claim

The first-born takes a double share of the father's estate but he does not take a double share of the mother’s estate. He also does not take a double share of the improvement in the value of the estate. Nor from what will fall due [to the estate] as he does of what is held in possession. Nor can a woman claim with her ketubah [from these], Nor can daughters claim their support. Nor can a yavam make a claim [from these]. None of these take from the improvement in the value of the estate, nor of what will fall to the estate as they do of what is now held in possession.

The first-born takes a double share of the father's estate but he does not take a double share of the mother’s estate. He also does not take a double share of the improvement in the value of the estate. Nor from what will fall due [to the estate] as he does of what is held in possession. Nor can a woman claim with her ketubah [from these], Nor can daughters claim their support. Nor can a yavam make a claim [from these]. None of these take from the improvement in the value of the estate, nor of what will fall to the estate as they do of what is now held in possession.

But it is not so with sacrifices. Even if his father was dying [when a man vowed] and left him ten thousand, or if he had a ship on the sea and it brought to him ten thousand, the sanctuary has no claim at all on them.

Whether one consecrates his property or evaluates himself, it [the Sanctuary] has no claim to his wife's garment or his children's garment or to the dyed clothes which he had dyed for their use or to the new sandals which he has bought for their use. Although they said: “Slaves are sold with their garments to increase their value,” because when a garment for thirty denars is bought for him his value is increased by a maneh. And likewise with a cow, if it is kept waiting to the market-day it increases in value, and similarly a pearl, if brought to a big city increases in value. Nevertheless, the Sanctuary can only claim the value of anything in its own place and at its own time.

Whether one consecrates his property or evaluates himself, it [the Sanctuary] has no claim to his wife's garment or his children's garment or to the dyed clothes which he had dyed for their use or to the new sandals which he has bought for their use. Although they said: “Slaves are sold with their garments to increase their value,” because when a garment for thirty denars is bought for him his value is increased by a maneh. And likewise with a cow, if it is kept waiting to the market-day it increases in value, and similarly a pearl, if brought to a big city increases in value. Nevertheless, the Sanctuary can only claim the value of anything in its own place and at its own time.

All persons can substitute, both men and women. Not that one is permitted to substitute, but that if one did so, the substitute is sacred, and he receives forty lashes. Priests have the power to substitute their own [animal] and Israelites also have the power to substitute their own [animal]. Priests do not have the power to substitute a hatat, an asham or a first-born: Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri: what is the reason [priests] do not have the power to substitute a first-born? Rabbi Akiva said: a hatat and an asham are priestly gifts and a first-born is also a priestly gift. Just as in the case of a hatat and an asham [priests] have no power to substitute them, so in the case of a first-born [priests] have no power to substitute it. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said to him: So what that priests should have no power to substitute a hatat and an asham, for there they have do not have a claim on these [offerings] while they are alive. How can you say that the same applies to a first-born upon which [the priests] do have a claim when it is alive? Rabbi Akiva replied to him: Has not Scripture already said: “Then it and its substitute shall be holy?” (Leviticus 27:10). Now where does the holiness [of the original animal] occur? In the house of the owners; so too the substitution occurs in the house of the owners.

All persons can substitute, both men and women. Not that one is permitted to substitute, but that if one did so, the substitute is sacred, and he receives forty lashes. Priests have the power to substitute their own [animal] and Israelites also have the power to substitute their own [animal]. Priests do not have the power to substitute a hatat, an asham or a first-born: Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri: what is the reason [priests] do not have the power to substitute a first-born? Rabbi Akiva said: a hatat and an asham are priestly gifts and a first-born is also a priestly gift. Just as in the case of a hatat and an asham [priests] have no power to substitute them, so in the case of a first-born [priests] have no power to substitute it. Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said to him: So what that priests should have no power to substitute a hatat and an asham, for there they have do not have a claim on these [offerings] while they are alive. How can you say that the same applies to a first-born upon which [the priests] do have a claim when it is alive? Rabbi Akiva replied to him: Has not Scripture already said: “Then it and its substitute shall be holy?” (Leviticus 27:10). Now where does the holiness [of the original animal] occur? In the house of the owners; so too the substitution occurs in the house of the owners.

“ If a Cohen sold a field to an Israel on condition that the tithes should be his, the tithes are his. If he dies, his sons have no right to the tithes. ‘For me and my sons, for me and my heirs,’ his sons have the tithes, his heirs have the tithes.” Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom asked before Rebbi Yose: So far only for heirs whose claim is from the Torah? Even for heirs whose claim is not from the Torah!

“ If a Cohen sold a field to an Israel on condition that the tithes should be his, the tithes are his. If he dies, his sons have no right to the tithes. ‘For me and my sons, for me and my heirs,’ his sons have the tithes, his heirs have the tithes.” Rebbi Yudan bar Shalom asked before Rebbi Yose: So far only for heirs whose claim is from the Torah? Even for heirs whose claim is not from the Torah!

It was stated: “If somebody mortgages a field to a woman for her ketubah or a creditor for his claim and then sells it, that is sold and the buyer should beware for himself” This baraita if he said to her: you should be paid from this. They disagree if he says, you should only be paid from this.

Nathan bar Hoshiah said, one speaks about a girl, the other about an adult woman. The girl has a fine but cannot be sold, the adult has no fine, she cannot be sold; has she no claim for shame and blemish? The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it that she seduced him or forgave him. Nathan bar Hoshaiah thinks that in a case of flogging and payment he pays and is not flogged. Why should he not be flogged and have to pay? (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” You sentence him for one guilt but you may not sentence him for two guilts. Why should he pay and not have to be flogged? From perjured witnesses. Just as perjured witnesses pay and are not flogged, here also he pays and is not flogged. Rebbi Jonah said, the reason of Nathan bar Hoshaiah: (Deut. 25:2): “The judge shall have him laid down and flogged in his presence.” It refers to one whose flogging frees him from his guilt, excluding one who is told: get up and pay.

MISHNAH: If somebody transports figs through his courtyard to cut them into pieces, his children and companions may eat and they are free; the same holds for laborers who work for him as long as they cannot claim their meals from him. But those who can claim their meals from him may not eat. If somebody takes his workers out to the field, if they have no claim to meals from him, they eat and are free. But if they can claim meals from him they may eat single fruits from the fig tree but not from the basket or the box or the muqẓeh. If somebody hires a laborer to work with him on olive trees and said to him “on condition to be able to eat olives,” he eats one by one and if he takes them together he is obligated. To thin out onions, if he said to him “on condition to be able to eat vegetables” he snips off leaf by leaf and eats but if he takes them together he is obligated.

MISHNAH: If somebody transports figs through his courtyard to cut them into pieces, his children and companions may eat and they are free; the same holds for laborers who work for him as long as they cannot claim their meals from him. But those who can claim their meals from him may not eat. If somebody takes his workers out to the field, if they have no claim to meals from him, they eat and are free. But if they can claim meals from him they may eat single fruits from the fig tree but not from the basket or the box or the muqẓeh. If somebody hires a laborer to work with him on olive trees and said to him “on condition to be able to eat olives,” he eats one by one and if he takes them together he is obligated. To thin out onions, if he said to him “on condition to be able to eat vegetables” he snips off leaf by leaf and eats but if he takes them together he is obligated.

MISHNAH: If somebody transports figs through his courtyard to cut them into pieces, his children and companions may eat and they are free; the same holds for laborers who work for him as long as they cannot claim their meals from him. But those who can claim their meals from him may not eat. If somebody takes his workers out to the field, if they have no claim to meals from him, they eat and are free. But if they can claim meals from him they may eat single fruits from the fig tree but not from the basket or the box or the muqẓeh. If somebody hires a laborer to work with him on olive trees and said to him “on condition to be able to eat olives,” he eats one by one and if he takes them together he is obligated. To thin out onions, if he said to him “on condition to be able to eat vegetables” he snips off leaf by leaf and eats but if he takes them together he is obligated.

MISHNAH: If somebody transports figs through his courtyard to cut them into pieces, his children and companions may eat and they are free; the same holds for laborers who work for him as long as they cannot claim their meals from him. But those who can claim their meals from him may not eat. If somebody takes his workers out to the field, if they have no claim to meals from him, they eat and are free. But if they can claim meals from him they may eat single fruits from the fig tree but not from the basket or the box or the muqẓeh. If somebody hires a laborer to work with him on olive trees and said to him “on condition to be able to eat olives,” he eats one by one and if he takes them together he is obligated. To thin out onions, if he said to him “on condition to be able to eat vegetables” he snips off leaf by leaf and eats but if he takes them together he is obligated.

According to Rav, what is the difference between himself and his children? He is forbidden because he depends on muqẓeh. His children who do not depend on muqẓeh are permitted. We understand his children, but his wife? Does she not have a claim for food against him? Following him who says, the wife’s food is not from the Torah. Following what we have stated: “The court will not determine food for a wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s.” Can she not be considered like a worker whose work is not worth a peruṭah? It implies that she is not considered like a worker whose work is not worth a peruṭah. Even according to him who says, the wife’s food is not from the Torah, does she not have a claim to a dwelling? Following what we stated: “If men participate with food without the knowledge of their wives, the participation is valid. But if wives participate without the knowledge of their husbands, the participation is invalid”.

According to Rav, what is the difference between himself and his children? He is forbidden because he depends on muqẓeh. His children who do not depend on muqẓeh are permitted. We understand his children, but his wife? Does she not have a claim for food against him? Following him who says, the wife’s food is not from the Torah. Following what we have stated: “The court will not determine food for a wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s.” Can she not be considered like a worker whose work is not worth a peruṭah? It implies that she is not considered like a worker whose work is not worth a peruṭah. Even according to him who says, the wife’s food is not from the Torah, does she not have a claim to a dwelling? Following what we stated: “If men participate with food without the knowledge of their wives, the participation is valid. But if wives participate without the knowledge of their husbands, the participation is invalid”.

It supports him because he says it is all praise, as Rebbi Joḥanan said, Joḥanan the High Priest sent and checked in all localities of Israel and found that they separated only Great Heave. But First and Second Tithes some were separating and some did not. He said, since [omitting] First Tithe is a deadly sin and [omitting] Second Tithe [implies] the sin of ṭevel, a person should give a name to heave and heave of the tithe and give them to the Cohen; Second Tithe he exchanges for coins. About the remaining tithe of the poor, he who has a claim on another person must bring proof.

MISHNAH: When did they say that additions to First Fruits follow the rules of First Fruits? If they come from the Land. But if they do not come from the Land, they do not follow the rules of First Fruits. Why did they say, First Fruits are the Cohen's property? He may use them to buy slaves, real estate, and impure animals. A creditor can take them for his claim and a woman for her ketuba, like a Torah scroll. And Rebbi Jehudah says, one gives them only to a fellow for goodwill, but the Sages say one gives them to the people of the watch and they distribute them among themselves like Temple-hallowed food.

Rav said, one who sits in a dilapidated house makes the Angel of Death to his creditor, as it is said, he claims death over them, as you say, if you have any claim against your neighbor.

Rebbi Jehudah ben Shalom, Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazy in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan. They formulated the symphon according to Rebbi Meïr in Qiddušin. Rebbi Jeremiah: Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, asked: Why does it have to follow Rebbi Meïr but not also the rabbis? Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” Why can he not say “on condition” but not double his stipulation? If he did not double his stipulation, could this eliminate the preliminary marriage? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everywhere Rebbi Meïr holds that from “no” you infer “yes”, except here? Rebbi Mattaniah said, one is more restrictive in matters of incest and adultery.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, they disagree about ceding rights. Rebbi Meïr says, he may cede rights, but the rabbis are saying, he may not cede rights. Rebbi Meïr says, he may cede rights, and you are saying, “be quick”? Even though Rebbi Meïr says, he may cede rights, he agrees that they may lay claim to the alley beforehand. It was stated thus: Because he may cede rights like a Jew, the words of Rebbi Meïr. “Whether in error or intentionally, he forbids.” So is the baraita: he does not forbid. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥinena: Everybody agrees that he may cede rights. Where do they disagree? To change his mind. Rebbi Meïr says he may cede his rights and retract it, but the rabbis say, he may cede his rights and cannot retract it. Rebbi Meïr says he may cede his rights and retract it, and you are saying, “be quick”? Even though Rebbi Meïr says, he may cede rights, he agrees that they may lay claim to the alley beforehand. It was stated thus: Because he may cede rights like a Jew, the words of Rebbi Meïr. “Whether in error or intentionally, he forbids.” So is the baraita: he does not forbid.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, they disagree about ceding rights. Rebbi Meïr says, he may cede rights, but the rabbis are saying, he may not cede rights. Rebbi Meïr says, he may cede rights, and you are saying, “be quick”? Even though Rebbi Meïr says, he may cede rights, he agrees that they may lay claim to the alley beforehand. It was stated thus: Because he may cede rights like a Jew, the words of Rebbi Meïr. “Whether in error or intentionally, he forbids.” So is the baraita: he does not forbid. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥinena: Everybody agrees that he may cede rights. Where do they disagree? To change his mind. Rebbi Meïr says he may cede his rights and retract it, but the rabbis say, he may cede his rights and cannot retract it. Rebbi Meïr says he may cede his rights and retract it, and you are saying, “be quick”? Even though Rebbi Meïr says, he may cede rights, he agrees that they may lay claim to the alley beforehand. It was stated thus: Because he may cede rights like a Jew, the words of Rebbi Meïr. “Whether in error or intentionally, he forbids.” So is the baraita: he does not forbid.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, at the start one accepts from them neither definite objects nor non-definite objects, and at the end one accepts from them definite objects but not non-definite objects. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, both at the beginning and at the end one accepts from them neither definite objects nor non-definite objects. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “One does not accept from them voluntary gifts for Temple property for the upkeep of the Temple.” He explains it, both at the start and at the end, if it is for non-definite objects. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Everybody agrees that they make vows and are objects of vows. He explains it for elevation offerings. One understands that he makes a vow to bring an elevation offering. Can he be the object of a vow for an elevation offering? No, if an Israel says, I undertake to bring an elevation offering, when a Gentile hears him and says, I am undertaking what he says. Does he not bring libations with it? Is not the excess money given for libations used for vessels of Service? Then it turns out that he brought {money for} a definite object! Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun objected, did we not state that they may offer their value? Are offerings of one’s value not for the upkeep of the Temple? It is as you are saying there, his intent was for Heaven; automatically it will be used for the upkeep of the Temple; so here you are saying, his intent was for Heaven; automatically it will be used for vessels of Service. How does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish treat this? He explains, it is not upon you and us to build our God’s House. Rebbi Ḥilkiah said, Rebbi Simon asked: Does this imply that one does not accept from them for an aqueduct, or the city walls, or its towers, because of you have no part, nor rightful claim, nor memorial, in Jerusalem.

According to Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what is between these Tannaim and those rabbis? Prohibitions without extirpation. Rebbi Judan said, he who sleeps with a bastard girl is between them. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, he who puts fire to the grain stack of his neighbor on a holiday is between them. These Tannaim think, since there is no extirpation, he pays. Those rabbis think, since there is flogging he does not pay. But then “these are the adolescent girls who can claim a fine” cannot follow the rabbis! Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it according to everybody if it refers to a bastard male who sleeps with a bastard girl But is his brother’s wife not his sister-in-law? Explain it that the man’s brother had children and had performed the preliminary wedding with a woman when he died and his brother came and raped her.

If he separated his festival offering and died, do the heirs have to bring it? Rebbi Ila said, shall be seen, has to be seen. He who can come brings, he who cannot come does not bring. Rebbi Ze`ira said, following Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Jonathan who both said, you have to redeem any first born of your sons, even after death, and here, they shall not appear before My Presence empty-handed, even after death. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, there is a disagreement between Samuel and Rebbi Joḥanan, regarding what we have stated there, “A woman who brought her purification sacrifice and died, the heirs have to bring her elevation sacrifice. Her elevation sacrifice and she died, the heirs shall not bring her purification sacrifice.” Samuel said, if it was separated. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if it was not separated. Where do we hold? If they inherited real estate, does Samuel say if it was separated? If they inherited movables, does Rebbi Joḥanan say, even if it was not separated? What is the difference between them? If they inherited real estate, in Samuel’s opinion one does neither claim it nor taking pledges for it; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion one even takes pledges. If they inherited movables, in Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion one claims it (and is) [but is not] taking pledges for it. In Samuel’s opinion one does not claim it.

If he separated his festival offering and died, do the heirs have to bring it? Rebbi Ila said, shall be seen, has to be seen. He who can come brings, he who cannot come does not bring. Rebbi Ze`ira said, following Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Jonathan who both said, you have to redeem any first born of your sons, even after death, and here, they shall not appear before My Presence empty-handed, even after death. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, there is a disagreement between Samuel and Rebbi Joḥanan, regarding what we have stated there, “A woman who brought her purification sacrifice and died, the heirs have to bring her elevation sacrifice. Her elevation sacrifice and she died, the heirs shall not bring her purification sacrifice.” Samuel said, if it was separated. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if it was not separated. Where do we hold? If they inherited real estate, does Samuel say if it was separated? If they inherited movables, does Rebbi Joḥanan say, even if it was not separated? What is the difference between them? If they inherited real estate, in Samuel’s opinion one does neither claim it nor taking pledges for it; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion one even takes pledges. If they inherited movables, in Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion one claims it (and is) [but is not] taking pledges for it. In Samuel’s opinion one does not claim it.

Rebbi Yudan asked: Following him who said, a man is not guilty for the woman who got ḥalîṣah but he is guilty for the co-wife, ḥalîṣah is freeing; is intercourse freeing? As you say, if he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she became forbidden to the brothers. Similarly, if he had intercourse with her, she became forbidden to the brothers. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If the first husband died, the second brother shall take her in levirate. If the second dies, the third shall take her in levirate! Rebbi Yose said, what do you think? That ḥalîṣah is the same as intercourse? Once he performed ḥalîṣah, the claim of the dead is removed from her retroactively. Retroactively fell on her the prohibition of the dead man regarding the brothers. But if he had intercourse with her, she is his wife. On that did Rebbi Ḥiyya state: If the first husband died, the second brother shall take her in levirate. If the second dies, the third shall take her in levirate.

HALAKHAH: “All these free their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from ḥalîṣah and levirate, etc.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. But we hold in case she says “I cannot stand marriage”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

HALAKHAH: “All these free their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from ḥalîṣah and levirate, etc.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. But we hold in case she says “I cannot stand marriage”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents can be collected only from unincumbered property, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect. Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed, he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership. Rebbi Abun said, because it is invalid. So far, if the old man took the loan and [later] the old man mortgaged. But if the old man took the loan and [later] the son mortgaged, can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun said, and was it not stated: The same holds for bills of divorce. Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold. From your own they gave to you. It would be logical that one should not eat heave. But they said that he eats, and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye” from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit, as we have stated: If somebody mortgages a slave and later sold him, he is not sold; if he freed him, he is freed. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days” and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.

MISHNAH: Secondary prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim. If she is secondarily prohibited to the husband but not to the levir, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. Secondarily prohibited to the levir but not to the husband, she is forbidden to the levir but permitted to the husband. Secondarily prohibited to both of them, she is forbidden to both of them. She may claim neither Ketubah nor usufruct nor upkeep nor wear but the child is qualified and one forces him to divorce her. A widow married to the High Priest, a divorcee of one that performed ḥalîṣah married to a simple priest, a female bastard or a Gibeoness married to an Israel, and Israel woman married to a Gibeonite or a bastard have a claim of Ketubah.

MISHNAH: Secondary prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim. If she is secondarily prohibited to the husband but not to the levir, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. Secondarily prohibited to the levir but not to the husband, she is forbidden to the levir but permitted to the husband. Secondarily prohibited to both of them, she is forbidden to both of them. She may claim neither Ketubah nor usufruct nor upkeep nor wear but the child is qualified and one forces him to divorce her. A widow married to the High Priest, a divorcee of one that performed ḥalîṣah married to a simple priest, a female bastard or a Gibeoness married to an Israel, and Israel woman married to a Gibeonite or a bastard have a claim of Ketubah.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said that Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila say that they differ about upkeep. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may demand upkeep. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, one says to [him], divorce her! And you say so? They wanted to say so, they differ about the conditions attached to a Ketubah. Everybody agrees that she cannot claim support since they even punished her heirs, so much more herself. But for him who says that they differ about upkeep it follows that they do not differ about the conditions attached to a Ketubah. They fined her but not her heirs.

MISHNAH: A woman’s husband went overseas and some persons came and told her, your husband died. If she remarried and then the husband returned, she has to leave both husbands, she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah. If they died, the brothers of both of them perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

What is the reason of the House of Shammai? The husband she may repudiate since she married him with her consent. The levir to whom she was given by an act of God she cannot repudiate. What is the reason of the House of Hillel? If she can repudiate the principal, so much more the levir! Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. If she says, I can stand marriage with you but not with your brother? Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

What is the reason of the House of Shammai? The husband she may repudiate since she married him with her consent. The levir to whom she was given by an act of God she cannot repudiate. What is the reason of the House of Hillel? If she can repudiate the principal, so much more the levir! Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. If she says, I can stand marriage with you but not with your brother? Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

HALAKHAH: “If an underage levir,” etc. It was stated: A claim of non-virginity may be brought within thirty days, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, immediately. Where do we hold? If he copulated, immediately. If he did not copulate, even after a longer delay. But we must hold if it was not spelled out. Rebbi Meїr said, it is credible that a man may hold himself back for thirty days. But the Sages say, a man does not hold himself back even for one day. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: According to Rebbi Meїr, would a man be believed to assert that he held himself back for thirty days in order to make the child fatherless? Let us hear from the following: “If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṣah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṣah with her.” (After thirty days.) And Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Meїr’s. And Rebbi Eleazar said, that refers only to her, but not to her co-wife. As you say there, she is not believed to damage her co-wife, so here, he is not believed to damage his son.

HALAKHAH: “The House of Shammai say, she should remarry,” etc. May the daughters claim upkeep based on her word?

Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah insisted on interpreting the ketubah. “Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah explained: ‘The sons shall inherit and the daughters shall be supported.’ Since the sons can only inherit after their father’s death, so the daughters can claim support only after their father’s death.”

“A man is sold for his theft,” for his theft but not for the double restitution. For his theft but not for his perjury. For his theft he is not sold twice. There is only a monetary claim on him. That means, for one theft, but for two thefts he can be sold a second time. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he stole from a partnership, how are you treating this? As one theft or as two thefts? If he stole and removed [things] in the night, we would say that if the owners realized [the loss] in the meantime, there are two thefts; otherwise, it is one theft.

It supports him because he says it is all praise, as Rebbi Joḥanan said, Joḥanan the High Priest sent and checked in all localities of Israel and found that they separated only Great Heave. But First and Second Tithes some were separating and some did not. He said, since [omitting] First Tithe is a deadly sin and [omitting] Second Tithe [implies] the sin of ṭevel, a person should give a name to heave and heave of the tithe and give them to the Cohen; Second Tithe he exchanges for coins. About the remaining tithe of the poor, he who has a claim on another person must bring proof.

It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah said, in Judea in earlier times they appointed two best men, one for the bride and one for the groom, but they appointed them only for the wedding day. In contrast, this was not done in Galilee. In Judea in earlier times one let the fiancé be alone with the fiancée for an hour so that he became familiar with her; in contrast, this was not done in Galilee. In Judea in earlier times the best men were investigating the places of groom and bride; in contrast, this was not done in Galilee. In Judea in earlier times the best men were sleeping in the room with groom and bride; in contrast, this was not done in Galilee. Anybody who did not follow these rules could not present a claim of missing virginity.

It was stated: The claim of virginity is based on any amount (of blood). It happened that for a certain woman nothing was found except for [a stain the size of] a mustard seed. She came before Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose, who said to her, there should be many like you in Israel. Rebbi Zachariah the son-in-law of Rebbi Levi: He cursed her, like people who, when they see a blind man, call him “much light”. The colleagues said, he needled her, any woman with little blood has few children. Rebbi Yose said, he praised her, any woman with little blood will not cause impurity to food prepared in purity.

MISHNAH: The ketubah of a virgin is 200 and that of a widow one mina. The ketubah of virgins who after a preliminary marriage become widows, divorcees, or who received ḥalîṣah, is 200 and they are subject to a claim of non-virginity. The ketubah of a proselyte, a prisoner, and a slave who were redeemed, freed, or converted at less than three years and one day of age, is 200 and they are subject to a claim of non-virginity.

MISHNAH: The ketubah of a virgin is 200 and that of a widow one mina. The ketubah of virgins who after a preliminary marriage become widows, divorcees, or who received ḥalîṣah, is 200 and they are subject to a claim of non-virginity. The ketubah of a proselyte, a prisoner, and a slave who were redeemed, freed, or converted at less than three years and one day of age, is 200 and they are subject to a claim of non-virginity.

There came a case before Rebbi Ḥanina of a woman whose ketubah was less than 200 zuz, and he said, she should take what he had written for her. He said to Rebbi Mana, sit down and sign. He answered, follow your argument and sign yourself, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in the name of Samuel, by the Temple šeqel? Rebbi Eudaimon of Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: Because of a renunciation. Now, should a woman whose ketubah was for less than 200 [zuz] not hide her ketubah in order to collect by the Temple šeqel? They said in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she presents she collects. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: If a deaf-mute man married a hearing wife, she has no claim for support nor ketubah, but if she died, he inherits from her, for she wanted to connect him with her property, but he could not want to connect her with his property. If a hearing male married a deaf-mute woman, she has a claim to support and ketubah, but if she died, he does not inherit, for he wanted to connect her with his property, but she could not want to connect him with her property. But can a deaf-mute woman acquire and have ketubah? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that at the moment he married her, she was hearing. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, he married her when she was hearing but she turned deaf-mute. In any case, did he not marry her when she was hearing? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that she was deaf-mute and turned hearing; he married her when she was hearing and she turned deaf. That you should not say, because at the start she was deaf-mute she has [no] ketubah, therefore it is necessary to say that she (does not have) [has]. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but since if one has sexual relations with a deaf-mute, is he not liable for a fine? Only if there were no fine would there be no ketubah. Rebbi Yudan said, does that depend on a fine? Look, the adult woman collects no fine but her ketubah is 200, the virgin after marriage collects a fine but her ketubah is a mina!

There came a case before Rebbi Ḥanina of a woman whose ketubah was less than 200 zuz, and he said, she should take what he had written for her. He said to Rebbi Mana, sit down and sign. He answered, follow your argument and sign yourself, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in the name of Samuel, by the Temple šeqel? Rebbi Eudaimon of Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna: Because of a renunciation. Now, should a woman whose ketubah was for less than 200 [zuz] not hide her ketubah in order to collect by the Temple šeqel? They said in the name of Rebbi Ḥuna, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she presents she collects. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: If a deaf-mute man married a hearing wife, she has no claim for support nor ketubah, but if she died, he inherits from her, for she wanted to connect him with her property, but he could not want to connect her with his property. If a hearing male married a deaf-mute woman, she has a claim to support and ketubah, but if she died, he does not inherit, for he wanted to connect her with his property, but she could not want to connect him with her property. But can a deaf-mute woman acquire and have ketubah? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that at the moment he married her, she was hearing. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, he married her when she was hearing but she turned deaf-mute. In any case, did he not marry her when she was hearing? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that she was deaf-mute and turned hearing; he married her when she was hearing and she turned deaf. That you should not say, because at the start she was deaf-mute she has [no] ketubah, therefore it is necessary to say that she (does not have) [has]. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but since if one has sexual relations with a deaf-mute, is he not liable for a fine? Only if there were no fine would there be no ketubah. Rebbi Yudan said, does that depend on a fine? Look, the adult woman collects no fine but her ketubah is 200, the virgin after marriage collects a fine but her ketubah is a mina!

MISHNAH: For virgins who after a final marriage become widows, divorcees, or who received ḥalîṣah, their ketubah is a mina and they are not subject to a claim of non-virginity. For a proselyte, a prisoner, and a slave who were redeemed, converted, or freed at more than three years and one day of age, their ketubah is a mina and they are not subject to a claim of non-virginity.

MISHNAH: For virgins who after a final marriage become widows, divorcees, or who received ḥalîṣah, their ketubah is a mina and they are not subject to a claim of non-virginity. For a proselyte, a prisoner, and a slave who were redeemed, converted, or freed at more than three years and one day of age, their ketubah is a mina and they are not subject to a claim of non-virginity.

It was stated: A claim of non-virginity may be brought within thirty days, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, immediately. Where do we hold? If he copulated, immediately. If he did not copulate, even after a longer delay. But we must deal with the case that it was not spelled out. Rebbi Meïr said, it is credible that a man may hold himself back for thirty days. But the Sages say, a man does not hold himself back even for one day. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: According to Rebbi Meïr, would a man be believed to assert that he held himself back for thirty days in order to make the child of unknown paternity? Let us hear from the following: “If the sister-in-law claims within thirty days that she was not copulated with, one forces him to perform ḥalîṢah with her. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṢah with her.” And Rebbi Eleazar said, this is Rebbi Meïr’s. And Rebbi Eleazar said, that refers only to her, but not to her co-wife. As you say there, she is not believed to damage her co-wife, so here, he is not believed to damage his son.

MISHNAH: If somebody eats at his father-in-law’s in Judea without chaperones cannot claim missing virginity since he is alone with her. Both for an Israel widow as a Cohanim widow the ketubah is a mina. The court of priests collected 400 zuz for a virgin, to which the Sages did not object.

HALAKHAH: “Somebody married a woman and found that she was no virgin”, etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Does this mean that a claim of missing virginity is impossible following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, only following Rebbi Joshua? He turned around and said, a claim of missing virginity is possible following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, if she remains silent. And even if you say that she talks, if she said that he found her a virgin and destroyed the evidence. Why should she not be believed? One cannot tolerate it, since Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. Here you say, she is believed. There, you say that she is not believed. In this case, both agree that the door was open.

HALAKHAH: “Somebody married a woman and found that she was no virgin”, etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Does this mean that a claim of missing virginity is impossible following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, only following Rebbi Joshua? He turned around and said, a claim of missing virginity is possible following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, if she remains silent. And even if you say that she talks, if she said that he found her a virgin and destroyed the evidence. Why should she not be believed? One cannot tolerate it, since Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. Here you say, she is believed. There, you say that she is not believed. In this case, both agree that the door was open.

HALAKHAH: “She says, I was injured by wood,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, that follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said the ketubah of one injured by wood is 200 [zuz]. Rebbi Yose said, we would think to say, when did Rebbi Meïr disagree with those rabbis? If he took her in assuming she was injured by wood. But if he took her in assuming she was a virgin and it turned out she was injured by wood, then even Rebbi Meïr agrees, since we have stated: “She says, I was injured by wood, but he says not so, you were trampled on by a man.” That means, there is a disagreement even if he took her in assuming she was injured by wood and she turned out to have been injured by wood. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and my ketubah is 200 [zuz]. He says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and you have no claim on me. What are we talking about? If he married her as a virgin and she turns out to have been injured by wood, Rebbi Meïr will agree. If he married her as one injured by wood and she turns out to have been injured by wood, is there a recognizable difference in the opening of the door between wood or man? Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira did not say so, but: She says, I was injured by wood and so I stipulated with you, but he says, it is not so, but you were trampled on by a man and there was no stipulation between you and me.

If somebody claimed a mina, the [defendant] denied it, and the [claimant] produced witnesses that the [defendant] owes him 50 [zuz]. The older Rebbi Ḥiyya said, [the defendant] has to swear about the remainder. Rebbi Joḥanan says, he does not have to swear. The older Rebbi Ḥiyya learned it from two who are grabbing a toga, as we have stated there: “Two are grabbing a toga, one says, I found it, and the other says, I found it.” The one who grabs half of it is as if he brought witnesses that that half belongs to him. The other says, “it belongs to me entirely”, and the fact that he grabs half of it is as if he brought witnesses that this half belongs to him. The one who says, “it belongs to me entirely”, swears that not the entire [toga] is the other’s. But he did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan that this oath is a rabbinic institution, that a man should not see another in the market and tell him, the toga which you are wearing is mine, come and split your toga with me! Rebbi Abin in the name of Rav: My uncle agrees in the case of a document. How is that? He claimed a mina, the [defendant] denied it, and the [claimant] produced a document that the [defendant] owed him 50 [zuz]. He has only fifty. And Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, we can understand it from the following: “‘The amount of … tetradrachmas’ and it was illegible, he owes no less than two. “If it is more, if the lender says five but the borrower says three, Ben Azzay says since he partially agreed to the claim, he has to swear, but the Sages say, what he agreed to is not of the kind which was claimed. Because it was not of the kind which was claimed! Therefore, if it were of the kind which was claimed, he would be obligated. And is it not here that the agreed sum was part of the claim? Everybody agrees that he owes her a mina. But she claimsanother mina from him, to which he does not agree. The burden of proof is on the claimant.

If somebody claimed a mina, the [defendant] denied it, and the [claimant] produced witnesses that the [defendant] owes him 50 [zuz]. The older Rebbi Ḥiyya said, [the defendant] has to swear about the remainder. Rebbi Joḥanan says, he does not have to swear. The older Rebbi Ḥiyya learned it from two who are grabbing a toga, as we have stated there: “Two are grabbing a toga, one says, I found it, and the other says, I found it.” The one who grabs half of it is as if he brought witnesses that that half belongs to him. The other says, “it belongs to me entirely”, and the fact that he grabs half of it is as if he brought witnesses that this half belongs to him. The one who says, “it belongs to me entirely”, swears that not the entire [toga] is the other’s. But he did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan that this oath is a rabbinic institution, that a man should not see another in the market and tell him, the toga which you are wearing is mine, come and split your toga with me! Rebbi Abin in the name of Rav: My uncle agrees in the case of a document. How is that? He claimed a mina, the [defendant] denied it, and the [claimant] produced a document that the [defendant] owed him 50 [zuz]. He has only fifty. And Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, we can understand it from the following: “‘The amount of … tetradrachmas’ and it was illegible, he owes no less than two. “If it is more, if the lender says five but the borrower says three, Ben Azzay says since he partially agreed to the claim, he has to swear, but the Sages say, what he agreed to is not of the kind which was claimed. Because it was not of the kind which was claimed! Therefore, if it were of the kind which was claimed, he would be obligated. And is it not here that the agreed sum was part of the claim? Everybody agrees that he owes her a mina. But she claimsanother mina from him, to which he does not agree. The burden of proof is on the claimant.

“He is not trustworthy” if he did not eat the years of legal claim from it. But if he ate the years of legal claim from it, he is trustworthy if [the second person’s] father did not die in possession. But if [the second person’s] father died in possession, he is [not] trustworthy. As the following: Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands the title to Simeon. Reuben came back and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to Reuben. That is what the rabbis here think. The rabbis there say, from the time it was removed, by clear testimony it was removed. So the rabbis here say, from the time she married, by clear testimony she married. Rebbi Yose said, the rabbis there agree that if during the first proceedings two [witnesses] say that his father died in possession and two say, he did not die in possession, Reuben’s claim is upheld.

“He is not trustworthy” if he did not eat the years of legal claim from it. But if he ate the years of legal claim from it, he is trustworthy if [the second person’s] father did not die in possession. But if [the second person’s] father died in possession, he is [not] trustworthy. As the following: Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands the title to Simeon. Reuben came back and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to Reuben. That is what the rabbis here think. The rabbis there say, from the time it was removed, by clear testimony it was removed. So the rabbis here say, from the time she married, by clear testimony she married. Rebbi Yose said, the rabbis there agree that if during the first proceedings two [witnesses] say that his father died in possession and two say, he did not die in possession, Reuben’s claim is upheld.

“He is not trustworthy” if he did not eat the years of legal claim from it. But if he ate the years of legal claim from it, he is trustworthy if [the second person’s] father did not die in possession. But if [the second person’s] father died in possession, he is [not] trustworthy. As the following: Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands the title to Simeon. Reuben came back and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to Reuben. That is what the rabbis here think. The rabbis there say, from the time it was removed, by clear testimony it was removed. So the rabbis here say, from the time she married, by clear testimony she married. Rebbi Yose said, the rabbis there agree that if during the first proceedings two [witnesses] say that his father died in possession and two say, he did not die in possession, Reuben’s claim is upheld.

“In the Land of Israel there are two legal claims to priestly status, the priestly blessings and the distribution from the threshing floor. In Syria, priestly blessings but not distribution from the threshing floor. Up to the place where the messengers for the New Moon arrive, up to Nimerin. Babylonia is like Syria. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, also in Alexandria in the time when regular courts are sitting there. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel stated: Just as heave establishes a legal claim to priesthood, so First Tithe establishes a legal claim to priesthood. If somebody gives his heave to the court to distribute he has no legal claim to priesthood;” I am saying that the heave came to him from his mother’s father, a Cohen.

“In the Land of Israel there are two legal claims to priestly status, the priestly blessings and the distribution from the threshing floor. In Syria, priestly blessings but not distribution from the threshing floor. Up to the place where the messengers for the New Moon arrive, up to Nimerin. Babylonia is like Syria. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, also in Alexandria in the time when regular courts are sitting there. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel stated: Just as heave establishes a legal claim to priesthood, so First Tithe establishes a legal claim to priesthood. If somebody gives his heave to the court to distribute he has no legal claim to priesthood;” I am saying that the heave came to him from his mother’s father, a Cohen.

“In the Land of Israel there are two legal claims to priestly status, the priestly blessings and the distribution from the threshing floor. In Syria, priestly blessings but not distribution from the threshing floor. Up to the place where the messengers for the New Moon arrive, up to Nimerin. Babylonia is like Syria. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, also in Alexandria in the time when regular courts are sitting there. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel stated: Just as heave establishes a legal claim to priesthood, so First Tithe establishes a legal claim to priesthood. If somebody gives his heave to the court to distribute he has no legal claim to priesthood;” I am saying that the heave came to him from his mother’s father, a Cohen.

MISHNAH: The following adolescent girls can claim a fine: From someone who has intercourse with a bastard girl, or a Gibeonite or a Samaritan girl, and one who comes to a female proselyte, a kidnap victim, or a slave girl who was redeemed, converted, or freed, at less than three years and one day of age. Also from one who has intercourse with his sister, or his father’s sister, or his mother’s sister, or his wife’s sister, or his brother’s wife, or his paternal uncle’s wife, or a menstruating girl; he has to pay the fine since it is not a capital crime even though he is subject to extirpation.

“A Samaritan.” That follows him who said, a Samaritan is a like full Jew. But for him who says that a Samaritan is like a Gentile, it is not so. As they disagreed: A Samaritan is like a Gentile, the words of Rebbi. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, a Samaritan is like a Jew in every respect. Even if you say, a Samaritan is like a Gentile, why are Samaritans disqualified? Not because of a Gentile and a slave? If a Gentile or a slave has intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. But a bastard girl can claim a fine! For restrictions or family relations you consider him a Gentile or a slave who had intercourse with a Jewish woman; the child is a bastard. But for a fine you consider this as a Jew having intercourse with a Gentile woman, in which case the child is a Gentile.

Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina said, a man who rapes or seduces an orphan girl does not have to pay. Rebbi Abba bar Mamai said, that is a disagreement, it follows Rebbi Yose the Galilean. But following Rebbi Aqiba she can claim the fine and the fine becomes her property. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah said “at less than three years and one day of age,” and is she not like an orphan? And did we not state: “Because he raped her,” that includes an orphan for a fine, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean? Rebbi Aḥai said, explain it that he had intercourse with her when her father was alive; when her father died, he already had the obligation to give to her father.

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was not cautioned should he not pay since when cautioned he would be flogged? A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If somebody eats heave in error, he pays principal and fifth,” but if he was cautioned, will he not be flogged? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr said, he is flogged and pays. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as we have stated: “The following adolescent girls can claim a fine,” but if he was cautioned, will he not be flogged? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr said, he is flogged and pays. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Rebbi Meïr learned from the calumniator. (Deut. 22:18) “They shall punish him,” flogging; (Deut. 22:19) “and they shall fine him”, money. But the rabbis say, [the law of] the calumniator is separate because of its novelty; one cannot learn from a novelty! Because nowhere else will a person become guilty by speech, but here he becomes guilty by speech; therefore, nothing can be inferred. Another explanation: one cannot transfer the rules of either payment or flogging. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he [eats] fat in error but is intentional about the sacrifice, if he was cautioned he will be flogged and has to bring a sacrifice? So here, he is flogged and he pays. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” If two possibilities are given to the court, one chooses one of them. This excludes matters in the power of Heaven.

Nathan bar Hoshiah said, one speaks about an adolescent girl, the other about an adult woman. The adolescent has a fine but nobody is flogged for her; for the adult he is flogged but pays no fine, she cannot be sold; she has no claim for shame and blemish. The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it that she seduced him or remitted [the fine] for him. Nathan bar Hoshaiah thinks that in a case of flogging and payment he pays but is not flogged. Why should he not be flogged and have to pay? (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” You sentence him for one offence but you may not sentence him for two offences. From perjured witnesses. Just as you say there, perjured witnesses pay but are not flogged, here also he pays and is not flogged. Rebbi Jonah said, the reason of Rebbi Nathan bar Hoshaiah: (Deut. 25:2): “For his evil deed.” It refers to one whose flogging frees him from his guilt, excluding one who is told: get up and pay.

According to Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what is between these Tannaïm and those rabbis? Prohibitions without extirpation. Rebbi Judan said, he who sleeps with a bastard girl is between them. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, he who puts fire to the grain stack of his neighbor on a holiday is between them. These Tannaïm think, since there is no extirpation, he pays. Those rabbis think, since there is flogging he does not pay. But then “these are the adolescent girls who can claim a fine” cannot follow the rabbis! Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it according to everybody if it refers to a bastard male who sleeps with a bastard girl.

MISHNAH: The following cannot claim a fine: One who comes to a proselyte woman, a kidnap victim, or a slave girl who was redeemed, converted, or freed, at more than three years and one day of age. Rebbi Jehudah says, the redeemed kidnap victim is in her holiness even if she is an adult.

HALAKHAH: “The following cannot claim a fine,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Jehudah excepted the kidnap victim only for the fine. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Also for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz]. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even to let her eat heave. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Dosa both said the same, as we have stated there: The kidnap victim eats heave, the words of Rebbi Dosa. Rebbi Ḥanina came in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Practice follows Rebbi Dosa.

MISHNAH: Anytime there is a sale there is no fine and anytime there is a fine there is no sale. The underage girl is subject to sale but not to fine; the adolescent can claim a fine but has no sale; the adult has neither fine nor sale.

From where comes this? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “You shall give them as inheritance to your sons to inherit property,” those to your sons and not your daughters to your sons; the verse speaks about the fine. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: They have no right to the fines of the daughter nor to payments for seduction or injuries. When does the fine become due? Rebbi Jonah said, from the first moment; Rebbi Yose said, at the end. Rebbi Yose objected to Rebbi Jonah: Since you say, from the first moment, did we not state: “If there were court proceedings during her father’s lifetime, [the payments] are the father’s; after the father’s death they are the brothers’”? He said to him, that refers to what Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated, “He shall give to the girl; he shall give to the girl’s father.” Rebbi Jonah objected to Rebbi Yose. In your opinion, since you say, at the end, did we not state: “If there were court proceedings before she became an adult, they are the father’s; after she became an adult they belong to herself.” Does an adult have a claim to a fine? He said to him, that refers to what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, as Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “Because he mistreated her,” that includes if she was an adolescent and became an adult. Does it turn out that this disagreement parallels another disagreement, as we have stated there: “If he stole from his father, slaughtered or sold, and afterwards [his father] died, …, he pays fourfold or fivefold”? Rebbi Yose objected to Rebbi Ḥaggai: In your opinion, since you say that it depends on the court proceedings, should one not state: If he stole from his father, slaughtered or sold during his father’s lifetime but did not appear in court until after his father’s death, he pays twofold? But it says fourfold or fivefold! But here, everybody agrees that they belong to herself. The only problem is whether he has to pay to her or to her father.

Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah insisted on interpreting the ketubah: Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah explained: ‘The sons shall inherit and the daughters shall be supported.’ Since the sons can only inherit after their father’s death, so the daughters can claim support only after their father’s death.

HALAKHAH: ““The female children you will have by me,” etc. Rav Ḥisda said, if they became adults, they lost the support. If they married, they lost their dowries. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “If they became adults without being married or were married without being adults, they lost their support but not their dowries.” Rebbi Abin in the name of Hila: They all agree on the following: If a widow sues the heirs, she says I did not receive my ketubah, but the heirs say you received your ketubah. Before she remarried, the burden of proof is on the heirs that she received her ketubah. After she remarried, the burden of proof is on her that she had not received her ketubah. But did we not state: “If an orphan was married off by her mother or her brother and they wrote her [a dowry of] 150 zuz, after she grows up she can extract from them.” The reason, because she was underage. Therefore, a grown up gave up her claim. Explain it that she had received partial payment. Did not Rebbi Avina say in the name of Rebbi Assi: If a firstborn took as a simple [brother], this is prima facie evidence that he gave up his claim. Still, if she had received part payment. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this one did not take anything from his primogeniture. There came a case before Rebbi Mana, who wanted to act following Rav Ḥisda. Rebbi Ḥananiah said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “if they became adults without being married or were married without being adults, they lost their support but not their dowries”? He said to him: I quoted a tradition, you quoted a Baraita. Let the tradition be disregarded before the Baraita.

HALAKHAH: ““The female children you will have by me,” etc. Rav Ḥisda said, if they became adults, they lost the support. If they married, they lost their dowries. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “If they became adults without being married or were married without being adults, they lost their support but not their dowries.” Rebbi Abin in the name of Hila: They all agree on the following: If a widow sues the heirs, she says I did not receive my ketubah, but the heirs say you received your ketubah. Before she remarried, the burden of proof is on the heirs that she received her ketubah. After she remarried, the burden of proof is on her that she had not received her ketubah. But did we not state: “If an orphan was married off by her mother or her brother and they wrote her [a dowry of] 150 zuz, after she grows up she can extract from them.” The reason, because she was underage. Therefore, a grown up gave up her claim. Explain it that she had received partial payment. Did not Rebbi Avina say in the name of Rebbi Assi: If a firstborn took as a simple [brother], this is prima facie evidence that he gave up his claim. Still, if she had received part payment. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this one did not take anything from his primogeniture. There came a case before Rebbi Mana, who wanted to act following Rav Ḥisda. Rebbi Ḥananiah said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “if they became adults without being married or were married without being adults, they lost their support but not their dowries”? He said to him: I quoted a tradition, you quoted a Baraita. Let the tradition be disregarded before the Baraita.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody dedicates his wife’s earnings,” etc. Rebbi Meïr says, it is sanctified as his property. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian says, it is profane as his property. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree about the excess over five tetradrachmas. He explains it in the case of one who supports his wife with food but does not give her an obolus for her needs, as we stated: “If he does not give her an obolus for her needs, what she earns is hers”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they disagree about the excess left after [the husband’s] death; for he explains it if he does not support her with food. But if he supports her with food, everybody agrees that it became dedicated. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, what one states there supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “When was this said? If he does not feed her. But if he feeds her, everybody agrees that it was sanctified.” But is not everything a wife has subject to the husband’s claim to its yield?

Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose: A wife who leaves because of a bad reputation has no rags; the rebellious one has rags. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The rebellious one and the one who leaves because of a bad reputation can claim neither sustenance nor rags.

She has no claim to wine since poor Jewish women do not drink wine. Do rich women drink? Did we not state: It happened that the Sages assigned to Martha bat Boethos two se‘ah of wine every day. How can the court assign wine? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, because of “Whoring, wine, and cider will destroy the mind.” But did we not state: ”If she was nursing, one reduces the amount of her work and increases her food”? Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said wine, for it increases the milk. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Also they assigned it for cooking. Nevertheless, she cursed them and said to them, so you should give to your daughters. Rebbi Aḥa said, and we answered her, Amen. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Ẓadoq said, I should not see consolation if I did not see her collecting barley grains between horses’ hooves at Acco. I quoted about her the verse: “The dainty one among you and the pampered, …” “If you have no experience, most beautiful of women, go following the flock …”. But did we not state: It happened that the Sages assigned to Miryam, the daughter of Simeon ben Gorion, a daily supply of perfume for 500 denar, when she was only waiting for her levir. Nevertheless, she cursed them and said to them, so you should give to your daughters. Rebbi Aḥa said, and we answered her, Amen. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Ẓadoq said, I should not see consolation if I did not see her bound with her hair to a horse’s tail at Acco. I quoted about her the verse: “The dainty one among you and the pampered, …”.

MISHNAH: If an orphan girl was married off by her mother or her brothers and they wrote her 100 or 50 zuz, after she becomes an adult she can claim from them what is appropriate to be given to her. Rebbi Jehudah says, if he married off his first daughter, the second should be given in the way the first had been given. But the Sages say, sometimes it happens that a person was poor and became rich, or was rich and became poor. But one appraises the property and gives to her

MISHNAH: If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no obligation of vows on her and it turned out that she had vows to fulfill, she is not preliminarily married. If he married her definitively without inquiry and she had vows to fulfill, she should leave without ketubah. If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no bodily defects and it turned out that she had bodily defects, she is not preliminarily married. If he married her definitively without inquiry and she had bodily defects, she should leave without ketubah; and all defects which disqualify a priest disqualify a woman. If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove that the defects developed after she was preliminarily married and his field was swamped; once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove that she had the defects before the preliminary wedding so that his acquisition was in error, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, when was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects, and if there is a public bathhouse in his town he has no claim for hidden defects since he checks her out through his female relatives.

MISHNAH: If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no obligation of vows on her and it turned out that she had vows to fulfill, she is not preliminarily married. If he married her definitively without inquiry and she had vows to fulfill, she should leave without ketubah. If somebody performed the preliminary marriage with a woman on condition that she had no bodily defects and it turned out that she had bodily defects, she is not preliminarily married. If he married her definitively without inquiry and she had bodily defects, she should leave without ketubah; and all defects which disqualify a priest disqualify a woman. If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove that the defects developed after she was preliminarily married and his field was swamped; once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove that she had the defects before the preliminary wedding so that his acquisition was in error, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, when was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects, and if there is a public bathhouse in his town he has no claim for hidden defects since he checks her out through his female relatives.

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if the father proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he [made it conditional], could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ban Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if the father proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he [made it conditional], could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ban Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if the father proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he [made it conditional], could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ban Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if the father proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he [made it conditional], could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ban Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if the father proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he [made it conditional], could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ban Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if the father proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he [made it conditional], could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ban Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

“And all defects which disqualify a priest disqualify a woman. They added to them for women mouth odor, sweat odor, and a hairless mole.” Rebbi Ammi bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: They taught this about the skin of the face. But did we not state: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects,” and this is of the visible defects! Explain it if she hid it under her headgear. It was stated: “A mole with hairs is a defect, whether it be large or small, whether it be on the body or on the face. Without a hair it is a defect on the face but not on the body. When has this been said? If it is small. But if it is large, it is a defect whether it be on the body or on the face. How big is large? Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, up to an Italic as.” Rebbi Eleazar bar Ḥanina said, for example such a Gordianic denar his measure is half an ubiquitous gold piece. Rebbi Radifa, Rebbi Jonah: Rebbi Jeremiah asked: A bald woman with a row of hair going from one ear to the other? They wanted to understand it from the following: “They added to them for women mouth odor, sweat odor, and a hairless mole.” They did not mention baldness. They wanted to conclude that it is not a defect. There came Rebbi Samuel the son of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun: Rebbi Nasa said, it is a defect. It is listed only if it is ugly for both sexes. But something which is beautiful in one sex but ugly in the other, like a bald pate, even though it is a defect it was not listed. You should know that this is so because a beard is beautiful for a man and a defect for a woman, and we did not state: In addition, for a woman a beard. There are breasts which are beautyiful for a woman and a defect for men, and we did not state: In addtion, for a man women’s breasts.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody died and left a wife,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, the weakest in his claim. For example, one lent before witnesses, the other lent on a mortgage document; it should be given to the one who lent before witnesses. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the weakest in his body. Think about it, if he is rich, like those of the family Andreas. Rebbi Aḥa said, the weakest in his body and poor. As the following: They gave to a relative of Rebbi Samuel bar Abba as the weakest. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish brought slaves of Rebbi Jehuda the Prince and took it away from her. Rebbi Joḥanan was leaning on Rebbi Simeon bar Abba and said, what was done with that poor woman? He said to him, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish brought slaves of Rebbi Jehuda the Prince and took it away from her. Was he justified in doing this? Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should we say that Rebbi Joḥanan follows his doctrine and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish his own? Since they disagree: Everybody agrees that if they err in arguments, one does not reverse. In the words of the Torah, one reverses. Where do they disagree? If one errs in a Mishnah, for Rebbi Joḥanan says, an error in Mishnah is like an error in arguments, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, an error in Mishnah is like an error in words of the Torah. What is said of the Mishnah is also said of words of the Elders.

MISHNAH: If he left produce taken from the ground, the one who takes them first acquires them. If the widow acquired more than her ketubah sum, or the creditor more than his claim, the remainder, Rebbi Ṭarphon says, should be given to the weakest among them. Rebbi Aqiba says, one does not show mercy in law! But it should be given to the heirs since all others have to swear, only the heirs do not have to swear.

HALAKHAH: “If the estate contained expected property,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, they disagree about the basic claim of the two ketubot. Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. But for the excess denar everybody agrees that it is movable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everybody agrees about the basic claim of the two ketubot that it must be real estate. Where do they disagree? About the excess denar, where Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rav: But in Syria they routinely collect from bronze and bedspreads. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only from bedspreads of that night. Rav Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The people in Arabia routinely collect from camels and spices. Similarly, only from spices of that night? Rebbi Ḥuna’s widow collected from movables following her place’s custom.

HALAKHAH: “If the estate contained expected property,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, they disagree about the basic claim of the two ketubot. Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. But for the excess denar everybody agrees that it is movable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everybody agrees about the basic claim of the two ketubot that it must be real estate. Where do they disagree? About the excess denar, where Rebbi Simeon says, real estate, but the rabbis say, movables. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda in the name of Rav: But in Syria they routinely collect from bronze and bedspreads. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Only from bedspreads of that night. Rav Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The people in Arabia routinely collect from camels and spices. Similarly, only from spices of that night? Rebbi Ḥuna’s widow collected from movables following her place’s custom.

MISHNAH: If somebody was married to three women when he died, the ketubah of one was a mina, of the other one 200, and of the other one 300. If the estate is only 100, they divide equally. If it was 200, the one who claims a mina takes 50, and those who claim 200 and 300 each take three gold denars. If it was 300, the one who claims a mina takes 50, the one who claims 200 takes a mina, and the one who claims 300 takes six gold denars. Similarly, if three who invested together lost or gained they would split in this manner.

MISHNAH: A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage, may sell without court supervision. Rebbi Simeon says, after definitive marriage she may sell without court supervision; after preliminary marriage, she may sell only under court supervision since she has no sustenance and any person who has no claim to sustenance may sell only under court supervision.

Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: The one who renounced her ketubah in favor of the orphans is sustained by them. This is difficult. If there were a woman without ketubah, does she not have claim to sustenance? A woman without ketubah has claim to sustenance. But here is it not enough that she renounced her ketubah in favor of the orphans, that you want to cheat her of her sustenance?

Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: The one who renounced her ketubah in favor of the orphans is sustained by them. This is difficult. If there were a woman without ketubah, does she not have claim to sustenance? A woman without ketubah has claim to sustenance. But here is it not enough that she renounced her ketubah in favor of the orphans, that you want to cheat her of her sustenance?

Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If she requested her ketubah in court, she lost her claim to sustenance. Rebbi Yose said, but only from a clear mind; not if forced. As in the case of the widow of Rebbi Eudaimon from Mozva to whom they said, Rebbi Abba bar Cohen wants you. She requested her ketubah and lost her sustenance. After the matter became known, it was brought before Rebbi Yose and she returned to her sustenance.

MISHNAH: Neither the orphan, nor the secondarily prohibited, nor the she-ram may claim ketubah, or usufruct, or sustenance, or depreciation. But if he married her from the start as a she-ram, she has claim to her ketubah. A widow [married] to the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or Gibeonite girl to an Israel, an Israel girl married to a bastard or Gibeonite, have claim to ketubah.