divorced

HALAKHAH: “Everybody agrees that he may not stipulate with her about before she was preliminarily married or about after she was divorced,” etc. Rebbi Yannai said, it is obvious that a man may forgive about his jealousy. If he divorced her it is as if he had forgiven. How is that? If he had declared his jealousy, divorced her, took her back, and then she was at a secluded place. If you say, if he divorced her it is as if he had forgiven, he has to declare his jealousy a second time. But if you say, if he divorced her it is as if he had not forgiven, he does not have to declare his jealousy a second time. But if he had declared his jealousy, she was at a secluded place and he knew it, then he divorced her, took her back, and then she was at a secluded place, if she drank and the water did nothing to her, she is pure. Or maybe that since the water does not check out a woman forbidden to her husband, she might be impure.

HALAKHAH: “Everybody agrees that he may not stipulate with her about before she was preliminarily married or about after she was divorced,” etc. Rebbi Yannai said, it is obvious that a man may forgive about his jealousy. If he divorced her it is as if he had forgiven. How is that? If he had declared his jealousy, divorced her, took her back, and then she was at a secluded place. If you say, if he divorced her it is as if he had forgiven, he has to declare his jealousy a second time. But if you say, if he divorced her it is as if he had not forgiven, he does not have to declare his jealousy a second time. But if he had declared his jealousy, she was at a secluded place and he knew it, then he divorced her, took her back, and then she was at a secluded place, if she drank and the water did nothing to her, she is pure. Or maybe that since the water does not check out a woman forbidden to her husband, she might be impure.

HALAKHAH: “Everybody agrees that he may not stipulate with her about before she was preliminarily married or about after she was divorced,” etc. Rebbi Yannai said, it is obvious that a man may forgive about his jealousy. If he divorced her it is as if he had forgiven. How is that? If he had declared his jealousy, divorced her, took her back, and then she was at a secluded place. If you say, if he divorced her it is as if he had forgiven, he has to declare his jealousy a second time. But if you say, if he divorced her it is as if he had not forgiven, he does not have to declare his jealousy a second time. But if he had declared his jealousy, she was at a secluded place and he knew it, then he divorced her, took her back, and then she was at a secluded place, if she drank and the water did nothing to her, she is pure. Or maybe that since the water does not check out a woman forbidden to her husband, she might be impure.

Did we not state: “Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water checks her out for every single intercourse for which she receives her husband after [intercourse with] her paramour, so it checks him out. Since she in general becomes forbidden, whether by him or by another [man], she is checked out. But when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out. If it checked him out but not her, I would say that merit suspends for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and it swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that he was in secret with other women. Did we not think to say, when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out? Explain it that he had criminal intent but she acted in error; then the water checked him out but not her. [ If the water checked her out but not him,] I would say that merit suspends for (her) [him]. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and her belly swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that she was in secret with other men. Then if he divorced her, she would be permitted to him. Explain it that he acted in error but she had criminal intent; then the water checked her out but not him. If he had criminal intent but she acted in error, then it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that he had criminal intent and you say so? If he acted in error but she had criminal intent, it is obvious that she is forbidden to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that she left because of him and you say so? From where do we know that all depends on her? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Is is written: “Do not ejaculate semen into your neighbor’s wife to be impure through her.” It depends on her; if she had criminal intent, she is forbidden, acted in error she is permitted.

Did we not state: “Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water checks her out for every single intercourse for which she receives her husband after [intercourse with] her paramour, so it checks him out. Since she in general becomes forbidden, whether by him or by another [man], she is checked out. But when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out. If it checked him out but not her, I would say that merit suspends for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and it swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that he was in secret with other women. Did we not think to say, when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out? Explain it that he had criminal intent but she acted in error; then the water checked him out but not her. [ If the water checked her out but not him,] I would say that merit suspends for (her) [him]. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and her belly swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that she was in secret with other men. Then if he divorced her, she would be permitted to him. Explain it that he acted in error but she had criminal intent; then the water checked her out but not him. If he had criminal intent but she acted in error, then it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that he had criminal intent and you say so? If he acted in error but she had criminal intent, it is obvious that she is forbidden to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that she left because of him and you say so? From where do we know that all depends on her? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Is is written: “Do not ejaculate semen into your neighbor’s wife to be impure through her.” It depends on her; if she had criminal intent, she is forbidden, acted in error she is permitted.

Did we not state: “Just as the water checks her out so it checks him out”? Just as she is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Just as the water checks her out for every single intercourse for which she receives her husband after [intercourse with] her paramour, so it checks him out. Since she in general becomes forbidden, whether by him or by another [man], she is checked out. But when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out. If it checked him out but not her, I would say that merit suspends for her. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and it swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that he was in secret with other women. Did we not think to say, when he makes [her] drink, he is checked out? Explain it that he had criminal intent but she acted in error; then the water checked him out but not her. [ If the water checked her out but not him,] I would say that merit suspends for (her) [him]. That is according to him who says that merit suspends and it is not recognizable. But following him who says that merit suspends and it is recognizable? Look, she was not recognized! But I could say that she drank uncovered water and her belly swelled. They should not have her checked out in this way but correctly! But I could say that she was in secret with other men. Then if he divorced her, she would be permitted to him. Explain it that he acted in error but she had criminal intent; then the water checked her out but not him. If he had criminal intent but she acted in error, then it is obvious that she is permitted to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that he had criminal intent and you say so? If he acted in error but she had criminal intent, it is obvious that she is forbidden to her house. If he divorced her, would she be permitted to him? Is it possible to say that she left because of him and you say so? From where do we know that all depends on her? Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Is is written: “Do not ejaculate semen into your neighbor’s wife to be impure through her.” It depends on her; if she had criminal intent, she is forbidden, acted in error she is permitted.

MISHNAH: If a woman became widowed or divorced and she claims to have been married as a virgin, but he says not so, I married you as a widow, if there are witnesses that she went out in hinuma or with uncovered hair, her ketubah is 200 [zuz]. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa says, the distribution of roasted kernels also is proof.

HALAKHAH: “If a woman became widowed,” etc. We understand if she was divorced. If she became widowed, who opposes? The heirs.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

MISHNAH: If a woman said, I was married but I am divorced, she is to be trusted, since the mouth which forbade is the mouth which permits. But if there are witnesses that she is married and she says, I am divorced, she is not trustworthy.

MISHNAH: If a woman said, I was married but I am divorced, she is to be trusted, since the mouth which forbade is the mouth which permits. But if there are witnesses that she is married and she says, I am divorced, she is not trustworthy.

HALAKHAH: “If a woman said, I was married,” etc. It was stated: If the witnesses came after she remarried, she should not leave. Rav Ḥuna and Rebbi Ḥanina both say, not only after she remarried but even after the court authorized her to remarry. As the following: A woman came to Rebbi Joḥanan and said to him, I was married but I am divorced, and he permitted her. After she left, they said to him, are not her witnesses at Lod? He said, so I am saying: Should she wait even if her witnesses are at קסוסנון? Rebbi Yose bar Rebbi Abun said, there were two cases. In one case, they said to him, are not her witnesses at Lod? In the other case, they said to him, are not her witnesses at Caesarea? And so it was!He said to them, so I am saying: Should she wait even if her witnesses are at קסוסנון?

Rebbi Yudan asked: “I had been married but I was divorced at place X”; if two [witnesses] come and say, no woman was divorced at place X, do they contradict her? Rebbi Yose asked, if she said, I had been married but I was divorced at place X at a certain date,” and two came and said, a woman was divorced at that place, but two [others] came and said, no woman was divorced at that place? That is a contradiction of the essence of the testimony; we live off her mouth.

Rebbi Yudan asked: “I had been married but I was divorced at place X”; if two [witnesses] come and say, no woman was divorced at place X, do they contradict her? Rebbi Yose asked, if she said, I had been married but I was divorced at place X at a certain date,” and two came and said, a woman was divorced at that place, but two [others] came and said, no woman was divorced at that place? That is a contradiction of the essence of the testimony; we live off her mouth.

Rebbi Yudan asked: “I had been married but I was divorced at place X”; if two [witnesses] come and say, no woman was divorced at place X, do they contradict her? Rebbi Yose asked, if she said, I had been married but I was divorced at place X at a certain date,” and two came and said, a woman was divorced at that place, but two [others] came and said, no woman was divorced at that place? That is a contradiction of the essence of the testimony; we live off her mouth.

Rebbi Yudan asked: “I had been married but I was divorced at place X”; if two [witnesses] come and say, no woman was divorced at place X, do they contradict her? Rebbi Yose asked, if she said, I had been married but I was divorced at place X at a certain date,” and two came and said, a woman was divorced at that place, but two [others] came and said, no woman was divorced at that place? That is a contradiction of the essence of the testimony; we live off her mouth.

Rebbi Yudan asked: “I had been married but I was divorced at place X”; if two [witnesses] come and say, no woman was divorced at place X, do they contradict her? Rebbi Yose asked, if she said, I had been married but I was divorced at place X at a certain date,” and two came and said, a woman was divorced at that place, but two [others] came and said, no woman was divorced at that place? That is a contradiction of the essence of the testimony; we live off her mouth.

One day, she said, I am married. The next day, she said, I am divorced. We asked her, yesterday you said this, today you say otherwise? She said to them, because of a group of amoral people who wanted to start up with me. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Ila: Since she provided an explanation for her words, she can be believed. A similar case: Samuel wanted to sleep with his wife, but she said to him, I am impure. The next day, she said, I am pure. He said to her, yesterday, you said impure, today pure? She said to him, I did not feel well enough at that moment. He came and asked Rav, who told him, since she provided an explanation for her words, she can be believed.

It was stated: “That we ate in X or Y’s clipping.” What is clipping? If a man sold his inherited field, his relatives filled amphoras with roasted kernels and nuts and broke them before children. The children were collecting them and saying, X was clipped from his inheritance. When he bought it back, they were doing the same and saying, X returned to his inheritance. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, also if a man married an unsuitable woman, his realtives filled amphoras with roasted kernels and nuts and broke them before children. The children were collecting them and saying, X was clipped from his family. Whe he divorced her, they were doing the same and saying, X returned to his family.

MISHNAH: If an adolescent girl had been preliminarily married but was divorced, Rebbi Yose the Galilean says she cannot collect the fine; Rebbi Aqiba says, she can collect the fine and it belongs to her.

If he came to her before she was preliminarily married, then she was preliminarily married and divorced. Does the statement of Rebbi Aḥai not imply that he pays? Did we not state: “For he had mistreated her,” to include the orphan for the fine, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. Rebbi Aḥai said, explain it that he came to her before her father died; when subsequently her father died he already was obligated to give to her father. One came to her before her father died and subsequently her father died; one came to her before she was preliminarily married, subsequently she was divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said that Rav Ḥisda asked: If one came to her before she was married and then she was married? Since you say there, she is under her husband but he has to pay to her father, so in this case she is under her husband but he has to pay to her father.

If he came to her before she was preliminarily married, then she was preliminarily married and divorced. Does the statement of Rebbi Aḥai not imply that he pays? Did we not state: “For he had mistreated her,” to include the orphan for the fine, the words of Rebbi Yose the Galilean. Rebbi Aḥai said, explain it that he came to her before her father died; when subsequently her father died he already was obligated to give to her father. One came to her before her father died and subsequently her father died; one came to her before she was preliminarily married, subsequently she was divorced. Rebbi Ze‘ira said that Rav Ḥisda asked: If one came to her before she was married and then she was married? Since you say there, she is under her husband but he has to pay to her father, so in this case she is under her husband but he has to pay to her father.

HALAKHAH: “How does he drink from his pot,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It should not have said “she shall be his wife” for the calumniator; it is superfluous since she already is his! Why does the verse say, “she shall be his wife”? You should infer from this by an equal cut. One has to infer from “she shall be his wife”, “she shall be his”. Since “she shall be his” which is said there means a wife appropriate for him, so “she shall be his” which is said here means a wife appropriate for him. Then since “she shall be his” which is said there means a wife appropriate for him and he pays the fine, so “she shall be his” which is said here means a wife appropriate for him and he pays the fine. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Ulla [ben] Ismael, in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It should not have said “she shall be his wife” for the calumniator; it is superfluous since she already is his! Why does the verse say, “she shall be his wife”? You should infer from this by an equal cut. One has to infer from “she shall be his wife”, “she shall be his”. Since “she shall be” which is said there means that if he divorced her one tells him to take her back, so “she shall be his” which is said here means that if he divorced her one tells him to take her back. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “In the cases of both the rapist and the calumniator who divorced, one forces them to take back. If they were Cohanim they absorb the forty.”

HALAKHAH: “How does he drink from his pot,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It should not have said “she shall be his wife” for the calumniator; it is superfluous since she already is his! Why does the verse say, “she shall be his wife”? You should infer from this by an equal cut. One has to infer from “she shall be his wife”, “she shall be his”. Since “she shall be his” which is said there means a wife appropriate for him, so “she shall be his” which is said here means a wife appropriate for him. Then since “she shall be his” which is said there means a wife appropriate for him and he pays the fine, so “she shall be his” which is said here means a wife appropriate for him and he pays the fine. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Ulla [ben] Ismael, in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It should not have said “she shall be his wife” for the calumniator; it is superfluous since she already is his! Why does the verse say, “she shall be his wife”? You should infer from this by an equal cut. One has to infer from “she shall be his wife”, “she shall be his”. Since “she shall be” which is said there means that if he divorced her one tells him to take her back, so “she shall be his” which is said here means that if he divorced her one tells him to take her back. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “In the cases of both the rapist and the calumniator who divorced, one forces them to take back. If they were Cohanim they absorb the forty.”

HALAKHAH: “How does he drink from his pot,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: It should not have said “she shall be his wife” for the calumniator; it is superfluous since she already is his! Why does the verse say, “she shall be his wife”? You should infer from this by an equal cut. One has to infer from “she shall be his wife”, “she shall be his”. Since “she shall be his” which is said there means a wife appropriate for him, so “she shall be his” which is said here means a wife appropriate for him. Then since “she shall be his” which is said there means a wife appropriate for him and he pays the fine, so “she shall be his” which is said here means a wife appropriate for him and he pays the fine. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Ulla [ben] Ismael, in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It should not have said “she shall be his wife” for the calumniator; it is superfluous since she already is his! Why does the verse say, “she shall be his wife”? You should infer from this by an equal cut. One has to infer from “she shall be his wife”, “she shall be his”. Since “she shall be” which is said there means that if he divorced her one tells him to take her back, so “she shall be his” which is said here means that if he divorced her one tells him to take her back. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “In the cases of both the rapist and the calumniator who divorced, one forces them to take back. If they were Cohanim they absorb the forty.”

MISHNAH: About an orphan girl who had been preliminarily married and was divorced, Rebbi Eleazar says that the rapist has to pay but the seducer does not.

HALAKHAH: “About an orphan girl who had been preliminarily married and was divorced,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it turns out that Rebbi Eleazar follows the opinion of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba said that she can collect the fine and it belongs to her, so Rebbi Eleazar said that she can collect the fine and it belongs to her. Then also for a seduced one? Rebbi Jeremiah said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, explain it that she remitted it to him. Can anybody remit anthing that does not belong to him? Explain it for an orphan; as it was stated in the House of Rebbi thus: The orphan, Rebbi Eleazar said that the rapist has to pay her but the seducer does not. Can anybody remit something which is not in his possession? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ura: The fine is not due from the first moment on. As we have stated there: “If she came to court before her father died, [the payments due] belong to her father and if the father died they belong to the brothers.” If you say that the fine is due from the first moment, it would belong to the brothers from the first moment! Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥisda: The Mishnah deals with shame and diminution of value. As Rebbi Mana said, how is it? The rapist is obligated for everything and the seducer is free from everything. Rebbi Abin said, [Rebbi] Shammai asked: What does it mean that the rapist has to pay but the seducer does not? The rapist has to pay everything but the seducer is free [from paying] for shame and diminution of value but is obligated for the fine. That is Rebbi Aqiba’s. Or, the rapist is free [from paying] for shame and diminution of value but is obligated for the fine but the seducer is free from everything? That is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s.

MISHNAH: If somebody gives his daughter in preliminary marriage and she was divorced, in preliminary marriage and she was widowed, the ketubah belongs to him. If he gave her in definitive marriage and she was divorced, in definitive marriage and she was widowed, the ketubah belongs to her. Rebbi Jehudah says, the first ketubah is his. They said to him, from the moment he gave her in definitive marriage, he no longer has any power over her.

MISHNAH: If somebody gives his daughter in preliminary marriage and she was divorced, in preliminary marriage and she was widowed, the ketubah belongs to him. If he gave her in definitive marriage and she was divorced, in definitive marriage and she was widowed, the ketubah belongs to her. Rebbi Jehudah says, the first ketubah is his. They said to him, from the moment he gave her in definitive marriage, he no longer has any power over her.

MISHNAH: Even though they said that a virgin collects 200 [zuz] and a widow a mina, if he wants to add even 100 minas, he may add. If she became widowed or divorced, whether preliminarily or definitively married, she collects everything. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah says, definitively married, she collects everything; preliminarily married a virgin collects 200 [zuz] and a widow a mina since he added only with the idea to bring her in.

So is the Mishnah: “Because he did only add for the love of the first night, when he had intercourse with her.” If he slept with her, divorced her, and took her back, the love of the first night is still there. If he slept with her, died, and she became available to the levir, the love of the first night is still there. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Alexis in the name of Ḥizqiah: Practice follows Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah who said, if they were divorced or widowed after a preliminary marriage she collects 200, after the definitive marriage she collects everything. Rebbi Ḥanania said, practice follows Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah. Rebbi Abbai said, they said to Rebbi Ḥanania, get outside to recite. Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Jonathan said, practice follows Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah. Rebbi Yosa, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Jonathan said, practice does not follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah. Rebbi Yose said, we had a rule that Ḥizqiah and Rebbi Jonathan said the same thing. As it was stated: If somebody’s son went overseas and one heard that he died, [the father] went and wrote his property to somebody else, and after that, the son returned. The gift remains valid; Rebbi Simeon ben Menasia says that the gift is invalid since he would not have written the deed if he had known that his son was alive. And Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, practice follows Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, and the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah is the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Menasia; and Rebbi Yannai said, they said to Rebbi Ḥanania, get outside to recite. And Rebbi Yose bar Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Jonathan said, practice does not follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah. An actual case was judged according to Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah.

So is the Mishnah: “Because he did only add for the love of the first night, when he had intercourse with her.” If he slept with her, divorced her, and took her back, the love of the first night is still there. If he slept with her, died, and she became available to the levir, the love of the first night is still there. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Alexis in the name of Ḥizqiah: Practice follows Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah who said, if they were divorced or widowed after a preliminary marriage she collects 200, after the definitive marriage she collects everything. Rebbi Ḥanania said, practice follows Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah. Rebbi Abbai said, they said to Rebbi Ḥanania, get outside to recite. Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Jonathan said, practice follows Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah. Rebbi Yosa, Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Jonathan said, practice does not follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah. Rebbi Yose said, we had a rule that Ḥizqiah and Rebbi Jonathan said the same thing. As it was stated: If somebody’s son went overseas and one heard that he died, [the father] went and wrote his property to somebody else, and after that, the son returned. The gift remains valid; Rebbi Simeon ben Menasia says that the gift is invalid since he would not have written the deed if he had known that his son was alive. And Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, practice follows Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah, and the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah is the reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Menasia; and Rebbi Yannai said, they said to Rebbi Ḥanania, get outside to recite. And Rebbi Yose bar Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Jonathan said, practice does not follow Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah. An actual case was judged according to Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Jehudah says, if he wants he writes,” etc. Does Rebbi Jehudah think that the minimum for a virgin is a mina and for a widow 50 zuz? Should he not write so from the start? But it must be a diminution afterwards. Why can he not write that “I received from you such and such”? It was found that bar Kappara stated: “I received from you such and such”. Rebbi Joḥanan said: Rebbi Jehudah formulated this only for the end; but at the start, even Rebbi Jehudah agrees. What is the beginning and what is the end? The colleagues in the name of R. Joḥanan: Before he had intercourse, and after he had intercourse. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of R. Joḥanan: Before he took her in, and after he took her in. If he did not have intercourse with her, divorced her, and took her in again; that is before and after.

“She nurses her baby.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, is says only “her baby,” therefore not twins. Why does it say “her baby”? As it was stated: “A man cannot force his wife to nurse another man’s child, nor can a woman force her husband to let her nurse another woman’s child. If she made a vow not to nurse her baby, the House of Shammai say that one removes the breast nipple from his mouth, but the House of Hillel say, one forces her. If she was divorced, one cannot force her if [the baby] is not used to her, but if he is used to her one forces her and pays her wages to nurse her baby.” How old is the baby if he can be presumed to know her? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Three months. But Rebbi Ze‘ira was staring at him. He asked him, why are you staring at me? Should I say to you following Samuel, since Samuel said, three days? Samuel follows his opinion, since Samuel said, I recognized the midwives who delivered me. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, I recognized the circumciser who circumcised me. Rebbi Joḥanan said, I recognized the women who kept my mother company.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody makes a vow that his wife should not have any usufruct from him,” etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody by a vow bars his wife from sexual intercourse,” and here you say so? There, he makes a vow to separate her from his body, but here he makes a vow to separate her from his property. But can anybody make a vow not to pay his debt? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, since in the future he will divorce her, pay her the ketubah, and stop her food supply, it is as if there was no debt. Why could she not sit there and wait; if he divorced her everything would be in order, otherwise let him provide her with food? It follows him who said that the wife’s food is not from words of the Torah, as it was stated: The court will not determine food for the wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s. Then should she not be considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah? This proves that she is not considered as a worker not worth a peruṭah.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody causes a vow of his wife,” etc. Can anybody cause somebody else’s vow during his lifetime? It must be that the wife made a vow, the husband heard it, and said to her: If you will eat from such and such, my property will be forbidden to you. If she ate from such and such, why should his property not be forbidden to her? Is that not the case from the beginning of the chapter? But if his wife made a vow, her husband was informed, and did not dissolve it, following him who says that he put his finger between her teeth, he has to divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Ḥuna said, even he who said that she put his finger between her teeth, and should be divorced without ketubah, will agree in case he provoked her to make the vow.

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if the father proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he [made it conditional], could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ban Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if the father proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he [made it conditional], could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ban Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

MISHNAH: He should not say to her “here your ketubah is lying on the table” but “all my properties are pledged for your ketubah.” If he divorced her, she has no ketubah-lien. If he took her back, she is like all women who have a ketubah.

HALAKHAH: “He should not say to her ‘here is your ketubah’”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah.” In the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.

HALAKHAH: “He should not say to her ‘here is your ketubah’”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah.” In the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.

HALAKHAH: “He should not say to her ‘here is your ketubah’”, etc. What does he do? “He marries her, he may divorce her and take her back, and she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Yose said, the baraita has two possibilities. “Or she writes him a receipt for her ketubah.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna: If he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, a Mishnah said so: “For he who takes back his wife, takes her back under the terms of her first ketubah.” In the end, if he married her, divorced her, and took her back? He tells you something new. Even if he married her, divorced her, and took her back, if he wrote her a new ketubah, the lien is on his property; otherwise, it is on the property of her first husband.

Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna said: A betrothed woman who died does not have a ketubah since she was not permitted to marry outside. That you should not say [the case] should be considered as if he divorced her and she should have a ketubah; therefore it was necessary to say that she does not have a ketubah.

It says only, “she died”. Therefore, if she was divorced, her status is that of a creditor. As it was stated: “He married a woman and wrote her a ketubah. He divorced her but did not pay the ketubah. He married another woman and wrote her a ketubah. He took back the first one and wrote her a ketubah in addition to the first ketubah. The [second ketubah] of the first [wife] has precedence over that of the second [wife] and her heirs, and the second [wife] and her heirs have precedence over the heirs of the first.”

It says only, “she died”. Therefore, if she was divorced, her status is that of a creditor. As it was stated: “He married a woman and wrote her a ketubah. He divorced her but did not pay the ketubah. He married another woman and wrote her a ketubah. He took back the first one and wrote her a ketubah in addition to the first ketubah. The [second ketubah] of the first [wife] has precedence over that of the second [wife] and her heirs, and the second [wife] and her heirs have precedence over the heirs of the first.”

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Just as a man is concerned about his widow’s honor so he has to be concerned about his divorcee’s honor, as Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, “do not hide yourself from your flesh”, that refers to one’s divorcee. Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s wife did mistreat him badly. Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah went to him and told him, rabbi, send her away, for she does not treat you with the honor due to you. He said to him, her ketubah is too large for me. He said to him, I shall give you the ketubah and send her away. He gave him the ketubah and he divorced her. She went and married the city treasurer. That one lost his property and became blind. She took him around the town and led him. Once they went around the entire town and nobody gave him anything. He said to her, is there not another neighborhood? She said to him, there is the neighborhood of my divorcer; it is beyond my powers to bring you there. He started hitting her. Rebbi Yose the Galilean passed by and heard them demeaning one another in public. He took them, brought them to one of his houses, and provided them with food all the days of their lives, because “do not hide yourself from your flesh”, that refers to one’s divorcee. Nevertheless they quarelled loudly in the night and her voice was heard saying, the pain she suffered outside her body was easier to bear than that inside her body.

What is the difference between these and those? Since these are words of the Torah and the words of the Torah [do not] need support, therefore they have ketubah. Those, because they are words of the Sopherim and the words of the Sopherim need support, therefore they do not have ketubah. Some want to say since these are punished together with the child, they did not fine them, therefore they have ketubah. Those, since they are not punished together with the child, they fined them, therefore they do not have ketubah. What is the difference between them? He who remarried his divorced wife after she had remarried. For him who says since these are words of the Torah, and this case is a word of the Torah, therefore she has ketubah. For him who says since these are punished together with the child, this one, since neither she nor the child is punished, therefore, she has no ketubah.

If she dies she is not with him. If she was divorced she is not with him. If he took her back? One says, this was stated for the ketubah but not for the stipulations; one says, both for the ketubah and the stipulations, which opinion is valid? “The intelligent ones did write: On condition that I support your daughter for five years the entire time you are with me;” on that it was stated: Only for the first marriage. This parallels what Rebbi Ḥanina said, if somebody marries off his son in a house, the latter acquires the house, but only for a first marriage.

If somebody together with his wife left for overseas, then she returns and says, my husband died, she shall be supported and collect her ketubah. My husband divorced me, she shall be supported from her ketubah since, as you take it, if she be a married woman, she must be supported from her husband’s; if she is no longer a married woman, she can be supported from her ketubah. “If somebody returns from overseas and his wife requests support but he says, let her earnings cover her sustenance, one listens to him. But if the court had allotted, what they allotted, they have allotted.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if her earnings are not enough for her support. In this case, does one listen to him? Following him who says, there is no support for the wife in biblical law, as we have stated: “The court will not determine food for a wife from Sabbatical money, but she may be given Sabbatical produce to eat at her husband’s.” Rebbi Yose says, if her earnings are sufficient for her support. In that case, why what they allotted, they have allotted? Explain it, if they allotted excess.

MISHNAH: Everybody moves to the Land of Israel but not everybody leaves. Everybody moves to Jerusalem but not everybody leaves. How is this? If he married a woman in the Land of Israel and divorced her in the Land of Israel, he pays her in coin of the Land of Israel. If he married a woman in the Land of Israel and divorced her in Kappadokia, he pays her in coin of the Land of Israel. If he married a woman in Kappadokia and divorced her in the Land of Israel, he pays her in coin of the Land of Israel; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in coin of Kappadokia. If he married a woman in Kappadokia and divorced her in Kappadokia, he pays her in coin of Kappadokia

MISHNAH: Everybody moves to the Land of Israel but not everybody leaves. Everybody moves to Jerusalem but not everybody leaves. How is this? If he married a woman in the Land of Israel and divorced her in the Land of Israel, he pays her in coin of the Land of Israel. If he married a woman in the Land of Israel and divorced her in Kappadokia, he pays her in coin of the Land of Israel. If he married a woman in Kappadokia and divorced her in the Land of Israel, he pays her in coin of the Land of Israel; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in coin of Kappadokia. If he married a woman in Kappadokia and divorced her in Kappadokia, he pays her in coin of Kappadokia

MISHNAH: Everybody moves to the Land of Israel but not everybody leaves. Everybody moves to Jerusalem but not everybody leaves. How is this? If he married a woman in the Land of Israel and divorced her in the Land of Israel, he pays her in coin of the Land of Israel. If he married a woman in the Land of Israel and divorced her in Kappadokia, he pays her in coin of the Land of Israel. If he married a woman in Kappadokia and divorced her in the Land of Israel, he pays her in coin of the Land of Israel; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in coin of Kappadokia. If he married a woman in Kappadokia and divorced her in Kappadokia, he pays her in coin of Kappadokia

MISHNAH: Everybody moves to the Land of Israel but not everybody leaves. Everybody moves to Jerusalem but not everybody leaves. How is this? If he married a woman in the Land of Israel and divorced her in the Land of Israel, he pays her in coin of the Land of Israel. If he married a woman in the Land of Israel and divorced her in Kappadokia, he pays her in coin of the Land of Israel. If he married a woman in Kappadokia and divorced her in the Land of Israel, he pays her in coin of the Land of Israel; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, in coin of Kappadokia. If he married a woman in Kappadokia and divorced her in Kappadokia, he pays her in coin of Kappadokia

MISHNAH: If somebody made a vow of ḥerem and said, I referred the vow only to mariner’s nets, or made a vow of qorbān and said, I referred the vow only to the gifts for kings, or said, my bone is qorbān and said, I referred the vow only to the bone that I keep in my house for purposes of vows, [or said] a qônām that my wife may not have any use from me and said, I referred the vow only to my first wife whom I divorced, all these do not need a question. If they do question, one punishes them and makes it difficult for them, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, one finds for them an opening from another place and teaches them that they should not be flippant about vows.

Ḥizqiah said, if he redeemed them they revert to their sanctity. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he redeemed them they are redeemed. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “These have no redemption.” He explains thus: After they have been cut they do not need redemption. Rebbi Yose said, what Ḥizqiah said refers to the case that he himself redeemed them. But if another person redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them. The argument of Rebbi Yose is switched: There, he says that if [another] redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them, but here, he says that if she was married to another man the qiddušin [of the first] were not removed! All that is questionable for him is if he gave her two peruṭot, one for the moment and one for after he has divorced her, what is the situation?

MISHNAH: One finds an opening for a man with his own honor and that of his children. One tells him, if you had known that tomorrow one will say of you, it is the habit of this man to divorce his wife, and about your daughters one will say, they are daughters of a divorcee, what did the mother of these do to get herself divorced? If he said, if I had known that it is so I would not have made the vow, then it is dissolved.

If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the husband.” They wanted to say, after the husband had dissolved his part. But if the husband had not dissolved his part when he died, the power is not voided in favor of the father. Let us hear from the following: “If she made a vow while being preliminarily married. If she was divorced on the same day, preliminarily married on the same day, even a hundred times, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows.” That means, even if the husband had not dissolved his part and died, his power is voided in favor of the father.

MISHNAH: If she made a vow while preliminarily married, was divorced on the same day, preliminarily married on the same day, even to a hundred men, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows. That is the principle: as long as she did not leave her father’s power for one moment, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows.

HALAKHAH: “ ‘T knew that there are vows,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the reason of Rebbi Meïr: It is a subterfuge. He wants her to make vows so he can divorce her. That is not so, he could have divorced her on the first occasion.

MISHNAH: “The vow of a widow or a divorcee, anything she forbids to herself shall be confirmed.” How is that? If she said, I shall be a nazir after thirty days, even if she married within these thirty days he cannot dissolve. If she made the vow under her husband’s authority and he dissolved it, if she had said, I shall be a nazir after thirty days, even if she should become a widow or a divorcee within the next 30 days, it remains dissolved. If she made a vow, was on the same day divorced, and taken back, he cannot dissolve. This is the principle: He cannot dissolve for any one who was on her own for one moment.

HALAKHAH: “The vow of a widow or a divorcee,” etc. This refers to what Rebbi Ismael says, the vow decides; Rebbi Aqiba says, prohibition decides. If vow and prohibition came together? How is that? She said, I shall be a nazir in 30 days. Her husband heard it and did not dissolve. He divorced her and remarried her within the 30 days. Is that when vow and prohibition come together?

MISHNAH: The vows of nine young women are confirmed: An adult who is an orphan, an adolescent who became an adult and is an orphan, an adolescent who did not become an adult but is an orphan. An adult whose father died, an adolescent who became an adult and her father died, an adolescent who did not become an adult and her father died. An adolescent whose father died and afterwards she became an adult, an adult whose father lives, an adolescent girl whose father lives. Rebbi Jehudah says, also if somebody marries off his underage daughter and she becomes widowed or divorced and returns to him, she still is an adolescent.

MISHNAH: Earlier they said, three categories of women have to be divorced and collect their ketubah: The one who says, I am impure for you, or Heaven is between you and me, or I am separated from the Jews. They changed to say that a woman should not be encouraged to want another man and cause trouble to her husband. If she says, I am impure for you, she should bring proof. Heaven is between you and me, they should try to mediate. I am separated from the Jews, he shall dissolve his part, she shall live with him and be separated from the Jews.

If she was divorced, let her go and cling to the Arabs, for she loves them.

Think of it, if she stayed in Rome ten years and remarried! Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Mishnah if he said to her, you shall only be divorced [by this document] at place X.

Rav said, none of these are invalid except for the last which is invalid. Issi said, all are invalid except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena said, all are invalid. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage not for a specific name, does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce, and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married.

Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose asked before Rebbi Yose: Concerning what you say that one bill of divorce is invalid for two women, should not two bills of divorce be invalid for two women? He asked him, what is the question? He answered, did we not state: “If two people sent two [identical] bills of divorce which were intermingled, he gives both documents to both women.” There, it is a divorce for this one and a divorce for the other one; the mix-up caused [the problem]. But here, neither this one is divorced in her name nor is that one divorced in her name.

Rebbi Eleazar bar Yose asked before Rebbi Yose: Concerning what you say that one bill of divorce is invalid for two women, should not two bills of divorce be invalid for two women? He asked him, what is the question? He answered, did we not state: “If two people sent two [identical] bills of divorce which were intermingled, he gives both documents to both women.” There, it is a divorce for this one and a divorce for the other one; the mix-up caused [the problem]. But here, neither this one is divorced in her name nor is that one divorced in her name.

What is “the good order”? Rebbi Sabbatai in the name of Ḥizqiah: Because of the good order of Jewish women, lest they frequently be divorced. Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac asked Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: It is valid, and you say so? If it were invalid, then [the explanation] would be acceptable. Rebbi Abun said, for the good order of the scribe, that his livelihood be guaranteed.

“Mr. X and all his names.” Think of it, if his name was Reuben and he went away under the name of Simeon. But: “I am X and every other name which I have.” “In addition, they said if he had two wives, one in Judea and one in Galilee, and he is known by two names, one in Judea and one in Galilee. He used [his name] in Judea to divorce the one in Galilee and [his name] in Galilee to divorce the one in Judea. Neither one is divorced.” This baraita if he was in Judea and wrote to divorce in Galilee or in Galilee and wrote to divorce in Judea. But if he was in Judea and wrote to divorce in Judea, or in Galilee and wrote to divorce in Galilee, she is divorced. Rebbi Ilai said, according to the rules he has to say: “I am X with every other name which I have in Galilee.” If he was at another place, he can divorce either one he wishes. Rebbi Yose said, one says that if he did it. But to start out he has to follow Rebbi Ilai. Rebbi Abin said, if he is known by (another) name at another place, he has to mention all three.

“Mr. X and all his names.” Think of it, if his name was Reuben and he went away under the name of Simeon. But: “I am X and every other name which I have.” “In addition, they said if he had two wives, one in Judea and one in Galilee, and he is known by two names, one in Judea and one in Galilee. He used [his name] in Judea to divorce the one in Galilee and [his name] in Galilee to divorce the one in Judea. Neither one is divorced.” This baraita if he was in Judea and wrote to divorce in Galilee or in Galilee and wrote to divorce in Judea. But if he was in Judea and wrote to divorce in Judea, or in Galilee and wrote to divorce in Galilee, she is divorced. Rebbi Ilai said, according to the rules he has to say: “I am X with every other name which I have in Galilee.” If he was at another place, he can divorce either one he wishes. Rebbi Yose said, one says that if he did it. But to start out he has to follow Rebbi Ilai. Rebbi Abin said, if he is known by (another) name at another place, he has to mention all three.

There, we have stated: “One writes a bill of divorce for a man even if his wife is not with him, and a receipt for a woman even if her husband is not with her, and the husband pays the fee.” Rebbi Abba said, he has to know both of them. Rebbi La said, he has to know the husband for the bill of divorce and the wife for her receipt. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi [ ]: Think of it, if he brought another woman and divorced by means of her. He said to him, let the witnesses come and testify. But did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say that they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been cross-examined in court? There, if they said, we did not sign at all. But here if they say, we signed this but not that. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Abba: “In earlier times, his name and her name and the names of his and her towns could change.” If he knows them, why would he change their names? There are people who know others by sight but do not know their names. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Ilai: “Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that one should write Mr. X and all his names, Mrs. Y and all her names, because of the public good.” The Mishnah about one who is forced to divorce, Rebbi Ila speaks about one who divorces on his initiative; some want to say if he divorces at another place.

For example Doso, Dodo’s brother, divorced his wife. The case came before the rabbis who said that she should pay the fee. But did we not state: “the husband pays the fee”? Rebbi Ilai in the name of Samuel: If she forgives him her ketubah.

HALAKHAH: “A person who is half slave and half free,” etc. How is it possible that anyone be half slave and half free? Explain it either following Rebbi, since Rebbi said that a person can free half of his slave, or following everybody in the case of a slave belonging to two partners, when one of them manumitted his part. If he found anything of value, on his master’s day it belongs to his master, on his own day it belongs to him. But would he not on the next day turn it over to his master? If he entered a preliminary marriage. On his master’s day, one would not consider his marriage, on his own day one would consider his marriage. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya say in Rebbi Joḥanan’s name: If a person who is half slave and half free entered a preliminary marriage, one does not consider his marriage. In parallel, if he divorced one does not consider his divorce.

MISHNAH: If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation, he cannot take her back; because of a vow, he cannot take her back. Rebbi Jehudah says, for any vow known in public, he cannot take her back; not known in public, he can take her back. Rebbi Meїr says, for any vow which needs investigation by a Sage, he cannot take her back; if it does not need investigation by a Sage, he can take her back. Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other. Rebbi Yose ben Jehudah said, it happened in Sidon that one said to his wife, a qonam if I do not divorce you, and he divorced her, and the Sages permitted him to take her back, for the public good.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation,” etc. And it was stated: “Why did the Sages say that he who divorces his wife because of bad reputation cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of bad reputation, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the accusations were baseless and he said, if I had known that the accusations were baseless, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her children bastards. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.”

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation,” etc. And it was stated: “Why did the Sages say that he who divorces his wife because of bad reputation cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of bad reputation, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the accusations were baseless and he said, if I had known that the accusations were baseless, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her children bastards. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.”

It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife because of a vow cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of a vow, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the vow was void and he said, if I had known that the vow was void, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which was not public knowledge! “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other.” The law should be that he can take her back even if it was a vow which needs investigation by a Sage, for the Elder uproots the vow. Why did they forbid a vow which needs investigation by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage.

It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife because of a vow cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of a vow, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the vow was void and he said, if I had known that the vow was void, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which was not public knowledge! “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other.” The law should be that he can take her back even if it was a vow which needs investigation by a Sage, for the Elder uproots the vow. Why did they forbid a vow which needs investigation by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage.

HALAKHAH: It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife as a she-ram cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife as a she-ram, when she went, married another man, and bore him children, and he said, if I had known that she can have children, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since there are women she-rams who are married and since [their husbands] are satisfied with them they keep them.

HALAKHAH: It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife as a she-ram cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife as a she-ram, when she went, married another man, and bore him children, and he said, if I had known that she can have children, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since there are women she-rams who are married and since [their husbands] are satisfied with them they keep them.

MISHNAH: Rebbi Joḥanan ben Gudguedah testified about a deaf-mute girl who was married off by her father, that she must be divorced by a bill of divorce, and about an underage girl who was married to a Cohen, that she may eat heave and her husband inherits from her if she dies, and about a stolen log which was used to build a house, that [the owner] has to take the value, and about a purification sacrifice of a stolen animal which was not known in public, that it atones because of the order of the altar.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Guedgedah testified,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah asked before Rebbi Immi. His testimony seems reasonable for a hearing woman of sound mind, that she is divorced with or without her acquiescence. But a deaf-mute woman who has no will should not be divorced except with her acquiescence. But is it not testimony “that is an example”; does one add to a testimony? Rebbi Ḥanania is of the opinion that this refers to a hearing girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became deaf-and-dumb. Rebbi Yose is of the opinion that this refers to an underage girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became divorced.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Guedgedah testified,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah asked before Rebbi Immi. His testimony seems reasonable for a hearing woman of sound mind, that she is divorced with or without her acquiescence. But a deaf-mute woman who has no will should not be divorced except with her acquiescence. But is it not testimony “that is an example”; does one add to a testimony? Rebbi Ḥanania is of the opinion that this refers to a hearing girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became deaf-and-dumb. Rebbi Yose is of the opinion that this refers to an underage girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became divorced.

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Guedgedah testified,” etc. Rebbi Ḥananiah asked before Rebbi Immi. His testimony seems reasonable for a hearing woman of sound mind, that she is divorced with or without her acquiescence. But a deaf-mute woman who has no will should not be divorced except with her acquiescence. But is it not testimony “that is an example”; does one add to a testimony? Rebbi Ḥanania is of the opinion that this refers to a hearing girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became deaf-and-dumb. Rebbi Yose is of the opinion that this refers to an underage girl who was married off by her father (and mother) and became divorced.

Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said: If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he went and said to him, your wife said, accept the bill of divorce for me, even after the bill came into her hand it is not a valid bill of divorce, since he thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. Rebbi Huna bar Ḥiyya objected: But did we not state that if a woman said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand? Then even if the bill came into her hand it should not be a valid bill! For she thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that practice is that “accept” and “obtain” mean “bring”. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” Then it should not be a valid bill even if the bill of divorce reaches her hand. For she thinks that maybe she is divorced by the acceptance of the agent, but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that a minor cannot appoint an agent.

Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said: If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he went and said to him, your wife said, accept the bill of divorce for me, even after the bill came into her hand it is not a valid bill of divorce, since he thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. Rebbi Huna bar Ḥiyya objected: But did we not state that if a woman said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand? Then even if the bill came into her hand it should not be a valid bill! For she thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that practice is that “accept” and “obtain” mean “bring”. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” Then it should not be a valid bill even if the bill of divorce reaches her hand. For she thinks that maybe she is divorced by the acceptance of the agent, but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that a minor cannot appoint an agent.

Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said: If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he went and said to him, your wife said, accept the bill of divorce for me, even after the bill came into her hand it is not a valid bill of divorce, since he thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. Rebbi Huna bar Ḥiyya objected: But did we not state that if a woman said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand? Then even if the bill came into her hand it should not be a valid bill! For she thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that practice is that “accept” and “obtain” mean “bring”. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” Then it should not be a valid bill even if the bill of divorce reaches her hand. For she thinks that maybe she is divorced by the acceptance of the agent, but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that a minor cannot appoint an agent.

Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said: If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he went and said to him, your wife said, accept the bill of divorce for me, even after the bill came into her hand it is not a valid bill of divorce, since he thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. Rebbi Huna bar Ḥiyya objected: But did we not state that if a woman said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand? Then even if the bill came into her hand it should not be a valid bill! For she thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that practice is that “accept” and “obtain” mean “bring”. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” Then it should not be a valid bill even if the bill of divorce reaches her hand. For she thinks that maybe she is divorced by the acceptance of the agent, but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that a minor cannot appoint an agent.

Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said: If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he went and said to him, your wife said, accept the bill of divorce for me, even after the bill came into her hand it is not a valid bill of divorce, since he thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. Rebbi Huna bar Ḥiyya objected: But did we not state that if a woman said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand? Then even if the bill came into her hand it should not be a valid bill! For she thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that practice is that “accept” and “obtain” mean “bring”. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” Then it should not be a valid bill even if the bill of divorce reaches her hand. For she thinks that maybe she is divorced by the acceptance of the agent, but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that a minor cannot appoint an agent.

Rav Naḥman bar Jacob said: If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he went and said to him, your wife said, accept the bill of divorce for me, even after the bill came into her hand it is not a valid bill of divorce, since he thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. Rebbi Huna bar Ḥiyya objected: But did we not state that if a woman said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand? Then even if the bill came into her hand it should not be a valid bill! For she thinks that she will be divorced by the acceptance of the agent but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that practice is that “accept” and “obtain” mean “bring”. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” Then it should not be a valid bill even if the bill of divorce reaches her hand. For she thinks that maybe she is divorced by the acceptance of the agent, but she can be divorced only by her own acceptance. If he knows that a minor cannot appoint an agent.

Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: So far if she said, bring me, but [the agent] said [to the husband] “receive for me”. If she said, receive for me but [the agent] said [to the husband] “bring me”? If was found stated in both cases, this is a bill of divorce and if he wants to retract he cannot retract. But did we not state: “He shall deliver into her hand,” that includes not only her hand, from where through his agent’s hand, into her agent’s hand, from his agent to her agent, and from her agent to his agent; the verse says, “he shall deliver, he shall deliver.” Who said, “it is impossible for me”? Rebbi! As it was stated: “If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he said to him, your wife said, accept my bill of divorce for me: If he brought it to her, gave it to her, he acquired it for her, it was received for her; if he wants to retract, he may not retract, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Nathan says, ‘bring it to her, give it to her,’ [if he wants to retract, he may retract; ‘acquire it for her, receive it for her’, if he wants to retract, he may not retract. Rebbi says, in any of these cases] he may not retract except if he says, ‘It is impossible for me that you accept it for her, but give it to her.’” It is difficult for Rebbi, “here you have it from my word”, if he wants to retract, he may retract. It is difficult for Rebbi Nathan, “here you have it from her word”, if he wants to retract, he may retract! Rav Ḥuna said, he becomes his and her agent. Assi said, everywhere we have stated “his and her agent”, she is both divorced and not divorced.

Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: So far if she said, bring me, but [the agent] said [to the husband] “receive for me”. If she said, receive for me but [the agent] said [to the husband] “bring me”? If was found stated in both cases, this is a bill of divorce and if he wants to retract he cannot retract. But did we not state: “He shall deliver into her hand,” that includes not only her hand, from where through his agent’s hand, into her agent’s hand, from his agent to her agent, and from her agent to his agent; the verse says, “he shall deliver, he shall deliver.” Who said, “it is impossible for me”? Rebbi! As it was stated: “If she said, bring me my bill of divorce, but he said to him, your wife said, accept my bill of divorce for me: If he brought it to her, gave it to her, he acquired it for her, it was received for her; if he wants to retract, he may not retract, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Nathan says, ‘bring it to her, give it to her,’ [if he wants to retract, he may retract; ‘acquire it for her, receive it for her’, if he wants to retract, he may not retract. Rebbi says, in any of these cases] he may not retract except if he says, ‘It is impossible for me that you accept it for her, but give it to her.’” It is difficult for Rebbi, “here you have it from my word”, if he wants to retract, he may retract. It is difficult for Rebbi Nathan, “here you have it from her word”, if he wants to retract, he may retract! Rav Ḥuna said, he becomes his and her agent. Assi said, everywhere we have stated “his and her agent”, she is both divorced and not divorced.

MISHNAH: A woman who said, accept my bill of divorce for me, needs two groups of witnesses; two who say that she appointed in their presence and two who say that in their presence he received it and tore it up, even if the first ones are the latter ones, or one of the first together with one of the latter and a third person is associated with them. A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce. Rebbi Jehudah says, no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce. Any female who cannot take care of her bill of divorce cannot be divorced. If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand. Therefore, if the husband wants to retract he can retract since an underage person cannot appoint an agent. But if her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.

If she is definitively married, she but not her father. An underage girl, her father but not she; if she is definitively married, both she and her father. If she has understanding, she but not her father. Who is an underage girl who needs to be divorced [by herself]? Rebbi Joḥanan said, any female who is given her bill of divorce together with something else and she produces it after some time.