divorced

[If a man declares] “I have given my daughter in betrothal,” [or] “I gave her in betrothal and divorced her while she was still a minor,” and she is [now] a minor, he is believed. “I gave her in betrothal and divorced her while she was still a minor,” and she is now of majority age, he is not believed. “She was taken captive and I redeemed her,” whether she is a minor or of majority age he is not believed. If a man declares at the time of his death “I have sons,” he is believed; “I have brothers,” he is not believed. If one betroths his daughter without specifying which, the daughters of majority age are not included.

[If a man declares] “I have given my daughter in betrothal,” [or] “I gave her in betrothal and divorced her while she was still a minor,” and she is [now] a minor, he is believed. “I gave her in betrothal and divorced her while she was still a minor,” and she is now of majority age, he is not believed. “She was taken captive and I redeemed her,” whether she is a minor or of majority age he is not believed. If a man declares at the time of his death “I have sons,” he is believed; “I have brothers,” he is not believed. If one betroths his daughter without specifying which, the daughters of majority age are not included.

Wherever there is kiddushin and there is no transgression, the child goes after the status of the male. And what case is this? When the daughter of a priest, a Levite or an Israelite is married to a priest, a Levite or an Israelite. And wherever there is kiddushin and there is transgression, the child goes after the status of the flawed parent. And what case is this? When a widow is married to a high priest, or a divorced woman or a halutzah to an ordinary priest, or a mamzeret or a netinah to an Israelite, and the daughter of an Israelite to a mamzer or a natin. And any [woman] who cannot contract kiddushin with that particular person but can contract kiddushin with another person, the child is a mamzer. And what case is this? One who has intercourse with any relation prohibited in the Torah. And any [woman] who can not contract kiddushin with that particular person or with others, the child follows her status. And what case is this? The child issue of a female slave or a gentile woman.

It is losing proposition to meet up with a deaf-mute, an idiot or a minor: he that injures them is obligated; and they that injure others are exempt. It is a losing proposition to meet up with a slave or [married] woman; he that injures them is obligated; and they that injure others are exempt. However, they pay after some time; if the woman was divorced or the slave freed they are liable for restitution.

That which is found by a man’s minor son or daughter, and that which is found by his Canaanite slave or female slave, and that which is found by his wife belongs to him. That which is found by his son or daughter that are of age, and that which is found by his Hebrew slave or female slave, and that which is found by his wife whom he has divorced, even though he has not yet paid her ketubah, belongs to them.

If a man sent betrothal gifts to his father-in-law’s house, and he sent there 100 maneh (10,000 dinar) and he ate a betrothal meal of but one dinar, [and he afterward divorced his wife] they (the betrothal gifts) are not recoverable. But if he did not eat the betrothal meal, they are recoverable. If he sent many betrothal gifts in order for them to return with her to her his house [when he marries her], they are recoverable. If he sent few betrothal gifts which were to be used in her father’s house, they are not recoverable.

If there were two brothers, one poor and one rich, and their father left them a bath house or an olive press, if the father had made them for hire, the profit is split equally. But if he made them for his own use alone, the rich brother may say to the poor brother, “Buy for yourself slaves and they can wash in the bath house” or “Buy for yourself olives and prepare them in the olive press.” If there were two in the same town, and one’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon and other’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon, neither can bring forth a debt document on the other, and another person cannot bring forth a debt document against them. And if some person finds amongst his documents a document that states, “The [debt] document of Joseph ben Shimon is paid”, both of their [debt] documents are paid. What should they do? They should write their names to the third generation. And if the names are the same through the third generation, they should give themselves a sign. And if their signs are the same, they should write “Cohen”. If a man said to his son, “One of my debt documents is paid and I do not know which one”, then all are deemed to be paid. If two documents were found [amongst his documents] written to the same debtor, then the large one is paid and the small one is not paid. If a man lent money to his fellow on a guarantor’s security, he may not exact payment from the guarantor. But if he had said, “On the condition that I may exact payment from whom I wish”, then he may exact payment from the guarantor. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If the borrower had property, in neither case can he exact payment from the guarantor.” Moreover, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel used to say: “If a man was a guarantor for a woman’s ketubah and her husband divorced her, the husband must vow to derive no further benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of the guarantor and take his wife back again.”

How do witnesses become liable [to punishment] as perjurers? [If they say:] “We testify that so and so [a priest] is a son of a woman who had [formerly] been divorced or a haluzah,” it is not said that each witness should himself be as if he was born of a divorcee or a haluzah; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so is guilty of [a crime entailing] exile”, it is not said that each witness should himself be exiled; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say:] “We testify that so and so divorced his wife and has not paid her kethubah” seeing that either today or tomorrow he [the husband] will pay her kethubah, the assessment should be made how much a man will be willing to pay [now] for the ownership of her kethubah, on the condition that if she should be widowed or divorced [he will take it over] but if she should die, her husband will inherit her [estate including the kethubah]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so owes his friend one thousand zuz on the condition that he will pay him within thirty days”, while the debtor says “ten years”, the assessment should be made how much a man is willing to pay for the use of a thousand zuz, whether he pays them in thirty days or ten years.

How do witnesses become liable [to punishment] as perjurers? [If they say:] “We testify that so and so [a priest] is a son of a woman who had [formerly] been divorced or a haluzah,” it is not said that each witness should himself be as if he was born of a divorcee or a haluzah; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so is guilty of [a crime entailing] exile”, it is not said that each witness should himself be exiled; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say:] “We testify that so and so divorced his wife and has not paid her kethubah” seeing that either today or tomorrow he [the husband] will pay her kethubah, the assessment should be made how much a man will be willing to pay [now] for the ownership of her kethubah, on the condition that if she should be widowed or divorced [he will take it over] but if she should die, her husband will inherit her [estate including the kethubah]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so owes his friend one thousand zuz on the condition that he will pay him within thirty days”, while the debtor says “ten years”, the assessment should be made how much a man is willing to pay for the use of a thousand zuz, whether he pays them in thirty days or ten years.

How do witnesses become liable [to punishment] as perjurers? [If they say:] “We testify that so and so [a priest] is a son of a woman who had [formerly] been divorced or a haluzah,” it is not said that each witness should himself be as if he was born of a divorcee or a haluzah; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so is guilty of [a crime entailing] exile”, it is not said that each witness should himself be exiled; rather he receives forty [lashes]. [If they say:] “We testify that so and so divorced his wife and has not paid her kethubah” seeing that either today or tomorrow he [the husband] will pay her kethubah, the assessment should be made how much a man will be willing to pay [now] for the ownership of her kethubah, on the condition that if she should be widowed or divorced [he will take it over] but if she should die, her husband will inherit her [estate including the kethubah]. [If they say]: “We testify that so and so owes his friend one thousand zuz on the condition that he will pay him within thirty days”, while the debtor says “ten years”, the assessment should be made how much a man is willing to pay for the use of a thousand zuz, whether he pays them in thirty days or ten years.

"I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that I am a priest, or, that I am a levite, or, that I am not the son of a divorced woman, or, that I am not the son of a halutzah; That so-and-so is a priest, or, that so-and-so is a levite, or, that he is not the son of a divorced woman, or, that he is not the son of a halutzah; That so-and-so violated his daughter, or seduced his daughter; That my son injured me; That my neighbor injured me, or set fire to my haystack on the Sabbath" [And they deny knowledge of testimony] they are exempt.

"I adjure you that you come and bear testimony for me that I am a priest, or, that I am a levite, or, that I am not the son of a divorced woman, or, that I am not the son of a halutzah; That so-and-so is a priest, or, that so-and-so is a levite, or, that he is not the son of a divorced woman, or, that he is not the son of a halutzah; That so-and-so violated his daughter, or seduced his daughter; That my son injured me; That my neighbor injured me, or set fire to my haystack on the Sabbath" [And they deny knowledge of testimony] they are exempt.

A woman is betrothed by a denar or the value of a denar, according to the opinion of Beth Shammai. But Beth Hillel says: by a perutah or the value of a perutah. And how much is a perutah? One-eighth of an Italian issar. Beth Shammai says: one may dismiss his wife with an old bill of divorcement, But Beth Hillel forbids it. What is an old bill of divorcement? Whenever he was secluded with her after he has written it for her. One who divorces his wife and she [afterwards] spends a night with him at the [same] inn: Beth Shammai says: she does not require a second bill of divorcement from him. But Beth Hillel says: she requires a second bill of divorcement from him. When [does she require a second bill of divorcement]? When she was divorced after marriage. But if she was divorced after betrothal she does not require from him a second bill of divorcement, since he is not [yet] familiar with her.

A woman is betrothed by a denar or the value of a denar, according to the opinion of Beth Shammai. But Beth Hillel says: by a perutah or the value of a perutah. And how much is a perutah? One-eighth of an Italian issar. Beth Shammai says: one may dismiss his wife with an old bill of divorcement, But Beth Hillel forbids it. What is an old bill of divorcement? Whenever he was secluded with her after he has written it for her. One who divorces his wife and she [afterwards] spends a night with him at the [same] inn: Beth Shammai says: she does not require a second bill of divorcement from him. But Beth Hillel says: she requires a second bill of divorcement from him. When [does she require a second bill of divorcement]? When she was divorced after marriage. But if she was divorced after betrothal she does not require from him a second bill of divorcement, since he is not [yet] familiar with her.

Both men and women. Only the man has the power in his hand, but the woman does not have the power in her own hand because others have disposition over her. If she is widowed or divorced, the power is in her own hand.

Rebbi Zeïra said: Rebbi Eleazar (about one’s friend), Rebbi Joḥanan, and Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said the same thing. Rebbi Eleazar, as Rebbi Zeïra said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: A man may acquire a find for his friend. Rebbi Joḥanan, as we have stated there (Mishnah Baba Meẓiah 1:5): “The finds of his minor sons and daughters, of his Gentile slaves and slave girls, and of his wife, belong to him. The finds of his adult sons and daughters, of his Jewish slaves and slave girls, and of his divorced wife in case that he had not yet paid her ketubah, belong to them. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if they are not dependents. But if they are dependent on their father, their finds belong to him. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, as Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said: They disagree about a rich owner. But if the owner is poor, since he has the right to take it, the other person acquired it.

“ That all tithes should be mine as long as you own it, he gets its tithes as long as the buyer owns it.” When he sold it to a third party, he has no tithes. If the buyer then bought it back from the third party, Rebbi Ḥiyya states that he has no tithes, Rebbi Hoshaia states that the tithes are his. This disagreement turns out like the other disagreement, as we have stated there “that he who divorces his wife and then remarries her, remarries her on the basis of the first ketubah.” Rebbi Ḥanin stated before Rebbi La: Two Amoraïm, one says for ketubah but not for individual stipulations, and the other says, both for ketubah and individual stipulations. For him who says, for ketubah but not for individual stipulations, he has the tithes. For him who says, both for ketubah and for individual stipulations, he has no tithes. But did we not state: “If somebody received (as sharecropper) from the daughter of a Cohen, she has the tithes. If she married an Israel, they split the tithes. If she was widowed or divorced, she returns to her prior status.” There when he sold, here when he received. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “When she sold?” Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, there it left the power of both parties; here, it left the power of the seller but not that of the buyer.

If she did not manage to pay before she was divorced? Come and see, if she had so many tithes, would they not be hers? There tithes are defined but here the heave is still undefined. What compares to this? First-born of donkeys.

MISHNAH: When they came to a woman who was eating heave and told her your husband died, or he divorced you; similarly a slave who was eating heave when they came and told him your master died, or he sold you to an Israel or gave you as a gift, or made you a free person; similarly a Cohen who was eating heave when it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or the son of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, Rebbi Eliezer obliges them to pay principal and fifth, but Rebbi Joshua frees them. If he was standing on top of the altar and sacrificing when it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or the son of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, Rebbi Eliezer says that all sacrifices he performed on the altar are invalid but Rebbi Joshua declares them valid. If it became known that he has a bodily defect, his work is invalid. All of these, if heave was in their mouths, Rebbi Eliezer says, they should swallow it, Rebbi Joshua says, they should spit it out. If they said to him, you and the heave have become impure, Rebbi Eliezer says, he should swallow it, Rebbi Joshua says, he should spit it out. You or the heave were impure, or if it became known that it was ṭevel, or First Tithe of which its heave had not been taken, or Second Tithe or dedicated [food] that had not been redeemed, or that he tasted the taste of a bed bug in his mouth, he has to spit it out.

HALAKHAH: “A woman who was eating heave,” etc. It is acceptable, “your husband died.” “He divorced you?” The rabbis say, this follows the old Mishnah, according to which the betrothed daughter of an Israel eats heave and her father accepts her divorce document. Rebbi Eliezer says, you may even say following the later Mishnah; explain it that she said to him, bring my divorce document from place X and usually that should have taken him ten days to deliver to her but he found a galloping horse and brought it to her in five days. Rebbi Eliezer cannot follow Rebbi Eleazar, as we have stated: “Rebbi Eleazar forbids her immediately.” Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree that if she said, bring my divorce document from place X, that she may eat heave until the document arrives at that place? Rebbi Ḥaninah said, when she said to him, bring my divorce document from place X, it is as if she had said to him, it shall become a divorce document only after ten days. What she ate, she ate with permission.

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi follows Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Nathan Rebbi Jehudah, as we have stated there: “I cannot accept that you accept it for her, but here you have it and give it to her, if he wants to take it back, he may take it back.” The Mishnah is Rebbi’s, as it was stated: “If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he said to him, your wife said, accept my bill of divorce for me. ‘Bring it to her, give it to her, acquire it for her, receive it for her’, if he wants to take it back, he may not take it back, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Nathan says, ‘bring it to her, give it to her,’ if he wants to take it back, he may take it back; ‘acquire it for her, receive it for her’, if he wants to take it back, he may not take it back.” Rebbi says, in any of these cases he may not take it back except if he says, “I cannot accept that you accept it for her, but give it to her.” It is difficult for Rebbi, “here you have it from my word”, if he wants to take it back, he may not take it back. It is difficult for Rebbi Nathan, “here you have it from her word”, if he wants to take it back, he may not take it back. Rebbi Ḥuna said, he becomes his and her agent. Assi said, everywhere we have stated “his and her agent”, she is divorced and not divorced. He said to him, what do you have in your hand, did not Rebbi Zeïra, Ḥiyya bar Abun, Abba bar Taḥlifa, say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, when do they differ? If they thought about other things but if they still were at the same theme, it is a bill of divorce.

Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Rebbi follows Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Nathan Rebbi Jehudah, as we have stated there: “I cannot accept that you accept it for her, but here you have it and give it to her, if he wants to take it back, he may take it back.” The Mishnah is Rebbi’s, as it was stated: “If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he said to him, your wife said, accept my bill of divorce for me. ‘Bring it to her, give it to her, acquire it for her, receive it for her’, if he wants to take it back, he may not take it back, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Nathan says, ‘bring it to her, give it to her,’ if he wants to take it back, he may take it back; ‘acquire it for her, receive it for her’, if he wants to take it back, he may not take it back.” Rebbi says, in any of these cases he may not take it back except if he says, “I cannot accept that you accept it for her, but give it to her.” It is difficult for Rebbi, “here you have it from my word”, if he wants to take it back, he may not take it back. It is difficult for Rebbi Nathan, “here you have it from her word”, if he wants to take it back, he may not take it back. Rebbi Ḥuna said, he becomes his and her agent. Assi said, everywhere we have stated “his and her agent”, she is divorced and not divorced. He said to him, what do you have in your hand, did not Rebbi Zeïra, Ḥiyya bar Abun, Abba bar Taḥlifa, say in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, when do they differ? If they thought about other things but if they still were at the same theme, it is a bill of divorce.

If one inserted a stick, surrounded it by a partition, and threw into it from the public domain. Rebbi Isaac ben Eleazar says, a case in dispute. Rebbi Yudan objected: But did we not state: “If she was standing on the top of her roof and he threw it to her, as soon as it reached the roof’s airspace she is divorced.” Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah speaks about a roof with a parapet, after it descended into the airspace of the parapet. If there is no parapet, only if it descended into three [hand-breadths] close to the roof since any three [hand-breadths] close to the roof are like the roof.

“Together”, this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world. “And one of them died”, of those who lived. Even if he divorced her and then died? This one is exempted. “Without child”. Therefore, if he has a child she is exempted.

“Together”, this excludes the wife of his brother who did not live in his world. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: The she-ram and the wife of his brother who did not live in his world were in the paragraph. Why do you see fit to say that the co-wife of the she-ram is permitted but the co-wife of the wife of his brother who did not live in his world is forbidden? He said to him, the she-ram was removed because of another reason: “she will bear”, this excludes the one who cannot have children. Is it not enough that she cannot be eligible for the levirate but you also want to forbid her co-wife? But the wife of his brother who did not live in his world is under an incest prohibition and any incest prohibition frees the co-wife. Assi said, the co-wife of a she-ram is forbidden. The Mishnah disagrees with Assi: “All of these, if they died, or refused, or were divorced, or turned out to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: Assi follows Rebbi Meїr since Rebbi Meїr said, in any case where you cannot take me in levirate you cannot take my co-wife.

MISHNAH: All these free their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from ḥalîṣah and levirate forever. And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted. But you cannot say about his mother-in-law or his mother-in-law’s mother that they were found to be she-rams or that they had repudiated.

HALAKHAH: “All these free their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from ḥalîṣah and levirate, etc.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. But we hold in case she says “I cannot stand marriage”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

HALAKHAH: “All these free their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from ḥalîṣah and levirate, etc.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. But we hold in case she says “I cannot stand marriage”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

HALAKHAH: “All these free their co-wives and the co-wives of their co-wives from ḥalîṣah and levirate, etc.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother, to permit the co-wife to her father, and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. But we hold in case she says “I cannot stand marriage”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

“His daughter”. How can his daughter repudiate, is she not married by Torah standards, “my daughter I gave to this man”? Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Explain it by a minor, who was married off by her father and divorced, who is like an orphan while her father is alive.

MISHNAH: The obligation of levirate is on the oldest [brother] but if a younger one got the start on him, he acquired. If somebody is accused in matters of a slave woman and she was manumitted, or of a Gentile and she converted, he should not marry her but if he married her one does not remove her from him. If somebody is accused in matters of a married woman and she was forcibly divorced from [her husband], even if he married her he must divorce her.

“If somebody is accused in matters of a slave woman and she was manumitted, or of a Gentile and she converted, he should not marry her but if he married her one does not remove her from him.” If he agreed lawfully not to marry her and [nevertheless] married her, she is forcibly removed from him. If he divorced her, may he take her back? If you would say that, would you not defame her children? “If somebody is accused in matters of a married woman,” Rav said, that is, he was accused by witnesses. Rebbi Yose asked, if he was accused by witnesses, is that what was stated: If he divorced her, even if he married her, he must divorce her? If somebody else divorced her, he can keep her! If he was accused by witnesses, even if somebody else divorced her, he must divorce her! But that is what we deal with: If he was accused not by witnesses, if somebody else divorced her, he may keep her.

“If somebody is accused in matters of a slave woman and she was manumitted, or of a Gentile and she converted, he should not marry her but if he married her one does not remove her from him.” If he agreed lawfully not to marry her and [nevertheless] married her, she is forcibly removed from him. If he divorced her, may he take her back? If you would say that, would you not defame her children? “If somebody is accused in matters of a married woman,” Rav said, that is, he was accused by witnesses. Rebbi Yose asked, if he was accused by witnesses, is that what was stated: If he divorced her, even if he married her, he must divorce her? If somebody else divorced her, he can keep her! If he was accused by witnesses, even if somebody else divorced her, he must divorce her! But that is what we deal with: If he was accused not by witnesses, if somebody else divorced her, he may keep her.

“If somebody is accused in matters of a slave woman and she was manumitted, or of a Gentile and she converted, he should not marry her but if he married her one does not remove her from him.” If he agreed lawfully not to marry her and [nevertheless] married her, she is forcibly removed from him. If he divorced her, may he take her back? If you would say that, would you not defame her children? “If somebody is accused in matters of a married woman,” Rav said, that is, he was accused by witnesses. Rebbi Yose asked, if he was accused by witnesses, is that what was stated: If he divorced her, even if he married her, he must divorce her? If somebody else divorced her, he can keep her! If he was accused by witnesses, even if somebody else divorced her, he must divorce her! But that is what we deal with: If he was accused not by witnesses, if somebody else divorced her, he may keep her.

“If somebody is accused in matters of a slave woman and she was manumitted, or of a Gentile and she converted, he should not marry her but if he married her one does not remove her from him.” If he agreed lawfully not to marry her and [nevertheless] married her, she is forcibly removed from him. If he divorced her, may he take her back? If you would say that, would you not defame her children? “If somebody is accused in matters of a married woman,” Rav said, that is, he was accused by witnesses. Rebbi Yose asked, if he was accused by witnesses, is that what was stated: If he divorced her, even if he married her, he must divorce her? If somebody else divorced her, he can keep her! If he was accused by witnesses, even if somebody else divorced her, he must divorce her! But that is what we deal with: If he was accused not by witnesses, if somebody else divorced her, he may keep her.

“If somebody is accused in matters of a slave woman and she was manumitted, or of a Gentile and she converted, he should not marry her but if he married her one does not remove her from him.” If he agreed lawfully not to marry her and [nevertheless] married her, she is forcibly removed from him. If he divorced her, may he take her back? If you would say that, would you not defame her children? “If somebody is accused in matters of a married woman,” Rav said, that is, he was accused by witnesses. Rebbi Yose asked, if he was accused by witnesses, is that what was stated: If he divorced her, even if he married her, he must divorce her? If somebody else divorced her, he can keep her! If he was accused by witnesses, even if somebody else divorced her, he must divorce her! But that is what we deal with: If he was accused not by witnesses, if somebody else divorced her, he may keep her.

MISHNAH: A rabbi who forbade a woman to her husband because of a vow cannot marry her. If she repudiated or performed ḥalîṣah before him he may marry her since he acts as a court. And all who had wives who [subsequently] died may marry them. And to all who were married to others and were divorced or widowed, they can be married. All are permitted to their sons or brothers.

“ “And all who had wives who [subsequently] died may marry them.” It only says “who died”; therefore, not if they were divorced. “And to all who were married to others and were divorced or widowed, they can be married”, since usually nobody sins for an uncertain future. “All are permitted to their sons or brothers,” since usually nobody sins for the benefit of either his son ot his brother.

“ “And all who had wives who [subsequently] died may marry them.” It only says “who died”; therefore, not if they were divorced. “And to all who were married to others and were divorced or widowed, they can be married”, since usually nobody sins for an uncertain future. “All are permitted to their sons or brothers,” since usually nobody sins for the benefit of either his son ot his brother.

HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. Do the House of Shammai follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely? If they would follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, in case he had divorced the “bespoken” widow, she would not need ḥalîṣah! But Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the House of Shammai agree that if he divorced the “bespoken”, she needs ḥalîṣah! It must be they follow Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. If they would follow Rebbi Simeon, in any case, if “bespeaking” acquires, nothing follows it. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, why “his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”? Maybe “bespeaking” for the House of Shammai is like candidacy for Rebbi Simeon in the interpretation of the rabbis there. As the rabbis there say, “bespeaking” acquires and leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, [candidacy] acquires and leaves a remainder. Rebbi Simeon says, no candidacy can come after a candidacy, so the House of Shammai say here, no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”.

HALAKHAH: “Three brothers, two of whom are married to two sisters,” etc. Do the House of Shammai follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, since Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely? If they would follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, in case he had divorced the “bespoken” widow, she would not need ḥalîṣah! But Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, the House of Shammai agree that if he divorced the “bespoken”, she needs ḥalîṣah! It must be they follow Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says, “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire. If they would follow Rebbi Simeon, in any case, if “bespeaking” acquires, nothing follows it. If “bespeaking” does not acquire, why “his wife is with him and the other one should leave as the wife’s sister”? Maybe “bespeaking” for the House of Shammai is like candidacy for Rebbi Simeon in the interpretation of the rabbis there. As the rabbis there say, “bespeaking” acquires and leaves a remainder, so Rebbi Simeon says, [candidacy] acquires and leaves a remainder. Rebbi Simeon says, no candidacy can come after a candidacy, so the House of Shammai say here, no candidacy can come after a “bespeaking”.

MISHNAH: Of three brothers, two are married to two sisters and one to an unrelated woman. If one of the sisters’ husbands divorced his wife, when the one married to an unrelated woman died and the divorcer married her and then died, that is what they said: Of all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or turned out to be she-rams, the co-wives are permitted.

MISHNAH: Of three brothers, two are married to two sisters and one to an unrelated woman. If one of the sisters’ husbands divorced his wife, when the one married to an unrelated woman died and the divorcer married her and then died, that is what they said: Of all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or turned out to be she-rams, the co-wives are permitted.

HALAKHAH: “Of three brothers,” etc. Rebbi Ḥaggai said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, not only if he divorced and after that married, but even if he married and after that divorced. That is what we had stated: “Of all of these, if they died or were divorced, their co-wives are permitted.”

HALAKHAH: “Of three brothers,” etc. Rebbi Ḥaggai said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, not only if he divorced and after that married, but even if he married and after that divorced. That is what we had stated: “Of all of these, if they died or were divorced, their co-wives are permitted.”

HALAKHAH: “Of three brothers,” etc. Rebbi Ḥaggai said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, not only if he divorced and after that married, but even if he married and after that divorced. That is what we had stated: “Of all of these, if they died or were divorced, their co-wives are permitted.”

HALAKHAH: “If he married her, she is his wife in every respect”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah.” At the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.

HALAKHAH: “If he married her, she is his wife in every respect”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah.” At the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.

HALAKHAH: “If he married her, she is his wife in every respect”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah.” At the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.

Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna said: A betrothed woman who died does not have a ketubah since she was not permitted to marry outside. That you should not say [the case] should be considered as if he divorced her and she should have a ketubah; therefore it was necessary to say that she does not have a ketubah.

MISHNAH: If his wife died, her sister is permitted to him. If he divorced her and she died, her sister is permitted to him. If she had married another man and died, her sister is permitted to him. If his sister-in-law died, her sister is permitted to him. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her and she died, her sister is permitted to him.

MISHNAH: A widow betrothed to the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had participated in ḥalîṣah to a private Cohen are not permitted to eat heave; Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon declare them able. When they were widowed or divorced, after marriage they are disabled, after betrothal they are enabled.

MISHNAH: A man should not rest from being fruitful and multiply unless he has children. The House of Shammai say two males, but the House of Hillel say a male and a female, as it is said “male and female He created them.” If he married a wife and she stayed with him for ten years and had no child he is not permitted to rest. If he divorced her, she is permitted to marry another and the second [husband] is permitted to stay with her for ten years, and if she had a miscarriage she counts from the moment of the miscarriage. The man is commanded to be fruitful and multiply but not the woman. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said, for both of them it says “God blessed them and God said to them, be fruitful and multiply,” etc.

Are these all? There are others: If somebody takes back a woman he divorced after she had been married [to another man], she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. If he slept with the sister of a woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. If a man with injured testicles married a qualified woman, she is forbidden to the husband but permitted to the levir. This supports Rebbi Jonah, since Rebbi Jonah said, the groupings of Rebbi are not exhaustive.

What is the difference between these and those? Since these are words of the Torah and the words of the Torah do not need support, therefore they have Ketubah. Those, because they are words of the Sopherim and the words of the Sopherim need support, therefore they do not have Ketubah. Some want to say since these are punished together with the child, they did not fine them, therefore they have Ketubah. Those, since they are not punished together with the child, they fined them, therefore they do not have Ketubah What is the difference between them? He who remarried his divorced wife after she had remarried. For him who says since these are words of the Torah, and this case is a word of the Torah, therefore she has Ketubah. For those who want to say since these are punished together with the child, this one, since neither she nor the child is punished, therefore, she has no Ketubah.

So far if she knows that she is a married woman. What if she did not know that she was a married woman? Let us hear from the following: An underage girl who was married off by her father. She was divorced and went and married on her own. About this Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife. Is there a difference? There, whether she knows or does not know, here also whether she knows or does not know.

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.

A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was betrothed, and two are saying, she was not betrothed, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was betrothed and divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others would come and identify the man who was betrothed to her.

A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was betrothed, and two are saying, she was not betrothed, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was betrothed and divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others would come and identify the man who was betrothed to her.

MISHNAH: If they told her, your husband died, and she remarried, and then they told her, he was alive but died, she must leave and the first child is a bastard, but the last is not a bastard. If they told her, your husband died; she was betrothed and after that her husband returned, she is permitted to return to him. Even though the second [husband] gave her a bill of divorce he did not disable her from priesthood. This Rebbi Eleazar ben Matthew explained, “a woman divorced from her husband,” and not a woman divorced from a non-husband.

MISHNAH: If they told her, your husband died, and she remarried, and then they told her, he was alive but died, she must leave and the first child is a bastard, but the last is not a bastard. If they told her, your husband died; she was betrothed and after that her husband returned, she is permitted to return to him. Even though the second [husband] gave her a bill of divorce he did not disable her from priesthood. This Rebbi Eleazar ben Matthew explained, “a woman divorced from her husband,” and not a woman divorced from a non-husband.

MISHNAH: [A male] nine years and one day old disables for the brothers and the brothers disable for him; only that he disables at the beginning and the brothers disable at beginning and end. How is that? [A male] nine years and one day old who copulated with his sister-in-law disabled her for the brothers. If [any one of] the brothers copulated with her, “bespoke” her, divorced her, or performed ḥalîṣah with her, they disabled her for him.

Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.

HALAKHAH: “[A woman] did not wait three months,” etc. “If both were Cohanim, he has to mourn intensely for them,” etc. Where do we hold? It is impossible after death [of the first] since we have stated: “He has to mourn intensely for them and they for him.” One understands that he does not defile himself for the second [husband], I say that he is the son of the first. But why does he not defile himself for the first one? It must be that he divorced. Then, as you take it, if he is his son, he should defile himself for him. If he is not his son, he is desecrated, and what happens if he defiles himself? It must be that he raped. Did not Rebbi Abba say in the name of Abba bar Jeremiah that a rape victim does not have to wait three months? Should we say, following the rabbis, but we follow Rebbi Yose!

If she had been in a situation that she could not repudiate, may she go and repudiate? Let us hear from the following: An underage girl who was married off by her father but then was divorced, if she went and married by herself she nevertheless can repudiate.

What is the reason of the House of Shammai? The husband she may repudiate since she married him with her consent. The levir to whom she was given by an act of God she cannot repudiate. What is the reason of the House of Hillel? If she can repudiate the principal, so much more the levir! Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. If she says, I can stand marriage with you but not with your brother? Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

What is the reason of the House of Shammai? The husband she may repudiate since she married him with her consent. The levir to whom she was given by an act of God she cannot repudiate. What is the reason of the House of Hillel? If she can repudiate the principal, so much more the levir! Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. If she says, I can stand marriage with you but not with your brother? Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

What is the reason of the House of Shammai? The husband she may repudiate since she married him with her consent. The levir to whom she was given by an act of God she cannot repudiate. What is the reason of the House of Hillel? If she can repudiate the principal, so much more the levir! Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. If she says, I can stand marriage with you but not with your brother? Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

“His daughter”. How can his daughter repudiate, is she not married by Torah standards, “my daughter I gave to this man”? Rebbi Huna in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Explain it by a minor, who was married off by her father and divorced, who is like an orphan while her father is alive.

MISHNAH: If [a girl] repudiates a man, he is permitted [to marry] her relatives and she is permitted [to marry] his relatives; he did not disable her for the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce, he is forbidden [to marry] her relatives and she is forbidden [to marry] his relatives; he did disable her for the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce and later took her back, then she repudiated him and married another man from whom she became widowed or divorced, she is permitted to return to him. If she repudiated him and he took her back, then he gave her a bill of divorce and she married another man from whom she became widowed or divorced, she is prohibited to return to him. That is the principle: By divorce after repudiation she is prohibited to return to him; by repudiation after divorce she is permitted to return to him.

MISHNAH: If [a girl] repudiates a man, he is permitted [to marry] her relatives and she is permitted [to marry] his relatives; he did not disable her for the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce, he is forbidden [to marry] her relatives and she is forbidden [to marry] his relatives; he did disable her for the priesthood. If he gave her a bill of divorce and later took her back, then she repudiated him and married another man from whom she became widowed or divorced, she is permitted to return to him. If she repudiated him and he took her back, then he gave her a bill of divorce and she married another man from whom she became widowed or divorced, she is prohibited to return to him. That is the principle: By divorce after repudiation she is prohibited to return to him; by repudiation after divorce she is permitted to return to him.

MISHNAH: If somebody divorced his wife and later took her back, she is permitted to the levir but Rebbi Eliezer forbids her. Similarly, if somebody divorced an orphan girl and took her back, she is permitted to the levir but Rebbi Eliezer forbids her. If an underage girl who was married off by her father was divorced, she is like an orphan during her father’s lifetime. If she was taken back, she is prohibited to the levir. The Sages agree with Rebbi Eliezer in case he divorced her as a minor and took her back as a minor, since her divorce is a total divorce but her return was not complete. But if he divorced her as a minor and took her back as an adult or she became an adult while married to him, she is permitted to the levir.

MISHNAH: If somebody divorced his wife and later took her back, she is permitted to the levir but Rebbi Eliezer forbids her. Similarly, if somebody divorced an orphan girl and took her back, she is permitted to the levir but Rebbi Eliezer forbids her. If an underage girl who was married off by her father was divorced, she is like an orphan during her father’s lifetime. If she was taken back, she is prohibited to the levir. The Sages agree with Rebbi Eliezer in case he divorced her as a minor and took her back as a minor, since her divorce is a total divorce but her return was not complete. But if he divorced her as a minor and took her back as an adult or she became an adult while married to him, she is permitted to the levir.

MISHNAH: If somebody divorced his wife and later took her back, she is permitted to the levir but Rebbi Eliezer forbids her. Similarly, if somebody divorced an orphan girl and took her back, she is permitted to the levir but Rebbi Eliezer forbids her. If an underage girl who was married off by her father was divorced, she is like an orphan during her father’s lifetime. If she was taken back, she is prohibited to the levir. The Sages agree with Rebbi Eliezer in case he divorced her as a minor and took her back as a minor, since her divorce is a total divorce but her return was not complete. But if he divorced her as a minor and took her back as an adult or she became an adult while married to him, she is permitted to the levir.

MISHNAH: If somebody divorced his wife and later took her back, she is permitted to the levir but Rebbi Eliezer forbids her. Similarly, if somebody divorced an orphan girl and took her back, she is permitted to the levir but Rebbi Eliezer forbids her. If an underage girl who was married off by her father was divorced, she is like an orphan during her father’s lifetime. If she was taken back, she is prohibited to the levir. The Sages agree with Rebbi Eliezer in case he divorced her as a minor and took her back as a minor, since her divorce is a total divorce but her return was not complete. But if he divorced her as a minor and took her back as an adult or she became an adult while married to him, she is permitted to the levir.

MISHNAH: If somebody divorced his wife and later took her back, she is permitted to the levir but Rebbi Eliezer forbids her. Similarly, if somebody divorced an orphan girl and took her back, she is permitted to the levir but Rebbi Eliezer forbids her. If an underage girl who was married off by her father was divorced, she is like an orphan during her father’s lifetime. If she was taken back, she is prohibited to the levir. The Sages agree with Rebbi Eliezer in case he divorced her as a minor and took her back as a minor, since her divorce is a total divorce but her return was not complete. But if he divorced her as a minor and took her back as an adult or she became an adult while married to him, she is permitted to the levir.

HALAKHAH: “The Sages agree,” etc. What is Rebbi Eliezer’s reason? That she was forbidden to him for an hour. The Sages agree with Rebbi Eliezer about the underage girl who was married off by her father and divorced, that she is like an orphan during her father’s lifetime. Her betrothal and divorce were by biblical standards; her remarriage was not by biblical standards.

HALAKHAH: Is the degree of acquisition of one equal to that of the other? What does he do? Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav: He marries the deaf-mute and divorces her; the underage girl has to wait until she can perform ḥalîṣah.” Why can she not perform ḥalîṣah immediately? She cannot because of Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Meїr said that one does not perform levirate or ḥalîṣah with an underage girl, since she might be found to be a she-ram. If he sleeps with the underage girl, he has to divorce her, and the deaf-mute is permanently forbidden. If he transgressed and had intercourse with the deaf-mute, he divorces her and she became permitted.” This follows what Rebbi Hila said, in order to fix her status. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Hila: What means, “in order to fix her status”? As you say there, he should perform ḥalîṣah for the aspect that was acquired in her and marry her co-wife; could he not perform ḥalîṣah for the aspect that was acquired in the underage girl and marry the deaf-mute? He said to him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: We never find two sisters-in-law of whom one performs ḥalîṣah and one is married in levirate. Do we find two sisters-in-law of whom one performs ḥalîṣah and one is divorced? He said to him, that happens. That is what we have stated there: “If he ‘bespoke’ one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, the first one needs a bill of divorce”.

Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan: The wife of a deaf-mute or an insane? He said to him, that does not even need a reparation sacrifice for a possible sin. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It does not even need a reparation sacrifice for a possible sin. Since you say, it does not even need a reparation sacrifice for a possible sin; if another man came and gave her qiddušin, they take hold of her. If he divorced, is she permitted to remarry the first [husband]? That is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: About the wife of a deaf-mute who after being divorced by the deaf-mute went and married a deaf-mute or a hearing person, I am reading: “Her first husband who sent her away cannot come to take her back.” About the wife of a hearing person who after being divorced went and married a deaf-mute or a hearing person, I am reading: “Her first husband who sent her away cannot … ” If a deaf-mute’s husband went overseas and they came and told his wife, your husband has died, and she went and married a deaf-mute or a hearing person, and then her husband returned, she has to leave both of them. If the husband of a hearing wife went overseas and they came and told her, your husband has died, and she went and married a deaf-mute, and then her hearing [husband] returned, we would think that the deaf-mute should divorce her but the hearing person can keep her. She is still under these disabilities.

Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan: The wife of a deaf-mute or an insane? He said to him, that does not even need a reparation sacrifice for a possible sin. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It does not even need a reparation sacrifice for a possible sin. Since you say, it does not even need a reparation sacrifice for a possible sin; if another man came and gave her qiddušin, they take hold of her. If he divorced, is she permitted to remarry the first [husband]? That is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: About the wife of a deaf-mute who after being divorced by the deaf-mute went and married a deaf-mute or a hearing person, I am reading: “Her first husband who sent her away cannot come to take her back.” About the wife of a hearing person who after being divorced went and married a deaf-mute or a hearing person, I am reading: “Her first husband who sent her away cannot … ” If a deaf-mute’s husband went overseas and they came and told his wife, your husband has died, and she went and married a deaf-mute or a hearing person, and then her husband returned, she has to leave both of them. If the husband of a hearing wife went overseas and they came and told her, your husband has died, and she went and married a deaf-mute, and then her hearing [husband] returned, we would think that the deaf-mute should divorce her but the hearing person can keep her. She is still under these disabilities.

Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan: The wife of a deaf-mute or an insane? He said to him, that does not even need a reparation sacrifice for a possible sin. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It does not even need a reparation sacrifice for a possible sin. Since you say, it does not even need a reparation sacrifice for a possible sin; if another man came and gave her qiddušin, they take hold of her. If he divorced, is she permitted to remarry the first [husband]? That is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: About the wife of a deaf-mute who after being divorced by the deaf-mute went and married a deaf-mute or a hearing person, I am reading: “Her first husband who sent her away cannot come to take her back.” About the wife of a hearing person who after being divorced went and married a deaf-mute or a hearing person, I am reading: “Her first husband who sent her away cannot … ” If a deaf-mute’s husband went overseas and they came and told his wife, your husband has died, and she went and married a deaf-mute or a hearing person, and then her husband returned, she has to leave both of them. If the husband of a hearing wife went overseas and they came and told her, your husband has died, and she went and married a deaf-mute, and then her hearing [husband] returned, we would think that the deaf-mute should divorce her but the hearing person can keep her. She is still under these disabilities.

“If she became insane he shall not divorce.” In the House of Rebbi Yannai they said, because of the fence. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce. Rebbi Nehemiah bar Mar Uqban (the son) [in the name] of Rebbi Yose explained three cases. If he transgressed and divorced her. According to him who said because of a fence, he divorced. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, it is forbidden. If she has a son, or a father, or a brother. According to him who said because of a fence, it is forbidden. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, she has a father and can preserve her bill of divorce. Sometimes she is insane and sometimes of lucid mind. According to him who said because of a fence, it is forbidden. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, sometimes she can preserve her bill of divorce.

“If she became insane he shall not divorce.” In the House of Rebbi Yannai they said, because of the fence. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce. Rebbi Nehemiah bar Mar Uqban (the son) [in the name] of Rebbi Yose explained three cases. If he transgressed and divorced her. According to him who said because of a fence, he divorced. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, it is forbidden. If she has a son, or a father, or a brother. According to him who said because of a fence, it is forbidden. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, she has a father and can preserve her bill of divorce. Sometimes she is insane and sometimes of lucid mind. According to him who said because of a fence, it is forbidden. According to him who said because she cannot preserve her bill of divorce, sometimes she can preserve her bill of divorce.

MISHNAH: Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, why can a deaf-mute woman be divorced but a deaf-mute man cannot divorce? They told him, a divorcing man is not comparable to a divorced woman since a woman can be divorced with or against her will but a man divorces only by his own will. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Gudgada testified about a deaf-mute girl who was married off by her father that she could be divorced by a bill of divorce. They said to him, that is an example.

MISHNAH: Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, why can a deaf-mute woman be divorced but a deaf-mute man cannot divorce? They told him, a divorcing man is not comparable to a divorced woman since a woman can be divorced with or against her will but a man divorces only by his own will. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Gudgada testified about a deaf-mute girl who was married off by her father that she could be divorced by a bill of divorce. They said to him, that is an example.

MISHNAH: Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, why can a deaf-mute woman be divorced but a deaf-mute man cannot divorce? They told him, a divorcing man is not comparable to a divorced woman since a woman can be divorced with or against her will but a man divorces only by his own will. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Gudgada testified about a deaf-mute girl who was married off by her father that she could be divorced by a bill of divorce. They said to him, that is an example.

MISHNAH: Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, why can a deaf-mute woman be divorced but a deaf-mute man cannot divorce? They told him, a divorcing man is not comparable to a divorced woman since a woman can be divorced with or against her will but a man divorces only by his own will. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Gudgada testified about a deaf-mute girl who was married off by her father that she could be divorced by a bill of divorce. They said to him, that is an example.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri testified,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah asked before Rebbi Hila. The matters seem reasonable for a hearing woman of sound mind, that she is divorced with or without her acquiescence. But a deaf-mute woman who has no will should not be divorced except with her acquiescence. But is it not testimony “that is an example”; does one add to a testimony? But Rebbi Ḥanania is of the opinion that this deals with a hearing girl who was married off by her father and became deaf-and-dumb. Rebbi Yose is of the opinion that this deals with an underage girl who was married off by her father and became divorced.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri testified,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah asked before Rebbi Hila. The matters seem reasonable for a hearing woman of sound mind, that she is divorced with or without her acquiescence. But a deaf-mute woman who has no will should not be divorced except with her acquiescence. But is it not testimony “that is an example”; does one add to a testimony? But Rebbi Ḥanania is of the opinion that this deals with a hearing girl who was married off by her father and became deaf-and-dumb. Rebbi Yose is of the opinion that this deals with an underage girl who was married off by her father and became divorced.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri testified,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah asked before Rebbi Hila. The matters seem reasonable for a hearing woman of sound mind, that she is divorced with or without her acquiescence. But a deaf-mute woman who has no will should not be divorced except with her acquiescence. But is it not testimony “that is an example”; does one add to a testimony? But Rebbi Ḥanania is of the opinion that this deals with a hearing girl who was married off by her father and became deaf-and-dumb. Rebbi Yose is of the opinion that this deals with an underage girl who was married off by her father and became divorced.

HALAKHAH: “A woman went with her husband,” etc. Just as you say, “if there are witnesses that she is a married woman and she says, I was divorced, she is not trustworthy;” would I say it is the same here? There is a difference for witnesses of death since if he comes he disproves [the testimony]. Then she should be trustworthy to say: “my levir died”! That is impossible since we have stated: “A woman is not trustworthy if she says ‘my levir died’ to remarry, or ‘my sister died’ to enter her house.” Rebbi Abba said, she is trustworthy for her husband whom she married out of her free will; she is not trustworthy about her levir on whom she was thrown against her will. Rebbi Hoshaia asked, think of it, then she should not be trustworthy if she was forced to marry him!

What is a quarrel? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi. “You never gave me qiddušin, you did not divorce me, I never was your wife,” that is not a quarrel. “You gave me qiddušin, you divorced me, but you never paid me what is owed me under my ketubah,” that is a quarrel. When Rebbi Abba said this before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, he said to him, my son, even if she clearly requests to be divorced.

What is a quarrel? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi. “You never gave me qiddušin, you did not divorce me, I never was your wife,” that is not a quarrel. “You gave me qiddušin, you divorced me, but you never paid me what is owed me under my ketubah,” that is a quarrel. When Rebbi Abba said this before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba, he said to him, my son, even if she clearly requests to be divorced.

MISHNAH: Everybody agrees that he may not stipulate with her about before she was preliminarily married or about after she was divorced. If she was secluded after that, became impure, and after that he took her back, he cannot stipulate with her. This is the rule: He cannot stipulate about any intercourse she could have had and would not be forbidden to him.

HALAKHAH: “Everybody agrees that he may not stipulate with her about before she was preliminarily married or about after she was divorced,” etc. Rebbi Yannai said, it is obvious that a man may forgive about his jealousy. If he divorced her it is as if he had forgiven. How is that? If he had declared his jealousy, divorced her, took her back, and then she was at a secluded place. If you say, if he divorced her it is as if he had forgiven, he has to declare his jealousy a second time. But if you say, if he divorced her it is as if he had not forgiven, he does not have to declare his jealousy a second time. But if he had declared his jealousy, she was at a secluded place and he knew it, then he divorced her, took her back, and then she was at a secluded place, if she drank and the water did nothing to her, she is pure. Or maybe that since the water does not check out a woman forbidden to her husband, she might be impure.

HALAKHAH: “Everybody agrees that he may not stipulate with her about before she was preliminarily married or about after she was divorced,” etc. Rebbi Yannai said, it is obvious that a man may forgive about his jealousy. If he divorced her it is as if he had forgiven. How is that? If he had declared his jealousy, divorced her, took her back, and then she was at a secluded place. If you say, if he divorced her it is as if he had forgiven, he has to declare his jealousy a second time. But if you say, if he divorced her it is as if he had not forgiven, he does not have to declare his jealousy a second time. But if he had declared his jealousy, she was at a secluded place and he knew it, then he divorced her, took her back, and then she was at a secluded place, if she drank and the water did nothing to her, she is pure. Or maybe that since the water does not check out a woman forbidden to her husband, she might be impure.

HALAKHAH: “Everybody agrees that he may not stipulate with her about before she was preliminarily married or about after she was divorced,” etc. Rebbi Yannai said, it is obvious that a man may forgive about his jealousy. If he divorced her it is as if he had forgiven. How is that? If he had declared his jealousy, divorced her, took her back, and then she was at a secluded place. If you say, if he divorced her it is as if he had forgiven, he has to declare his jealousy a second time. But if you say, if he divorced her it is as if he had not forgiven, he does not have to declare his jealousy a second time. But if he had declared his jealousy, she was at a secluded place and he knew it, then he divorced her, took her back, and then she was at a secluded place, if she drank and the water did nothing to her, she is pure. Or maybe that since the water does not check out a woman forbidden to her husband, she might be impure.