stipulate

Rabbi Judah further said: a man may stipulate concerning a basket [of produce] on the first festival day [of Rosh Hashanah] and may then eat it on the second day, And so also if an egg was laid on the first [festival] day it may be eaten on the second. But the sages did not agree with him.

What counts as lost property? If he found an ass or a cow grazing on the path, this does not count as lost property. But if he found an ass with its trappings turned over, or a cow running in the vineyards, this is lost property. If he returned it and it escaped again, and he returned it and it escaped again, even four or five times, he is obligated to return it [yet again], since it is stated (Deut. 22:1): “You shall surely return it to your brother”. If [the finder] lost time at work that was worth a sela (an amount of money), he may not say to the owner, “Give me a sela”. Rather the owner need only pay him the wages of an unemployed laborer. If there was a court of law in the that place the finder may stipulate before them [for damages for time lost]. If there was no court of law, before whom can he stipulate? His comes first.

What counts as lost property? If he found an ass or a cow grazing on the path, this does not count as lost property. But if he found an ass with its trappings turned over, or a cow running in the vineyards, this is lost property. If he returned it and it escaped again, and he returned it and it escaped again, even four or five times, he is obligated to return it [yet again], since it is stated (Deut. 22:1): “You shall surely return it to your brother”. If [the finder] lost time at work that was worth a sela (an amount of money), he may not say to the owner, “Give me a sela”. Rather the owner need only pay him the wages of an unemployed laborer. If there was a court of law in the that place the finder may stipulate before them [for damages for time lost]. If there was no court of law, before whom can he stipulate? His comes first.

Rabbi Akiva declares one liable to an asham talui for sacrilege; But the sages declare him exempt. Rabbi Akiba admits that he does not bring his restitution money until he becomes aware [of his trespass], when he must bring with it a certain asham. Rabbi Tarfon: Why should he bring two ashams? Rather, let him set aside the principal with an added fifth, and bring an asham the value of two sela's and stipulate: “If I did commit sacrilege, here is my restitution and this my asham; and if the sacrilege was doubtful, let the money be a freewill gift and the [offering an] asham talui;” since the same type of sacrifice he brings for a case where he doesn’t know, he brings for one where he does know.

It was stated: If he stipulated about it it shall be permitted. Where do we hold? If following Rebbi Meїr, even if he stipulated it should be forbidden. If following Rebbi Simeon, even if he did not stipulate it should be permitted. But here we hold following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah says, a pottery light is disgusting, a table is not disgusting. From where did you understand to say, we are holding with Rebbi Jehudah? As it was stated: If a light was lying behind a door one opens and closes on the Sabbath if only he not intend either to extinguish or to make it burn. Rav and Samuel explain it about one who forgot but cursed one who would do this; May the Eternal extirpate the man who does this, awake and answering.

If he did not stipulate? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody made eruvim for two domains he can go to the South according to his eruv in the North, to the North according to his eruv in the South. If he split the domain he may not move from his place.” An animal belonging to two partners one of which made an eruv in the North and the other in the South. It may walk to the South according to the eruv of the one in the North and to the North according to the eruv of the one in the South. If they split the domain it may not move from its place. If they slaughtered it. Rav said, limbs suck from one another. Ulla bar Ismael said, limbs do not suck from one another. Rav agrees about an amphora that it was his part from before.

MISHNAH: In addition, Rebbi Jehudah says that a person may stipulate about a basket on the first day and eat from it on the second; similarly an egg which was laid on the first may be eaten on the second; but the Sages did not agree with him.

HALAKHAH: “One does not take wood from a hut but only from what is leaning on it.” Samuel said, if he did not intend to fortify it. But if he intended to fortify it it is forbidden, unless he stipulated about it. Therefore if he stipulated it is permitted. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob asked, may a person stipulate to tear down tents? One said before Samuel, if it was pasted on it, and Rav Naḥman bar Jacob was wondering about it.

It was stated: “One is permitted to eat until the East is illuminated, the words of Rebbi. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, until the cock calls.” What means “until the cock calls”? If he slept and awoke he is forbidden. That is, if he did not stipulate, but if he stipulated it is permitted.

Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, who stated “the one waiting for her levir”? Rebbi Aqiba! For Rebbi Aqiba said, there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law. Rebbi Ilai said to him, why should a bastard be relevant for jealousy? The Torah said: “He shall declare his jealousy to his wife”, even a partial wife. Rebbi Shammai said, did not Rebbi Yannai say the following: More than 30 Elders voted, from where that qiddushin have no legal effect on a sister-in-law? The verse says, “the wife of the deceased may not belong to any outside unrelated man, her levir shall come to her”, that she cannot have any existence with another man. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not a Mishnah? “Or after your levir will have performed ḥalîṣah with you, she is not preliminarily married.” And Rebbi Yannai praised him “those who pour out gold from the wallet,” “my son, they should not be removed from your eyes,” “get wise, my son, and make me happy”, “give to the wise that he shall become wiser,” “let the wise listen that he increase in knowledge.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after all these praises I can explain it following Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba said that there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law! Could he not object: Why should a bastard be relevant for jealousy? The Torah said: “He shall declare his jealousy to his wife”, even a partial wife. A woman waiting for her levir who whored, Rebbi Eleazar said she is permitted to her house, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said she is forbidden to her house. What do the rabbis say? Rebbi Mana said, did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to [the levir], since we have stated: “This is the rule: He cannot stipulate about any intercourse she could have had and would not be forbidden to him.”

MISHNAH: Everybody agrees that he may not stipulate with her about before she was preliminarily married or about after she was divorced. If she was secluded after that, became impure, and after that he took her back, he cannot stipulate with her. This is the rule: He cannot stipulate about any intercourse she could have had and would not be forbidden to him.

MISHNAH: Everybody agrees that he may not stipulate with her about before she was preliminarily married or about after she was divorced. If she was secluded after that, became impure, and after that he took her back, he cannot stipulate with her. This is the rule: He cannot stipulate about any intercourse she could have had and would not be forbidden to him.

MISHNAH: Everybody agrees that he may not stipulate with her about before she was preliminarily married or about after she was divorced. If she was secluded after that, became impure, and after that he took her back, he cannot stipulate with her. This is the rule: He cannot stipulate about any intercourse she could have had and would not be forbidden to him.

HALAKHAH: “Everybody agrees that he may not stipulate with her about before she was preliminarily married or about after she was divorced,” etc. Rebbi Yannai said, it is obvious that a man may forgive about his jealousy. If he divorced her it is as if he had forgiven. How is that? If he had declared his jealousy, divorced her, took her back, and then she was at a secluded place. If you say, if he divorced her it is as if he had forgiven, he has to declare his jealousy a second time. But if you say, if he divorced her it is as if he had not forgiven, he does not have to declare his jealousy a second time. But if he had declared his jealousy, she was at a secluded place and he knew it, then he divorced her, took her back, and then she was at a secluded place, if she drank and the water did nothing to her, she is pure. Or maybe that since the water does not check out a woman forbidden to her husband, she might be impure.

What is a wife and what is a concubine? Rebbi Meïr says, a wife has a ketubah, a concubine has no ketubah. Rebbi Jehudah says, both have a ketubah. A wife has a ketubah and the ketubah stipulations; a concubine has a ketubah but no ketubah stipulations. Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: These are the opinions of Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Jehudah. But the words of the Sages: “A man may marry a woman and stipulate with her not to feed her and not to provide for her. Not only that, but that she should feed and provide for him and teach him Torah. It happened that Rebbi Joshua, son of Rebbi Aqiba, married a woman and stipulated with her not to feed her and not to provide for her. Not only that, but that she should feed and provide for him and teach him Torah. But when years of famine came and they distributed the properties among themselves, she started complaining about him to the Sages of Israel. He said to them, for me she is trustworthy more than anybody. She told them, it is true that thus I stipulated with him. [They said to her], nothing comes after acquisition.”

So is the Mishnah: “And a perfume box for every mina.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, they made usufruct of perfumes like usufruct of money. Rebbi Avin said, they made usufruct of procreation like usufruct of money. As the following: The students of Rebbi Yose went to Qaddišin; they found them childless. They said to them: Did you stipulate between you? If you stipulated, it is fine; otherwise everything follows the local custom.

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

So is the Mishnah: “Any vow which I make in the future shall be void, [it is void] if he remembers at the moment he makes the vow,” if he did not stipulate a reservation. But if he stipulated a reservation, then even if he does not remember. That is for vows; but for oaths? There are reservations for vows, there are no reservations for oaths, as it was stated about oaths imposed by judges: “According to our understanding, not according to your understanding.” Rebbi Jehudah said, he makes him swear according to his understanding. Why does he stipulate with him? Because of the uneducated, lest they say that there may be mental reservations for oaths.

So is the Mishnah: “Any vow which I make in the future shall be void, [it is void] if he remembers at the moment he makes the vow,” if he did not stipulate a reservation. But if he stipulated a reservation, then even if he does not remember. That is for vows; but for oaths? There are reservations for vows, there are no reservations for oaths, as it was stated about oaths imposed by judges: “According to our understanding, not according to your understanding.” Rebbi Jehudah said, he makes him swear according to his understanding. Why does he stipulate with him? Because of the uneducated, lest they say that there may be mental reservations for oaths.

Rebbi Yudan said, we deal with the case that it was lost by compulsion. They treated her like an unpaid trustee who may stipulate to be free from an oath. Rebbi Yose said, do we state here that the unpaid trustee is free from an oath? But we deal with the case that it was lost by mishandling. They treated the stole according to its value. But the rabbis say that in any case it has to be treated as a case of condition of a bill of divorce.

After Rebbi Eliezer’s death, four Elders assembled to object to Rebbi Eliezer’s words: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, Rebbi Yose the Galilean, Rebbi Tarphon, and Rebbi Aqiba. Rebbi Joshua told them, one does not contradict the lion after his death. Rebbi Tarphon objected: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married [the latter’s brother who] died childless; how can she contract the levirate marriage? Does it not turn out that he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and anybody’s condition contradicting what is written in the Torah is invalid. Then nobody should be permitted to marry his brother’s daughter, lest he come to stipulate against what is written in the Torah. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, one understands the reason. There, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Ḥananiah objected in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Should one not state “sixteen women” following Rebbi Eliezer? Rebbi Mana said, the reason was already explained: there, the Torah forbade her to him. But here, he forbids to him! Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he said to her, you are permitted to any man except Mr. X; she went and married the latter’s brother who died childless, how can the latter permit what the first forbade? His words imply that death and divorce permit what the first [husband] prohibited. Rebbi Jeremiah said, he said only death and divorce; therefore, not marriage.

“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

MISHNAH: What is a lost animal? If he found a donkey or a cow grazing on the road, this is no lost animal. A donkey whose gear is upside-down or a cow running in a vineyard are lost animals. If he returned it but it ran away, returned it but it ran away even four or five times, he is obligated to return it since it is said: “Return it returning.” If he was losing time worth a tetradrachma, he cannot say, give me a tetradrachma but [the owner] may pay him at the rate of an unemployed worker. If there is a court, he can stipulate with him before the court. If there is no court, before whom could he stipulate? His own comes first. If one found it in the cow-shed, he has no obligation; in the public domain he is obligated. But if it was between graves, he may not defile himself. If his father told him to defile himself, or told him not to return it, he should not listen to him. If he unloaded and loaded, unloaded and loaded even four or five times, he is obligated since it is said: “restoring restore”. If he sat down and said, since it is your religious obligation, if you want to unload, unload, he is free since it is said: “with him”. It is a religious obligation to unload, but not to load; Rebbi Simeon says, also to load. Rebbi Yose the Galilean said, if the load was more than the ordinary, he need not do anything since it is said: “under its load,” a load which it can carry.

MISHNAH: What is a lost animal? If he found a donkey or a cow grazing on the road, this is no lost animal. A donkey whose gear is upside-down or a cow running in a vineyard are lost animals. If he returned it but it ran away, returned it but it ran away even four or five times, he is obligated to return it since it is said: “Return it returning.” If he was losing time worth a tetradrachma, he cannot say, give me a tetradrachma but [the owner] may pay him at the rate of an unemployed worker. If there is a court, he can stipulate with him before the court. If there is no court, before whom could he stipulate? His own comes first. If one found it in the cow-shed, he has no obligation; in the public domain he is obligated. But if it was between graves, he may not defile himself. If his father told him to defile himself, or told him not to return it, he should not listen to him. If he unloaded and loaded, unloaded and loaded even four or five times, he is obligated since it is said: “restoring restore”. If he sat down and said, since it is your religious obligation, if you want to unload, unload, he is free since it is said: “with him”. It is a religious obligation to unload, but not to load; Rebbi Simeon says, also to load. Rebbi Yose the Galilean said, if the load was more than the ordinary, he need not do anything since it is said: “under its load,” a load which it can carry.

Rebbi Eleazar invested a denar with a person and told him, what it earns between now and Ḥanukkah is mine [and yours], afterwards I do not have any part with you, whether they earn or lose it is yours. He wanted to give to him after Ḥanukkah but he did not accept. Rebbi Eleazar had misgivings because of “close to gain and far from loss,” as it was stated: “Close to gain and far from loss is the way of the wicked. Close to loss and far from gain is the way of the just. Close and far equally to both is the way of everybody.” Rebbi Isaac invested denars with a person. He wanted to stipulate as did Rebbi Eleazar but the other did not accept. Cahana invested 40 denars with a person to buy flax for him. Flax went up in price. He went to ask Rav, who told him to go and collect 40 large kor.

In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Matthew, a man who goes to another place to preliminarily marry a woman has to stipulate with her and tell her, on condition that you work so and so much and eat for such and such costs.

MISHNAH: One wolf is not an unavoidable accident, two wolves are. Rebbi Jehudah says, in times when wolves appear in packs, even a single wolf is an unavoidable accident. Two dogs are not an unavoidable accident. Yaddua the Babylonian says in the name of Rebbi Meїr: From the same direction it is not an unavoidable accident; from two different directions it is an unavoidable accident Robbers are an unavoidable accident. A lion, and a bear, and a leopard, and a panther, and a snake are unavoidable accidents. When? If they came by themselves. But if he led [the flock] to a place of troops of wild animals or robbers, these are not unavoidable accidents. If [an animal] dies a natural death it is an unavoidable accident. If he tortured it and it died, it is not an unavoidable accident. If it climbed to the top of a cliff and fell, it is an unavoidable accident. If he led it onto the top of a cliff and it fell, it is not an unavoidable accident. The unpaid keeper may stipulate that he be free from swearing, the borrower that he not be liable to pay, the paid keeper and the renter that they not be liable to swear or to pay. The stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid. Any stipulation which follows a prior action is invalid. But any stipulation which it is possible to fulfill at the end and he stipulated it at the start is valid.

HALAKHAH: “All who must swear by Torah standards,” etc. One understands from what is said, an oath before the Eternal shall be between them, would we not know that if he does not swear, he has to pay? Why does the verse say, its owner shall take it, and he does not have to pay? But from the moment the owner accepted his oath, he does not have to pay. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is this only following Rebbi Meїr or even following the rabbis? Did not Rebbi Assi say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Meїr is the one who says that out of a negative one understands a positive? Its owner shall take it, and he does not have to pay, therefore if he does not swear, he has to pay. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: The unpaid and the paid trustees may stipulate to be like a borrower. Rebbi Ḥanina said, everybody agrees that in the language of the Torah out of a negative one understands a positive; where do they disagree? In everyday speech.