supports

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Aqiba said, when I left the country for Nahardea for the intercalation of the year, Nehemiah from Badala found me,” etc. If it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”; Rebbi Jeremiah said, one lets his wife remarry; Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, one does not let his wife remarry. A baraita supports the one, a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Jeremiah: “By the mouth of witnesses,” not on basis of their writings, not on the word of a translator, not on the testimony of a single witness.” Today, does one not let remarry on the testimony of a single witness? Therefore also one lets remarry on basis of their writings and on the word of a translator. A baraita supports Rebbi Abun bar Cahana: The power of witnesses is greater than the power of a document and the power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses. Since if witnesses say, “X died, X was killed”, one lets his wife remarry but if it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”, one does not let his wife remarry. The power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses, since if somebody gives a loan before witnesses, he can foreclose only from unincumbered property; by a document, he can foreclose from mortgaged property.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Aqiba said, when I left the country for Nahardea for the intercalation of the year, Nehemiah from Badala found me,” etc. If it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”; Rebbi Jeremiah said, one lets his wife remarry; Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, one does not let his wife remarry. A baraita supports the one, a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Jeremiah: “By the mouth of witnesses,” not on basis of their writings, not on the word of a translator, not on the testimony of a single witness.” Today, does one not let remarry on the testimony of a single witness? Therefore also one lets remarry on basis of their writings and on the word of a translator. A baraita supports Rebbi Abun bar Cahana: The power of witnesses is greater than the power of a document and the power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses. Since if witnesses say, “X died, X was killed”, one lets his wife remarry but if it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”, one does not let his wife remarry. The power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses, since if somebody gives a loan before witnesses, he can foreclose only from unincumbered property; by a document, he can foreclose from mortgaged property.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Aqiba said, when I left the country for Nahardea for the intercalation of the year, Nehemiah from Badala found me,” etc. If it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”; Rebbi Jeremiah said, one lets his wife remarry; Rebbi Abun bar Cahana said, one does not let his wife remarry. A baraita supports the one, a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Jeremiah: “By the mouth of witnesses,” not on basis of their writings, not on the word of a translator, not on the testimony of a single witness.” Today, does one not let remarry on the testimony of a single witness? Therefore also one lets remarry on basis of their writings and on the word of a translator. A baraita supports Rebbi Abun bar Cahana: The power of witnesses is greater than the power of a document and the power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses. Since if witnesses say, “X died, X was killed”, one lets his wife remarry but if it was found in a document: “X died, X was killed”, one does not let his wife remarry. The power of a document is greater than the power of witnesses, since if somebody gives a loan before witnesses, he can foreclose only from unincumbered property; by a document, he can foreclose from mortgaged property.

MISHNAH: On the same day, Rebbi Aqiba explained: “Any clay vessel into which some of them would fall, all inside shall become impure.” It does not say “is impure” but “shall become impure”; this teaches about the secondarily impure loaf that it defiles the tertiary. Rebbi Joshua said, who would remove the dust from your eyes, Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai, since you were saying that a future generation would purify the tertiary loaf since there is nothing about it in the Torah, but behold, your student Aqiba supports it by a verse from the Torah, as it has been said, “everything inside shall become impure.”

A Mishnah supports Rav: “Profane food which is impure primarily is impure and defiles, secondarily it invalidates but does not defile, but the tertiary can be eaten in heave broth.” This implies that it is forbidden to turn it into heave. And it is said after that: “Heave which is impure primarily or secondarily is impure and defiles, tertiarily impure it invalidates but does not defile, but the fourth degree can be eaten in sacrificial broth.” If you say that it is forbidden to turn it into sacrificial food, you would find that Rav’s statements are contradictory since Rebbi Abba said in the name of Rav: The tertiary comes because of the reptile but the fourth degree can be turned into sacrificial food, because they spoke about fourth degree [of impurity] for sacrifices only for dedicated sacrifices of the Temple! Rebbi Ḥuna said, are we not talking about heave? But it is forbidden to turn heave into sacrificial food in order to avoid accidents! And it was said after that: “Sacrifices which are impure primarily, secondarily, or tertiarily are impure and defile, impurity in the fourth degree invalidates but does not defile, but the fifth degree can be eaten in sacrificial broth.” If you say, it is forbidden to turn it into sacrificial food, is there any impurity of the fifth degree in sacrifices? But you say there is not. So here also, there is not.

“ ‘To save you’, that is the camp of the Ark.” But some say, that is the Name which was given in the Ark, as it was stated’: “Rebbi Jehudah ben Laqish says, two arks were travelling with Israel in the desert; one in which the Torah was deposited and one in which the broken pieces of the tablets were deposited. The one in which the Torah was deposited was put into the Tent of Meeting; that is what is written: “Moses and the Ark of the Eternal’s covenant did not move from the camp.” The one in which the broken pieces of the tablets were deposited was going out and coming in with them. But the Rabbis say, it was only one, and once it went out in the days of Eli and was taken prisoner. A verse supports the Rabbis: “Woe to us, who will save us from this mighty god?” A word [which shows that] they never had seen it before. A verse supports Rebbi Jehudah ben Laqish. “Saul said to Aḥiya: present God’s Ark”. But was the Ark not at Qiryat Ye‘arim? What do the rabbis with it? ‘Present to me the High Priest’s diadem.’ Another verse supports Rebbi Jehudah ben Laqish: “The Ark, Israel, and Jehudah, dwell in huts.”. Was the Ark not in Zion? What do the rabbis with it? The straw roof cover that was in the walls, since the Temple was not yet built.

“ ‘To save you’, that is the camp of the Ark.” But some say, that is the Name which was given in the Ark, as it was stated’: “Rebbi Jehudah ben Laqish says, two arks were travelling with Israel in the desert; one in which the Torah was deposited and one in which the broken pieces of the tablets were deposited. The one in which the Torah was deposited was put into the Tent of Meeting; that is what is written: “Moses and the Ark of the Eternal’s covenant did not move from the camp.” The one in which the broken pieces of the tablets were deposited was going out and coming in with them. But the Rabbis say, it was only one, and once it went out in the days of Eli and was taken prisoner. A verse supports the Rabbis: “Woe to us, who will save us from this mighty god?” A word [which shows that] they never had seen it before. A verse supports Rebbi Jehudah ben Laqish. “Saul said to Aḥiya: present God’s Ark”. But was the Ark not at Qiryat Ye‘arim? What do the rabbis with it? ‘Present to me the High Priest’s diadem.’ Another verse supports Rebbi Jehudah ben Laqish: “The Ark, Israel, and Jehudah, dwell in huts.”. Was the Ark not in Zion? What do the rabbis with it? The straw roof cover that was in the walls, since the Temple was not yet built.

“ ‘To save you’, that is the camp of the Ark.” But some say, that is the Name which was given in the Ark, as it was stated’: “Rebbi Jehudah ben Laqish says, two arks were travelling with Israel in the desert; one in which the Torah was deposited and one in which the broken pieces of the tablets were deposited. The one in which the Torah was deposited was put into the Tent of Meeting; that is what is written: “Moses and the Ark of the Eternal’s covenant did not move from the camp.” The one in which the broken pieces of the tablets were deposited was going out and coming in with them. But the Rabbis say, it was only one, and once it went out in the days of Eli and was taken prisoner. A verse supports the Rabbis: “Woe to us, who will save us from this mighty god?” A word [which shows that] they never had seen it before. A verse supports Rebbi Jehudah ben Laqish. “Saul said to Aḥiya: present God’s Ark”. But was the Ark not at Qiryat Ye‘arim? What do the rabbis with it? ‘Present to me the High Priest’s diadem.’ Another verse supports Rebbi Jehudah ben Laqish: “The Ark, Israel, and Jehudah, dwell in huts.”. Was the Ark not in Zion? What do the rabbis with it? The straw roof cover that was in the walls, since the Temple was not yet built.

It supports him because he says it is all praise, as Rebbi Joḥanan said, Joḥanan the High Priest sent and checked in all localities of Israel and found that they separated only Great Heave. But First and Second Tithes some were separating and some did not. He said, since [omitting] First Tithe is a deadly sin and [omitting] Second Tithe [implies] the sin of ṭevel, a person should give a name to heave and heave of the tithe and give them to the Cohen; Second Tithe he exchanges for coins. About the remaining tithe of the poor, he who has a claim on another person must bring proof.

Rebbi Eleazar explains the reason given in the Mishnah, that if he has a complaint about virginity he can quickly go to court. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Since the time of danger they used to marry on Tuesdays and the Sages did not object; about Monday one does not listen to him, but if it was because of a danger it is permitted. What is “because of a danger”? because of sorcery. What is the difference between Monday and Tuesday? One who waits one day cannot be compared to one who waits two days. Why not let him wait two days? That his acquisition should not be sweet for him. Why should his acquisition not be sweet for him? One cannot tolerate it, since Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. Could we not suspect that she was raped? A rape is public knowledge. And even if you suspect that she was raped, there is no other doubt. There is a doubt whether she was raped or whether she was [willingly] opened. From the words of the Torah one has to be stringent. Rebbi Yose said, if you suspect that she was raped, there are two doubts. There is a doubt whether she was raped or whether she was [willingly] opened; there is a doubt whether it happened after she was preliminarily married or before. From the words of the Torah, with two doubts one has to be lenient.

One agrees that she should not be married either Friday or Saturday night. Not on Friday, for the honor of the Sabbath. Not Saturday night: The colleagues say, because of the exertion; Rebbi Yose says, for the honor of the Sabbath. A baraita supports the colleagues: Why did they say, a virgin is married on Wednesday? That a man should prepare for his needs three consecutive days.

HALAKHAH: “The ketubah of a virgin is 200 and that of a widow one mina,” etc. Huna in the name of Samuel: In the Temple šeqel. Rebbi Abba bar Bina said, circulating coin. A Mishnah supports Rebbi Abba bar Bina: “The five tetradrachmas of the firstborn are in Tyrian coinage, the 30 of the slave, the 50 of the rapist and the seducer, the 100 of the slanderer, are all computed in Temple šeqels in Tyrian coinage.” A woman’s ketubah is not stated with them. Rebbi Abin said, did they not learn the ketubah of a woman from the rapist and the seducer? Since the rapist and the seducer are mentioned, it is as if women’s ketubah was stated with them.

Should one not worry that he might be a slave? This supports what Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: It is forbidden for a man to teach Torah to his slave. But did not Rebbi Ze‘ira say in the name of Rav Jeremiah: A slave is counted as one of the seven readers; wayedabber is counted as one of three verses! Explain it, if he learned it by himself or his master taught him like Tebi. Should one not worry that he might be a slave? This supports what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Women and slaves cannot share in the distribution on the threshing floor, but one gives them the gifts of priesthood and levitic status from the house.

Should one not worry that he might be a slave? This supports what Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: It is forbidden for a man to teach Torah to his slave. But did not Rebbi Ze‘ira say in the name of Rav Jeremiah: A slave is counted as one of the seven readers; wayedabber is counted as one of three verses! Explain it, if he learned it by himself or his master taught him like Tebi. Should one not worry that he might be a slave? This supports what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Women and slaves cannot share in the distribution on the threshing floor, but one gives them the gifts of priesthood and levitic status from the house.

So far payments that are consequences of sexual relations. If somebody injured her, blinded one of her eyes, cut off one of her hands, broke one of her legs? To whom does he pay, to her or to her father? Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays to her father; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he pays to her. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is of the opinion that her earnings belong to her even before she becomes an adult. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only after she comes of age. Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: They disagree before she comes of age, but after she is an adult everybody agrees that all belongs to her. A baraita supports either one of them. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody injures somebody else’s daughter or son, the payments for the son must be given immediately; those for the daughter shall be held as property value. Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Judah the father of Rebbi Mattaniah, said that some state it so that beginning and end support Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If somebody injures his own underage daughter, diminution of value belong to her and he is free from paying for shame and diminution of value. If others injure her, diminution of values belong to her, the rest shall be transformed into property value, but payments for shame and diminution of value belong to her father.

So far payments that are consequences of sexual relations. If somebody injured her, blinded one of her eyes, cut off one of her hands, broke one of her legs? To whom does he pay, to her or to her father? Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays to her father; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he pays to her. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish is of the opinion that her earnings belong to her even before she becomes an adult. Rebbi Joḥanan says, only after she comes of age. Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: They disagree before she comes of age, but after she is an adult everybody agrees that all belongs to her. A baraita supports either one of them. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody injures somebody else’s daughter or son, the payments for the son must be given immediately; those for the daughter shall be held as property value. Rebbi Yudan, the father of Rebbi Judah the father of Rebbi Mattaniah, said that some state it so that beginning and end support Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If somebody injures his own underage daughter, diminution of value belong to her and he is free from paying for shame and diminution of value. If others injure her, diminution of values belong to her, the rest shall be transformed into property value, but payments for shame and diminution of value belong to her father.

HALAKHAH: “She always remains in the father’s power,” etc. Not only to the bridal chamber but to a house where the bridal chamber is. In which way? A banquet hall and a bedroom, the bridal chamber being the bedroom, and she entered the banquest hall. In which respect? Rebbi Eleazar said, to inherit from her. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, to dissolve her vows. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even though Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, to dissolve her vows, he agrees that he does not actually dissolve them until she enters the bridal chamber. Rebbi Huna said, a baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “To whore in her father’s house,” that excludes the case that the father’s emissaries entrusted her to the husband’s emissaries, after which she should not be stoned but strangled.

Rav Huna insists on interpreting the contract text. Rav Huna explained: “The sons shall inherit but the daughters must be fed.” Since the sons inherit movables, the daughters also are fed from movables. Samuel said, the daughters are not fed from movables. A Mishnah supports Samuel: “The female children you shall have from me shall dwell in my house and be supported from my property.” It was stated on this: From real estate but not from movables. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda said: Rav Huna follows Rebbi and Samuel follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “One uses both guaranteed property and non-guaranteed property for the support of the wife and the daughters, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, guaranteed property may be taken by sons from sons, by daughters from daughters, by sons from daughters, and by daughters from sons. But non-guaranteed property may be taken by sons from daughters but not by daughters from sons.” They said, Rav Huna reversed himself. They said, that was well done, ketubah is a biblical commandment but support of the daughters is from their words. May their words uproot a biblical commandment? It must be that they differ about the money contained in their mother’s ketubah. [Even if you say, they differ about the money contained in their mother’s ketubah.] But is the money stipulated in their mother’s ketubah not also real estate?

HALAKHAH: “If he did not write her “if you are kidnapped I shall ransom you,” etc. “If she was kidnapped he is obligated to ransom her,” etc. It was stated: If a sister-in-law was kidnapped, the heirs do not have to ransom her. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: Not only if she was kidnapped when her husband was still alive but even if she was kidnapped after the husband’s death, the heirs do not have to ransom her. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Aḥa: The Mishnah supports Rav: “And bring you back as wife;” there is no “wife”.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody dedicates his wife’s earnings,” etc. Rebbi Meïr says, it is sanctified as his property. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian says, it is profane as his property. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree about the excess over five tetradrachmas. He explains it in the case of one who supports his wife with food but does not give her an obolus for her needs, as we stated: “If he does not give her an obolus for her needs, what she earns is hers”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they disagree about the excess left after [the husband’s] death; for he explains it if he does not support her with food. But if he supports her with food, everybody agrees that it became dedicated. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, what one states there supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “When was this said? If he does not feed her. But if he feeds her, everybody agrees that it was sanctified.” But is not everything a wife has subject to the husband’s claim to its yield?

HALAKHAH: “If somebody dedicates his wife’s earnings,” etc. Rebbi Meïr says, it is sanctified as his property. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian says, it is profane as his property. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree about the excess over five tetradrachmas. He explains it in the case of one who supports his wife with food but does not give her an obolus for her needs, as we stated: “If he does not give her an obolus for her needs, what she earns is hers”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they disagree about the excess left after [the husband’s] death; for he explains it if he does not support her with food. But if he supports her with food, everybody agrees that it became dedicated. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, what one states there supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “When was this said? If he does not feed her. But if he feeds her, everybody agrees that it was sanctified.” But is not everything a wife has subject to the husband’s claim to its yield?

HALAKHAH: “If somebody dedicates his wife’s earnings,” etc. Rebbi Meïr says, it is sanctified as his property. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian says, it is profane as his property. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree about the excess over five tetradrachmas. He explains it in the case of one who supports his wife with food but does not give her an obolus for her needs, as we stated: “If he does not give her an obolus for her needs, what she earns is hers”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they disagree about the excess left after [the husband’s] death; for he explains it if he does not support her with food. But if he supports her with food, everybody agrees that it became dedicated. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, what one states there supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “When was this said? If he does not feed her. But if he feeds her, everybody agrees that it was sanctified.” But is not everything a wife has subject to the husband’s claim to its yield?

Some Tannaïm state: thirty days. Some Tannaïm state: up to thirty days. He who says thirty days supports Rav; he who says up to thirty days supports Samuel.

Some Tannaïm state: thirty days. Some Tannaïm state: up to thirty days. He who says thirty days supports Rav; he who says up to thirty days supports Samuel.

HALAKHAH: “If she inherited after she was definitively married,” etc. We did state: She may sell or give away and it is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: She should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid. ”Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, that is not what Rabban Gamliel gave as answer, but the following was his argument: No, if you have an argument about a preliminarily married one, where he has rights neither to what she finds, nor to her handiwork, nor to dissolve her vows, what can you say about a definitively married one where he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows? Let the proof be the case of one who [inherited] before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, in which case he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows, and you admit to us that she should not sell or give away. He said to them, I agree that she should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid..” There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, is not Rabban Gamliel’s an isolated opinion? One cannot rely on it. A baraita supports him and disagrees with him: ”Our teachers took up the case again, voted, and instructed about property which she inherited before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, that she should not sell or give away, and if she sold or gave away it is invalid.” It disagrees that the sale is invalid. It agrees that our teachers took up the case again, instructed, and voted. Before they voted, they did not disagree with him.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Simeon differentiates between properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, properties known to the husband are real estate, those not known to the husband are movables. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, properties known to the husband are those she inherited in the presence of the husband, those not known to the husband are those she inherited while her husband was overseas. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: The following are properties not known to the husband, what she inherited while her husband was overseas.

HALAKHAH: “If she inherited old vines or olive trees,” etc. Rav Abun in the name of the rabbis there: The Mishnah deals with the case that she inherited olive trees but not their ground, vines but not their ground. But if she inherited olive trees with their ground, vines with their ground, she does not have to sell since her father’s house’s glory still exists. But the rabbis here say, even if she inherited olive trees with their ground, vines with their ground, did she not inherit the value of the olive grove, did she not inherit the value of the vineyard? A baraita supports the rabbis there: “ ‘I am selling you the vineyard’, this is a valid sale even if there are no vines since he sells him [the real estate] by description. ‘I am selling you the grove’, this is a valid sale even if there are no trees since he sells him [the real estate] by description.”

HALAKHAH: “If a widow’s ketubah was 200,” etc. We understand worth a mina for 200 or worth 200 for a mina. In any case, she made the orphans lose a mina. [If it was worth] a mina [and she sold it] for 200, would the sale not be invalidated as erroneous buy? Explain it that the property increased in value. Rebbi Abin said, this supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, real estate buys are never under the laws of overcharging. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if the transaction was excessive, it comes under the law of overcharging. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “The following do not fall under the laws of overcharging: Slaves, securities, real estate, and redemptions.” He explains it, unless it was excessive. If he redeemed what was worth a mina by 200, Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is not redeemed, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is redeemed. A baralta disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: If he said, this toga instead of this donkey, the latter becomes profane. And its end disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is necessary to compute the value. Rebbi Yose said, the baraita itself implies that it is necessary to compute the value. Where do they disagree? To bring [a sacrifice to atone for] larceny. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he has to bring a sacrifice for larceny; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he does not have to bring a sacrifice for larceny.

HALAKHAH: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, her sale is valid,” etc. That is, if she sold them in four contracts. If she sold them in one contract, there is disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as they disagreed: If somebody wrote all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yasa: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Elazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified. From where even 100? The verse says, ‘witnesses’”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is as if there was one testimony about one person. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

It was stated: He supports her the first five years, whether in inflation or in deflation. If [living expenses] were high and became low, if he was the cause, he pays the high rate, if she was the cause, he pays the low rate. If they were low and became high, whether he was the cause or she was the cause, he pays the low rate. That is, “the daughter neither ascends nor descends.”

HALAKHAH: “If the daughter married, the husband has to sustain her,” etc. What is the status of the ketubah stipulations if he wrote them in the document? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he wrote them for emphasis; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he wrote them to collect from encumbered property. Rebbi Jeremiah switched the traditions. Rebbi Yudan said, a Mishnah supports him who said, he wrote them for emphasis, since we stated there: “One does not foreclose from mortgaged property to indemnify for produce or investment, or sustenance of widow and daughters, in order not to impede the economy.” Are [the first categories] not based on a document? Here also based on the document. Rebbi Ḥanania said, “since her status is that of a creditor”! Is that not based on a document? Here also based on the document.

“He pays her in coin of the Land of Israel.” This implies that the coins of the land of Israel are the best of all countries. This supports him who says that a woman’s ketubah is from the words of the Torah, against Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, as it was stated: A woman’s ketubah is from the words of the Torah. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, a woman’s ketubah is only an institution of the Soferim.

“Like a sheep.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, like the sheep of the daily offering. There, they say, like the young of a purification offering. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like our father Abraham’s ram. What Rebbi Ḥiyya stated supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Like a sheep which never suckled. Following the opinions of the rabbis there, one could state: Like the Temple courtyard. Rebbi Abin said, following the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish one could state: Like the sacrifices on the altar. Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, following Rebbi Joḥanan one could state: Like the cleansing of the inner altar and the candelabra.

Rebbi Immi said, who is the Tanna of speeding-up vows? Rebbi Tarphon! For he explains it for those who insist. Rebbi Abba said, explain it according to everybody for those who do not insist. If you say for those who insist, one should have stated that Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob and Rebbi Tarphon say the same thing. Some Tannaїm say, “one who wants”; some Tannaïm say, “also one who wants”. He who says “one who wants” supports Rebbi Abba; he who says “also one who wants”, supports Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: who is the Tanna of speeding-up vows? Rebbi Tarphon!

Rebbi Immi said, who is the Tanna of speeding-up vows? Rebbi Tarphon! For he explains it for those who insist. Rebbi Abba said, explain it according to everybody for those who do not insist. If you say for those who insist, one should have stated that Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob and Rebbi Tarphon say the same thing. Some Tannaїm say, “one who wants”; some Tannaïm say, “also one who wants”. He who says “one who wants” supports Rebbi Abba; he who says “also one who wants”, supports Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: who is the Tanna of speeding-up vows? Rebbi Tarphon!

So far, if he abandoned it for a longer period of time. But if he abandoned only for a short time? Let us hear from the following: “If he abandoned his field, he may cancel his action during three days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it says only “three days”. Therefore, after three days he may not cancel his action. Rebbi Simeon Dayana stated before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Even after three he may cancel his action. He said to him, since you say after three days, is it the same after three or after many? A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “About when is this said? If he abandoned in an unspecified way. But if he said: My field shall be abandoned one day, one week, one month, one year, a sabbatical period, as long as nobody took it over, either he or another person, he may cancel. But after somebody acquired it, either he or somebody else, he cannot cancel.” This means that short or long periods are the same. It also means that they were not worried about dishonesty. This means that a person may abandon and reacquire. That obviously answers Rebbi Zeïra’s question, since Rebbi Zeira had said, are short and long times the same?

HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not work according to the wishes of my father,’ etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody dedicates his wife’s work, she works and eats. The excess? Rebbi Meїr says, it is dedicated; Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, it is profane.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree about the excess over five tetradrachmas. He explains it in the case of one who supports his wife with food but does not give her an obolus for her needs, as we stated: “If he does not give her an obolus for her needs, what she earns is hers”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they disagree about the excess left after [the husband’s] death; for he explains it if he does not support her with food. But if he supports her with food, everybody agrees that it became dedicated. And here, he cannot dissolve! Rebbi Meїr says. he does not have to dissolve. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, hers. Rebbi Aqiba said, hers. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, his.

HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not work according to the wishes of my father,’ etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody dedicates his wife’s work, she works and eats. The excess? Rebbi Meїr says, it is dedicated; Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, it is profane.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree about the excess over five tetradrachmas. He explains it in the case of one who supports his wife with food but does not give her an obolus for her needs, as we stated: “If he does not give her an obolus for her needs, what she earns is hers”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they disagree about the excess left after [the husband’s] death; for he explains it if he does not support her with food. But if he supports her with food, everybody agrees that it became dedicated. And here, he cannot dissolve! Rebbi Meїr says. he does not have to dissolve. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, hers. Rebbi Aqiba said, hers. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, his.

HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir [abstaining] from dried figs and fig cake,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the reason of the House of Shammai: because he mentioned the state of nazir. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, because of substitutes of substitutes. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, a verse supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “So says the Eternal, as cider is found in the grape bunch, etc.” The Torah called a grape bunch “cider”. And people call a dried fig cider, because of substitutes of substitutes. What is the difference between them? If he said, “I shall be a nazir[abstaining] from dried figs and fig cake.” In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is a nazir, in Rebbi Simeon’s opinion he is not a nazir. “I shall be a nazir[abstaining] from a loaf of bread,” in Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is a nazir, in Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is not a nazir. “From a loaf of bread,” he did not say anything. Rebbi Uqba asked before Rebbi Mana: The opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems to be inverted, as we have stated there: “ ‘I take upon myself the obligation to bring a flour offering from barley.’ He shall bring from wheat.” And Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, because he mentioned “flour offering.” And here, he says so? He accepts one and he accepts the other. He accepts because he mentioned the state of nazir, and he accepts because of substitutes of substitutes. You should know that it is so since we have stated: “If he said, the cow said.” She did not say anything; it is because he mentioned the state of nazir, and here he mentioned the state of nazir.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody said, “I am a nazir,” etc. This supports Bar Qappara, that if he shaved on the 30 day, he did not fulfill his obligation. This supports Rebbi Jonathan, that if he shaved on the 30 day, he did fulfill his obligation. Both of them? It is only one opinion, “this testimony”. They knew that it was forbidden to shave on the 30th; they thought that if he shaved on the 30th day, he did not fulfill his obligation. He came to testify that if he shaved on the 30th day, he fulfilled his obligation.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody said, “I am a nazir,” etc. This supports Bar Qappara, that if he shaved on the 30 day, he did not fulfill his obligation. This supports Rebbi Jonathan, that if he shaved on the 30 day, he did fulfill his obligation. Both of them? It is only one opinion, “this testimony”. They knew that it was forbidden to shave on the 30th; they thought that if he shaved on the 30th day, he did not fulfill his obligation. He came to testify that if he shaved on the 30th day, he fulfilled his obligation.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody vowed two neziriot,” etc. If he finished his first period of nezirut and started to lean on the second, when they did not find an opening for the first while they found an opening for the second, the second can be used for the first. Where do we hold? If he said, “I am a nazir twice,” a vow which is partially annulled is totally annulled. If he said, “I am a nazir for these 30 days and those 30 days,” in this case the second cannot be used for the first. But we must hold that he said, “I am a nazir and nazir.” If he said, “these are for nezirut.” But if he said, “these are for my nezirut; those are for the other nezirut,” in this case the second cannot be used for the first. Rebbi Eleazar said, if he finished the first nezirut, as soon as he brought a sacrifice and shaved, the first is credited for the second. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa commanded the colleagues: If you hear anything formulated by Rebbi Eleazar, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees: not unless he brings all his sacrifices, following the rabbis; but following Rebbi Simeon even if he brings only one sacrifice. If he dedicated both together, he has only one in his hand. If he dedicated each of them separately or brought each of them for the other, he did not acquit himself [of his obligation]. This means that as far as holiness goes, they became holy. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “His sacrifice to the Eternal for his nezirut,” i. e., that his vow of nazir should precede his sacrifice, rather than that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir. It is different, because he still is in nezirut. One understands the second for the first. The first for the second? Rebbi Jehudah said, this supports Rebbi Eleazar. But did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa command the colleagues: If you hear anything formulated by Rebbi Eleazar, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees; not unless he brings all his sacrifices. They wanted to say, following the rabbis. But here, we hold with Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Explain it for his nezirut and the nezirut he pledged for his son. In that, the second can be used for the first. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, did we not argue about one who said, “I am a nazir”? He really should be a nazir only once. You were severe with him and obligated him to be a nazir twice. Is it not enough that you were severe with him and obligated him to be a nazir twice, that now you say, he has nothing in his hands?

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ at the end. Rebbi Simeon says, only if he mentions ‘oath’ for every item.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, [Rebbi Simeon implies] if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest. Rebbi Abba said, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree with this. If it turns out that he had no wheat, does [the oath] refer to the other kinds? The colleagues said, it does not; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it does. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the baraita supports the colleagues: “A woman made a vow as nazir and her friend heard it and said, ‘so am I;’ if the first’s husband heard and told her, ‘it is permitted to you,’ the first one is permitted and the second forbidden. Rebbi Simeon says, if she said, my intention was only to be like her, in her state, the second also is permitted.” Because she said “to be like her, in her state;” therefore, if she did not say “to be like her, in her state,” the first is permitted and the second forbidden. Since there, where there was no original nezirut, you say it applies, here, where there was an original oath, not so much more? When Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon implies that if it turns out that he had no wheat, he is not prosecutable for the rest, if he attaches: If he says, [my obligation for] barley shall be like that for wheat; [my obligation for] spelt shall be like that for wheat.

There, we have stated: “Leftovers for nezirim are for nezirim; what is left over from a nazir is for donation.” Rav Ḥisda said, only if his purification offering was presented last. But if his well-being offering waspresented last, what is left over is for a well-being offering. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if his well-being offering was presented last, it is a general rule for a nazir that his leftover be for donation. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “The following are undesignated monies: any which contain money for purification offerings that should die. Even if he designated money for purification offerings that should die, it remains undesignated.” A baraita supports Rav Ḥisda: “This is for my purification offering and the rest for my nezirut. Then he died. One commits larceny with all of them but not with part of them.” It does not say, when he died it should be given for donation.

There, we have stated: “Leftovers for nezirim are for nezirim; what is left over from a nazir is for donation.” Rav Ḥisda said, only if his purification offering was presented last. But if his well-being offering waspresented last, what is left over is for a well-being offering. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if his well-being offering was presented last, it is a general rule for a nazir that his leftover be for donation. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “The following are undesignated monies: any which contain money for purification offerings that should die. Even if he designated money for purification offerings that should die, it remains undesignated.” A baraita supports Rav Ḥisda: “This is for my purification offering and the rest for my nezirut. Then he died. One commits larceny with all of them but not with part of them.” It does not say, when he died it should be given for donation.

There, we have stated: “Leftovers for nezirim are for nezirim; what is left over from a nazir is for donation.” Rav Ḥisda said, only if his purification offering was presented last. But if his well-being offering waspresented last, what is left over is for a well-being offering. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if his well-being offering was presented last, it is a general rule for a nazir that his leftover be for donation. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “The following are undesignated monies: any which contain money for purification offerings that should die. Even if he designated money for purification offerings that should die, it remains undesignated.” A baraita supports Rav Ḥisda: “This is for my purification offering and the rest for my nezirut. Then he died. One commits larceny with all of them but not with part of them.” It does not say, when he died it should be given for donation.

There, we have stated: “Leftovers for nezirim are for nezirim; what is left over from a nazir is for donation.” Rav Ḥisda said, only if his purification offering was presented last. But if his well-being offering waspresented last, what is left over is for a well-being offering. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if his well-being offering was presented last, it is a general rule for a nazir that his leftover be for donation. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “The following are undesignated monies: any which contain money for purification offerings that should die. Even if he designated money for purification offerings that should die, it remains undesignated.” A baraita supports Rav Ḥisda: “This is for my purification offering and the rest for my nezirut. Then he died. One commits larceny with all of them but not with part of them.” It does not say, when he died it should be given for donation.

HALAKHAH: “If one of the bloods was sprinkled for her,” etc. He dissolves for her because of her hair. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It is a decision of Scripture: “He dissolved her vows,” he dissolves what is on her. Whenever he dissolves her vow, he dissolves what is on her. Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is everybody’s opinion, after she was transferred from the prohibition to the positive commandment. The rabbis say, “afterwards, the nazir shall drink wine,” after all these actions. Rebbi Simeon says, even after a single action. Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi (Bevai). “When has this been said? If she shaves in purity. But if she shaves in impurity, he may dissolve since he can say, I cannot stand an unseemly wife.” Therefore, shaving in purity does not make her unseemly. Who holds that shaving does not make unseemly? Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, even Rebbi thinks so: “Rebbi says, he may dissolve even if she shaves [in purity], since he can say, I cannot stand a shorn wife.” Should he not say, I cannot stand an unseemly and shorn wife? Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi (Jehudah) said that only for the purification sacrifice, since a purification sacrifice would be invalid if not in her name. That means, as long as it is alive it is surrendered to Heaven only by slaughter.

There, we have stated: “If somebody collects coins and says, ‘these are for my Temple tax,’ the House of Shammai say, the excess should be given as a donation, but the House of Hillel say, the excess is profane. ‘That I shall be able to pay my Temple tax,’ they agree that the excess is profane. ‘These [monies] are for my purification offering’, they agree that the excess is profane.” Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: When do they disagree? If he collects little by little. But if he says “these,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Bevai: “Rebbi Simeon says, what is the difference between Temple tax and purification sacrifices? Only that the Temple tax is a fixed amount.” Where do we hold? If he says, “that I shall use it for the Temple tax,” everybody agrees that the excess should be given as a donation. If he says, “that I shall use it for my purification offering,” everybody agrees that the excess is profane. But we are considering one who says “these.” Since the Temple tax has a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess is profane. Since purification offerings do not have a fixed rate from the Torah, the excess should be given as a donation. How does Rebbi Yose handle this? He explains it if he collects little by little, following the House of Hillel.

So far, if he thought that it was the tenth which he called “tenth”. If he knew that it was the ninth and called it “tenth”? The colleagues say, it is sanctified. Rebbi Yudan said, it is not sanctified. The Mishnah supports the colleagues: “The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Do you not agree that it leaves and grazes with the herd? The House of Shammai anwered them, do you not agree that if somebody erred and designated the ninth as the tenth, or the tenth as ninth, or the eleventh as tenth, it is sanctified.” And they do not accept it! Otherwise, they could have answered: Why do you answer us from something which is sanctified only if not in [willful] error about something which will be sanctified both in error and not in error! As Rebbi Immi said, they were rich in answer, or as Rebbi Nasa said, like somebody who has two reasons and he responds by giving one of them.

A “torn” [creature] that was turned into a carcass. Rebbi Yasa, the son of Rebbi Yasa’s daughter, in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan says, he is guilty twice; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is guilty only once. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yose, the following supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “ ‘Any person who would eat any carcass meat,’ why does the verse say ‘and torn’? If a ‘torn’ animal can survive, was ‘carcass meat’ mentioned before? If a ‘torn’ animal must die, is it not included in ‘carcass meat’ ”? Should he not say, it is carcass meat? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: The reason of Rebbi Yose: “Do not defile yourself by animals and birds,” but only the Eight Reptiles impart impurity! But the measure of their impurities is the measure of their uses as food. Rebbi Eleazar objected: May not the limbs of pure animals impart impurity in the most minute amount but as food only in the volume of an olive? He accepted it. What is meant by “he accepted it”? Like a person who said, the opponent accepted it. Ḥiyya bar Abba said: “You shall not [eat] any carcass meat.” The Torah identified all eating together. Rebbi Ḥanina objected: Is not the impurity of the Eight Reptiles in the size of a lentil, but as food in the volume of an olive, whether for blood or for meat?

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”

HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”

HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”

HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”

If [the bill of divorce] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the husband’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the divorce? Or, since his protest is void [only] about the divorce, is it valid about the gift? We have stated later: “Bills of divorce for wives and documents of manumission are equal in the rules of carrying and bringing.” If [the document of manumission] contained documentation of a gift and [the messenger] said, it was written and signed before me, is [the master’s] protest about the gift void since it is void about the manumission? Or since his protest is void [only] about the manumission, is it valid about the gift? If somebody signed all his property over to his slave, you say that the gift is the document of manumission. How do you treat this? Is it a document of manumission and his protest is void or is it a gift and his protest is valid? This can be compared to the following: If somebody signed all his property over to two persons in one document and the testimony of the witnesses was valid for one but invalid for the other. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Immi: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagreed; one said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other, but the other said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Mana did not specify; Rebbi Abin specified: Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is invalid for one it is invalid for the other; but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for one and invalid for the other. Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “Since testimony of two [witnesses] is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified, so also of three [witnesses] it is invalid if one of them turns out to be related or disqualified”. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Ḥanina the colleague of the rabbis and the rabbis disagree. One says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, but the other says, Rebbi Eleazar is not correct. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is correct, it is a testimony about one person; as testimony it is totally invalid if it is partially invalid. For him who says, the argument of Rebbi Eleazar is not correct, it is as if two groups of witnesses came, valid for one and disqualified for the other.

Only if he says, it was written before me during the day and signed during the day; only if he says, it was written before me especially for her and signed expressly for her. It was asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Does he have to know the names of the witnesses at the moment of their signing? He said to them, did the Gentiles Luciani sign it? And you say so? A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “All bills of divorce coming from overseas are valid even if their names sound Gentile since Jews outside the Land of Israel bear Gentile names.” He said only, outside the Land; therefore not in the Land of Israel. What about this? Rebbi Bevai in the name of Rebbi Issi: unless he writes, at a Jewish place. If there is no Jewish place, in the synagogue. If there is no synagogue, he assembles there ten people. Rebbi Abun said, it would be better to certify the signatures than to assemble there ten people. What about this? Even in a Jewish store.

Rebbi Immi said, where do they disagree? If the document is presented by him personally. But if it is presented by another person, even the rabbis will agree that it is valid. Rebbi Ḥananiah agrees with Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, where do they disagree? If the document is presented by another person. But if it is presented by him personally, even Rebbi Jehudah will agree that it is invalid. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected to Rebbi Immi: If the document is presented by him personally, does Rebbi Jehudah declare it valid even in the first case? Rebbi Immi brought his father-in-law Rebbi Jonah who stated for him: If one said “it was written before me” and another “it was signed before me”, it is invalid, but Rebbi Jehudah declares it valid. Rebbi Abin said, the formulation of a baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: In that case, Rebbi Jehudah declares it valid. But it is difficult following Rebbi Ze‘ira: If the document is presented by another person, that is when they do not treat the messenger as two. When do they treat him as two? When he testifies to both writing and signing.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon stated this only for the night; but on the next day even Rebbi Simeon will agree. But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there is no difference, whether night, or the next day, or after many days. What is the next day? Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mana, one said the next day, the other said the day after the next. The statement of Rebbi Joḥanan about Rebbi Simeon (ben Laqish) is difficult! So says Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: It turns out that Rebbi Simeon (ben Laqish) agrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Just as Rebbi Eleazar said, even if there are no witnesses signed on it, it is valid, so Rebbi Simeon said, even if there are no witnesses signed on it, it is valid. Rebbi Samuel, the brother of Rebbi Berekhiah, said: Here, if he wants the document to be signed, there if she does not want the document to be signed. If he said to ten people, sign the bill of divorce, and some signed today and some the next day. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for the remainder [are signing] only because of the condition. Rebbi Joḥanan said it is invalid unless all sign on the same day. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: There was a case that one said to ten people, sign the bill of divorce, and some signed on that day and some the next day. The case came before the rabbis who reluctantly declared it valid. This supports Rebbi Joḥanan from the position of the rabbis and disagrees with Rebbi Simeon. This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from the position of Rebbi Simeon and disagrees with the rabbis.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Simeon stated this only for the night; but on the next day even Rebbi Simeon will agree. But Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, there is no difference, whether night, or the next day, or after many days. What is the next day? Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Mana, one said the next day, the other said the day after the next. The statement of Rebbi Joḥanan about Rebbi Simeon (ben Laqish) is difficult! So says Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: It turns out that Rebbi Simeon (ben Laqish) agrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Just as Rebbi Eleazar said, even if there are no witnesses signed on it, it is valid, so Rebbi Simeon said, even if there are no witnesses signed on it, it is valid. Rebbi Samuel, the brother of Rebbi Berekhiah, said: Here, if he wants the document to be signed, there if she does not want the document to be signed. If he said to ten people, sign the bill of divorce, and some signed today and some the next day. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is valid for the remainder [are signing] only because of the condition. Rebbi Joḥanan said it is invalid unless all sign on the same day. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: There was a case that one said to ten people, sign the bill of divorce, and some signed on that day and some the next day. The case came before the rabbis who reluctantly declared it valid. This supports Rebbi Joḥanan from the position of the rabbis and disagrees with Rebbi Simeon. This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from the position of Rebbi Simeon and disagrees with the rabbis.

HALAKHAH: “A widow can be paid from the orphans’ property only,” etc. Earlier they swore falsely and buried their children, since it is written: “For vain [vows] I smote your children.” In addition, they fear vows more than oaths. If she transgressed and swore? Rav Huna said, if she swore, she swore. Rav said to his daughter-in-law: If I were not a person readily making concessions, even the cover on your head would be my property. Samuel said, she acquires the garments which she is wearing. A Mishnah supports Samuel: “Neither his wife’s garments nor his children’s are his property.”

The Mishnah is Rebbi Meїr’s, since Rebbi Meїr says that a Gentile may not acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to remove it from tithes; Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, a Gentile may acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to free it from tithes. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The reason of Rebbi Meïr (Lev. 25:46): “You shall transmit them by inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit by the rules of real estate.” This brackets slaves with real estate. Just as you may buy slaves from them but they cannot buy from you, so real estate you may buy from them but they cannot buy from you. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yasa, the following supports Rebbi Meїr (Lev. 25:23): “The land shall not be sold permanently,” absolutely. He said to him, that in itself supports Rebbi Simeon. “It shall not be sold”, because if it was sold, it would be sold absolutely. Rebbi Huna from Sepphoris said, Rebbi Ḥanina instituted in Sepphoris following Rebbi Simeon.

The Mishnah is Rebbi Meїr’s, since Rebbi Meїr says that a Gentile may not acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to remove it from tithes; Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, a Gentile may acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to free it from tithes. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The reason of Rebbi Meïr (Lev. 25:46): “You shall transmit them by inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit by the rules of real estate.” This brackets slaves with real estate. Just as you may buy slaves from them but they cannot buy from you, so real estate you may buy from them but they cannot buy from you. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yasa, the following supports Rebbi Meїr (Lev. 25:23): “The land shall not be sold permanently,” absolutely. He said to him, that in itself supports Rebbi Simeon. “It shall not be sold”, because if it was sold, it would be sold absolutely. Rebbi Huna from Sepphoris said, Rebbi Ḥanina instituted in Sepphoris following Rebbi Simeon.

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yudan did not go to the assembly. He was standing with Rebbi Mana and asked him, what new was said? He said: So says Rebbi Yose, a person causing impurity does not have the status of a perpetrator, fromthe following: “Heave which became impure.” He answered: Explain it, if it became impure by itself; then you cannot infer anything, because of a Mishnah: “If somebody judged, absolved the guilty and obligated the innocent, declared the pure impure and the impure pure.” For Rav Jeremiah said in the name of Rav: If he touched it with his hand. Samuel said: If he touched it with his hand. Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi says, it should have been logical that even intentionally he should have been free. Why did they say that he is obligated? That he should tell. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, it should have been logical that even unintentionally he should have been obligated. Why did they say that he is free? Because of a fine. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan comes from this: “If someone causes anything to become impure, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “A person who puts a yoke on another’s cow is free in human law but guilty in Heaven’s law.”

There, we have stated: One does not knead or form bread with a baker working in impurity. And it was stated additionally: One should neither cull nor grind with him. And here, it says so? Rebbi La said, here for profane [bread], there for heave. Can you say heave at a baker’s? The colleagues say, one if he washes, there if he does not wash. The Mishnah supports the colleagues: “But she may not touch hers once water has been put in.”

HALAKHAH: “This is your bill of divorce,” etc. For what? Rebbi Elazar said, for his house; Rebbi Joḥanan said, for places. The Mishnah supports him who said, for his house: “If he came to Acco, and returned, it is invalidated following his condition.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Yose, explain it following him who said that Acco is part of the Land of Israel for bills of divorce. But even if you say that Acco is part of the Land of Israel for bills of divorce, does that mean also for conditions imposed on a bill of divorce?

We stated: “After he wrote it for her.” Some Tannaïm state “after he delivered it to her.” He who says “after he wrote it for her” supports the House of Shammai; he who says “after he delivered it to her” supports the House of Hillel.

We stated: “After he wrote it for her.” Some Tannaïm state “after he delivered it to her.” He who says “after he wrote it for her” supports the House of Shammai; he who says “after he delivered it to her” supports the House of Hillel.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody married his sister-in-law,” etc. If she should not have married but entered levirate, this is the case of a sister-in-law who married without ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this man performs ḥalīṣah, the other one keeps her. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: She must leave. Rebbi Yose asked Rebbi Phineas, how does the rabbi hold? He said, with Rebbi Jeremiah. He said to him, change your mind, for otherwise I shall publicly call you a rebellious Elder. Rebbi Zevidah said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “She must leave both of them and the thirteen items apply to her, following Rebbi Meïr who said it in the name of Rebbi Aqibah. But the Sages say, there is no bastard from a sister-in-law.” Therefore she must leave.

“Rebbi Eleazar says: If it was found out immediately, this is no bill of divorce. If it was found out later, it is a bill of divorce since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.” What is immediately? Rebbi Ze‘ira says, before she was preliminarily married, or when she was preliminarily married. Rebbi Isaac ben Ḥaqula said, before she was definitively married, or when she was definitively married. The Mishnah supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “Since the first cannot destroy the rights of the second.”

HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.

By document. Rebbi Jeremiah thought to say, by a contract without obligating money, but with a contract obligating money he did not acquire until he paid. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both said, he acquired even if he did not pay. A baraita supports Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose: “If he sold him ten fields together, when he took possession of one of them, he took possession of all of them. But if he only paid the amount for one or wrote the deed only for one of them he acquired only the one which was sold to him.” Does there exist a deed without money? If you say, we hold that he paid for all of them, did it not say: “the amount of one”? It must be one or the other.

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One has a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged one for the other. The donkey’s owner took the cow. When the cow’s owner came to take the donkey and found that it had died, the donkey’s owner has to bring proof that his donkey was alive at the moment he took the cow. For the burden of proof is on the claimant except for barter. And anybody who does not agree to this does not know anything about civil law. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I do not agree. Rebbi Abba said to Rebbi Ze‘ira: A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” Not the husband has to prove to regain the [money given] for preliminary marriage from the father. The students of Rebbi Jonah said, explain it if little money was involved. An example: Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yosef to learn from him. They said to him, the Mishnah supports Samuel: “Once she entered the husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” Would not the father have to prove, to extract the ketubah from the husband’s possession? He answered them, does not Samuel agree that if the cow’s owner took possession of the donkey, he has to prove that it was defective before it came into his possession? And this one, when he took her in it is as if he drew close.

Rebbi Eleazar said: The Passover sacrifice of women is voluntary but one pushes the Sabbath away for it. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The Passover sacrifice by women and slaves is voluntary; certainly one does push the Sabbath away for it. What is their maẓẓah? He said to him, it is obligatory. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is in dispute. Rebbi Hila said, it is everybody’s [opinion]. A baraita supports the one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: Lettuce, maẓẓah and Passover sacrifice are obligatory in the first night; on all other days they are voluntary. A baraita supports Rebbi Hila: It was said: “Do not eat leavened matter with it,” and it was said: “For seven days you shall eat with it maẓẓot, the bread of deprivation’.” Anybody under the prohibition of leavened matter is under the obligation to eat maẓẓah, and women, being under the prohibition of leavened matter, are under the obligation to eat maẓẓah. But did we not state: “For any positive commandment triggered by time, men are obligated but women are free”? Rebby Mana said, it is a positive commandment which is implied by a prohibition.

Rebbi Eleazar said: The Passover sacrifice of women is voluntary but one pushes the Sabbath away for it. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The Passover sacrifice by women and slaves is voluntary; certainly one does push the Sabbath away for it. What is their maẓẓah? He said to him, it is obligatory. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is in dispute. Rebbi Hila said, it is everybody’s [opinion]. A baraita supports the one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: Lettuce, maẓẓah and Passover sacrifice are obligatory in the first night; on all other days they are voluntary. A baraita supports Rebbi Hila: It was said: “Do not eat leavened matter with it,” and it was said: “For seven days you shall eat with it maẓẓot, the bread of deprivation’.” Anybody under the prohibition of leavened matter is under the obligation to eat maẓẓah, and women, being under the prohibition of leavened matter, are under the obligation to eat maẓẓah. But did we not state: “For any positive commandment triggered by time, men are obligated but women are free”? Rebby Mana said, it is a positive commandment which is implied by a prohibition.

Rebbi Eleazar said: The Passover sacrifice of women is voluntary but one pushes the Sabbath away for it. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The Passover sacrifice by women and slaves is voluntary; certainly one does push the Sabbath away for it. What is their maẓẓah? He said to him, it is obligatory. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is in dispute. Rebbi Hila said, it is everybody’s [opinion]. A baraita supports the one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: Lettuce, maẓẓah and Passover sacrifice are obligatory in the first night; on all other days they are voluntary. A baraita supports Rebbi Hila: It was said: “Do not eat leavened matter with it,” and it was said: “For seven days you shall eat with it maẓẓot, the bread of deprivation’.” Anybody under the prohibition of leavened matter is under the obligation to eat maẓẓah, and women, being under the prohibition of leavened matter, are under the obligation to eat maẓẓah. But did we not state: “For any positive commandment triggered by time, men are obligated but women are free”? Rebby Mana said, it is a positive commandment which is implied by a prohibition.

Rebbi Eleazar said: The Passover sacrifice of women is voluntary but one pushes the Sabbath away for it. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The Passover sacrifice by women and slaves is voluntary; certainly one does push the Sabbath away for it. What is their maẓẓah? He said to him, it is obligatory. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is in dispute. Rebbi Hila said, it is everybody’s [opinion]. A baraita supports the one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: Lettuce, maẓẓah and Passover sacrifice are obligatory in the first night; on all other days they are voluntary. A baraita supports Rebbi Hila: It was said: “Do not eat leavened matter with it,” and it was said: “For seven days you shall eat with it maẓẓot, the bread of deprivation’.” Anybody under the prohibition of leavened matter is under the obligation to eat maẓẓah, and women, being under the prohibition of leavened matter, are under the obligation to eat maẓẓah. But did we not state: “For any positive commandment triggered by time, men are obligated but women are free”? Rebby Mana said, it is a positive commandment which is implied by a prohibition.

HALAKHAH: “If a man performs preliminary marriage using ‘orlah, or kilaim of a vineyard,” etc. The first-born of a she-ass, Rebbi Eleazar said, may be used to preliminarily marry a woman; Rebbi Joḥanan said, it may not be used to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The first-born of a she-ass may be used to preliminarily marry a woman by an argument de minore ad majus. Since you say that a firstling, whose prohibition cannot be lifted during its lifetime, can be used to preliminarily marry a woman, this one, whose prohibition can be lifted during its lifetime, not so much more? What is the difference between them? If somebody transgressed and redeemed it without the knowledge of its owner. Rebbi Eleazar said, it is not redeemed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is redeemed. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar and disagrees with him. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: If somebody steals the first-born of another person’s she-ass, he has to pay double restitution. The end disagrees with him: For even though he has no interest in it now he will later. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar: One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Eleazar explained that, after breaking of [the foal’s] neck. For Rebbi Eleazar said, everybody agrees that after its neck was broken it cannot be redeemed.

HALAKHAH: “If a man performs preliminary marriage using ‘orlah, or kilaim of a vineyard,” etc. The first-born of a she-ass, Rebbi Eleazar said, may be used to preliminarily marry a woman; Rebbi Joḥanan said, it may not be used to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The first-born of a she-ass may be used to preliminarily marry a woman by an argument de minore ad majus. Since you say that a firstling, whose prohibition cannot be lifted during its lifetime, can be used to preliminarily marry a woman, this one, whose prohibition can be lifted during its lifetime, not so much more? What is the difference between them? If somebody transgressed and redeemed it without the knowledge of its owner. Rebbi Eleazar said, it is not redeemed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is redeemed. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar and disagrees with him. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: If somebody steals the first-born of another person’s she-ass, he has to pay double restitution. The end disagrees with him: For even though he has no interest in it now he will later. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar: One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Eleazar explained that, after breaking of [the foal’s] neck. For Rebbi Eleazar said, everybody agrees that after its neck was broken it cannot be redeemed.

Only if it be with his and her agreement. If it was symphōn in his opinion and preliminary marriage in her opinion, Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is symphōn, Rebbi Ḥaggai in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it is preliminary marriage. Rebbi Ḥanina was taking up arms against Rebbi Ḥaggai, when Rebbi Hila said to him, accept Ḥaggai, for Ḥaggai is a thinking man; this is what Rebbi Ze‘ira said. In the first Adar, Rebbi Hila died. In the second Adar, a case came before Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, and he wanted to rule following Rebbi Ḥaggai. Rebbi Samuel bar Immi told him, Rebbi Hila was wrong when he told you, accept Ḥaggai, for Ḥaggai is a thinking man. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, a Mishnah supports him: “ ‘You married me preliminarily’, and he says, ‘I did not marry you preliminarily.’ He is permitted her relatives but she is forbidden his relatives.” Rebbi Borqai asked before Rebbi Mana: Is it the same with symphōn? He answered, a symphōn is not doubtful but the rules are identical for symphōn and preliminary marriage.

HALAKHAH: “One does not investigate from the altar and before,” etc. It is written: “You certainly shall put a king over you.” This refers not only to a king; from where to add public officials, administrators of welfare, clerks of the court, and those who whip with a lash; from where? The verse says, “from amidst your brothers you shall appoint a king over you,” anybody whom you appoint over you shall only be from the select among your brethren. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: “Their distinguished lineage in the army in war.” The merit of their lineage supports them in war. So far from tradition; from the words of the Torah? “No bastard shall come into the Eternal’s congregation.” “No person injured in his testicles shall come, etc.” What is written afterwards? “When you encamp against your enemies, etc.”

“A dog stole a hot pitta.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if he lit every single ear of grain. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another. Rebbi Isaac bar Tevelai said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If a kid goat was bound to it and a slave was close by and was burned, he is obligated. If the slave was bound and the kid goat close by, he is free.” But if you say that he is not like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another, then for the first ear he is guilty of a capital crime; for the remainder he should be liable for repayment. Rebbi Yose said, you also understand that from: “If his cattle set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is obligated. But if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is free.” But if you say that he is not like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another, then should he not become obligated since for the remainder he should be liable for repayment. A person did put out a hot water bottle outside. A donkey passed by and broke it. The case came before Rebbi Isaac bar Tevelai, who said to him: He does not owe you anything. Not only that but if [the donkey] suffered damage, [you] would be obligated for its damages.

HALAKHAH: “If his jar was broken in the public domain,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, they disagree at the moment of the accident. But after the accident everybody agrees that he must pay. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the disagreement is both at the moment of the accident and afterwards. Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Eleazar: If he does not have to pay at the moment of the accident, is it not an inference de minore ad majus afterwards? Why should he be free at the moment of the accident? For a person declares his damaged property in the public domain as ownerless. A baraita supports both of them, as it was stated: “The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah that somebody who puts down his stone or his load in the public domain does not have to pay if another person stumbled over it, for on this condition did Joshua distribute the Land.” Therefore, if Joshua had not distributed the Land on this condition, he would have to pay. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he intended use of the potsherds. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, if he intended to cause damage. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi La both say that Rebbi Jehudah agrees with the Sages that one has to pay if he declares his bull who gored in the public domain ownerless. Stationary damage cannot be compared to walking damage.

“He may use it for Second Tithe without hesitation since it is only miserly.” Jacob bar Zavdi, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Simon: One does not add a fifth for any Second Tithe which in itself is not worth a peruṭah. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One does not add a fifth for any Second Tithe for which the fifth is not worth a peruṭah. A baraita supports the one, a baraita supports the other. As it was stated: “From its tithe,” except what is worth less than a peruṭah. This means, not unless itself is worth a peruṭah. Another Tanna states: “From its tithe, its fifths” except if it is worth less than a peruṭah. This means, not unless the fifth is worth a peruṭah. Rebbi Abin bar Mamal said, our Mishnah follows neither one since we have stated “there are five peruṭot”, but we did not state “not unless itself is worth a peruṭah”; we have stated “there are five fifths”, but we did not state “not unless the fifth is worth a peruṭah”.

“He may use it for Second Tithe without hesitation since it is only miserly.” Jacob bar Zavdi, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Simon: One does not add a fifth for any Second Tithe which in itself is not worth a peruṭah. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One does not add a fifth for any Second Tithe for which the fifth is not worth a peruṭah. A baraita supports the one, a baraita supports the other. As it was stated: “From its tithe,” except what is worth less than a peruṭah. This means, not unless itself is worth a peruṭah. Another Tanna states: “From its tithe, its fifths” except if it is worth less than a peruṭah. This means, not unless the fifth is worth a peruṭah. Rebbi Abin bar Mamal said, our Mishnah follows neither one since we have stated “there are five peruṭot”, but we did not state “not unless itself is worth a peruṭah”; we have stated “there are five fifths”, but we did not state “not unless the fifth is worth a peruṭah”.

Those bearing columns. Rebbi Ze‘ira: He tells the bottom dweller, you are obliged to support me. Rebbi La: He tells the dweller in the upper floor, the builders say that both have to build the foundations. The following supports the builders: “If his ruined building was close to the wall of his neighbor’s courtyard, he should not tell him: I am contributing to the foundations of your wall where it comes up, but he has to contribute to the foundations from the bottom and up. If it was built on top of ditches or caves, he is not obligated for anything.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it, for example those inhabitants of Bet Shean where the bottom dweller cannot build unless the builder of the upper floor builds.

Rav said, there can be no claim of undisturbed possession from a fugitive, nor one made from one country to another. Samuel said, there can be a claim of undisturbed possession from a fugitive, and a claim of undisturbed possession made from one country to another. Rav Naḥman bar Rav Isaac said, a verse supports what Samuel said: “The king gave her an adjutant,” etc.

If there were five openings one inside another, the measure of all of them is a drill hole. This supports what the builders say, viz., that a window open above a stone bench is made only to let light in. Since it cannot represent a right of possession, it cannot bring impurity.

HALAKHAH: “One makes no hollow,” etc. If they collapsed and he wants to rebuild. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he gave up his rights. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he did not give up his rights. A Mishnah supports one, a baraita supports the other. A Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If a public road went through somebody’s field and he took it and gave them on the side. What he gave, he gave, but his own did not come to him.” A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If somebody bought a courtyard and there are protrusions and balconies, if they collapsed he rebuilds them based on his right of possession.”

HALAKHAH: “One makes no hollow,” etc. If they collapsed and he wants to rebuild. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he gave up his rights. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he did not give up his rights. A Mishnah supports one, a baraita supports the other. A Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If a public road went through somebody’s field and he took it and gave them on the side. What he gave, he gave, but his own did not come to him.” A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If somebody bought a courtyard and there are protrusions and balconies, if they collapsed he rebuilds them based on his right of possession.”

HALAKHAH: “One makes no hollow,” etc. If they collapsed and he wants to rebuild. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he gave up his rights. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he did not give up his rights. A Mishnah supports one, a baraita supports the other. A Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If a public road went through somebody’s field and he took it and gave them on the side. What he gave, he gave, but his own did not come to him.” A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If somebody bought a courtyard and there are protrusions and balconies, if they collapsed he rebuilds them based on his right of possession.”

HALAKHAH: “One makes no hollow,” etc. If they collapsed and he wants to rebuild. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he gave up his rights. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he did not give up his rights. A Mishnah supports one, a baraita supports the other. A Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If a public road went through somebody’s field and he took it and gave them on the side. What he gave, he gave, but his own did not come to him.” A baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If somebody bought a courtyard and there are protrusions and balconies, if they collapsed he rebuilds them based on his right of possession.”

One verse says, he made a libation for the Eternal, but another verse says, he covered. He who says ויסך, supports Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. He who says, he made a libation, supports Bar Qappara. Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Yose: He had a problem with the rules of captives. Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi said, he desired to build the Temple

One verse says, he made a libation for the Eternal, but another verse says, he covered. He who says ויסך, supports Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba. He who says, he made a libation, supports Bar Qappara. Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Yose: He had a problem with the rules of captives. Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi said, he desired to build the Temple

What happened in Alexandria supports him who said, Jehudah ben Ṭabbai was president, since the people from Jerusalem did write: From the great Jerusalem to the small Alexandria: How long still will my husband live in your midst and I am sitting sorrowful in my house?

What happened in Ascalon supports him who said, Simeon ben Sheṭaḥ was president. Two students were in Ascalon. They ate together, drank together, and studied Torah together. One of them died, and nobody attended his funeral. The son of Ma`yan the publican died; the entire city stopped working to attend his funeral. The other student started crying and said woe, do the haters of Israel have no hope? It was shown to him in his dream and said, do not denigrate your Master’s children. This one did one good deed and died with it, the other one committed one sin and died with it. What sin did he commit? Far be it that he committed a sin, but once he put on his head phylacteries before his arm phylacteries. What good deed did the son of publican Ma`yan do? Far be it that he committed a good deed, but once he prepared a breakfast for the city council but they did not show up. He said, let the poor come and eat it, so it should not go to waste. Some say, he was walking in the street, having a loaf under his shoulder. It fell down and a poor person picked it up. He did not say anything in order not to embarrass him. This student saw gardens and water sources. He saw the son of Ma`yan the publican standing on the river bank trying in vain to reach the water. He also saw Miriam, Onion-leaf’s daughter, hanging on her breast nipples; but some say, the door of Hell was fixed in her ear. He asked, [why? They told him, because she fasted and made herself famous among her neighbors. Some say, she fasted one day and was dissolute two days. He asked them] for how long? They told him, when Simeon ben Sheṭaḥ comes, we shall remove it from her ear and put is in his ear. He asked them, what is his misdeed? They told him, because he made a personal vow that if he were elected president, he would kill all sorcerers. But now he was made president and he did not kill them. In fact, there are eighty women in the cave of Ascalon who hurt the world; go and tell him! He told them, he is an important personality, he will not believe me. They told him, he is very meek and will believe you. In case that he will not believe you, take out one of your eyes and put it in your hand. He took out one of his eyes and put it in his hand. They said, return it; it was even with the other. He went and told him. He wanted to perform his miracle before him, but he told him, you do not need to. I know that you are a pious person. Even though I intended so in my thoughts, I never spoke it with my mouth. It was a day of rainstorms. He took eighty select men in clean garments and took with them eighty amphoras. He told them, when I whistle once, put on your garments. When I whistle for the second time, come. When he came to the cave of Ascalon, he said אוים, אוים, open for me, I am one of yours. When he entered, one said what she said and produced bread. One said what she said and produced a dish. One said what she said and produced wine. They asked him, what can you do? He told them, when I whistle twice, I shall bring here eighty select men in dry garments for your pleasure and entertainment. They told him, we desire them. When he whistled, they put on their garments; when he whistled for the second time, they all entered together. He made them a sign for each one to grab one of them and lift her from the earth. Then they did not succeed in what they were trying to do. He told the one who brought bread, bring bread! She did not succeed. He said, take her to be crucified. Bring a dish! She did not succeed. He said, take her to be crucified. Bring wine! She did not succeed. He said, take her to be crucified. This he did to all of them. That is what we have stated: “Simeon ben Shetaḥ hanged eighty women in Ascalon, but one does not try two on the same day.” But the hour needed it.