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Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav: If somebody sets a term to his state of nazir, one does not allow him to shave. And it was stated thus: “I am a nazir all my days, I am a nazir in perpetuity; 100 years, or 200 years, he is not a nazir in perpetuity.”

Any expressions can be used for nezirut except the expression qorban. Any expressions can be used for qorban except the expression nezirut. If he said about a bunch of grapes, “I am locked away from you, I am separated from you, I am prevented from you, I am nazir from you,” he is a nazir. “It is for me qorban,” he only forbade it for himself as qorban. If he said about a loaf of bread, “I am locked away from it, I am separated from it, I am prevented from it, it is qorban for me,” he only forbade it for himself as qorban. “I am nazir from it,” he is a nazir. “Prevented” implies both nezirut and qorban. If somebody said about a bunch of grapes, “I am prevented from it,” if he wanted to eat it, one tells him, is it not holy for its money’s worth? If he redeemed it, one tells him, are you not a nazir?

MISHNAH: If a cup of wine was prepared for somebody who then said, “I am a nazir [abstaining] from it”, he is a nazir. It happened that a cup of wine was prepared for a woman who already was drunk, when she said, “I am a nazir [abstaining] from it”. The Sages said that she only intended to say, “it shall be qorban for me.”

MISHNAH: If somebody said, “I am a nazir,” he shaves on the 31 day, but if he shaved on the 30 day, he has fulfilled his obligation. “I am a nazir for 30 days,” if he shaved on the 30th day, he did not fulfill his obligation.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody said, “I am a nazir,” etc. This supports Bar Qappara, that if he shaved on the 30 day, he did not fulfill his obligation. This supports Rebbi Jonathan, that if he shaved on the 30 day, he did fulfill his obligation. Both of them? It is only one opinion, “this testimony”. They knew that it was forbidden to shave on the 30th; they thought that if he shaved on the 30th day, he did not fulfill his obligation. He came to testify that if he shaved on the 30th day, he fulfilled his obligation.

Something happened to Rebbi Immi and he shaved on the 30 day, and something happened to Rebbi Immi and he shaved on the 31 day. Rebbi Zeriqa said, Rebbi Immi learned this from the Mishnah, as we have stated there: “If somebody vowed two neziriot, he shaves for the first on the 31 day, for the second on the 61 day.” Rebbi Yose said, there when it happened, here from the start. Rebbi Jeremiah instructed Rebbi Isaac Aṭoshia, and some say, Rav Ḥiyya bar Rav Isaac Aṭoshia, to shave on the 30th day, following the Mishnah: “Eight days, the decree of 30 days is waived for him.” The eighth has the same status as the 30 day. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference; there they permitted in order to honor the holiday. You should know this, since Rebbi Ḥelbo bar Ḥuna said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If his eighth day falls on the Sabbath, he shaves Sabbath eve. If you say that they did not permit in order to honor the holiday, then even if his 30 day falls on the Sabbath, he should shave Sabbath eve. In addition, from what Rebbi Joḥanan had said: “For all deceased he stitches together after seven days and mends after 30.” Why should he not stitch on the seventh day and mend on the 30 day? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, this has been transmitted in this way and that has been transmitted in that way.

MISHNAH: If somebody vowed two neziriot, he shaves for the first on the 31 day, for the second on the 61 day, but if he shaved for the first on the 30 day, he shaves for the second on the 60, and if he shaved on the day before the 6018, he has fulfilled his obligation. The following testimony did Rebbi Pappaias give: if somebody vowed two neziriot, he shaves for the first on the 31st day, for the second on the 61st day, but if he shaved for the first on the 30th day, he shaves for the second on the 60th, and if he shaved on the day before the 60th, he has fulfilled his obligation since the 30th day is counted for him.

MISHNAH: If somebody vowed two neziriot, he shaves for the first on the 31 day, for the second on the 61 day, but if he shaved for the first on the 30 day, he shaves for the second on the 60, and if he shaved on the day before the 6018, he has fulfilled his obligation. The following testimony did Rebbi Pappaias give: if somebody vowed two neziriot, he shaves for the first on the 31st day, for the second on the 61st day, but if he shaved for the first on the 30th day, he shaves for the second on the 60th, and if he shaved on the day before the 60th, he has fulfilled his obligation since the 30th day is counted for him.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody vowed two neziriot,” etc. If he finished his first period of nezirut and started to lean on the second, when they did not find an opening for the first while they found an opening for the second, the second can be used for the first. Where do we hold? If he said, “I am a nazir twice,” a vow which is partially annulled is totally annulled. If he said, “I am a nazir for these 30 days and those 30 days,” in this case the second cannot be used for the first. But we must hold that he said, “I am a nazir and nazir.” If he said, “these are for nezirut.” But if he said, “these are for my nezirut; those are for the other nezirut,” in this case the second cannot be used for the first. Rebbi Eleazar said, if he finished the first nezirut, as soon as he brought a sacrifice and shaved, the first is credited for the second. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa commanded the colleagues: If you hear anything formulated by Rebbi Eleazar, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees: not unless he brings all his sacrifices, following the rabbis; but following Rebbi Simeon even if he brings only one sacrifice. If he dedicated both together, he has only one in his hand. If he dedicated each of them separately or brought each of them for the other, he did not acquit himself [of his obligation]. This means that as far as holiness goes, they became holy. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “His sacrifice to the Eternal for his nezirut,” i. e., that his vow of nazir should precede his sacrifice, rather than that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir. It is different, because he still is in nezirut. One understands the second for the first. The first for the second? Rebbi Jehudah said, this supports Rebbi Eleazar. But did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa command the colleagues: If you hear anything formulated by Rebbi Eleazar, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees; not unless he brings all his sacrifices. They wanted to say, following the rabbis. But here, we hold with Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Explain it for his nezirut and the nezirut he pledged for his son. In that, the second can be used for the first. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, did we not argue about one who said, “I am a nazir”? He really should be a nazir only once. You were severe with him and obligated him to be a nazir twice. Is it not enough that you were severe with him and obligated him to be a nazir twice, that now you say, he has nothing in his hands?

MISHNAH: If somebody says, “I am a nazir” and became impure on the 30 day, he invalidated everything; Rebbi Eliezer says, he invalidated only seven. “I am a nazir for 30 days,” if he became impure on the 30 day, he invalidated everything.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody says, ‘I am a nazir’,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Eliezer learned from the sufferer from skin disease, for whom we find seven days between shaving and shaving. Why does he not learn from the impure nazir? The sufferer from skin disease shaves repeatedly; the impure nazir does not shave repeatedly. The rabbis from Caesarea say, they disagree explicitly: Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Eliezer learned from the sufferer from skin disease; Rebbi Eleazar says, Rebbi Eliezer learned from the impure nazir. What difference does it make for Rebbi Eliezer whether the vow for nazir was implicit rather than explicit? If the vow for nazir was implicit, he does not invalidate if he tears his hair out, and his seventh day is counted for him; if the vow for nazir was explicit, he invalidates if he tears his hair out and his seventh day is not counted for him.

HALAKHAH: ““I am a nazir for 100 days,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The reason of Rebbi Eliezer: “This is the teaching for the nazir on the day of his fulfilling;” if he becomes impure on the day of his fulfilling, one gives him the teaching for the nazir. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he becomes impure in those days, what is their status, to be given the teaching for the nazir? Rebbi Shammai said, he is obligated by the teaching for the nazir if he becomes impure on the day of his fulfilling, and for one who becomes impure on the day of his fulfilling the seventh day is not counted. Rebbi Mana asked: If he becomes impure at fulfilling, why should he invalidate 30, should he not invalidate only seven? But if somebody became impure after fulfilling, the seventh day is counted for him.

MISHNAH: If somebody made a vow of nazir while he was in a cemetery, even if he stayed there for thirty days, they are not counted and he does not bring a sacrifice for impurity. If he left and re-entered, they are counted and he has to bring a sacrifice for impurity. Rebbi Eliezer said, not on that day, since it is said: “The earlier days fall away,” until he has earlier days.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody made a vow of nazir while he was in a cemetery,” etc. If he made the vow while he was among grave sites, Rebbi Joḥanan said, one warns him about wine and shaving. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, since one cannot warn him because of impurity, one does not warn him about wine and shaving. The argument of Rebbi Joḥanan seems inverted. There, he says, one warns him about wine, impurity, and shaving. And here, he says so? The rabbis from Caesarea: They disagree about the whole, for Rebbi Joḥanan said, one warns him about wine and shaving. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, since one cannot warn him because of impurity, one does not warn him either about wine or about shaving.

MISHNAH: If somebody vowed a lengthy nezirut, finished his nezirut, and then came to the Land, the House of Shammai say, he is a nazir for 30 days, but the House of Hillel say, he is a nazir from the start. It happened to Queen Helena that her son went to war and she said, if my son returns from the war, I shall be a nezirah for seven years. Her son returned from war and she was a nezirah for seven years. At the end of seven years, she came to the Land, and the House of Hillel instructed her to be a nezirah for another seven years. At the end of seven years she became impure and was nezirah for a total of 21 years. Rebbi Jehudah said, she was a nezirah only for fourteen years.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody vowed,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph and Rebbi Joḥanan disagreed. One said, Rebbi Jehudah follows the House of Shammai. But the other said, Rebbi Jehudah thinks that she never became impure. If you say, Rebbi Jehudah follows the House of Shammai, should he not have stated 30 days and forteen years? One does not state months while reporting years.

MISHNAH: If somebody said “I am a nazir” and another person heard it and said, “and so am I”, “and so am I”, “and so am I”, all of them are nezirim. If the first one was permitted, all are permitted; if the last was permitted, the last is permitted and all others forbidden. “I am a nazir” and another person heard it and said, “my mouth is as his mouth and my hair as his hair,” he is a nazir. “I am a nazir” and his wife heard it and said, “and so am I”, he can dissolve hers but his vow remains. “I am a nezirah” and her husband heard it and said, “and so am I”, he cannot dissolve.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody said ‘I am a nazir’ and another person heard it and said, ‘and so am I’,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “and so am I”, “and so am I”. Who is the Tanna of conjunctions? Rebbi Jehudah. But following Rebbi Meïr, “I am,” “I am”. Does the Mishnah require that all of them follow immediately after the speaking of the first? It was stated: If the middle one was permitted, all following him are permitted, all preceding him are forbidden. The Mishnah applies even if not all of them follow immediately after the speaking of the first, but each one follows immediately after the speaking of the preceding person. What means “to follow immediately after the speaking”? Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The time needed for greeting between two people. Abba bar bar Ḥana in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The time needed for greeting between teacher and student, that he say to him, “peace upon you, my master.”

If one said, “I am a nazir for 100 days, and another heard it and said, “so am I for 100 days”, and repeated and said, “so am I”, the main [statement] becomes an accessory. If one said, “I am a nazir;” somebody said “and I” following immediately the first, another heard it and said, “so am I” following immediately the second. If the first became permitted, so does the second. If the second became permitted, the third was not permitted. If one said, “I am a nazir twice,” and two people heard it and said, “so are we”, are they two nezirim or is each of them a nazir twice? If he was permitted, they were permitted. He was not permitted. If two said, “we are nezirim,” another heard it and said, “so am I,” did he make a vow regarding both of them or did he make a vow parallel to each of them? If they were permitted, [he] was permitted; if [he] was permitted, they were not permitted.

It is written: “The Eternal will forgive her.” This tells that she needs forgiveness. When Rebbi Jacob came to this verse, he used to say: If somebody needs atonement having intended to get pig’s meat but happened to get kosher [animal’s] meat, so much more one who had the intent to get pig’s meat and got pig’s meat.

HALAKHAH: “The House of Shammai say, dedication in error is dedication.” There, we have stated: “If somebody intends to say heave but says tithe, tithe but says heave, fire offering but says well-being offering, well-being offering but says fire offering.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if he intends to say “profane” and says “fire sacrifice”, he dedicated it. Rebbi Yose said, we consider only whether he intended to dedicate but erred because of something else. What is the status of this Mishnah? In the opinion of Rebbi Jeremiah it is in dispute, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose it is everybody’s opinion.

There, we have stated: “If somebody collects coins and says, ‘these are for my Temple tax,’ the House of Shammai say, the excess should be given as a donation, but the House of Hillel say, the excess is profane. ‘That I shall be able to pay my Temple tax,’ they agree that the excess is profane. ‘These [monies] are for my purification offering’, they agree that the excess is profane.” Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Bevai: “Rebbi Simeon says, what is the difference between Temple tax and purification sacrifices? Only that the Temple tax is a fixed amount.” Where do we hold? If he says, “that I shall use it for the Temple tax,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. If he says, “that I shall use it for my purification offering,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. But we are considering one who says “these.” Since the Temple tax has a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess is profane. Since purification offerings do not have a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess should be given as a donation. How does Rebbi Yose handle this? He explains it if he collects little by little, following the House of Hillel.

If somebody put aside his Temple tax in the belief that he owed it and it turned out that he did not owe, it was not dedicated. If he put aside two in the belief that he owed twice and it turned out that he owed only once, how do you treat the second? If he believed that he owed it and it turned out that he did not owe, [or as] if he said: “these”? If somebody put aside a purification sacrifice in the belief that he owed it and it turned out that he did not owe, it was not dedicated. If he put aside two in the belief that he owed two and it turned out that he owed only one, how do you treat the second? As if he believed that he owed it and it turned out that he did not owe, or as if he had said “these”?

If somebody put aside his Temple tax in the belief that he owed it and it turned out that he did not owe, it was not dedicated. If he put aside two in the belief that he owed twice and it turned out that he owed only once, how do you treat the second? If he believed that he owed it and it turned out that he did not owe, [or as] if he said: “these”? If somebody put aside a purification sacrifice in the belief that he owed it and it turned out that he did not owe, it was not dedicated. If he put aside two in the belief that he owed two and it turned out that he owed only one, how do you treat the second? As if he believed that he owed it and it turned out that he did not owe, or as if he had said “these”?

There, we have stated: “If somebody says, ‘I undertake [to bring] on a pan’ and he brought in a deep vessel, in a deep vessel and he brought on a pan.” Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This is the House of Shammai’s, since the House of Shammai say, “dedication in error is dedication.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yose: Why do we not explain it according to everybody, if he said, “I said, on a pan”? But if he said, “I undertake [to bring] on a pan,” and then he changed his mind and said, “in a deep vessel”, he fulfilled his duty. Rebbi Ḥanina and Rebbi Yasa came in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said, “I undertake [to bring] on a pan or in a deep vessel,” turned around and said, “on a pan”, and turned around and said, “in a deep vessel”? Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Hama in the name of Rebbi Yose: He determines even orally. They thought to say, even holidays determine, even vessels determine.

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, He made error equal to intent for substitution, but not for sacrifices.” Ḥizqiah said, in error: a prohibition, the one who substitutes: a prohibition. If he wants to say “profane” but said “an elevation sacrifice”, it is sanctified. If he wants to say “an elevation sacrifice” but said “profane”, it is not sanctified. It follows that Rebbi Joḥanan, interpreting Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, parallels Rebbi Jeremiah’s explanation regarding the House of Shammai on sacrifices. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, may one understand that “He made error equal to intent for substitution, but not for sacrifices,” if somebody dedicates a firstling? Can it be dedicated? Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Aḥa, and Rebbi Yasa say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody dedicated a firstling and it was brought to the altar, it is not sanctified even for its money’s worth. If somebody dedicated a blemished animal for the altar, even as a substitute it is not sanctified. But if somebody dedicated an animal with a temporary blemish. Is that consistent with whipping? Rebbi Yudan, Rebbi Mattaniah’s father, said, explain it if he gave unblemished animals for the upkeep of the Temple.

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, He made error equal to intent for substitution, but not for sacrifices.” Ḥizqiah said, in error: a prohibition, the one who substitutes: a prohibition. If he wants to say “profane” but said “an elevation sacrifice”, it is sanctified. If he wants to say “an elevation sacrifice” but said “profane”, it is not sanctified. It follows that Rebbi Joḥanan, interpreting Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, parallels Rebbi Jeremiah’s explanation regarding the House of Shammai on sacrifices. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, may one understand that “He made error equal to intent for substitution, but not for sacrifices,” if somebody dedicates a firstling? Can it be dedicated? Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Aḥa, and Rebbi Yasa say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody dedicated a firstling and it was brought to the altar, it is not sanctified even for its money’s worth. If somebody dedicated a blemished animal for the altar, even as a substitute it is not sanctified. But if somebody dedicated an animal with a temporary blemish. Is that consistent with whipping? Rebbi Yudan, Rebbi Mattaniah’s father, said, explain it if he gave unblemished animals for the upkeep of the Temple.

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, He made error equal to intent for substitution, but not for sacrifices.” Ḥizqiah said, in error: a prohibition, the one who substitutes: a prohibition. If he wants to say “profane” but said “an elevation sacrifice”, it is sanctified. If he wants to say “an elevation sacrifice” but said “profane”, it is not sanctified. It follows that Rebbi Joḥanan, interpreting Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, parallels Rebbi Jeremiah’s explanation regarding the House of Shammai on sacrifices. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, may one understand that “He made error equal to intent for substitution, but not for sacrifices,” if somebody dedicates a firstling? Can it be dedicated? Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Aḥa, and Rebbi Yasa say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody dedicated a firstling and it was brought to the altar, it is not sanctified even for its money’s worth. If somebody dedicated a blemished animal for the altar, even as a substitute it is not sanctified. But if somebody dedicated an animal with a temporary blemish. Is that consistent with whipping? Rebbi Yudan, Rebbi Mattaniah’s father, said, explain it if he gave unblemished animals for the upkeep of the Temple.

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, He made error equal to intent for substitution, but not for sacrifices.” Ḥizqiah said, in error: a prohibition, the one who substitutes: a prohibition. If he wants to say “profane” but said “an elevation sacrifice”, it is sanctified. If he wants to say “an elevation sacrifice” but said “profane”, it is not sanctified. It follows that Rebbi Joḥanan, interpreting Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, parallels Rebbi Jeremiah’s explanation regarding the House of Shammai on sacrifices. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion, may one understand that “He made error equal to intent for substitution, but not for sacrifices,” if somebody dedicates a firstling? Can it be dedicated? Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Aḥa, and Rebbi Yasa say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody dedicated a firstling and it was brought to the altar, it is not sanctified even for its money’s worth. If somebody dedicated a blemished animal for the altar, even as a substitute it is not sanctified. But if somebody dedicated an animal with a temporary blemish. Is that consistent with whipping? Rebbi Yudan, Rebbi Mattaniah’s father, said, explain it if he gave unblemished animals for the upkeep of the Temple.

Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah follows his father’s method: If somebody dedicated unblemished animals for the upkeep of the Temple, he violates a positive commandment. Why also a prohibition? The verse says: “The Eternal spoke to Moses לאמר”: a prohibition was pronounced, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi was sitting and studying the rule that “a firstling cannot be substituted” when Bar Pedaiah’s father was passing by. Rebbi saw him, and said, do I know what I should say here, “the Eternal spoke to Moses לאמר,” could one explain the words of Rebbi Jehudah? Is it written thus? It follows what Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: For interpretation, one removes from its beginning to its end. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: Even a middle word. “You have to pour oil on.” You have to pour oil on a flour offering, to subject all flour offerings to pouring.

MISHNAH: A person who made a vow of nazir, asked the Sages and they forbade, counts from the moment of his vow. If he asked the Sages and they permitted, if he had an animal designated, it leaves and grazes with the herd. The house of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Do you not agree that this is dedication in error, it leaves and grazes in the herd? The House of Shammai anwered, do you not agree that if somebody erred and designated the ninth as the tenth, or the tenth as ninth, or the eleventh as tenth, it is sanctified? The House of Hillel anwered, not the staff sanctified it, for if he erred and put his staff on the eighth or the twelth, did he do anything? But the verse which sanctified the tenth sanctified the ninth and the eleventh.

So far, if he thought that it was the tenth which he called “tenth”. If he knew that it was the ninth and called it “tenth”? The colleagues say, it is sanctified. Rebbi Yudan said, it is not sanctified. The Mishnah supports the colleagues: “The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Do you not agree that it leaves and grazes with the herd? The House of Shammai anwered them, do you not agree that if somebody erred and designated the ninth as the tenth, or the tenth as ninth, or the eleventh as tenth, it is sanctified.” And they do not accept it! Otherwise, they could have answered: Why do you answer us from something which is sanctified only if not in [willful] error about something which will be sanctified both in error and not in error! As Rebbi Immi said, they were rich in answer, or as Rebbi Nasa said, like somebody who has two reasons and he responds by giving one of them.

So far, if he thought that it was the tenth which he called “tenth”. If he knew that it was the ninth and called it “tenth”? The colleagues say, it is sanctified. Rebbi Yudan said, it is not sanctified. The Mishnah supports the colleagues: “The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Do you not agree that it leaves and grazes with the herd? The House of Shammai anwered them, do you not agree that if somebody erred and designated the ninth as the tenth, or the tenth as ninth, or the eleventh as tenth, it is sanctified.” And they do not accept it! Otherwise, they could have answered: Why do you answer us from something which is sanctified only if not in [willful] error about something which will be sanctified both in error and not in error! As Rebbi Immi said, they were rich in answer, or as Rebbi Nasa said, like somebody who has two reasons and he responds by giving one of them.

Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.

Warning for one who eats carcass meat, from where? “You shall not eat any carcass meat.” That covers carcass meat; from a “torn” animal from where? Rebbi Joḥanan said, “carcass meat” and “any carcass meat”, to include the “torn” animal. If somebody eats flesh from a living animal which is “torn”, Rebbi Yasa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is guilty twice, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is guilty only once. What is the reason of Rebbi Joḥanan? “You shall not eat any carcass meat;” “you shall not eat of life with the flesh.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? The colleagues said before Rebbi Yose: The assertion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish parallels what Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob stated: “ ‘Flesh torn on the field you shall not eat’, you shall not tear from an animal and eat in the way you tear from the ground and eat.” What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? The colleagues before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish does not hold with Rebbi Joḥanan about the “torn” animal; if he did hold with him, one should be twice guilty. He said to them, even if he held with him, one should be guilty only once. There is a difference, because He repeated it and combined it. They objected: “Suet you shall not eat,” “and blood you shall not eat,” and it is written: “Any suet and any blood you shall not eat.” Then because He repeated it and combined it, one should be guilty only once! He said to them, if it were written “suet and blood”, you would be correct. But it is written “any suet and any blood,” to declare him guilty for each case separately. But it is not written: “Anything soaked with grapes he shall not drink,” and it is written, “from skins to seeds he shall not eat.” Then because He repeated it and combined it, one should be guilty only once! He said to them, if it were written “skins and seeds”, you would be correct. But it is written “skins unto seeds,” to declare him guilty for each case separately.

Rebbi [Yose] said to the colleagues: You should know that Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree: If somebody split a limb from a living animal and ate it, everybody agrees that he is free from prosecution. Where do they disagree? If he split it in his mouth before he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan considers his mouth as inside, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish considers his mouth as outside. They asked him, what do you say? He answered them, I informed you that mighty mountains disagree, and you ask this? If it is so, even if he split it outside and then ate, he should be guilty! Why? That is how one eats. If somebody split an ant in his mouth and ate it, that is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Maisha asked Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he split a grape in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered, there it is something for which there is a prohibition and impurity. In a circumstance in which its impurity disappeard, its prohibition disappeared. But here is a prohibition and no impurity. Rebbi Abba ben Rebbi Mamal asked: If he split an olive-sized bit of mazzah in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, in the other cases, his palate did not enjoy an olive sized bit. The rabbis of Caesarea said that Rebbi Nisa asked: If he split in his mouth pomegranate berries which are ‘orlah and ate them, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Where do we hold? If because of fluids, we already did state: “Nothing makes impure as a drink except what comes from olives and grapes.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it if he swallowed them.

Rebbi [Yose] said to the colleagues: You should know that Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree: If somebody split a limb from a living animal and ate it, everybody agrees that he is free from prosecution. Where do they disagree? If he split it in his mouth before he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan considers his mouth as inside, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish considers his mouth as outside. They asked him, what do you say? He answered them, I informed you that mighty mountains disagree, and you ask this? If it is so, even if he split it outside and then ate, he should be guilty! Why? That is how one eats. If somebody split an ant in his mouth and ate it, that is the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Maisha asked Rebbi Ze‘ira: If he split a grape in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? He answered, there it is something for which there is a prohibition and impurity. In a circumstance in which its impurity disappeard, its prohibition disappeared. But here is a prohibition and no impurity. Rebbi Abba ben Rebbi Mamal asked: If he split an olive-sized bit of mazzah in his mouth and ate it, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, in the other cases, his palate did not enjoy an olive sized bit. The rabbis of Caesarea said that Rebbi Nisa asked: If he split in his mouth pomegranate berries which are ‘orlah and ate them, is that the disagreement of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Where do we hold? If because of fluids, we already did state: “Nothing makes impure as a drink except what comes from olives and grapes.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it if he swallowed them.

Rebbi Samuel bar Sosarti asked: Then one who eats a limb from a kosher living animal should be guilty on two counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh.” Does one argue from kosher abour non-kosher animals? But did not Rebbi Eleazar argue from kosher about non-kosher animals? Then one who eats a limb from a non-kosher living animal should be guilty on three counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh”; and because of “you shall not eat from their flesh.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If somebody ate five ants together, in one forgetting, he is guilty for each one separately because of “creature”. If he fragmented and ate them, he is guilty only once, if together they amount to the volume of an olive. If he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive, he is guilty; if he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive and an ant, he is guilty twice. If this is correct, then if he ate of the fragments less than the volume of an olive and an ant completed the volume of an olive, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, if the ate an ant the size of an olive, is he guilty twice? The same rule applies to combinations of a nazir. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive, he is guilty. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive and a grape berry, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, then if he ate a grape berry for the volume ofan olive, is he guilty twice? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All [food] prohibitions combine together to be whipped for the volume of an olive, but for an ant one is guilty twice. Then if he ate prohibited food and an ant completed the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice. Then if he ate an ant the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice.

Rav said, waving stops the nazir. But did we not state: “The teachings for the nazir,” whether or not he has wings? What Rav says, if he does, as it was stated thus: For somebody able to wave, waving stops him; for somebody unable to wave, waving does not stop him. Samuel says, measure stops a nazir, as for the waves and thumbs of a sufferer from skin disease. But did we not state: “The teachings for the sufferer from skin disease,” whether or not he has thumbs? He explains it following Rebbi Eliezer who said, he puts it on their place.

Rav said, waving stops the nazir. But did we not state: “The teachings for the nazir,” whether or not he has wings? What Rav says, if he does, as it was stated thus: For somebody able to wave, waving stops him; for somebody unable to wave, waving does not stop him. Samuel says, measure stops a nazir, as for the waves and thumbs of a sufferer from skin disease. But did we not state: “The teachings for the sufferer from skin disease,” whether or not he has thumbs? He explains it following Rebbi Eliezer who said, he puts it on their place.

If somebody finds a corpse of obligation, he has to take care of it and bury it at its place. When is that? If he finds it outside the town limits. But if he found it inside the town limits, he brings it to the cemetary to bury it.

“Which corpse has decay? One who was buried naked in a marble coffin, or on a stone floor, or on a marble table. But if he was buried in a wooden casket or on a woooden plank; that is not decay but graves’ dust and needs somewhat more than a spoonful.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, if even the smallest attachment was buried with him, there is no decay. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Of two corpses which were buried together, each one becomes an attachment for the other. This is automatic; could one alone be an attachment to another? Abba bar Nathan objected: Think of it, that somebody brought half a spoonful from one and half a spoonful from the other! He was considering it when he was seen laughing; he was offended by him and he died. Rebbi Yose said, there this man is gone and we did hear nothing about it. What about it? There, neither of them will produce a spoonful of decayed matter, but here, each of them can generate a spoonful of decay.

If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.

If the public became publicly impure in a doubtful case of a grave in the abyss, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since in the case of a single person, whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of known impurity, you clarified to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the public, whose position you clarified to its advantage in the case of known impurity, you should clarify it to its advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. A leniency which you apply to a single person you treat as a restriction for the public. A leniency which you apply to a single person, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he should be treated as if he became impure before sprinkling, that he should eat the meat. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir is a restriction for the impure nazir. The leniency which you apply to the pure nazir, so that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as impure after sprinkling, that he should bring a sacrifice of impurity. You treat it as a restriction for the impure nazir, that if it became known to him after sprinkling he is treated as somebody repeatedly becoming impure so that he has to bring a sacrifice of impurity for each single case. As it was stated: If he repeatedly became impure, he has to bring a sacrifice for each single case. If somebody is officiating for the Passover sacrifice, does the diadem make it acceptable? It is a conclusion de minore ad maius. Since for the owners [of the Passover sacrifice] whose position you clarified to their disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you clarified to their advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss, it should be only logical that for the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, you should clarify it to his advantage in the case of a grave in the abyss. No. For the owners [of sacrifices] you clarify to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year; you also say for the officiating that you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year. Since you clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of impurity during the rest of the year, you also clarify their position to their disadvantage in the case of the impurity of the dead on Passover. How is it really? “For you”, whether for him or for the one officiating for him. So far for the people celebrating Passover. From where the nazir? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rav Ḥisda: We thought, “on him”, not on the one officiating for him. Since we stated that the same rules apply to the nazir and to those celebrating Passover, it means that what holds for the one holds for the other.

MISHNAH: If somebody finds a corpse in original position, lying as usual, he takes him and his surroundings. If he finds two, he takes them and their surroundings. If he finds three and between one and the next is a distance of between four and eight cubits, enough for the bier and the people who bury, that is a cemetery. He has to check on both sides for another 20 cubits. If he finds a grave at the end of 20 cubits, he has to check another 20 cubits since it is obvious that if this were a new burial ground, one would have taken him and his surroundings there.

There, we have stated: “If a vineyard is planted with less that four cubits of space, Rebbi Simeon says that it is no vineyard. But the Sages say that it is a vineyard and one disregards the plants in the middle as if nonexistent.” Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Just as they disagree here, they disagree about a graveyard. Rebbi Jonah said, one cannot compare these. There, they form a graveyard; here, they do not form a graveyard. Rebbi Yose said, one cannot compare these. There, if they were spaced apart and one moved them closer together, that is the disagreement. If they were close and one moved them apart, everybody would agree. But here, what is their disagreement? When one found them close together. Rebbi Simeon said, a landslide fell on them and compressed them. But the Sages say, were they spaced apart and somebody brought them close together?”

MISHNAH: If somebody injured another person who was judged dying and then this person’s state improved but later he died, he is guilty. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, he cannot be prosecuted since it is not unsubstantiated.

MISHNAH: Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from overseas must be able to say: “It was written and signed before me.” Rabban Gamliel says, even somebody who brings from Reqam and Ḥeger; Rebbi Eliezer says, even from Kefar Ludim to Lydda; but the Sages say that the only one who has to be able to say that it was written and signed before him is one who brings from overseas or to overseas. One who brings from one province to another overseas has to say that it was written and signed before him; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, even from one district to the next.

MISHNAH: Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from overseas must be able to say: “It was written and signed before me.” Rabban Gamliel says, even somebody who brings from Reqam and Ḥeger; Rebbi Eliezer says, even from Kefar Ludim to Lydda; but the Sages say that the only one who has to be able to say that it was written and signed before him is one who brings from overseas or to overseas. One who brings from one province to another overseas has to say that it was written and signed before him; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, even from one district to the next.

HALAKHAH: “Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from overseas,” etc. This is difficult. If somebody brings a gift document from overseas,would you require him to say, it was written and signed before me? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce. Rebbi Joḥanan said, that is a leniency lest she sit abandoned. Is that a leniency? It is only a restriction, for if he does not say to her, it was written and signed before me, you do not permit her to remarry. Rebbi Yose said, the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was written and signed before me, makes it easy for her at the end. For if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void. Rebbi Mana wanted to say, a protest other than the text of the bill. But is a protest about the text of the bill a protest which has no validity? Even for a protest which has validity, said Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, since you say that the reason for the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was signed before me, is to make it easy for her at the end, that if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void; this means that there is no difference whether it is a protest not about the text of the bill or about the body of the bill, a protest which has no validity, or a protest which does have validity! But should you worry that maybe be gave the bill to disqualified witnesses to sign? Rebbi Abun said, he is not suspect to damage her before Heaven. Before the court he is suspect to damage her. But since he knows that if he comes and protests his protest is void, he will choose qualified witnesses to sign.

HALAKHAH: “Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from overseas,” etc. This is difficult. If somebody brings a gift document from overseas,would you require him to say, it was written and signed before me? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, there is a difference because they are not conversant with the fine points of bills of divorce. Rebbi Joḥanan said, that is a leniency lest she sit abandoned. Is that a leniency? It is only a restriction, for if he does not say to her, it was written and signed before me, you do not permit her to remarry. Rebbi Yose said, the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was written and signed before me, makes it easy for her at the end. For if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void. Rebbi Mana wanted to say, a protest other than the text of the bill. But is a protest about the text of the bill a protest which has no validity? Even for a protest which has validity, said Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, since you say that the reason for the difficulty which you impose upon her at the beginning, that he is required to say, it was signed before me, is to make it easy for her at the end, that if [the husband] would come and protest, his protest would be void; this means that there is no difference whether it is a protest not about the text of the bill or about the body of the bill, a protest which has no validity, or a protest which does have validity! But should you worry that maybe be gave the bill to disqualified witnesses to sign? Rebbi Abun said, he is not suspect to damage her before Heaven. Before the court he is suspect to damage her. But since he knows that if he comes and protests his protest is void, he will choose qualified witnesses to sign.

If [the bill of divorce] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the husband’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the divorce? Or, since his protest is void [only] about the divorce, is it valid about the gift? We have stated later: “Bills of divorce for wives and documents of manumission are equal in the rules of carrying and bringing.” If [the document of manumission] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the master’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the manumission? Or since his protest is void [only] about the manumission, is it valid about the gift? If somebody signed all his property over to his slave, you say that the gift is the document of manumission. How do you treat this? Is it a document of manumission and his protest is void or is it a gift and his protest is valid? This can be compared to the following: If somebody signed all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a testimony about one person; as testimony it is totally invalid if it is partially invalid. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

If [the bill of divorce] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the husband’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the divorce? Or, since his protest is void [only] about the divorce, is it valid about the gift? We have stated later: “Bills of divorce for wives and documents of manumission are equal in the rules of carrying and bringing.” If [the document of manumission] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the master’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the manumission? Or since his protest is void [only] about the manumission, is it valid about the gift? If somebody signed all his property over to his slave, you say that the gift is the document of manumission. How do you treat this? Is it a document of manumission and his protest is void or is it a gift and his protest is valid? This can be compared to the following: If somebody signed all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a testimony about one person; as testimony it is totally invalid if it is partially invalid. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan told the people of Sepphoris: You say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, even a person who brings a bill of divorce from Babylonia does not have to say “it was written and signed before me.” But I am saying that it is necessary, for there is a Mishnah: “Rebbi Jehudah says, from Reqam to the East and Reqam belongs to the East.” And even if you say that they disagree with Rebbi Jehudah and say that Reqam does not belong to the East, what about from Babylonia to here? Rav said, we consider ourselves as in the Land of Israel in the matter of bills of divorce. But Samuel said, even from one city quarter to another. He asked before him to change his opinion, when Cahana told him, what would we do with the earlier cases of women who remarried? He said to him, what do you have in your hand? For he was of Rebbi’s opinion as it was stated: If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas which was neither written nor signed in his presence, she has to leave under the thirteen penalties, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages did not agree in this matter.

Everybody agrees that if [the husband] comes and protests, his protest is invalid. That is, if he protested after she remarried. If he protested before she remarried and then she remarried? Let us hear from the following: It happened that somebody brought a bill of divorce before Rebbi Ismael. He asked him, from where are you? He answered, from Kefar Simai in the region of Acco. He said to him, then you have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence;” you do not need witnesses. After [that person] left, Rebbi Ilai said to him, my teacher, is not Kefar Simai in the Land of Israel, closer to Sepphoris than to Acco? He answered, since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands. What means “since the matter was resolved in a permissive way; it stands”? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that if [the husband] came and protested, his protest would be invalid. But does a person who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel for delivery in the Land of Israel have to say, “it was written and signed in my presence”? Therefore, there cannot be any difference whether he protested after she remarried or before she remarried and then she remarried.

MISHNAH: Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel does not have to say: “It was written and signed before me.” If the document is contested, it should be confirmed by its signers. If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and is unable to say: “it was written and signed before me,” it should be confirmed by its signers. Bills of divorce and slaves’ bills of manumission are equal in [the requirement] about those who carry and bring. This is one of the aspects in which bills of divorce, have the same rules as bills of manumission.

MISHNAH: Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel does not have to say: “It was written and signed before me.” If the document is contested, it should be confirmed by its signers. If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and is unable to say: “it was written and signed before me,” it should be confirmed by its signers. Bills of divorce and slaves’ bills of manumission are equal in [the requirement] about those who carry and bring. This is one of the aspects in which bills of divorce, have the same rules as bills of manumission.

HALAKHAH: “Somebody who brings a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel,” etc. Who protests? Rav Ḥisda said, the husband protests. Rebbi Yose said, the buyers protest, lest she repossess from them. Rebbi asked: So far a protest which does not concern the text of the bill. A protest which concerns the text of the bill is in dispute between Rebbi Joḥanan and the rabbis there. In the opinion of the rabbis there, there is no difference to a protest concerning or not concerning the body of the bill. A protest not concerning the text of the bill is void, a protest concerning the text of the bill is valid.

As it was stated: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas which was not written and signed in his presence, he returns the bill to its place of origin, presents it to a court and has its signatures notarized. Then he does not have so say, ‘it was written and signed before me’, but he says, ‘I am deputized by the court.’ ”

Why are Samaritans disqualified? Rebbi Joḥanan said, because they are lions’ proselytes. But if somebody converted not for Heaven’s sake and then converted for Heaven’s sake, does one not accept him? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Because the child is a bastard if a Gentile or a slave have intercourse with a Jewish woman. But did not Rebbi Aqiba say, they are genuine proselytes? Because they require levirate marriage from the preliminarily married and free the definitively married. But do not the rabbis say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law? Because they are not conversant with the fine points in writing bills of divorce. But does not Rabban Gamliel accept their bills of divorce? Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because they intermingled with the priests of the High Places: “He chose priests from the borderline of the people,”. Rebbi Ila said, from the “thorns” of the people, i. e., from the disqualified of the people.

“If somebody says, I freed my slave Ṭabi, I shall free him, he is free, he acquired.” Rebbi Inaia in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But only by a document. “He should be freed, Rebbi says, he acquired, but for the Sages he did not acquire. Give this document of manumission, and he died, Rebbi says, he did not acquire but the Sages say, he did acquire; one forces the heirs to fulfill the instructions of the deceased.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If he said, “free him”, Rebbi will agree. If he said, “write and deliver,” the Sages will agree. But we deal with the case that he said “give”. Rebbi says, one who says “give” is like one who said “write and deliver,” but the Sages say, one who says “give” is like one who said “free him”.

“If somebody said that all his property should be given to X, a Cohen, and [the estate] contained slaves, even if [the Cohen] said ‘I cannot have them’ they eat heave. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘I cannot have them’, the heirs acquired them.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, they disagree if he did not specify. How do we hold? If he accepted at the first moment, Rabban Gamliel will agree. If he did refuse at the first moment, the rabbis will agree. But we deal with the case that he did not specify. Rebbi says, nobody says ‘it is impossible’ unless he had accepted. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, since he said ‘it is impossible’, the end is proof for the start.

“If somebody says, give this mina to X because I owe it to him, bring this mina to X for the pledge which he has from me, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so but he himself is responsible until X receives his due.” Rebbi Ila said, a gift is like a debt. “Give this mina to X, bring this mina to X, give this gift document to X, if he wants to change his mind he can(not) do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should return it to the sender, and if that one had died he should give it to the latter’s heirs.” “Acquire this mina for X, accept this mina for X, acquire this gift document for X, accept this gift document for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should deliver it to his heirs. But if he acquired after [X’s] death he should return it to the sender since nobody can acquire documents after his death.” “If somebody says, this mina is for X, take this mina for X, this mina shall be in your hand for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so” because if somebody acquires for another person it cannot be changed.

“If somebody says, give this mina to X because I owe it to him, bring this mina to X for the pledge which he has from me, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so but he himself is responsible until X receives his due.” Rebbi Ila said, a gift is like a debt. “Give this mina to X, bring this mina to X, give this gift document to X, if he wants to change his mind he can(not) do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should return it to the sender, and if that one had died he should give it to the latter’s heirs.” “Acquire this mina for X, accept this mina for X, acquire this gift document for X, accept this gift document for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should deliver it to his heirs. But if he acquired after [X’s] death he should return it to the sender since nobody can acquire documents after his death.” “If somebody says, this mina is for X, take this mina for X, this mina shall be in your hand for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so” because if somebody acquires for another person it cannot be changed.

“If somebody says, give this mina to X because I owe it to him, bring this mina to X for the pledge which he has from me, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so but he himself is responsible until X receives his due.” Rebbi Ila said, a gift is like a debt. “Give this mina to X, bring this mina to X, give this gift document to X, if he wants to change his mind he can(not) do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should return it to the sender, and if that one had died he should give it to the latter’s heirs.” “Acquire this mina for X, accept this mina for X, acquire this gift document for X, accept this gift document for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so. If he went and found that X had died, he should deliver it to his heirs. But if he acquired after [X’s] death he should return it to the sender since nobody can acquire documents after his death.” “If somebody says, this mina is for X, take this mina for X, this mina shall be in your hand for X, if he wants to change his mind he cannot do so” because if somebody acquires for another person it cannot be changed.

Explanation: Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Yose ben Kipper descended to collect there for a colleague when they were slandered. They came and wanted to take it back from them. They answered, we already acquired it. They said, we wish for you to accept it in good faith; they answered, we are unpaid trustees. They approached Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai who told them, there it is, all of it. They took Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, whipped him with ropes, and took it from him. When they returned here, he went to his father and told him, look what your son did to me! He asked him, what did he do to you? He answered, if he had taken my position, they could not have taken anything from us. He asked him, why did you act in such a way? He said, I saw that they were a unanimous court, their hats were a cubit wide, they were directing blows, my brother Yose was bound and the whip ascended and descended. I said, does my father have another Dositheos? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, you say that for somebody who cannot give a warranty in good faith. But if somebody gives a warranty in good faith, one takes from this one and gives to the other.

Explanation: Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Yose ben Kipper descended to collect there for a colleague when they were slandered. They came and wanted to take it back from them. They answered, we already acquired it. They said, we wish for you to accept it in good faith; they answered, we are unpaid trustees. They approached Rebbi Dositheos ben Rebbi Yannai who told them, there it is, all of it. They took Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, whipped him with ropes, and took it from him. When they returned here, he went to his father and told him, look what your son did to me! He asked him, what did he do to you? He answered, if he had taken my position, they could not have taken anything from us. He asked him, why did you act in such a way? He said, I saw that they were a unanimous court, their hats were a cubit wide, they were directing blows, my brother Yose was bound and the whip ascended and descended. I said, does my father have another Dositheos? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, you say that for somebody who cannot give a warranty in good faith. But if somebody gives a warranty in good faith, one takes from this one and gives to the other.

If somebody forgave a bond to another person. Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mamal: one said it is forgiven; the other said it is not forgiven unless he handed over the bond.

MISHNAH: If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, “it was written before me,” but not “it was signed before me,” or “it was signed before me” but not “it was written before me”, “it was written before me but signed only partially before me”, “it was partially written before me but signed completely before me”, it is invalid. If one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”, it is invalid; if two people say, “it was written before us” but only one says, “it was signed before me,” it is invalid; but Rebbi Jehudah declares it valid. If one says, “it was written before me” but two say, “it was signed before us,” it is valid.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas,” etc. One understands “it was written before me” but not “it was signed before me”, but “it was signed before me” but not “it was written before me”? Is not a bill of divorce validated by its signatures? That must follow Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah invalidates forms. Following Rebbi Jehudah outside the Land as for one who divorces in the Land of Israel. Are there forms of bills of divorce outside the Land for divorces outside the Land? It is necessary for him to know that it is a bill of divorce and that he be appointed as an agent; he would not know that it was a bill of divorce unless it was written completely before him. Rebbi Ḥanin stated: It is permitted that he enter and leave.

If the witnesses do not know how to sign. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one sketches for them in ink and they sign with vermilion, or with vermilion and they sign in ink. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, because we are occupied with the rules of the Sabbath, should we permit a married woman? But he brings an blank sheet of paper and cuts it before them. Would it not have been the first person’s handwriting? One has to widen the cuts. Rebbi Mana said, why do we not say that one sketches for them with water? If he would come and protest, his protest would be accepted. If somebody tears into skin in the form of writing it is valid. If somebody sketches on skin in the form of writing it is invalid.

If the witnesses do not know how to sign. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one sketches for them in ink and they sign with vermilion, or with vermilion and they sign in ink. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, because we are occupied with the rules of the Sabbath, should we permit a married woman? But he brings an blank sheet of paper and cuts it before them. Would it not have been the first person’s handwriting? One has to widen the cuts. Rebbi Mana said, why do we not say that one sketches for them with water? If he would come and protest, his protest would be accepted. If somebody tears into skin in the form of writing it is valid. If somebody sketches on skin in the form of writing it is invalid.

MISHNAH: If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce he has to leave space for the man, the woman, and the time. For bonds, he has to leave space for the lender, the borrower, the sum, and the time. For commercial deeds, he has to leave space for the buyer, the seller, the sum, the field, and the time, because of good order. Rebbi Jehudah invalidates all of these. Rebbi Eleazar validates all of them except women’s bills of divorce, for it is said: “He shall write for her”, in her name.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce he has to leave space for the man, the woman, and the time.” He explains it, with the essential text. It is difficult for Rebbi Joḥanan: Do the Sages declare valid in case he wrote the essential text with the formulaic text? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: From its invalidity you learn its validity. If he wrote everything in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names not in her name, would that be valid? Similarly, if he wrote everything not in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names in her name, it is valid. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Jeremiah: Think of it, if it was paired? He said, so said his teacher Rebbi Ze‘ira to him: Since pairing is infrequent, even if there was pairing it is as if there was no pairing. Then it is difficult for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Even if he did not write the essential text in the formula, Rebbi Jehudah declares invalid! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ze‘ira: Rebbi Jehudah refers to something else; it follows what Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An empty space of two lines about one subject is invalid in any case.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, writing the essential text with the formula is valid. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, writing the essential text with the formula is invalid. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If somebody writes formulaic texts of bills of divorce he has to leave space for the man, the woman, and the time.” He explains it, with the essential text. It is difficult for Rebbi Joḥanan: Do the Sages declare valid in case he wrote the essential text with the formulaic text? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: From its invalidity you learn its validity. If he wrote everything in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names not in her name, would that be valid? Similarly, if he wrote everything not in her name but the husband’s and the wife’s names in her name, it is valid. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Jeremiah: Think of it, if it was paired? He said, so said his teacher Rebbi Ze‘ira to him: Since pairing is infrequent, even if there was pairing it is as if there was no pairing. Then it is difficult for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Even if he did not write the essential text in the formula, Rebbi Jehudah declares invalid! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ze‘ira: Rebbi Jehudah refers to something else; it follows what Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An empty space of two lines about one subject is invalid in any case.

MISHNAH: If somebody transports a bill of divorce and loses it, if he finds it on the spot it is valid, otherwise it is invalid. If he finds it in a small bag or in a box, if he recognizes it, it is valid. If somebody transports a bill of divorce from an old or sick man, he delivers it to her under the presumption that the man is alive. The daughter of an Israel who is married to a Cohen and whose husband went overseas, may eat heave under the presumption that he is alive. If somebody sends his purification offering from overseas, it is sacrificed under the presumption that he is alive.

MISHNAH: If somebody transports a bill of divorce and loses it, if he finds it on the spot it is valid, otherwise it is invalid. If he finds it in a small bag or in a box, if he recognizes it, it is valid. If somebody transports a bill of divorce from an old or sick man, he delivers it to her under the presumption that the man is alive. The daughter of an Israel who is married to a Cohen and whose husband went overseas, may eat heave under the presumption that he is alive. If somebody sends his purification offering from overseas, it is sacrificed under the presumption that he is alive.

MISHNAH: If somebody transports a bill of divorce and loses it, if he finds it on the spot it is valid, otherwise it is invalid. If he finds it in a small bag or in a box, if he recognizes it, it is valid. If somebody transports a bill of divorce from an old or sick man, he delivers it to her under the presumption that the man is alive. The daughter of an Israel who is married to a Cohen and whose husband went overseas, may eat heave under the presumption that he is alive. If somebody sends his purification offering from overseas, it is sacrificed under the presumption that he is alive.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody transports a bill of divorce and loses it,” etc. What means “on the spot”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as nobody passed by there. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: as long as three people did not pass by there. If a Gentile passed by there? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana transported a bill of divorce; he lost it and a Saracen found it. The case came before Rebbi Joḥanan; they declared [the bill] valid. This means that if a Gentile passed by it is valid. Could we say that he had a mark to identify it? But was it not stated: There are no marks for bills of divorce. That is, if he said, two or three lines. But here, the ה in it had a spot. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana: Why is it invalid here? I say, it was another [husband] whose name was like his name. Think of it, if they checked out that entire place and did not find another man whose name was like his name! But it is because of the severity of adultery. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry”? Rebbi Mana told him: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid, the other invalid. He lost the valid one and threw away the invalid. When he found it, I say that what he found was the invalid bill.

But did we not state: From where that “if somebody says to his wife, this is your bill of divorce one hour before my death, or he says to his slave girl, this is the document of your manumission one hour before my death, each would be immediately forbidden to eat heave?” There, she is disabled immediately, but here she will only be disabled when he has died.

MISHNAH: If somebody is transporting a bill of divorce in the Land of Israel when he falls sick, he may send it by somebody else. If [the husband] had told him, take from her such and such, he cannot send it by somebody else since he does not want to see his valuables in somebody else’s hand.

MISHNAH: If somebody is transporting a bill of divorce in the Land of Israel when he falls sick, he may send it by somebody else. If [the husband] had told him, take from her such and such, he cannot send it by somebody else since he does not want to see his valuables in somebody else’s hand.

MISHNAH: If somebody is transporting a bill of divorce in the Land of Israel when he falls sick, he may send it by somebody else. If [the husband] had told him, take from her such and such, he cannot send it by somebody else since he does not want to see his valuables in somebody else’s hand.

MISHNAH: If somebody is transporting a bill of divorce in the Land of Israel when he falls sick, he may send it by somebody else. If [the husband] had told him, take from her such and such, he cannot send it by somebody else since he does not want to see his valuables in somebody else’s hand.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody is transporting a bill of divorce in the Land of Israel when he falls sick,” etc. Because he falls sick; therefore not if he did not fall sick.

This does not disagree with what Rebbi Joḥanan said, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if an agent handed over to another agent, the first one is responsible. Rebbi Abba the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya: Because of a condition of the divorce. What is the difference between them? If the husband came earlier and took it. If you say, because of a condition of the divorce, that is understandable. If you say, because I do not want to see my valuables in somebody else’s hand, his valuables are not in somebody else’s hand. Is it the same for preliminary marriages? What is the difference between divorces and preliminary marriages? One can divorce through the agency of anybody. One cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody.

This does not disagree with what Rebbi Joḥanan said, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if an agent handed over to another agent, the first one is responsible. Rebbi Abba the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya: Because of a condition of the divorce. What is the difference between them? If the husband came earlier and took it. If you say, because of a condition of the divorce, that is understandable. If you say, because I do not want to see my valuables in somebody else’s hand, his valuables are not in somebody else’s hand. Is it the same for preliminary marriages? What is the difference between divorces and preliminary marriages? One can divorce through the agency of anybody. One cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody.

MISHNAH: If somebody transports a bill of divorce overseas and falls sick, he assembles a court to send it and declares before them: “it was written and signed before me.” The later messenger does not have to say: “it was written and signed before me,” but he says: “I am an agent of the court.

HALAKHAH: If somebody transports a bill of divorce overseas and falls sick,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, this is only necessary if he already has arrived in the Land of Israel. Lest you say, since he arrived in the Land of Israel it should be treated as a bill of divorce from the Land of Israel, and for bills of divorce from the Land of Israel one does not have to say: “it was written and signed before me.”

MISHNAH: If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account, he can proceed on the assumption that they are alive and does not worry whether the Cohen or Levite died or the poor person became rich. If they died, he has to receive permission from the heirs; if the loan was executed in court he does not need permission.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This follows Rebbi Yose; as we have stated there: “Rebbi Yose says, anything whose replacement is in the Cohen’s hand is freed from the gifts, but Rebbi Meїr obligates.” Did Rebbi Yose not speak only if it did exist? But here, he still needs to sow! Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah speaks of acquaintances of Cohanim or Levites. But did we not state “a poor person”? Does a poor person have acquaintances? There came a case before Rebbi Immi: A Cohen or Levite who owed money to an Israel and told him, separate from my part for my account. He said to him, did we not state: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account.” When the loan was given under these conditions. Therefore, not if it was not a condition of the loan! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if it was not a condition of the loan. Rebbi Ze‘ira’s force is from the following: “Similarly, a Levite who owed money to an Israel and said to him, separate on my account; only he should not collect and separate because no Levite makes a Levite.” He only said, he should not separate, but from his own he may separate.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen,” etc. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This follows Rebbi Yose; as we have stated there: “Rebbi Yose says, anything whose replacement is in the Cohen’s hand is freed from the gifts, but Rebbi Meїr obligates.” Did Rebbi Yose not speak only if it did exist? But here, he still needs to sow! Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah speaks of acquaintances of Cohanim or Levites. But did we not state “a poor person”? Does a poor person have acquaintances? There came a case before Rebbi Immi: A Cohen or Levite who owed money to an Israel and told him, separate from my part for my account. He said to him, did we not state: “If somebody lent money to a Cohen, a Levite, or a poor person to separate on their account.” When the loan was given under these conditions. Therefore, not if it was not a condition of the loan! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if it was not a condition of the loan. Rebbi Ze‘ira’s force is from the following: “Similarly, a Levite who owed money to an Israel and said to him, separate on my account; only he should not collect and separate because no Levite makes a Levite.” He only said, he should not separate, but from his own he may separate.

There is no “he does not worry,” since he has to worry lest the poor became rich. It was stated so: “If somebody lends money to a poor and rich person he cannot separate for him, for one does not separate for what was lost.”

Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The Mishnah speaks of the heirs in priesthood and Levitic status. But concerning the poor, the poor has no inheritance. Bar Qappara stated: No person is immune from this; if not he then his son, if not his son then his grandson. This means, he can change the terms. Can the creditor change the terms? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody lends money to a first rich and then poor person he cannot separate for him, for one does not separate for what was lost and the poor acquired what is in his hand.” This implies that the creditor cannot change the terms.

MISHNAH: If somebody sets aside produce to be used for future heave and tithes, or money to be used for Second Tithe, can refer to them on the presumption that they exist. If they were lost, one worries about them for 24 hours back, the words of Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Jehudah says, three times a year one has to check the wine: At the time of East wind after Tabernacles, when the vines blossom, and when fluid starts to enter unripe grapes.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody sets aside produce,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar ben Antigonos in the name of Rebbi Eleazar ben Yannai: This means that nothing is in disorder for 24 hours but the last day. Rebbi Joḥanan said: Nothing is in order for 24 hours but the first day, as we have stated there: “If a miqweh was measured and found deficient.” Ḥinena the son of Rav Assi bar Mamal in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: That is to negate the words of Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated: “If they were lost, one worries about them for 24 hours back, the words of Rebbi Eleazar.”

Rebbi Crispus asked: Does he check every year or only once every three years? Let us hear from the following: If somebody sells unspecified wine to another person, he has to warrant it until after Tabernacles. Rebbi Yudan said, explain it for those Galileans who harvest only after the beginning of Tabernacles and you cannot deduce anything. That which was said, “old from the preceding year, very old aged three years”, should we say because of the tasting? This means that any time it is declared old he has to warrant it for two years. This means that very old [wine] has to be warranted until Tabernacles. This means that he has to check every year. How does he check? May one check one amphora on which all others depend that they would not become vinegar? Rebbi Shammai said, there are people who knock on the barrel from the outside and know what is inside.

MISHNAH: If somebody sent a bill of divorce to his wife and caught up with the agent, or he sent another agent after him and said: the bill of divorce I gave you is annulled, it is annulled. If he met his wife or he sent an agent to her and said: the bill of divorce I sent to you is annulled, it is annulled. After the bill of divorce came into her possession, he no longer can annul it.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody sent a bill of divorce to his wife,” etc. This disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said that a person invalidates the agent appointed by him by a declaration. He explains it by the stringency of the rules of incest. If he appointed an agent to deliver the bill of divorce, the latter has to deliver it in the presence of two [witnesses]; the agent is not counted as one of the two. If another agent went to invalidate the bill of divorce, he has to invalidate it in the presence of two [witnesses] and the agent is counted as one of the two. If he met him on the road and asked him, what about the bill of divorce I gave you? He answered, I delivered it to her. While they were talking there, he dropped it. He said, did you not tell me that you delivered it to her? He explained, I delivered it to her and she said, keep it for me. What? Can he be believed since it is in his power to divorce, or can he not be believed because it is in his hand? If the agent fell sick, how do you treat this? By the rules of divorces or the rules of preliminary marriages? By the rules of divorces one can divorce through the agency of anybody. By the rules of preliminary marriages one cannot preliminarily marry through the agency of anybody.

Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a slave fled from the kidnappers to his master, the master may not enslave him but has to write him a bill of manumission. Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody declares his slave as ownerless he can neither enslave him nor write him a bill of manumission. Rebbi Ze‘ira said to him, everybody says that he needs one; do you say that he does not need? Would he hinder him from eating the Passah [sacrifice]? As it was stated: “The slave of any man, acquisition of his money, if you circumcise him.” Anytime he serves his master, he prevents his master from eating the Passah; if he does not serve his master, he does not prevent his master from eating the Passah.