impurity caused by a corpse for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty if entering the Sanctuary.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Yannai, Rebbi Joḥanan: It is needed from what comes from the corpse: For a quartarius of blood or a quarter qab of bones, for which the nazir does not shave, one is not guilty; for half a log of blood and half a qab of bones, for which the nazir shaves, one is guilty.

HALAKHAH: “Gentiles cannot vow as nazir,” etc. Israelites can vow as nazir, Gentiles cannot vow as nazir. Since you say, “a man”, why does the verse mention “a man”? To include Gentiles, who make vows and offer voluntary gifts like Israelites! Why should one not say the same here? There is a difference, for it is written “He shall atone for him.” This refers to one to whom atonement applies. It excludes Gentiles, to whom atonement does not apply.

MISHNAH: Samuel was a nazir following the words of Rebbi Nahorai, as it is said: “A shaving knife shall not come on his head.” It is said about Samson “a shaving knife”, and it is said about Samuel “a shaving knife”. Since “a shaving knife” mentioned for Samson refers to nazir, so “a shaving knife” mentioned for Samuel refers to nazir. Rebbi Yose said, but fear is only of flesh and blood! Rebbi Nahorai answered him: Was it not said: “Samuel said, how can I go? Will not Saul hear of it and kill me?” The fear of flesh and blood already was on him.

MISHNAH: Samuel was a nazir following the words of Rebbi Nahorai, as it is said: “A shaving knife shall not come on his head.” It is said about Samson “a shaving knife”, and it is said about Samuel “a shaving knife”. Since “a shaving knife” mentioned for Samson refers to nazir, so “a shaving knife” mentioned for Samuel refers to nazir. Rebbi Yose said, but fear is only of flesh and blood! Rebbi Nahorai answered him: Was it not said: “Samuel said, how can I go? Will not Saul hear of it and kill me?” The fear of flesh and blood already was on him.

“ ‘Give this mina to X,’ then he died. If the heirs want to hinder [the delivery] they are powerless. It is unnecessary to say that it is so if he said, acquire for him, if he said, accept by my orders.” Rebbi Abba barMamal said, this baraita refers to a sick person. If he is sick, does he not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him? Rebbi Mana said, I confirmed this by what Rebbi Abba bar Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: They treated verbal instructions by a sick person as if they were written and delivered. But only if he died from that sickness, not if he recovered, he did not have to say: acquire for him, accept for him.

“ ‘Give this mina to Mr. X’ and he dies, they shall deliver it after his death”. Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: The Mishnah refers to a sick person.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce he has to leave space for the man, the woman, and the time.” He explains it, with the essential text. It is difficult for Rebbi Joḥanan: Do the Sages declare valid in case he wrote the essential text with the formulaic text? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: From its invalidity you learn its validity. If he wrote everything in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names not in her name, would that be valid? Similarly, if he wrote everything not in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names in her name, it is valid. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Jeremiah: Think of it, if it was paired? He said, so said his teacher Rebbi Ze‘ira to him: Since pairing is infrequent, even if there was pairing it is as if there was no pairing. Then it is difficult for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Even if he did not write the essential text in the formula, Rebbi Jehudah declares invalid! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ze‘ira: Rebbi Jehudah refers to something else; it follows what Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An empty space of two lines about one subject is invalid in any case.

For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.

For freshly pressed wine one can allow for up to forty days presuming that it is wine; Rebbi Jehudah says, up to a break point. You find that there is a leniency and a restriction following Rebbi Jehudah, and a leniency and a restriction following the rabbis. A leniency following Rebbi Jehudah, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed, and a restriction if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave. A leniency following the rabbis, if forty days passed without break point that he cannot give heave, and a restriction, if a break point arrived before forty days had passed that he cannot give heave. Rebbi Simon asked: If the fortieth day arrived and he did not check. He was lazy for two or three days, then he came and found it to be vinegar. Is it retroactively considered to be vinegar or only from there on to the future? What is the difference? If he had transgressed and given heave. If you say that retroactively it is considered to be vinegar, his heave is heave. From there on to the future it is not heave. If he had checked an amphora to continuously give heave from it. When he returned, he found it to be vinegar. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is wine, the last vinegar, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, I heard that from Rebbi Joshua ben Levi; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is wine, after that it is in doubt. Do they differ in the treatment of doubt? What Rebbi Joḥanan said refers to the case that he came and found it to be stale vinegar. What Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said refers to the case that he came and found it to be strong vinegar. Or their difference equals another difference, for what we have stated there: “A rusty or broken needle is pure.” It was stated: He put it down smooth, then he came and found it rusty. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The first three days it certainly is impure, the last pure, and the middle ones are in doubt. Rebbi Abbahu said, that is what Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said; Rebbi Joḥanan did not say so but the first three days it certainly is impure, after that it is in doubt. Rebbi Ila, Rebbi Abba and Rebbi Eleazar in the name of all rabbis who are frequenting the House of Study: Concerning wine and needle practice follows Rebbi Joshua ben Levi.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Guedgedah testified,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah asked before Rebbi Immi. His testimony seems reasonable for a hearing woman of sound mind, that she is divorced with or without her acquiescence. But a deaf-mute woman who has no will should not be divorced except with her acquiescence. But is it not testimony “that is an example”; does one add to a testimony? Rebbi Ḥanania is of the opinion that this refers to a hearing girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became deaf-and-dumb. Rebbi Yose is of the opinion that this refers to an underage girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became divorced.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Guedgedah testified,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah asked before Rebbi Immi. His testimony seems reasonable for a hearing woman of sound mind, that she is divorced with or without her acquiescence. But a deaf-mute woman who has no will should not be divorced except with her acquiescence. But is it not testimony “that is an example”; does one add to a testimony? Rebbi Ḥanania is of the opinion that this refers to a hearing girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became deaf-and-dumb. Rebbi Yose is of the opinion that this refers to an underage girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became divorced.

Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: That refers to divorce documents, but it does not apply to a gift. Rebbi Joḥanan adds something, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish adds something. Rebbi Joḥanan adds something. Since a find which cannot be acquired by the knowledge of another person can be acquired within four cubits, should this rule not apply a fortiori to a gift that is acquired by the knowledge of another person? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish adds something. Since a gift which could only be acquired within four cubits by the knowledge of another person, should this not a fortiori apply to a find?

Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah speaks of a roof with a parapet when it descended lower than the parapet, or one without a parapet when it descended lower than within three handbreadths of the roof, since anything within three handbreadths of the roof is as if it were part of the roof. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Abba bar Hamnuna in the name of Rav Ada bar Aḥawa: This refers to the rules of the Sabbath, where anything within three handbreadths of a partition is considered part of the partition. Rebbi Yasa said, they are not comparable, for bills of divorce are about the top, the rules of the Sabbath about the below. For bills of divorce even if it never came to rest, for the Sabbath only if it rested. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only if it descended to within the partitions. Rebbi Immi asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does the Mishnah follow Rebbi, since Rebbi considers partitions as solidly filled up? He said to him, here in the matter of bills of divorce it is everybody’s opinion. Could one not object that Rebbi said, if it is roofed? And you say, it is not roofed? What is the difference between bills of divorce and the Sabbath? Rebbi Abba said, about the Sabbath it is written: “You shall not do any work;” it may make itself automatically. But here “he shall deliver into her hand,” into her domain.

HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.

Rav Jehudah sent and asked Rebbi Eleazar: The extortionist, and the robber, and the thief? He answered, it is assumed that the owners do not deal with the dead animal. From where that the owners do not deal with the dead animal? Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, “alive, he shall pay double,” but not dead animals. That refers to theft; for robbery? Rebbi Abun said, “he shall return the robbed object which he robbed,” as it was.

From where did they learn rollover of oaths? From the suspected wife: Amen from this man, Amen from any other man. That refers to subjects he is able to make her swear about. What about subjects he is not able to make her swear about? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, let us hear from the following: “Amen that I was not deviant preliminarily married and married, waiting for the levir and taken in.” Can he make her swear when she is preliminarily married or waiting for the levir? Nevertheless one rolls over.

Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: “ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma after thirty [days].’ Even if she spent it within the thirty [days], she is preliminarily married; also Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar will agree to this.” What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was not given for preliminary marriage, while this was given from the start for preliminary marriage. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Then even if a peruṭah’s worth was not left, she should be preliminarily married! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “Be preliminarily married to me by the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meïr said that anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber, so Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says here, anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber. For he explains it to be for a loan when the lender said, buy wheat for me, but he bought barley for him. That is difficult: can one pay for a preliminary marriage with robbed money? Rebbi Yose asked: One understands that a person may invest a peruṭah to gain a denar; would he invest a peruṭah to gain a perutah? Some Tannaïm state: One may preliminarily marry with a robbed item; some Tannaïm state: One cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item. Rebbi Mana said, the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has a chance to recoup from her hand. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has no chance to remove from her hand. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner gave up hope to recover. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner did not give up hope to recover.

Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: “ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma after thirty [days].’ Even if she spent it within the thirty [days], she is preliminarily married; also Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar will agree to this.” What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was not given for preliminary marriage, while this was given from the start for preliminary marriage. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Then even if a peruṭah’s worth was not left, she should be preliminarily married! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “Be preliminarily married to me by the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meïr said that anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber, so Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says here, anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber. For he explains it to be for a loan when the lender said, buy wheat for me, but he bought barley for him. That is difficult: can one pay for a preliminary marriage with robbed money? Rebbi Yose asked: One understands that a person may invest a peruṭah to gain a denar; would he invest a peruṭah to gain a perutah? Some Tannaïm state: One may preliminarily marry with a robbed item; some Tannaïm state: One cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item. Rebbi Mana said, the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has a chance to recoup from her hand. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has no chance to remove from her hand. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner gave up hope to recover. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner did not give up hope to recover.

Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: “ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma after thirty [days].’ Even if she spent it within the thirty [days], she is preliminarily married; also Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar will agree to this.” What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was not given for preliminary marriage, while this was given from the start for preliminary marriage. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Then even if a peruṭah’s worth was not left, she should be preliminarily married! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “Be preliminarily married to me by the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meïr said that anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber, so Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says here, anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber. For he explains it to be for a loan when the lender said, buy wheat for me, but he bought barley for him. That is difficult: can one pay for a preliminary marriage with robbed money? Rebbi Yose asked: One understands that a person may invest a peruṭah to gain a denar; would he invest a peruṭah to gain a perutah? Some Tannaïm state: One may preliminarily marry with a robbed item; some Tannaïm state: One cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item. Rebbi Mana said, the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has a chance to recoup from her hand. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has no chance to remove from her hand. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner gave up hope to recover. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner did not give up hope to recover.

Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: “ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma after thirty [days].’ Even if she spent it within the thirty [days], she is preliminarily married; also Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar will agree to this.” What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was not given for preliminary marriage, while this was given from the start for preliminary marriage. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Then even if a peruṭah’s worth was not left, she should be preliminarily married! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “Be preliminarily married to me by the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meïr said that anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber, so Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says here, anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber. For he explains it to be for a loan when the lender said, buy wheat for me, but he bought barley for him. That is difficult: can one pay for a preliminary marriage with robbed money? Rebbi Yose asked: One understands that a person may invest a peruṭah to gain a denar; would he invest a peruṭah to gain a perutah? Some Tannaïm state: One may preliminarily marry with a robbed item; some Tannaïm state: One cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item. Rebbi Mana said, the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has a chance to recoup from her hand. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has no chance to remove from her hand. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner gave up hope to recover. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner did not give up hope to recover.

Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: “ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma after thirty [days].’ Even if she spent it within the thirty [days], she is preliminarily married; also Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar will agree to this.” What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was not given for preliminary marriage, while this was given from the start for preliminary marriage. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Then even if a peruṭah’s worth was not left, she should be preliminarily married! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “Be preliminarily married to me by the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meïr said that anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber, so Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says here, anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber. For he explains it to be for a loan when the lender said, buy wheat for me, but he bought barley for him. That is difficult: can one pay for a preliminary marriage with robbed money? Rebbi Yose asked: One understands that a person may invest a peruṭah to gain a denar; would he invest a peruṭah to gain a perutah? Some Tannaïm state: One may preliminarily marry with a robbed item; some Tannaïm state: One cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item. Rebbi Mana said, the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has a chance to recoup from her hand. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has no chance to remove from her hand. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner gave up hope to recover. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner did not give up hope to recover.

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The baraita if he said to her, by the deposit you are holding for me. But if he said, by everything which I deposited with you, she is not preliminarily married unless all of it is available. What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was given to be spent; this was not given to be spent. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah.” Then even if a peruṭah’ s worth was left, she should not be preliminarily married unless all of them were available! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Abun said, were we not of the opinion to say, who is the Tanna of Wawim? Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Joḥanan said: The words of Rebbi Jehudah imply comprehensive one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices. Just as he says there, comprehensive one sacrifice, in detail three sacrifices, so he says here, comprehensive one preliminary marriage, in detail three preliminary marriages.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody preliminarily marries two women with the value of a peruṭah,” etc. It was stated: “In all these cases, if they had intercourse they acquired. Rebbi Simeon [ben] Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Simeon: In all these cases, if they had intercourse they did acquire since his intercourse was predicated on the preceding preliminary marriage.” What did they acquire? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They acquired for restrictions. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: With any condition which refers to a preceding action, she is preliminarily married for restrictions. Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yudan: Who is the Tanna who stated: “Any condition which refers to a preceding action is invalid”? This does not follow Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She is preliminarily married for restrictions. How is that: “I am marrying you preliminarily by intercourse on condition that rains should fall.” If rain fell, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In matters of a preliminary marriage by a loan for restrictions, for real estate it was not acquired, for movables one does not deliver him to “Him Who exacted retribution.” If [the buyer] insists on the deal? Let us hear from the following: “You have wine to get from me, when he had no wine.” Therefore, if he had wine he would be obligated to deliver. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, if he has wine he is obligated to deliver. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac did (not) say there: You should know that Rebbi Ḥiyya instructed following Rebbi Joḥanan that a preliminary marriage by a loan is for restrictions. Rebbi Ze‘ira resented it. Why? Because they were restrictive in practice and he taught them leniency? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, they were lenient in practice and he taught them to be restrictive, that if another man came and married her preliminarily, his marriage would hold. Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ḥanan said, if there is a doubt between adultery and no adultery, decide on no adultery.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody preliminarily marries two women with the value of a peruṭah,” etc. It was stated: “In all these cases, if they had intercourse they acquired. Rebbi Simeon [ben] Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Simeon: In all these cases, if they had intercourse they did acquire since his intercourse was predicated on the preceding preliminary marriage.” What did they acquire? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They acquired for restrictions. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: With any condition which refers to a preceding action, she is preliminarily married for restrictions. Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yudan: Who is the Tanna who stated: “Any condition which refers to a preceding action is invalid”? This does not follow Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She is preliminarily married for restrictions. How is that: “I am marrying you preliminarily by intercourse on condition that rains should fall.” If rain fell, she is preliminarily married, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In matters of a preliminary marriage by a loan for restrictions, for real estate it was not acquired, for movables one does not deliver him to “Him Who exacted retribution.” If [the buyer] insists on the deal? Let us hear from the following: “You have wine to get from me, when he had no wine.” Therefore, if he had wine he would be obligated to deliver. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, if he has wine he is obligated to deliver. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac did (not) say there: You should know that Rebbi Ḥiyya instructed following Rebbi Joḥanan that a preliminary marriage by a loan is for restrictions. Rebbi Ze‘ira resented it. Why? Because they were restrictive in practice and he taught them leniency? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, they were lenient in practice and he taught them to be restrictive, that if another man came and married her preliminarily, his marriage would hold. Rebbi Yudan ben Rebbi Ḥanan said, if there is a doubt between adultery and no adultery, decide on no adultery.

“As daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen she may eat heave.” Some Tannaïm state: She may not eat heave. Rebbi Hila said, the one who says that she may eat heave refers to the case that the second man is a Cohen, but the one who says that she may not eat heave refers to the case that the second man is not a Cohen.

“As daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen she may eat heave.” Some Tannaïm state: She may not eat heave. Rebbi Hila said, the one who says that she may eat heave refers to the case that the second man is a Cohen, but the one who says that she may not eat heave refers to the case that the second man is not a Cohen.

There, it was stated: “These orchard trees shall be qorbān if they are not cut, this garment shall be qorbān if it is not burned.” And it was burned. Were they sanctified retroactively? He committed larceny. If you say that it refers to the future, he did not commit larceny.

Ḥizqiah said, if he redeemed them they revert to their sanctity. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he redeemed them they are redeemed. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “These have no redemption.” He explains thus: After they were cut they do not need redemption. Rebbi Yose said, what Ḥizqiah said refers to the case that he himself redeemed them. But if another person redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them. The argument of Rebbi Yose is switched: There, he says that if [another] redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them, but here, he says that if she was married to another man the qiddušin [of the first] were not removed! All that is questionable for him is if he gave her two peruṭot, one for the moment and one for after he divorced her; what is the situation?

“Proselytes,” meaning “everyone who separated himself from the impurities of the peoples of the earth to join them.” Freedmen, as in “and all the Gibeonites, etc.” Bastards. Rebbi Simeon said, it is written: “And the following came up from Salt Hill, Ploughing Hill”. From Salt Hill, that is Babylon. Ploughing Hill refers to silenced ones and foundlings. Kerub means the bastards; the young are those who go after their eyes; Addon, for they were saying, there is no judgment and no Master. Rebbi Ḥizqiah changed the wording: These are those who went after their eyes and said, there is no judgment and no judge. And Immer, who rebelled against God by their evil deeds. Rebbi Abbun in the name of Rebbi Phineas: They publicized themselves like the seam of a garment. Rebbi Levi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: They would have been worthy of being turned into a salt hill, but Divine justice was silent for them. Ploughing Hill.

It is written: “The King said, I shall give.” “The King took the two sons of Riṣpah bat Ayah whom she had born to Saul, Admoni and Mephiboshet,” etc. “Michal, Saul’s daughter, did not have a child until the day of her death,” and you say so? Say now that they were sons of Merab but Michal raised them, so they were named after her. “He gave them into the hand of the Gibeonites who hanged them on the mountain before the Eternal; all seven fell together.” Defective without י. That refers to Mephiboshet ben Jonathan ben Saul, who was great in the Torah and David intended to save him from their hand. David said, I let them pass by the altar and anyone received by the altar will be mine. He let each pass by the altar, prayed for him, and the altar moved and received him. This is what is written: “I shall call to the Most High God, to the Power Who has the ultimate decision about me!” For the Holy One, praise to Him, agreed with David. “ They were killed on the first days of harvest;” it is written “the barley harvest.” “Riṣpah bat Ayah took a sack and laid it out on the rock.” What means: “On the rock”? Rebbi Hoshaia said, she was reciting: “The rock, perfect is His action.” Rebbi Abba bar Zamina in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Sanctification of the Name is greater than desecration of the Name. Referring to desecration of the Name it is written: “Do not leave his corpse on the gallows overnight.” But referring to sanctification of the Name it is written: “From the start of harvest until water was poured on them.” This teaches that they were hanging from the sixteenth of Nisan to the seventeenth of Marḥeshwan. The passers-by were saying: How did these people sin that the rules of justice were changed for them? They were answered: Because these had attacked attached proselytes. They would say that even for those who did not convert for the sake of Heaven, the Eternal avenged their blood; if one would convert for the sake of Heaven not so much more? There is no Power like your God and no people like your people. Many converts were converted at that time; that is what is written: “Solomon counted all proselytes and appointed from them 70’000 carriers and 80’000 hewers of stone in the mountains.”

Rebbi Ḥanina said, the Mishnah does not follow Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said that four congregations are called “congregation”, the congregation of Cohanim, the congregation of Levites, the congregation of Israelites, the congregation of converts. They objected to Rebbi Jehudah, but is it not written, “one injured in his testicles or with amputated urethra should not come into the Eternal’s congregation”? That refers to bodily blemishes. But is it not written, “children that will be born to them in the third generation may enter the Eternal’s congregation”? That is a positive commandment. But the rabbis said, there are three congregations, the congregation of Cohanim, the congregation of Levites, the congregation of Israelites; “they shall not come, they shall not come, they shall not come.”

There, we have stated: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-months’ child of the first [brother] or a seven-months’ of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for a possible sin.” It was stated: “The first son could be [High] Priest, any second son possibly is a bastard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob said, there is no such thing as a possible bastard.” Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees in cases of doubt of Samaritans and desecrated persons. This refers to what we have stated there: “Ten classes returned from Babylonia.” In the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, eight. In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, nine. In the opinion of the rabbis, ten.

HALAKHAH: “One does not investigate from the altar and before,” etc. It is written: “You certainly shall put a king over you.” This refers not only to a king; from where to add public officials, administrators of welfare, clerks of the court, and those who whip with a lash; from where? The verse says, “from amidst your brothers you shall appoint a king over you,” anybody whom you appoint over you shall only be from the select among your brethren. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: “Their distinguished lineage in the army in war.” The merit of their lineage supports them in war. So far from tradition; from the words of the Torah? “No bastard shall come into the Eternal’s congregation.” “No person injured in his testicles shall come, etc.” What is written afterwards? “When you encamp against your enemies, etc.”

We have stated: “Four main categories of damages.” But Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thirteen: Damages, suffering, medical costs, loss of earning power, shame; the unpaid trustee, and the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Say now, what we stated [refers to] responsibility for damages. What Rebbi Ḥiyya stated [refers to] both responsibility for damages and bodily injury. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: How can we state “four main categories”? If everything was said about one bull; let us state “three,” if it was said about three bulls, let us state “five”! But as it is presented in the verse, thus it is presented in the Mishnah.

We have stated: “Four main categories of damages.” But Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thirteen: Damages, suffering, medical costs, loss of earning power, shame; the unpaid trustee, and the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Say now, what we stated [refers to] responsibility for damages. What Rebbi Ḥiyya stated [refers to] both responsibility for damages and bodily injury. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: How can we state “four main categories”? If everything was said about one bull; let us state “three,” if it was said about three bulls, let us state “five”! But as it is presented in the verse, thus it is presented in the Mishnah.

Rav Jehudah sent and asked Rebbi Eleazar: Does one estimate for the extortionist, the thief, and the robber? He anwered him: one estimates neither for the thief nor for the robber. From where that one does not estimate for them? Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, “alive, he shall pay double;” alive, not dead. That refers to theft; from where for robbery? Rebbi Abin said, “he shall return the robbed object in the state in which he robbed it.”

HALAKHAH: “Anything I am obligated to watch I did set up for damage claims,” etc. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: This refers to cattle and pit. But he did not state “fire”. Rebbi Jeremiah said, the fire set up for damage claims? Rebbi Yose said, if the fire were [more than] damage claims, should he not accept warning according to this opinion and be whipped? How is this? The fire in setting up for damage claims he accepts [responsibility] for damages, suffering, medical costs, loss of earning power, shame.

HALAKHAH: “How is the tooth notorious,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it refers to the first part. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it refers to all. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted. There, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is responsible. And here, he says so? They said, there in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia; but here, in his own name. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, is it free [from payment]. Rebbi Joḥanan’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is obligated. Not only if the walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down or one which is lying down kicks the walking one. If a walking [animal] kicks a walking one? Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is free [from payment]. But in the case of one lying down against one walking or one who was walking against one walking, it is obligated. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: It always is free. What is Rebbi Hoshaia’s reason; is there no “horn” in the public domain? Rav said, if it stood still and ate from heaped produce, [it is obligated]. Since the leniency for “tooth” is in case it ate walking from the standing; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the one standing still. Ilfai said: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is obligated. Since the leniency for “tooth” is that it ate walking {from the standing} [from the walking]; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the walking one.

HALAKHAH: “How is the tooth notorious,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it refers to the first part. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it refers to all. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted. There, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is responsible. And here, he says so? They said, there in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia; but here, in his own name. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, is it free [from payment]. Rebbi Joḥanan’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is obligated. Not only if the walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down or one which is lying down kicks the walking one. If a walking [animal] kicks a walking one? Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is free [from payment]. But in the case of one lying down against one walking or one who was walking against one walking, it is obligated. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: It always is free. What is Rebbi Hoshaia’s reason; is there no “horn” in the public domain? Rav said, if it stood still and ate from heaped produce, [it is obligated]. Since the leniency for “tooth” is in case it ate walking from the standing; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the one standing still. Ilfai said: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is obligated. Since the leniency for “tooth” is that it ate walking {from the standing} [from the walking]; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the walking one.

Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.

It is written: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” At another place, He says: “Do not be softhearted.” One refers to inadvertent acts, the other to intentional ones. He could mention the inadvertent but not mention the intentional. But if the inadvertent had been mentioned but not the intentional, I would have said that for the inadvertent act he shall pay money, for the intentional [have his hand cut off. Therefore it was necessary to mention the intentional. Or if the intentional had been mentioned but not the inadvertent, I would have said that for the intentional act he shall pay money, for the inadvertent] he should not pay at all. Therefore it was necessary to mention both inadvertent and intentional. And if he blinded a blind man or cut off the arm of an amputee, how could one fulfill: “Do to him as he intended to do to his brother”? This indicates that he only pays money.