claim

MISHNAH: Neither the orphan, nor the secondarily prohibited, nor the she-ram may claim ketubah, or usufruct, or sustenance, or depreciation. But if he married her from the start as a she-ram, she has claim to her ketubah. A widow [married] to the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or Gibeonite girl to an Israel, an Israel girl married to a bastard or Gibeonite, have claim to ketubah.

MISHNAH: Neither the orphan, nor the secondarily prohibited, nor the she-ram may claim ketubah, or usufruct, or sustenance, or depreciation. But if he married her from the start as a she-ram, she has claim to her ketubah. A widow [married] to the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or Gibeonite girl to an Israel, an Israel girl married to a bastard or Gibeonite, have claim to ketubah.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said that Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila say that they differ about sustenance. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may demand sustenance. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, one says to him, divorce her! And you say so? They wanted to say, for him who says they differ about the conditions attached to a ketubah, Rebbi Joḥanan said, she has the ketubah stipulations. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, everybody agrees that she cannot claim support since they even punished her heirs, so much more herself. But for him who says that they differ about sustenance, it follows that they do not differ about the stipulations of a ketubah. They fined her, but did not fine her heirs.

HALAKHAH: “All the time she lives in her father’s house,” etc. For the good she received; her properties became delivered during her husband’s lifetime and after 25 years she gave up the claim to her ketubah. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi La: One understands for a woman who has no ketubah. But should a woman who has a ketubah not be able to collect forever? He answered him, it tells you more: Even a woman who has a ketubah collects only up to 25 years. The statement of Rebbi Eleazar says, the creditor collects forever. He said only, “the creditor”; but a woman can collect only up to years. Rebbi Abin said, this is reasonable only for a woman who is not being supported. But for a woman who is being supported, I say that she did not claim it because of her support.

HALAKHAH: “All the time she lives in her father’s house,” etc. For the good she received; her properties became delivered during her husband’s lifetime and after 25 years she gave up the claim to her ketubah. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi La: One understands for a woman who has no ketubah. But should a woman who has a ketubah not be able to collect forever? He answered him, it tells you more: Even a woman who has a ketubah collects only up to 25 years. The statement of Rebbi Eleazar says, the creditor collects forever. He said only, “the creditor”; but a woman can collect only up to years. Rebbi Abin said, this is reasonable only for a woman who is not being supported. But for a woman who is being supported, I say that she did not claim it because of her support.

Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One stated this only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects forever. Rebbi Abbahu quoted in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she can collect only up to 25 years. This disagreement parallels the following disagreement, as was stated there: “Torts are estimated from choice land, creditor’s claims from average, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable.” Rebbi Jeremiah said to him, this was stated only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz], but a ketubah of 1’000 denar is evaluated in terms of average quality land. But Rebbi Yose said, even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects only from the least valuable land. It turns out that Rebbi Yose follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Jeremiah Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. As we have stated there: “If somebody signs over his property to his sons and signs over some real estate to his wife, she lost her claim to ketubah.” Rav said, if he lets them acquire through her. Samuel says, if he distributes in her presence. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, they stated here a relaxation of the laws of ketubah. Rebbi Abba said, the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina is that it applies not only to a ketubah of a mina or two hundred, but even regarding a ketubah of one thousand denar they proclaimed a relaxation of the laws of ketubah.

As you say, after deduction for her ketubah, after deduction of burial costs, after deduction of loans by witnesses or by contract. After deduction for daughters’ dowries? For him who says, one forecloses from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are privileged. For him who says, one does not foreclose from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are not privileged. Let us hear from the following: The widow and the sons are of equal rank. The widow and the daughters are of equal rank. The widow does not push the sons aside and the widow does not push the daughters aside. How is that? If there was enough for 12 months sustenance and a widow to sustain. That explains that sometimes the widow pushes out the sons by means of the daughters. Just as she pushes out the sons by means of the daughters, should she not push them out by means of the sons? She might claim her ketubah and lose her right to sustenance.

MISHNAH: If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil, and the defendant admits [that he owes him] vessels, Admon says, since he admitted part of the claim he is made to swear, but the Sages say, what he admitted was not of the kind that was claimed. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement,

Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free. And why did we state: “Rabban Gamliel obligates him”? This comes to tell you the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he obligates people. Rebbi Abbahu [supported] that of Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, the Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is obligated. Rav followed Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went with another to court before Rav. He started claiming from him barley, wheat and spelt. Rav told him, charge him with anything you have to charge, and in the end he will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free, did we not state “if he sued him for vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? If he is obligated for vessels about vessels, not so much more vessels for real estate? What does he do with it? He explains it, to transfer an oath to him. But did we not state: If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil, and the defendant admits [that he owes him] vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for oil and he admitted vessels, everybody agrees that what he admitted does not refer to the claim, for Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna said in the name of Rav: The Mishnah deals with the case that he sued for vessels full of oil; the ones are full, the others empty. One understands vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abun formulates it as oil bucket. Can one not ask him in the end? If he lost his speech.

Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free. And why did we state: “Rabban Gamliel obligates him”? This comes to tell you the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he obligates people. Rebbi Abbahu [supported] that of Rebbi Immi. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish says, the Mishnah, if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is obligated. Rav followed Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went with another to court before Rav. He started claiming from him barley, wheat and spelt. Rav told him, charge him with anything you have to charge, and in the end he will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to everybody he is free, did we not state “if he sued him for vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? If he is obligated for vessels about vessels, not so much more vessels for real estate? What does he do with it? He explains it, to transfer an oath to him. But did we not state: If somebody sues another for amphoras of oil, and the defendant admits [that he owes him] vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for oil and he admitted vessels, everybody agrees that what he admitted does not refer to the claim, for Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Abuna said in the name of Rav: The Mishnah deals with the case that he sued for vessels full of oil; the ones are full, the others empty. One understands vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abun formulates it as oil bucket. Can one not ask him in the end? If he lost his speech.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.

MISHNAH: If a person is by a vow prevented to benefit his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband shall have no claim to them, except what you trade for your needs.

HALAKHAH: “For tort victims one estimates with best quality land,” etc. “By an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.” Rebbi Abba bar Pappaios said before Rebbi Yose, where do we hold? If to qualify as damages, is that not what we stated “his neighbor’s ox” but not the ox of Temple property? If for bodily damages, is that not what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: A private person can claim damages but not the Temple? But we must deal with one who said, I obligate myself to give 100 minas to the Temple, when his ox went and did damage. You should not say, [the Temple] is a creditor and should collect from average quality land. Therefore, it was necessary to say that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land, by an inference de minore ad maius, for Temple property.”

Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “Full and partial damages are collected from encumbered property.” One understands full damages. Are partial damages not collected from the animal’s body? Rebbi Yose said, explain it when it was a docile ox which did damage and then his owner went and sold it. Its body already was encumbered to the injured party. The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it if he converted it into a loan. Then it should be foreclosed only by average quality land! Since the debt originated in a damage claim, he may collect from best quality.

“His field,” except movables. “His vineyard,” except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession. “ ‘His field,’ except movables.” About those who did not claim movables from the start. Is this different from what we stated: There is not only real estate; from where if he wanted to pay money? The verse says: “Money he shall return to its owner.” What did you mean to say that real estate is primary? Or should we say that money is primary? Then it should be irrevocably given to [the claimant] from the start! Do we not see rabbis who irrevocably give him real estate! “ ‘His vineyard,’ except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.” Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Nisa: If his father dug a cistern which caused injury during his father’s lifetime. Property fell to him after his father’s death. I might say that this property should be encumbered for that damage; therefore, it was necessary to say “his vineyard” to except potential property which is not similar in status to that in possession.

“For a woman’s ketubah with lowest quality.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, they taught only for a ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz], but a ketubah of a thousand denar she collects from average quality. Rebbi Yose said, even a ketubah of a thousand denar she collects only from lowest quality. It turns out that this disagreement parallels the following disagreement: “While she lives in her father’s house, she always can collect her ketubah; if she lives in her husband’s house, she can collect her ketubah for 25 years.” Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: One stated this only for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But a ketubah of 1’000 denar she collects forever. Rebbi Abbahu quoted in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even a ketubah of 1’000 denar she can collect only up to 25 years. It turns out that Rebbi Yose follows Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Jeremiah Rebbi Joshua ben Levi. As we have stated there: “If somebody signs over his property to his sons and signs over some real estate to his wife, she loses her claim to ketubah.” Rav said, if he sells through her. Samuel says, if he distributes in her presence. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, they stated here a relaxation of the laws of ketubah. Rebbi Abba said, the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina is that it applies not only to a ketubah of a mina or two hundred, but even regarding a ketubah of one thousand denar they proclaimed a relaxation of the laws of ketubah.

For what? Rebbi Eleazar said, to inherit from her, as we have stated there: “He has a claim on what she finds and on her earnings, to dissolve her vows.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is what is implied by “she is a married woman in all respects.”

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A anddefinitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, maybe in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A anddefinitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, maybe in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.

MISHNAH: If he wrote in the name of an inappropriate government, in the name of the government of Media or the government of Greece, from the construction of the Temple or the destruction of the Temple; if he was in the West and wrote “in the East” or in the East and wrote “in the West”, she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah. If they died, the brothers of both of them perform ḥaliṣah but not levirate. If he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city she shall be divorced from both of them and all the indicated consequences apply to her. Referring to all the close relatives about whom they said that their co-wives are permitted, if any of the co-wives went and married otherwise but the relatives turned out to be she-rams, she shall be divorced from both of them and all the aforementioned consequences apply to her.

It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents can be collected only from unincumbered property, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. [But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect. Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed,] he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership. Rebbi Abina said, because it is invalid And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abin asked, so far, if the old man took the loan [and the old man mortgaged. But if the old man took the loan and the son mortgaged,] can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun asked, was it not stated: The same holds for bills of divorce? Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid.

There, we have stated: “A judicial oath, for a claim of two silver pieces and a judicial acknowlegdment of a peruṭah. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolus, but the House of Hillel say, two obols.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolus. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say, “money” is a peruṭah, but here, they say that “money” is two obols. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The house of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said: “She leaves gratis, without silver.” Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, “without silver”? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolus and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left, and at the end of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolus, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

There, we have stated: “A judicial oath, for a claim of two silver pieces and a judicial acknowlegdment of a peruṭah. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolus, but the House of Hillel say, two obols.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolus. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say, “money” is a peruṭah, but here, they say that “money” is two obols. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The house of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said: “She leaves gratis, without silver.” Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, “without silver”? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolus and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left, and at the end of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolus, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. It is written: “If a person give to his neighbor money or vessels to watch over.” If to teach that the court will not act on less that a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written: “To incur liability for it”? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. (Why does the verse say, “without silver”?) From there, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two obols. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? “Or vessels”; since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret “or vessels”? As we have stated: Rebbi Nathan says, “or vessels”, to include all kinds of vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is guilty. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two perutot, that the claim should be about a perutah’s worth and the confession about a perutah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two obols, also “vessels” means two oboli’s worth.

“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.

If he picked up a find and said, for the purpose that I own it rather than my master. Does he and his master own it automatically or does he own it but not his master? Let us hear from the following: “If a person is by a vow prevented from benefitting his son-in-law but wants to give money to his daughter, he says to her: These coins are given to you as a gift on condition that your husband have no claim to them, except what you put into your mouth.” It was stated: “Neither do you”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, who stated “neither do you”? Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of a slave the hand of his master. For a gift [we follow] Rebbi Meïr that the wife’s hand is her husband’s hand; for a find [do we follow] the rabbis? Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, is there not a difference, for he is as if he acquired by somebody else’s opinion? He said to him, is it not a case a fortiori? Since in her case, when she would acquire by somebody else’s opinion, you say that what a wife acquired, her husband acquired: here where he acquires by his own opinion, a fortiori what the slave acquired his master must acquire.

“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

“And all defects which disqualify a priest disqualify a woman. They added to them for women mouth odor, sweat odor, and a hairless mole.” Rebbi Ḥamai bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: They taught this about the skin of the face. But did we not state: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” Is this not of the visible defects? Explain it if she hid it under her headgear. It was stated: “A mole with hairs is a defect, whether it be large or small, whether it be on the body or on the face. Without a hair it is a defect on the face but not on the body. When has this been said? If it is small. But if it is large, it is a defect whether it be on the body or on the face. How big is large? Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, up to an Italic as.” Rebbi Eleazar bar Ḥanina said, for example such a Gordianic denar: its measure is half a ubiquitous gold piece. Rebbi Radifa, Rebbi Jonah: Rebbi Jeremiah asked: A bald woman with a row of hair going from one ear to the other? They wanted to understand it from the following: “They added to them for women mouth odor, sweat odor, and a hairless mole.” They did not mention baldness. They wanted to conclude that it is not a defect. There came Rebbi Samuel the son of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun: Rebbi Nasa said, it is a defect. It is listed only if it is ugly for both sexes. But something which is beautiful in one sex but ugly in the other, like a bald pate, even though it is a defect it was not listed. You should know that this is so because a beard is beautiful for a man and a defect for a woman, and we did not state: In addition, for a woman a beard. There are breasts which are beautiful for a woman and a defect for men, and we did not state: In addition, for a man women’s breasts.

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, sometime in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, sometime in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.

Rebbi Jehudah bar Sisin, Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazy in the name of Rebbi Aḥa. They formulated the symphōn according to Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the colleague of the rabbis, asked: Why does it have to follow Rebbi Meïr but not also the rabbis? Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” Why can he not say “on condition” but not double his stipulation? If he did not double his stipulation, could this eliminate the preliminary marriage? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, everywhere Rebbi Meïr holds that from “no” you infer “yes”, except here? Rebbi Mattaniah said, one is more restrictive in matters of incest and adultery.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody split [wood] in a private domain,” etc. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, if he was splitting wood in his courtyard when a worker entered to claim his wages, and a splinter ricocheted and damaged him, he is liable. If he died he does not go into exile. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “he is not liable”? They do not disagree. What Rebbi Yose said, if he had seen him, but what Rebbi Ḥiyya said, if he had not seen him. If he had not seen him, once he said to him: enter, {should he not be liable? But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “he is not liable”? Since he told him: enter, he has to take precautions. Some want to say, since he told him to enter it} becomes like the courtyard of partners, about which Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Partners acquire from one another in a courtyard and are mutually liable for damages. But did not Rav say: If he filled the entire public domain? And did this fill the entire public domain? They said, since he walks in the entire courtyard, it is as if he had filled the entire courtyard.

HALAKHAH: “A bull which gored four or five bulls,” etc. Rebbi Yannai said, Rebbi Meïr attacks him from two sides: As you take it, if it is yours, give it to me. If it is not yours, hand it over to me that I may satisfy my claim. But did not Rebbi Eleazar say, the guarding of damages parallels the guarding of acquisitions? Rebbi Jehudah told him, it was delivered to him for his damages but it remains a pledge.

Rebbi Abbahu asked: Why did we not state that double restitution is due if a claim of theft is made in a partnership, where quadruple or quintuple restitution does not apply?

MISHNAH: This is more severe regarding a human than an ox since a human pays damages and pays for unborn children, but the ox pays only damages and does not pay for unborn children. A person who hits his father or mother without causing a concussion or who causes injury on the Day of Atonement is liable for everything. He who injures a Hebrew slave is liable for everything except for lost earnings if he is his own. He who injures another person’s Canaanite slave is liable for everything. Rebbi Jehudah says, slaves have no claim for embarrassment.

MISHNAH: If a person appropriates a deposit, the House of Shammai say, he shall be hit by less or more, but the House of Hillel say, [at the price] at the time of delivery; Rebbi Aqiba says, at the time of claim. If somebody intends to take the deposit, the House of Shammai hold him liable but the House of Hillel say, he is liable only from the moment he takes it. How is this? If he tilted the amphora and took a quartarius, and then it broke, he pays only for a quartarius. If he lifted it and took a quartarius, and then it broke, he pays for all.

HALAKHAH: “If a person appropriates a deposit,” etc. So is the Mishnah: At the time of claim in court. Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Aqiba. Even though the House of Hillel disagree with him? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: It happened that there was a case and Rebbi instructed following Rebbi Aqiba. Rav Hoshaia said, if there are no witnesses. But if there are witnesses, everybody agrees with Rebbi Aqiba’s position. There came a case before Rebbi Nasa and he instructed following Rebbi Aqiba.

MISHNAH: Cheating is four obols per tetradrachma of 24 obols, one sixth of the sale price. Until when may one return [the merchandise]? Until one can show it to a trader or a relative. Rebbi Tarphon instructed in Lydda that cheating is eight obols per tetradrachma, a third of the sale price, and the traders of Lydda were rejoicing. He told them, one may return [the merchandise] the entire day; they said, let Rebbi Tarphon keep our place quiet; they returned to the words of the Sages. Just as a private person can be cheated, so a trader can be cheated. Rebbi Jehudah says, a trader has no claim of being cheated. The person overcharged has the advantage; if he so desires, he says, give me my money back, or give me back by what you overcharged me.

MISHNAH: How much time does one have to return it? In walled cities until one can show it to a banker, in villages until Sabbath eve. If he recognizes it, he should take it back even after twelve months, but he has only a complaint against him. He may use it for Second Tithe without hesitation since it is only miserly’. Cheating is by four oboli, claim is about two oboli, confession is about one peruṭah. There are five peruṭot: Confession is about one peruṭah; a woman is preliminarily married by one peruṭah’s worth; one who used one peruṭah’s worth of Temple property committed larceny; one who finds one peruṭah’ s worth has to make it public; one who robbed another of one peruṭah’s worth and swore about it, has to return it to him even in Media. There are five fifths: He who eats heave, or heave of the tithe, or heave of the tithe of demay, or ḥallah, or first fruits, adds a fifth. He who redeems his vineyard in the fourth year or his Second Tithe, adds a fifth. He who redeems his own gifts to the Temple, adds a fifth. He who used one peruṭah’s worth of Temple property, adds a fifth. He who robbed another of one peruṭah’s worth and swore about it, adds a fifth.

MISHNAH: One who hires workers and tells them to start early and work late, at a place where it is not customary to start early or work late cannot force them to do so. At a place where it is customary to feed them, he has to feed them; to supply a snack, he has to supply it, always following local custom. It happened that Rebbi Joḥanan ben Matthew said to his son, go and hire workers for us. He awarded them food, but when he returned to his father, the latter told him, even if you serve them Solomon’s meal in his time you did not fulfill your pledge since they are descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. But before they start work go and tell them: On condition that your only claim be for bread and legumes. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, that was unnecessary; one always follows local custom.

HALAKHAH: “One wolf is not an unavoidable accident,” etc. “The stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah,” etc. It was stated: “The stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah, monetary stipulations are valid, nonmonetary stipulations are invalid.” How is this? If one said to a woman: be preliminarily married to me on condition that you have no claim on me for sustenance, clothing, and marital relations, she is preliminarily married [and his stipulation is valid. “On condition] that it I die you shall not be obligated for levirate marriage, she is preliminarily married but his stipulation is invalid.”

HALAKHAH: “He who leases a dwelling to another person,” etc. Why? If he came to claim at the end of the month, can he collect everything? And if he came to him at the beginning of the month, he can tell him, get out. Samuel says, the Mishnah is so: If he came to claim in the middle of the month. Rav said, a rule to collect. Rebbi La said, this clearly does not follow the rule of Ben Nannas who said, the later language supersedes the earlier one.

HALAKHAH: “He who leases a dwelling to another person,” etc. Why? If he came to claim at the end of the month, can he collect everything? And if he came to him at the beginning of the month, he can tell him, get out. Samuel says, the Mishnah is so: If he came to claim in the middle of the month. Rav said, a rule to collect. Rebbi La said, this clearly does not follow the rule of Ben Nannas who said, the later language supersedes the earlier one.

MISHNAH: Wages of a human, as well as wages for an animal, as well as wages for implements are subsumed under “you must pay his wages on his day” and “one may not withhold a hireling’s wages until the morning”. When? If he claimed it. If he did not claim it, one does not transgress. If one gave him a draft on a storekeeper or a banker, he does not transgress. In his time the hireling swears and takes; after his time he does not swear and take. But if there are witnesses that he did claim, he swears and takes. The resident proselyte is protected by “you must pay his wages on his day” but not by “one may not withhold a hireling’s wages until the morning”.

MISHNAH: Wages of a human, as well as wages for an animal, as well as wages for implements are subsumed under “you must pay his wages on his day” and “one may not withhold a hireling’s wages until the morning”. When? If he claimed it. If he did not claim it, one does not transgress. If one gave him a draft on a storekeeper or a banker, he does not transgress. In his time the hireling swears and takes; after his time he does not swear and take. But if there are witnesses that he did claim, he swears and takes. The resident proselyte is protected by “you must pay his wages on his day” but not by “one may not withhold a hireling’s wages until the morning”.

It was stated: I could think that if one gave him a draft on a storekeeper or a banker, he would transgress about him. He does not transgress about him but they transgress about him. When? If he claimed it. If he did not claim it, one does not transgress.

HALAKHAH: “A person should not put,” etc. It was stated: Nor a smithy. Rav Qarna stated: If he was like a metal worker, or it was built originally as a smithy, it is permitted. How is it in front of his dwelling? Rebbi Aḥa said, certainly not in front of his dwelling. Rebbi Jonathan said, a person causing damage has no claim of undisturbed posession. Rebbi Joshua said, the rabbis object to permanent smoke. As the following: A woman was burning sand below [the apartment of] Rebbi Ilfay. He wanted to object to her. The case came before Rebbi Nasa who said, they said it only about continuous smoke.

MISHNAH: Confirmation of claim of undisturbed possession of houses, cisterns, ditches, and caverns, and bath houses, and dove-cotes, oil presses, irrigated land, and slaves, and everything which yields continuously is three years from day to day. The claim of undisturbed possession of an unirrigated field is three years, but not from day to day.

MISHNAH: Confirmation of claim of undisturbed possession of houses, cisterns, ditches, and caverns, and bath houses, and dove-cotes, oil presses, irrigated land, and slaves, and everything which yields continuously is three years from day to day. The claim of undisturbed possession of an unirrigated field is three years, but not from day to day.

HALAKHAH: “The claim of undisturbed possession of houses, cisterns, ditches, and caverns,” etc. From where confirmation of claims of undisturbed possession? Rebbi Joḥanan said, we heard from those who went to Usha that they learned it from the notorious bull. Rebbi Yose said, who holds that a bull becomes notorious after three days? Not Rebbi Jehudah? As we stated there: “Rebbi Jehudah said, they said three years only for the case that if he is in Spain, he should be in possession for one year; they went and told him during one year, and he returns within one year.”

Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If someboldy is selling a house to another, when he delivered the key [the buyer] took possession. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody is selling a house to another, when [the buyer] stored produce there, he took possession. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, only produce usually stored. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If somebody is selling a cistern to another, when he handed over its pails [the buyer] took possession. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If somebody sold a flock to another person, when [the seller] delivered the maškokît, [the buyer] took possession. What is maškokît? Some say, the shepherd’s staff. But some say, a pandura. And some say, the bell-wether. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Bar Qappara: If somebody is selling a burial chamber to another, when that one buried there one dead it is confirmation of claim for the entire chamber. When he buried three dead in three chambers, it is confirmation of claim for the entire burial cavern.

Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If someboldy is selling a house to another, when he delivered the key [the buyer] took possession. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody is selling a house to another, when [the buyer] stored produce there, he took possession. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, only produce usually stored. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If somebody is selling a cistern to another, when he handed over its pails [the buyer] took possession. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If somebody sold a flock to another person, when [the seller] delivered the maškokît, [the buyer] took possession. What is maškokît? Some say, the shepherd’s staff. But some say, a pandura. And some say, the bell-wether. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Bar Qappara: If somebody is selling a burial chamber to another, when that one buried there one dead it is confirmation of claim for the entire chamber. When he buried three dead in three chambers, it is confirmation of claim for the entire burial cavern.

Rav said, there can be no claim of undisturbed possession from a fugitive, nor one made from one country to another. Samuel said, there can be a claim of undisturbed possession from a fugitive, and a claim of undisturbed possession made from one country to another. Rav Naḥman bar Rav Isaac said, a verse supports what Samuel said: “The king gave her an adjutant,” etc.

Rav said, there can be no claim of undisturbed possession from a fugitive, nor one made from one country to another. Samuel said, there can be a claim of undisturbed possession from a fugitive, and a claim of undisturbed possession made from one country to another. Rav Naḥman bar Rav Isaac said, a verse supports what Samuel said: “The king gave her an adjutant,” etc.

Rav said, there can be no claim of undisturbed possession from a fugitive, nor one made from one country to another. Samuel said, there can be a claim of undisturbed possession from a fugitive, and a claim of undisturbed possession made from one country to another. Rav Naḥman bar Rav Isaac said, a verse supports what Samuel said: “The king gave her an adjutant,” etc.

Rebbi Eleazar said: Even two אבטיניות, e. g., שלומי and נבירו separated by the Jordan and a person may see another taking possession of the field, his property, there is no creation of a claim of undisturbed possession unless he was in the same locality, in the same province.

Rav said, the main confirmation of a claim of possession is storing the produce. Does Rav not agree about weeding and turning the soil? Rav agrees about weeding and turning the soil. What does it mean that Rav said, the main indication of a claim of possession is storing the produce? That if they saw him ploughing, and harvesting, and binding into sheaves, and threshing, and grading, but did not see him storing the produce, there is no claim of possession without storing the produce.

Rav said, the main confirmation of a claim of possession is storing the produce. Does Rav not agree about weeding and turning the soil? Rav agrees about weeding and turning the soil. What does it mean that Rav said, the main indication of a claim of possession is storing the produce? That if they saw him ploughing, and harvesting, and binding into sheaves, and threshing, and grading, but did not see him storing the produce, there is no claim of possession without storing the produce.

Rav said, the main confirmation of a claim of possession is storing the produce. Does Rav not agree about weeding and turning the soil? Rav agrees about weeding and turning the soil. What does it mean that Rav said, the main indication of a claim of possession is storing the produce? That if they saw him ploughing, and harvesting, and binding into sheaves, and threshing, and grading, but did not see him storing the produce, there is no claim of possession without storing the produce.

Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked Rebbi Joḥanan: Must a protest be filed before a court? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: a protest does not have to be filed before a court. But some say, Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked Rebbi Joḥanan’s student: Must a protest be filed before a court? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: a protest must be filed before a court. Samuel said, even if he protested against him in front of workers, it is a protest, but he has to protest in each one of the three years. Giddul ben Minyamin had a case; his judges were Ḥilqiah bar Tobi, Rav Huna, and Ḥiyya bar Rav. Ḥiyya bar Rav told them, so said my father: Once he protested the first three years, he is not required to protest further. It was stated thus: “If he ate it as his own for six years, he protested against him the first three years; then he said, you sold it to me, you gave it to me as a gift, there is no claim of undisturbed possession. Because of an initial claim it would have been a claim of undisturbed possession since any claim of undisturbed possession not accompanied by a claim of legal ownership is not a claim of undisturbed possession.” Samuel said, if it is so, nothing would be left for the great people of the Land of Israel.

Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked Rebbi Joḥanan: Must a protest be filed before a court? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: a protest does not have to be filed before a court. But some say, Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked Rebbi Joḥanan’s student: Must a protest be filed before a court? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: a protest must be filed before a court. Samuel said, even if he protested against him in front of workers, it is a protest, but he has to protest in each one of the three years. Giddul ben Minyamin had a case; his judges were Ḥilqiah bar Tobi, Rav Huna, and Ḥiyya bar Rav. Ḥiyya bar Rav told them, so said my father: Once he protested the first three years, he is not required to protest further. It was stated thus: “If he ate it as his own for six years, he protested against him the first three years; then he said, you sold it to me, you gave it to me as a gift, there is no claim of undisturbed possession. Because of an initial claim it would have been a claim of undisturbed possession since any claim of undisturbed possession not accompanied by a claim of legal ownership is not a claim of undisturbed possession.” Samuel said, if it is so, nothing would be left for the great people of the Land of Israel.

Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked Rebbi Joḥanan: Must a protest be filed before a court? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: a protest does not have to be filed before a court. But some say, Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked Rebbi Joḥanan’s student: Must a protest be filed before a court? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: a protest must be filed before a court. Samuel said, even if he protested against him in front of workers, it is a protest, but he has to protest in each one of the three years. Giddul ben Minyamin had a case; his judges were Ḥilqiah bar Tobi, Rav Huna, and Ḥiyya bar Rav. Ḥiyya bar Rav told them, so said my father: Once he protested the first three years, he is not required to protest further. It was stated thus: “If he ate it as his own for six years, he protested against him the first three years; then he said, you sold it to me, you gave it to me as a gift, there is no claim of undisturbed possession. Because of an initial claim it would have been a claim of undisturbed possession since any claim of undisturbed possession not accompanied by a claim of legal ownership is not a claim of undisturbed possession.” Samuel said, if it is so, nothing would be left for the great people of the Land of Israel.

Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked Rebbi Joḥanan: Must a protest be filed before a court? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: a protest does not have to be filed before a court. But some say, Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked Rebbi Joḥanan’s student: Must a protest be filed before a court? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: a protest must be filed before a court. Samuel said, even if he protested against him in front of workers, it is a protest, but he has to protest in each one of the three years. Giddul ben Minyamin had a case; his judges were Ḥilqiah bar Tobi, Rav Huna, and Ḥiyya bar Rav. Ḥiyya bar Rav told them, so said my father: Once he protested the first three years, he is not required to protest further. It was stated thus: “If he ate it as his own for six years, he protested against him the first three years; then he said, you sold it to me, you gave it to me as a gift, there is no claim of undisturbed possession. Because of an initial claim it would have been a claim of undisturbed possession since any claim of undisturbed possession not accompanied by a claim of legal ownership is not a claim of undisturbed possession.” Samuel said, if it is so, nothing would be left for the great people of the Land of Israel.

Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked Rebbi Joḥanan: Must a protest be filed before a court? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: a protest does not have to be filed before a court. But some say, Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked Rebbi Joḥanan’s student: Must a protest be filed before a court? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: a protest must be filed before a court. Samuel said, even if he protested against him in front of workers, it is a protest, but he has to protest in each one of the three years. Giddul ben Minyamin had a case; his judges were Ḥilqiah bar Tobi, Rav Huna, and Ḥiyya bar Rav. Ḥiyya bar Rav told them, so said my father: Once he protested the first three years, he is not required to protest further. It was stated thus: “If he ate it as his own for six years, he protested against him the first three years; then he said, you sold it to me, you gave it to me as a gift, there is no claim of undisturbed possession. Because of an initial claim it would have been a claim of undisturbed possession since any claim of undisturbed possession not accompanied by a claim of legal ownership is not a claim of undisturbed possession.” Samuel said, if it is so, nothing would be left for the great people of the Land of Israel.

Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked Rebbi Joḥanan: Must a protest be filed before a court? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: a protest does not have to be filed before a court. But some say, Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina asked Rebbi Joḥanan’s student: Must a protest be filed before a court? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: a protest must be filed before a court. Samuel said, even if he protested against him in front of workers, it is a protest, but he has to protest in each one of the three years. Giddul ben Minyamin had a case; his judges were Ḥilqiah bar Tobi, Rav Huna, and Ḥiyya bar Rav. Ḥiyya bar Rav told them, so said my father: Once he protested the first three years, he is not required to protest further. It was stated thus: “If he ate it as his own for six years, he protested against him the first three years; then he said, you sold it to me, you gave it to me as a gift, there is no claim of undisturbed possession. Because of an initial claim it would have been a claim of undisturbed possession since any claim of undisturbed possession not accompanied by a claim of legal ownership is not a claim of undisturbed possession.” Samuel said, if it is so, nothing would be left for the great people of the Land of Israel.

MISHNAH: Any claim of undisturbed possession not accompanied by a claim of legal ownership is not a claim of undisturbed possession. How is this? He said to him, what are you doing on my property? Nobody ever said anything to me is not a claim of undisturbed possession. You sold it to me, you gave it to me as a gift, is a claim of undisturbed possession. A person entering because of inheritance does not need a claim.

MISHNAH: Any claim of undisturbed possession not accompanied by a claim of legal ownership is not a claim of undisturbed possession. How is this? He said to him, what are you doing on my property? Nobody ever said anything to me is not a claim of undisturbed possession. You sold it to me, you gave it to me as a gift, is a claim of undisturbed possession. A person entering because of inheritance does not need a claim.

MISHNAH: Any claim of undisturbed possession not accompanied by a claim of legal ownership is not a claim of undisturbed possession. How is this? He said to him, what are you doing on my property? Nobody ever said anything to me is not a claim of undisturbed possession. You sold it to me, you gave it to me as a gift, is a claim of undisturbed possession. A person entering because of inheritance does not need a claim.

MISHNAH: Any claim of undisturbed possession not accompanied by a claim of legal ownership is not a claim of undisturbed possession. How is this? He said to him, what are you doing on my property? Nobody ever said anything to me is not a claim of undisturbed possession. You sold it to me, you gave it to me as a gift, is a claim of undisturbed possession. A person entering because of inheritance does not need a claim.

MISHNAH: Any claim of undisturbed possession not accompanied by a claim of legal ownership is not a claim of undisturbed possession. How is this? He said to him, what are you doing on my property? Nobody ever said anything to me is not a claim of undisturbed possession. You sold it to me, you gave it to me as a gift, is a claim of undisturbed possession. A person entering because of inheritance does not need a claim.

MISHNAH: Any claim of undisturbed possession not accompanied by a claim of legal ownership is not a claim of undisturbed possession. How is this? He said to him, what are you doing on my property? Nobody ever said anything to me is not a claim of undisturbed possession. You sold it to me, you gave it to me as a gift, is a claim of undisturbed possession. A person entering because of inheritance does not need a claim.

HALAKHAH: “Any claim of undisturbed possession not accompanied by a claim of legal ownership,” etc. But it needs proof of undisturbed possession. There, we have stated: “Rebbi Joshua agrees that if somebody says to anothet, ‘this field’, etc.” As the following. Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands it over to Simeon. Reuben went and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to him. Rav said, when you gave it to him, you gave it on the basis of a court decree. From there on the burden of proof is on the claimant.

HALAKHAH: “Any claim of undisturbed possession not accompanied by a claim of legal ownership,” etc. But it needs proof of undisturbed possession. There, we have stated: “Rebbi Joshua agrees that if somebody says to anothet, ‘this field’, etc.” As the following. Reuben ate from a field claiming that it was his. Simeon brought witnesses that his father died in possession. One removes [the field] from Reuben and hands it over to Simeon. Reuben went and brought witnesses that [Simeon’s] father did not die in possession. Rebbi Naḥman ben Jacob said, I took it from Reuben, I am returning it to him. Rav said, when you gave it to him, you gave it on the basis of a court decree. From there on the burden of proof is on the claimant.

MISHNAH: Partners and sharecroppers have no claim of undisturbed possession. A husband has no claim of undisturbed possession in his wife’s property, nor a wife in her husband’s property, nor a father in his son’s property, nor the son in his father’s property. When has this been said? For one who claims undisturbed possession. But if one is given a gift, or brothers distributed the estate, one takes possession of a convert’s property, when he locked, fenced in, or made any breach that is a legal form of taking in possession.

MISHNAH: Partners and sharecroppers have no claim of undisturbed possession. A husband has no claim of undisturbed possession in his wife’s property, nor a wife in her husband’s property, nor a father in his son’s property, nor the son in his father’s property. When has this been said? For one who claims undisturbed possession. But if one is given a gift, or brothers distributed the estate, one takes possession of a convert’s property, when he locked, fenced in, or made any breach that is a legal form of taking in possession.

HALAKHAH: “Partners and sharecroppers,” etc. “A partner.” Samuel said, “partner” is not mentioned here. Does the partner not have a claim to undisturbed possession? Did not Samuel say that the partner who went and planted, planted with permission? When you say, the partner who went and planted, planted with permission, if he was there. When you say, the partner has no claim of undisturbed possession, if he was not there. What does he include in his stead? Artisans and robbers have no claim of undisturbed possession. “If somebody saw his slave at an artisan’s, or his garments at the washer’s, and told him, give me my slave, give me my garments, but he answered him, you gave him to me as a gift; you sold him to me; this is no claim of undisturbed possession. You told me to sell him; you instructed to give him to me as a gift, this is a claim of undisturbed possession.”

HALAKHAH: “Partners and sharecroppers,” etc. “A partner.” Samuel said, “partner” is not mentioned here. Does the partner not have a claim to undisturbed possession? Did not Samuel say that the partner who went and planted, planted with permission? When you say, the partner who went and planted, planted with permission, if he was there. When you say, the partner has no claim of undisturbed possession, if he was not there. What does he include in his stead? Artisans and robbers have no claim of undisturbed possession. “If somebody saw his slave at an artisan’s, or his garments at the washer’s, and told him, give me my slave, give me my garments, but he answered him, you gave him to me as a gift; you sold him to me; this is no claim of undisturbed possession. You told me to sell him; you instructed to give him to me as a gift, this is a claim of undisturbed possession.”

HALAKHAH: “Partners and sharecroppers,” etc. “A partner.” Samuel said, “partner” is not mentioned here. Does the partner not have a claim to undisturbed possession? Did not Samuel say that the partner who went and planted, planted with permission? When you say, the partner who went and planted, planted with permission, if he was there. When you say, the partner has no claim of undisturbed possession, if he was not there. What does he include in his stead? Artisans and robbers have no claim of undisturbed possession. “If somebody saw his slave at an artisan’s, or his garments at the washer’s, and told him, give me my slave, give me my garments, but he answered him, you gave him to me as a gift; you sold him to me; this is no claim of undisturbed possession. You told me to sell him; you instructed to give him to me as a gift, this is a claim of undisturbed possession.”

HALAKHAH: “Partners and sharecroppers,” etc. “A partner.” Samuel said, “partner” is not mentioned here. Does the partner not have a claim to undisturbed possession? Did not Samuel say that the partner who went and planted, planted with permission? When you say, the partner who went and planted, planted with permission, if he was there. When you say, the partner has no claim of undisturbed possession, if he was not there. What does he include in his stead? Artisans and robbers have no claim of undisturbed possession. “If somebody saw his slave at an artisan’s, or his garments at the washer’s, and told him, give me my slave, give me my garments, but he answered him, you gave him to me as a gift; you sold him to me; this is no claim of undisturbed possession. You told me to sell him; you instructed to give him to me as a gift, this is a claim of undisturbed possession.”

HALAKHAH: “Partners and sharecroppers,” etc. “A partner.” Samuel said, “partner” is not mentioned here. Does the partner not have a claim to undisturbed possession? Did not Samuel say that the partner who went and planted, planted with permission? When you say, the partner who went and planted, planted with permission, if he was there. When you say, the partner has no claim of undisturbed possession, if he was not there. What does he include in his stead? Artisans and robbers have no claim of undisturbed possession. “If somebody saw his slave at an artisan’s, or his garments at the washer’s, and told him, give me my slave, give me my garments, but he answered him, you gave him to me as a gift; you sold him to me; this is no claim of undisturbed possession. You told me to sell him; you instructed to give him to me as a gift, this is a claim of undisturbed possession.”

“Sharecroppers.” Rav Huna said, a permanent sharecropper, but a temporary sharecropper has a claim of undisturbed possession. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both teach that even a temporary sharecropper has no claim of undisturbed possession, for we may say that he is satisfied with him and let him have it. There, they say that a sharecropper has no claim of undisturbed possession but a sharecropper’s son has a claim of undisturbed possession; Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, neither a sharecropper nor a sharecropper’s son have a claim of undisturbed possession, for we may say that he was satisfied with his father and let the son have it. As Rebbi Joḥanan said, a sharecropper who engaged another sharecropper has no claim of undisturbed possession since it is common for sharecroppers to engage sub-sharecroppers.

“Sharecroppers.” Rav Huna said, a permanent sharecropper, but a temporary sharecropper has a claim of undisturbed possession. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both teach that even a temporary sharecropper has no claim of undisturbed possession, for we may say that he is satisfied with him and let him have it. There, they say that a sharecropper has no claim of undisturbed possession but a sharecropper’s son has a claim of undisturbed possession; Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, neither a sharecropper nor a sharecropper’s son have a claim of undisturbed possession, for we may say that he was satisfied with his father and let the son have it. As Rebbi Joḥanan said, a sharecropper who engaged another sharecropper has no claim of undisturbed possession since it is common for sharecroppers to engage sub-sharecroppers.

“Sharecroppers.” Rav Huna said, a permanent sharecropper, but a temporary sharecropper has a claim of undisturbed possession. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both teach that even a temporary sharecropper has no claim of undisturbed possession, for we may say that he is satisfied with him and let him have it. There, they say that a sharecropper has no claim of undisturbed possession but a sharecropper’s son has a claim of undisturbed possession; Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, neither a sharecropper nor a sharecropper’s son have a claim of undisturbed possession, for we may say that he was satisfied with his father and let the son have it. As Rebbi Joḥanan said, a sharecropper who engaged another sharecropper has no claim of undisturbed possession since it is common for sharecroppers to engage sub-sharecroppers.

“Sharecroppers.” Rav Huna said, a permanent sharecropper, but a temporary sharecropper has a claim of undisturbed possession. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both teach that even a temporary sharecropper has no claim of undisturbed possession, for we may say that he is satisfied with him and let him have it. There, they say that a sharecropper has no claim of undisturbed possession but a sharecropper’s son has a claim of undisturbed possession; Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, neither a sharecropper nor a sharecropper’s son have a claim of undisturbed possession, for we may say that he was satisfied with his father and let the son have it. As Rebbi Joḥanan said, a sharecropper who engaged another sharecropper has no claim of undisturbed possession since it is common for sharecroppers to engage sub-sharecroppers.

“Sharecroppers.” Rav Huna said, a permanent sharecropper, but a temporary sharecropper has a claim of undisturbed possession. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both teach that even a temporary sharecropper has no claim of undisturbed possession, for we may say that he is satisfied with him and let him have it. There, they say that a sharecropper has no claim of undisturbed possession but a sharecropper’s son has a claim of undisturbed possession; Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, neither a sharecropper nor a sharecropper’s son have a claim of undisturbed possession, for we may say that he was satisfied with his father and let the son have it. As Rebbi Joḥanan said, a sharecropper who engaged another sharecropper has no claim of undisturbed possession since it is common for sharecroppers to engage sub-sharecroppers.

“Sharecroppers.” Rav Huna said, a permanent sharecropper, but a temporary sharecropper has a claim of undisturbed possession. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both teach that even a temporary sharecropper has no claim of undisturbed possession, for we may say that he is satisfied with him and let him have it. There, they say that a sharecropper has no claim of undisturbed possession but a sharecropper’s son has a claim of undisturbed possession; Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, neither a sharecropper nor a sharecropper’s son have a claim of undisturbed possession, for we may say that he was satisfied with his father and let the son have it. As Rebbi Joḥanan said, a sharecropper who engaged another sharecropper has no claim of undisturbed possession since it is common for sharecroppers to engage sub-sharecroppers.

In truth, should a man supervising his wife’s properties have a claim of undisturbed possession, since usually husbands supervise their wife’s properties? “A husband has no claim of undisturbed possession in his wife’s property” during her lifetime. But after her death he has a claim of undisturbed possession. “Nor a wife in her husband’s property” during his lifetime. But after his death she has a claim of undisturbed possession. “Nor a son in the father’s property” during his lifetime. But after the father’s death he has a claim of undisturbed possession. “Nor the father in his son’s property” during his lifetime. But after the son’s death he has a claim of undisturbed possession.

In truth, should a man supervising his wife’s properties have a claim of undisturbed possession, since usually husbands supervise their wife’s properties? “A husband has no claim of undisturbed possession in his wife’s property” during her lifetime. But after her death he has a claim of undisturbed possession. “Nor a wife in her husband’s property” during his lifetime. But after his death she has a claim of undisturbed possession. “Nor a son in the father’s property” during his lifetime. But after the father’s death he has a claim of undisturbed possession. “Nor the father in his son’s property” during his lifetime. But after the son’s death he has a claim of undisturbed possession.

In truth, should a man supervising his wife’s properties have a claim of undisturbed possession, since usually husbands supervise their wife’s properties? “A husband has no claim of undisturbed possession in his wife’s property” during her lifetime. But after her death he has a claim of undisturbed possession. “Nor a wife in her husband’s property” during his lifetime. But after his death she has a claim of undisturbed possession. “Nor a son in the father’s property” during his lifetime. But after the father’s death he has a claim of undisturbed possession. “Nor the father in his son’s property” during his lifetime. But after the son’s death he has a claim of undisturbed possession.

In truth, should a man supervising his wife’s properties have a claim of undisturbed possession, since usually husbands supervise their wife’s properties? “A husband has no claim of undisturbed possession in his wife’s property” during her lifetime. But after her death he has a claim of undisturbed possession. “Nor a wife in her husband’s property” during his lifetime. But after his death she has a claim of undisturbed possession. “Nor a son in the father’s property” during his lifetime. But after the father’s death he has a claim of undisturbed possession. “Nor the father in his son’s property” during his lifetime. But after the son’s death he has a claim of undisturbed possession.

In truth, should a man supervising his wife’s properties have a claim of undisturbed possession, since usually husbands supervise their wife’s properties? “A husband has no claim of undisturbed possession in his wife’s property” during her lifetime. But after her death he has a claim of undisturbed possession. “Nor a wife in her husband’s property” during his lifetime. But after his death she has a claim of undisturbed possession. “Nor a son in the father’s property” during his lifetime. But after the father’s death he has a claim of undisturbed possession. “Nor the father in his son’s property” during his lifetime. But after the son’s death he has a claim of undisturbed possession.

In truth, should a man supervising his wife’s properties have a claim of undisturbed possession, since usually husbands supervise their wife’s properties? “A husband has no claim of undisturbed possession in his wife’s property” during her lifetime. But after her death he has a claim of undisturbed possession. “Nor a wife in her husband’s property” during his lifetime. But after his death she has a claim of undisturbed possession. “Nor a son in the father’s property” during his lifetime. But after the father’s death he has a claim of undisturbed possession. “Nor the father in his son’s property” during his lifetime. But after the son’s death he has a claim of undisturbed possession.