divorce

Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister. But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. She is forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥinenah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob [bar Aḥa] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted to her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.

It was stated in the name of Rebbi Meïr: Just as there are opinions in eating and drinking, so opinions are [varied] among men. There is a man, if a fly falls into his cup, he takes it out, throws it away and drinks. That is like a normal man who sees his wife talking to her neighbors and relatives. Or you have a man who if a fly flies over his cup, takes it, pours [the contents] out, and does not taste them. That is a bad human attitude because he thinks of divorcing her. Or you have a man who, if a fly sits on his cup, takes it and leaves [the cup] untouched. That is Pappos ben Jehudah who locked his wife in. They said to him, did your forefathers behave like this? Or you have a man who finds a dead fly in his cup, takes it, licks it, and drinks. That is the wicked one who sees that his wife is overbearing with her slaves and slave-girls, where he would be commanded to divorce her, as it is said: “She left his house and went and married another man.” The verse called him other because he is not of the class of the first who expelled his wife because of a sexual transgression and the other one stumbled over her. If Heaven gives him credit, he will divorce her; otherwise, at the end she will bury him as it is said, “or if the latter man dies.” That man deserves to die since he brought that woman into his house.

It was stated in the name of Rebbi Meïr: Just as there are opinions in eating and drinking, so opinions are [varied] among men. There is a man, if a fly falls into his cup, he takes it out, throws it away and drinks. That is like a normal man who sees his wife talking to her neighbors and relatives. Or you have a man who if a fly flies over his cup, takes it, pours [the contents] out, and does not taste them. That is a bad human attitude because he thinks of divorcing her. Or you have a man who, if a fly sits on his cup, takes it and leaves [the cup] untouched. That is Pappos ben Jehudah who locked his wife in. They said to him, did your forefathers behave like this? Or you have a man who finds a dead fly in his cup, takes it, licks it, and drinks. That is the wicked one who sees that his wife is overbearing with her slaves and slave-girls, where he would be commanded to divorce her, as it is said: “She left his house and went and married another man.” The verse called him other because he is not of the class of the first who expelled his wife because of a sexual transgression and the other one stumbled over her. If Heaven gives him credit, he will divorce her; otherwise, at the end she will bury him as it is said, “or if the latter man dies.” That man deserves to die since he brought that woman into his house.

There, we have stated: “A she-ram, an old woman, or a sterile one neither drinks nor collects her ketubah,” as it is said: “She will be declared innocent and bear seed,” [this refers to] one able to bear seed; it excludes one who is unable to bear seed. They objected, is there not the widow [married to] the High Priest, is she not able to bear seed? There is a difference, since it is written: “He may not desecrate his seed among his people.” There, we have stated: “A bastard disables and enables to eat. How is this?” And here he says so? Rebbi Tanḥuma said, there, “she has no issue” of any kind, but here one requires enabled seed, not disabled seed. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the water only serves to permit her to her house; but about this one one tells him to divorce once she went to a secluded place.

HALAKHAH: A woman pregnant by another man or nursing another man’s [child],” etc. A man should not marry a woman pregnant by another man or nursing another man’s [child], but if he did marry her, the verse says about him: “Do not remove the eternal boundaries and do not enter the orphans’ field.” He who marries a woman pregnant by another man or nursing another man’s [child] has to divorce her and should never retake her, the words of Rebbi Meĩr, but the Sages say, he may separate from her and take her back later. Does Rebbi Meїr always fine people? Let us hear from the following: “The underage woman who performed ḥalîṣah should repeat ḥalîṣah once she becomes of age but if she did not repeat it, the ḥalîṣah is valid.” Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Isaac the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya the scribe in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is Rebbi Meїr who said that one does not perform ḥalîṣah or levirate with an underage girl because she might turn out to be a she-ram.

MISHNAH: If somebody declared his jealousy to [his wife] and she went to a secluded place, even if he heard about it from a bird flying by he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Joshua says, from the moment she is the subject of talk of women spinning by moonlight.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

MISHNAH: The seducer pays for three things and the rapist for four. The seducer pays for shame, diminution of value, and fine. The rapist in addition pays for suffering; the seducer does not pay for suffering. The rapist pays immediately, the seducer only if he divorces her. The rapist drinks from his pot; the seducer may divorce if he wishes.

MISHNAH: The father has the benefit to give his daughter in preliminary marriage by money, contract, or intercourse; he has the right to what she finds and to her earnings, to dissolve her vows, and to receive her bill of divorce, but cannot eat usufruct in her lifetime. If she is definitively married, the husband in addition eats usufruct in her lifetime but is required to pay for her upkeep, her ransom, and her burial. Rebbi Jehudah says, even the poorest in Israel should not provide for her less than two flutes and one wailing woman.

MISHNAH: If he did not write her “if you are kidnapped I shall ransom you and bring you back as my wife,” or for Cohens’ wives “I shall return you to your country,” he is obligated, for this is a stipulation enforced by the court. If she was kidnapped he is obligated to ransom her. If he said, here is her divorce document and her ketubah, let her redeem herself; he is not allowed to do that. If she was smitten, he is obligated to heal her. If he said, here is her divorce document and her ketubah, let her redeem herself; he is allowed to do that.

MISHNAH: If he did not write her “if you are kidnapped I shall ransom you and bring you back as my wife,” or for Cohens’ wives “I shall return you to your country,” he is obligated, for this is a stipulation enforced by the court. If she was kidnapped he is obligated to ransom her. If he said, here is her divorce document and her ketubah, let her redeem herself; he is not allowed to do that. If she was smitten, he is obligated to heal her. If he said, here is her divorce document and her ketubah, let her redeem herself; he is allowed to do that.

HALAKHAH: “The levir does not cause her to eat heave,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah said, we stated there: The sister-in-law is fed from her husband’s estate all of the three months. If her levir had come before the court and fled, she is fed from his property. If he became sick it is as if he had fled. If he went overseas it is as if he had fled. If the widow said, I am bound in my widowhood to my husband’s house, one listens to her. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: The one who says, I shall not giveḥalîṣah, is like the one who says, I shall not divorce. Rav Zabda said, Rebbi Isaac intructed that the one who says., I shall not give ḥalîṣah, is like the one who says, I shall not divorce.

HALAKHAH: “The levir does not cause her to eat heave,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah said, we stated there: The sister-in-law is fed from her husband’s estate all of the three months. If her levir had come before the court and fled, she is fed from his property. If he became sick it is as if he had fled. If he went overseas it is as if he had fled. If the widow said, I am bound in my widowhood to my husband’s house, one listens to her. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: The one who says, I shall not giveḥalîṣah, is like the one who says, I shall not divorce. Rav Zabda said, Rebbi Isaac intructed that the one who says., I shall not give ḥalîṣah, is like the one who says, I shall not divorce.

MISHNAH: These are the kinds of work a woman does for her husband: She grinds flour, bakes, launders, nurses her baby, makes his bed, and spins wool. If she brought a slave girl with her, she does not have to grind flour, bake, and launder. Two, she does not have to nurse her baby. Three, she does not have to make his bed or spin wool. Four, she sits in a chair. Rebbi Eliezer says, even if she brought him a hundred slave girls, he forces her to spin wool because indolence causes immorality. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, also a man who by a vow forbids his wife to work must divorce her and pay her ketubah since idleness induces mental illness.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody decided on money for his son-in-law and the son-in-law died,” etc. Are these not the things that are acquired by speech? Bar Qappara stated: He promised the dowry on condition there be a marriage. And it is so: If somebody decided on money for his underage daughter, one forces him to give. But not for the adult one? Rebbi Abun said, one forces [the groom] to give a bill of divorce.

MISHNAH: If somebody makes a vow that his wife should not have any usufruct from him, up to thirty days he shall appoint a provider, more than that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah; in the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.

MISHNAH: If somebody makes a vow that his wife should not have any usufruct from him, up to thirty days he shall appoint a provider, more than that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah; in the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.

MISHNAH: If somebody makes a vow that his wife should not have any usufruct from him, up to thirty days he shall appoint a provider, more than that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah; in the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody makes a vow that his wife should not have any usufruct from him,” etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody by a vow bars his wife from sexual intercourse,” and here you say so? There, he makes a vow to separate her from his body, but here he makes a vow to separate her from his property. But can anybody make a vow not to pay his debt? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, since in the future he will divorce her, pay her the ketubah, and stop her food supply, it is as if there was no debt. Why could she not sit there and wait; if he divorced her everything would be in order, otherwise let him provide her with food? It follows him who said that the wife’s food is not from words of the Torah, as it was stated: The court will not determine food for the wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s. Then should she not be considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah? This proves that she is not considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah.

He could appoint a provider, as the following: “X is forbidden any profit from me by a vow and I do not know what to do.” Let him appoint a provider! A woman has the right to say, it is impossible for me to be provided for by anybody other than my husband. But did we not state: “If somebody provides for his wife through a third party.” There, if she accepted it; here, if she did not accept it. If she did not accept it then he should not appoint even for one day! She continues with him for one month, perhaps he will find an opening for his vow. Samuel says, if he vowed for thirty days. But if he vowed forever, he shall divorce immediately and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Avina in the name of Rav: Even if he vowed forever, she continues with him for one month, perhaps he will find an opening for his vow.

Rebbi Yose said, they differ about wives of Cohanim. “Beyond that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of the second [month]. “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of the second [month]. “In the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the third. And a disagreement was stated, at the end of three [months], the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana said to him, where no disagreement was stated, you introduce a disagreement. But they disagree if he is an Israel. “Beyond that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the second [month]. “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the second. “In the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of three [months]. It was stated thus: At the end of three by everybody’s opinion.

Rebbi Yose said, they differ about wives of Cohanim. “Beyond that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of the second [month]. “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of the second [month]. “In the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the third. And a disagreement was stated, at the end of three [months], the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana said to him, where no disagreement was stated, you introduce a disagreement. But they disagree if he is an Israel. “Beyond that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the second [month]. “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the second. “In the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of three [months]. It was stated thus: At the end of three by everybody’s opinion.

Rebbi Yose said, they differ about wives of Cohanim. “Beyond that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of the second [month]. “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of the second [month]. “In the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the third. And a disagreement was stated, at the end of three [months], the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana said to him, where no disagreement was stated, you introduce a disagreement. But they disagree if he is an Israel. “Beyond that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the second [month]. “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the second. “In the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of three [months]. It was stated thus: At the end of three by everybody’s opinion.

Rebbi Yose said, they differ about wives of Cohanim. “Beyond that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of the second [month]. “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of the second [month]. “In the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the third. And a disagreement was stated, at the end of three [months], the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana said to him, where no disagreement was stated, you introduce a disagreement. But they disagree if he is an Israel. “Beyond that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the second [month]. “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the second. “In the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of three [months]. It was stated thus: At the end of three by everybody’s opinion.

Rebbi Yose said, they differ about wives of Cohanim. “Beyond that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of the second [month]. “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of the second [month]. “In the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the third. And a disagreement was stated, at the end of three [months], the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana said to him, where no disagreement was stated, you introduce a disagreement. But they disagree if he is an Israel. “Beyond that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the second [month]. “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the second. “In the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of three [months]. It was stated thus: At the end of three by everybody’s opinion.

Rebbi Yose said, they differ about wives of Cohanim. “Beyond that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of the second [month]. “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of the second [month]. “In the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the third. And a disagreement was stated, at the end of three [months], the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Mana said to him, where no disagreement was stated, you introduce a disagreement. But they disagree if he is an Israel. “Beyond that he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the second [month]. “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the beginning of the second. “In the case of the wife of a Cohen for two months he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah,” at the end of three [months]. It was stated thus: At the end of three by everybody’s opinion.

MISHNAH: If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not taste any kind of fruits has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah; in the case of the wife of a Cohen for two [months] he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.

MISHNAH: If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not taste any kind of fruits has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah; in the case of the wife of a Cohen for two [months] he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.

MISHNAH: If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not taste any kind of fruits has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Jehudah says, if he is an Israel, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah; in the case of the wife of a Cohen for two [months] he should keep her, for three he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife,” etc. Can anybody cause somebody else’s vow during his lifetime? It must be that the wife made a vow, the husband heard it, and said to her: If you will eat from such and such, my property will be forbidden to you. If she ate from such and such, why should his property not be forbidden to her? Is that not the case from the beginning of the chapter? But if his wife made a vow, her husband was informed, and did not dissolve it, following him who says that he put his finger between her teeth, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ḥuna said, even he who said that she put his finger between her teeth, and should be divorced without ketubah, will agree in case he provoked her to make the vow.

MISHNAH: If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not adorn herself with one of the kinds has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Yose says, among the poor if he did not give a time limit, among the rich for thirty days.

MISHNAH: If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not go to her father’s house, if they live in the same city she does, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. If they live in another city, for one holiday he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.

MISHNAH: If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not go to her father’s house, if they live in the same city she does, for one month he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. If they live in another city, for one holiday he should keep her, for two he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.

MISHNAH: If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not pay condolence visits or go to weddings has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. But if he argues because of another reason, he is in his rights. If he said to her you should tell X what I said to you or that she should fill [vessels] and pour them out on garbage heaps, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.

MISHNAH: If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not pay condolence visits or go to weddings has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. But if he argues because of another reason, he is in his rights. If he said to her you should tell X what I said to you or that she should fill [vessels] and pour them out on garbage heaps, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not pay condolence visits,” etc. ”If he made her vow not to lend out fine and coarse sieves, he shall divorce her and pay the ketubah, since he gives her a bad reputation among her [female] neighbors. And so if she made a vow not to lend out fine and coarse sieves, she should leave without ketubah since she gives him a bad reputation among his [male] neighbors.” ”If he made her vow not to pay condolence visits or go to weddings, he shall divorce her and pay the ketubah, since tomorrow a relative of hers will die and nobody will take notice of her. And so if she made a vow not to pay condolence visits or go to weddings, she should leave without ketubah since tomorrow a relative of his will die and nobody will take notice of him.” ”Rebbi Meïr is saying in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba: ‘It is better to pay condolence visits than to go to a wedding since the former is the end of every human, and the living should take notice.’ Why does the verse say, ‘and the living should take notice’? But do so they shall: eulogize so they should eulogize, bury so they should bury, accompany so they should accompany.”

HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife that she should not pay condolence visits,” etc. ”If he made her vow not to lend out fine and coarse sieves, he shall divorce her and pay the ketubah, since he gives her a bad reputation among her [female] neighbors. And so if she made a vow not to lend out fine and coarse sieves, she should leave without ketubah since she gives him a bad reputation among his [male] neighbors.” ”If he made her vow not to pay condolence visits or go to weddings, he shall divorce her and pay the ketubah, since tomorrow a relative of hers will die and nobody will take notice of her. And so if she made a vow not to pay condolence visits or go to weddings, she should leave without ketubah since tomorrow a relative of his will die and nobody will take notice of him.” ”Rebbi Meïr is saying in the name of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba: ‘It is better to pay condolence visits than to go to a wedding since the former is the end of every human, and the living should take notice.’ Why does the verse say, ‘and the living should take notice’? But do so they shall: eulogize so they should eulogize, bury so they should bury, accompany so they should accompany.”

“If he said to her I require that you tell Mr. X what you said to me,” alone, “or I said to you”, alone, “or that she should fill [vessels] and pour them out on garbage heaps, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah.” There, they say, like Er’s action, but the rabbis here say, senseless things.

“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.

“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.

“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.

“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.

“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.

“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.

“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.

“If she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is preliminarily married. To a doctor and he healed her, she is not preliminarily married.” What is the difference between the Elder and the doctor? The elder uproots the vow from its start; the doctor heals only for the future. Some Tannaïm state: Even if she went to an Elder and her dissolved her vow, she is not preliminarily married. The baraita follows Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade this only because of the other.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar? It would have been logical about a vow which has to be investigated by a Sage … because a vow which does not have to be investigated by a Sage. Some Tannaïm state: She is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce. Some Tannaïm state: She is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce. They wanted to say that he who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce, is Rebbi Eleazar, and he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, are the rabbis. Everything follows the rabbis. He who says, she is allowed to marry without a bill of divorce: Since she knows that if she went to an Elder, he would dissolve her vow, since she does not go therefore she can be married without a bill of divorce. But he who says, she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce, that she should not go to an Elder who would dissolve her vow, then the preliminary marriage would become retroactively valid for her and it would turn out that her children become bastards. Therefore she is forbidden to marry without a bill of divorce.

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if the father proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he [made it conditional], could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ban Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

MISHNAH: If a man developed defects, one does not force him to divorce. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, when has this been said? For minor defects. But for major defects one forces him to divorce.

MISHNAH: If a man developed defects, one does not force him to divorce. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, when has this been said? For minor defects. But for major defects one forces him to divorce.

HALAKHAH: “If a man developed defects,” etc. Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah, “if he had.” But if they developed newly, one forces him to divorce. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah about a kopeaḥ, and he forced him. It turns out that following Rav if he did not become so, following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel if he became so. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Which [statement of] Rebbi Meïr? The former or the later? If the former, until she made a condition. If the later, even if he made a condition it is nothing. But this Mishnah turns out following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; does “the following one forces to divorce” [follows] the rabbis? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if it was a major defect, e. g., blind in one eye, amputated of one of his hands, lame in one of his legs, immediately he shall divorce and pay the ketubah.” This Mishnah turns out following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; “the following one forces to divorce” [follows] the rabbis.

HALAKHAH: “If a man developed defects,” etc. Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah, “if he had.” But if they developed newly, one forces him to divorce. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah about a kopeaḥ, and he forced him. It turns out that following Rav if he did not become so, following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel if he became so. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Which [statement of] Rebbi Meïr? The former or the later? If the former, until she made a condition. If the later, even if he made a condition it is nothing. But this Mishnah turns out following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; does “the following one forces to divorce” [follows] the rabbis? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if it was a major defect, e. g., blind in one eye, amputated of one of his hands, lame in one of his legs, immediately he shall divorce and pay the ketubah.” This Mishnah turns out following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; “the following one forces to divorce” [follows] the rabbis.

HALAKHAH: “If a man developed defects,” etc. Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah, “if he had.” But if they developed newly, one forces him to divorce. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah about a kopeaḥ, and he forced him. It turns out that following Rav if he did not become so, following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel if he became so. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Which [statement of] Rebbi Meïr? The former or the later? If the former, until she made a condition. If the later, even if he made a condition it is nothing. But this Mishnah turns out following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; does “the following one forces to divorce” [follows] the rabbis? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if it was a major defect, e. g., blind in one eye, amputated of one of his hands, lame in one of his legs, immediately he shall divorce and pay the ketubah.” This Mishnah turns out following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; “the following one forces to divorce” [follows] the rabbis.

HALAKHAH: “If a man developed defects,” etc. Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: So is the Mishnah, “if he had.” But if they developed newly, one forces him to divorce. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel. There came a case before Rebbi Jeremiah about a kopeaḥ, and he forced him. It turns out that following Rav if he did not become so, following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel if he became so. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel follows Rebbi Meïr. Which [statement of] Rebbi Meïr? The former or the later? If the former, until she made a condition. If the later, even if he made a condition it is nothing. But this Mishnah turns out following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; does “the following one forces to divorce” [follows] the rabbis? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, if it was a major defect, e. g., blind in one eye, amputated of one of his hands, lame in one of his legs, immediately he shall divorce and pay the ketubah.” This Mishnah turns out following Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel; “the following one forces to divorce” [follows] the rabbis.

MISHNAH: The following one forces to divorce: Those smitten with boils, the one afflicted with a polyp, the dung collector, the brass refiner, and the tanner, whether they were in this before they married or they came to it after they married. For all of these says Rebbi Meïr that, even if he contracted with her, she can say “I thought that I could stand it, now I cannot stand it.” But the Sages say, she is forced to stand it except for the one smitten with boils because she causes him consumption. It happened in Sidon that a tanner died who had a brother tanner; there the Sages said, she can say: “I could stand that in your brother, I cannot stand it in you.”

HALAKHAH: “The following one forces to divorce: Those smitten with boils,” etc. “The meqammeṣ.” This is the dung collector; but some say it is the tanner. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the Mishnah implies that this is the dung collector since we have stated: “The meqammeṣ and the tanner.” “The brass refiner.” Samuel said, that is the one who smelts brass from its ore.

HALAKHAH: “He should not say to her ‘here is your ketubah’”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah.” In the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.

In earlier times, her ketubah was deposited with her family; then it was easy for him to divorce her. They then instituted that her ketubah had to be deposited with her husband; even so it was easy for him to divorce her. Then they instituted that a man should buy with his wife’s ketubah cups, plates, and bowls; that is what we did state: “He should not say to her ‘here your ketubah is lying on the table’ but all his properties are pledged for her ketubah.” Finally they instituted that a person should use his wife’s ketubah in business, then because he uses his wife’s ketubah in his business dealings he loses track of it and it becomes difficult for him to divorce her.

In earlier times, her ketubah was deposited with her family; then it was easy for him to divorce her. They then instituted that her ketubah had to be deposited with her husband; even so it was easy for him to divorce her. Then they instituted that a man should buy with his wife’s ketubah cups, plates, and bowls; that is what we did state: “He should not say to her ‘here your ketubah is lying on the table’ but all his properties are pledged for her ketubah.” Finally they instituted that a person should use his wife’s ketubah in business, then because he uses his wife’s ketubah in his business dealings he loses track of it and it becomes difficult for him to divorce her.

In earlier times, her ketubah was deposited with her family; then it was easy for him to divorce her. They then instituted that her ketubah had to be deposited with her husband; even so it was easy for him to divorce her. Then they instituted that a man should buy with his wife’s ketubah cups, plates, and bowls; that is what we did state: “He should not say to her ‘here your ketubah is lying on the table’ but all his properties are pledged for her ketubah.” Finally they instituted that a person should use his wife’s ketubah in business, then because he uses his wife’s ketubah in his business dealings he loses track of it and it becomes difficult for him to divorce her.

MISHNAH: If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah. A ketubah without the bill of divorce when she says, I lost my bill of divorce but he says, I lost my receipt; similarly, the holder of an instrument of debt not accompanied by a prozbol; these shall not be paid. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, since the times of the persecution, a woman collects without the bill of divorce and the creditor collects without prozbol.

MISHNAH: If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah. A ketubah without the bill of divorce when she says, I lost my bill of divorce but he says, I lost my receipt; similarly, the holder of an instrument of debt not accompanied by a prozbol; these shall not be paid. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, since the times of the persecution, a woman collects without the bill of divorce and the creditor collects without prozbol.

MISHNAH: If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah. A ketubah without the bill of divorce when she says, I lost my bill of divorce but he says, I lost my receipt; similarly, the holder of an instrument of debt not accompanied by a prozbol; these shall not be paid. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, since the times of the persecution, a woman collects without the bill of divorce and the creditor collects without prozbol.

MISHNAH: If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah. A ketubah without the bill of divorce when she says, I lost my bill of divorce but he says, I lost my receipt; similarly, the holder of an instrument of debt not accompanied by a prozbol; these shall not be paid. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, since the times of the persecution, a woman collects without the bill of divorce and the creditor collects without prozbol.

HALAKHAH: “From encumbered property, how is that?” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody disputes a court document, he is not trustworthy. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him: Is that not the Mishnah? “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah”! Rebbi Joḥanan said to him: Babylonian, after I removed the clay from the pearl, you say to me: Is that not the Mishnah? Rav said, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she produces she collects. He changed his mind and said, she collects even at a place where one writes a ketubah; let anyone powerful object to this! Rebbi Yose objected: Was it not stated: She might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, and collect a second time? If those died. Are there not witnesses? Bring them! They went overseas. Is there not an agreement? Is there no registrar of agreements? There is a registrar of agreements; as you say, if a document is lost, one writes a replacement. This is what one says, if the ketubah was lost, one writes a new one. Rebbi Abba objected: Was it not stated, she might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, wait until he dies, and collect a second time? Rebbi Yose bar Abun said to him: Would she not have to prove that she lived with him until he died?

HALAKHAH: “From encumbered property, how is that?” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody disputes a court document, he is not trustworthy. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him: Is that not the Mishnah? “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah”! Rebbi Joḥanan said to him: Babylonian, after I removed the clay from the pearl, you say to me: Is that not the Mishnah? Rav said, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she produces she collects. He changed his mind and said, she collects even at a place where one writes a ketubah; let anyone powerful object to this! Rebbi Yose objected: Was it not stated: She might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, and collect a second time? If those died. Are there not witnesses? Bring them! They went overseas. Is there not an agreement? Is there no registrar of agreements? There is a registrar of agreements; as you say, if a document is lost, one writes a replacement. This is what one says, if the ketubah was lost, one writes a new one. Rebbi Abba objected: Was it not stated, she might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, wait until he dies, and collect a second time? Rebbi Yose bar Abun said to him: Would she not have to prove that she lived with him until he died?

HALAKHAH: “From encumbered property, how is that?” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody disputes a court document, he is not trustworthy. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him: Is that not the Mishnah? “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah”! Rebbi Joḥanan said to him: Babylonian, after I removed the clay from the pearl, you say to me: Is that not the Mishnah? Rav said, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she produces she collects. He changed his mind and said, she collects even at a place where one writes a ketubah; let anyone powerful object to this! Rebbi Yose objected: Was it not stated: She might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, and collect a second time? If those died. Are there not witnesses? Bring them! They went overseas. Is there not an agreement? Is there no registrar of agreements? There is a registrar of agreements; as you say, if a document is lost, one writes a replacement. This is what one says, if the ketubah was lost, one writes a new one. Rebbi Abba objected: Was it not stated, she might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, wait until he dies, and collect a second time? Rebbi Yose bar Abun said to him: Would she not have to prove that she lived with him until he died?

Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba found Rebbi Jonathan’s prozbol and ran to give it to him. He said to him, I do not need it, as it was stated: The creditor can be believed if he says, I discarded this document and tore it up. Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya: The Mishnah says so: “Since the times of the persecution, a woman collects without the bill of divorce and the creditor collects without prozbol.” Is that not impossible? I tore it without discarding? Here, I discarded and tore it.

MISHNAH: Two bills of divorce and two ketubot, she collects two ketubot. Two ketubot and one bill of divorce, or one ketubah and two bills of divorce, or one ketubah, and a bill of divorce, and death; she collects only one ketubah since a person who divorces his wife and takes her back, takes her back on the basis of her prior ketubah. If a minor was married off by his father, [his wife’s] ketubah is valid since he kept her by that understanding. If a proselyte converted together with his wife, her ketubah is valid since he kept her by that understanding.

MISHNAH: Two bills of divorce and two ketubot, she collects two ketubot. Two ketubot and one bill of divorce, or one ketubah and two bills of divorce, or one ketubah, and a bill of divorce, and death; she collects only one ketubah since a person who divorces his wife and takes her back, takes her back on the basis of her prior ketubah. If a minor was married off by his father, [his wife’s] ketubah is valid since he kept her by that understanding. If a proselyte converted together with his wife, her ketubah is valid since he kept her by that understanding.

MISHNAH: Two bills of divorce and two ketubot, she collects two ketubot. Two ketubot and one bill of divorce, or one ketubah and two bills of divorce, or one ketubah, and a bill of divorce, and death; she collects only one ketubah since a person who divorces his wife and takes her back, takes her back on the basis of her prior ketubah. If a minor was married off by his father, [his wife’s] ketubah is valid since he kept her by that understanding. If a proselyte converted together with his wife, her ketubah is valid since he kept her by that understanding.

MISHNAH: Two bills of divorce and two ketubot, she collects two ketubot. Two ketubot and one bill of divorce, or one ketubah and two bills of divorce, or one ketubah, and a bill of divorce, and death; she collects only one ketubah since a person who divorces his wife and takes her back, takes her back on the basis of her prior ketubah. If a minor was married off by his father, [his wife’s] ketubah is valid since he kept her by that understanding. If a proselyte converted together with his wife, her ketubah is valid since he kept her by that understanding.

HALAKHAH: “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah,” etc. “Two bills of divorce and two ketubot” etc. But only if the bill of divorce is dated between the two ketubot. So far if they are equal. If one was for a mina, the other for 200 [zuz]? Rav Huna and Rav Jeremiah and Rav Ḥisda. One said, she collects the first one. The other said, she collects the second one and the excess she collects from the date of the second.

HALAKHAH: “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah,” etc. “Two bills of divorce and two ketubot” etc. But only if the bill of divorce is dated between the two ketubot. So far if they are equal. If one was for a mina, the other for 200 [zuz]? Rav Huna and Rav Jeremiah and Rav Ḥisda. One said, she collects the first one. The other said, she collects the second one and the excess she collects from the date of the second.

HALAKHAH: “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah,” etc. “Two bills of divorce and two ketubot” etc. But only if the bill of divorce is dated between the two ketubot. So far if they are equal. If one was for a mina, the other for 200 [zuz]? Rav Huna and Rav Jeremiah and Rav Ḥisda. One said, she collects the first one. The other said, she collects the second one and the excess she collects from the date of the second.

One understands a proselyte. A minor? Can a minor divorce? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I explained it following what Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Only if he slept with her when he regained sight or became sane mentally. And here, if he slept with her after he reached adulthood.

There, we have stated: “A forced bill of divorce is valid in Israel; it is invalid from Gentiles.” Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him, up to 30 days he shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?

There, we have stated: “A forced bill of divorce is valid in Israel; it is invalid from Gentiles.” Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him, up to 30 days he shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?

There, we have stated: “A forced bill of divorce is valid in Israel; it is invalid from Gentiles.” Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him, up to 30 days he shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said that Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila say that they differ about sustenance. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may demand sustenance. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, one says to him, divorce her! And you say so? They wanted to say, for him who says they differ about the conditions attached to a ketubah, Rebbi Joḥanan said, she has the ketubah stipulations. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, everybody agrees that she cannot claim support since they even punished her heirs, so much more herself. But for him who says that they differ about sustenance, it follows that they do not differ about the stipulations of a ketubah. They fined her, but did not fine her heirs.

As it was stated: “If somebody went overseas and another person provided for his wife.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, another. Therefore, the father can recover. Rebbi Yose says, neither the father nor a third party can recover. There is a parallel disagreement, as we have stated there: “He has the right to what she finds and to her earnings, to dissolve her vows, and to receive her bill of divorce, but cannot eat usufruct in her lifetime… He is required to pay for her upkeep, her ransom, and her burial.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, the father. Therefore, a third party cannot recover. Rebbi Yose says, both the father or a third party can recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥaggai, both for burial as for upkeep the father can recover, a third party cannot recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, for burial both the father and also a third party can recover because it is unthinkable that his wife should be thrown to the dogs. For sustenance, neither the father nor a third party can recover.

MISHNAH: If somebody obligates himself about money for his son-in-law but then goes bankrupt, she must wait until her hair grows white. Admon says: “If I had obligated myself, I would have to wait until my hair grows white. My father obligated himself, what can I do? Marry definitively or divorce!” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement.

It was stated: Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, Admon and the rabbis did not disagree about one for whom the father had promised money but went bankrupt that she may sit until her hair grows white. Where did they disagree? If she promised herself. Admon says, she might say, “I was of the opinion that my father wants to give, but now my father does not want to give, what can I do? Marry definitively or divorce!” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, I am convinced by Admon’s statement.

Rebbi Yasa asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Is our Mishnah from Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel, since Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, any obstacle that is not from her side does not invalidate the bill of divorce? He said to him, here it is different because of opening the vow. Rebbi Yose said, but do we not deal with vows which do not need dissolution by a Sage? Rebbi Jonah said, we deal not only with one who made his vow dependent on something. So far it is if he wants to give him something. But in the case that he does not want to give to him, he can say, I wanted only to examine you; but since I saw that it gives you pain, it is as if I had received.

MISHNAH: If they were importuning him to marry his sister’s daughter and he said, a qônām if she ever has any usufruct from me, and similarly, a man who was about to divorce his wife and said, a qônām if my wife ever has any usufruct from me, they may have usufruct from him since he intended only about matters of marriage.

HALAKHAH: “If they were importuning him to marry his sister’s daughter,” etc. Rebbi Yose said, this is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “everything refers to the vow.” “And similarly, a man who was about to divorce his wife.” Rebbi Yose said, this is Rebbi Jehudah’s, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “everything refers to the vow.”

MISHNAH: One finds an opening for a man with his own honor and that of his children. One tells him, if you had known that tomorrow one will say of you, it is the habit of this man to divorce his wife, and about your daughters one will say, they are daughters of a divorcee, what did the mother of these do to get herself divorced? If he said, if I had known that it is so I would not have made the vow, then it is dissolved.

Rebbi Ze‘ira explained the Mishnah: “These are the vows which he can dissolve: Matters connected with mortification. [E. g.], ‘if I wash, if I do not wash; if I shall wear jewels, if I do not wear jewels.’ Rebbi Yose said, these are not vows of mortification” but vows between him and her. “The following are vows of mortification” following Rebbi Yose. For example, “she said, all produce of the world is qônām for me, he may dissolve.” The rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Vows between him and her are only dissolved as long as she is married to him. Rebbi Yose says, both vows of mortification and vows between him and her, if he dissolved them they are permanently dissolved. That means, the rabbis say, if he dissolves vows of mortification, they are permanently dissolved. Rebi Yose says, if he dissolves vows between him and her, they are permanently dissolved. What is the difference between them? If she said, any benefit from me shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Why can he not dissolve that? Because she did not say, any benefit from my body shall be qônām for you when I leave your domain. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila, both of them say: That is the essence of vows between him and her. In the opinion of Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said the same thing since we stated there: “Rebbi Joḥanan said, he shall dissolve it since maybe he would divorce her, then she would be forbidden to return to him.”

MISHNAH: 4: ‘A qônām that I shall not work according to the wishes of my father, or your father, or my brother, or your brother,’ he cannot dissolve. ‘According to your wish,’ he does not have to dissolve. Rebbi Aqiba says, he has to dissolve, maybe she works more than the required minimum. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, he shall dissolve since maybe he would divorce her, then she would be forbidden to return to him.

HALAKHAH: “ ‘T knew that there are vows,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the reason of Rebbi Meïr: It is a subterfuge. He wants her to make vows so he can divorce her. That is not so, he could have divorced her on the first occasion.

If a woman made a vow to be a nazir; her husband heard and did not dissolve it: Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Jehudah say, he put his finger between her teeth, for if he wants to confirm, he can confirm. If he said, I cannot stand her being a nazir, he should divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon say, she put her finger between her teeth, for if he wants to confirm, he can confirm. If she said, I can stand it to be a nazir, he may divorce her without paying the ketubah.” Remove this, how can Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Jehudah say so in the Mishnah? Even in the later Mishnah, why did he not dissolve? Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon follow the later Mishnah. But you might say, the earlier Mishnah. Why did she make the vow?

If a woman made a vow to be a nazir; her husband heard and did not dissolve it: Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Jehudah say, he put his finger between her teeth, for if he wants to confirm, he can confirm. If he said, I cannot stand her being a nazir, he should divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon say, she put her finger between her teeth, for if he wants to confirm, he can confirm. If she said, I can stand it to be a nazir, he may divorce her without paying the ketubah.” Remove this, how can Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Jehudah say so in the Mishnah? Even in the later Mishnah, why did he not dissolve? Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon follow the later Mishnah. But you might say, the earlier Mishnah. Why did she make the vow?

HALAKHAH: The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr says, one has to double one’s stipulation. It follows everybody’s opinion; one tells him: Watch and keep discipline. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr or Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema, as it was stated: “This is your bill of divorce, on condition that you not fly in the air, that you not cross the Sea on your feet, that is a bill of divorce. On condition that you fly in the air, that you cross the Sea on your feet, that is no bill of divorce; Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema said, it is a bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you should realize that he seeks a subterfuge for the bill of divorce, since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied. What is Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema’s reason? Since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied, it is as if the condition attached to the bill of divorce were satisfied.

HALAKHAH: The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr says, one has to double one’s stipulation. It follows everybody’s opinion; one tells him: Watch and keep discipline. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr or Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema, as it was stated: “This is your bill of divorce, on condition that you not fly in the air, that you not cross the Sea on your feet, that is a bill of divorce. On condition that you fly in the air, that you cross the Sea on your feet, that is no bill of divorce; Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema said, it is a bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you should realize that he seeks a subterfuge for the bill of divorce, since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied. What is Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema’s reason? Since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied, it is as if the condition attached to the bill of divorce were satisfied.

HALAKHAH: The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr says, one has to double one’s stipulation. It follows everybody’s opinion; one tells him: Watch and keep discipline. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr or Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema, as it was stated: “This is your bill of divorce, on condition that you not fly in the air, that you not cross the Sea on your feet, that is a bill of divorce. On condition that you fly in the air, that you cross the Sea on your feet, that is no bill of divorce; Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema said, it is a bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you should realize that he seeks a subterfuge for the bill of divorce, since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied. What is Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema’s reason? Since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied, it is as if the condition attached to the bill of divorce were satisfied.

HALAKHAH: The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr says, one has to double one’s stipulation. It follows everybody’s opinion; one tells him: Watch and keep discipline. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr or Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema, as it was stated: “This is your bill of divorce, on condition that you not fly in the air, that you not cross the Sea on your feet, that is a bill of divorce. On condition that you fly in the air, that you cross the Sea on your feet, that is no bill of divorce; Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema said, it is a bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you should realize that he seeks a subterfuge for the bill of divorce, since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied. What is Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema’s reason? Since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied, it is as if the condition attached to the bill of divorce were satisfied.

HALAKHAH: The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr says, one has to double one’s stipulation. It follows everybody’s opinion; one tells him: Watch and keep discipline. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr or Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema, as it was stated: “This is your bill of divorce, on condition that you not fly in the air, that you not cross the Sea on your feet, that is a bill of divorce. On condition that you fly in the air, that you cross the Sea on your feet, that is no bill of divorce; Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema said, it is a bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you should realize that he seeks a subterfuge for the bill of divorce, since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied. What is Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema’s reason? Since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied, it is as if the condition attached to the bill of divorce were satisfied.

HALAKHAH: The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr says, one has to double one’s stipulation. It follows everybody’s opinion; one tells him: Watch and keep discipline. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Meïr or Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema, as it was stated: “This is your bill of divorce, on condition that you not fly in the air, that you not cross the Sea on your feet, that is a bill of divorce. On condition that you fly in the air, that you cross the Sea on your feet, that is no bill of divorce; Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema said, it is a bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you should realize that he seeks a subterfuge for the bill of divorce, since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied. What is Rebbi Jehudah ben Tema’s reason? Since he attached conditions that cannot be satisfied, it is as if the condition attached to the bill of divorce were satisfied.