states

He bids men also, when lying down to sleep and rising tip again, to meditate upon the works of God, not only in word, but by observing distinctly the change and impression produced upon them, when they are going to sleep, and also their waking, how divine and incomprehensible the change from one of these states to the other is.

As for the occasions of so great disagreement of theirs, there may be assigned many that are very probable, if any have a mind to make an inquiry about them; but I ascribe these contradictions chiefly to two causes, which I will now mention, and still think what I shall mention in the first place to be the principal of all. For if we remember that in the beginning the Greeks had taken no care to have public records of their several transactions preserved, this must for certain have afforded those that would afterward write about those ancient transactions the opportunity of making mistakes, and the power of making lies also; for this original recording of such ancient transactions hath not only been neglected by the other states of Greece, but even among the Athenians themselves also, who pretend to be Aborigines, and to have applied themselves to learning, there are no such records extant; nay, they say themselves that the laws of Draco concerning murders, which are now extant in writing, are the most ancient of their public records; which Draco yet lived but a little before the tyrant Pisistratus. For as to the Arcadians, who make such boasts of their antiquity, what need I speak of them in particular, since it was still later before they got their letters, and learned them, and that with difficulty also.

Treating of the regulations respecting idolatry as being peculiar to Christianity, Celsus establishes their correctness, saying that the Christians do not consider those to be gods that are made with hands, on the ground that it is not in conformity with right reason [to suppose] that images, fashioned by the most worthless and depraved of workmen, and in many instances also provided by wicked men, can be [regarded as] gods. In what follows, however, wishing to show that this is a common opinion, and one not first discovered by Christianity, he quotes a saying of Heraclitus to this effect: “That those who draw near to lifeless images, as if they were gods, act in a similar manner to those who would enter into conversation with houses.” Respecting this, then, we have to say, that ideas were implanted in the minds of men like the principles of morality, from which not only Heraclitus, but any other Greek or barbarian, might by reflection have deduced the same conclusion; for he states that the Persians also were of the same opinion, quoting Herodotus as his authority. We also can add to these Zeno of Citium, who in his Polity says: “And there will be no need to build temples, for nothing ought to be regarded as sacred, or of much value, or holy, which is the work of builders and of mean men.” It is evident, then, with respect to this opinion [as well as others], that there has been engraven upon the hearts of men by the finger of God a sense of the duty that is required.

After these assertions, he takes from the Gospel of Matthew, and perhaps also from the other Gospels, the account of the dove alighting upon our Saviour at His baptism by John, and desires to throw discredit upon the statement, alleging that the narrative is a fiction. Having completely disposed, as he imagined, of the story of our Lord’s birth from a virgin, he does not proceed to deal in an orderly manner with the accounts that follow it; since passion and hatred observe no order, but angry and vindictive men slander those whom they hate, as the feeling comes upon them, being prevented by their passion from arranging their accusations on a careful and orderly plan. For if he had observed a proper arrangement, he would have taken up the Gospel, and, with the view of assailing it, would have objected to the first narrative, then passed on to the second, and so on to the others. But now, after the birth from a virgin, this Celsus, who professes to be acquainted with all our history, attacks the account of the appearance of the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove at the baptism. He then, after that, tries to throw discredit upon the prediction that our Lord was to come into the world. In the next place, he runs away to what immediately follows the narrative of the birth of Jesus—the account of the star, and of the wise men who came from the east to worship the child. And you yourself may find, if you take the trouble, many confused statements made by Celsus throughout his whole book; so that even in this account he may, by those who know how to observe and require an orderly method of arrangement, be convicted of great rashness and boasting, in having inscribed upon his work the title of A True Discourse,—a thing which is never done by a learned philosopher. For Plato says, that it is not an indication of an intelligent man to make strong assertions respecting those matters which are somewhat uncertain; and the celebrated Chrysippus even, who frequently states the reasons by which he is decided, refers us to those whom we shall find to be abler speakers than himself. This man, however, who is wiser than those already named, and than all the other Greeks, agreeably to his assertion of being acquainted with everything, inscribed upon his book the words, A True Discourse!

The first book of our answer to the treatise of Celsus, entitled A True Discourse, which concluded with the representation of the Jew addressing Jesus, having now extended to a sufficient length, we intend the present part as a reply to the charges brought by him against those who have been converted from Judaism to Christianity. And we call attention, in the first place, to this special question, viz. why Celsus, when he had once resolved upon the introduction of individuals upon the stage of his book, did not represent the Jew as addressing the converts from heathenism rather than those from Judaism, seeing that his discourse, if directed to us, would have appeared more likely to produce an impression. But probably this claimant to universal knowledge does not know what is appropriate in the matter of such representations; and therefore let us proceed to consider what he has to say to the converts from Judaism. He asserts that “they have forsaken the law of their fathers, in consequence of their minds being led captive by Jesus; that they have been most ridiculously deceived, and that they have become deserters to another name and to another mode of life.” Here he has not observed that the Jewish converts have not deserted the law of their fathers, inasmuch as they live according to its prescriptions, receiving their very name from the poverty of the law, according to the literal acceptation of the word; for Ebion signifies “poor” among the Jews, and those Jews who have received Jesus as Christ are called by the name of Ebionites. Nay, Peter himself seems to have observed for a considerable time the Jewish observances enjoined by the law of Moses, not having yet learned from Jesus to ascend from the law that is regulated according to the letter, to that which is interpreted according to the spirit,—a fact which we learn from the Acts of the Apostles. For on the day after the angel of God appeared to Cornelius, suggesting to him “to send to Joppa, to Simon surnamed Peter,” Peter “went up into the upper room to pray about the sixth hour. And he became very hungry, and would have eaten: but while they made ready he fell into a trance, and saw heaven opened, and a certain vessel descending unto him, as it had been a great sheet knit at the four corners, and let down to the earth; wherein were all manner of four-footed beasts, and creeping things of the earth, and fowls of the air. And there came a voice to him, Rise, Peter; kill, and eat. But Peter said, Not so, Lord; for I have never eaten anything that is common or unclean. And the voice spake unto him again the second time, What God hath cleansed, that call thou not common.” Now observe how, by this instance, Peter is represented as still observing the Jewish customs respecting clean and unclean animals. And from the narrative that follows, it is manifest that he, as being yet a Jew, and living according to their traditions, and despising those who were beyond the pale of Judaism, stood in need of a vision to lead him to communicate to Cornelius (who was not an Israelite according to the flesh), and to those who were with him, the word of faith. Moreover, in the Epistle to the Galatians, Paul states that Peter, still from fear of the Jews, ceased upon the arrival of James to eat with the Gentiles, and “separated himself from them, fearing them that were of the circumcision;” and the rest of the Jews, and Barnabas also, followed the same course. And certainly it was quite consistent that those should not abstain from the observance of Jewish usages who were sent to minister to the circumcision, when they who “seemed to be pillars” gave the right hand of fellowship to Paul and Barnabas, in order that, while devoting themselves to the circumcision, the latter might preach to the Gentiles. And why do I mention that they who preached to the circumcision withdrew and separated themselves from the heathen, when even Paul himself “became as a Jew to the Jews, that he might gain the Jews?” Wherefore also in the Acts of the Apostles it is related that he even brought an offering to the altar, that he might satisfy the Jews that he was no apostate from their law. Now, if Celsus had been acquainted with all these circumstances, he would not have represented the Jew holding such language as this to the converts from Judaism: “What induced you, my fellow-citizens, to abandon the law of your fathers, and to allow your minds to be led captive by him with whom we have just conversed, and thus be most ridiculously deluded, so as to become deserters from us to another name, and to the practices of another life?”

He charges us, moreover, with introducing “a man formed by the hands of God,” although the book of Genesis has made no mention of the “hands” of God, either when relating the creation or the “fashioning” of the man; while it is Job and David who have used the expression, “Thy hands have made me and fashioned me;” with reference to which it would need a lengthened discourse to point out the sense in which these words were understood by those who used them, both as regards the difference between “making” and “fashioning,” and also the “hands” of God. For those who do not understand these and similar expressions in the sacred Scriptures, imagine that we attribute to the God who is over all things a form such as that of man; and according to their conceptions, it follows that we consider the body of God to be furnished with wings, since the Scriptures, literally understood, attribute such appendages to God. The subject before us, however, does not require us to interpret these expressions; for, in our explanatory remarks upon the book of Genesis, these matters have been made, to the best of our ability, a special subject of investigation. Observe next the malignity of Celsus in what follows. For the Scripture, speaking of the “fashioning” of the man, says, “And breathed into his face the breath of life, and the man became a living soul.” Whereon Celsus, wishing maliciously to ridicule the “inbreathing into his face of the breath of life,” and not understanding the sense in which the expression was employed, states that “they composed a story that a man was fashioned by the hands of God, and was inflated by breath blown into him,” in order that, taking the word “inflated” to be used in a similar way to the inflation of skins, he might ridicule the statement, “He breathed into his face the breath of life,”—terms which are used figuratively, and require to be explained in order to show that God communicated to man of His incorruptible Spirit; as it is said, “For Thine incorruptible Spirit is in all things.”

After this Celsus continues: “It is not easy, indeed, for one who is not a philosopher to ascertain the origin of evils, though it is sufficient for the multitude to say that they do not proceed from God, but cleave to matter, and have their abode among mortal things; while the course of mortal things being the same from beginning to end, the same things must always, agreeably to the appointed cycles, recur in the past, present, and future.” Celsus here observes that it is not easy for one who is not a philosopher to ascertain the origin of evils, as if it were an easy matter for a philosopher to gain this knowledge, while for one who is not a philosopher it was difficult, though still possible, for such an one, although with great labour, to attain it. Now, to this we say, that the origin of evils is a subject which is not easy even for a philosopher to master, and that perhaps it is impossible even for such to attain a clear understanding of it, unless it be revealed to them by divine inspiration, both what evils are, and how they originated, and how they shall be made to disappear. But although ignorance of God is an evil, and one of the greatest of these is not to know how God is to be served and worshipped, yet, as even Celsus would admit, there are undoubtedly some philosophers who have been ignorant of this, as is evident from the views of the different philosophical sects; whereas, according to our judgment, no one is capable of ascertaining the origin of evils who does not know that it is wicked to suppose that piety is preserved uninjured amid the laws that are established in different states, in conformity with the generally prevailing ideas of government. No one, moreover, who has not heard what is related of him who is called “devil,” and of his “angels,” and what he was before he became a devil, and how he became such, and what was the cause of the simultaneous apostasy of those who are termed his angels, will be able to ascertain the origin of evils. But he who would attain to this knowledge must learn more accurately the nature of demons, and know that they are not the work of God so far as respects their demoniacal nature, but only in so far as they are possessed of reason; and also what their origin was, so that they became beings of such a nature, that while converted into demons, the powers of their mind remain. And if there be any topic of human investigation which is difficult for our nature to grasp, certainly the origin of evils may be considered to be such.

Let us next notice the statements of Celsus, which follow the preceding, and which are as follow: “As the Jews, then, became a peculiar people, and enacted laws in keeping with the customs of their country, and maintain them up to the present time, and observe a mode of worship which, whatever be its nature, is yet derived from their fathers, they act in these respects like other men, because each nation retains its ancestral customs, whatever they are, if they happen to be established among them. And such an arrangement appears to be advantageous, not only because it has occurred to the mind of other nations to decide some things differently, but also because it is a duty to protect what has been established for the public advantage; and also because, in all probability, the various quarters of the earth were from the beginning allotted to different superintending spirits, and were thus distributed among certain governing powers, and in this manner the administration of the world is carried on. And whatever is done among each nation in this way would be rightly done, wherever it was agreeable to the wishes [of the superintending powers], while it would be an act of impiety to get rid of the institutions established from the beginning in the various places.” By these words Celsus shows that the Jews, who were formerly Egyptians, subsequently became a “peculiar people,” and enacted laws which they carefully preserve. And not to repeat his statements, which have been already before us, he says that it is advantageous to the Jews to observe their ancestral worship, as other nations carefully attend to theirs. And he further states a deeper reason why it is of advantage to the Jews to cultivate their ancestral customs, in hinting dimly that those to whom was allotted the office of superintending the country which was being legislated for, enacted the laws of each land in co-operation with its legislators. He appears, then, to indicate that both the country of the Jews, and the nation which inhabits it, are superintended by one or more beings, who, whether they were one or more, co-operated with Moses, and enacted the laws of the Jews.

It appears to me, indeed, that Celsus has misunderstood some of the deeper reasons relating to the arrangement of terrestrial affairs, some of which are touched upon even in Grecian history, when certain of those who are considered to be gods are introduced as having contended with each other about the possession of Attica; while in the writings of the Greek poets also, some who are called gods are represented as acknowledging that certain places here are preferred by them before others. The history of barbarian nations, moreover, and especially that of Egypt, contains some such allusions to the division of the so-called Egyptian nomes, when it states that Athena, who obtained Saïs by lot, is the same who also has possession of Attica. And the learned among the Egyptians can enumerate innumerable instances of this kind, although I do not know whether they include the Jews and their country in this division. And now, so far as testimonies outside the word of God bearing on this point are concerned, enough have been adduced for the present. We say, moreover, that our prophet of God and His genuine servant Moses, in his song in the book of Deuteronomy, makes a statement regarding the portioning out of the earth in the following terms: “When the Most High divided the nations, when He dispersed the sons of Adam, He set the bounds of the people according to the number of the angels of God; and the Lord’s portion was His people Jacob, and Israel the cord of His inheritance.” And regarding the distribution of the nations, the same Moses, in his work entitled Genesis, thus expresses himself in the style of a historical narrative: “And the whole earth was of one language and of one speech; and it came to pass, as they journeyed from the east, that they found a plain in the land of Shinar, and they dwelt there.” A little further on he continues: “And the Lord came down to see the city and the tower, which the children of men had built. And the Lord said, Behold, the people is one, and they have all one language; and this they have begun to do: and now nothing will be restrained from them which they have imagined to do. Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another’s speech. And the Lord scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth: and they left off to build the city and the tower. Therefore is the name of it called Confusion; because the Lord did there confound the language of all the earth: and from thence did the Lord scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth.” In the treatise of Solomon, moreover, on “Wisdom,” and on the events at the time of the confusion of languages, when the division of the earth took place, we find the following regarding Wisdom: “Moreover, the nations. in their wicked conspiracy being confounded, she found out the righteous, and preserved him blameless unto God, and kept him strong in his tender compassion towards his son.” But on these subjects much, and that of a mystical kind, might be said; in keeping with which is the following: “It is good to keep close the secret of a king,”—in order that the doctrine of the entrance of souls into bodies (not, however, that of the transmigration from one body into another) may not be thrown before the common understanding, nor what is holy given to the dogs, nor pearls be cast before swine. For such a procedure would be impious, being equivalent to a betrayal of the mysterious declarations of God’s wisdom, of which it has been well said: “Into a malicious soul wisdom shall not enter, nor dwell in a body subject to sin.” It is sufficient, however, to represent in the style of a historic narrative what is intended to convey a secret meaning in the garb of history, that those who have the capacity may work out for themselves all that relates to the subject.

With some such object as this in view does Celsus seem to have been actuated, when he alleged that Christians term the Creator an “accursed divinity;” in order that he who believes these charges of his against us, should, if possible, arise and exterminate the Christians as the most impious of mankind. Confusing, moreover, things that are distinct, he states also the reason why the God of the Mosaic cosmogony is termed “accursed,” asserting that “such is his character, and worthy of execration in the opinion of those who so regard him, inasmuch as he pronounced a curse upon the serpent, who introduced the first human beings to the knowledge of good and evil.” Now he ought to have known that those who have espoused the cause of the serpent, because he gave good advice to the first human beings, and who go far beyond the Titans and Giants of fable, and are on this account called Ophites, are so far from being Christians, that they bring accusations against Jesus to as great a degree as Celsus himself; and they do not admit any one into their assembly until he has uttered maledictions against Jesus. See, then, how irrational is the procedure of Celsus, who, in his discourse against the Christians, represents as such those who will not even listen to the name of Jesus, or admit even that He was a wise man, or a person of virtuous character! What, then, could evince greater folly or madness, not only on the part of those who wish to derive their name from the serpent as the author of good, but also on the part of Celsus, who thinks that the accusations with which the Ophites are charged, are chargeable also against the Christians! Long ago, indeed, that Greek philosopher who preferred a state of poverty, and who exhibited the pattern of a happy life, showing that he was not excluded from happiness although he was possessed of nothing, termed himself a Cynic; while these impious wretches, as not being human beings, whose enemy the serpent is, but as being serpents, pride themselves upon being called Ophites from the serpent, which is an animal most hostile to and greatly dreaded by man, and boast of one Euphrates as the introducer of these unhallowed opinions.

After this he returns to the subject of Marcion’s opinions (having already spoken frequently of them), and states some of them correctly, while others he has misunderstood; these, however, it is not necessary for us to answer or refute. Again, after this he brings forward the various arguments that may be urged on Marcion’s behalf, and also against him, enumerating what the opinions are which exonerate him from the charges, and what expose him to them; and when he desires to support the statement which declares that Jesus has been the subject of prophecy,—in order to found a charge against Marcion and his followers,—he distinctly asks, “How could he, who was punished in such a manner, be shown to be God’s Son, unless these things had been predicted of him?” He next proceeds to jest, and, as his custom is, to pour ridicule upon the subject, introducing “two sons of God, one the son of the Creator, and the other the son of Marcion’s God; and he portrays their single combats, saying that the Theomachies of the Fathers are like the battles between quails; or that the Fathers, becoming useless through age, and falling into their dotage, do not meddle at all with one another, but leave their sons to fight it out.” The remark which he made formerly we will turn against himself: “What old woman would not be ashamed to lull a child to sleep with such stories as he has inserted in the work which he entitles A True Discourse? For when he ought seriously to apply himself to argument, he leaves serious argument aside, and betakes himself to jesting and buffoonery, imagining that he is writing mimes or scoffing verses; not observing that such a method of procedure defeats his purpose, which is to make us abandon Christianity and give in our adherence to his opinions, which, perhaps, had they been stated with some degree of gravity, would have appeared more likely to convince, whereas, since he continues to ridicule, and scoff, and play the buffoon, we answer that it is because he has no argument of weight (for such he neither had, nor could understand) that he has betaken himself to such drivelling.”

His next remark was, “Have not these inferior powers had assigned to them by God different departments, according as each was deemed worthy?” But this is a question which requires a very profound knowledge. For we must determine whether the Word of God, who governs all things, has appointed wicked demons for certain employments, in the same way as in states executioners are appointed, and other officers with cruel but needful duties to discharge; or whether as among robbers, who infest desert places, it is customary for them to choose out of their number one who may be their leader,—so the demons, who are scattered as it were in troops in different parts of the earth, have chosen for themselves a chief under whose command they may plunder and pillage the souls of men. To explain this fully, and to justify the conduct of the Christians in refusing homage to any object except the Most High God, and the First-born of all creation, who is His Word and God, we must quote this from Scripture, “All that ever came before me are thieves and robbers; but the sheep did not hear them;” and again, “The thief cometh not but for to steal, and to kill, and to destroy;” and other similar passages, as, “Behold, I have given you authority to tread on serpents and scorpions, and over all the power of the enemy; and nothing shall by any means hurt you;” and again, “Thou shalt tread upon the lion and adder: the young lion and the dragon shalt thou trample under feet.” But of these things Celsus knew nothing, or he would not have made use of language like this: “Is not everything which happens in the universe, whether it be the work of God, of angels, of other demons, or of heroes, regulated by the law of the Most High God? Have these not had assigned to them various departments of which they were severally deemed worthy? Is it not just, therefore, that he who serves God should serve those also to whom God has assigned such power?” To which he adds, “It is impossible, they say, for a man to serve many masters.” This last point we must postpone to the next book; for this, which is the seventh book which we have written in answer to the treatise of Celsus, is already of sufficient length.

And we are not to believe in demons, although Celsus urges us to do so; but if we are to obey God, we must die, or endure anything sooner than obey demons. In the same way, we are not to propitiate demons; for it is impossible to propitiate beings that are wicked and that seek the injury of men. Besides, what are the laws in accordance with which Celsus would have us propitiate the demons? For if he means laws enacted in states, he must show that they are in agreement with the divine laws. But if that cannot be done, as the laws of many states are quite inconsistent with each other, these laws, therefore, must of necessity either be no laws at all in the proper sense of the word, or else the enactments of wicked men; and these we must not obey, for “we must obey God rather than men.” Away, then, with this counsel, which Celsus gives us, to offer prayer to demons: it is not to be listened to for a moment; for our duty is to pray to the Most High God alone, and to the only-begotten, the first-born of the whole creation, and to ask Him as our High Priest to present the prayers which ascend to Him from us, to His God and our God, to His Father and the Father of those who direct their lives according to His word. And as we would have no desire to enjoy the favour of those men who wish us to follow their wicked lives, and who give us their favour only on condition that we choose nothing opposed to their wishes, because their favour would make us enemies of God, who cannot be pleased with those who have such men for their friends,—in the same way those who are acquainted with the nature, the purposes, and the wickedness of demons, can never wish to obtain their favour.

And we are not to believe in demons, although Celsus urges us to do so; but if we are to obey God, we must die, or endure anything sooner than obey demons. In the same way, we are not to propitiate demons; for it is impossible to propitiate beings that are wicked and that seek the injury of men. Besides, what are the laws in accordance with which Celsus would have us propitiate the demons? For if he means laws enacted in states, he must show that they are in agreement with the divine laws. But if that cannot be done, as the laws of many states are quite inconsistent with each other, these laws, therefore, must of necessity either be no laws at all in the proper sense of the word, or else the enactments of wicked men; and these we must not obey, for “we must obey God rather than men.” Away, then, with this counsel, which Celsus gives us, to offer prayer to demons: it is not to be listened to for a moment; for our duty is to pray to the Most High God alone, and to the only-begotten, the first-born of the whole creation, and to ask Him as our High Priest to present the prayers which ascend to Him from us, to His God and our God, to His Father and the Father of those who direct their lives according to His word. And as we would have no desire to enjoy the favour of those men who wish us to follow their wicked lives, and who give us their favour only on condition that we choose nothing opposed to their wishes, because their favour would make us enemies of God, who cannot be pleased with those who have such men for their friends,—in the same way those who are acquainted with the nature, the purposes, and the wickedness of demons, can never wish to obtain their favour.

Celsus afterwards states what is adduced by Jews and Christians alike in defence of abstinence from idol sacrifices, namely, that it is wrong for those who have dedicated themselves to the Most High God to eat with demons. What he brings forward against this view, we have already seen. In our opinion, a man can only be said to eat and drink with demons when he eats the flesh of what are called sacred victims, and when he drinks the wine poured out to the honour of the demons. But Celsus thinks that we cannot eat bread or drink wine in any way whatever, or taste fruits, or even take a draught of water, without eating and drinking with demons. He adds also, that the air which we breathe is received from demons, and that not an animal can breathe without receiving the air from the demons who are set over the air. If any one wishes to defend this statement of Celsus, let him show that it is not the divine angels of God, but demons, the whole race of whom are bad, that have been appointed to communicate all those blessings which have been mentioned. We indeed also maintain with regard not only to the fruits of the earth, but to every flowing stream and every breath of air, that the ground brings forth those things which are said to grow up naturally,—that the water springs in fountains, and refreshes the earth with running streams,—that the air is kept pure, and supports the life of those who breathe it only in consequence of the agency and control of certain beings whom we may call invisible husbandmen and guardians; but we deny that those invisible agents are demons. And if we might speak boldly, we would say that if demons have any share at all in these things, to them belong famine, blasting of the vine and fruit trees, pestilence among men and beasts: all these are the proper occupations of demons, who in the capacity of public executioners receive power at certain times to carry out the divine judgments, for the restoration of those who have plunged headlong into wickedness, or for the trial and discipline of the souls of the wise. For those who through all their afflictions preserve their piety pure and unimpaired, show their true character to all spectators, whether visible or invisible, who behold them; while those who are otherwise minded, yet conceal their wickedness, when they have their true character exposed by misfortunes, become manifest to themselves as well as to those whom we may also call spectators.

He who writes two letters in two states of unawareness, one in the morning and one in the evening: Rabban Gamaliel declares him liable; But the sages exempt him.

A man who brings a bill of divorce from a country beyond the sea and states, “it was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence”, must not marry the [divorcer’s] wife. [Similarly, if one states] “he died”, “I killed him”, or “We killed him”, he must not marry his wife. Rabbi Judah said: [If he says], “ I killed him”, the woman may not marry [any one]; [If, he states], “We killed him”, the woman may marry.

A man who brings a bill of divorce from a country beyond the sea and states, “it was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence”, must not marry the [divorcer’s] wife. [Similarly, if one states] “he died”, “I killed him”, or “We killed him”, he must not marry his wife. Rabbi Judah said: [If he says], “ I killed him”, the woman may not marry [any one]; [If, he states], “We killed him”, the woman may marry.

A man who brings a bill of divorce from a country beyond the sea and states, “it was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence”, must not marry the [divorcer’s] wife. [Similarly, if one states] “he died”, “I killed him”, or “We killed him”, he must not marry his wife. Rabbi Judah said: [If he says], “ I killed him”, the woman may not marry [any one]; [If, he states], “We killed him”, the woman may marry.

If she stated, “my husband died first and my father-in-law died after him”, she may marry again and she also receives her ketubah, but her mother-in-law is forbidden [to remarry]. If [her mother-in-law] was the daughter of an Israelite [who was married] to a priest, she is permitted to eat terumah, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead her away from transgression, unless [it be enacted that] she shall be forbidden both to marry and to eat terumah. If a man betrothed one of five women and he does not know which of them he has betrothed, and each states, “he has betrothed me”, he gives a letter of divorce to every one of them, and he leaves one ketubah [sum] for them and withdraws, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead him away from transgression, unless he gives to each of them both a get and a ketubah. If a man robbed one of five persons and does not know which of them he has robbed, and each one states, “he has robbed me”, he leaves the [amount of] the robbery among them and withdraws, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead them away from transgression, unless one pays [the full amount of the robbery] to every one [of the persons involved].

If she stated, “my husband died first and my father-in-law died after him”, she may marry again and she also receives her ketubah, but her mother-in-law is forbidden [to remarry]. If [her mother-in-law] was the daughter of an Israelite [who was married] to a priest, she is permitted to eat terumah, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead her away from transgression, unless [it be enacted that] she shall be forbidden both to marry and to eat terumah. If a man betrothed one of five women and he does not know which of them he has betrothed, and each states, “he has betrothed me”, he gives a letter of divorce to every one of them, and he leaves one ketubah [sum] for them and withdraws, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead him away from transgression, unless he gives to each of them both a get and a ketubah. If a man robbed one of five persons and does not know which of them he has robbed, and each one states, “he has robbed me”, he leaves the [amount of] the robbery among them and withdraws, the words of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: this is not a way that would lead them away from transgression, unless one pays [the full amount of the robbery] to every one [of the persons involved].

[If a woman states], “A son was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea” and she also states, “my son died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed. [If she states], “my husband died and afterwards my son died”, she is not believed, but we are concerned that her words [might be true] and she must, therefore, perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum.

[If a woman states], “A son was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea” and she also states, “my son died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed. [If she states], “my husband died and afterwards my son died”, she is not believed, but we are concerned that her words [might be true] and she must, therefore, perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum.

[If a woman states], “A son was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea” and she also states, “my son died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed. [If she states], “my husband died and afterwards my son died”, she is not believed, but we are concerned that her words [might be true] and she must, therefore, perform halitzah but may not contract yibbum.

[If a woman states] “a brother-in-law was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea”, and afterwards she states, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law died” or “my brother-in-law died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed. If a woman and her husband and her brother-in-law went to a country beyond the sea, and she [on returning home] stated, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law [died]” or “my brother-in-law [died] and afterwards my husband [died]” she is not believed; For a woman is not to be believed when she asserts “my brother-in-law is dead”, in order that she may marry again; Nor [is she believed when she states that] her sister is dead, in order that she may enter his house. A man also is not believed when he states “my brother is dead”, so that he may have yibbum with his wife, nor [when he states that] his wife is dead, in order that he may marry her sister.

[If a woman states] “a brother-in-law was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea”, and afterwards she states, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law died” or “my brother-in-law died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed. If a woman and her husband and her brother-in-law went to a country beyond the sea, and she [on returning home] stated, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law [died]” or “my brother-in-law [died] and afterwards my husband [died]” she is not believed; For a woman is not to be believed when she asserts “my brother-in-law is dead”, in order that she may marry again; Nor [is she believed when she states that] her sister is dead, in order that she may enter his house. A man also is not believed when he states “my brother is dead”, so that he may have yibbum with his wife, nor [when he states that] his wife is dead, in order that he may marry her sister.

[If a woman states] “a brother-in-law was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea”, and afterwards she states, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law died” or “my brother-in-law died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed. If a woman and her husband and her brother-in-law went to a country beyond the sea, and she [on returning home] stated, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law [died]” or “my brother-in-law [died] and afterwards my husband [died]” she is not believed; For a woman is not to be believed when she asserts “my brother-in-law is dead”, in order that she may marry again; Nor [is she believed when she states that] her sister is dead, in order that she may enter his house. A man also is not believed when he states “my brother is dead”, so that he may have yibbum with his wife, nor [when he states that] his wife is dead, in order that he may marry her sister.

[If a woman states] “a brother-in-law was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea”, and afterwards she states, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law died” or “my brother-in-law died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed. If a woman and her husband and her brother-in-law went to a country beyond the sea, and she [on returning home] stated, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law [died]” or “my brother-in-law [died] and afterwards my husband [died]” she is not believed; For a woman is not to be believed when she asserts “my brother-in-law is dead”, in order that she may marry again; Nor [is she believed when she states that] her sister is dead, in order that she may enter his house. A man also is not believed when he states “my brother is dead”, so that he may have yibbum with his wife, nor [when he states that] his wife is dead, in order that he may marry her sister.

[If a woman states] “a brother-in-law was given to me [while I was] in a country beyond the sea”, and afterwards she states, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law died” or “my brother-in-law died and afterwards my husband died”, she is believed. If a woman and her husband and her brother-in-law went to a country beyond the sea, and she [on returning home] stated, “my husband died and afterwards my brother-in-law [died]” or “my brother-in-law [died] and afterwards my husband [died]” she is not believed; For a woman is not to be believed when she asserts “my brother-in-law is dead”, in order that she may marry again; Nor [is she believed when she states that] her sister is dead, in order that she may enter his house. A man also is not believed when he states “my brother is dead”, so that he may have yibbum with his wife, nor [when he states that] his wife is dead, in order that he may marry her sister.

Rabbi Akiva said: When I went down to Nehardea to intercalate the year, I met Nehemiah of Bet D’li who said to me, “I heard that in the land of Israel no one, permits a [married] woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, except Rabbi Judah ben Bava”. “That is so”, I told him. He said to me, “Tell them in my name: ‘You know that this country is in confusion because of marauders. I have received a tradition from Rabban Gamaliel the Elder: that they allow a [married] woman to remarry on the evidence of one witness’”. And when I came and recounted the conversation in the presence of Rabban Gamaliel he rejoiced at my words and exclaimed, “We have found a match for Rabbi Judah ben Bava!” As a result of this talk Rabban Gamaliel remembered that some men were once killed at Tel Arza, and that Rabban Gamaliel the Elder had allowed their wives to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and the law was established that they allow a woman to marry again on the evidence of one witness, and on the testimony of one [who states that he has heard] from another witness, from a slave, from a woman or from a female slave. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua say: a woman is not be allowed to remarry on the evidence of one witness. Rabbi Akiva ruled: [a woman is not allowed to marry again] on the evidence of a woman, on that of a slave, on that of a female slave or on that of relatives. They said to him: It once happened that a number of Levites went to Tsoar, the city of palms, and one of them became ill on the way, and they left him in an inn. When they returned they asked the [female] innkeeper, “Where is our friend?” And she replied, “He is dead and I buried him”, and they allowed his wife to remarry. Should not then a priest’s wife [be believed at least as much] as an innkeeper!” He answered them: When she will [give such evidence] as the innkeeper [gave] she will be believed, for the innkeeper had brought out to them [the dead man’s] staff, his bag and the Torah scroll which he had with him.

On that day Rabbi Akiva expounded, “You shall measure off two thousand cubits outside the town on the east side” (Numbers 35:5). But another verse states, “from the wall of the city outward a thousand cubits around” (vs. It is impossible to say that it was a thousand cubits since it has been already stated two thousand cubits; and it is impossible to say that it was two thousand cubits since it has been already stated a thousand cubits! How then is this so? A thousand cubits for the field [surrounding the city] and two thousand cubits for the Sabbath-limits. Rabbi Eliezer the son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: a thousand cubits for the field [surrounding the city] and two thousand cubits for fields and vineyards.

On that day Rabbi Joshua ben Hyrcanus expounded: Job only served the Holy One, blessed be He, from love: as it is said, “Though he slay me, yet I will wait for him” (Job 13:15). And it is still evenly balanced whether to read “I will wait for him” or “I will not wait for him”? Scripture states, “Until I die I will maintain my integrity” (Job 27:5), this teaches that what he did was from love. Rabbi Joshua [ben Hananiah] said: who will remove the dust from your eyes, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai, since you had expounded all your life that Job only served the Omnipresent from fear, as it is said, “A blameless and upright man that fears God and shuns evil” (Job 1:8) did not Joshua, the student of your student, teach that what he did was from love?

For it would have been logical: Now if the first evidence [that the woman had secluded herself with the man], which does not prohibit her [to her husband] for all time, is not established by fewer than two witnesses, is it not logical that the final evidence [that she had been defiled] which does prohibit her to him for all time, should not be established by fewer than two witnesses! Scripture states, “And there is no witness against her” (Numbers 5:13) whatever testimony there may be against her [is believed]. And now with respect to the first evidence [about her seclusion with the man] there is an a fortiori (kal vehomer) argument: Now if the final evidence [regarding her being defiled], which prohibits her to her husband for all time, is established by one witness, is it not logical that the first evidence, which does not prohibit her to him for all time, should be established by one witness! Scripture states, “Because he has found some unseemly matter in her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and elsewhere [Scripture] states, “By the mouth of two witnesses ... shall the matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15); just as the “matter” mentioned in this latter case must be based on the testimony of two witnesses, so also here [in the case of the suspected woman] the “matter” must be based on the testimony of two witnesses.

For it would have been logical: Now if the first evidence [that the woman had secluded herself with the man], which does not prohibit her [to her husband] for all time, is not established by fewer than two witnesses, is it not logical that the final evidence [that she had been defiled] which does prohibit her to him for all time, should not be established by fewer than two witnesses! Scripture states, “And there is no witness against her” (Numbers 5:13) whatever testimony there may be against her [is believed]. And now with respect to the first evidence [about her seclusion with the man] there is an a fortiori (kal vehomer) argument: Now if the final evidence [regarding her being defiled], which prohibits her to her husband for all time, is established by one witness, is it not logical that the first evidence, which does not prohibit her to him for all time, should be established by one witness! Scripture states, “Because he has found some unseemly matter in her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and elsewhere [Scripture] states, “By the mouth of two witnesses ... shall the matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15); just as the “matter” mentioned in this latter case must be based on the testimony of two witnesses, so also here [in the case of the suspected woman] the “matter” must be based on the testimony of two witnesses.

For it would have been logical: Now if the first evidence [that the woman had secluded herself with the man], which does not prohibit her [to her husband] for all time, is not established by fewer than two witnesses, is it not logical that the final evidence [that she had been defiled] which does prohibit her to him for all time, should not be established by fewer than two witnesses! Scripture states, “And there is no witness against her” (Numbers 5:13) whatever testimony there may be against her [is believed]. And now with respect to the first evidence [about her seclusion with the man] there is an a fortiori (kal vehomer) argument: Now if the final evidence [regarding her being defiled], which prohibits her to her husband for all time, is established by one witness, is it not logical that the first evidence, which does not prohibit her to him for all time, should be established by one witness! Scripture states, “Because he has found some unseemly matter in her” (Deuteronomy 24:1), and elsewhere [Scripture] states, “By the mouth of two witnesses ... shall the matter be established” (Deuteronomy 19:15); just as the “matter” mentioned in this latter case must be based on the testimony of two witnesses, so also here [in the case of the suspected woman] the “matter” must be based on the testimony of two witnesses.

“And it shall be, when the officers have finished speaking to the people, they shall appoint captains of hosts at the head of the people” (Deuteronomy 20:9). And at the rear of the people they station guards in front of them and others behind them, with iron axes in their hands, and should anyone wish to flee, they have permission to strike his thighs, because the beginning of falling [in battle] is fleeing, as it is said, “Israel fled before the Philistines, and the people also suffered a great slaughter” (I Samuel 4:17) and elsewhere it states, “And the men of Israel fled before the Philistines and fell down slain” (ibid 31:1).

[If a father declares,] “I have given my daughter in betrothal, but do not know to whom I have betrothed her,” and then a man comes and states, “I betrothed her,” he is believed. If one says, “I betrothed her,” and another [man] says, “I betrothed her,” both must give a get; but if they want, one may give a get and the other marry her.

If one lent one’s fellow, he may exact a pledge from him only with the permission of a court, and he may not enter his house to take the pledge, as it is states, “You shall stand outside” (Deut. 24:1. If the borrower had two utensils, he may take one but must give back the other. And he must give back the pillow at night and the plow during the day. And if the creditor dies he need not return the pledge to his heirs. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “Even to the debtor himself he need only return the pledge within thirty days [of the loan], and after thirty days he may sell it with the consent of the court. A pledge may not be taken from a widow, whether she be rich or poor, as it states, “Do not take the a widow’s garment as a pledge” (Deut. 24:17). If one takes a millstone as a pledge he violates a negative commandment and he is also in violation of both parts [of the millstone], as it states, “Do not take a mill or an upper millstone as a pledge” (Deut. 24:6). And they didn’t say just an upper millstone or a mill but anything that is necessary for food, as it states, “for that would be taking someone’s life as a pledge” (ibid.).

If one lent one’s fellow, he may exact a pledge from him only with the permission of a court, and he may not enter his house to take the pledge, as it is states, “You shall stand outside” (Deut. 24:1. If the borrower had two utensils, he may take one but must give back the other. And he must give back the pillow at night and the plow during the day. And if the creditor dies he need not return the pledge to his heirs. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “Even to the debtor himself he need only return the pledge within thirty days [of the loan], and after thirty days he may sell it with the consent of the court. A pledge may not be taken from a widow, whether she be rich or poor, as it states, “Do not take the a widow’s garment as a pledge” (Deut. 24:17). If one takes a millstone as a pledge he violates a negative commandment and he is also in violation of both parts [of the millstone], as it states, “Do not take a mill or an upper millstone as a pledge” (Deut. 24:6). And they didn’t say just an upper millstone or a mill but anything that is necessary for food, as it states, “for that would be taking someone’s life as a pledge” (ibid.).

If one lent one’s fellow, he may exact a pledge from him only with the permission of a court, and he may not enter his house to take the pledge, as it is states, “You shall stand outside” (Deut. 24:1. If the borrower had two utensils, he may take one but must give back the other. And he must give back the pillow at night and the plow during the day. And if the creditor dies he need not return the pledge to his heirs. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “Even to the debtor himself he need only return the pledge within thirty days [of the loan], and after thirty days he may sell it with the consent of the court. A pledge may not be taken from a widow, whether she be rich or poor, as it states, “Do not take the a widow’s garment as a pledge” (Deut. 24:17). If one takes a millstone as a pledge he violates a negative commandment and he is also in violation of both parts [of the millstone], as it states, “Do not take a mill or an upper millstone as a pledge” (Deut. 24:6). And they didn’t say just an upper millstone or a mill but anything that is necessary for food, as it states, “for that would be taking someone’s life as a pledge” (ibid.).

If one lent one’s fellow, he may exact a pledge from him only with the permission of a court, and he may not enter his house to take the pledge, as it is states, “You shall stand outside” (Deut. 24:1. If the borrower had two utensils, he may take one but must give back the other. And he must give back the pillow at night and the plow during the day. And if the creditor dies he need not return the pledge to his heirs. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “Even to the debtor himself he need only return the pledge within thirty days [of the loan], and after thirty days he may sell it with the consent of the court. A pledge may not be taken from a widow, whether she be rich or poor, as it states, “Do not take the a widow’s garment as a pledge” (Deut. 24:17). If one takes a millstone as a pledge he violates a negative commandment and he is also in violation of both parts [of the millstone], as it states, “Do not take a mill or an upper millstone as a pledge” (Deut. 24:6). And they didn’t say just an upper millstone or a mill but anything that is necessary for food, as it states, “for that would be taking someone’s life as a pledge” (ibid.).

If there were two brothers, one poor and one rich, and their father left them a bath house or an olive press, if the father had made them for hire, the profit is split equally. But if he made them for his own use alone, the rich brother may say to the poor brother, “Buy for yourself slaves and they can wash in the bath house” or “Buy for yourself olives and prepare them in the olive press.” If there were two in the same town, and one’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon and other’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon, neither can bring forth a debt document on the other, and another person cannot bring forth a debt document against them. And if some person finds amongst his documents a document that states, “The [debt] document of Joseph ben Shimon is paid”, both of their [debt] documents are paid. What should they do? They should write their names to the third generation. And if the names are the same through the third generation, they should give themselves a sign. And if their signs are the same, they should write “Cohen”. If a man said to his son, “One of my debt documents is paid and I do not know which one”, then all are deemed to be paid. If two documents were found [amongst his documents] written to the same debtor, then the large one is paid and the small one is not paid. If a man lent money to his fellow on a guarantor’s security, he may not exact payment from the guarantor. But if he had said, “On the condition that I may exact payment from whom I wish”, then he may exact payment from the guarantor. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If the borrower had property, in neither case can he exact payment from the guarantor.” Moreover, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel used to say: “If a man was a guarantor for a woman’s ketubah and her husband divorced her, the husband must vow to derive no further benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of the guarantor and take his wife back again.”

If they find him not guilty, he is discharged, if not, it [the trial] is adjourned till the following day. During this time they [the judges] go about in pairs, practice moderation in food, drink no wine the whole day, and discuss the case throughout the night. Early next morning they reassemble in court. He who is in favor of acquittal states, ‘I declare him innocent and I stand by my opinion.’ While he who is in favor of condemnation says: ‘I declare him guilty and stand by my opinion.’ One who [previously] argued for conviction may now argue for acquittal, but one who [previously] argued for acquittal may not now argue for conviction. If they have made any mistake, the two judges’ scribes are to remind them. If they find him not guilty, they discharge him. If not, they take a vote. If twelve acquit and eleven condemn, he is acquitted. If twelve condemn and eleven acquit, or if eleven condemn and eleven acquit and one says, ‘I do not know,’ or even if twenty-two acquit or condemn and a single one says, ‘I do not know,’ they add to the judges. Up to what number is the court increased? By twos up to the limit of seventy-one. If thirty-six acquit and thirty-five condemn, he is acquitted. But if thirty-six condemn and thirty-five acquit, the two sides debate the case together until one of those who condemn agrees with the view of those who are for acquittal.

Perjuring witnesses are not to be put to death until [after] the end of the trial. Because the Sadducees say: “[Perjurers were put to death] only after the accused had [actually] been executed, as it says, “ A life for a life” (Deuteronomy 19:21). The [Pharisaic] Sages said to them: “But has not it already been said “You shall do to him as he schemed to do to his fellow” (Deuteronomy 19:19) which implies when his brother is still alive? If so, why does it say “A life for life”? For it might have been that perjurers are liable to be put to death from the moment their testimony had been taken, therefore the Torah states “A life for a life” that is to say that they are not executed until [after] the termination of the trial.

“A person shall be put to death only on the testimony of two witnesses or three witnesses” (Deuteronomy 17:6). If the testimony is sufficiently established by two witnesses, why does Scripture [further] specify three? This is to compare two to three: just as three are competent to incriminate two as perjurers, so are two competent to incriminate three as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Shimon says: “Just as two witnesses are not put to death until both have been incriminated as perjurers, so three are not put to death until all three have been incriminated as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Akiba says: “The third witness was only mentioned in order to be stringent upon him and make his judgement the same as the other two. And if Scripture thus penalizes one who consorts with those who commit a transgression, as [if he is actually] one of those who commits the transgression, how much more so shall he who consorts with those who perform commandments receive a reward as [if he is actually] one of those who performs the commandments!”

“A person shall be put to death only on the testimony of two witnesses or three witnesses” (Deuteronomy 17:6). If the testimony is sufficiently established by two witnesses, why does Scripture [further] specify three? This is to compare two to three: just as three are competent to incriminate two as perjurers, so are two competent to incriminate three as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Shimon says: “Just as two witnesses are not put to death until both have been incriminated as perjurers, so three are not put to death until all three have been incriminated as perjurers. How do we know [that two or three can even incriminate] a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Akiba says: “The third witness was only mentioned in order to be stringent upon him and make his judgement the same as the other two. And if Scripture thus penalizes one who consorts with those who commit a transgression, as [if he is actually] one of those who commits the transgression, how much more so shall he who consorts with those who perform commandments receive a reward as [if he is actually] one of those who performs the commandments!”

Just as in the case of two witnesses, if one of them was found to be a relative or [otherwise] disqualified, their whole evidence is rendered void, so it is with three, if one of them was found to be a relative or [otherwise] disqualified, the whole evidence is void. How do we know that this is the case even with a hundred? The Torah states “witnesses”. Rabbi Yose said: “When is this true? With regards to capital cases; but in monetary suits, the evidence may be established by the rest. Rabbi says: “It is one and the same rule, be it in monetary suits or capital cases.” This is the rule when both [disqualified] witnesses warned the transgressor, but when they did not warn him, what could two brothers do that saw someone killing a person?

The first oil of the first crop, there is none better than it. The second oil of the first crop and the first oil of the second crop are equal. The third oil of the first crop, the second oil of the second crop and the first oil of the third crop are equal. The third oil of the second crop and the second oil of the third crop are equal. As to the third oil of the third crop, there is none worse than it. It would have been logical by the following argument that menahot should also require the purest olive oil: if the candlestick, whose [oil] is not for eating, requires pure olive oil, how much more should menahot, whose oil is for eating, require pure olive oil! But the text states, “Pure olive oil of beaten olives for lighting” (Exodus 27:20), but not “pure olive oil of beaten olives for menahot.”

The [law of] the shoulder and the cheeks and the stomach is in force both within the Land and outside it, both during the existence of the Temple and after it, in respect of unconsecrated animals but not consecrated animals. For it might have been argued thus: if unconsecrated animals, which are not subject to the law of the breast and the thigh, are subject to these dues, how much more are consecrated animals, with are subject to the law of the breast and the thigh, subject also to these dues! Scripture states, “And I have given them to Aaron the priest and his sons as a due for ever” (Leviticus 7:34) only what is mentioned in this passage shall be his.

The law concerning the tithe of cattle is in force in the Land and outside the Land, in the days when the Temple exists and when it does not exist, [It applies] to hullin (non-sacred) animals only but not to consecrated animals. It applies both to cattle and flock animals, but they are not tithed together. To lambs and to goats, and they are tithed together. To the new and the old, but they are not tithed together. Now it might be logical: seeing that new and old animals which are not treated as kilayim in regard to one another are yet not tithed one for the other, lambs and goats which are treated as kilyaim in regard to one another, all the more should not be tithed one for the other. Scripture therefore states: “And of the flock” all kinds of flock are considered one [for purposes of tithing].

Rabbi Shimon says: lambs are mentioned before goats in all places. You might think that it is because they are choicer, therefore Scripture states, “And if he brings a lamb as his offering,” (Leviticus 4:32) to teach that both are equal. Turtle-doves are mentioned before young pigeons in all places. You might think that it is because they are choicer, therefore Scripture states, “A young pigeon or a turtle-dove for a hatat,” (Leviticus 12:6) to teach that both are equal. The father comes before the mother in all places. You might think that it is because the honor due a father is greater than the honor due a mother, therefore Scripture states, “A man shall fear his mother and his father,” (Leviticus 19: to teach that both are equal. But the sages have said: the father comes before the mother in all places, because both a son and his mother are obligated to honor the father. And so it is also with the study of Torah; if the son has been worthy [to sit] before the teacher, the teacher comes before the father in all places, because both a man and his father are obligated to honor the teacher.

Rabbi Shimon says: lambs are mentioned before goats in all places. You might think that it is because they are choicer, therefore Scripture states, “And if he brings a lamb as his offering,” (Leviticus 4:32) to teach that both are equal. Turtle-doves are mentioned before young pigeons in all places. You might think that it is because they are choicer, therefore Scripture states, “A young pigeon or a turtle-dove for a hatat,” (Leviticus 12:6) to teach that both are equal. The father comes before the mother in all places. You might think that it is because the honor due a father is greater than the honor due a mother, therefore Scripture states, “A man shall fear his mother and his father,” (Leviticus 19: to teach that both are equal. But the sages have said: the father comes before the mother in all places, because both a son and his mother are obligated to honor the father. And so it is also with the study of Torah; if the son has been worthy [to sit] before the teacher, the teacher comes before the father in all places, because both a man and his father are obligated to honor the teacher.

Rabbi Shimon says: lambs are mentioned before goats in all places. You might think that it is because they are choicer, therefore Scripture states, “And if he brings a lamb as his offering,” (Leviticus 4:32) to teach that both are equal. Turtle-doves are mentioned before young pigeons in all places. You might think that it is because they are choicer, therefore Scripture states, “A young pigeon or a turtle-dove for a hatat,” (Leviticus 12:6) to teach that both are equal. The father comes before the mother in all places. You might think that it is because the honor due a father is greater than the honor due a mother, therefore Scripture states, “A man shall fear his mother and his father,” (Leviticus 19: to teach that both are equal. But the sages have said: the father comes before the mother in all places, because both a son and his mother are obligated to honor the father. And so it is also with the study of Torah; if the son has been worthy [to sit] before the teacher, the teacher comes before the father in all places, because both a man and his father are obligated to honor the teacher.

Rebbi Yose bar Abun said: If you say to give the thickness of the sky to the night both in the evening and in the morning then you must say that day and night are not of equal length; but we have stated: On the days of the vernal and autumnal equinoxes, day and night have equal length. Rebbi Huna said: We may learn from the ways of the world since if the king leaves [his palace] one already states that he left before he left but when he returns one does not say that he did return until he actually entered [the palace].

There we have stated: Rabban Gamliel says, the reader frees the public from their obligation. The older Rebbi Huna from Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan: Practice follows Rabban Gamliel for the prayer accompanying the blowing of the Shofar. Rebbi Zeïra and Rav Ḥisda were sitting there for the blowing of the Shofar. After they finished the prayer, Rav Ḥisda got up and prayed. Rebbi Zeïra said to him: Did we not pray just now? He said to him, I prayed and I am repeating the prayer, because Westerners came down and said in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan: Practice follows Rabban Gamliel for the prayer accompanying the blowing of the Shofar, but I was inattentive. If I had been attentive, I would have fulfilled my duty. Rebbi Zeïra said, that is fine. All Tannaïm state it in the name of Rabban Gamliel, Rebbi Hoshaia states it in the name of the Sages. Rebbi Ada from Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan: This is only if he attended from the start. Rebbi Tanḥum said, the Mishnah expresses this: The order of benediction, one says “Forefathers”, “Greatness”, and “Sanctification of the Name”.

It is stated: “One should pray neither out of conversation, nor out of jokes, nor out of frivolities, nor out of idle occupations, but out of words of Torah. Similarly, one should not take leave from one’s friend either out of conversation, or out of jokes, or out of frivolities, or out of idle occupations, but out of words of Torah, since we find that the earlier prophets were closing their words with expressions of praise and consolation.” Rebbi Eleazar said, except for Jeremiah who closed with words of reprobation. Rebbi Yoḥanan said to him, still he closed with words of consolation and said (Jer. 51:64) “So Babylon shall sink.” Because Jeremiah continued to prophesy about the Temple. One could think that he closed with the destruction of the Temple, but the verse states (Jer. 51:64) “So far the words of Jeremiah,” he finished with the downfall of its destroyers, he did not close with words of reprobation. But is it not written (Is. 66:24): “They will be a horror for all flesh?” That verse deals with Gentiles. But is it not written (Lament. 5:22): “But You much despised us”? (Lament. 5:21) “Make us return” replaces “But You much despised us”. Also Elijah did take leave from Elisha only out of words of Torah, (2Kings 2:11) “they walked talking.” What did they talk of? Rebbi Aḥawa the son of Rebbi Zeïra said, they discussed the recitation of Shema‘, (Deut. 6:7) “you should talk about them.” Rebbi Judah ben Pazi said, they were discussing Creation, (Ps. 33:6) “through the word of the Eternal the heavens were made.” Rebbi Yudan, the son of Rebbi Ayvu, said, they were occupied with the consolations of Jerusalem, as you say (Is. 40:2) “Speak to Jerusalem’s heart.” But the rabbis say, they were occupied with the Divine Chariot, as you say (2Kings 2:11) “behold, a chariot of fire and horses of fire, etc.”

Rebbi Abba bar Zamina waited upon Zeïra and mixed him a cup. He said to him: Old man, make the benediction, and have the intention of drinking another one, as we have stated: The waiter makes a benediction for every single cup but not for every morsel. He answered him: Just as I have the intention of absolving you of your obligation by the benediction so you must have the intention of absolving me of my obligation by “Amen”. Rebbi Tanḥum bar Jeremiah said, a Mishnah (Rosh Hashanah 4:8) states this: The absent-minded did not fulfill his obligation and he who heard from the absent-minded did not fulfill his obligation.

“If there are a hundred” etc. Rebbi Yoḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Jose the Galilean, but the Sages say “there is no difference between ten and ten myriads”. Rava said, practice follows him who states that there is no difference between ten and ten myriads.

Here, a baraita states: “If he heard but did not answer, he did his duty. If he answered but did not hear, he did not do his duty.” Rav in the name of Abba bar Ḥana, or, as some say, Abba bar Ḥana in the name of Rav, that is only if he answered the beginnings of chapters. Rebbi Zeïra inquired, what are beginnings of chapters? (Ps. 113:1) “Hallelujah, praise, you servants of the Eternal, praise the name of the Eternal.” They asked before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, from where do we know that if somebody heard but did not answer, that he fulfilled his duty? He said, because we see great rabbis acting accordingly. They stand in the congregation where some say (Ps. 118:26): “Blessed he who comes,” and the others say: “in the name of the Eternal,” and all have fulfilled their duty.

“ That all tithes should be mine as long as you own it, he gets its tithes as long as the buyer owns it.” When he sold it to a third party, he has no tithes. If the buyer then bought it back from the third party, Rebbi Ḥiyya states that he has no tithes, Rebbi Hoshaia states that the tithes are his. This disagreement turns out like the other disagreement, as we have stated there “that he who divorces his wife and then remarries her, remarries her on the basis of the first ketubah.” Rebbi Ḥanin stated before Rebbi La: Two Amoraïm, one says for ketubah but not for individual stipulations, and the other says, both for ketubah and individual stipulations. For him who says, for ketubah but not for individual stipulations, he has the tithes. For him who says, both for ketubah and for individual stipulations, he has no tithes. But did we not state: “If somebody received (as sharecropper) from the daughter of a Cohen, she has the tithes. If she married an Israel, they split the tithes. If she was widowed or divorced, she returns to her prior status.” There when he sold, here when he received. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “When she sold?” Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, there it left the power of both parties; here, it left the power of the seller but not that of the buyer.

“ That all tithes should be mine as long as you own it, he gets its tithes as long as the buyer owns it.” When he sold it to a third party, he has no tithes. If the buyer then bought it back from the third party, Rebbi Ḥiyya states that he has no tithes, Rebbi Hoshaia states that the tithes are his. This disagreement turns out like the other disagreement, as we have stated there “that he who divorces his wife and then remarries her, remarries her on the basis of the first ketubah.” Rebbi Ḥanin stated before Rebbi La: Two Amoraïm, one says for ketubah but not for individual stipulations, and the other says, both for ketubah and individual stipulations. For him who says, for ketubah but not for individual stipulations, he has the tithes. For him who says, both for ketubah and for individual stipulations, he has no tithes. But did we not state: “If somebody received (as sharecropper) from the daughter of a Cohen, she has the tithes. If she married an Israel, they split the tithes. If she was widowed or divorced, she returns to her prior status.” There when he sold, here when he received. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “When she sold?” Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, there it left the power of both parties; here, it left the power of the seller but not that of the buyer.

“I could think one would whip because of the additions.” Rebbi Joḥanan explains the baraita, I could think that one would whip because of ploughing in the Sabbatical. Rebbi Eleazar explains the baraita, I could think that one would whip because of the prohibition of the first two terms. Some Tannaïm state (Lev. 25:3): “Six years you shall sow your field, six years you shall prune your vineyard.” Some Tannaïm state (Lev. 25:4) “Your field you should not sow, your vineyard you should not prune.” He who states: “Six years you shall sow your field, six years you shall prune your vineyard,” supports Rebbi Joḥanan. He who states: “Your field you should not sow, your vineyard you should not prune,” supports Rebbi Eleazar.

“I could think one would whip because of the additions.” Rebbi Joḥanan explains the baraita, I could think that one would whip because of ploughing in the Sabbatical. Rebbi Eleazar explains the baraita, I could think that one would whip because of the prohibition of the first two terms. Some Tannaïm state (Lev. 25:3): “Six years you shall sow your field, six years you shall prune your vineyard.” Some Tannaïm state (Lev. 25:4) “Your field you should not sow, your vineyard you should not prune.” He who states: “Six years you shall sow your field, six years you shall prune your vineyard,” supports Rebbi Joḥanan. He who states: “Your field you should not sow, your vineyard you should not prune,” supports Rebbi Eleazar.

Is Sabbatical straw forbidden as aftergrowth? Rebbi Levi from Sennabaris asked Rebbi Abba bar Zavda and he permitted it. Rebbi Zeïra said, since I did not want to rely on myself I asked those from Beit Barsana and they said, we used to collect straw before the start of the Sabbatical and when we are running out, we bring it from the walls. Rebbi Jeremiah said, a baraita states that it is permitted, as it was stated: “Dyers and cattle feeders may buy coarse bran from everywhere without worry.” Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say, even from one who is suspect. Rebbi Yose said to him, they said that only if he does not know whether he is suspect. Only if he might not be suspect; therefore if it is clear that he is suspect, it is forbidden. Rebbi Shammai said, a Mishnah says that it is forbidden, as we have stated there: “In matters of Sabbatical, kilaim in a vineyard, or dedicated things, if there is enough in both seed and wood to give taste.”

Who states “the deaf-mute?” Not Rebbi Jehudah, since it was stated: “Rebbi Jehudah said, it happened that the sons of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Gudgada were all deaf-mutes and all purities in Jerusalem were handled by them. They said to him, because purities do not need thought and may be produced by a deaf-mute, an insane, and a minor. But heaves and tithes need thought and do not become invalidated by absent-mindedness.” Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi La: Thought is not written in regard to them, only watching.

Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish (Num. 18:27): “Your heave will be counted as if it were grain from the threshing-floor.” From what He commanded the Levites to give heave, from the finished product. That means it is forbidden to give him ears. Ḥiyya bar Ada in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If First Tithe was given from grain ears, it is forbidden to eat a snack from it. What is the reason? (Num. 18:32): “You should not desecrate the holy things of the Children of Israel lest you die.” Will one be whipped for its ṭevel as biblical law? Rebbi Ashian in the name of Rebbi Jonah: A Mishnah states that one is not whipped for its ṭevel as biblical law, as we have stated there: “Heave of the tithe is like First Fruits in two respects and like tithe in two respects. One may give it from pure for impure or not earmarked produce, like First Fruits. It makes forbidden from the threshing floor and has a tariff similar to heave.” When can you say “from the threshing floor”, does this not mean after smoothing? That implies that one is not whipped for its ṭevel as biblical law.

Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: “Unintentionally”, when it is forbidden, “intentionally” when it is forbidden. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah states this: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if unintentionally it may be eaten, if intentionally it may not be eaten”; “unintentionally”, when it is forbidden, “intentionally”, when it is [equally] forbidden. It was stated: “What was cooked on the Sabbath, if it was done unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah said, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath, intentionally never. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath by others but not by himself, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” Samuel followed Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. Rav in his own group instructed following Rebbi Meïr, in public following Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. Rebbi Simeon bar Karsana said, he instructed us following Rebbi Ismael, the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. As it was stated: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said, in any case where an intentional sin is punished by extirpation and an unintentional sin by an expiatory offering, if the sin was committed on the Sabbath unintentionally or intentionally, the result is forbidden both for him and for others; it may not be eaten. In any case an intentional sin is not punished by extirpation and for the unintentional sin no expiatory offering is due; if it was done on the Sabbath unintentionally the result may be eaten by others after the end of the Sabbath but not by him, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: What do you say? He said, I have only the Mishnah: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if in error it may be eaten, if intentionally it may not be eaten”. Rav Ḥisda heard this and said, the Sabbaths have been permitted! Did not Rav Huna say in the name of Rav and did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “In earlier times they said, one who forgets some dish on his stove on the Sabbath, unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten. People were suspected that they left it intentionally and said, it was forgotten; they forbade it to them when it was forgotten.” And here, you say so? Rebbi Ila said, they were suspected to leave it on, they were not suspected to cook. They imposed a fine for forgetting but not for cooking.

Paragraph. “One who vows not to eat food is permitted water and salt.” There, we have stated: “One who made a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food.” A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: “If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it.” A verse states that “roasted” is called “cooked” as it is said: They cooked the Pesaḥ in fire. If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, as is the rule. A Mishnah [states] that scalded is called cooked, and a verse that roasted is called cooked; but did we not state: “One who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. What is the difference between them? If one said, a qonam that I shall not taste wine on Tabernacles. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is forbidden on the last day of the holiday. In the opinion of Rebbi Joshia, is he permitted? Also Rebbi Joshia agrees that he is prohibited. Rebbi Joshia said it only for restrictions.

Paragraph. “One who vows not to eat food is permitted water and salt.” There, we have stated: “One who made a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food.” A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: “If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it.” A verse states that “roasted” is called “cooked” as it is said: They cooked the Pesaḥ in fire. If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, as is the rule. A Mishnah [states] that scalded is called cooked, and a verse that roasted is called cooked; but did we not state: “One who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. What is the difference between them? If one said, a qonam that I shall not taste wine on Tabernacles. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is forbidden on the last day of the holiday. In the opinion of Rebbi Joshia, is he permitted? Also Rebbi Joshia agrees that he is prohibited. Rebbi Joshia said it only for restrictions.

Paragraph. “One who vows not to eat food is permitted water and salt.” There, we have stated: “One who made a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food.” A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: “If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it.” A verse states that “roasted” is called “cooked” as it is said: They cooked the Pesaḥ in fire. If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, as is the rule. A Mishnah [states] that scalded is called cooked, and a verse that roasted is called cooked; but did we not state: “One who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. What is the difference between them? If one said, a qonam that I shall not taste wine on Tabernacles. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is forbidden on the last day of the holiday. In the opinion of Rebbi Joshia, is he permitted? Also Rebbi Joshia agrees that he is prohibited. Rebbi Joshia said it only for restrictions.

“Rabban Gamliel says, the public reader absolves the public from their obligation.” The great Rabbi Ḥuna of Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rabban Gamliel in this prayer combined with shofar blowing. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rav Ḥisda were sitting there during the prayer combined with shofar blowing. After they finished praying the prayer, Rav Ḥisda got up and prepared to pray. Rebbi Ze`ira said to him, did we not pray already? He said to him, we prayed and I am going back to pray, for Westerners came down and said (there) in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, practice follows Rabban Gamliel in this prayer combined with shofar blowing; but I did not concentrate. If I had concentrated I would have fulfilled my obligation. Rebbi Ze`ira said, this is correct. All Tannaim state this in the name of Rabban Gamliel, but Rebbi Hoshaia states it in the name of the Sages. Rebbi Ada from Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But only if he is present from the start of the prayer. Rebbi Tanḥum ben Rebbi Jeremiah said, the Mishnah implies this: “The order of benedictions: One recites “fathers”, “mightiness”, and “Sanctification of the name.”

Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Abbahu, in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: One is forbidden to fast until the sixth hour on the Sabbath. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the Mishnah states this: “before noon they should not finish,” because it is morning; “after noontime they should finish,” since most of the day already was spent in holiness.

Rebbi Levi in the name of Rebbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina: That year was intercalary. What is the reason? From day to day, and from month to month, to the twelfth month which is the month of Adar. Is the first Adar additional? Is the second Adar additional? What is the difference between them? Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, the two lambs of Pentecost are between them. If it was born on the fifteenth of Adar in a non-intercalary year and it enters an intercalary year; if you are saying that the first Adar is additional, it is a long year. If you are saying that the second Adar is additional, it has only up to the fifteenth of the first Adar. Rebbi Ayvo bar Naggari said, a Mishnah states that the first Adar is additional, as we have stated there: “They testified that one may intercalate the year during all of Adar; for there were those who said, until Purim. They testified that one may intercalate the year conditionally.” This implies that the first Adar is additional. If you would say that the second Adar is the addition, it no longer is the year and he intercalates it? Mar Uqba found two letters. In one was written, “it is good in my eyes and the eyes of my colleagues to add thirty days to the year.” And in one it was written, “it is good in my eyes and the eyes of my colleagues to add a month to the year.” He who says “thirty days” implies that the first Adar is additional; he who says “a month” implies that the second Adar is additional. If from there, you cannot infer anything, as Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa and Rebbi Yudan from Gezur, Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, forever both months may be augmented. If he augmented the first and did not augment the second, what he did is well done. Always the Adar close to Nisan is defective.

It was stated in the name of Rebbi Simeon: “The community only brings what Scripture fixed for it.” Rebbi Simeon is of the opinion that since when Second Tithe was introduced it was not interrupted. What is between them? Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, the bull of hidden things is between them. Rebbi Yose says, voluntary offerings of the community are between them. It was stated, both men and women. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no woman here, “man” is written in the paragraph. It was stated, also a nazir’s sacrifices. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there are no nazir’s sacrifices here; nazir’s sacrifices are an obligation. It was stated, also libations. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he who states “libations” does not hold with Rebbi, as it was stated, Rebbi says, I am saying that also after Israel entered the Land, libations only are brought inside. What is the reason? In the Sanctuary pour alcoholic libations to the Eternal. A prohibition is written only for inside; from where for the outside? Let us hear from the following. From where that one who slaughters as Pesah for an individual on a private altar or the public altar in a time where altars are forbidden, that he transgresses a prohibition? The verse says, you may not slaughter the Pesaḥ at one. He is punished with extirpation and you are saying so? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, this is about one who slaughters in the afternoon not for its name in a time when altars are permitted. Then why does he say, in a time when altars are forbidden? In a time when his altar is forbidden. Why not for its name? That you should not say, it is well-being offering and qualified. In addition, from the following: I could think that if he slaughtered it in the afternoon it should be qualified. Why do you have (in the afternoon it should be qualified) [in the morning it should be disqualified]? No. It is not for its name. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that well-being sacrifices brought because of Pesaḥ are qualified on an altar. Would an elevation offering be brought because of a reparation sacrifice be qualified on an altar according to Rebbi Eleazar? Let us hear from the following: “This is the principle: Anything which can be vowed or donated is sacrificed on a private altar; but nothing which cannot be vowed or donated is sacrificed on a private altar.”

HALAKHAH: “One does not explain sexual aberrations to three {persons},” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: This is Rebbi Aqiba’s, but following Rebbi Ismael? Since Rebbi Ismael states warnings to the actors. Since Rebbi Immi was sitting and stating a warning for active homosexual and a warning for the passive homosexual, this implies that practice follows Rebbi Ismael.

Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: If a holiday falls on a Friday, one eats making Sabbath after the holiday like the holiday. Rebbi Ze`ira said, a baraita states this: The eve of Passover is like Passover, the day of slaughter is like Pentecost. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, we also stated more than this: “Rebbi Jehudah says, also not if the holiday was over on Thursday since the priests are not free.”

HALAKHAH: “Fifteen [categories of] women free their co-wives”, etc. It is written “unleavened it must be eaten”. Since it was permitted and then forbidden, when it became permitted again should one think it returned to its prior permission? The verse states “unleavened it should be eaten” as commandment. Similarly, “her levir shall come upon her” as a commandment. Since she was permitted and then forbidden, when she became permitted again should one think she returned to her prior permission? The verse states “her levir shall come upon her” as commandment.

HALAKHAH: “Fifteen [categories of] women free their co-wives”, etc. It is written “unleavened it must be eaten”. Since it was permitted and then forbidden, when it became permitted again should one think it returned to its prior permission? The verse states “unleavened it should be eaten” as commandment. Similarly, “her levir shall come upon her” as a commandment. Since she was permitted and then forbidden, when she became permitted again should one think she returned to her prior permission? The verse states “her levir shall come upon her” as commandment.

Rebbi Yose explains the baraita: “Unleavened it must be eaten”. Since it was permitted before it was dedicated, if one wants to eat it, he eats, not to eat, he does not eat. When he dedicated it became forbidden. When the fistful was brought it became permitted again; should one think it returned to its prior permission? If he wants to eat it, he eats, not to eat, he does not eat? The verse states “unleavened it must be eaten” as commandment. Similarly, “her levir shall come upon her” as a commandment. Since she was permitted before she was married to his brother, if he wanted to bring her into his house, he could bring her, not to bring her into his house, he would not bring her. When she was married to his brother she became forbidden. When his brother died childless she became permitted again. Should one think she returned to her prior permission, if he wanted to bring her into his house, he could bring her, not to bring her into his house, he would not bring her? The verse states “her levir shall come upon her” as commandment.

Rebbi Yose explains the baraita: “Unleavened it must be eaten”. Since it was permitted before it was dedicated, if one wants to eat it, he eats, not to eat, he does not eat. When he dedicated it became forbidden. When the fistful was brought it became permitted again; should one think it returned to its prior permission? If he wants to eat it, he eats, not to eat, he does not eat? The verse states “unleavened it must be eaten” as commandment. Similarly, “her levir shall come upon her” as a commandment. Since she was permitted before she was married to his brother, if he wanted to bring her into his house, he could bring her, not to bring her into his house, he would not bring her. When she was married to his brother she became forbidden. When his brother died childless she became permitted again. Should one think she returned to her prior permission, if he wanted to bring her into his house, he could bring her, not to bring her into his house, he would not bring her? The verse states “her levir shall come upon her” as commandment.

Rebbi Huna explains the baraita: “Unleavened it must be eaten”. Since it was permitted before it was dedicated, if one wants to eat it leavened, he eats it, unleavened, he eats it. The verse states “unleavened it should be eaten” as commandment. Similarly, “her brother-in-law shall come upon her” as commandment. Since she was permitted before she was married to his brother, if he wanted to bring her into his house because of her shapeliness, he could bring her, because of her money, he could bring her. When she was married to his brother she became forbidden. When his brother died childless she became permitted again. Should one think she returned to her prior permission, if he wanted to bring her into his house because of her shapeliness, he could bring her, because of her money, he could bring her? The verse states “her levir shall come upon her” as commandment.

Rebbi Huna explains the baraita: “Unleavened it must be eaten”. Since it was permitted before it was dedicated, if one wants to eat it leavened, he eats it, unleavened, he eats it. The verse states “unleavened it should be eaten” as commandment. Similarly, “her brother-in-law shall come upon her” as commandment. Since she was permitted before she was married to his brother, if he wanted to bring her into his house because of her shapeliness, he could bring her, because of her money, he could bring her. When she was married to his brother she became forbidden. When his brother died childless she became permitted again. Should one think she returned to her prior permission, if he wanted to bring her into his house because of her shapeliness, he could bring her, because of her money, he could bring her? The verse states “her levir shall come upon her” as commandment.

Are sacrifices forbidden for the uncircumcised? One cannot deduce the answer from Passover since they are not subject to [the prohibition of] breaking a bone, neither from heave since that would be inference after inference. At the end, you have to say “from it, from it.” Since “from it” which was said in the laws of Passover implies that the uncircumcised is disqualified, so “from it” which was said in the laws of sacrifices must imply that the uncircumcised is disqualified. Are sacrifices forbidden for the mourner? “From it, from it.” Since “from it” which was said in the laws of tithe states that the mourner is disqualified, so “from it” which was said in the laws of Passover must imply that the mourner is disqualified.

Rebbi Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: The daughter of an Ammonite convert is enabled, the daughter of an Ammonite woman convert is disabled. Rebbi Joḥanan told him: Babylonian, you crossed three rivers on your way and got lost! But both the daughter of an Ammonite convert and the daughter of an Ammonite woman convert are enabled. Rebbi Yosa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The statement is needed only if her mother was from Israel. That you should not say, since her mother was desecrated, so the daughter is desecrated. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, she is enabled even for the High Priest. What is the reason? “In his peoples”. A people divided into two peoples, the males are forbidden but their females permitted. Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish did not say so, but the daughter of an Ammonite convert is disabled since she comes from a disabled drop. Rebbi Joḥanan said, we have stated thus: Of Gentiles married unconverted, the males are permanently forbidden but their females are immediately permitted. If they converted, the males are permanently forbidden but their females are permitted after three generations. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of [Rebbi] Aḥa: A baraita states this: From where can you say that if one of any of the families of the earth cohabited with a Canaanite woman and she gave birth to a son, that you may buy him as a slave? The verse says, “whom they will father in your land,” not from those who dwell in your land.

So far if she knows that she is a married woman. What if she did not know that she was a married woman? Let us hear from the following: An underage girl who was married off by her father. She was divorced and went and married on her own. About this Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife. Is there a difference? There, whether she knows or does not know, here also whether she knows or does not know.

Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.

Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. She is forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥinenah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted to her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.

There, it was stated: “The following flour offerings have a handful taken and the remainders are eaten.” Rebbi Abba bar Mamal and Rebbi [Samuel] bar Rav Isaac were sitting together. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked from Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: From where [do we know that] the remainders of the ‘Omer offering are eaten? He said to him: Did not Rebbi Joḥanan say in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “Offering of, offering of.” Since “offering of” mentioned there is from barley, so also “offering of” mentioned here is from barley. Since the remainders of the offering of the suspected wife are eaten, so the remainders of the ‘Omer offering are eaten. Rebbi (Aqiba) said: After they got up, Rebbi Abba bar Mamal was standing with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him: Look, how he made your question fly away! From where [do we know that] the remainders of the offering of the suspected wife are eaten? Rebbi Ze‘ira brought Rebbi Isaac Aṭoshiyya, who stated for him: “Any flour offering mixed with oil”. Where do we hold? If about mixed wheat flour, it already had been said. So if it does not refer to mixed wheat flour, apply it to mixed barley flour. Another [baraita] states: “Or dry”. Where do we hold? If about dry wheat flour, it already had been said. So if it does not refer to dry wheat flour, apply it to dry barley flour. Rebbi Yose said, we deal with mixed wheat flour and dry wheat flour, and it was said for a purpose. “[It] shall belong to all sons of Aaron, to each man as to his brother.” A man takes his part even if he is blemished. A minor does not take a part even if he is unblemished. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said: Because the Torah added a detail in one case, can you add that in every case? But “remembrance, remembrance”. “You shall bring,” to include the ‘Omer flour offering in presentations. “He shall present it,” to include the suspected wife’s flour offering in presentations. It is written after that: “What is left from the offering is most holy for Aaron and his sons.”

“If she said ‘I am impure’ after the scroll was erased, the water is poured out and her offering dispersed over the ashes.” This proves that the suspected wife’s offering is holy before the scroll is written. Rebbi Yose said, there is more: Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, her offering is holy once she is on her way. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, our Mishnah states this: “Or if her husband had sexual relations with her on the road.”

Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: We understand that, since it said “if there is no case of murder, a fine shall be imposed”, that if it is a case of murder, you shall take life for life? Why does the verse say, it is a case of murder? To add the case of premeditation and warning. Rebbi Yose said, is that not a Mishnah, “for anybody committing a capital crime does not pay cash”, that it deals not only with cases of error. Ḥizqiah said, one states a baraita: “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody dedicates his wife’s earnings,” etc. Rebbi Meïr says, it is sanctified as his property. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian says, it is profane as his property. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree about the excess over five tetradrachmas. He explains it in the case of one who supports his wife with food but does not give her an obolus for her needs, as we stated: “If he does not give her an obolus for her needs, what she earns is hers”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they disagree about the excess left after [the husband’s] death; for he explains it if he does not support her with food. But if he supports her with food, everybody agrees that it became dedicated. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, what one states there supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “When was this said? If he does not feed her. But if he feeds her, everybody agrees that it was sanctified.” But is not everything a wife has subject to the husband’s claim to its yield?

“Both are forbidden to put a grindstone or an oven up there, or to raise chickens there.” This is needed for Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, for what he states about “partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another.” Because they mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another, does this imply that if they had not made vows not to have usufruct from one another, they would be presumed to concede one to the other? Rebbi Jeremiah said, partners have the custom to concede one to the other in these matters. There, we have stated: “The following establish presumption of ownership.” Rebbi Eleazar said, if somebody raises chickens in a courtyard in which he does not dwell, this establishes presumption of ownership. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. As you look at it, if he had the right to raise them, he raised them. If he had no right to raise them, he established a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Benaiah: Partners can veto any activity of the other party in a courtyard except for washing, for the honor of the daughters of Israel. Rebbi Mattaniah said, that is, at a place where women wash, but not at a place where men wash. And what you say except for washing in the courtyard [applies to] the entire courtyard except for the four cubits of that party where one cannot hinder anything. But if the place was at an incline, one can veto even within the four cubits of another party since one might say to him, you pour out and it flows down to my place. It was stated: The place of an oven or a hearth does not establish a presumption of ownership, but roofing of any size on top of them establishes a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, only if the wall is useful for the oven.

HALAKHAH: “One who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food,” etc. A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: “If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it.” A verse [states] that “roasted” is called “cooked”: “They cooked the pesaḥ” etc. If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, “as is the rule”. A Mishnah states that scalded is called cooked, and a verse that roasted is called cooked; but did we not state: “One who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. What is the difference between them? ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine on Tabernacles.’ In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is forbidden on the last day of the holiday. In the opinion of Rebbi Joshia, is he permitted? Also Rebbi Joshia agrees that he is prohibited. Rebbi Joshia said it only for restrictions.

HALAKHAH: “One who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food,” etc. A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: “If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it.” A verse [states] that “roasted” is called “cooked”: “They cooked the pesaḥ” etc. If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, “as is the rule”. A Mishnah states that scalded is called cooked, and a verse that roasted is called cooked; but did we not state: “One who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. What is the difference between them? ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine on Tabernacles.’ In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is forbidden on the last day of the holiday. In the opinion of Rebbi Joshia, is he permitted? Also Rebbi Joshia agrees that he is prohibited. Rebbi Joshia said it only for restrictions.

HALAKHAH: “One who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food,” etc. A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: “If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it.” A verse [states] that “roasted” is called “cooked”: “They cooked the pesaḥ” etc. If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, “as is the rule”. A Mishnah states that scalded is called cooked, and a verse that roasted is called cooked; but did we not state: “One who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. What is the difference between them? ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine on Tabernacles.’ In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is forbidden on the last day of the holiday. In the opinion of Rebbi Joshia, is he permitted? Also Rebbi Joshia agrees that he is prohibited. Rebbi Joshia said it only for restrictions.

Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Abbahu, in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: On the Sabbath, a person is forbidden to fast until the sixth hour. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah states this: “If they fasted when it started to rain, before noon they should not finish,” because until then it is morning; “after noon they should finish,” since most of the day already was spent in holiness.

Some Tannaïm state: “One separates matted hair.” Some Tannaïm state: “One does not separate.” Rav Ḥisda said, the one who states that one separates, for healthy [hair]; the one who states that one does not separate, for weak [hair].

Some Tannaïm state: “One separates matted hair.” Some Tannaïm state: “One does not separate.” Rav Ḥisda said, the one who states that one separates, for healthy [hair]; the one who states that one does not separate, for weak [hair].

HALAKHAH: A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: “If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it.” A verse [states] that “roasted” is called “cooked”: “They cooked the pesaḥ”, etc. If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, “as is the rule”. A Mishnah states that scalded is called cooked: “Is one who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food permitted roasted and scalded food”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. What is the difference between them? ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine on Tabernacles.’ In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is forbidden on the last day of the holiday. In the opinion of Rebbi Joshia, is he permitted? Rebbi Joshia also agrees that he is prohibited. Rebbi Joshia said it only for restrictions.

HALAKHAH: A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: “If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it.” A verse [states] that “roasted” is called “cooked”: “They cooked the pesaḥ”, etc. If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, “as is the rule”. A Mishnah states that scalded is called cooked: “Is one who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food permitted roasted and scalded food”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. What is the difference between them? ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine on Tabernacles.’ In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is forbidden on the last day of the holiday. In the opinion of Rebbi Joshia, is he permitted? Rebbi Joshia also agrees that he is prohibited. Rebbi Joshia said it only for restrictions.