divorce

HALAKHAH: “A slave disables because of intercourse,” etc. From where that the intercourse with a slave disables? Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “If a Cohen’s daughter becomes a widow or a divorcee without issue,” from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. Rebbi Jeremiah objected: But if a widow whored she has no widowhood or divorce and she returns! Rebbi Yose did not say so, but [he held] that the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is reversed. In Giṭṭin he says, why are Samaritans disqualified? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: Because if a Gentile or a slave has intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. In Qiddushin one says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Here he says it in his own name but there he says it in the name of Rebbi Ismael! For also according to the words of the Sages the child is a bastard. Rebbi Ḥizqiah did not say so, but: the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is reversed. In Giṭṭin he says, why are Samaritans disqualified? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: Because if a Gentile or slave has intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. In Qiddushin one says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Here he says, from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. Rebbi Mattaniah said, I went to Seḥora and heard: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Ismael the sons of Jesua: “If a Cohen’s daughter becomes a widow or a divorcee without issue,” from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. And I said, that is correct, there is no bastard, following Rebbi Joshua, for a bastard is only from a woman which is for him under an incest prohibition and for whom one is punished by divine extirpation.

HALAKHAH: “A slave disables because of intercourse,” etc. From where that the intercourse with a slave disables? Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “If a Cohen’s daughter becomes a widow or a divorcee without issue,” from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. Rebbi Jeremiah objected: But if a widow whored she has no widowhood or divorce and she returns! Rebbi Yose did not say so, but [he held] that the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is reversed. In Giṭṭin he says, why are Samaritans disqualified? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: Because if a Gentile or a slave has intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. In Qiddushin one says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Here he says it in his own name but there he says it in the name of Rebbi Ismael! For also according to the words of the Sages the child is a bastard. Rebbi Ḥizqiah did not say so, but: the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is reversed. In Giṭṭin he says, why are Samaritans disqualified? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: Because if a Gentile or slave has intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. In Qiddushin one says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Here he says, from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. Rebbi Mattaniah said, I went to Seḥora and heard: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Ismael the sons of Jesua: “If a Cohen’s daughter becomes a widow or a divorcee without issue,” from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. And I said, that is correct, there is no bastard, following Rebbi Joshua, for a bastard is only from a woman which is for him under an incest prohibition and for whom one is punished by divine extirpation.

HALAKHAH: “A slave disables because of intercourse,” etc. From where that the intercourse with a slave disables? Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “If a Cohen’s daughter becomes a widow or a divorcee without issue,” from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. Rebbi Jeremiah objected: But if a widow whored she has no widowhood or divorce and she returns! Rebbi Yose did not say so, but [he held] that the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is reversed. In Giṭṭin he says, why are Samaritans disqualified? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: Because if a Gentile or a slave has intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. In Qiddushin one says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Here he says it in his own name but there he says it in the name of Rebbi Ismael! For also according to the words of the Sages the child is a bastard. Rebbi Ḥizqiah did not say so, but: the argument of Rebbi Joḥanan is reversed. In Giṭṭin he says, why are Samaritans disqualified? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael: Because if a Gentile or slave has intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. In Qiddushin one says, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Here he says, from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. Rebbi Mattaniah said, I went to Seḥora and heard: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Ismael the sons of Jesua: “If a Cohen’s daughter becomes a widow or a divorcee without issue,” from [a man] with whom she has widowhood or divorce she returns, from [a man] with whom she has no relation of widowhood or divorce she does not return. And I said, that is correct, there is no bastard, following Rebbi Joshua, for a bastard is only from a woman which is for him under an incest prohibition and for whom one is punished by divine extirpation.

There, we have stated: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month’s child of the first [brother] or a seven-month’s of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for a possible sin.” It was stated: “The first son could be High Priest, any second son possibly is a bastard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob said, there is no such thing as a possible bastard.” Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees in cases of doubt of Samaritans and desecrated persons. This refers to what we have stated there: “Ten classes returned from Babylonia.” In the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, eight. In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, nine. In the opinion of the rabbis, ten.

MISHNAH: Secondary prohibitions instituted by the Sopherim. If she is secondarily prohibited to the husband but not to the levir, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. Secondarily prohibited to the levir but not to the husband, she is forbidden to the levir but permitted to the husband. Secondarily prohibited to both of them, she is forbidden to both of them. She may claim neither Ketubah nor usufruct nor upkeep nor wear but the child is qualified and one forces him to divorce her. A widow married to the High Priest, a divorcee of one that performed ḥalîṣah married to a simple priest, a female bastard or a Gibeoness married to an Israel, and Israel woman married to a Gibeonite or a bastard have a claim of Ketubah.

There, we have stated: “A forced bill of divorce is valid in Israel; it is invalid from Gentiles.” Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. And Samuel said, publicize in your towns: It is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him, up to 30 days he shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay Ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?

There, we have stated: “A forced bill of divorce is valid in Israel; it is invalid from Gentiles.” Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. And Samuel said, publicize in your towns: It is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him, up to 30 days he shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay Ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?

There, we have stated: “A forced bill of divorce is valid in Israel; it is invalid from Gentiles.” Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. And Samuel said, publicize in your towns: It is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him, up to 30 days he shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay Ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said that Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila say that they differ about upkeep. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may demand upkeep. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, one says to [him], divorce her! And you say so? They wanted to say so, they differ about the conditions attached to a Ketubah. Everybody agrees that she cannot claim support since they even punished her heirs, so much more herself. But for him who says that they differ about upkeep it follows that they do not differ about the conditions attached to a Ketubah. They fined her but not her heirs.

MISHNAH: A woman’s husband went overseas and some persons came and told her, your husband died. If she remarried and then the husband returned, she has to leave both husbands, she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah. If they died, the brothers of both of them perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

HALAKHAH: “A woman’s husband went overseas,” etc. As you say there, “these women one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have a child one returns them at once.” Should one not say the same here? There is a difference, since there others deceived them. Did here not also others deceive them? They instituted a fine so that she should investigate carefully. Then they should fine her with respect to the second [husband] but not with respect to the first! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Then she should not need a bill of divorce from him! There is a difference since she was married to him in a lawful manner. Samuel said, I say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did we not state: “If they said to her, your husband has died, she was betrothed and then her husband came, she is permitted to return to him.” If you say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas; should she not be forbidden to return to him? But it must follow Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, as Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, from betrothal it is permitted. Did Rebbi Yose ben Kipper not agree that if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce that she was not disabled from priesthood? As we have stated, “even if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce, she was not disabled from priesthood.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Hila: In order to make clear the prohibition of the first.

HALAKHAH: “A woman’s husband went overseas,” etc. As you say there, “these women one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have a child one returns them at once.” Should one not say the same here? There is a difference, since there others deceived them. Did here not also others deceive them? They instituted a fine so that she should investigate carefully. Then they should fine her with respect to the second [husband] but not with respect to the first! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Then she should not need a bill of divorce from him! There is a difference since she was married to him in a lawful manner. Samuel said, I say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did we not state: “If they said to her, your husband has died, she was betrothed and then her husband came, she is permitted to return to him.” If you say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas; should she not be forbidden to return to him? But it must follow Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, as Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, from betrothal it is permitted. Did Rebbi Yose ben Kipper not agree that if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce that she was not disabled from priesthood? As we have stated, “even if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce, she was not disabled from priesthood.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Hila: In order to make clear the prohibition of the first.

HALAKHAH: “A woman’s husband went overseas,” etc. As you say there, “these women one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have a child one returns them at once.” Should one not say the same here? There is a difference, since there others deceived them. Did here not also others deceive them? They instituted a fine so that she should investigate carefully. Then they should fine her with respect to the second [husband] but not with respect to the first! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Then she should not need a bill of divorce from him! There is a difference since she was married to him in a lawful manner. Samuel said, I say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did we not state: “If they said to her, your husband has died, she was betrothed and then her husband came, she is permitted to return to him.” If you say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas; should she not be forbidden to return to him? But it must follow Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, as Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, from betrothal it is permitted. Did Rebbi Yose ben Kipper not agree that if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce that she was not disabled from priesthood? As we have stated, “even if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce, she was not disabled from priesthood.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Hila: In order to make clear the prohibition of the first.

HALAKHAH: “A woman’s husband went overseas,” etc. As you say there, “these women one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have a child one returns them at once.” Should one not say the same here? There is a difference, since there others deceived them. Did here not also others deceive them? They instituted a fine so that she should investigate carefully. Then they should fine her with respect to the second [husband] but not with respect to the first! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Then she should not need a bill of divorce from him! There is a difference since she was married to him in a lawful manner. Samuel said, I say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did we not state: “If they said to her, your husband has died, she was betrothed and then her husband came, she is permitted to return to him.” If you say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas; should she not be forbidden to return to him? But it must follow Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, as Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, from betrothal it is permitted. Did Rebbi Yose ben Kipper not agree that if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce that she was not disabled from priesthood? As we have stated, “even if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce, she was not disabled from priesthood.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Hila: In order to make clear the prohibition of the first.

HALAKHAH: “A woman’s husband went overseas,” etc. As you say there, “these women one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have a child one returns them at once.” Should one not say the same here? There is a difference, since there others deceived them. Did here not also others deceive them? They instituted a fine so that she should investigate carefully. Then they should fine her with respect to the second [husband] but not with respect to the first! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Then she should not need a bill of divorce from him! There is a difference since she was married to him in a lawful manner. Samuel said, I say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did we not state: “If they said to her, your husband has died, she was betrothed and then her husband came, she is permitted to return to him.” If you say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas; should she not be forbidden to return to him? But it must follow Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, as Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, from betrothal it is permitted. Did Rebbi Yose ben Kipper not agree that if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce that she was not disabled from priesthood? As we have stated, “even if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce, she was not disabled from priesthood.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Hila: In order to make clear the prohibition of the first.

So far if she knows that she is a married woman. What if she did not know that she was a married woman? Let us hear from the following: An underage girl who was married off by her father. She was divorced and went and married on her own. About this Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife. Is there a difference? There, whether she knows or does not know, here also whether she knows or does not know.

“Any child from either of the men is a bastard.” One understands that the child is a bastard from the second [husband]. Is it a bastard from the first? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, this follows Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says if a man copulates with his wife whom he accuses of infidelity the child is a bastard, if a man takes back his divorcee after she had remarried the child is a bastard. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila, according to everybody the child is acceptable; the status of her bill of divorce is the status of her bastardy. What is the difference between them? If the second one gave her a bill of divorce and then the first one copulated with her. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the child is a bastard following Rebbi Aqiba; in the opinion of Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila, according to everybody the child is acceptable.

“Any child from either of the men is a bastard.” One understands that the child is a bastard from the second [husband]. Is it a bastard from the first? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, this follows Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says if a man copulates with his wife whom he accuses of infidelity the child is a bastard, if a man takes back his divorcee after she had remarried the child is a bastard. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila, according to everybody the child is acceptable; the status of her bill of divorce is the status of her bastardy. What is the difference between them? If the second one gave her a bill of divorce and then the first one copulated with her. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the child is a bastard following Rebbi Aqiba; in the opinion of Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila, according to everybody the child is acceptable.

Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.

Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two would say, X ate fat, and two would say, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not be married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

MISHNAH: If they told her, your husband died, and she remarried, and then they told her, he was alive but died, she must leave and the first child is a bastard, but the last is not a bastard. If they told her, your husband died; she was betrothed and after that her husband returned, she is permitted to return to him. Even though the second [husband] gave her a bill of divorce he did not disable her from priesthood. This Rebbi Eleazar ben Matthew explained, “a woman divorced from her husband,” and not a woman divorced from a non-husband.

“Rebbi Yose says, anything which disables,” etc. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: If his wife’s sister was married, since he disables her for others, he disables her for himself. But his wife’s unmarried sister which he does not disable for others, he does not disable for himself. As Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she needs a bill of divorce from him.

HALAKHAH: Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like a bill of divorce of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.

HALAKHAH: Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like a bill of divorce of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.

Do they disagree with Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Antigonos? From what Rebbi Joḥanan said, which is the underage girl that needs a bill of divorce? Anyone who is given her bill of divorce together with something else and she produces it after some time. This implies that they disagree with Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Antigonos.

Do they disagree with Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Antigonos? From what Rebbi Joḥanan said, which is the underage girl that needs a bill of divorce? Anyone who is given her bill of divorce together with something else and she produces it after some time. This implies that they disagree with Rebbi Ḥananiah ben Antigonos.

Rebbi Eliezer says, the actions of an underage girl have no legal standing. He has no right to what she finds or earns, nor may he dissolve her vows; she is as if not his wife in any respect except that she needs repudiation from him. Rebbi Joshua said, he owns what she finds or earns, he may he dissolve her vows; she is his wife in all respects except that she needs a bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Ismael said, I looked around at all logical systems of Sages and did not find anybody who was consistent in the matter of an underage girl except Rebbi Eliezer, only that he requires repudiation from him.

According to Rebbi Eliezer, may she repudiate him and collect a fine from him? According to Rebbi Joshua, may she repudiate him and collect a fine from another man? May she repudiate this one and invalidate her bill of divorce, a desecrated or a bastard? Rebbi Isaac asked, may she repudiate and return to her father’s food? It is obvious that she does not return to her husband’s food since he writes for her: “You shall live in my house and be fed from my property,” and she is not in his house. Therefore, the only question is, may she repudiate and return to her father’s food?

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob said,” etc. It was stated: “Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob said, every impediment that comes from the man by a bill of divorce makes her as if she were his wife; every impediment that does not come from the man by repudiation makes her as if she were not his wife.”

MISHNAH: If [a girl] repudiates a man, he is permitted [to marry] her relatives and she is permitted [to marry] his relatives; he did not disable her for the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce, he is forbidden [to marry] her relatives and she is forbidden [to marry] his relatives; he did disable her for the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce and later took her back, then she repudiated him and married another man from whom she became widowed or divorced, she is permitted to return to him. If she repudiated him and he took her back, then he gave her a bill of divorce and she married another man from whom she became widowed or divorced, she is prohibited to return to him. That is the principle: By divorce after repudiation she is prohibited to return to him; by repudiation after divorce she is permitted to return to him.

MISHNAH: If [a girl] repudiates a man, he is permitted [to marry] her relatives and she is permitted [to marry] his relatives; he did not disable her for the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce, he is forbidden [to marry] her relatives and she is forbidden [to marry] his relatives; he did disable her for the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce and later took her back, then she repudiated him and married another man from whom she became widowed or divorced, she is permitted to return to him. If she repudiated him and he took her back, then he gave her a bill of divorce and she married another man from whom she became widowed or divorced, she is prohibited to return to him. That is the principle: By divorce after repudiation she is prohibited to return to him; by repudiation after divorce she is permitted to return to him.

MISHNAH: If [a girl] repudiates a man, he is permitted [to marry] her relatives and she is permitted [to marry] his relatives; he did not disable her for the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce, he is forbidden [to marry] her relatives and she is forbidden [to marry] his relatives; he did disable her for the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce and later took her back, then she repudiated him and married another man from whom she became widowed or divorced, she is permitted to return to him. If she repudiated him and he took her back, then he gave her a bill of divorce and she married another man from whom she became widowed or divorced, she is prohibited to return to him. That is the principle: By divorce after repudiation she is prohibited to return to him; by repudiation after divorce she is permitted to return to him.

MISHNAH: If [a girl] repudiates a man, he is permitted [to marry] her relatives and she is permitted [to marry] his relatives; he did not disable her for the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce, he is forbidden [to marry] her relatives and she is forbidden [to marry] his relatives; he did disable her for the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce and later took her back, then she repudiated him and married another man from whom she became widowed or divorced, she is permitted to return to him. If she repudiated him and he took her back, then he gave her a bill of divorce and she married another man from whom she became widowed or divorced, she is prohibited to return to him. That is the principle: By divorce after repudiation she is prohibited to return to him; by repudiation after divorce she is permitted to return to him.

MISHNAH: If [a girl] repudiates a man, he is permitted [to marry] her relatives and she is permitted [to marry] his relatives; he did not disable her for the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce, he is forbidden [to marry] her relatives and she is forbidden [to marry] his relatives; he did disable her for the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce and later took her back, then she repudiated him and married another man from whom she became widowed or divorced, she is permitted to return to him. If she repudiated him and he took her back, then he gave her a bill of divorce and she married another man from whom she became widowed or divorced, she is prohibited to return to him. That is the principle: By divorce after repudiation she is prohibited to return to him; by repudiation after divorce she is permitted to return to him.

MISHNAH: If [a girl] repudiates a man and marries another who divorces her, another and she repudiates him, another who divorces her, another and she repudiates him, she is forbidden to return to anyone who had divorce her but permitted to return to those she had repudiated.

MISHNAH: If somebody divorced his wife and later took her back, she is permitted to the levir but Rebbi Eliezer forbids her. Similarly, if somebody divorced an orphan girl and took her back, she is permitted to the levir but Rebbi Eliezer forbids her. If an underage girl who was married off by her father was divorced, she is like an orphan during her father’s lifetime. If she was taken back, she is prohibited to the levir. The Sages agree with Rebbi Eliezer in case he divorced her as a minor and took her back as a minor, since her divorce is a total divorce but her return was not complete. But if he divorced her as a minor and took her back as an adult or she became an adult while married to him, she is permitted to the levir.

MISHNAH: If somebody divorced his wife and later took her back, she is permitted to the levir but Rebbi Eliezer forbids her. Similarly, if somebody divorced an orphan girl and took her back, she is permitted to the levir but Rebbi Eliezer forbids her. If an underage girl who was married off by her father was divorced, she is like an orphan during her father’s lifetime. If she was taken back, she is prohibited to the levir. The Sages agree with Rebbi Eliezer in case he divorced her as a minor and took her back as a minor, since her divorce is a total divorce but her return was not complete. But if he divorced her as a minor and took her back as an adult or she became an adult while married to him, she is permitted to the levir.

HALAKHAH: “The Sages agree,” etc. What is Rebbi Eliezer’s reason? That she was forbidden to him for an hour. The Sages agree with Rebbi Eliezer about the underage girl who was married off by her father and divorced, that she is like an orphan during her father’s lifetime. Her betrothal and divorce were by biblical standards; her remarriage was not by biblical standards.

What is the status of her co-wife? Rav said, her co-wife is forbidden. Rebbi Joḥanan said, her co-wife is forbidden. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, her co-wife is permitted. Rebbi Eleazar said, I looked around at the rabbis here and at the rabbis there and did not find anybody agreeing with me except Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who says, her co-wife is permitted.Rav Hamnuna was sitting before Rav Ada bar Ahava and said, what is the status of her co-wife? He said to him, she is permitted. He asked, divorce? He answered, forbidden. He said, go around. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, it is reasonable following him who said that her co-wife is permitted. But following him who said, her co-wife is forbidden, as you take it: The aspect he acquired in her makes the corresponding aspect forbidden in her co-wife, the aspect he did not acquire in her makes the corresponding aspect permitted in her co-wife! Rebbi Shammai said, does one admit that kind of argument in matters of incest prohibitions? What about it? For any sister-in-law who is not totally outside [the family], the acquired aspect of her belongs to an incest prohibition and an incest prohibition forbids the co-wife.

MISHNAH: Two brothers are married to two underage orphan [sisters]. If the husband of one of them dies, the other one has to leave as wife’s sister. And so for two deaf-mute [sisters]. If one is adult and the other underage, if the husband of the underage girl died, she has to leave as wife’s sister. If the husband of the adult one died, Rebbi Eliezer said, one teaches the underage one to repudiate him. Rabban Gamliel says, if she repudiated, she repudiated; otherwise she should wait until she becomes of age and the other one has to leave as wife’s sister. Rebbi Joshua says, woe to him for his wife, woe to him for his brother’s wife! He has to send away his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s wife by ḥalîṣah.

HALAKHAH: Is the degree of acquisition of one equal to that of the other? Did we not state “underage and deaf-mute”? Rebbi Hiyya stated ““underage and deaf-mute”: “If the husband of the underage girl died, the husband of the deaf-mute has to divorce her and the underage girl has to wait until she comes of age and perform ḥalîṣah” Why can she not perform ḥalîṣah immediately? She cannot because of Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Meїr said that one does not perform levirate or ḥalîṣah with an underage girl, since she might be found to be a she-ram. “If the husband of the deaf-mute died, the husband of the underage girl has to divorce her and the deaf-mute is permanently forbidden. If he transgressed and had intercourse with the deaf-mute, he divorces her and she becomes permitted.” This follows what Rebbi Hila said, in order to fix her status.

HALAKHAH: Is the degree of acquisition of one equal to that of the other? Did we not state “underage and deaf-mute”? Rebbi Hiyya stated ““underage and deaf-mute”: “If the husband of the underage girl died, the husband of the deaf-mute has to divorce her and the underage girl has to wait until she comes of age and perform ḥalîṣah” Why can she not perform ḥalîṣah immediately? She cannot because of Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Meїr said that one does not perform levirate or ḥalîṣah with an underage girl, since she might be found to be a she-ram. “If the husband of the deaf-mute died, the husband of the underage girl has to divorce her and the deaf-mute is permanently forbidden. If he transgressed and had intercourse with the deaf-mute, he divorces her and she becomes permitted.” This follows what Rebbi Hila said, in order to fix her status.

Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Ze‘ira, Menaḥem in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rebbi Eliezer, if she repudiated, she repudiated. Rebbi Eliezer said, one teaches the underage one to repudiate him, and you say so? Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rebbi Joshua, if she repudiated, she repudiated. Rebbi Joshua says, woe to him for his wife, woe to him for his brother’s wife! And you say so? Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rabban Gamliel. Rebbi Joshua agrees with Rabban Gamliel, if she repudiated, she repudiated; otherwise she should wait until she becomes of age. If not, he has to send away his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s wife by ḥalîṣah.

HALAKHAH: Is the degree of acquisition of one equal to that of the other? What does he do? Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: He marries the deaf-mute and divorces her; the underage girl has to wait until she can perform ḥalîṣah.” Why can she not perform ḥalîṣah immediately? She cannot because of Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Meїr said that one does not perform levirate or ḥalîṣah with an underage girl, since she might be found to be a she-ram. If he sleeps with the underage girl, he has to divorce her, and the deaf-mute is permanently forbidden. If he transgressed and had intercourse with the deaf-mute, he divorces her and she became permitted.” This follows what Rebbi Hila said, in order to fix her status. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Hila: What means, “in order to fix her status”? As you say there, he should perform ḥalîṣah for the aspect that was acquired in her and marry her co-wife; could he not perform ḥalîṣah for the aspect that was acquired in the underage girl and marry the deaf-mute? He said to him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: We never find two sisters-in-law of whom one performs ḥalîṣah and one is married in levirate. Do we find two sisters-in-law of whom one performs ḥalîṣah and one is divorced? He said to him, that happens. That is what we have stated there: “If he ‘bespoke’ one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, the first one needs a bill of divorce”.

HALAKHAH: Is the degree of acquisition of one equal to that of the other? What does he do? Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: He marries the deaf-mute and divorces her; the underage girl has to wait until she can perform ḥalîṣah.” Why can she not perform ḥalîṣah immediately? She cannot because of Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Meїr said that one does not perform levirate or ḥalîṣah with an underage girl, since she might be found to be a she-ram. If he sleeps with the underage girl, he has to divorce her, and the deaf-mute is permanently forbidden. If he transgressed and had intercourse with the deaf-mute, he divorces her and she became permitted.” This follows what Rebbi Hila said, in order to fix her status. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Hila: What means, “in order to fix her status”? As you say there, he should perform ḥalîṣah for the aspect that was acquired in her and marry her co-wife; could he not perform ḥalîṣah for the aspect that was acquired in the underage girl and marry the deaf-mute? He said to him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: We never find two sisters-in-law of whom one performs ḥalîṣah and one is married in levirate. Do we find two sisters-in-law of whom one performs ḥalîṣah and one is divorced? He said to him, that happens. That is what we have stated there: “If he ‘bespoke’ one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, the first one needs a bill of divorce”.

“If a woman made a vow forbidding herself any usufruct,” etc. Consider the following: He said, I copulated, but she says, I was not copulated with. Even if he changed and then said, I did not copulate, he cannot be believed since from the start he had said, I copulated. But if from the start he said that he had not copulated, the two together can uproot the presumption. The colleagues asked: What are we talking about? If following the early Mishnah, we have understood that one may marry in levirate. If following the later Mishnah, we have understood that one may perform ḥalîṣah. Where did we hear that one coerces? Rav Huna in the name of Rav: That is, if a bill of divorce has passed from his hand to her hand. He says, it is the bill of divorce of a wife. But she says, it is the bill of divorce of a sister-in-law. Within thirty days, the presumption is that he did not copulate; one coerces him to performḥalîṣah. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose asked, after thirty days, the presumption is that he copulated and you say one coerces? But it must be the following: Rav Huna in the name of Rav: That is, if a bill of divorce has passed from his hand to her hand. He says, it is the bill of divorce of a wife. But she says, it is the bill of divorce of a sister-in-law. Within thirty days, the presumption is that he did not copulate; one coerces him to performḥalîṣah. After thirty days, one asks him to performḥalîṣah. The following: If he says, I copulated, and she says, I was not copulated with, it is obvious that he has to sustain her. It is obvious that he does not inherit from her. The problem is whether he inherits his brother’s property. If she says, I was copulated with, and he says, I did not copulate, it is obvious that he does not have to sustain her. It is obvious that he inherits his brother’s property. The problem is whether he inherits from her.

“If a woman made a vow forbidding herself any usufruct,” etc. Consider the following: He said, I copulated, but she says, I was not copulated with. Even if he changed and then said, I did not copulate, he cannot be believed since from the start he had said, I copulated. But if from the start he said that he had not copulated, the two together can uproot the presumption. The colleagues asked: What are we talking about? If following the early Mishnah, we have understood that one may marry in levirate. If following the later Mishnah, we have understood that one may perform ḥalîṣah. Where did we hear that one coerces? Rav Huna in the name of Rav: That is, if a bill of divorce has passed from his hand to her hand. He says, it is the bill of divorce of a wife. But she says, it is the bill of divorce of a sister-in-law. Within thirty days, the presumption is that he did not copulate; one coerces him to performḥalîṣah. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose asked, after thirty days, the presumption is that he copulated and you say one coerces? But it must be the following: Rav Huna in the name of Rav: That is, if a bill of divorce has passed from his hand to her hand. He says, it is the bill of divorce of a wife. But she says, it is the bill of divorce of a sister-in-law. Within thirty days, the presumption is that he did not copulate; one coerces him to performḥalîṣah. After thirty days, one asks him to performḥalîṣah. The following: If he says, I copulated, and she says, I was not copulated with, it is obvious that he has to sustain her. It is obvious that he does not inherit from her. The problem is whether he inherits his brother’s property. If she says, I was copulated with, and he says, I did not copulate, it is obvious that he does not have to sustain her. It is obvious that he inherits his brother’s property. The problem is whether he inherits from her.

“If a woman made a vow forbidding herself any usufruct,” etc. Consider the following: He said, I copulated, but she says, I was not copulated with. Even if he changed and then said, I did not copulate, he cannot be believed since from the start he had said, I copulated. But if from the start he said that he had not copulated, the two together can uproot the presumption. The colleagues asked: What are we talking about? If following the early Mishnah, we have understood that one may marry in levirate. If following the later Mishnah, we have understood that one may perform ḥalîṣah. Where did we hear that one coerces? Rav Huna in the name of Rav: That is, if a bill of divorce has passed from his hand to her hand. He says, it is the bill of divorce of a wife. But she says, it is the bill of divorce of a sister-in-law. Within thirty days, the presumption is that he did not copulate; one coerces him to performḥalîṣah. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose asked, after thirty days, the presumption is that he copulated and you say one coerces? But it must be the following: Rav Huna in the name of Rav: That is, if a bill of divorce has passed from his hand to her hand. He says, it is the bill of divorce of a wife. But she says, it is the bill of divorce of a sister-in-law. Within thirty days, the presumption is that he did not copulate; one coerces him to performḥalîṣah. After thirty days, one asks him to performḥalîṣah. The following: If he says, I copulated, and she says, I was not copulated with, it is obvious that he has to sustain her. It is obvious that he does not inherit from her. The problem is whether he inherits his brother’s property. If she says, I was copulated with, and he says, I did not copulate, it is obvious that he does not have to sustain her. It is obvious that he inherits his brother’s property. The problem is whether he inherits from her.

“If a woman made a vow forbidding herself any usufruct,” etc. Consider the following: He said, I copulated, but she says, I was not copulated with. Even if he changed and then said, I did not copulate, he cannot be believed since from the start he had said, I copulated. But if from the start he said that he had not copulated, the two together can uproot the presumption. The colleagues asked: What are we talking about? If following the early Mishnah, we have understood that one may marry in levirate. If following the later Mishnah, we have understood that one may perform ḥalîṣah. Where did we hear that one coerces? Rav Huna in the name of Rav: That is, if a bill of divorce has passed from his hand to her hand. He says, it is the bill of divorce of a wife. But she says, it is the bill of divorce of a sister-in-law. Within thirty days, the presumption is that he did not copulate; one coerces him to performḥalîṣah. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose asked, after thirty days, the presumption is that he copulated and you say one coerces? But it must be the following: Rav Huna in the name of Rav: That is, if a bill of divorce has passed from his hand to her hand. He says, it is the bill of divorce of a wife. But she says, it is the bill of divorce of a sister-in-law. Within thirty days, the presumption is that he did not copulate; one coerces him to performḥalîṣah. After thirty days, one asks him to performḥalîṣah. The following: If he says, I copulated, and she says, I was not copulated with, it is obvious that he has to sustain her. It is obvious that he does not inherit from her. The problem is whether he inherits his brother’s property. If she says, I was copulated with, and he says, I did not copulate, it is obvious that he does not have to sustain her. It is obvious that he inherits his brother’s property. The problem is whether he inherits from her.

“If a woman made a vow forbidding herself any usufruct,” etc. Consider the following: He said, I copulated, but she says, I was not copulated with. Even if he changed and then said, I did not copulate, he cannot be believed since from the start he had said, I copulated. But if from the start he said that he had not copulated, the two together can uproot the presumption. The colleagues asked: What are we talking about? If following the early Mishnah, we have understood that one may marry in levirate. If following the later Mishnah, we have understood that one may perform ḥalîṣah. Where did we hear that one coerces? Rav Huna in the name of Rav: That is, if a bill of divorce has passed from his hand to her hand. He says, it is the bill of divorce of a wife. But she says, it is the bill of divorce of a sister-in-law. Within thirty days, the presumption is that he did not copulate; one coerces him to performḥalîṣah. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose asked, after thirty days, the presumption is that he copulated and you say one coerces? But it must be the following: Rav Huna in the name of Rav: That is, if a bill of divorce has passed from his hand to her hand. He says, it is the bill of divorce of a wife. But she says, it is the bill of divorce of a sister-in-law. Within thirty days, the presumption is that he did not copulate; one coerces him to performḥalîṣah. After thirty days, one asks him to performḥalîṣah. The following: If he says, I copulated, and she says, I was not copulated with, it is obvious that he has to sustain her. It is obvious that he does not inherit from her. The problem is whether he inherits his brother’s property. If she says, I was copulated with, and he says, I did not copulate, it is obvious that he does not have to sustain her. It is obvious that he inherits his brother’s property. The problem is whether he inherits from her.

“If a woman made a vow forbidding herself any usufruct,” etc. Consider the following: He said, I copulated, but she says, I was not copulated with. Even if he changed and then said, I did not copulate, he cannot be believed since from the start he had said, I copulated. But if from the start he said that he had not copulated, the two together can uproot the presumption. The colleagues asked: What are we talking about? If following the early Mishnah, we have understood that one may marry in levirate. If following the later Mishnah, we have understood that one may perform ḥalîṣah. Where did we hear that one coerces? Rav Huna in the name of Rav: That is, if a bill of divorce has passed from his hand to her hand. He says, it is the bill of divorce of a wife. But she says, it is the bill of divorce of a sister-in-law. Within thirty days, the presumption is that he did not copulate; one coerces him to performḥalîṣah. After thirty days, one asks him to perform ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose asked, after thirty days, the presumption is that he copulated and you say one coerces? But it must be the following: Rav Huna in the name of Rav: That is, if a bill of divorce has passed from his hand to her hand. He says, it is the bill of divorce of a wife. But she says, it is the bill of divorce of a sister-in-law. Within thirty days, the presumption is that he did not copulate; one coerces him to performḥalîṣah. After thirty days, one asks him to performḥalîṣah. The following: If he says, I copulated, and she says, I was not copulated with, it is obvious that he has to sustain her. It is obvious that he does not inherit from her. The problem is whether he inherits his brother’s property. If she says, I was copulated with, and he says, I did not copulate, it is obvious that he does not have to sustain her. It is obvious that he inherits his brother’s property. The problem is whether he inherits from her.

MISHNAH: A deaf-mute man who married a hearing woman or a hearing man who married a deaf-mute woman may divorce or stay married at will; just as he marries with sign language so he divorces with sign language. A hearing man who married a hearing woman who then became deaf-mute may divorce or stay married at will. If she became insane he shall not divorce. If he became deaf-mute or insane, he can never divorce.

MISHNAH: A deaf-mute man who married a hearing woman or a hearing man who married a deaf-mute woman may divorce or stay married at will; just as he marries with sign language so he divorces with sign language. A hearing man who married a hearing woman who then became deaf-mute may divorce or stay married at will. If she became insane he shall not divorce. If he became deaf-mute or insane, he can never divorce.

MISHNAH: A deaf-mute man who married a hearing woman or a hearing man who married a deaf-mute woman may divorce or stay married at will; just as he marries with sign language so he divorces with sign language. A hearing man who married a hearing woman who then became deaf-mute may divorce or stay married at will. If she became insane he shall not divorce. If he became deaf-mute or insane, he can never divorce.

MISHNAH: A deaf-mute man who married a hearing woman or a hearing man who married a deaf-mute woman may divorce or stay married at will; just as he marries with sign language so he divorces with sign language. A hearing man who married a hearing woman who then became deaf-mute may divorce or stay married at will. If she became insane he shall not divorce. If he became deaf-mute or insane, he can never divorce.

HALAKHAH: “A deaf-mute who married a hearing woman”, etc. How does he do it? He communicates in sign language and gives her the bill of divorce. In the same way he communicates with others, others communicate with him.

The Mishnah applies if he became betrothed to her by money. But if he became betrothed to her by copulation, his betrothal is an action but his divorce is not an action.

Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan: The wife of a deaf-mute or an insane? He said to him, that does not even need a reparation sacrifice for a possible sin. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It does not even need a reparation sacrifice for a possible sin. Since you say, it does not even need a reparation sacrifice for a possible sin; if another man came and gave her qiddušin, they take hold of her. If he divorced, is she permitted to remarry the first [husband]? That is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: About the wife of a deaf-mute who after being divorced by the deaf-mute went and married a deaf-mute or a hearing person, I am reading: “Her first husband who sent her away cannot come to take her back.” About the wife of a hearing person who after being divorced went and married a deaf-mute or a hearing person, I am reading: “Her first husband who sent her away cannot … ” If a deaf-mute’s husband went overseas and they came and told his wife, your husband has died, and she went and married a deaf-mute or a hearing person, and then her husband returned, she has to leave both of them. If the husband of a hearing wife went overseas and they came and told her, your husband has died, and she went and married a deaf-mute, and then her hearing [husband] returned, we would think that the deaf-mute should divorce her but the hearing person can keep her. She is still under these disabilities.

“If she became insane he shall not divorce.” In the House of Rebbi Yannai they said, because of the fence. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce. Rebbi Nehemiah bar Mar Uqban (the son) [in the name] of Rebbi Yose explained three cases. If he transgressed and divorced her. According to him who said because of a fence, he divorced. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, it is forbidden. If she has a son, or a father, or a brother. According to him who said because of a fence, it is forbidden. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, she has a father and can preserve her bill of divorce. Sometimes she is insane and sometimes of lucid mind. According to him who said because of a fence, it is forbidden. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, sometimes she can preserve her bill of divorce.

“If she became insane he shall not divorce.” In the House of Rebbi Yannai they said, because of the fence. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce. Rebbi Nehemiah bar Mar Uqban (the son) [in the name] of Rebbi Yose explained three cases. If he transgressed and divorced her. According to him who said because of a fence, he divorced. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, it is forbidden. If she has a son, or a father, or a brother. According to him who said because of a fence, it is forbidden. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, she has a father and can preserve her bill of divorce. Sometimes she is insane and sometimes of lucid mind. According to him who said because of a fence, it is forbidden. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, sometimes she can preserve her bill of divorce.

“If she became insane he shall not divorce.” In the House of Rebbi Yannai they said, because of the fence. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce. Rebbi Nehemiah bar Mar Uqban (the son) [in the name] of Rebbi Yose explained three cases. If he transgressed and divorced her. According to him who said because of a fence, he divorced. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, it is forbidden. If she has a son, or a father, or a brother. According to him who said because of a fence, it is forbidden. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, she has a father and can preserve her bill of divorce. Sometimes she is insane and sometimes of lucid mind. According to him who said because of a fence, it is forbidden. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, sometimes she can preserve her bill of divorce.

“If she became insane he shall not divorce.” In the House of Rebbi Yannai they said, because of the fence. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce. Rebbi Nehemiah bar Mar Uqban (the son) [in the name] of Rebbi Yose explained three cases. If he transgressed and divorced her. According to him who said because of a fence, he divorced. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, it is forbidden. If she has a son, or a father, or a brother. According to him who said because of a fence, it is forbidden. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, she has a father and can preserve her bill of divorce. Sometimes she is insane and sometimes of lucid mind. According to him who said because of a fence, it is forbidden. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, sometimes she can preserve her bill of divorce.

“If she became insane he shall not divorce.” In the House of Rebbi Yannai they said, because of the fence. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce. Rebbi Nehemiah bar Mar Uqban (the son) [in the name] of Rebbi Yose explained three cases. If he transgressed and divorced her. According to him who said because of a fence, he divorced. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, it is forbidden. If she has a son, or a father, or a brother. According to him who said because of a fence, it is forbidden. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, she has a father and can preserve her bill of divorce. Sometimes she is insane and sometimes of lucid mind. According to him who said because of a fence, it is forbidden. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, sometimes she can preserve her bill of divorce.

“If she became insane he shall not divorce.” In the House of Rebbi Yannai they said, because of the fence. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce. Rebbi Nehemiah bar Mar Uqban (the son) [in the name] of Rebbi Yose explained three cases. If he transgressed and divorced her. According to him who said because of a fence, he divorced. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, it is forbidden. If she has a son, or a father, or a brother. According to him who said because of a fence, it is forbidden. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, she has a father and can preserve her bill of divorce. Sometimes she is insane and sometimes of lucid mind. According to him who said because of a fence, it is forbidden. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, sometimes she can preserve her bill of divorce.

“If she became insane he shall not divorce.” In the House of Rebbi Yannai they said, because of the fence. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce. Rebbi Nehemiah bar Mar Uqban (the son) [in the name] of Rebbi Yose explained three cases. If he transgressed and divorced her. According to him who said because of a fence, he divorced. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, it is forbidden. If she has a son, or a father, or a brother. According to him who said because of a fence, it is forbidden. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, she has a father and can preserve her bill of divorce. Sometimes she is insane and sometimes of lucid mind. According to him who said because of a fence, it is forbidden. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, sometimes she can preserve her bill of divorce.

MISHNAH: Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, why can a deaf-mute woman be divorced but a deaf-mute man cannot divorce? They told him, a divorcing man is not comparable to a divorced woman since a woman can be divorced with or against her will but a man divorces only by his own will. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Gudgada testified about a deaf-mute girl who was married off by her father that she could be divorced by a bill of divorce. They said to him, that is an example.

MISHNAH: Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, why can a deaf-mute woman be divorced but a deaf-mute man cannot divorce? They told him, a divorcing man is not comparable to a divorced woman since a woman can be divorced with or against her will but a man divorces only by his own will. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Gudgada testified about a deaf-mute girl who was married off by her father that she could be divorced by a bill of divorce. They said to him, that is an example.

MISHNAH: Two deaf-mute brothers married to two deaf-mute sisters, or two hearing sisters, or two sisters of whom one is deaf-mute, the other hearing; or two deaf-mute sisters married to two deaf-mute brothers, or two hearing brothers, or two brothers of whom one is deaf-mute, these are free from ḥalîṣah and levirate. If the women are unrelated, they must marry them, and, if they want to, they may send them away. Two brothers, one deaf-mute and one hearing, married to two hearing sisters. If the deaf-mute married to the hearing wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife do? [The widow] has to leave as the wife’s sister. If the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife died, what shall the deaf-mute married to the hearing wife do? He divorces his wife by a bill of divorce; his brother’s widow is permanently forbidden.

MISHNAH: Two hearing brothers married to two sisters, one deaf-mute and one hearing. If the hearing [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to a hearing wife do? [The widow] has to leave as the wife’s sister. If the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife do? He removes his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.

MISHNAH: Two brothers, one deaf-mute and one hearing, married to two sisters, one deaf-mute and one hearing. If the deaf-mute [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to a hearing wife do? [The widow] has to leave as the wife’s sister. If the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife died, what shall the deaf-mute [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife do? He removes his wife by a bill of divorce; his brother’s wife is permanently forbidden.

MISHNAH: Two brothers, one deaf-mute and one hearing, married to two unrelated hearing women. If the deaf-mute [brother] married to a hearing wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to a hearing wife do? He performs either ḥalîṣah or levirate. If the hearing [brother] married to a hearing wife died, what shall the deaf-mute [brother] married to a hearing wife do? He marries [the widow] and never can divorce her.

MISHNAH: Two hearing brothers, married to two unrelated women, one deaf-mute and one hearing. If the hearing [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to a hearing wife do? He marries [the widow], and if he wants to divorce, he divorces. If the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife do? He performs either ḥalîṣah or levirate. Two brothers, one deaf-mute and one hearing, married to two unrelated women, one deaf-mute and one hearing. If the deaf-mute [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife do? He marries, and if he wants to divorce, he divorces. If the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife died, what shall the deaf-mute [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife do? He marries and can never divorce.

MISHNAH: Two hearing brothers, married to two unrelated women, one deaf-mute and one hearing. If the hearing [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to a hearing wife do? He marries [the widow], and if he wants to divorce, he divorces. If the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife do? He performs either ḥalîṣah or levirate. Two brothers, one deaf-mute and one hearing, married to two unrelated women, one deaf-mute and one hearing. If the deaf-mute [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife do? He marries, and if he wants to divorce, he divorces. If the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife died, what shall the deaf-mute [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife do? He marries and can never divorce.

MISHNAH: Two hearing brothers, married to two unrelated women, one deaf-mute and one hearing. If the hearing [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to a hearing wife do? He marries [the widow], and if he wants to divorce, he divorces. If the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife do? He performs either ḥalîṣah or levirate. Two brothers, one deaf-mute and one hearing, married to two unrelated women, one deaf-mute and one hearing. If the deaf-mute [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife died, what shall the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife do? He marries, and if he wants to divorce, he divorces. If the hearing [brother] married to the hearing wife died, what shall the deaf-mute [brother] married to the deaf-mute wife do? He marries and can never divorce.

What is a quarrel? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi. “You never gave me qiddušin, you did not divorce me, I never was your wife,” that is not a quarrel. “You gave me qiddušin, you divorced me, but you never paid me what is owed me under my ketubah,” that is a quarrel. When Rebbi Abba said this before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, he said to him, my son, even if she clearly requests to be divorced.

MISHNAH: Everybody is accepted to be a witness for her except her mother-in-law, her mother-in-law’s daughter, her co-wife, her levir’s wife, and her husband’s daughter. What is the difference between a bill of divorce and death? The document is the proof. If one witness says that he died and she remarried, then another comes and says that he is not dead, she shall not leave. If one witness says that he died but two say that he did not die, even if she remarried she must leave. If two say that he died but one said that he did not die, even if she has not yet remarried she may remarry.

Does the document prove? Do we not have to believe what she says? If she did not say ‘it was written in my presence, it was signed in my presence’, would you permit her to remarry? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that parallels what Rebbi Abun said, one does not suspect him to vilify her in the eyes of Heaven; he is suspect to vilify her in the eyes of the court. Since he knows that if he were to come [and object, his objection] would not be accepted, he has [the bill of divorce] signed by witnesses in good standing. And here, since she knows that her word does not count for the other woman, she will be truthful.

“If one witness says,” etc. “If one witness says that he died and she remarried, then another comes and says that he is not dead, she shall not leave.” Because he said that after she had remarried. Therefore if [the second witness came] before she remarried, if she remarried she has to leave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are the words of Rebbi Menaḥem ben Rebbi Yose. But the words of the Sages [are], whether he testified after she remarried or before she remarried, she should not remarry, but if she remarried she shall not leave. Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said in the name of Rav, if she was married by the testimony of two witnesses, even if he returns, one says to him, “you are not he.” Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac asked, think of it, if he is a famous person like Immi? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, is there nobody who would look like Rebbi Immi? There came a case before the rabbis there. They said to him, “you are not he.” Abba bar Abba got up and whispered in his ear saying, by your life, give her a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rav’s students got up and beat him. Somebody said, the whip is burning and the footstool is burning. Samuel said, I was there, no whip was burning and no footstool was burning, but my father was hit and got up. There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said to him, yes, it is sure that she is permitted to you but you should know that the child of this man is a bastard before Heaven. Rebbi Ze‘ira was praising him because he made the situation clear.

MISHNAH: If he became betrothed to one of five women but it cannot be ascertained to which of them he became betrothed, and each one says he became betrothed to me, he gives a bill of divorce to each of them, puts up the amount of one ketubah between them and removes himself, the words of Rebbi Tarphon. Rebbi Aqiba says, in this way one does not remove him from sin unless he gives a bill of divorce and pays the ketubah to each of them. He robbed one of five people, it is not known which of them he robbed and each one says “I was robbed”, he puts up the amount of the robbery between them and removes himself, the words of Rebbi Tarphon. Rebbi Aqiba says, in this way one does not remove him from sin unless he pays the amount of the robbery to each of them.

MISHNAH: If he became betrothed to one of five women but it cannot be ascertained to which of them he became betrothed, and each one says he became betrothed to me, he gives a bill of divorce to each of them, puts up the amount of one ketubah between them and removes himself, the words of Rebbi Tarphon. Rebbi Aqiba says, in this way one does not remove him from sin unless he gives a bill of divorce and pays the ketubah to each of them. He robbed one of five people, it is not known which of them he robbed and each one says “I was robbed”, he puts up the amount of the robbery between them and removes himself, the words of Rebbi Tarphon. Rebbi Aqiba says, in this way one does not remove him from sin unless he pays the amount of the robbery to each of them.

HALAKHAH: [(He robbed one of five people). Rebbi Abun said, the Mishnah deals with the case that she was betrothed by a document. But if he was betrothed by money, everybody agrees that he gives a bill of divorce and pays the ketubah to each of them.]

What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? Is it because she is not suspected to cause trouble [to herself in order later to cause trouble to her co-wife or because she is not suspected to cause any trouble] to her co-wife? Let us hear from the following: “If a woman went overseas with her husband and returns and says ‘my husband died’, she can remarry and collect her ketubah, but her co-wife remains forbidden.” We explain it, saying that she is suspected to cause trouble to herself in order to cause trouble to her co-wife, and Rebbi Eleazar does not disagree. It is impossible that the reason be that she is not suspected to cause any trouble to her co-wife. We could suspect that perhaps her husband sent her a bill of divorce from overseas. Think of it, what if her [next] husband was a Cohen? Rebbi Abba bar Rebbi Zemina said, she is suspected to produce several desecrated children in order to make bastards of her co-wife’s children.

HALAKHAH: “One testifies by the light of a candle.” Rebbi Ḥanina said, Rebbi Jonathan taught me, only if they saw a man’s shadow. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: There, we have stated: “If somebody had been thrown into a cistern and said, anybody who hears my voice should write a bill of divorce to my wife, they should write and deliver,” and Rebbi Jonathan said, only if the saw a man’s shadow. Rebbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina, in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: That means, in the fields, but in town even without a man’s shadow. But did we not state: “If somebody had been thrown into a cistern and said, anybody who hears my voice should write a bill of divorce to my wife, they should write and deliver,” and Rebbi Jonathan said, only if they saw a man’s shadow? Rebbi Abun said, damaging spirits are as frequent in cisterns as they are frequent on the fields.

HALAKHAH: “One testifies by the light of a candle.” Rebbi Ḥanina said, Rebbi Jonathan taught me, only if they saw a man’s shadow. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: There, we have stated: “If somebody had been thrown into a cistern and said, anybody who hears my voice should write a bill of divorce to my wife, they should write and deliver,” and Rebbi Jonathan said, only if the saw a man’s shadow. Rebbi Aḥa bar Ḥanina, in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: That means, in the fields, but in town even without a man’s shadow. But did we not state: “If somebody had been thrown into a cistern and said, anybody who hears my voice should write a bill of divorce to my wife, they should write and deliver,” and Rebbi Jonathan said, only if they saw a man’s shadow? Rebbi Abun said, damaging spirits are as frequent in cisterns as they are frequent on the fields.

There, we have stated: “If somebody was bringing a bill of divorce and lost it, if he found it again immediately, it is valid; otherwise it is invalid.” What is immediately? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as less than three people passed by. If a Gentile passed by, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana was bringing a bill of divorce when he lost it. A Saracen found it. The case came before the rabbis and they declared [the bill] valid. That means, if a Gentile passed by, it is valid. May we say that he had an identifying mark on [the bill]? But was it not stated that there are no identifying marks on bills of divorce? That means, two or three lines. But here it had a heh which was pointed. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana, why should it be invalid in that case? I would say, it was another bill executed for a person with the same name. Think of it, if they investigated and did not find there another person with the same name! It must be that one is very strict in matters of possible incest. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry?” Rebbi Mana said to him: So says Rebbi Shammai, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid and one invalid. He lost the valid one after he had thrown away the invalid one. When he found it, I am saying that he found the invalid one.

There, we have stated: “If somebody was bringing a bill of divorce and lost it, if he found it again immediately, it is valid; otherwise it is invalid.” What is immediately? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as less than three people passed by. If a Gentile passed by, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana was bringing a bill of divorce when he lost it. A Saracen found it. The case came before the rabbis and they declared [the bill] valid. That means, if a Gentile passed by, it is valid. May we say that he had an identifying mark on [the bill]? But was it not stated that there are no identifying marks on bills of divorce? That means, two or three lines. But here it had a heh which was pointed. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana, why should it be invalid in that case? I would say, it was another bill executed for a person with the same name. Think of it, if they investigated and did not find there another person with the same name! It must be that one is very strict in matters of possible incest. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry?” Rebbi Mana said to him: So says Rebbi Shammai, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid and one invalid. He lost the valid one after he had thrown away the invalid one. When he found it, I am saying that he found the invalid one.

There, we have stated: “If somebody was bringing a bill of divorce and lost it, if he found it again immediately, it is valid; otherwise it is invalid.” What is immediately? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as less than three people passed by. If a Gentile passed by, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana was bringing a bill of divorce when he lost it. A Saracen found it. The case came before the rabbis and they declared [the bill] valid. That means, if a Gentile passed by, it is valid. May we say that he had an identifying mark on [the bill]? But was it not stated that there are no identifying marks on bills of divorce? That means, two or three lines. But here it had a heh which was pointed. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana, why should it be invalid in that case? I would say, it was another bill executed for a person with the same name. Think of it, if they investigated and did not find there another person with the same name! It must be that one is very strict in matters of possible incest. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry?” Rebbi Mana said to him: So says Rebbi Shammai, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid and one invalid. He lost the valid one after he had thrown away the invalid one. When he found it, I am saying that he found the invalid one.

There, we have stated: “If somebody was bringing a bill of divorce and lost it, if he found it again immediately, it is valid; otherwise it is invalid.” What is immediately? Rebbi Joḥanan said, as long as less than three people passed by. If a Gentile passed by, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: Abba bar bar Ḥana was bringing a bill of divorce when he lost it. A Saracen found it. The case came before the rabbis and they declared [the bill] valid. That means, if a Gentile passed by, it is valid. May we say that he had an identifying mark on [the bill]? But was it not stated that there are no identifying marks on bills of divorce? That means, two or three lines. But here it had a heh which was pointed. Rebbi Ezra asked before Rebbi Mana, why should it be invalid in that case? I would say, it was another bill executed for a person with the same name. Think of it, if they investigated and did not find there another person with the same name! It must be that one is very strict in matters of possible incest. But did we not state: “They went and found nobody but let his wife remarry; they went there, did not recognize him, and let his wife remarry?” Rebbi Mana said to him: So says Rebbi Shammai, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: This man had two bills of divorce in his hand, one valid and one invalid. He lost the valid one after he had thrown away the invalid one. When he found it, I am saying that he found the invalid one.

The declaration of jealousy, Rebbi Joshua said in the name of Rebbi Eliezer, is obligatory; but Rebbi Joshua said, it is optional. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yasa, it turns out that Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai and Rebbi Joshua the House of Hillel. As the House of Shammai say, a man may not divorce his wife except if he found in her a matter of nakedness. If he found her behavior ugly, he cannot divorce her since he found no proof of adultery; he cannot keep her since he found her behavior ugly. Therefore, he says, it is obligatory. But was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” Rebbi Mana said, I confirmed this if there are witnesses, but not if there are no witnesses.

The declaration of jealousy, Rebbi Joshua said in the name of Rebbi Eliezer, is obligatory; but Rebbi Joshua said, it is optional. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yasa, it turns out that Rebbi Eliezer follows the House of Shammai and Rebbi Joshua the House of Hillel. As the House of Shammai say, a man may not divorce his wife except if he found in her a matter of nakedness. If he found her behavior ugly, he cannot divorce her since he found no proof of adultery; he cannot keep her since he found her behavior ugly. Therefore, he says, it is obligatory. But was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” Rebbi Mana said, I confirmed this if there are witnesses, but not if there are no witnesses.

“And Rebbi Joshua [follows] the House of Hillel.” For the House of Hillel say, even if she burned his food. Therefore, he says it is optional. If he wants to declare his jealousy, he declares his jealousy; if he wants to divorce her, he divorces her.

If she was seen going to a secluded place by one witness in the morning and by one witness in the evening, it is to be treated like the following: “If she was together alone with him by the testimony of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him; if there was a single witness she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. With one witness in the morning and one witness in the evening, such a case happened and Rebbi Eleazar ben Thaddeus asked the Sages, who told him that this is not being together alone.” If he declared his jealousy before one witness in the morning and before one witness in the evening; since he is a man and she is a woman, his declaration is nothing. Or is it to be treated like the following: “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar [Rav] Isaac in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on her back and the other says, I saw one hair on her back, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia the son of Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. Two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement; Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.

If she was seen going to a secluded place by one witness in the morning and by one witness in the evening, it is to be treated like the following: “If she was together alone with him by the testimony of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him; if there was a single witness she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. With one witness in the morning and one witness in the evening, such a case happened and Rebbi Eleazar ben Thaddeus asked the Sages, who told him that this is not being together alone.” If he declared his jealousy before one witness in the morning and before one witness in the evening; since he is a man and she is a woman, his declaration is nothing. Or is it to be treated like the following: “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar [Rav] Isaac in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on her back and the other says, I saw one hair on her back, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia the son of Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. Two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement; Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.

Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. She is forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥinenah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted to her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.