rights

MISHNAH: Brothers sharing property who were eating at their father’s table but sleeping in their own houses need an eruv for each of them. Therefore if one of them forgot and did not make an eruv he is deemed to have ceded his rights. When? If they all bring their eruvin to one place but if the eruv came to them, or there were no other dwellers with them, they do not need an eruv.

HALAKHAH: Paragraph. “Brothers sharing property who were eating at their father’s table,” etc. Where is the main dwelling? Rebbi Jonah said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said, at the place of their bread, but the other said, at the place of sleeping. We did not know who said what but since Samuel said, higher than ten [hand-breadths] is rabbinically forbidden, he must say, at the place of their bread. The Mishnah disagrees with Samuel, “Brothers who were eating”. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: The Mishnah is if they are sustained by their father. In any case, are they not partners in what they are eating? Rebbi Abba said, Rebbi Samuel explained to me that their father gives them property rights only for what they are eating. Then even if the eruv does not come to them? They treated it as a house where they deposited the eruv. Samuel said, he and his sons and the people of his house make an eruv with one loaf. Does he disagree? There he says, at the place of their bread, and here he says so? He explains it if two persons were partners in it. This is similar to what Rebbi Aḥawa bar Rebbi Ze`ira said, one may make an eruv with half a loaf. But we have stated: “Even if it was baked from a se’ah and was sliced one may not use it for eruv”, and you are saying so? He explains it if two persons were partners in it.

“If the courtyards made eruvin but did not participate in the alley.” The Mishnah is Rebbi Meïr’s since Rebbi Meïr said, by an eruv and by participation. Everybody follows Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Ze`ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even about the reading of the Esther scroll everybody follows Rebbi Meïr. In matters of eruvin and public fast-days everybody follows Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name Rebbi Joḥanan and in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Even though Rebbi Meïr says that he may cede rights he agrees that if one of them forgot and did not contribute to the eruv, that he may rely on his participation. Who holds “by an eruv and by participation,” not Rebbi Meïr? Since Rebbi Meïr said, by an eruv and by participation. He told him, why do you make us forget the practices of eruvin? Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ila; it should be like one of them. For one of them said, maybe he comes to a courtyard which does not need participation. Which is a courtyard which does not need participation? That is the customary courtyard. He sees them preparing an eruv but not participating. Then he will infer to say that maybe an eruv is valid without participation? But no eruv is valid without participation. And the other one will say, maybe he comes to a courtyard which already participated. He sees them preparing an eruv but not participating. Then he will neither make an eruv nor participate.

Rebbi Yasa said, when I still was there I heard the voice of Rav Jehudah asking Samuel, if somebody put aside his šeqel and died? He told him, it should be used for voluntary gifts. The excess of his tenth of an epha, Rebbi Joḥanan said, he should bring it to the Dead Sea; Rebbi Eleazar said, it should be used for voluntary gifts. They asked before him: May one cede rights from courtyard to courtyard? He told them, one may cede rights from courtyard to courtyard.

Rebbi Yasa said, when I still was there I heard the voice of Rav Jehudah asking Samuel, if somebody put aside his šeqel and died? He told him, it should be used for voluntary gifts. The excess of his tenth of an epha, Rebbi Joḥanan said, he should bring it to the Dead Sea; Rebbi Eleazar said, it should be used for voluntary gifts. They asked before him: May one cede rights from courtyard to courtyard? He told them, one may cede rights from courtyard to courtyard.

It was stated: “A straw heap between two courtyards. Each one opens his door and feeds. If the straw was less than ten hand-breadths, both are forbidden until they make an eruv. Therefore if one of them wants to block his door and cede his rights, he is forbidden but his neighbor is permitted.” (And so it is with a cistern) [A ditch] between two courtyards. This implies that one may not cede from courtyard to courtyard. This implies, even if they did not make an eruv. This implies, even if they did not intend to. This implies that two domains may not use one domain. This implies, if each of them uses his door, both are forbidden. And so it is with a house between two courtyards, not following Rebbi Meïr, who said that a locked house is forbidden.

MISHNAH: How may one participate in an alley? One puts down an amphora and says, this shall be for all dwellers in the alley, and transfers rights through his adult son or daughter or his male or female Hebrew slave or through his wife. But he cannot transfer rights through his minor son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave because their hand is like his own.

MISHNAH: How may one participate in an alley? One puts down an amphora and says, this shall be for all dwellers in the alley, and transfers rights through his adult son or daughter or his male or female Hebrew slave or through his wife. But he cannot transfer rights through his minor son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave because their hand is like his own.

HALAKHAH: Paragraph. It was stated: He cannot transfer rights to the amphora which he has in the cellar. Rav Hoshaia said, lest he forget and drink from it.

Where do we hold? If she is an adult, she becomes free by the signs [of puberty]. If she is underage, may an underage person transfer rights? Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it following him who said that a minor may give heave. He answered him, but even according to him who says that a minor cannot give heave, the minor can acquire rights. This is acceptable following the opinion of the rabbis there. There, they are saying in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: One to whom one gives a nut and he throws it away, a pebble and he keeps it, what one finds in his hand is as if found on a garbage heap; a nut and he keeps it, a pebble and he throws it away, what one robs from him is robbery because of the ways of peace; a nut or a pebble and he takes, hides them, and produces them later, what is robbed from him is total robbery. He can acquire for himself but not for others. Rav Huna said, just as he can acquire for himself so he can acquire for others. Everybody agrees that his gift is not a gift, since it is written, if a man give, a man’s gift is a gift, the gift of a minor is no gift, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Robbing from him is never clear robbery unless he grew two pubic hairs. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: That which you say is to make one pay by a law suit; but to have to bring a sacrifice for a [false] oath everybody agrees only after he grew two pubic hairs. But following to the rabbis here, Rebbi Yose asked that even for himself he should not be able to acquire since it is written to his neighbor, only if he be like his neighbor. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac: They came to it by the rules of school children as we have stated: “School children’s buying is buying and their selling is selling, for movables.” But did we not state: “But he cannot transfer rights through his minor son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave because their hand is like his hand.” The rabbis of Caesarea say, here a minor with knowledge, there a minor without knowledge.

Where do we hold? If she is an adult, she becomes free by the signs [of puberty]. If she is underage, may an underage person transfer rights? Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it following him who said that a minor may give heave. He answered him, but even according to him who says that a minor cannot give heave, the minor can acquire rights. This is acceptable following the opinion of the rabbis there. There, they are saying in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: One to whom one gives a nut and he throws it away, a pebble and he keeps it, what one finds in his hand is as if found on a garbage heap; a nut and he keeps it, a pebble and he throws it away, what one robs from him is robbery because of the ways of peace; a nut or a pebble and he takes, hides them, and produces them later, what is robbed from him is total robbery. He can acquire for himself but not for others. Rav Huna said, just as he can acquire for himself so he can acquire for others. Everybody agrees that his gift is not a gift, since it is written, if a man give, a man’s gift is a gift, the gift of a minor is no gift, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Robbing from him is never clear robbery unless he grew two pubic hairs. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: That which you say is to make one pay by a law suit; but to have to bring a sacrifice for a [false] oath everybody agrees only after he grew two pubic hairs. But following to the rabbis here, Rebbi Yose asked that even for himself he should not be able to acquire since it is written to his neighbor, only if he be like his neighbor. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac: They came to it by the rules of school children as we have stated: “School children’s buying is buying and their selling is selling, for movables.” But did we not state: “But he cannot transfer rights through his minor son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave because their hand is like his hand.” The rabbis of Caesarea say, here a minor with knowledge, there a minor without knowledge.

Where do we hold? If she is an adult, she becomes free by the signs [of puberty]. If she is underage, may an underage person transfer rights? Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom said before Rebbi Yose: Explain it following him who said that a minor may give heave. He answered him, but even according to him who says that a minor cannot give heave, the minor can acquire rights. This is acceptable following the opinion of the rabbis there. There, they are saying in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: One to whom one gives a nut and he throws it away, a pebble and he keeps it, what one finds in his hand is as if found on a garbage heap; a nut and he keeps it, a pebble and he throws it away, what one robs from him is robbery because of the ways of peace; a nut or a pebble and he takes, hides them, and produces them later, what is robbed from him is total robbery. He can acquire for himself but not for others. Rav Huna said, just as he can acquire for himself so he can acquire for others. Everybody agrees that his gift is not a gift, since it is written, if a man give, a man’s gift is a gift, the gift of a minor is no gift, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Robbing from him is never clear robbery unless he grew two pubic hairs. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: That which you say is to make one pay by a law suit; but to have to bring a sacrifice for a [false] oath everybody agrees only after he grew two pubic hairs. But following to the rabbis here, Rebbi Yose asked that even for himself he should not be able to acquire since it is written to his neighbor, only if he be like his neighbor. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac: They came to it by the rules of school children as we have stated: “School children’s buying is buying and their selling is selling, for movables.” But did we not state: “But he cannot transfer rights through his minor son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave because their hand is like his hand.” The rabbis of Caesarea say, here a minor with knowledge, there a minor without knowledge.

There, we have stated: “If somebody borrows a cow and [the lender] sent her to him through his son, his slave, or his agent, in case it died he is not liable.” Does this not say that a slave is able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Rebbi Eleazar said, explain it about a Hebrew slave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, you can even explain it for a Canaanite slave, it he told him, open the gate for her and she will go by herself, as we have stated: If he led her, drew her, called her and she followed him, he is required to pay as a borrower. Rebbi Ze`ira understood it from here: “But he cannot make them acquire through his minor son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is not like his hand.” Does this not imply that a slave is not able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Explain it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. But did we not state “his wife”? Rebbi Meïr holds that the hand of the wife is the hand of her husband! Rebbi Ḥananiah said in the name of Rebbi Phineas, explain it following the Tanna who stated: “His wife cannot redeem Second Tithe for him. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, his wife can redeem Second Tithe for him.” For that Tanna, Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master but not the hand of the wife the hand of her husband!

There, we have stated: “If somebody borrows a cow and [the lender] sent her to him through his son, his slave, or his agent, in case it died he is not liable.” Does this not say that a slave is able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Rebbi Eleazar said, explain it about a Hebrew slave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, you can even explain it for a Canaanite slave, it he told him, open the gate for her and she will go by herself, as we have stated: If he led her, drew her, called her and she followed him, he is required to pay as a borrower. Rebbi Ze`ira understood it from here: “But he cannot make them acquire through his minor son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is not like his hand.” Does this not imply that a slave is not able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Explain it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. But did we not state “his wife”? Rebbi Meïr holds that the hand of the wife is the hand of her husband! Rebbi Ḥananiah said in the name of Rebbi Phineas, explain it following the Tanna who stated: “His wife cannot redeem Second Tithe for him. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, his wife can redeem Second Tithe for him.” For that Tanna, Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master but not the hand of the wife the hand of her husband!

MISHNAH: If the food became less he adds, transfers rights, but does not have to notify. If [dwellers] are added he adds, transfers rights, and has to notify.

MISHNAH: If the food became less he adds, transfers rights, but does not have to notify. If [dwellers] are added he adds, transfers rights, and has to notify.

HALAKHAH: Paragraph. Why does he notify? By practice. Does this not imply that he does not transfers rights to the food proper? Rebbi Ḥanina said, explain it if rats dragged it away.

HALAKHAH: “How does one participate for domains,” etc. One does not state “one transfers rights.” Why does one not state “one transfers rights”? Samuel said, there we stated that “one transfers rights,” one has to transfer rights; but here, where we did not state “one transfers rights”, one does not have to transfer rights. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad maius. If there, where eruvin of courtyards are a rabbinic institution you are saying that one has to transfer rights, not so much more eruvin of domains which are words of the Torah? Rav follows Rebbi Joḥanan, (and) Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, to treat all domains equally.

HALAKHAH: “How does one participate for domains,” etc. One does not state “one transfers rights.” Why does one not state “one transfers rights”? Samuel said, there we stated that “one transfers rights,” one has to transfer rights; but here, where we did not state “one transfers rights”, one does not have to transfer rights. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad maius. If there, where eruvin of courtyards are a rabbinic institution you are saying that one has to transfer rights, not so much more eruvin of domains which are words of the Torah? Rav follows Rebbi Joḥanan, (and) Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, to treat all domains equally.

HALAKHAH: “How does one participate for domains,” etc. One does not state “one transfers rights.” Why does one not state “one transfers rights”? Samuel said, there we stated that “one transfers rights,” one has to transfer rights; but here, where we did not state “one transfers rights”, one does not have to transfer rights. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad maius. If there, where eruvin of courtyards are a rabbinic institution you are saying that one has to transfer rights, not so much more eruvin of domains which are words of the Torah? Rav follows Rebbi Joḥanan, (and) Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, to treat all domains equally.

HALAKHAH: “How does one participate for domains,” etc. One does not state “one transfers rights.” Why does one not state “one transfers rights”? Samuel said, there we stated that “one transfers rights,” one has to transfer rights; but here, where we did not state “one transfers rights”, one does not have to transfer rights. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad maius. If there, where eruvin of courtyards are a rabbinic institution you are saying that one has to transfer rights, not so much more eruvin of domains which are words of the Torah? Rav follows Rebbi Joḥanan, (and) Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, to treat all domains equally.

HALAKHAH: “How does one participate for domains,” etc. One does not state “one transfers rights.” Why does one not state “one transfers rights”? Samuel said, there we stated that “one transfers rights,” one has to transfer rights; but here, where we did not state “one transfers rights”, one does not have to transfer rights. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad maius. If there, where eruvin of courtyards are a rabbinic institution you are saying that one has to transfer rights, not so much more eruvin of domains which are words of the Torah? Rav follows Rebbi Joḥanan, (and) Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, to treat all domains equally.

HALAKHAH: “How does one participate for domains,” etc. One does not state “one transfers rights.” Why does one not state “one transfers rights”? Samuel said, there we stated that “one transfers rights,” one has to transfer rights; but here, where we did not state “one transfers rights”, one does not have to transfer rights. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad maius. If there, where eruvin of courtyards are a rabbinic institution you are saying that one has to transfer rights, not so much more eruvin of domains which are words of the Torah? Rav follows Rebbi Joḥanan, (and) Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, to treat all domains equally.

HALAKHAH: “How does one participate for domains,” etc. One does not state “one transfers rights.” Why does one not state “one transfers rights”? Samuel said, there we stated that “one transfers rights,” one has to transfer rights; but here, where we did not state “one transfers rights”, one does not have to transfer rights. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad maius. If there, where eruvin of courtyards are a rabbinic institution you are saying that one has to transfer rights, not so much more eruvin of domains which are words of the Torah? Rav follows Rebbi Joḥanan, (and) Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, to treat all domains equally.

MISHNAH: If one deposits his eruv in a porter’s lodge, a porch, or a balcony, it is no eruv and any person who might dwell there does not forbid him. In a storage room for straw, in a cowshed, in a storage room for wood, or a general storage area, it is an eruv and any person who might dwell there does forbid him. Rebbi Jehusah says, if the householder retains rights of use he does not forbid him.

There, we have stated: “A slave whom his master gave as mortgage to others and then freed him [in strict law does not owe anything, but for the public good one forces the master to formally manumit him and he writes a bond for his own value. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the one who manumits writes.] Who frees? Rav says, either his first or his second master. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only his first master alone is able to free. Rebbi Haggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita disagree with Rav? If a Jew gave a loan to a Gentile on the latter’s leavened matter, it is permitted after Passover. If you say that the Jew has property rights in it, it would be forbidden. What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Yudan said, manumission is made easy, as it was stated: If somebody gives his slave as mortgage, if he sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the manumittor writes. If somebody mortgaged his field to another, then went and sold it, can the creditor not come and foreclose? Rebbi Abbahu said, in this matter Rebbi Joḥanan opened for us a door to illuminate. We do not find that a slave can again be enslaved after having been freed. If that is so, he should not have to write a bond for his value! Rebbi Ila said, it is better that a person say to him, give me the 200 zuz which you owe me than say to him, you are my slave! The rabbis of Caesarea say in Rebbi Nasaʹs name: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meïr imposes a fine for words, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel imposes a fine for words. As it was stated: With a bond documenting both principal and interest one can collect neither principal nor interest, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, one collects the principal but not the interest.

HALAKHAH: Rav and Samuel: one says, like the feet of the depositor. The other one says, they are like the feet of him they are deposited with. The Mishnah disagrees with him who says, they are like the feet of him they are deposited with. As we have stated, “If somebody had produce in another village and the people of that village made an eruv to come to him, they should not bring him his produce” If you would say, they are like the feet of him they are deposited with, they should bring him his produce. Rebbi Yudan said, explain it if the key was in the hands of the owner, or that he did not concede his powers to them before the start of the holiday. And what says this? “If he invited guests they may not carry away their parts unless through another person he gave them the right to their parts on the eve of the holiday”. Are they not like the feet of him they are deposited with from the moment that he gave them the rights to their parts.

When does one overturn the couches? From the moment when the dead left the gate of the courtyard, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But Rebbi Joshua says, from when the cover plate was laid on the grave. And when Rabban Gamliel died, after he left the gate of the courtyard, Rebbi Eliezer said to the students: Overturn the couches. And when the cover plate was laid on the grave, Rebbi Joshua said to the students: Overturn the couches. They said to him: We already did turn them over on the orders of the old man. Friday evening he rights his couch, at the end of Sabbat he overturns them. It was stated: A dargesh is put upright and is not turned over. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, he removes its qlmnṭryn and that is enough. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: practice follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yasa, a couch whose posts are upright and removed together with it, he takes them off and that is enough.

There, we have stated: “If somebody receives [a flock] under mortmain conditions from a Gentile, the young are free, the young’s young are obligated.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked: There you say, the young are for the first, and here you say, the young are for the second! Rebbi Yosa said, there, because the property rights are with the first, the young belong to the first. But here, because the property rights are with the second, the young belong to the second.

There, we have stated: “If somebody receives [a flock] under mortmain conditions from a Gentile, the young are free, the young’s young are obligated.” Rebbi Jeremiah asked: There you say, the young are for the first, and here you say, the young are for the second! Rebbi Yosa said, there, because the property rights are with the first, the young belong to the first. But here, because the property rights are with the second, the young belong to the second.

Rav said, the main point in acquiring squatters’ rights is the bringing in of the yield. Did not Rav say, only if one saw him hoeing and weeding? Even though Rav said, only if one saw him hoeing and weeding, Rav agrees that the main point in acquiring squatters’ rights is the bringing in of the yield.

Rav said, the main point in acquiring squatters’ rights is the bringing in of the yield. Did not Rav say, only if one saw him hoeing and weeding? Even though Rav said, only if one saw him hoeing and weeding, Rav agrees that the main point in acquiring squatters’ rights is the bringing in of the yield.

If she was seen going to a secluded place by one witness in the morning and by one witness in the evening, it is to be treated like the following: “If she was together alone with him by the testimony of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him; if there was a single witness she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. With one witness in the morning and one witness in the evening, such a case happened and Rebbi Eleazar ben Thaddeus asked the Sages, who told him that this is not being together alone.” If he declared his jealousy before one witness in the morning and before one witness in the evening; since he is a man and she is a woman, his declaration is nothing. Or is it to be treated like the following: “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar [Rav] Isaac in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on her back and the other says, I saw one hair on her back, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia the son of Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. Two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement; Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.

If she was seen going to a secluded place by one witness in the morning and by one witness in the evening, it is to be treated like the following: “If she was together alone with him by the testimony of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him; if there was a single witness she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. With one witness in the morning and one witness in the evening, such a case happened and Rebbi Eleazar ben Thaddeus asked the Sages, who told him that this is not being together alone.” If he declared his jealousy before one witness in the morning and before one witness in the evening; since he is a man and she is a woman, his declaration is nothing. Or is it to be treated like the following: “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar [Rav] Isaac in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on her back and the other says, I saw one hair on her back, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia the son of Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. Two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement; Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.

Rebbi Ḥaggai said that Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: Can one witness testifying orally and one by a document be taken together? Is a single witness on a written document worth anything? Therefore, his question was, if there are two. They managed to confirm the first signature but not the second. Rebbi Mana asked, is one witness on a written document enough to force anybody to swear? Is a single witness on a written document worth anything? Therefore, his question was, if there are two. They managed to confirm the first signature but not the second. Parallel to it: One does not accept testimony from witnesses unless they had seen together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw one after the other. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac, in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa for witnesses about primogeniture and rights of possession.

Rebbi Eleazar asked: Do the daughters of the rape victim have the rights given by the ketubah stipulations? It is clear to me that the rape victim has no [ketubah] of the male children, and that the seduced victim has no [ketubah] of the male children. If you say that he questions in both cases, we could ask, do the daughters of the rape victim and the daughters of the seduced girl have the rights given by the ketubah stipulations? That is a problem following the rabbis, but it is obvious following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah; as it was stated: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, the rapist gives a mina as ketubah.

Rebbi Eleazar asked: Do the daughters of the rape victim have the rights given by the ketubah stipulations? It is clear to me that the rape victim has no [ketubah] of the male children, and that the seduced victim has no [ketubah] of the male children. If you say that he questions in both cases, we could ask, do the daughters of the rape victim and the daughters of the seduced girl have the rights given by the ketubah stipulations? That is a problem following the rabbis, but it is obvious following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah; as it was stated: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, the rapist gives a mina as ketubah.

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa says, if he speaks about somebody who is a legal heir, his statements are valid, but about somebody who is not a legal heir, his statements are invalid.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Ben Beroqa spoke only about a son among sons or a (daughter) son among daughters, not about a daughter and brother or a brother among daughters. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There was a case and Rebbi decided following Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi asked Nathan the Babylonian, why did they say that practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa? Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the reason? He asked Nathan the Babylonian, why did the Sages say that practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa? Are you not the one who stated “shall inherit”? (He said to him, you stated “shall take”; he came to him). He said to him, there is no “shall inherit” but “shall take”. When he came to his father, he said to him: you disadvantaged Nathan the Bablylonian; there is no “shall take” but “shall inherit”. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is what he told him: I made an error in what I taught you; there is no “shall take” but “shall inherit”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is one of the leniencies of the ketubah stipulations. In general, a person can transfer rights only by a document; here even verbally. In general, a person cannot transfer rights to somebody not yet existing; here to the non-existing. Rebbi Jeremiah said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: I am wondering how the rabbis can compare ketubah to inheritance, for inheritance is a biblical law but ketubah is from their words; how can one argue this? Even if you say that ketubah is a biblical law, do they not agree that the stipulations of the ketubah are from their words?

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa says, if he speaks about somebody who is a legal heir, his statements are valid, but about somebody who is not a legal heir, his statements are invalid.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Ben Beroqa spoke only about a son among sons or a (daughter) son among daughters, not about a daughter and brother or a brother among daughters. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There was a case and Rebbi decided following Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi asked Nathan the Babylonian, why did they say that practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa? Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the reason? He asked Nathan the Babylonian, why did the Sages say that practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa? Are you not the one who stated “shall inherit”? (He said to him, you stated “shall take”; he came to him). He said to him, there is no “shall inherit” but “shall take”. When he came to his father, he said to him: you disadvantaged Nathan the Bablylonian; there is no “shall take” but “shall inherit”. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is what he told him: I made an error in what I taught you; there is no “shall take” but “shall inherit”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is one of the leniencies of the ketubah stipulations. In general, a person can transfer rights only by a document; here even verbally. In general, a person cannot transfer rights to somebody not yet existing; here to the non-existing. Rebbi Jeremiah said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: I am wondering how the rabbis can compare ketubah to inheritance, for inheritance is a biblical law but ketubah is from their words; how can one argue this? Even if you say that ketubah is a biblical law, do they not agree that the stipulations of the ketubah are from their words?

““And you shall dwell in my house”. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he slept with her when she still was in her father’s house, did he then activate all ketubah stipulations or is that only by definitive marriage? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If she renounced her ketubah, what is the situation? She renounced her rights but not those of her children.

It was stated: Just as the husband decides, so the father decides; only that the husband transfers rights in writing but the father only by speech, restricted to those things that can be acquired by speech. What is that? Gidul in the name of Rav: How much are you giving to your son? Such and such. And how much are you giving to your daughter? Such and such. When he preliminarily married her, the daughter acquired among the daughters. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, Gidul found something large and said something small! But it is as follows: How much are you giving to your son? Such and such. How much are you giving to your daughter? Such and such. When he preliminarily married her, the daughter acquired among the daughters and the son among the sons. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, is that something small? Does he not acquire a wife on top of movables with one peruṭa’s worth? But nobody can acquire two wives with one peruṭa’s worth! But cannot a person acquire real estate and several movables with one peruṭa’s worth? For a person can acquire two pieces of real estate with one peruṭa’s worth, but nobody can acquire two wives with one peruṭa’s worth.

For whom is it needed? For Rebbi Meïr! Even though for Rebbi Meïr the hand of the slave is his master’s hand and if the wife acquired title the husband should have acquired it; he agrees that his rights over it are restricted to the use of the yield. There, we have stated: “The finds of his underage son and daughter or of his Canaanite slave or slave-girl as well as his wife’s find belong to him,” for he can direct them to do other work. Why do we say: “The finds of his adult son and daughter or of his Hebrew slave or slave-girl belong to them,” because he cannot direct them to do other work. But his wife he cannot direct to do other work and you say that her find belongs to him! Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is another reason for his wife. What is the other reason for his wife? Rebbi Ḥaggai says, because of quarrel. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but that she should not smuggle away any of her husband’s property and say, I found it. Think of it, if another person gave it to her as a gift! A gift is public knowledge, a find is not public knowledge. Think of it, if she found it in the presence of witnesses! This because of that. Rebbi Yoḥanan said, if they are not dependent on their father. But if they are dependent on their father, their finds belong to him.

”If they died, others should inherit.” Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person can transfer property rights in any language except with an expression of inheritance? One does not have here “they shall inherit” but “they shall take”. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: Do they not differ here in matters of a gift? If somebody signed over all his property to two persons at the same time; to one he wrote in the language of gift but to the other in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Eleazar said, since the one acquired in the language of gift, the other one acquired in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it seems that one did acquire in the language of gift but the other did not acquire in the language of inheritance Rebbi Phineas said, there came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah: Practice follows Rebbi Eleazar since Rebbi Eleazar stated a docrine but Rebbi Joḥanan said only “it seems”. Rebbi Samuel said, but did not Rebbi Meïr say that and it does not seem reasonable; is that nothing? Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say in the name of Rebbi Assi: Carded firstling wool becomes insignificant in a plurality. Rebbi Ḥiyya the Sepphorean brought before Rebbi Ammi a pound in eight but the latter refused to rule since had not Rebbi Assi said, is that not a Mishnah? “If somebody weaves the length of a sîṭ of firstling’s wool in a cloth, the cloth must be burned, of hair of a nazir or firstling donkey in sackcloth, the sackcloth must be burned”? The following Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote any expression of gift either at the start, or in the middle, or at the end, his instructions are valid.” There, to one person in an expression of gift and to one an expression of inheritance. But here to each one both in the language of gift and the language of inheritance Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: But does he not prejudice the rights of others? He said to him, if there are no brothers. But does he not prejudice the rights of his paternal uncles? Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel: A person prefers the good of his house over his relatives.

”If they died, others should inherit.” Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person can transfer property rights in any language except with an expression of inheritance? One does not have here “they shall inherit” but “they shall take”. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: Do they not differ here in matters of a gift? If somebody signed over all his property to two persons at the same time; to one he wrote in the language of gift but to the other in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Eleazar said, since the one acquired in the language of gift, the other one acquired in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it seems that one did acquire in the language of gift but the other did not acquire in the language of inheritance Rebbi Phineas said, there came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah: Practice follows Rebbi Eleazar since Rebbi Eleazar stated a docrine but Rebbi Joḥanan said only “it seems”. Rebbi Samuel said, but did not Rebbi Meïr say that and it does not seem reasonable; is that nothing? Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say in the name of Rebbi Assi: Carded firstling wool becomes insignificant in a plurality. Rebbi Ḥiyya the Sepphorean brought before Rebbi Ammi a pound in eight but the latter refused to rule since had not Rebbi Assi said, is that not a Mishnah? “If somebody weaves the length of a sîṭ of firstling’s wool in a cloth, the cloth must be burned, of hair of a nazir or firstling donkey in sackcloth, the sackcloth must be burned”? The following Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote any expression of gift either at the start, or in the middle, or at the end, his instructions are valid.” There, to one person in an expression of gift and to one an expression of inheritance. But here to each one both in the language of gift and the language of inheritance Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: But does he not prejudice the rights of others? He said to him, if there are no brothers. But does he not prejudice the rights of his paternal uncles? Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel: A person prefers the good of his house over his relatives.

”If they died, others should inherit.” Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person can transfer property rights in any language except with an expression of inheritance? One does not have here “they shall inherit” but “they shall take”. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: Do they not differ here in matters of a gift? If somebody signed over all his property to two persons at the same time; to one he wrote in the language of gift but to the other in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Eleazar said, since the one acquired in the language of gift, the other one acquired in the language of inheritance. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it seems that one did acquire in the language of gift but the other did not acquire in the language of inheritance Rebbi Phineas said, there came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah: Practice follows Rebbi Eleazar since Rebbi Eleazar stated a docrine but Rebbi Joḥanan said only “it seems”. Rebbi Samuel said, but did not Rebbi Meïr say that and it does not seem reasonable; is that nothing? Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say in the name of Rebbi Assi: Carded firstling wool becomes insignificant in a plurality. Rebbi Ḥiyya the Sepphorean brought before Rebbi Ammi a pound in eight but the latter refused to rule since had not Rebbi Assi said, is that not a Mishnah? “If somebody weaves the length of a sîṭ of firstling’s wool in a cloth, the cloth must be burned, of hair of a nazir or firstling donkey in sackcloth, the sackcloth must be burned”? The following Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote any expression of gift either at the start, or in the middle, or at the end, his instructions are valid.” There, to one person in an expression of gift and to one an expression of inheritance. But here to each one both in the language of gift and the language of inheritance Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: But does he not prejudice the rights of others? He said to him, if there are no brothers. But does he not prejudice the rights of his paternal uncles? Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel: A person prefers the good of his house over his relatives.

MISHNAH: If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not pay condolence visits or go to weddings has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. But if he argues because of another reason, he is in his rights. If he said to her you should tell X what I said to you or that she should fill [vessels] and pour them out on garbage heaps, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.

“If he argues because of another reason, he is in his rights,” because of bad reputation.

Rebbi Phineas asked before Rebbi Yose, why did we not state it with the leniencies of the House of Shammai and the stringencies of the House of Hillel? He said to him, the Mishnaiot apply only to circumstances that are either stringent on both sides or lenient on both sides. But here it is a stringency on one side and a leniency on the other side. But did we not state: “The House of Shammai say, property abandoned to the poor [is abandoned]?” Is this not lenient for the poor and stringent for the householder, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the poor and not stringent for the householder, since he intentionally abandoned it. He said to him, did we not state: “If the sheaf that was near a closure, a stack, cattle, or vessels was forgotten,” is this not lenient for the householder and stringent for the poor, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the householder but not stringent for the poor, because they did not acquire it yet. You may also say here, it is lenient for the woman and not stringent for the husband since he did not yet acquire property rights to it. He said to him, since he became betrothed to her, the inheritance fell to both of them.

HALAKHAH: “If she inherited after she was definitively married,” etc. We did state: She may sell or give away and it is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: She should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid. ”Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, that is not what Rabban Gamliel gave as answer, but the following was his argument: No, if you have an argument about a preliminarily married one, where he has rights neither to what she finds, nor to her handiwork, nor to dissolve her vows, what can you say about a definitively married one where he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows? Let the proof be the case of one who [inherited] before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, in which case he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows, and you admit to us that she should not sell or give away. He said to them, I agree that she should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid..” There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, is not Rabban Gamliel’s an isolated opinion? One cannot rely on it. A baraita supports him and disagrees with him: ”Our teachers took up the case again, voted, and instructed about property which she inherited before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, that she should not sell or give away, and if she sold or gave away it is invalid.” It disagrees that the sale is invalid. It agrees that our teachers took up the case again, instructed, and voted. Before they voted, they did not disagree with him.

HALAKHAH: “If she inherited after she was definitively married,” etc. We did state: She may sell or give away and it is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: She should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid. ”Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, that is not what Rabban Gamliel gave as answer, but the following was his argument: No, if you have an argument about a preliminarily married one, where he has rights neither to what she finds, nor to her handiwork, nor to dissolve her vows, what can you say about a definitively married one where he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows? Let the proof be the case of one who [inherited] before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, in which case he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows, and you admit to us that she should not sell or give away. He said to them, I agree that she should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid..” There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, is not Rabban Gamliel’s an isolated opinion? One cannot rely on it. A baraita supports him and disagrees with him: ”Our teachers took up the case again, voted, and instructed about property which she inherited before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, that she should not sell or give away, and if she sold or gave away it is invalid.” It disagrees that the sale is invalid. It agrees that our teachers took up the case again, instructed, and voted. Before they voted, they did not disagree with him.

HALAKHAH: “If she inherited after she was definitively married,” etc. We did state: She may sell or give away and it is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: She should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid. ”Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, that is not what Rabban Gamliel gave as answer, but the following was his argument: No, if you have an argument about a preliminarily married one, where he has rights neither to what she finds, nor to her handiwork, nor to dissolve her vows, what can you say about a definitively married one where he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows? Let the proof be the case of one who [inherited] before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, in which case he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows, and you admit to us that she should not sell or give away. He said to them, I agree that she should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid..” There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, is not Rabban Gamliel’s an isolated opinion? One cannot rely on it. A baraita supports him and disagrees with him: ”Our teachers took up the case again, voted, and instructed about property which she inherited before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, that she should not sell or give away, and if she sold or gave away it is invalid.” It disagrees that the sale is invalid. It agrees that our teachers took up the case again, instructed, and voted. Before they voted, they did not disagree with him.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he did not take her in. But if he took her in, nobody can lose his rights by these expressions. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is the word of Rebbi Ḥiyya: He who says that “my hands are removed from this field, my feet are removed from this field,” did not say anything. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does a Mishnah imply that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions? Did we not state there: “If somebody was married to two wives when he sold a field and the first one wrote for the buyer: I have no claims on you, the second one can take it away from the buyer’s hands,” this implies, not the first one. He said to him, that text itself implies that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions, but here the second wife cannot take anything away from the first, and why can the first one not take it away from the buyer’s hands? For she writes to him: For any complaint I shall have regarding this field, I shall have nothing against you.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he did not take her in. But if he took her in, nobody can lose his rights by these expressions. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is the word of Rebbi Ḥiyya: He who says that “my hands are removed from this field, my feet are removed from this field,” did not say anything. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does a Mishnah imply that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions? Did we not state there: “If somebody was married to two wives when he sold a field and the first one wrote for the buyer: I have no claims on you, the second one can take it away from the buyer’s hands,” this implies, not the first one. He said to him, that text itself implies that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions, but here the second wife cannot take anything away from the first, and why can the first one not take it away from the buyer’s hands? For she writes to him: For any complaint I shall have regarding this field, I shall have nothing against you.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he did not take her in. But if he took her in, nobody can lose his rights by these expressions. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is the word of Rebbi Ḥiyya: He who says that “my hands are removed from this field, my feet are removed from this field,” did not say anything. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does a Mishnah imply that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions? Did we not state there: “If somebody was married to two wives when he sold a field and the first one wrote for the buyer: I have no claims on you, the second one can take it away from the buyer’s hands,” this implies, not the first one. He said to him, that text itself implies that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions, but here the second wife cannot take anything away from the first, and why can the first one not take it away from the buyer’s hands? For she writes to him: For any complaint I shall have regarding this field, I shall have nothing against you.

If he wrote for her and she wrote for him. Just as he did not lose his rights so she did not lose her rights. If he wrote to her “from preliminary and definitive marriage”, that is the disagreement between the Houses of Shammai and Hillel. In the opinion of the House of Shammai she shall sell; in the opinion of the House of Hillel she should not sell.

If he wrote for her and she wrote for him. Just as he did not lose his rights so she did not lose her rights. If he wrote to her “from preliminary and definitive marriage”, that is the disagreement between the Houses of Shammai and Hillel. In the opinion of the House of Shammai she shall sell; in the opinion of the House of Hillel she should not sell.

Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” and she inherited properties afterwards, what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: From his rights you can infer his obligations. If he had not written to her, would it make any difference, would he not receive its yield? That means, from his rights you can infer his obligations. Rebbi Levi bar Ḥaita asked: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties which you shall inherit in the future,” what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence?

Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” and she inherited properties afterwards, what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: From his rights you can infer his obligations. If he had not written to her, would it make any difference, would he not receive its yield? That means, from his rights you can infer his obligations. Rebbi Levi bar Ḥaita asked: If he wrote to her: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties which you shall inherit in the future,” what is the rule? Can a person put a condition on something not in existence?

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.

“This is your bill of divorce on condition that you give it to me,” is invalid. “On condition that you return it to me,” is valid. Is that not the prior case? Rebbi Yose said, after you went to court. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, “after you have acquired all the rights for which it was made, return it to me.” Similar to that: Etrogim were scarce over there. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob gave an etrog to his son and said to him, if you have acquired it and fulfilled its obligation, return it to me.

Who frees? Rav says, either his first or his second master. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only his first master alone is able to free. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Yose: Does not a baraita disagree with Rav? If a Jew gave a loan to a Gentile on the latter’s leavened matter, it is permitted after Passover. If you say that the Jew has property rights in it, it would be forbidden. What does Rav do with this? Rebbi Yudan said, manumission is made easy, as it was stated: If somebody gives his slave as mortgage, if he sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, only the manumittor writes. If somebody mortgaged his field to another, then went and sold it, can the creditor not come and foreclose? Rebbi Abbahu said, in this matter Rebbi Joḥanan opened for us a door to illuminate. We do not find that a slave can again be enslaved after having been freed. If that is so, he should not have to write a bond for his value! Rebbi Ila said, it is better that a person say to him, give me the 200 zuz which you owe me than say to him, you are my slave! The rabbis of Caesarea say in Rebbi Nasa’s name: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meїr imposes a fine for words, so Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel imposes a fine for words. As it was stated: With a bond documenting both principal and interest one can collect neither principal nor interest, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, one collects the principal but not the interest.

Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Even though Rebbi Meїr said that a Gentile may not acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to remove it from tithes, he agrees that he has property rights. What are property rights? Rebbi Abba said, the usufruct; as we have stated: “the buyer brings First Fruits because of the public good,” otherwise he could have brought First Fruits by the word of the Torah.

Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Even though Rebbi Meїr said that a Gentile may not acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to remove it from tithes, he agrees that he has property rights. What are property rights? Rebbi Abba said, the usufruct; as we have stated: “the buyer brings First Fruits because of the public good,” otherwise he could have brought First Fruits by the word of the Torah.

But are her garden and her courtyard not subject to her husband’s having the usufruct? Rebbi Joshua in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he writes to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” Rebbi Isaac bar Ḥaqulah in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah: Even if he did not write to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” It turns out that Rebbi Yannai follows the rabbis and Rebbi Hoshaiah follows Rebbi Meїr. Rebbi Yannai follows the rabbis, for the rabbis say, even though the slave’s hand is his master’s hand, he can acquire his document of manumission from [his master’s] hand. But her garden and her courtyard are subject to her husband’s having the usufruct unless he writes to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” It is difficult for the rabbis: since the slave’s hand is his master’s hand, how can he acquire his document of manumission from [his master’s] hand? Rebbi Hoshaiah follows Rebbi Meїr, for Rebbi Meїr said since the wife’s hand is not her husband’s hand, she can acquire her bill of divorce from her husband. Her garden and her courtyard will not be subject to her husband, even if he has the usufruct, even if he did not write to her, “I have nothing to do with your properties.” If he inherited properties together with her, even if he wrote it is as if he did not write; [for example] if he had married his brother’s daughter, even if he wrote it is as if he did not write. If another person gave her a gift and told her, on condition that your husband have no rights to it, but it is for you to trade on your own account, then even if he did not write it is as if he wrote.

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Did we not state: (Mishnah Baba Meẓi‘a 1:4) “If somebody saw a find and fell on it, when another person came and grabbed it, he who grabbed it had the rights to it?” He answered him: Explain it if the first one did not say that his four cubits should acquire it for him. But did we not state: “If he fell on it or spread his talith on it, one removes him from it?” He said to him, that is the same, if he did not say that his four cubits should acquire it for him. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: (Tosephta Peah 2:2) “If two were pushing one another because of a sheaf and another person came and grabbed it from before them, the one who grabbed is entitled to it. He said to him, it is the same, they did not say that our four cubits should acquire it for us.

MISHNAH: If the scribe wrote and then in error handed the bill of divorce to the woman and the receipt to the man and they exchanged them, then later the bill of divorce is found with the man and the receipt with the woman, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her. Rebbi Eliezer says: If it was found out immediately, this is no bill of divorce. If it was found out later, it is a bill of divorce since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.

“Rebbi Eleazar says: If it was found out immediately, this is no bill of divorce. If it was found out later, it is a bill of divorce since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.” What is immediately? Rebbi Ze‘ira says, before she was preliminarily married, or when she was preliminarily married. Rebbi Isaac ben Ḥaqula said, before she was definitively married, or when she was definitively married. The Mishnah supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “Since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.”

“Rebbi Eleazar says: If it was found out immediately, this is no bill of divorce. If it was found out later, it is a bill of divorce since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.” What is immediately? Rebbi Ze‘ira says, before she was preliminarily married, or when she was preliminarily married. Rebbi Isaac ben Ḥaqula said, before she was definitively married, or when she was definitively married. The Mishnah supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “Since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.”

It is obvious that a slave may accept a gift by one third party to another, by a third party to his master, [but] not from his master to himself. From a third party to himself is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the Sages. If one said: Here [I am giving] you this money on condition that your master have no power over it, the slave acquired it and with him his master, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, the slave acquired it [but not] his master. What is the problem? From his master to a third party. Since the slave may receive from a third party for his master, may he receive from his master for a third party? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed a cow and [the lender] sent her to him through his slave, his son, or his agent.” Does this not mean that the slave is able to transfer rights from his master to a third party? Rebbi Eleazar said, explain it for a Hebrew slave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, you have to explain if for a Canaanite slave; explain it that he said, open [the gate] for her and she will come by herself, as we have stated: “If he led her, drew her to himself, called her and she followed him, he is responsible as a borrower.” Rebbi Zeïra understood it from here: “But he cannot make them acquire through his underage son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is not like his hand.” Does this not imply that a slave is not able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Explain it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. But did we not state “his wife”? Rebbi Meïr holds that the hand of the wife is the hand of her husband! Rebbi Ḥananiah said in the name of Rebbi Phineas, explain it following the Tanna who stated: “His wife cannot redeem Second Tithe for him. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, his wife can redeem Second Tithe for him.” For that Tanna, Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master but not the hand of the wife the hand of her husband!

It is obvious that a slave may accept a gift by one third party to another, by a third party to his master, [but] not from his master to himself. From a third party to himself is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the Sages. If one said: Here [I am giving] you this money on condition that your master have no power over it, the slave acquired it and with him his master, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, the slave acquired it [but not] his master. What is the problem? From his master to a third party. Since the slave may receive from a third party for his master, may he receive from his master for a third party? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed a cow and [the lender] sent her to him through his slave, his son, or his agent.” Does this not mean that the slave is able to transfer rights from his master to a third party? Rebbi Eleazar said, explain it for a Hebrew slave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, you have to explain if for a Canaanite slave; explain it that he said, open [the gate] for her and she will come by herself, as we have stated: “If he led her, drew her to himself, called her and she followed him, he is responsible as a borrower.” Rebbi Zeïra understood it from here: “But he cannot make them acquire through his underage son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is not like his hand.” Does this not imply that a slave is not able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Explain it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. But did we not state “his wife”? Rebbi Meïr holds that the hand of the wife is the hand of her husband! Rebbi Ḥananiah said in the name of Rebbi Phineas, explain it following the Tanna who stated: “His wife cannot redeem Second Tithe for him. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, his wife can redeem Second Tithe for him.” For that Tanna, Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master but not the hand of the wife the hand of her husband!

“By money.” Rebbi Abba was of the opinion, by money if there was no intention to write a deed. But if money was given with the intention to write a deed for him, possession was transferred only when the deed was written. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose disagree. It follows that Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel and Rav Huna Rebbi Joḥanan. Rebbi Abba parallels Samuel. Samuel asked Rav Ḥuna: He was slaughtering sacrifices while being occupied? He answered, “for your intention,” this excludes one otherwise occupied. If one wrote a gift in the language of a sale? He answered, he made it ride on two racing horses; Rebbi Abba said this; Samuel did not accept it. What means “he made it ride on two shining racing horses”? They wanted to say, one brings two crazy horses and makes it ride on both. One goes in one direction and the other in another; he has nothing in his hand. Rebbi Yose from Mamelia said, he doubly empowered him, for there is a title guarantee in a sale but none for a gift; the seller did not sell everything but the giver of a gift gave everything. And Rav Ḥuna parallels Rebbi Joḥanan. A person, when he lay dying, said: my property should be given to X. Afterwards he said: write and deliver. Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon bar Yaqim brought the case before Rebbi Joḥanan who said: If he said to transfer to him, everybody agrees that he entered into possession. If the transfer was to be in writing, everybody agrees that nobody transfers rights in writing after his death. Who would notify the greatness? Explain it if witnesses know. Think of it, if no witnesses know it? Rebbi Yose said, the field remains in the hand of its proprietors; the burden of proof is on the claimant.

From where that non-guaranteed property may be acquired together with guaranteed property, by money, document, or by possession? Rebbi Yose in the name of Ḥizqiah; Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Ḥanina Tortaya in the name of Ḥizqiah, it is written (2Chr. 21:3): “Their father gave them many gifts, silver and gold and delicacies, with fortified cities in Jehudah.” So far real estate and movables were at the same place. If real estate was at one place and movables elsewhere? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eliezer said to them, it happened that a man from Meron was dwelling in Jerusalem, who was rich in movables. He wanted to distribute them, to give them as gifts. They said to him, you cannot do that except if you acquire real estate. What did he do? He went and bought a rock near Jerusalem and said: The Northern part I give to X with a hundred amphoras of wine, the Southern part I give to Y with a hundred amphoras of oil. The matter came before the Sages and they upheld his words. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: But was he not bedridden? For in general a person might give property rights only in writing, and here even orally. In general, a person might give only if real estate and movables are at the same place; here, however, the real estate was at one place and the movables elsewhere. He said to him: But is there a difference for Rebbi Eliezer? Is not the sick person for Rebbi Eliezer like the sick person for the rabbis? He said to him: The sick person for Rebbi Eliezer is like the healthy person for the rabbis.

The brother of Rebbi Jehudah bar Zavdi in the name of [Rav]: As long as a baby lies in the public domain, either his father or his mother can testify about him. Once he was collected from the public domain, one needs two witnesses; its father and mother are like two witnesses. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rav Ḥisda: That is, if the baby is not moving. But a baby which is moving needs two witnesses; its father and mother are like two witnesses. This parallels what Rebbi Yannai said: property rights on jumping calves and lambs cannot be proven by possession.

HALAKHAH: “If one gave something to artisans to repair and they broke it,” etc. Rav Huna said, only if he put in the last nail to acquire the rights to his utensils.

This topic came up between Rebbi Abba bar Mamal and Rav Amram. One said, one does not entrust an oath to a suspect person. The other said, one does not even formulate an oath for such a one. Rav Huna said: “An oath that I have property rights to it to the amount of no less than (the value of a peruṭah) [half of its value]. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if it is about this, it is an institutional oath.

“And slaves.” Rebbi Simon the brother of Rebbi Jehudah bar Zavdi in the name of Rav: As long as a baby lies in the public domain, his father or his mother can testify about him. Once he has been collected from the public domain, one needs two witnesses and its father and mother are like two witnesses. Rebbi Abbahu said, can a person be suspected to say about one who is not his son that he is his son? Maybe it was said about the property of a convert? He told him, but all our teachers in the Diaspora testify that in this form we heard it from Rav Ada bar Abuh. Rav Ḥisda said: That is, if the baby is not moving. But [the case of] a baby which is moving refers to what Rebbi Joḥanan said: property rights on jumping calves and lambs which move from place to place cannot be proven by possession.

In the House of Rebbi Yannai they said, up to three steps it is like a chair. Rebbi La said in the name of the House of Rebbi Yannai, this was said referring to impurity. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said in the name of the House of Rebbi Yannai, this was said referring to rights of possession. Rebbi Yose in the name of the House of Rebbi Yannai, this was said referring to the Sabbath.

HALAKHAH: “One makes no hollow,” etc. If they collapsed and he wants to rebuild. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he gave up his rights. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he did not give up his rights. A Mishnah supports one, a baraita supports the other. A Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If a public road went through somebody’s field and he took it and gave them on the side. What he gave, he gave, but his own did not come to him.” A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If somebody bought a courtyard and there are protrusions and balconies, if they collapsed he rebuilds them based on his right of possession.”

HALAKHAH: “One makes no hollow,” etc. If they collapsed and he wants to rebuild. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he gave up his rights. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he did not give up his rights. A Mishnah supports one, a baraita supports the other. A Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If a public road went through somebody’s field and he took it and gave them on the side. What he gave, he gave, but his own did not come to him.” A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If somebody bought a courtyard and there are protrusions and balconies, if they collapsed he rebuilds them based on his right of possession.”

HALAKHAH: “Four situations for sellers.,” etc. How is this? If the measuring vessel belonged to the seller, he has the property rights, if to the buyer, he has the property rights. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, Rebbi La in the name of the Great Rebbi Jehudah, so is the Mishnah: If the measuring vessel belonged to a third person. It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah says, Friday evenings close to sundown he is not liable since he has permission, but the Sages say, in any case he is liable. What is the reason for what Rebbi Jehudah said? “If he is hired, it is paid for by his wages.”

HALAKHAH: “Four situations for sellers.,” etc. How is this? If the measuring vessel belonged to the seller, he has the property rights, if to the buyer, he has the property rights. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel, Rebbi La in the name of the Great Rebbi Jehudah, so is the Mishnah: If the measuring vessel belonged to a third person. It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah says, Friday evenings close to sundown he is not liable since he has permission, but the Sages say, in any case he is liable. What is the reason for what Rebbi Jehudah said? “If he is hired, it is paid for by his wages.”

HALAKHAH: So far if real estate and movables were at the same place. If real estate was at one place and movables elsewhere? Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, let us hear from the following: Rebbi Eliezer said to them, it happened that a man from Meron was dwelling in Jerusalem who was rich in movables. He wanted to distribute them, to give them as gifts. They said to him, you cannot do that except if you acquire real estate. What did he do? He went and bought a rock near Jerusalem and said: The Northern part I give to X with a hundred sheep and a hundred amphoras of wine, the Southern part I give to Y with a hundred amphoras of oil. The matter came before the Sages, who upheld his words. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: But was he not bedridden? For in general a person might give property rights only in writing, and here even orally. In general, a person might give only if real estate and movables are at the same place; here, however, the real estate was at one place and the movables elsewhere. He said to him: But is there a difference for Rebbi Eliezer? Would the sick person for Rebbi Eliezer be like the healthy person for the rabbis? He said to him: The sick person for Rebbi Eliezer is like the healthy person for the rabbis.

MISHNAH: If somebody paid off part of his debt, Rebbi Jehudah said, he shall exchange [his bond], but Rebbi Yose said, he shall write a receipt. Said Rebbi Jehudah, but then this one must guard his receipt from the rats! Rebbi Yose answered him, that comes to him rightly, not to impair the other one’s rights.

Rav said, one has to mention the earlier date in the second document. But Samuel said, one does not have to mention the earlier date in the second document. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, one does not have to mention the earlier date in the second document. Rebbi Joḥanan asked, if one had to mention the earlier date in the second document, would Rebbi Yose have said, “that comes to him rightly, not to impair the other one’s rights”?

Yose from Maon interpreted in the synagogue of Tiberias: Listen to this, you priests, why do you not study Torah? Did I not give you 24 gifts? They told him, they do not give us anything. And hearken, House of Israel, why do you not give the 24 gifts which I commanded you at Sinai? They told him, the king takes everything. Listen, king’s court, for yours are legal proceedings, for you I did say, these are the priests’ legal rights; in the future I shall sit in judgment over you, to stop them and to eliminate them from the world. Rebbi Jehudah the Prince heard this and became angry. He was afraid and fled. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish went to appease him. They told him, Rabbi, he is a great man. He asked them, would it be possible that he could answer any question which I would ask him? They told him, yes. He asked him: What is that which is written: For their mother whored? Was our mother Sarah a whore? He answered, like daughter like mother, like mother like daughter, like generation like the prince, like the prince like the generation, like the altar like its priests. Cahana used to say, like the garden like its gardener. He told them, not only did he curse me once in my absence, but he cursed me three times in my presence! He asked him, what is that which is written: Anybody wanting to formulate a simile about you will state as follows: like mother like daughter; was our mother Leah a prostitute since it is written, Dinah went out? He told him, for it is written, Leah went out towards him. One identifies going out with going out.

Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his side. If one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his side. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and two are saying, we saw one hair on his belly. Rav Yose and Rav Hoshaia ben Rav Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. One says, two hairs on his back; and one says, two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi [Yose] said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mama said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses], and another those of the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥinena learns it (because of) [from the years of] squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth, fifth, and sixth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses.

Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his side. If one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his side. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and two are saying, we saw one hair on his belly. Rav Yose and Rav Hoshaia ben Rav Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. One says, two hairs on his back; and one says, two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi [Yose] said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mama said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses], and another those of the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥinena learns it (because of) [from the years of] squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth, fifth, and sixth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses.

Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.

Or like the following. “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in the name of Rav Isaac who said in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: the same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and one says, I saw one hair on his back and the other says, I saw one hair on his belly, that is nothing; so much more his back and his back. Two are saying, we saw one hair on his back; and one is saying, I saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun and Rebbi Hoshaia ben Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe it was rubbed off. One says, I saw two hairs on his back; and one says, I saw two on his belly. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Yose says, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said to Rebbi Ḥaggai, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four seals, if one person (permitted) two, and another (questioned) the other two, and the document was attacked, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanina learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another testified that he ate it the fourth and fifth years, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, every single sign needs two witnesses.