verse

It is written: “The Eternal will forgive her.” This tells that she needs forgiveness. When Rebbi Jacob came to this verse, he used to say: If somebody needs atonement having intended to get pig’s meat but happened to get kosher [animal’s] meat, so much more one who had the intent to get pig’s meat and got pig’s meat.

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: Money can be non-designated, no animal can be non-designated. Rav Sheshet said, it was stated thus: “I might think that one could not satisfy his obligation with his father’s sacrifice, with an animal which he dedicated, whether from a minor sin for a major sin, or from a major sin for a minor sin, or from a minor sin for a minor sin, or from a major sin for a major sin, since he cannot shave for his nezirut with his father’s animal; but he could satisfy his obligation with his father’s sacrifice, with money he dedicated, whether from a minor sin for a major sin, or from a major sin for a minor sin, or from a minor sin for a minor sin, or from a major sin for a major sin, since he can shave on money for his nezirut, any time it is not designated, but not if it is designated. The verse says, ‘his sacrifice’, he can only satisfy his obligation with his sacrifice, not with his father’s sacrifice.” Talking about money, one mentions “not designated”.

HALAKHAH: “A man can declare his son a nazir,” etc. “A man”. This refers not only to a man; from where for a woman? The verse says, “afflicted with skin disease,” whether man, woman, or minor. If it is so, why is “a man” written? For the next theme, “a man is dishevelled and has open seams, no woman is dishevelled and has open seams.”

“With his lips but not in his mind.” I could think that I exclude him who decides in his mind; the verse says (Lev. 5:4): “To articulate”. But Samuel said, he who decides in his mind is not obligated until he pronounces with his lips. But did we not state: “(Ex. 35:5) Everyone who volunteers in his mind,” that is he who decides in his mind. You say, that is he who decides in his mind, but maybe that is he who pronounces with his lips? When he says (Deut. 23:24): “What comes out from your lips you have to keep,” that speaks about him who pronounces with his lips. Therefore, how can I confirm “every one who volunteers in his mind?” That is he who decides in his mind. What Samuel said refers to a sacrifice.

Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah follows his father’s method: If somebody dedicated unblemished animals for the upkeep of the Temple, he violates a positive commandment. Why also a prohibition? The verse says: “The Eternal spoke to Moses לאמר”: a prohibition was pronounced, the words of Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi was sitting and studying the rule that “a firstling cannot be substituted” when Bar Pedaiah’s father was passing by. Rebbi saw him, and said, do I know what I should say here, “the Eternal spoke to Moses לאמר,” could one explain the words of Rebbi Jehudah? Is it written thus? It follows what Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: For interpretation, one removes from its beginning to its end. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: Even a middle word. “You have to pour oil on.” You have to pour oil on a flour offering, to subject all flour offerings to pouring.

MISHNAH: A person who made a vow of nazir, asked the Sages and they forbade, counts from the moment of his vow. If he asked the Sages and they permitted, if he had an animal designated, it leaves and grazes with the herd. The house of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: Do you not agree that this is dedication in error, it leaves and grazes in the herd? The House of Shammai anwered, do you not agree that if somebody erred and designated the ninth as the tenth, or the tenth as ninth, or the eleventh as tenth, it is sanctified? The House of Hillel anwered, not the staff sanctified it, for if he erred and put his staff on the eighth or the twelth, did he do anything? But the verse which sanctified the tenth sanctified the ninth and the eleventh.

There, we have stated: “If he called the ninth tenth, and the tenth ninth, and the eleventh tenth, all three are sanctified. The ninth may be eaten when it develops a defect, the tenth is tithe, the eleventh is brought as well-being sacrifice.” “It shall be holy”, this teaches that holiness falls on the ninth and the eleventh. I could think that both of them should be sacrificed, the verse says “cattle”, “cattle” to include the eleventh. “From the cattle”, to exclude the ninth. What reason do you have to include the eleventh and to exclude the ninth? After the verse included, it excluded. You can argue, when are sanctified [animals] subject to substitution? Before or after? One has to say, afterwards. I am including the eleventh which is after sanctification and I am excluding the ninth which is before sanctification.

There, we have stated: “If he called the ninth tenth, and the tenth ninth, and the eleventh tenth, all three are sanctified. The ninth may be eaten when it develops a defect, the tenth is tithe, the eleventh is brought as well-being sacrifice.” “It shall be holy”, this teaches that holiness falls on the ninth and the eleventh. I could think that both of them should be sacrificed, the verse says “cattle”, “cattle” to include the eleventh. “From the cattle”, to exclude the ninth. What reason do you have to include the eleventh and to exclude the ninth? After the verse included, it excluded. You can argue, when are sanctified [animals] subject to substitution? Before or after? One has to say, afterwards. I am including the eleventh which is after sanctification and I am excluding the ninth which is before sanctification.

It has been stated: 300 nezirim came in the days of Rebbi Simeon ben Shetaḥ. For 150 of them he found an opening, for 150 of them he did not find an opening. He came to king Yannai and said to him: There are here 300 nezirim who need 900 sacrifices. You should give half of them from your side, I shall give half from my side. The king sent him 450 animals. An informer went around and said that the other one had not given anything from his own money. King Yannai heard about it and got angry. Simeon ben Shetaḥ heard and fled. After some time, important people from the Persian empire came to king Yannai. They said to him: We remember that there was an old man who gave us a rabbinic discourse. They said to him, send and bring him! He sent and gave him his word; he came and sat between king and queen. He said to him, why did you trick me? He said, I did not trick you; you with your money and I with my learning, as it is written (Eccl. 7:12) “In the shadow of wisdom, in the shadow of money.” He said to him, why did you disappear? He said to him, I heard that my lord was angry with me and I wanted to fulfill the verse (Is. 26:20) “Hide a little bit until the rage passes;” he used about himself (Eccl. 7:12): “Knowledge is an advantage, wisdom lets its possessor live.” He said to him, why did you sit between king and queen? He said to him, it is written in the book of Ben Sirach: “Esteem it and it will raise you and seat you among princes.” He said, bring him a cup that he may recite Grace. They brought him a cup and he said: “Let us give praise for the food that Yannai and his company ate.” He said to him, what should I say, “for the food that we did not eat?” He said, bring him something that he may eat. They brought, he ate and recited: “For the food that we ate.” Rebbi Yoḥanan said, his colleagues disagree with Simeon ben Shetaḥ. Rebbi Jeremiah said, about the first action; Rebbi Abba said, about the second action. Rebbi Jeremiah seems to contradict himself! There he wondered about it and here it is obvious for him! He wondered following the Sages; it is obvious to him following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. We have stated about this: If one came, was lying on a couch, and dipped with them, even if he did not eat grain the volume of an olive one ‘invites’ with him, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan: One never ‘invites’ anyone unless he has eaten grain the volume of an olive. But did we not formulate, “two [eating] bread and one [eating] vegetable, then one ‘invites’?” This baraita follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel.

A “torn” [creature] that was turned into a carcass. Rebbi Yasa, the son of Rebbi Yasa’s daughter, in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan says, he is guilty twice; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he is guilty only once. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yose, the following supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “ ‘Any person who would eat any carcass meat,’ why does the verse say ‘and torn’? If a ‘torn’ animal can survive, was ‘carcass meat’ mentioned before? If a ‘torn’ animal must die, is it not included in ‘carcass meat’ ”? Should he not say, it is carcass meat? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: The reason of Rebbi Yose: “Do not defile yourself by animals and birds,” but only the Eight Reptiles impart impurity! But the measure of their impurities is the measure of their uses as food. Rebbi Eleazar objected: May not the limbs of pure animals impart impurity in the most minute amount but as food only in the volume of an olive? He accepted it. What is meant by “he accepted it”? Like a person who said, the opponent accepted it. Ḥiyya bar Abba said: “You shall not [eat] any carcass meat.” The Torah identified all eating together. Rebbi Ḥanina objected: Is not the impurity of the Eight Reptiles in the size of a lentil, but as food in the volume of an olive, whether for blood or for meat?

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”

“Rebbi Aqiba says, even if he dipped his bread in wine for a total volume of an olive, he is guilty.” Rebbi Ḥanania said, only if he dipped in an olive-sized volume of wine. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: For a mixed cup one whips because of soaking. That is, if they did (not) warn because of soaking. But if they warned because of soaking, this does not apply. It is written: “He shall not drink anything soaked in grapes.” Not only soaking grapes, from where soaking grape skins? The verse says “soaked, anything soaked,” that all kinds of soaking are counted. Mixed wine combines with pure wine. Soaking water of grapes combines with grapes. Do soaked grapes and wine combine? If one ate half an olive’s volume of wine and half an olive’s volume of soaking water, is he not guilty. Separately, he is not prosecutable. Because he combined, he is guilty. If he ate (sic!) an olive’s volume of wine and an olive’s volume of soaking water, he is guilty only once. Separately, he is guilty twice. Because he combined, he should be guilty only once.

HALAKHAH: “One is guilty for wine separately, for grapes separately,” etc. It is written: “Also grapes, fresh or dried, he shall not eat.” One understands, since it said “grapes”, do we not know that they are fresh? Why does the verse say, “grapes, fresh or dried”? To declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Ḥizqiah stated: Since at a place where He did not treat the waste of fruits like fruits, He treated fresh and dried equally, here, where He treated the waste of fruits like fruits, would it not be logical that we treat fresh and dried equally? The verse said, “fresh or dried”, to declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Rebbi Hila said: “One may not impound the movable and the fixed part of a flour-mill. “One understands, since it said “the fixed part”, do we not know that the entire mill is understood? Why does the verse say, “the movable and the fixed part”? To declare guilty for either part separately.

HALAKHAH: “One is guilty for wine separately, for grapes separately,” etc. It is written: “Also grapes, fresh or dried, he shall not eat.” One understands, since it said “grapes”, do we not know that they are fresh? Why does the verse say, “grapes, fresh or dried”? To declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Ḥizqiah stated: Since at a place where He did not treat the waste of fruits like fruits, He treated fresh and dried equally, here, where He treated the waste of fruits like fruits, would it not be logical that we treat fresh and dried equally? The verse said, “fresh or dried”, to declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Rebbi Hila said: “One may not impound the movable and the fixed part of a flour-mill. “One understands, since it said “the fixed part”, do we not know that the entire mill is understood? Why does the verse say, “the movable and the fixed part”? To declare guilty for either part separately.

HALAKHAH: “One is guilty for wine separately, for grapes separately,” etc. It is written: “Also grapes, fresh or dried, he shall not eat.” One understands, since it said “grapes”, do we not know that they are fresh? Why does the verse say, “grapes, fresh or dried”? To declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Ḥizqiah stated: Since at a place where He did not treat the waste of fruits like fruits, He treated fresh and dried equally, here, where He treated the waste of fruits like fruits, would it not be logical that we treat fresh and dried equally? The verse said, “fresh or dried”, to declare guilty for either one separately. This parallels what Rebbi Hila said: “One may not impound the movable and the fixed part of a flour-mill. “One understands, since it said “the fixed part”, do we not know that the entire mill is understood? Why does the verse say, “the movable and the fixed part”? To declare guilty for either part separately.

HALAKHAH: “An unspecified nezirut is thirty days,” etc. It is written: “A shaving knife shall not pass over his head;” therefore, if it did pass, he is guilty. “His head’s hair grows wildly;” how much means growing hair? 30 days. {That refers to an impure nazir. A pure nazir? “He has to shave his head on the day be becomes pure.” Why does the verse say: “On the seventh day he shall shave all his hair”? That shows that he shaves a second time.} “He shaves,” all, not in part. From here that if he left two hairs, he [did] nothing. “A shaving knife shall not pass over his head.” Not only a shaving knife, from where to treat a cropper and scissors like a shaving knife? The verse says, “shall not pass over his head.” That means not only a shaving knife; all methods of removal are understood. From here that he starts again only for a [shaving knife].

HALAKHAH: “An unspecified nezirut is thirty days,” etc. It is written: “A shaving knife shall not pass over his head;” therefore, if it did pass, he is guilty. “His head’s hair grows wildly;” how much means growing hair? 30 days. {That refers to an impure nazir. A pure nazir? “He has to shave his head on the day be becomes pure.” Why does the verse say: “On the seventh day he shall shave all his hair”? That shows that he shaves a second time.} “He shaves,” all, not in part. From here that if he left two hairs, he [did] nothing. “A shaving knife shall not pass over his head.” Not only a shaving knife, from where to treat a cropper and scissors like a shaving knife? The verse says, “shall not pass over his head.” That means not only a shaving knife; all methods of removal are understood. From here that he starts again only for a [shaving knife].

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said: “The ram he shall offer, etc.” Why does the verse say, “he shall offer”? Start the procedure with it. Rebbi Ḥinena objected before Rebbi Mana: But is it not written: “He shall offer his flour offering and his libation”? Should he not start with them? How is that? Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: If he shaved for any of the three, he satisfied his obligation. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: Who is the Tanna of: “All purification offerings in the Torah precede the reparation offerings”? Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion, “all purification offerings in the Torah precede the reparation offerings.”

HALAKHAH: A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: “If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it.” A verse [states] that “roasted” is called “cooked”: “They cooked the pesaḥ”, etc. If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, “as is the rule”. A Mishnah states that scalded is called cooked: “Is one who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food permitted roasted and scalded food”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. What is the difference between them? ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine on Tabernacles.’ In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is forbidden on the last day of the holiday. In the opinion of Rebbi Joshia, is he permitted? Rebbi Joshia also agrees that he is prohibited. Rebbi Joshia said it only for restrictions.

Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, Rebbi Joḥanan ate bake-meats and said, I did not taste food on that day. But did we not state: “He who made a vow not to eat food is permitted water and salt”? Explain it following Rebbi Joshia, who said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. And from where that everything is called food? Rebbi Aḥa bar Ulla said: “And ten female donkeys carrying grain, bread, and food, etc.” Why does the verse say, “and food”? From here that everything is called food.

It is written: “The Cohen takes the cooked fore-leg of the ram.” If cooked, I could think separately. The verse says, “from the ram”. How is this? He cuts it off so that only a barley grain’s width remains. Does not the sanctified absorb from the profane, or the profane from the sanctified?.

Some want to derive it from the following: “For a hanged person is blasphemy.” Anybody warned about blasphemy is warned about a corpse of obligation. Anybody not warned about blasphemy is not warned about a corpse of obligation. They objected, are there not Gentiles? Those executed by hanging, this exludes those executed by the sword. “Bury!” A positive commandment. From where do you add the sword he was killed with, the gallows on which he was hanged, the towel with which he was strangled? Why does the verse say, “you shall bury him”? I could think he alone is buried; the verse says “bury, you shall bury him”, a burial for him, and his gallows, and his stone. How does one do it? One digs down three [handbreadths], so the plough shall not unearth him. “You shall bury him”, whole and not partially. “You shall bury him”, from here that if he left anything [unburied], he did not do anything, for it is said “bury, you shall bury him”. From here that it is not a corpse of obligation unless it consists of his head with most of the body.

Some want to derive it from the following: “For a hanged person is blasphemy.” Anybody warned about blasphemy is warned about a corpse of obligation. Anybody not warned about blasphemy is not warned about a corpse of obligation. They objected, are there not Gentiles? Those executed by hanging, this exludes those executed by the sword. “Bury!” A positive commandment. From where do you add the sword he was killed with, the gallows on which he was hanged, the towel with which he was strangled? Why does the verse say, “you shall bury him”? I could think he alone is buried; the verse says “bury, you shall bury him”, a burial for him, and his gallows, and his stone. How does one do it? One digs down three [handbreadths], so the plough shall not unearth him. “You shall bury him”, whole and not partially. “You shall bury him”, from here that if he left anything [unburied], he did not do anything, for it is said “bury, you shall bury him”. From here that it is not a corpse of obligation unless it consists of his head with most of the body.

We have stated: “Rebbi Yose said, dried flesh from a corpse which even if soaked will not return to its former status is pure. What is Rebbi Yose’s reason? Did he not infer this from a carcass? From a carcass, since a dried carcass is pure, so also a dried corpse should be pure. Rebbi Immi asked: Since a foul-smelling carcass is pure, would a foul-smelling corpse also be pure? Then there can be no decayed matter for Rebbi Yose! It was found stated in Rebbi Yose’s name that there was decayed matter. The colleagues asked before Rebbi Yose: Since a carcass has no decay, so a corpse should have no decay! He told them that he inferred from an animal only for the flesh, not for the bones. There is no decay from flesh, there is decay from bones, as Bar Qappara stated, “decay of bones is jealousy.” Rebbi Yannai said, “or a grave”, even if one touched the first Adam’s grave. The colleagues say, he transposes the verse: “or a grave qbr” means “or decay rqb”. Bar Qappara stated, “or a grave qbr”, “or decay rqb”.

HALAKHAH: “But for overhanging branches, or protuberances,” etc. What is the status of the undistributed middle? Rebbi Joḥanan said, the undistributed middle is judged leniently. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the undistributed middle is judged restrictively. What is the undistributed middle? That is a limb from a corpse or a limb from a living body which is not sufficiently covered by flesh. Rebbi Yose asked: From where [do we infer that] a bone [induces impurity in the size of] a barley grain? Not from that verse, “or a person’s bone”? Here you require a barley grain, there you do not require a barley grain! Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon stated: “A slain one”, anything from a slain person, that is a limb from a corpse or a limb from a living body which is not sufficiently covered by flesh.

HALAKHAH: “Gentiles cannot vow as nazir,” etc. Israelites can vow as nazir, Gentiles cannot vow as nazir. Since you say, “a man”, why does the verse mention “a man”? To include Gentiles, who make vows and offer voluntary gifts like Israelites! Why should one not say the same here? There is a difference, for it is written “He shall atone for him.” This refers to one to whom atonement applies. It excludes Gentiles, to whom atonement does not apply.

HALAKHAH: So is the Mishnah: Rebbi Neḥemia declares him not prosecutable but the Sages declare him guilty since it is not unsubstantiated. The Sages say, two estimations have precedence over one estimation; Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the intermediate estimation has precedence over the two. What is Rebbi Neḥemiah’s reason? “ ‘If he gets up and walks outside on his cane, the attacker is exonerated.’ Could you think that this one walks in the market and the other is executed because of him? But even if he died according to the first estimation he cannot be prosecuted.” What is the rabbi’s reason? “If he does not die but is bedridden.” Would we not know that even if he does not die that he will be bedridden? But if they estimated that he would die. If they estimated that he would die, that is what is written: “If he gets up and walks outside on his cane.” Therefore, if he does not get up, [the attacker] is guilty. But if they did not estimate that he would die? If they did not estimate that he would die, that is what is written: “But he has to pay for his disability.” Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: It was an erroneous estimation. What is the difference between them? If his state improved. For him who says, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he has to pay; if he paid, he paid. If he did not pay, the verse makes him pay. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If they estimated that he would die, when does he have to pay him? From the moment he improves. For him who says, it was an erroneous estimation; if he did not pay one does not order him to pay. If he paid, can he take it back? This supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If they estimated that he would live but he died. From when does one have to pay him? From the moment he turns worse. Rebbi Yose said, it does not say here, “from the moment he turns worse” but “from the moment he turns better.”

If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if it is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the [hand]? Let us hear from the following: “If people quarrel,” “if people brawl.” Is not quarrel brawl and brawl quarrel? Why does the verse say, “if people quarrel, if people brawl”? To apply the rules of the unintended to the intended and of the intended to the unintended. It must be the following: If he hit him on his hand and it withered. The physicians said, if it is amputated he will live. Does he have to pay for the [hand]? Since you say there, it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand, so here it is an extraordinary decree of Scripture that he pay for the hand.

Rav Huna said, I asked before Rebbi Jacob ben Aḥa: Following him who says tithes are from their words. But following him who says tithes are from the Torah, does Hillel institute anything against the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose said, from the moment that Israel was exiled to Babylonia, did they not become free from all commandments connected with the Land, but the remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah? Rebbi Yose turned and said, (Deut. 15:2) “this is the word of the abandonment, remit” as long as abandonment is followed in the Land as a word of the Torah, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from the words of the Torah, but when abandonment is followed in the Land as their word, remission of debts applies both in the Land and outside the Land from their word. There, they say that even one who holds that tithes are from the Torah will hold that the Sabbatical is from their word. (Deut. 15:2): “This is the word of the remission, remit!” Rebbi says, two remissions are the Sabbatical and the Jubilee. As long as the Jubilee is operative, the Sabbatical is from words of the Torah. If the Jubilees are abolished, the Sabbatical is operative from their words. When were the Jubilees abolished? (Lev. 25:10) “For all its inhabitants.” In the time when they lived on it, not when they went from it into exile. If they lived on it but did (not) intermingle, the tribe of Judah in Benjamin, and the tribe of Benjamin in Judah, I could think that the Jubilee was operative. The verse mentions its inhabitants, “All its inhabitants;” you find that when the tribes of Reuben, Gad, and half the tribe of Manasseh went into exile, the Jubilees were disestablished.

If [the master] blinded [the slave’s] two eyes simultaneously, or broke two of his teeth simultaneously, the slave thereby obtains his freedom. One after the other, he obtains his freedom from the first [injury] and [the master] has to pay for the second. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Following the opinion that [the master] does not have to write a bill of manumission for him. But following the opinion that [the master] has to write a bill of manumission for him, can you say that he has to pay him? Not only does this apply to one who gains his freedom for a tooth or an eye, from where also that he may gain his freedom by a cap, or הרנירק טיאונוס, or the king’s freedom? The verse says, “he shall send him to freedom”, in any way. What is the status of his children? The children of him who leaves for a tooth or an eye are slaves, the children of him who leaves by the loss of hope are free. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is unreasonable; it is the other way around. The children of one who leaves for a tooth or an eye are free because the Torah freed him. The children of one who leaves by the loss of hope are slaves because the Torah did not free him.

“His field,” except movables. “His vineyard,” except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession. “ ‘His field,’ except movables.” About those who did not claim movables from the start. Is this different from what we stated: There is not only real estate; from where if he wanted to pay money? The verse says: “Money he shall return to its owner.” What did you mean to say that real estate is primary? Or should we say that money is primary? Then it should be irrevocably given to [the claimant] from the start! Do we not see rabbis who irrevocably give him real estate! “ ‘His vineyard,’ except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.” Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Nisa: If his father dug a cistern which caused injury during his father’s lifetime. Property fell to him after his father’s death. I might say that this property should be encumbered for that damage; therefore, it was necessary to say “his vineyard” to except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.

“The best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay,” i. e., the party responsible for the damage, the words of Rebbi Ismael. Rebbi Aqiba says, “the best of his field and the best of his vineyard”, of the person suffering the damage. It is difficult for Rebbi Aqiba, he suffered damage, and you say so? But the court see what the field was worth before it was damaged and estimates accordingly. As it was stated, it is possible if the grazing was on best quality land, one estimates from best quality, from lowest quality one estimates from lowest quality. How is this? The best of the lowest quality is quite good. If you say so you provide a windfall for the person suffering the damage. One looks at the field as if it was full of first quality [produce] and estimates for him from the best quality land; least quality one estimates from least quality land. It turns out that he pays with best quality for best quality and from least quality for least quality. From where has Rebbi Aqiba that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land”? It is not from the Torah, it is a decree. “Why did they say, ‘for tort victims one estimates with best quality land’? Because of the robbers. That a man should say, why should I have robbed [land] in my hand, or land subject to a suit for damages on my hand? Tomorrow, the court will see my good field, take it from me, and support it by the verse, ‘the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay.’ ” So far his real estate. His pledge was inferred from his real estate. Since his real estate [is taken] from the best quality, also his pledge [is taken] from the best.

There, we have stated: “You have in your hand a mina of my father’s; you have to get from me only 50 denars. He does not have to swear since he is like a person who returns a find.” Rebbi Eleazar said, in this case they instituted a regulation as they instituted for a find, as we have stated: “The finder of a lost object shall not swear because of the public good.” Rebbi Abba said, this Mishnah [applies] when he said to him, you found my two oxen. But if he said, I found your two oxen and returned both of them, but the other said, you returned only one, in that case they did not institute the rule. Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In this case they did institute. But in the first case, it is a word of the Torah, as it was stated: I could think that if he said to him, you found my two oxen, but the other said, I found only one, should he be obligated [to swear]? The verse says, “or if he found a find and disowned it;” that excludes this one who did not disown. But if he said to him, I was standing on my roof when I saw you dragging away two tied oxen, two tied oxen you dragged away from me, and he says, only one I dragged away; in that case they made no regulation. Similarly: “I was standing with my father when he was dying and he claimed from you a mina and you agreed to it,” and the other says, “I agreed only for 50;” in that case they made no regulation.

Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: So far if she said, bring me, but [the agent] said [to the husband] “receive for me”. If she said, receive for me but [the agent] said [to the husband] “bring me”? If was found stated in both cases, this is a bill of divorce and if he wants to retract he cannot retract. But did we not state: “He shall deliver into her hand,” that includes not only her hand, from where through his agent’s hand, into her agent’s hand, from his agent to her agent, and from her agent to his agent; the verse says, “he shall deliver, he shall deliver.” Who said, “it is impossible for me”? Rebbi! As it was stated: “If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he said to him, your wife said, accept my bill of divorce for me: If he brought it to her, gave it to her, he acquired it for her, it was received for her; if he wants to retract, he may not retract, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Nathan says, ‘bring it to her, give it to her,’ [if he wants to retract, he may retract; ‘acquire it for her, receive it for her’, if he wants to retract, he may not retract. Rebbi says, in any of these cases] he may not retract except if he says, ‘It is impossible for me that you accept it for her, but give it to her.’” It is difficult for Rebbi, “here you have it from my word”, if he wants to retract, he may retract. It is difficult for Rebbi Nathan, “here you have it from her word”, if he wants to retract, he may retract! Rav Ḥuna said, he becomes his and her agent. Assi said, everywhere we have stated “his and her agent”, she is both divorced and not divorced.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody throws a bill of divorce to his wife,” etc. “He shall write,” “he shall deliver into her hand.” Not only into her hand; from where also into her garden or into her courtyard? The verse says “he shall deliver, he shall deliver.” Is this following Rebbi Ismael? It is following Rebbi Aqiba. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Ismael, “he took all his land from his hand, up to the Arnon.” Did he take it out of his hand? What means “from his hand”? From his possession.

HALAKHAH: Was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” How can the House of Shammai confirm this? Lest you say that one divorced because of immorality is forbidden, for anothercause she would be permitted. Rebbi Shila from Kefar-Tamarta said: The verse is difficult for the House of Shammai: “Her first husband, who had sent her away, cannot afterwards retake her.” Where do we hold? If to forbid her to him, is she not already forbidden to him? But we must hold, to burden him with a prohibition.

HALAKHAH: Was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” How can the House of Shammai confirm this? Lest you say that one divorced because of immorality is forbidden, for anothercause she would be permitted. Rebbi Shila from Kefar-Tamarta said: The verse is difficult for the House of Shammai: “Her first husband, who had sent her away, cannot afterwards retake her.” Where do we hold? If to forbid her to him, is she not already forbidden to him? But we must hold, to burden him with a prohibition.

Rebbi Abin said that Ḥisqiah stated: “After he acquires,” which means that she is acquired by money. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the Hebrew slave girl, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by money, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, should be acquired by money? This is proved by the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money but is acquired by intercourse. Therefore you would not be astonished if this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, might not be acquired by money. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money.

“And has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money, can be acquired by intercourse, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by money, should be acquired by intercourse? The Hebrew slave girl proves, who cannot be acquired by intercourse but is acquired by money. You likewise do not wonder that this one, who may be acquired by money, might not be acquired by intercourse. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money; “and has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse.

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

“A man.” Why does the verse say, “any man”? To include that Gentiles who committed adultery or incest by Gentile rules should be judged by Gentile law, but if they committed adultery with a Jewishwoman, one judges them by Jewish law. Rebbi Eleazar said, of all of them there is only the Jewish betrothed, for if he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty, with a betrothed Gentile woman he cannot be prosecuted. If he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty. How is he found to be guilty? By their rules or by Jewish rules? If you say by Jewish rules, by two witnesses, 23 judges, after warning, and by stoning. If you say by their rules, by one witness, one judge, without warning, and by the sword.

If you say, by Jewish rules, he is guilty if he converted. If you say, by their rules, he cannot be prosecuted if he converted, as Rebbi Ḥanina said, a descendant of Noah who blasphemed and then converted cannot be prosecuted since the law changed for him. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The descendants of Noah are warned about nakedness as Jews are; the verse says, “he shall cling to his wife”, not to somebody else’s wife. “He shall cling to his wife”, not to a male, nor to an animal. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: A descendant of Noah who had perverse intercourse with his wife is killed. What is the reason? “He shall cling to his wife so they become one flesh,” at the place where they together create one flesh.

There, we have stated: “A judicial oath, for a claim of two silver pieces and a judicial acknowlegdment of a peruṭah. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolus, but the House of Hillel say, two obols.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolus. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say, “money” is a peruṭah, but here, they say that “money” is two obols. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The house of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said: “She leaves gratis, without silver.” Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, “without silver”? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolus and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left, and at the end of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolus, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. It is written: “If a person give to his neighbor money or vessels to watch over.” If to teach that the court will not act on less that a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written: “To incur liability for it”? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. (Why does the verse say, “without silver”?) From there, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two obols. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? “Or vessels”; since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret “or vessels”? As we have stated: Rebbi Nathan says, “or vessels”, to include all kinds of vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is guilty. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two perutot, that the claim should be about a perutah’s worth and the confession about a perutah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two obols, also “vessels” means two oboli’s worth.

“She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce,” as it is written: “He shall write her a bill of divorce.” “Or the husband’s death,” as it is written: “Or if the latter husband dies.” So far, if the latter one dies, [what about] the death of the former? Since the latter’s death releases her, even though his death does not cause a complete release, it is only logical that the former’s death should release her since his death will cause a complete release. Rebbi Ḥuna said, the verse implies that death releases, as it is written: “If brothers live together and one of them dies childless, etc.” Therefore, if he had a child, death releases. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if you would say that death does not release, how could we find a widow for a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah for a common priest? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, explain it for a sister-in-law.

“Her levir shall come upon her”, that is cohabitation. “And take her as a wife for himself”, that is “bespeaking”. I might think that just as cohabitation is final so “bespeaking” is final; the verse says “and take her in levirate.” This directs the entire paragraph towards levirate. Cohabitation is final, “bespeaking” is not final. Then what is “bespeaking” good for? To forbid her to his brothers.

Can she regain her autonomy through her master’s death or by the end of six [years]? What is the problem? Following Rebbi Aqiba? But Rebbi Aqiba said that the verse speaks about a woman half slave and half free engaged to be married by a free man. Therefore, his problem is following Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael said that the verse speaks about a Canaanite slave girl married to a Hebrew slave, since this is marriage sanctioned by the Torah: “If his master give him a wife.” But his problem is whether she regains her autonomy through her master’s death or by the end of six [years] for him who says that the Hebrew slave does not serve the heir.

Can she regain her autonomy through her master’s death or by the end of six [years]? What is the problem? Following Rebbi Aqiba? But Rebbi Aqiba said that the verse speaks about a woman half slave and half free engaged to be married by a free man. Therefore, his problem is following Rebbi Ismael, since Rebbi Ismael said that the verse speaks about a Canaanite slave girl married to a Hebrew slave, since this is marriage sanctioned by the Torah: “If his master give him a wife.” But his problem is whether she regains her autonomy through her master’s death or by the end of six [years] for him who says that the Hebrew slave does not serve the heir.

“By money”. “The money of his sale price shall be;” he can be redeemed by money, not by produce nor by vessels. Everywhere you treat money’s worth like money, but here you do not treat money’s worth like money. Rebbi Abba Mari said, there is a difference, because the verse repeated “money, of money”. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, but if he wants to reduce, he can leave for the reduced amount even for produce, even for vessels. Rebbi Yudan, Rebbi Mattaniah’s father, said that this is only if he did not give them their money’s worth. But if he gave them their money’s worth, it is like money.

It is written: “Six years he shall work.” How much does he work? I could think that he leaves at the end of six [years]. The verse says, “and in the seventh he shall leave.” I could think that he leave at the end of seven [years]. The verse says, “six years he shall work.” How is that? He works the entire six and leaves at the start of the seventh. “And in the seventh he shall leave.” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Do you say, the seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world? Since it says, “six years he shall work,” this spells out six years. How can I confirm “and in the seventh he shall leave?” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Say it is the opposite. Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Huna: It is written: “and in the seventh,” “and in the seventh”. Rebbi Ḥuna said, if you say, in the Seventh of the world, what would the Jubilee free? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, this follows him who said that the Jubilee does not become part of a Sabbatical period. But following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, sometimes it falls in the middle of a Sabbatical period. The rabbis of Caesarea say, even following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, we could deduce from here that the Sabbatical year frees the slaves and the Jubilee the pierced ones.

It is written: “Six years he shall work.” How much does he work? I could think that he leaves at the end of six [years]. The verse says, “and in the seventh he shall leave.” I could think that he leave at the end of seven [years]. The verse says, “six years he shall work.” How is that? He works the entire six and leaves at the start of the seventh. “And in the seventh he shall leave.” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Do you say, the seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world? Since it says, “six years he shall work,” this spells out six years. How can I confirm “and in the seventh he shall leave?” The seventh from the sale and not the Seventh of the world. Say it is the opposite. Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rav Huna: It is written: “and in the seventh,” “and in the seventh”. Rebbi Ḥuna said, if you say, in the Seventh of the world, what would the Jubilee free? Rebbi Joḥanan bar Marius said, this follows him who said that the Jubilee does not become part of a Sabbatical period. But following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, sometimes it falls in the middle of a Sabbatical period. The rabbis of Caesarea say, even following him who said that the Jubilee becomes part of a Sabbatical period, we could deduce from here that the Sabbatical year frees the slaves and the Jubilee the pierced ones.

From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.

From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.

From where even if he fell ill? The verse says, “in the seventh year he shall leave into freedom gratis.” I could think, even if he fled; the verse says, “six years he shall work.” What did you see to include this and to exclude that? After the verse included, it excluded. I am including the one who remains in his power and am exluding the one who is not in his power. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said that Rav Hoshaia asked: I understand that if he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up [the time lost]. If he fled and then fell ill? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, let us hear from the following: “If a woman rebels against her husband, one writes him a bill of rebellion on her ketubah.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: One writes a bill of rebellion on the ketubah of a menstruating woman or a sick one, a preliminarily married one and one waiting for her levir. Where do we hold? If she rebelled against him while she was menstruating, the Torah instructed her to rebel. But we must hold that she rebelled when she was not menstruating and then started menstruating. Here she is unable to rebel, nevertheless you say, one writes. Here also, if he rebelled and then fell ill he has to make up. For he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would not have become sick. Rebbi Ḥinena said, that argument even works in the first case. If he fell ill and fled afterwards, he has to make up, since he can say to him, if you had stayed with me, you would have recuperated sooner.

“Or the Jubilee,” as it is written, “in the Jubilee he shall leave.” “Or reduction of the amount,” as it is written: “If there still are many years.” Do we not know that if there are many there are not few, and if there are few there are not many? Rebbi Hila said, sometimes the years are worth more than the wages, sometimes the wages are worth more than the years. How do you explain the following? If he was sold for a mina each and improved so that now he is worth 200 each, from where that one computes for him only by a mina each? The verse says, “according to the years he shall compute his redemption.” We learned that one sold to a Gentile is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed. From where that one sold to an Israel is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed? “Hireling, hireling” for an equal cut. Since the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to a Gentile, so too the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to an Israel. Rebbi says, why does the verse say “he shall be redeemed, he shall be redeemed,” three times? To add all redemptions that they have to follow this order.

“Or the Jubilee,” as it is written, “in the Jubilee he shall leave.” “Or reduction of the amount,” as it is written: “If there still are many years.” Do we not know that if there are many there are not few, and if there are few there are not many? Rebbi Hila said, sometimes the years are worth more than the wages, sometimes the wages are worth more than the years. How do you explain the following? If he was sold for a mina each and improved so that now he is worth 200 each, from where that one computes for him only by a mina each? The verse says, “according to the years he shall compute his redemption.” We learned that one sold to a Gentile is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed. From where that one sold to an Israel is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed? “Hireling, hireling” for an equal cut. Since the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to a Gentile, so too the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to an Israel. Rebbi says, why does the verse say “he shall be redeemed, he shall be redeemed,” three times? To add all redemptions that they have to follow this order.

“If he be not redeemed by these.” Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, by these to freedom, by all others to servitude. Rebbi Aqiba says, by these to servitude, by all others to freedom. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Both interpret the same verse: “Unless he be redeemed by these.” Rebbi Yose the Galilean interprets: “Unless he be redeemed by these” but by others he is made to serve before he leaves. Rebbi Aqiba interprets: “Unless he be redeemed by these”, by these he completes before he leaves. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In both cases to freedom. It was stated thus: “If his hand achieves,” his own hand. “Or he found for his redemption.” Since his own hand achieves for himself, what others achieve also is for himself.

“If he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother. He should be able to allot her to his brother by an argument de minore ad majus! If he may allot her to his son who may not take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate, should it not be logical that he may allot her to his brother who may take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate? No. If you would accept the son since he will take [the father’s] place in a field of inheritance, what can you say about his brother who will not take his place in a field of inheritance? Would it be reasonable that he may allot her to him? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother.

Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi Abun preached: The earlobe was pierced, lest a Cohen become disqualified. Rebbi Meïr says, he was pierced at his cartilage. Therefore, Rebbi Meïr says that a Cohen cannot be pierced lest he become blemished and be disqualified for service. Could not the cartilage be pierced less than the size of a vetch seed? Maybe it would result in the size of a vetch seed. Let it be the size of a vetch! The Torah said, “he shall return to his inheritance,” as he was. He cannot be pierced unless he had a wife and children. “By an awl”. Not only an awl, from where even a buck-thorn, even a thorn, even glass? The verse says, “he pierces”. This follows Rebbi Aqiba.

Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: At three places teaching circumvents Scripture and at another place the interpretation.The Torah said, “in a scroll”, but practice said on anything separated from the ground. The Torah said, “in dust”, but practice said in anything on which plants grow. The Torah said, “with an awl”, but practice said, even a buck-thorn, even a thorn, even glass. And at one place the interpretation: Rebbi Ismael stated: “It shall be on the seventh day that he shave all his hair,” inclusion. “His head, his beard, and his eyebrows,” detail. Since it continues “and all his hair he shall shave,” it repeats inclusion. Inclusion, detail, and inclusion is judged only by what is similar to the detail. Since the detail is explained as place of bunching and exposed, it should refer only [hair growing] in bunches at exposed places. But practice is that he shaves to be like a gourd. “With an awl”, since an awl is made of metal, so anything made of metal. Rebbi Yose said, this is a large drill. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, that is the engraving-knife. “He shall bring him to the door.” I could think, even if it was lying flat. The verse says, “or to the door-post”. Since the door-post is upright, so also the door has to be upright: a shame to him and to his family.

HALAKHAH: “Any commandment the father has to fulfill towards his son,” etc. “To circumcise him, to redeem him, to teach him Torah, to teach him a trade, and to marry him to a wife. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to teach him to swim in water.” To circumcise him, “on the eighth day, he shall circumcise the flesh of his foreskin.” “To redeem him,” as is written: “Any firstborn human among your sons you shall redeem.” To teach him Torah, “you shall teach them to your sons.” To teach him a trade, Rebbi Ismael stated: “Choose life,” that is a trade. To marry him to a wife, “make it known to your children and grandchildren.” When do you have children and grandchildren: if you marry off your sons when young. Rebbi Aqiba says, also to swim in water. “That you shall live together with your descendants.” How is this? Is it a commandment or is it obligatory? Let us hear from the following: Bar Tarima came to Rebbi Immi and said to him, talk to my father that he should marry me to a woman. He talked to [the father], but the latter refused. That means it is a commandment, for if it were obligatory, he should have forced him. From where that if his father did not do these things for him, he is required to do them himself? The verse says a human you shall redeem”, “you shall circumcise” them, “you shall study them”, “you shall know” yourself, “that you shall live.”

Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Cahana: It is written (Prov. 5:6): “She does not smooth the way of life, her tracks deviate and you will not notice it.” The Holy One, praise to Him, moved the rewards of those who fulfill the commandments (to the future world) so that they should act in faith. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Isaac: It is written (Prov. 4:23): “Observe carefully everything which must be kept, for from it comes life,” observe carefully all the things you were told in the Torah, for you do not know from which of them life will come to you. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana said, the verse equals the easiest commandment with the most difficult one. The easiest commandment is sending away [the mother] from the nest. The most difficult one is honoring father and mother. For both of them it is written: “Your days will be lengthened.” Rebbi Abun said, if for anything that is repayment of debt it is written (Deut. 5:16): “That you shall be well and that your days shall be lengthened,” so much more something that involves monetary loss and personal danger. Rebbi Levi said, this one is greater; repaying a debt is greater than fulfilling an obligation that does not involve repaying a debt. Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: Just as their rewards are the same, so their punishments are identical. (Prov. 30:17) “The eye that scoffs at the father and despises to obey the mother,” the eye that scoffs about honoring father and mother and despises the commandment not to take the mother with the chicks, “the river ravens should pick it out,” the cruel raven should come, pick it out, and not have any enjoyment from it, “the sons of the eagle should eat it,” the merciful eagle should come and enjoy it.

HALAKHAH: “Any commandment which does not refer to the Land,” etc. It is written (Deut. 12:1): “These are the statutes and the rules of law which you will be required to follow in the Land.” In the Land you are required to follow them but not outside the Land. Still we say obligations depending on the Land only apply in the Land, but we might think that obligations not depending on the Land also should only apply in the Land. The verse says (Deut. 11:16–18) “Be careful, lest your heart be seduced … and the Eternal’s rage be inflamed against you, etc. Put these words on your hearts,”. Even if you are exiled. (Deut. 11:18) “Put these words on your hearts and your persons.” You have to say, for example tefillin and the study of Torah. Just as tefillin and the study of Torah do not depend on the Land and apply both in the Land and outside the Land, so everything not depending on the Land applies both in the Land and outside the Land.

If it is so, they should have been freed once they were redeemed. It is written (Neh. 8:17): “All the congregation coming from captivity … since the days of Joshua bin Nun.” Why Joshua? Rebbi Hillel, the son of Samuel ben Naḥmani: The verse damaged the reputation of the just person in his grave for the reputation of the just person in his time; it compares their coming in the days of Ezra to the coming in the days of Joshua. As at the coming in the days of Joshua they had been free and became obligated, also at the coming in the days of Ezra they had been free and became obligated. How did they become obligated? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, they became obligated by the words of the Torah; that is what is written (Deut. 30:5): “The Eternal, your God, will bring you to the Land that your fathers inherited and you will inherit it.” Just as the inheritance of your fathers was by the words of the Torah, so your inheritance is by the words of the Torah. “He will be good to you and give increase to you more than to your forefathers.” Your fathers had been free and became obligated, also you had been free and became obligated. On your fathers there was no yoke of government, but you [are obligated] even though there is on you the yoke of government. Your fathers did become obligated only after fourteen years, seven they conquered and seven they distributed, but you became obligated [immediately when you entered. Your fathers did become obligated only after they had acquired all, but you become obligated] for every single piece at the moment you acquire it.

How does Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina explain “In view of all this, we execute a contract and sign”? Since they accepted [the obligations] with good grace, the verse credits it to them as if they had accepted it voluntarily. How does Rebbi Eleazar explain “more than your forefathers?” He explains it for the future since Rebbi Ḥelbo, Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Your forefathers inherited the land of seven peoples, but you will in the future inherit the land of ten peoples. The three others are (Gen. 15:19) “the Qenites, the Qenizites and the Qadmonites.” Rebbi Jehudah said, [these are] Arabia, Salmaia and Nabataea. Rebbi Simeon says, Asia, Spain, and Damascus. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, Asia, Cartagena, and Thrace. Rebbi says, Edom, Moab, and the best of Ammon. “More than your forefathers”: Your forefathers, even though they were redeemed, were later subjugated again. But you when you are redeemed will not be subjugated again. What is the reason? (Jer. 30:6) “Inquire and see whether a male gives birth.” Just as a male cannot give birth so you, after you are redeemed, will not be subjugated again.

MISHNAH: Everybody who keeps one commandment they treat well and prolong his life; he will inherit the Land. But everybody who does not keep one commandment they do not treat well, do not prolong his life, and he does not inherit the Land. Anybody who knows neither Scripture nor Mishnah nor a trade is not part of civilization, but about one who holds on to these three, the verse says: “The triple cord will not easily break.”

They asked before Rebbi Zeïra: a Cohen to an Israel, Rebbi forbids. What does Rebbi Yose say? He did not respond. Rebbi Ḥizqiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa said, so he said to them: In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina, why is a Cohen to an Israel forbidden, not because it looks badly? Also Rebbi Joḥanan holds that from an Israel to an Israel it is forbidden because it looks badly. In addition, because of the following, as it was stated: “Cohanim and Levites who help at the threshing floor have no right either to heave or to tithe, and if the farmer gave, it is desecrated, as it is said (Lev. 22:15): ‘They should not desecrate the sanctified things of the Children of Israel,’ but they do desecrate them! In addition, they said that their heave is no heave, their tithes are no tithes, their dedications are no dedications, and about them the verse says (Micha 3:11): ‘Their heads judge for bribes, their priests instruct for hire, etc.’ The Omnipresent brings over them three catastrophes; that is what is written (Micha 3:12): ‘Therefore, because of you Zion will be ploughed over as a field, Jerusalem will be desolate, and the Temple Mount a wooded hill.’

Rebbi Yannai said: More than 30 Elders voted: from where that qiddushin have no legal effect on a sister-in-law? The verse says, “the wife of the deceased may not belong to any outside unrelated man”, that she cannot have any existence with an outsider. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not a Mishnah? “Or after your levir will have performed ḥalîṣah with you, she is not preliminarily married.” And Rebbi Yannai praised him “those who pour out gold from the wallet,” “my son, they should not be removed from your eyes,” “get wise, my son, and make me happy, that I can answer those who insult me”, “give to the wise that he shall become wiser,” “let the wise listen that he increase in knowledge.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after all these praises I can explain it following Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba said that there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law!

One understands “the daughter of an Israel to a bastard or a Gibeonite,” for it is written: “A bastard shall not come into the Eternal’s congregation.” Why does the verse say: “of his shall not come”? To disqualify. Rebbi Abbu said, what means ממזר? “A strange defect.” This disagrees with what Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, “God installs singles as heads of families,” even if there is a male bastard at one end of the world and a female bastard at the other, the Holy One, praise to Him, brings them and copulates them with one another. Rav Huna said, a bastard does not live more than thirty days. In the days of Rebbi Berekhiah, a Babylonian immigrated here; he was informed that this was a bastard. He said to him, support me. He told him, tomorrow you will stand up in the community and I shall look for an allowance for you. He came and sat during the sermon. When he finished the sermon, he said, our brothers, support this man for he is a bastard. After the congegration had left, he said to him, rabbi, I requested material support from you but you destroyed this man’s life. He answered, by your life, life I gave you for Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna, said in the name of Rav: A bastard lives only thirty days. When? If he is not publicly known. But when he is publicly known, he survives.

It was stated: “If a Gentile or a slave had intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard; Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Simeon, the child is not a bastard, for a bastard is only from a woman forbidden to him by an incest prohibition for which the penalty is extirpation.” Both of them explained the same verse, “nobody may take his father’s wife, etc.” Rebbi Meïr explains: Since his father’s wife is special in that he cannot have preliminary marriage with her, but she could have preliminary marriage with others, and the child is a bastard, so in all cases in which she cannot have preliminary marriage with him, the child is a bastard. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah explains: Since his father’s wife is special in that she cannot have preliminary marriage with him, but she could have preliminary marriage with others, and the child is a bastard; this excludes the Gentile and the slave who cannot contract preliminary marriage with her or with others. Rebbi Samuel bar Abba questions that first Tanna: The sister-in-law who whored cannot have preliminary marriage with him or with others, but the child is qualified! Rebbi Yannai in the name of Rebbi: If a Gentile or a slave had intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, in the name of Rebbi (Yannai ben) Rebbi: The child is neither qualified nor disqualified but dirtied. Rebbi Jonathan went with Rebbi Jehudah Neśia to the hot springs of Gadara. There, he instructed: The child is qualified. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this child improves as time goes by. Rebbi declared the child dirtied, his grandson declared him qualified. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda instructed in the name of all rabbis: The child is qualified. Rebbi Bevai said before Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The child is qualified. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if it is from that, one does not learn from a declaration. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, I know the story from beginning to end. Rebbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina went up to the hot springs of Gadara. He visited his father who said to him: Be careful, because there are those who are disqualified, lest you injure them.

Jacob from Kefar Naboraia went to Tyre. They came to ask him, may one circumcise the son of a Gentile woman on the Sabbath? He wanted to permit it from the verse: “They determined their genealogies for their families according to their fathers’ houses.” Rebbi Ḥaggai heard it and said, he shall come and be whipped. He said to him, for what reason do you whip me? He said, from what is written: “Now we shall make a covenant to send away all foreign women and those born to them, etc”. He said, you want to whip me based on tradition? He said, “and it should be done according to the Torah.” He said to him, from which teaching? He said, from that which Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai, it is written: “You shall not conclude marriage with them,” etc. He said to him, whip your whipping, because it is good to impress.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josia: The eleventh generation of bastards is qualified following Rebbi Simeon; he does not use [the principle of gezerah šawah for] “the tenth, the tenth.” It was stated: Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, in the eleventh generation of bastards, the males are forbidden but the females permitted. Rebbi Samuel ben Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it turns out that Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follows the argument of Rebbi Meïr. As Rebbi Meïr said, a gezerah šawah is as if written in a verse, so Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, a gezerah šawah is as if written in a verse. Here also, the males are forbidden but the females permitted. In that case, even immediately? Only from the tenth onward.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josia: The eleventh generation of bastards is qualified following Rebbi Simeon; he does not use [the principle of gezerah šawah for] “the tenth, the tenth.” It was stated: Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, in the eleventh generation of bastards, the males are forbidden but the females permitted. Rebbi Samuel ben Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it turns out that Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon follows the argument of Rebbi Meïr. As Rebbi Meïr said, a gezerah šawah is as if written in a verse, so Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, a gezerah šawah is as if written in a verse. Here also, the males are forbidden but the females permitted. In that case, even immediately? Only from the tenth onward.

HALAKHAH: “One does not investigate from the altar and before,” etc. It is written: “You certainly shall put a king over you.” This refers not only to a king; from where to add public officials, administrators of welfare, clerks of the court, and those who whip with a lash; from where? The verse says, “from amidst your brothers you shall appoint a king over you,” anybody whom you appoint over you shall only be from the select among your brethren. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: “Their distinguished lineage in the army in war.” The merit of their lineage supports them in war. So far from tradition; from the words of the Torah? “No bastard shall come into the Eternal’s congregation.” “No person injured in his testicles shall come, etc.” What is written afterwards? “When you encamp against your enemies, etc.”

“Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says,” etc. There, we have stated: “Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, the daughter of proselytes should not marry into the priesthood unless her mother be from Israel” They all interpret the same verse (Ez. 44:22): “Only virgins from the seed of the House of Israel.” Rebbi Jehudah says, unless his father be from Israel. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, either her father or her mother. Rebbi Yose says, unless they are born in the holiness of Israel. Rebbi Simeon says, unless they grow the hymen in the holiness of Israel. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Simeon: “A girl which became a proselyte being less than three years and one day of age is acceptable for the priesthood since it was said (Num. 31:18): ‘All the female children unfit for sleeping with a male you shall let live for yourselves,’ and Phineas was with them.” How do the rabbis explain? You shall let live as slaves and slave girls for yourselves.

We have stated: “Four main categories of damages.” But Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thirteen: Damages, suffering, medical costs, loss of earning power, shame; the unpaid trustee, and the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Say now, what we stated [refers to] responsibility for damages. What Rebbi Ḥiyya stated [refers to] both responsibility for damages and bodily injury. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked: How can we state “four main categories”? If everything was said about one bull; let us state “three,” if it was said about three bulls, let us state “five”! But as it is presented in the verse, thus it is presented in the Mishnah.

HALAKHAH: “Estimation and determination of money’s worth,” etc. One does not say that a cow be compensated for by a stole, but one appraises all property in court. “Money’s worth,” this teaches that the court only appraises mortgageable property. But if the person suffering damage appropriated movables, one appraises those. “By a court”, this teaches that one only appraises in court. “Based on testimony”, for one only appraises by testimony. “Of free persons of the Covenant”, this excludes Gentiles, and slaves, and persons disqualified for testimony. “Women are under the rule of torts”; since the verse speaks only of men, it is necessary to include women: Rebbi Ismael stated, “these are the laws which you shall put before them” “And sometimes both the person who causes and the one who suffers the damage pay”; they pay half the damage. From here, that one splits the damage; each one loses half the value of the damage.

Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Meïr for the tame animal and Rebbi Jehudah for testimony, as we have stated: “A bull which gored three times on the same day is not notorious. Why does the verse say ‘from yesterday and the day before’? For if it mended its ways for three days one after the other it is judged to be tame.” We were thinking to say that practice follows Rav Huna who said following both of them. This is confirmed by Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Meïr for the tame [bull] and Rebbi Jehudah for testimony.

One objects from the Mishnah; sometimes one objects in support of Rebbi Joḥanan, sometimes one objects in support of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A person may eat once and be liable for four purification and one reparation sacrifices: An impure person who ate suet which was leftover sacrifice on the Day of Atonement. Rebbi Meïr said, if it was a Sabbath and he took it out on the Sabbath. They told him, it is not from that category.” When they objected in support of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he took it out on the Sabbath, there is no putting down. Why did they say, it is not from that category? When they objected in support of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Why is he not liable if he took it out on the Day of Atonement? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Meïr follows Rebbi Aqiba, as it was stated: From where that if one unintentionally worked on a Day of Atonement which fell on the Sabbath, he is liable for each one separately? The verse says, “it is Sabbath,” “it is the Day of Atonement.” Rebbi Ismael said, he is liable only once. If he took it out] on the Sabbath and put it down. Why did they say: “it is not from that category”? I would say in explanation that he ate it. Is eating not putting it down? Therefore, it is only reasonable that if he took it out on the Sabbath, he be liable. Then if he took it out [on the Day of Atonement why should he not be liable?

What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? The verse says, “they shall sell the living bull and split its proceeds.” How does Rebbi Jehudah support “and also the cadaver they shall split”? From here that each one loses half the damages.

HALAKHAH: “A bull which gored a human,” etc. It was stated: “But the owner of the bull is free,” free from half the weregilt, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, Rabbi, is he not destined for the severity of the stoning place? He answered him, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, etc. Before he objects to Rebbi Eliezer, should he not object to himself? Rebbi Miasha said, explain it if he transgressed and slaughtered it. But some want to say, from what we learn from Rebbi Eliezer who said, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, a Gentile but killed an Israel, still birth but killed a viable [child], he is not liable. How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “the owner of the bull is free”’? Free from paying for a slave. Does not Rebbi Eliezer agree that he is free from paying for a slave? “If weregilt is imposed on him,” the verse speaks of the notorious. Does not Rebbi Aqiba agree that he is free from half the weregilt? It is said here, “the bull shall be stoned,” and it says there, “the bull shall be stoned.” Since about “the bull” mentioned there, the verse speaks of the notorious, so also about “the bull shall be stoned” mentioned here, the verse speaks of the notorious. But is it not written: “The bull by stoning shall be stoned”? It is better that “the bull shall be stoned” shall be interpreted following “the bull shall be stoned” rather than that “the bull shall be stoned” should be interpreted following “the bull by stoning shall be stoned”.

HALAKHAH: “A bull which gored a human,” etc. It was stated: “But the owner of the bull is free,” free from half the weregilt, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, Rabbi, is he not destined for the severity of the stoning place? He answered him, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, etc. Before he objects to Rebbi Eliezer, should he not object to himself? Rebbi Miasha said, explain it if he transgressed and slaughtered it. But some want to say, from what we learn from Rebbi Eliezer who said, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, a Gentile but killed an Israel, still birth but killed a viable [child], he is not liable. How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “the owner of the bull is free”’? Free from paying for a slave. Does not Rebbi Eliezer agree that he is free from paying for a slave? “If weregilt is imposed on him,” the verse speaks of the notorious. Does not Rebbi Aqiba agree that he is free from half the weregilt? It is said here, “the bull shall be stoned,” and it says there, “the bull shall be stoned.” Since about “the bull” mentioned there, the verse speaks of the notorious, so also about “the bull shall be stoned” mentioned here, the verse speaks of the notorious. But is it not written: “The bull by stoning shall be stoned”? It is better that “the bull shall be stoned” shall be interpreted following “the bull shall be stoned” rather than that “the bull shall be stoned” should be interpreted following “the bull by stoning shall be stoned”.

HALAKHAH: “A bull which gored a human,” etc. It was stated: “But the owner of the bull is free,” free from half the weregilt, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, Rabbi, is he not destined for the severity of the stoning place? He answered him, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, etc. Before he objects to Rebbi Eliezer, should he not object to himself? Rebbi Miasha said, explain it if he transgressed and slaughtered it. But some want to say, from what we learn from Rebbi Eliezer who said, I said this only for one which intended to kill an animal but killed a human, a Gentile but killed an Israel, still birth but killed a viable [child], he is not liable. How does Rebbi Aqiba explain “the owner of the bull is free”’? Free from paying for a slave. Does not Rebbi Eliezer agree that he is free from paying for a slave? “If weregilt is imposed on him,” the verse speaks of the notorious. Does not Rebbi Aqiba agree that he is free from half the weregilt? It is said here, “the bull shall be stoned,” and it says there, “the bull shall be stoned.” Since about “the bull” mentioned there, the verse speaks of the notorious, so also about “the bull shall be stoned” mentioned here, the verse speaks of the notorious. But is it not written: “The bull by stoning shall be stoned”? It is better that “the bull shall be stoned” shall be interpreted following “the bull shall be stoned” rather than that “the bull shall be stoned” should be interpreted following “the bull by stoning shall be stoned”.

Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.

Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.

Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.

Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.

From where damages for a slave? The verse says, “or it gores a son, or it gores a daughter, …, and if a slave, etc.” Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba and Rebbi Samuel bar Isaac. One said, the addition may not be more than the main thing. But the other said, he has to pay the entire damages.

It was stated: “I am selling you a fertile slave girl, her children increase her value. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, this is buttocks.” It is written: “If quarrelling men hit a pregnant woman and she loses her children.” Abba Yose ben Ḥanan said, from the meaning of “and she loses her children” would I not know that she was pregnant? Then why does the verse say “pregnant”? It tells you that he is not liable unless he hits her at the place of her pregnancy. Therefore, if he hit her on the palm of her hand or the sole of her foot, he is not liable. “As the woman’s husband will put on him”. Do I understand, even if the pregnancy is not his? The verse says, “pregnant”. It tells that he pays only to the master of the pregnancy. Rebbi Uqba asked, if somebody sleeps with his mother or his sister, is that one not also the master of the pregnancy? The verse says “husband”, somebody who may be called “husband”. This excludes those who cannot be called “husband”.

It was stated: “I am selling you a fertile slave girl, her children increase her value. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, this is buttocks.” It is written: “If quarrelling men hit a pregnant woman and she loses her children.” Abba Yose ben Ḥanan said, from the meaning of “and she loses her children” would I not know that she was pregnant? Then why does the verse say “pregnant”? It tells you that he is not liable unless he hits her at the place of her pregnancy. Therefore, if he hit her on the palm of her hand or the sole of her foot, he is not liable. “As the woman’s husband will put on him”. Do I understand, even if the pregnancy is not his? The verse says, “pregnant”. It tells that he pays only to the master of the pregnancy. Rebbi Uqba asked, if somebody sleeps with his mother or his sister, is that one not also the master of the pregnancy? The verse says “husband”, somebody who may be called “husband”. This excludes those who cannot be called “husband”.

It was stated: “I am selling you a fertile slave girl, her children increase her value. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, this is buttocks.” It is written: “If quarrelling men hit a pregnant woman and she loses her children.” Abba Yose ben Ḥanan said, from the meaning of “and she loses her children” would I not know that she was pregnant? Then why does the verse say “pregnant”? It tells you that he is not liable unless he hits her at the place of her pregnancy. Therefore, if he hit her on the palm of her hand or the sole of her foot, he is not liable. “As the woman’s husband will put on him”. Do I understand, even if the pregnancy is not his? The verse says, “pregnant”. It tells that he pays only to the master of the pregnancy. Rebbi Uqba asked, if somebody sleeps with his mother or his sister, is that one not also the master of the pregnancy? The verse says “husband”, somebody who may be called “husband”. This excludes those who cannot be called “husband”.

HALAKHAH: “One who digs a pit in the public domain,” etc. It is written: “If a man open a pit” and “if a man dig a pit.” One pit for damages, the other pit for death. Rebbi Isaac said, both the pit of death and the pit of damages were added from the same verse, but when it comes to the pit of death you say he is not liable for vessels, but when it comes to the pit of damages you say he is liable for vessels! This is not only if he dug, from where if he bought, inherited, or it was given to him as a gift? The verse says, “if a man acquire a pit.” Has one the right to abandon his damages in the public domain? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah who said, three [handbreadths] close to a domain are like that domain.

HALAKHAH: “One who digs a pit in the public domain,” etc. It is written: “If a man open a pit” and “if a man dig a pit.” One pit for damages, the other pit for death. Rebbi Isaac said, both the pit of death and the pit of damages were added from the same verse, but when it comes to the pit of death you say he is not liable for vessels, but when it comes to the pit of damages you say he is liable for vessels! This is not only if he dug, from where if he bought, inherited, or it was given to him as a gift? The verse says, “if a man acquire a pit.” Has one the right to abandon his damages in the public domain? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah who said, three [handbreadths] close to a domain are like that domain.

“If an ox and its equipment fell in and broke, a donkey and its equipment and was torn, he is liable for the animal but not liable for the equipment.” Samuel said, when it became disoriented because of the air, but if it hit the ground he is liable. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, even if it hit the ground, he is not liable: The Torah absolved from liability when it fell down. “An ox or a donkey fell in there;” “an ox” and not an ox and its equipment; “a donkey” and not a donkey and its equipment. Since it looked logical: If a pit of damages, where one is not liable for death, one is liable for vessels; would it not be logical that for a pit ten handbreadths deep, for which one is liable for death, should one not be liable for vessels? The verse says, “an ox or a donkey fell in there;” “an ox” and not an ox and its equipment; “a donkey” and not a donkey and its equipment.

MISHNAH: The ox and any domestic animal equally are under the rules of falling into a pit, separating from Mount Sinai, paying double restitution, returning lost property, unloading, muzzling, interbreeding, and the Sabbath. Wild animals and birds follow the same rules. Then why was it said “ox or donkey”? But the verse speaks of the actuality.

HALAKHAH: “He who sets a fire which consumes wood,” etc. Since thorns are flammable, do I only include flammable material? The verse says, “a stack”. Since a stack of sheaves is particular in that it was harvested, do I only include harvested material? The verse says, “standing grain.” Since all of these are particular in that they are flammable, do I only include flammable material? If it swept his furrow or damaged his stone, from where? The verse says, “or the field.” Should it only have mentioned thorns, standing grain, and stack, but not mentioned field? In the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah this is acceptable since he says, he pays for everything inside. But according to the rabbis, who say that he only pays for a stack of wheat or barley sheaves, why did it mention “field”, why did it mention “stack”?

HALAKHAH: “He who sets a fire which consumes wood,” etc. Since thorns are flammable, do I only include flammable material? The verse says, “a stack”. Since a stack of sheaves is particular in that it was harvested, do I only include harvested material? The verse says, “standing grain.” Since all of these are particular in that they are flammable, do I only include flammable material? If it swept his furrow or damaged his stone, from where? The verse says, “or the field.” Should it only have mentioned thorns, standing grain, and stack, but not mentioned field? In the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah this is acceptable since he says, he pays for everything inside. But according to the rabbis, who say that he only pays for a stack of wheat or barley sheaves, why did it mention “field”, why did it mention “stack”?

HALAKHAH: “He who sets a fire which consumes wood,” etc. Since thorns are flammable, do I only include flammable material? The verse says, “a stack”. Since a stack of sheaves is particular in that it was harvested, do I only include harvested material? The verse says, “standing grain.” Since all of these are particular in that they are flammable, do I only include flammable material? If it swept his furrow or damaged his stone, from where? The verse says, “or the field.” Should it only have mentioned thorns, standing grain, and stack, but not mentioned field? In the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah this is acceptable since he says, he pays for everything inside. But according to the rabbis, who say that he only pays for a stack of wheat or barley sheaves, why did it mention “field”, why did it mention “stack”?