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HALAKHAH: “For tort victims one estimates with best quality land,” etc. “By an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.” Rebbi Abba bar Pappaios said before Rebbi Yose, where do we hold? If to qualify as damages, is that not what we stated “his neighbor’s ox” but not the ox of Temple property? If for bodily damages, is that not what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: A private person can claim damages but not the Temple? But we must deal with one who said, I obligate myself to give 100 minas to the Temple, when his ox went and did damage. You should not say, [the Temple] is a creditor and should collect from average quality land. Therefore, it was necessary to say that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land, by an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.”

If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.

Rebbi Abin said that Ḥisqiah stated: “After he acquires,” which means that she is acquired by money. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the Hebrew slave girl, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by money, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, should be acquired by money? This is proved by the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money but is acquired by intercourse. Therefore you would not be astonished if this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, might not be acquired by money. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money.

“And has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money, can be acquired by intercourse, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by money, should be acquired by intercourse? The Hebrew slave girl proves, who cannot be acquired by intercourse but is acquired by money. You likewise do not wonder that this one, who may be acquired by money, might not be acquired by intercourse. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money; “and has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse.

By a document. Since money which does not send out permits to enter, would it not be logical that a document which sends out should permit to enter? No. If you speak about money which eliminates dedication through redemption, what can you say about a document which does not eliminate dedication through redemption? The argument de minore ad majus is broken and you have to return to Scripture. Therefore, it was necessary to say: “He shall write her a bill of divorce, hand it to her, and send her out of his house. If she left his house and went to be another man’s.” It brackets her being with her leaving. Since her leaving was by a document, so her being is by a document.

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

“If he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother. He should be able to allot her to his brother by an argument de minore ad majus! If he may allot her to his son who may not take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate, should it not be logical that he may allot her to his brother who may take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate? No. If you would accept the son since he will take [the father’s] place in a field of inheritance, what can you say about his brother who will not take his place in a field of inheritance? Would it be reasonable that he may allot her to him? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother.

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.

HALAKHAH: “If a man performs preliminary marriage using ‘orlah, or kilaim of a vineyard,” etc. The first-born of a she-ass, Rebbi Eleazar said, may be used to preliminarily marry a woman; Rebbi Joḥanan said, it may not be used to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: The first-born of a she-ass may be used to preliminarily marry a woman by an argument de minore ad majus. Since you say that a firstling, whose prohibition cannot be lifted during its lifetime, can be used to preliminarily marry a woman, this one, whose prohibition can be lifted during its lifetime, not so much more? What is the difference between them? If somebody transgressed and redeemed it without the knowledge of its owner. Rebbi Eleazar said, it is not redeemed. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is redeemed. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar and disagrees with him. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: If somebody steals the first-born of another person’s she-ass, he has to pay double restitution. The end disagrees with him: For even though he has no interest in it now he will later. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar: One may not use the first-born of a she-ass to preliminarily marry a woman. Rebbi Eleazar explained that, after breaking of [the foal’s] neck. For Rebbi Eleazar said, everybody agrees that after its neck was broken it cannot be redeemed.

New paragraph. “Rebbi Meïr says that a man should try to teach his son a clean trade,” etc. What should a man do? A person should try and teach his son an unassuming trade and pray for mercy to Him to Whom riches belong since there is no trade in which poor and rich people are not found, for everything depends on a person’s merit. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Meïr: Did you ever see a lion porter, a (lion) [deer] maker of fig cakes, a fox grocer, a wolf selling pots? And they sustain themselves without pain. Why were they created? Only to serve me, and I was created to serve my Maker. Is it not an argument de minore ad maius? Since they were created to serve me and sustain themselves so without pain, should it not be logical that I, who was created to serve my Maker, should be able to sustain myself without pain? What caused me to have to sustain myself with pain? One has to say, my sins. Because I worsened my deeds and destroyed my sustenance.

MISHNAH: How does one treat the bull of the person causing the damage in the domain of the person sustaining the damage? If it gored, hit, bit, wallowed, or kicked, in the public domain he pays half of the damages. In the domain of the person sustaining the damage, Rebbi Ṭarphon said, full damages; but the Sages say, half damages. Rebbi Tarphon said to them: Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, where one is free, He was restrictive for them in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, when full damages must be paid, and He was restrictive regarding damage by the horn in the public domain, where one has to pay half damages; is it not logical that we should be restrictive in this case in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, that full damages must be paid? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages. He said to them, I do not argue horn from horn, I argue horn from foot! Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, He was restrictive for damage by the horn, when He was restrictive with [damage by] tooth or foot in the domain of the person sustaining the damage; is it not logical that we should be restrictive [in case of damage] by the horn? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages.

MISHNAH: How does one treat the bull of the person causing the damage in the domain of the person sustaining the damage? If it gored, hit, bit, wallowed, or kicked, in the public domain he pays half of the damages. In the domain of the person sustaining the damage, Rebbi Ṭarphon said, full damages; but the Sages say, half damages. Rebbi Tarphon said to them: Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, where one is free, He was restrictive for them in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, when full damages must be paid, and He was restrictive regarding damage by the horn in the public domain, where one has to pay half damages; is it not logical that we should be restrictive in this case in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, that full damages must be paid? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages. He said to them, I do not argue horn from horn, I argue horn from foot! Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, He was restrictive for damage by the horn, when He was restrictive with [damage by] tooth or foot in the domain of the person sustaining the damage; is it not logical that we should be restrictive [in case of damage] by the horn? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages.

HALAKHAH: “If his jar was broken in the public domain,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, they disagree at the moment of the accident. But after the accident everybody agrees that he must pay. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the disagreement is both at the moment of the accident and afterwards. Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Eleazar: If he does not have to pay at the moment of the accident, is it not an inference de minore ad majus afterwards? Why should he be free at the moment of the accident? For a person declares his damaged property in the public domain as ownerless. A baraita supports both of them, as it was stated: “The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah that somebody who puts down his stone or his load in the public domain does not have to pay if another person stumbled over it, for on this condition did Joshua distribute the Land.” Therefore, if Joshua had not distributed the Land on this condition, he would have to pay. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he intended use of the potsherds. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, if he intended to cause damage. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi La both say that Rebbi Jehudah agrees with the Sages that one has to pay if he declares his bull who gored in the public domain ownerless. Stationary damage cannot be compared to walking damage.

So far a daughter. A son? Since the daughter, whose power is diminished regarding the father’s property, has her power increased regarding the mother’s property, should the son’s power not be increased regarding the mother’s property, since his power is increased regarding the father’s property? It turns out that for the daughter one infers from the verse and for the son from an argument de minore ad majus. Does the son precede the daughter? Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Zachariah the butcher’s son: So did Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah say in the name of Rebbi Simeon: Both son and daughter are equal for the mother’s tribe Rebbi Mallukh in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Practice follows Rebbi Zachariah. Rebbi Yannai the Kappadokian had a case; the judges were Rav Huna, Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi, and Rebbi Aḥa. Rebbi Aḥa told them: Our brothers outside the Land are unqualified and err in practice; in particular they rely on Rebbi Mallukh in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, but it is not so. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Practice does not follow Rebbi Zachariah. Rebbi Abba the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice does not follow Rebbi Zachariah. Rebbi Eleazar the father of Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah: Practice does not follow Rebbi Zachariah. Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Joḥanan were sitting when Rebbi Yudan the Prince came and asked concerning: “Any daughter who is an heiress of the tribes,” what is the rule? He said to him, it binds the father’s tribe together with the mother’s tribe. Since from the father’s tribe there is nothing for the daughter when there is a son, so also from the mother’s tribe there is nothing for the daughter when there is a son. Or is it the other way around? Since from the mother’s tribe there is something for the daughter when there is a son, so also from the father’s tribe is there something for the daughter when there is a son? Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, let us leave; that man does not want to listen to words of instruction.

“If he goes to war, he carries it with him for it is said: It shall be with him, and he shall read in it all the days of his life. Is there not an inference de minore ad majus? Since for a king of Israel, who was occupied by the needs of Israel, is it said that he shall read in it all the days of his life, a private person so much more. Similarly, it was said to Joshua: You shall meditate about it day and night. Is there not an inference de minore ad majus? Since for Joshua, who is occupied by the needs of Israel, it is said: you shall meditate about it day and night, then certainly a private person.

“If he goes to war, he carries it with him for it is said: It shall be with him, and he shall read in it all the days of his life. Is there not an inference de minore ad majus? Since for a king of Israel, who was occupied by the needs of Israel, is it said that he shall read in it all the days of his life, a private person so much more. Similarly, it was said to Joshua: You shall meditate about it day and night. Is there not an inference de minore ad majus? Since for Joshua, who is occupied by the needs of Israel, it is said: you shall meditate about it day and night, then certainly a private person.

Can he forever disqualify and have the other appoint [a replacement]? Rebbi Zeˋira said, they taught this about subsidiaries. Rebbi La said, what Rebbi Eleazar said about “one said in Tiberias, but the other said in Sepphoris,” is about those who live at the same place, from where to [Sepphoris] it is seven mil, but from there to [Tiberias] it is nine mil. Rebbi Yose said, one understands from this, that if two people had a case in Tiberias; one of them said in the permanent court, but the other said in an ad hoc court; one listens to the one who said in the permanent court.

“Therefore man was created,” etc. “Man was created single in the world because of the families, lest they should attack one another. Is that not argument de minore ad majus? Since now that they are all descendants of one father they attack one another, if they had been descendants of two not so much more? Another explanation: The just ones should not say, we are the descendants of a just man, but you are the sons of evildoers.”

The king said, I shall give. The king took the two sons of Riṣpah bat Ayah. Michal, Saul’s daughter, did not have a child, and you say so? Say now that they were sons of Merab but Michal raised them, so they were named after her. The king gave them into the hand of the Gibeonites who hanged them on the mountain before the Eternal. All seven is written defective of one letter. That refers to Mephiboshet, for whom David prayed and whom the altar received. He told them, I let them pass by the altar and anyone whom the altar receives will be his, because of Mephiboshet who was great in Torah. He let him pass by the altar, which received him. Rebbi Avin said, I shall call to the Most High God, to the Power Who has the ultimate decision over me. For the Holy One, praise to Him, agreed with David. They were killed on the day of harvest …at the start of the barley harvest. Riṣpah bat Ayah took a garment and laid it out on the rock. What means on the rock? Rebbi Hoshaia said, she was reciting: The rock, perfect is His action. Rebbi Abba bar Zamina in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Sanctification of the Name is greater than desecration of the Name. Referring to sanctification of the Name it is written: Do not leave his corpse overnight. But referring to desecration of the Name it is written that they were left hanging until water was poured on them. This teaches that they were hanging from the sixteenth of Nisan to the seventeenth of Marḥeshwan. The passers-by were saying: How did these people sin that the rules of justice were changed for them? They were answered: Because these had attacked cursed proselytes. Is that not an argument de minore ad majus? Since even for those who did not convert for the sake of Heaven, the Eternal avenged their blood; if one would convert for the sake of Heaven not so much more? Many converts were converted at that time; that is what is written: Solomon counted all proselytes … and appointed from them 70’000 carriers, etc.

It is written: For he showed contempt for the Eternal’s Word. Not only if he was contemptuous of the teachings of the Torah, from where if he denied one verse, one Aramaic expression, one argument de minore ad majus? The verse says, His command he violated. One verse, Lotan’s sister was Timna`. One Aramaic expression, Laban called it Yegar Sahadu̅ta̅. One argument de minore ad majus: For Cain would be avenged sevenfold, etc..

It is written: For he showed contempt for the Eternal’s Word. Not only if he was contemptuous of the teachings of the Torah, from where if he denied one verse, one Aramaic expression, one argument de minore ad majus? The verse says, His command he violated. One verse, Lotan’s sister was Timna`. One Aramaic expression, Laban called it Yegar Sahadu̅ta̅. One argument de minore ad majus: For Cain would be avenged sevenfold, etc..

HALAKHAH: All its spoils you shall collect, etc. Rebbi Simeon said, is there not an argument de minore ad majus about this? Since properties, which have no knowledge of good or bad, but because they caused the just to dwell with the evildoers the Torah said, should be burned, if somebody has the intention of influencing his neighbor and influences him from good ways to bad ones, not so much more? Rebbi Eleazar said, the matter is demonstrated by Lot who dwelt in Sodom only because of his money but left there with his hands on his head. This is what is written: Quickly escape to there; it is enough for you that you escape with your life.

“And a prophet who transgressed his own word,” like the companion of Micha. That is what is written: An old prophet was dwelling at Bethel; his son came and told him all the actions which the man of God had wrought, etc. Their father asked them, which way did he go, etc. He told his sons, saddle the donkey for me, etc. He followed the man of God and found him sitting under the terebinth, etc. He said to him, come with me to my house and eat. He told him, I cannot return, etc., up to he said to him, I also am a prophet like you and an angel spoke to me the words of the Eternal as follows, etc., up to he should eat food and drink water; he tricked him. What means “tricked him”? He lied to him. While they were sitting at table, the word of the Eternal came to the prophet who had turned him back. It is not written “who had returned,” but “who had turned him back.” Is that not an argument de minore ad majus? Since one who fed his neighbor food in falsehood was worthy of the Word to be addressed to him, one who feeds his neighbor food in truth, so much more.

For the borrower only the broken is written. From where loss and theft? It is logical. Since the paid keeper and the renter who do not pay for the broken or the dead have to pay for theft and loss, the borrower who pays for the broken or the dead certainly has to pay for theft and loss. It was stated about this: This is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged. From where the abducted? It is said here, it was broken or died; and it is said there, it dies or was broken. Since there the abducted was included, here also the abducted was included. So far following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael follows Rebbi Nathan. Rebbi Nathan says, or, to include the abducted. Or following Rebbi Meïr who said, an equal cut at the place it comes from. Since there one swears for duress, also here one swears for duress. Still following Rebbi Nathan, for Rebbi Nathan said, or it died, to include the abducted one.

Rebbi Yudan asked: If he claimed the claim of a thief and duress? He told him, an armed robber came and took it; does he have to pay double restitution of duress? Rebbi Yose said, if it were so one should state “the paid keeper and the renter;” but we have stated: We do not find that the paid keeper and the renter pay double restitution of duress. On this we have stated, “this is an argument de minore ad majus which is questionable”. Rebbi Ḥanina said, if you say so, should you say, this is an argument de minore ad majus which is questionable, for he can tell him, let us say that the borrower pays double restitution. On this it was stated, this is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged.

Rebbi Yudan asked: If he claimed the claim of a thief and duress? He told him, an armed robber came and took it; does he have to pay double restitution of duress? Rebbi Yose said, if it were so one should state “the paid keeper and the renter;” but we have stated: We do not find that the paid keeper and the renter pay double restitution of duress. On this we have stated, “this is an argument de minore ad majus which is questionable”. Rebbi Ḥanina said, if you say so, should you say, this is an argument de minore ad majus which is questionable, for he can tell him, let us say that the borrower pays double restitution. On this it was stated, this is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged.

Rebbi Yudan asked: If he claimed the claim of a thief and duress? He told him, an armed robber came and took it; does he have to pay double restitution of duress? Rebbi Yose said, if it were so one should state “the paid keeper and the renter;” but we have stated: We do not find that the paid keeper and the renter pay double restitution of duress. On this we have stated, “this is an argument de minore ad majus which is questionable”. Rebbi Ḥanina said, if you say so, should you say, this is an argument de minore ad majus which is questionable, for he can tell him, let us say that the borrower pays double restitution. On this it was stated, this is an argument de minore ad majus which cannot be challenged.

And profane animals slaughtered in the Temple precinct. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: The Torah said, slaughter what is Mine in My place and what is yours in yours. Since Mine in yours is forbidden, also yours in Mine. Is it punished by extirpation? Does not Rebbi Ismael say, one infers by an argument de minore ad majus but one does not punish by an argument de minore ad majus?

And profane animals slaughtered in the Temple precinct. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: The Torah said, slaughter what is Mine in My place and what is yours in yours. Since Mine in yours is forbidden, also yours in Mine. Is it punished by extirpation? Does not Rebbi Ismael say, one infers by an argument de minore ad majus but one does not punish by an argument de minore ad majus?

And from where does Rebbi Yitzchak learn [re'shia bar re'shia]? He learns it out from a kal v'chomer (fortiori), That it was taught in a barasia, Rabbi Akiva says, I asked Raban Gmaliel ad Rebbi Yehosua [while] in the meat market of Iemus, (that they had traveled to to purchase an animal for the wedding feast of Rabban Gamliel's son), If one had [inadvertently] cohabited with his sister, who was his father's sister, who his mother's sister, what would the halacha be? Would he only be liable one sacrifice for all of them, or would he be liable [a separate sacrifice] for each one?