laqish

“A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father] contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

“A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father] contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

“A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father] contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

“A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that [her father] contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she has legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage by himself and through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage by herself and through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill until the bill of divorce reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together; only her father alone can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

The colleagues said, they disagree about courtyard and four cubits. Rebbi Joḥanan said, she has both courtyard and four cubits. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, she has neither courtyard nor four cubits. Rebbi Eleazar said, they disagree about the courtyard but she has no four cubits. What did Rebbi Joḥanan say about outstretched hands? Rebbi Eleazar asked, does an agent’s courtyard act as his hand?

If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.

If somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the intention invalidates, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the intention does not invalidate. Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Did we not state: “Rebbi Yose said, that is a matter of a conclusion de minore ad majus. Since in a case where thought makes sanctified food unusable, etc.,” and thought invalidates for piggul and leftover. He said to him, truly thought invalidates for piggul and leftover; but if somebody slaughtered with the intention of sprinkling [the victim’s] blood in idolatry or to burn its fat for idolatry, the intention does not invalidate. If he slaughtered and then the blood was sprinkled in an idolatrous rite and the fat was burned in an idolatrous rite, there was such a case in Caesarea and they pronounced neither prohibition nor permission. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were not apprehensive. If you say that they were apprehensive, they should have taught a prohibition. Rebbi Yose in the name of Rav Ḥisda: This means that they were apprehensive. If you say that they were not apprehensive, they should not have dealt with the case.

“If sometimes he is insane and sometimes healthy. When he is insane he is insane in all regards, when healthy he is normal in all regards.” A case came before Samuel who said, when he is of sound mind he should deliver the bill of divorce. Why? Samuel follows Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish; as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, when he regains his sanity. It follows that Samuel acted according to Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, only if he is of sound mind may he deliver the bill of divorce; (Is. 38:16) “make me healthy and let me live!”

“If sometimes he is insane and sometimes healthy. When he is insane he is insane in all regards, when healthy he is normal in all regards.” A case came before Samuel who said, when he is of sound mind he should deliver the bill of divorce. Why? Samuel follows Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish; as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, when he regains his sanity. It follows that Samuel acted according to Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, only if he is of sound mind may he deliver the bill of divorce; (Is. 38:16) “make me healthy and let me live!”

“If sometimes he is insane and sometimes healthy. When he is insane he is insane in all regards, when healthy he is normal in all regards.” A case came before Samuel who said, when he is of sound mind he should deliver the bill of divorce. Why? Samuel follows Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish; as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, when he regains his sanity. It follows that Samuel acted according to Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, only if he is of sound mind may he deliver the bill of divorce; (Is. 38:16) “make me healthy and let me live!”

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even while he is suffering an attack of seizures, one writes the bill of divorce and delivers it to his wife. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, when he regains his sanity. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems to be inverted, since they disagreed: If he became deaf-mute, or insane, or became an apostate, or the Court ruled that fat may be eaten, Rebbi Joḥanan said, his sacrifice of purification is pushed aside, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, his sacrifice of purification is not pushed aside. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi (Joḥanan) [Aḥa] switches traditions, to avoid that a word of Rebbi Joḥanan contradict his own word. For Rebbi Samuel bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One sprinkles the blood of a purification sacrifice or a reparation sacrifice for a person terminally ill. The rabbis of Caesarea said, Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Yasa, one follows the one, the other follows the other.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even while he is suffering an attack of seizures, one writes the bill of divorce and delivers it to his wife. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, when he regains his sanity. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems to be inverted, since they disagreed: If he became deaf-mute, or insane, or became an apostate, or the Court ruled that fat may be eaten, Rebbi Joḥanan said, his sacrifice of purification is pushed aside, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, his sacrifice of purification is not pushed aside. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi (Joḥanan) [Aḥa] switches traditions, to avoid that a word of Rebbi Joḥanan contradict his own word. For Rebbi Samuel bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One sprinkles the blood of a purification sacrifice or a reparation sacrifice for a person terminally ill. The rabbis of Caesarea said, Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Yasa, one follows the one, the other follows the other.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even while he is suffering an attack of seizures, one writes the bill of divorce and delivers it to his wife. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, when he regains his sanity. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems to be inverted, since they disagreed: If he became deaf-mute, or insane, or became an apostate, or the Court ruled that fat may be eaten, Rebbi Joḥanan said, his sacrifice of purification is pushed aside, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, his sacrifice of purification is not pushed aside. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi (Joḥanan) [Aḥa] switches traditions, to avoid that a word of Rebbi Joḥanan contradict his own word. For Rebbi Samuel bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One sprinkles the blood of a purification sacrifice or a reparation sacrifice for a person terminally ill. The rabbis of Caesarea said, Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Yasa, one follows the one, the other follows the other.

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even while he is suffering an attack of seizures, one writes the bill of divorce and delivers it to his wife. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, when he regains his sanity. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems to be inverted, since they disagreed: If he became deaf-mute, or insane, or became an apostate, or the Court ruled that fat may be eaten, Rebbi Joḥanan said, his sacrifice of purification is pushed aside, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, his sacrifice of purification is not pushed aside. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi (Joḥanan) [Aḥa] switches traditions, to avoid that a word of Rebbi Joḥanan contradict his own word. For Rebbi Samuel bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One sprinkles the blood of a purification sacrifice or a reparation sacrifice for a person terminally ill. The rabbis of Caesarea said, Rebbi Ḥiyya and Rebbi Yasa, one follows the one, the other follows the other.

The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If he had said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, and afterwards had an attack of seizures and said, do not write, his later words are disregarded.” He explains it: After he regains his sanity, his later words are disregarded. If he gave her a bill of divorce saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. If he threw her bill of divorce to her saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Eleazar said that Rebbi Abin asked: If he separated heave from his grain heap and said, it shall be heave only tomorrow but the next day he suffered an attack of seizures, is this the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it: If somebody had been crucified or mortally wounded when he signalled to write a bill of divorce to his wife, one writes and delivers on the assumption that his soul hangs on in him. Is it not impossible that his mind should not have been disturbed for an hour? This disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it.

The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If he had said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, and afterwards had an attack of seizures and said, do not write, his later words are disregarded.” He explains it: After he regains his sanity, his later words are disregarded. If he gave her a bill of divorce saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. If he threw her bill of divorce to her saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Eleazar said that Rebbi Abin asked: If he separated heave from his grain heap and said, it shall be heave only tomorrow but the next day he suffered an attack of seizures, is this the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it: If somebody had been crucified or mortally wounded when he signalled to write a bill of divorce to his wife, one writes and delivers on the assumption that his soul hangs on in him. Is it not impossible that his mind should not have been disturbed for an hour? This disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it.

The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If he had said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, and afterwards had an attack of seizures and said, do not write, his later words are disregarded.” He explains it: After he regains his sanity, his later words are disregarded. If he gave her a bill of divorce saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. If he threw her bill of divorce to her saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Eleazar said that Rebbi Abin asked: If he separated heave from his grain heap and said, it shall be heave only tomorrow but the next day he suffered an attack of seizures, is this the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it: If somebody had been crucified or mortally wounded when he signalled to write a bill of divorce to his wife, one writes and delivers on the assumption that his soul hangs on in him. Is it not impossible that his mind should not have been disturbed for an hour? This disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it.

The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If he had said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, and afterwards had an attack of seizures and said, do not write, his later words are disregarded.” He explains it: After he regains his sanity, his later words are disregarded. If he gave her a bill of divorce saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. If he threw her bill of divorce to her saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Eleazar said that Rebbi Abin asked: If he separated heave from his grain heap and said, it shall be heave only tomorrow but the next day he suffered an attack of seizures, is this the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it: If somebody had been crucified or mortally wounded when he signalled to write a bill of divorce to his wife, one writes and delivers on the assumption that his soul hangs on in him. Is it not impossible that his mind should not have been disturbed for an hour? This disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it.

The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If he had said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, and afterwards had an attack of seizures and said, do not write, his later words are disregarded.” He explains it: After he regains his sanity, his later words are disregarded. If he gave her a bill of divorce saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. If he threw her bill of divorce to her saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Eleazar said that Rebbi Abin asked: If he separated heave from his grain heap and said, it shall be heave only tomorrow but the next day he suffered an attack of seizures, is this the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it: If somebody had been crucified or mortally wounded when he signalled to write a bill of divorce to his wife, one writes and delivers on the assumption that his soul hangs on in him. Is it not impossible that his mind should not have been disturbed for an hour? This disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it.

The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If he had said, write a bill of divorce for my wife, and afterwards had an attack of seizures and said, do not write, his later words are disregarded.” He explains it: After he regains his sanity, his later words are disregarded. If he gave her a bill of divorce saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. If he threw her bill of divorce to her saying that it should be valid only the next day and then suffered an attack of seizures, this is the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Rebbi Eleazar said that Rebbi Abin asked: If he separated heave from his grain heap and said, it shall be heave only tomorrow but the next day he suffered an attack of seizures, is this the disagreement between Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it: If somebody had been crucified or mortally wounded when he signalled to write a bill of divorce to his wife, one writes and delivers on the assumption that his soul hangs on in him. Is it not impossible that his mind should not have been disturbed for an hour? This disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and he cannot explain it.

HALAKHAH: “This is your bill of divorce on condition that you serve my father,” etc. Rebbi Abba said: During his lifetime, on condition that she serve all his needs, on condition that she breast-feed all his needs. Even if she did not serve all his needs, even if she did not breast-feed all his needs, but even if she served him for one hour, or breast-fed him for one hour. After death, even if she never served him or never breast-fed him. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “How long does she have to breast-feed him? Two years, Rebbi Jehudah says, eighteen months.” Rebbi Abin said, this was taught about the cost of a wet-nurse.

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A anddefinitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, maybe in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A anddefinitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, maybe in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I shall give you property A anddefinitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, maybe in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.

Ulla bar Ismael said, he never thought to have a right to her wool basket. Think of it, if her wool basket was of gold? Certainly he never thought to have a right to her wool basket. Rebbi Joḥanan said, only if it is being used. Rebbi Yose said, only if she is using it at that moment. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if it is tied to her; Rebbi Yose said, if she lifts it for her purpose. Rebbi Hoshaiah stated in support of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even if he threw it into her maloš she is divorced.

HALAKHAH: “The same applies for preliminary marriages”, etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Abba Cohen Bar Dalaia: A person acquires a find within four cubits of himself. What is the reason? (1Chr. 22:14) “Look, in my poverty I prepared for the House of the Eternal 100’000 kikkar of gold, 1’000’000 kikkar of silver, bronze and iron unweighed because it was so much; I prepared wood and stones, and you should add to them.”

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Did we not state: (Mishnah Baba Meẓi‘a 1:4) “If somebody saw a find and fell on it, when another person came and grabbed it, he who grabbed it had the rights to it?” He answered him: Explain it if the first one did not say that his four cubits should acquire it for him. But did we not state: “If he fell on it or spread his talith on it, one removes him from it?” He said to him, that is the same, if he did not say that his four cubits should acquire it for him. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: (Tosephta Peah 2:2) “If two were pushing one another because of a sheaf and another person came and grabbed it from before them, the one who grabbed is entitled to it. He said to him, it is the same, they did not say that our four cubits should acquire it for us.

Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: That refers to divorce documents, but it does not apply to a gift. Rebbi Joḥanan adds something, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish adds something. Rebbi Joḥanan adds something. Since a find which cannot be acquired by the knowledge of another person can be acquired within four cubits, should this rule not apply a fortiori to a gift that is acquired by the knowledge of another person? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish adds something. Since a gift which could only be acquired within four cubits by the knowledge of another person, should this not a fortiori apply to a find?

Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: That refers to divorce documents, but it does not apply to a gift. Rebbi Joḥanan adds something, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish adds something. Rebbi Joḥanan adds something. Since a find which cannot be acquired by the knowledge of another person can be acquired within four cubits, should this rule not apply a fortiori to a gift that is acquired by the knowledge of another person? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish adds something. Since a gift which could only be acquired within four cubits by the knowledge of another person, should this not a fortiori apply to a find?

Rebbi Zeïra objected before Rebbi Yasa: But did we not state: The same applies to marriage? He answered him, divorce documents and marriage contracts have the same rules. But did we not state: The same applies to debt? He said to him, because if he said to him: Throw it into the sea and your debt will be forgiven, it would be forgiven. But if that is true, even if it fell down close to the debtor, the debtor should have the benefit! But we have stated, if it falls down close to the debtor, the debtor is still obligated. For he said to him, throw it so that it will enter my domain, but it did not yet enter his domain. Rebbi Abbahu said, all those objections that Rebbi Zeïra raised before Rebbi Yasa, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish raised before Rebbi Joḥanan. Did he accept them from him? He solved them with those same solutions.

Rebbi Joḥanan said: There is no “she shall be divorced”. Rebbi Immi said, several boxes of cases came before Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish and they said, go and complete following Rebbi Aqiba.

HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.

HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.

“If he allots her to his son;” with [the girl’s] agreement. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no agreement here. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said so, the statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, even if you say the statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, is he not a minor? “If he allots her to his son;” with [the latter’s] agreement. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he allots her to his minor or adult son, with or without the latter’s agreement. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he allots her only to his adult son with the latter’s agreement.

“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.

“A male nine years and one day old makes a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who performed ḥalîṣah for a common priest.” In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who must explain this for a marriage, she should also be free from levirate or ḥalîṣah, as we have stated: “If he married a woman, that one is free from levirate or ḥalîṣah.” Rebbi Abin said, following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish it comes following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, as it was stated so: If a male nine years and one day old up to twelve years and one day old grew two pubic hairs, they are warts. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah said, they are indicators [of puberty]. Rebbi Jacob ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: Only if they were still there at the time of indicators.

Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked before me: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.

Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked before me: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If somebody sold a flock to another person, when [the seller] delivered the maškokît, [the buyer] took possession. What is maškokît? Some say, the shepherd’s staff. But some say, a whistle. And some say, the bell-wether.

“Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: He who sells the tithes of his field to another person did not do anything; the future children of his slave girl to another person, he did not do anything; the fetus of his animal to another person, he did not do anything; the airspace of his dry land to another person, he did not do anything. But he may sell him a field and reserve the tithes for himself; a slave girl and reserve her children for himself; an animal and reserve her fetus for himself. Is it not impossible for a person to sell the airspace of his dry land to another person? Explain it if he tells him, tear out some grasses from that dry land to acquire its airspace. And here there is real estate before him and he says, pluck something from the ground so that one tenth of it be acquired by you.

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rebbi Assi: If an underage girl married herself off preliminarily with two pubic hairs, her father repudiates the marriage but not she herself. This follows neither Rebbi Joḥanan nor Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. If following Rebbi Joḥanan, there is no place for repudiation. If following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the marriage is valid by biblical standards. It follows only Rebbi Joḥanan. Even though Rebbi Joḥanan says that everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself, he agrees in this case that the father repudiates on her behalf.

Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rebbi Assi: If an underage girl married herself off preliminarily with two pubic hairs, her father repudiates the marriage but not she herself. This follows neither Rebbi Joḥanan nor Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. If following Rebbi Joḥanan, there is no place for repudiation. If following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the marriage is valid by biblical standards. It follows only Rebbi Joḥanan. Even though Rebbi Joḥanan says that everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself, he agrees in this case that the father repudiates on her behalf.

Rebbi Abba bar Cahana and Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: If she was preliminarily married with agreement but definitively married without agreement: there was such a case and the father came and removed her from the bridal chamber. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua: He had an indication that Rebbi Joshua ben Levi disagreed with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But this does not disagree. Just as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said there, she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings, so Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said here, she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana and Rebbi Jacob bar Idi came in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: If she was preliminarily married without agreement and was being definitively married without agreement: there was such a case and the father came and annulled her preliminary marriage.

Rebbi Abba bar Cahana and Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: If she was preliminarily married with agreement but definitively married without agreement: there was such a case and the father came and removed her from the bridal chamber. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua: He had an indication that Rebbi Joshua ben Levi disagreed with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But this does not disagree. Just as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said there, she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings, so Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said here, she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana and Rebbi Jacob bar Idi came in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: If she was preliminarily married without agreement and was being definitively married without agreement: there was such a case and the father came and annulled her preliminary marriage.

“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

“If he married her definitively without inquiry”. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with the case that he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. But if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she can claim her ketubah. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even if he married her preliminarily silently and definitively silently, she has no ketubah. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: But she needs a bill of divorce from him even if he married her preliminarily conditionally but definitively silently. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: In case he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage, what does Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say? Let us hear from the following: “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” This implies that if he proved his case, she can claim her ketubah. What do you see to say, if he married her preliminarily silently and divorced her after the preliminary marriage! Where do we hold? Since afterwards [it is stated]: “When was this said? For hidden defects, but he has no claim about visible defects.” If he. made it conditional, could he not also claim for visible ones? But did not the colleagues say before Rebbi Yose: Should we say that the following statement disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? “Once she entered her husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” This implies that if the husband proved his case, she has no claim to ketubah. But by the statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, she has a claim to ketubah. Rebbi Cohen in the name of the rabbis of Caesarea: The Mishnah deals with the case that he definitively married her but did not sleep with her; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish speaks about the case that he definitively married her and slept with her; I am saying that she was acceptable to him since he took her to bed.

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, sometime in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, sometime in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.

Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The following is the contract text: “I, X son of Y, contract a preliminary marriage with you, Z, daughter of U, on condition that I give you property A and definitively marry you by day B. If that day should pass without me having taken you in, I shall have no claim on you.” If anything intervened beyond his control? Rebbi Joḥanan said, matters beyond his control are as if he were inactive. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, matters outside his control are as if he had acted. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what would be necessary? “If that day should pass without you having taken me in, I shall have no claim on you.” When Rebbi Joḥanan was dying, he told his daughters to act following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. He said, sometime in the future there might be a court which follows him; then his descendants might be in danger of bastardy.

Rebbi Yannai said: More than 30 Elders voted: from where that qiddushin have no legal effect on a sister-in-law? The verse says, “the wife of the deceased may not belong to any outside unrelated man”, that she cannot have any existence with an outsider. Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, is that not a Mishnah? “Or after your levir will have performed ḥalîṣah with you, she is not preliminarily married.” And Rebbi Yannai praised him “those who pour out gold from the wallet,” “my son, they should not be removed from your eyes,” “get wise, my son, and make me happy, that I can answer those who insult me”, “give to the wise that he shall become wiser,” “let the wise listen that he increase in knowledge.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, after all these praises I can explain it following Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Aqiba said that there exists a bastard from a sister-in-law!

“On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; if the father does not agree, she is not preliminarily married;” silently he does not agree. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” silently he agreed. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” silently he agreed. Rebbi Joḥanan asked Rebbi Yannai, can the Mishnah say so? He answered him, do you ask wretched Yannai to explain Qiddušin? Rebbi Yannai returned and explained the Mishnah: “On condition that my father agree; if the father agreed, she is preliminarily married; otherwise she is not preliminarily married,” he said on condition that [the father] express his opinion but he did not. “If the father died, she is preliminarily married;” as if he had given his opinion. “If the son died, one instructs the father to say that he does not agree;” as if he had given his opinion. Rebbi Ze‘ira said [before Rebbi Yasa]: Can Rebbi Yannai explain the Mishnah as he wishes? He answered him, so says Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, Rebbi does not refrain from stating generality and detail simultaneously. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah states thus: “On condition that I have a bet kor of arable land”, a generality; “at place X”, a detail.

HALAKHAH: “In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: If a proselyte married a bastard girl, there is no sinful preliminary marriage, but the child follows the blemished part? He answered, everywhere Rebbi taught, he explained: “Who is this? A priestly, or Levitic, or Israel woman married to a Cohen, a Levite, or an Israel.” Rebbi Abin understood this from the second part: (In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the father.) [In any case of a sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the blemished part.] Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: If a proselyte married a bastard girl, there is no sinful preliminary marriage, but the child follows the blemished part? He answered, everywhere Rebbi taught, he explained: “Who is this? A widow [married to] a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a bastard or a Gibeonite.” Could he not have objected to him: In the case of a disqualified priest married to the daughter of an Israel there is no sinful marriage but the child follows the blemished part? In the case of a man taking back his divorcee after she had been remarried, there is (no) sinful marriage but the child is unblemished since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The daughter of a man taking back his divorcee after she had been remarried is enabled for the priesthood. What is the reason? [For she is an abomination,] she is an abomination but her children are not an abomination.

HALAKHAH: “In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: If a proselyte married a bastard girl, there is no sinful preliminary marriage, but the child follows the blemished part? He answered, everywhere Rebbi taught, he explained: “Who is this? A priestly, or Levitic, or Israel woman married to a Cohen, a Levite, or an Israel.” Rebbi Abin understood this from the second part: (In any case of a not sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the father.) [In any case of a sinful preliminary marriage, the child follows the blemished part.] Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: If a proselyte married a bastard girl, there is no sinful preliminary marriage, but the child follows the blemished part? He answered, everywhere Rebbi taught, he explained: “Who is this? A widow [married to] a High priest, a divorcee or one who has received ḥalîṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a bastard or a Gibeonite.” Could he not have objected to him: In the case of a disqualified priest married to the daughter of an Israel there is no sinful marriage but the child follows the blemished part? In the case of a man taking back his divorcee after she had been remarried, there is (no) sinful marriage but the child is unblemished since Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The daughter of a man taking back his divorcee after she had been remarried is enabled for the priesthood. What is the reason? [For she is an abomination,] she is an abomination but her children are not an abomination.

It was stated: “If a Gentile or a slave had intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard; Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Simeon, the child is not a bastard, for a bastard is only from a woman forbidden to him by an incest prohibition for which the penalty is extirpation.” Both of them explained the same verse, “nobody may take his father’s wife, etc.” Rebbi Meïr explains: Since his father’s wife is special in that he cannot have preliminary marriage with her, but she could have preliminary marriage with others, and the child is a bastard, so in all cases in which she cannot have preliminary marriage with him, the child is a bastard. Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah explains: Since his father’s wife is special in that she cannot have preliminary marriage with him, but she could have preliminary marriage with others, and the child is a bastard; this excludes the Gentile and the slave who cannot contract preliminary marriage with her or with others. Rebbi Samuel bar Abba questions that first Tanna: The sister-in-law who whored cannot have preliminary marriage with him or with others, but the child is qualified! Rebbi Yannai in the name of Rebbi: If a Gentile or a slave had intercourse with a Jewish woman, the child is a bastard. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, the child is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba, Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, in the name of Rebbi (Yannai ben) Rebbi: The child is neither qualified nor disqualified but dirtied. Rebbi Jonathan went with Rebbi Jehudah Neśia to the hot springs of Gadara. There, he instructed: The child is qualified. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this child improves as time goes by. Rebbi declared the child dirtied, his grandson declared him qualified. Rebbi Abba bar Zavda instructed in the name of all rabbis: The child is qualified. Rebbi Bevai said before Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The child is qualified. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if it is from that, one does not learn from a declaration. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, I know the story from beginning to end. Rebbi Ḥama bar Ḥanina went up to the hot springs of Gadara. He visited his father who said to him: Be careful, because there are those who are disqualified, lest you injure them.

“Proselytes,” meaning “everyone who separated himself from the impurities of the peoples of the earth to join them.” Freedmen, as in “and all the Gibeonites, etc.” Bastards. Rebbi Simeon said, it is written: “And the following came up from Salt Hill, Ploughing Hill”. From Salt Hill, that is Babylon. Ploughing Hill refers to silenced ones and foundlings. Kerub means the bastards; the young are those who go after their eyes; Addon, for they were saying, there is no judgment and no Master. Rebbi Ḥizqiah changed the wording: These are those who went after their eyes and said, there is no judgment and no judge. And Immer, who rebelled against God by their evil deeds. Rebbi Abbun in the name of Rebbi Phineas: They publicized themselves like the seam of a garment. Rebbi Levi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: They would have been worthy of being turned into a salt hill, but Divine justice was silent for them. Ploughing Hill.

They asked Rebbi Eliezer, what is the status of the eleventh generation of a bastard? He said to them, bring to me a third generation and I shall declare him pure, for he would not live. Rebbi Eliezer parallels Rebbi Ḥanina? As Rebbi Ḥanina said, once every sixty to seventy years the Holy One, praise to Him, brings a plague into the world to eliminate the bastards and he takes the qualified ones with them in order not to publicize the sinners. This parallels what Rebbi Levi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “In the place where the ascent offering has its throat cut before the Eternal, the purification sacrifice has its throat cut,” in order not to publicize the sinners. “Also He is wise and brings evil;” could one better understand “also He is wise and brings good”? But to teach you that even the evil that the Holy One, praise to Him, brings to the world, He brings in wisdom. “His word He did not remove, He overcomes the house of evildoers and accomplices of workers of iniquity.” Rav Huna said, no bastard lives more than thirty days. When Rebbi Ze‘ira immigrated here, he heard voices call “he-bastard, she-bastard”. He said, what is this? There goes that of Rav Huna, since Rav Huna said, no bastard lives more than thirty days. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said to him, I was with you when Rebbi Abba, Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: No bastard lives more than thirty days, when? If it is unknown. Therefore, if it is known, he lives.

Rebbi Joḥanan said, one does not investigate a family in which a family disqualification has disappeared. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, a Mishnah says so: “There was a family Bene Ṣerifa in Transjordan who were forcibly distanced by Ben Ṣion. Another [family] was there who were forcibly integrated by the people of Ṣion.” Nevertheless, the Sages did not want to make their names public. But the Sages transmit them to their sons and students two times in a Week. Rebbi Joḥanan said, by the Temple service, I know them and the leading personalities of the generation have disappeared in them. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, Pashḥur ben Immer had 5000 slaves, and their traces have disappeared in the high priesthood. These are the insolent in the priesthood. Rebbi Eleazar said, their main training: “Your people is like quarrelsome priests.” Rebbi Abbahu said, Samaritans disappeared in thirteen villages in the times of [persecution]. They said, עדן דמשאה is one of them.

[In the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah, may a male bastard not marry a female bastard?] Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Jacob from Gebal stated before Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Isaac bar Tevele in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Rebbi Jehudah stated that a male bastard should not marry a female bastard so that bastards should disappear from the world. Similarly, is an Ammonite man forbidden to marry an Ammonite woman? Was that needed for the rabbis? For if Rebbi Jehudah thought that this disqualified converts from any of the Eternal’s congregations, then [the Ammonite] could not marry an Ammonite woman since for her he would be of the Eternal’s congregation. He could not marry an Egyptian woman since for her he would be of the Eternal’s congregation. Rebbi Mattania said, one frees a slave girl and marries her to him. Similarly, could an Egyptian man not marry an Egyptian woman? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Abbahu stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: “Rebbi Jehudah said, Benjamin, an Egyptian convert, was a student of Rebbi Aqiba. He said, I am an Egyptian convert married to an Egyptian convert. My son is an Egyptian convert; I shall marry him to an Egyptian convert so that my grandson will be qualified to marry into the congregation. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, my son, it is not so. But you marry him to the daughter of an Egyptian woman convert so that there should be three generations on either side.”

HALAKHAH: “If somebody empowered his agent,” etc. It was stated: “If a man and a woman come from overseas; he says, she is my wife, and she says, he is my husband. One will not execute anybody because of her being a married woman. If they become generally known, one will execute because of her being a married woman.” How long does it take to be generally known? Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Up to thirty days. There, we have stated: “A toddler who is found near cake-dough with a piece of dough in his hand, Rebbi Meïr declares pure but the Sages declare it impure, for toddlers will slap their hands on cake-dough.” Does one burn because of general knowledge? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one executes because of general knowledge. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one does not execute because of general knowledge. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Everybody agrees that one executes because of general knowledge. Where do they disagree? About burning. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one executes because of general knowledge but one does not burn because of general knowledge. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, since one executes because of general knowledge, one also burns because of general knowledge. And from where that one executes because of general knowledge? Rebbi Samuel, the son of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it is written: “He who hits his father or his mother shall be put to death.” But is it certain that this one is his father? Is it not only general knowledge that he is his father? But it says, one executes. So here also one executes.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody empowered his agent,” etc. It was stated: “If a man and a woman come from overseas; he says, she is my wife, and she says, he is my husband. One will not execute anybody because of her being a married woman. If they become generally known, one will execute because of her being a married woman.” How long does it take to be generally known? Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Up to thirty days. There, we have stated: “A toddler who is found near cake-dough with a piece of dough in his hand, Rebbi Meïr declares pure but the Sages declare it impure, for toddlers will slap their hands on cake-dough.” Does one burn because of general knowledge? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one executes because of general knowledge. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one does not execute because of general knowledge. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Everybody agrees that one executes because of general knowledge. Where do they disagree? About burning. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one executes because of general knowledge but one does not burn because of general knowledge. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, since one executes because of general knowledge, one also burns because of general knowledge. And from where that one executes because of general knowledge? Rebbi Samuel, the son of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it is written: “He who hits his father or his mother shall be put to death.” But is it certain that this one is his father? Is it not only general knowledge that he is his father? But it says, one executes. So here also one executes.

HALAKHAH: “If somebody empowered his agent,” etc. It was stated: “If a man and a woman come from overseas; he says, she is my wife, and she says, he is my husband. One will not execute anybody because of her being a married woman. If they become generally known, one will execute because of her being a married woman.” How long does it take to be generally known? Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Up to thirty days. There, we have stated: “A toddler who is found near cake-dough with a piece of dough in his hand, Rebbi Meïr declares pure but the Sages declare it impure, for toddlers will slap their hands on cake-dough.” Does one burn because of general knowledge? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish disagree. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one executes because of general knowledge. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, one does not execute because of general knowledge. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: Everybody agrees that one executes because of general knowledge. Where do they disagree? About burning. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one executes because of general knowledge but one does not burn because of general knowledge. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, since one executes because of general knowledge, one also burns because of general knowledge. And from where that one executes because of general knowledge? Rebbi Samuel, the son of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, it is written: “He who hits his father or his mother shall be put to death.” But is it certain that this one is his father? Is it not only general knowledge that he is his father? But it says, one executes. So here also one executes.

HALAKHAH: “How is the tooth notorious,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it refers to the first part. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it refers to all. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted. There, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is responsible. And here, he says so? They said, there in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia; but here, in his own name. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, is it free [from payment]. Rebbi Joḥanan’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is obligated. Not only if the walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down or one which is lying down kicks the walking one. If a walking [animal] kicks a walking one? Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is free [from payment]. But in the case of one lying down against one walking or one who was walking against one walking, it is obligated. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: It always is free. What is Rebbi Hoshaia’s reason; is there no “horn” in the public domain? Rav said, if it stood still and ate from heaped produce, [it is obligated]. Since the leniency for “tooth” is in case it ate walking from the standing; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the one standing still. Ilfai said: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is obligated. Since the leniency for “tooth” is that it ate walking {from the standing} [from the walking]; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the walking one.

HALAKHAH: “How is the tooth notorious,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it refers to the first part. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it refers to all. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted. There, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is responsible. And here, he says so? They said, there in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia; but here, in his own name. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, is it free [from payment]. Rebbi Joḥanan’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is obligated. Not only if the walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down or one which is lying down kicks the walking one. If a walking [animal] kicks a walking one? Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is free [from payment]. But in the case of one lying down against one walking or one who was walking against one walking, it is obligated. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: It always is free. What is Rebbi Hoshaia’s reason; is there no “horn” in the public domain? Rav said, if it stood still and ate from heaped produce, [it is obligated]. Since the leniency for “tooth” is in case it ate walking from the standing; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the one standing still. Ilfai said: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is obligated. Since the leniency for “tooth” is that it ate walking {from the standing} [from the walking]; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the walking one.

HALAKHAH: “How is the tooth notorious,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it refers to the first part. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it refers to all. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted. There, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is responsible. And here, he says so? They said, there in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia; but here, in his own name. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, is it free [from payment]. Rebbi Joḥanan’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is obligated. Not only if the walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down or one which is lying down kicks the walking one. If a walking [animal] kicks a walking one? Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is free [from payment]. But in the case of one lying down against one walking or one who was walking against one walking, it is obligated. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: It always is free. What is Rebbi Hoshaia’s reason; is there no “horn” in the public domain? Rav said, if it stood still and ate from heaped produce, [it is obligated]. Since the leniency for “tooth” is in case it ate walking from the standing; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the one standing still. Ilfai said: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is obligated. Since the leniency for “tooth” is that it ate walking {from the standing} [from the walking]; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the walking one.

HALAKHAH: “How is the tooth notorious,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it refers to the first part. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it refers to all. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted. There, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is responsible. And here, he says so? They said, there in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia; but here, in his own name. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, is it free [from payment]. Rebbi Joḥanan’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is obligated. Not only if the walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down or one which is lying down kicks the walking one. If a walking [animal] kicks a walking one? Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is free [from payment]. But in the case of one lying down against one walking or one who was walking against one walking, it is obligated. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: It always is free. What is Rebbi Hoshaia’s reason; is there no “horn” in the public domain? Rav said, if it stood still and ate from heaped produce, [it is obligated]. Since the leniency for “tooth” is in case it ate walking from the standing; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the one standing still. Ilfai said: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is obligated. Since the leniency for “tooth” is that it ate walking {from the standing} [from the walking]; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the walking one.

HALAKHAH: “How is the tooth notorious,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it refers to the first part. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it refers to all. The argument of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish seems inverted. There, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is responsible. And here, he says so? They said, there in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia; but here, in his own name. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, is it free [from payment]. Rebbi Joḥanan’s word implies that if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is obligated. Not only if the walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down or one which is lying down kicks the walking one. If a walking [animal] kicks a walking one? Rebbi Immi said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if a walking [animal] kicks one which is lying down, it is free [from payment]. But in the case of one lying down against one walking or one who was walking against one walking, it is obligated. Rebbi Hoshaia stated: It always is free. What is Rebbi Hoshaia’s reason; is there no “horn” in the public domain? Rav said, if it stood still and ate from heaped produce, [it is obligated]. Since the leniency for “tooth” is in case it ate walking from the standing; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the one standing still. Ilfai said: If it stood still and ate from heaped produce, it is obligated. Since the leniency for “tooth” is that it ate walking {from the standing} [from the walking]; the restriction for “horn” is in case the walking animal kicked the walking one.

“A dog stole a hot pitta.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if he lit every single ear of grain. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another. Rebbi Isaac bar Tevelai said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If a kid goat was bound to it and a slave was close by and was burned, he is obligated. If the slave was bound and the kid goat close by, he is free.” But if you say that he is not like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another, then for the first ear he is guilty of a capital crime; for the remainder he should be liable for repayment. Rebbi Yose said, you also understand that from: “If his cattle set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is obligated. But if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is free.” But if you say that he is not like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another, then should he not become obligated since for the remainder he should be liable for repayment. A person did put out a hot water bottle outside. A donkey passed by and broke it. The case came before Rebbi Isaac bar Tevelai, who said to him: He does not owe you anything. Not only that but if [the donkey] suffered damage, [you] would be obligated for its damages.

“A dog stole a hot pitta.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, only if he lit every single ear of grain. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another. Rebbi Isaac bar Tevelai said, a Mishnah supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If a kid goat was bound to it and a slave was close by and was burned, he is obligated. If the slave was bound and the kid goat close by, he is free.” But if you say that he is not like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another, then for the first ear he is guilty of a capital crime; for the remainder he should be liable for repayment. Rebbi Yose said, you also understand that from: “If his cattle set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is obligated. But if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is free.” But if you say that he is not like a person who shoots an arrow from one place to another, then should he not become obligated since for the remainder he should be liable for repayment. A person did put out a hot water bottle outside. A donkey passed by and broke it. The case came before Rebbi Isaac bar Tevelai, who said to him: He does not owe you anything. Not only that but if [the donkey] suffered damage, [you] would be obligated for its damages.

“A fence which collapsed into the public domain.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: This is Rebbi Meïr’s, since Rebbi Meïr said, one is liable for damage caused by inaction. This is the following: “If he was given a deadline by which to cut the tree or demolish the wall and they collapsed, if it happened within the term, he is not liable; after the term, he is liable.” How much is a term? Rebbi Hoshaia stated: 30 days.

One objects from the Mishnah; sometimes one objects in support of Rebbi Joḥanan, sometimes one objects in support of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A person may eat once and be liable for four purification and one reparation sacrifices: An impure person who ate suet which was leftover sacrifice on the Day of Atonement. Rebbi Meïr said, if it was a Sabbath and he took it out on the Sabbath. They told him, it is not from that category.” When they objected in support of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he took it out on the Sabbath, there is no putting down. Why did they say, it is not from that category? When they objected in support of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Why is he not liable if he took it out on the Day of Atonement? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Meïr follows Rebbi Aqiba, as it was stated: From where that if one unintentionally worked on a Day of Atonement which fell on the Sabbath, he is liable for each one separately? The verse says, “it is Sabbath,” “it is the Day of Atonement.” Rebbi Ismael said, he is liable only once. If he took it out] on the Sabbath and put it down. Why did they say: “it is not from that category”? I would say in explanation that he ate it. Is eating not putting it down? Therefore, it is only reasonable that if he took it out on the Sabbath, he be liable. Then if he took it out [on the Day of Atonement why should he not be liable?

One objects from the Mishnah; sometimes one objects in support of Rebbi Joḥanan, sometimes one objects in support of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A person may eat once and be liable for four purification and one reparation sacrifices: An impure person who ate suet which was leftover sacrifice on the Day of Atonement. Rebbi Meïr said, if it was a Sabbath and he took it out on the Sabbath. They told him, it is not from that category.” When they objected in support of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he took it out on the Sabbath, there is no putting down. Why did they say, it is not from that category? When they objected in support of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Why is he not liable if he took it out on the Day of Atonement? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Meïr follows Rebbi Aqiba, as it was stated: From where that if one unintentionally worked on a Day of Atonement which fell on the Sabbath, he is liable for each one separately? The verse says, “it is Sabbath,” “it is the Day of Atonement.” Rebbi Ismael said, he is liable only once. If he took it out] on the Sabbath and put it down. Why did they say: “it is not from that category”? I would say in explanation that he ate it. Is eating not putting it down? Therefore, it is only reasonable that if he took it out on the Sabbath, he be liable. Then if he took it out [on the Day of Atonement why should he not be liable?

HALAKHAH: “A bull which was rubbing itself against a wall,” etc. “A man who kills any human soul,” to include a hit which is potentially deadly. Some Tannaïm state, even if it is not deadly. Rebbi La said, even if it is deadly but a third person came and killed, the killer is guilty. “And it killed a man or a woman,” just as a man lets his sons inherit his injury claims, so a woman lets her sons inherit her injury claims. But does not a man inherit from his wife? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, so did Rebbi Hoshaiah, the father of the Mishnah, explain: One teaches here about weregilt which is due after death.

HALAKHAH: “A bull which is led out to be stoned,” etc. It was stated: If a bull was led out to be stoned when its witnesses were found to be false, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the first to come acquires it; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it was false despair. Similarly, if a slave was led out to be killed when his witnesses were found to be false, Rebbi Joḥanan said, he acquired himself; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it was false despair.

HALAKHAH: “A bull which is led out to be stoned,” etc. It was stated: If a bull was led out to be stoned when its witnesses were found to be false, Rebbi Joḥanan said, the first to come acquires it; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it was false despair. Similarly, if a slave was led out to be killed when his witnesses were found to be false, Rebbi Joḥanan said, he acquired himself; Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it was false despair.

“And similarly, if a cow gored an ox,” etc. Rebbi Abun bar Cahana asked before Rebbi Immi: Because it is in doubt; therefore if it were certain, each one would give half? Would I say that a foot of a person is the entire person? Each one would give half? He said to him, the Mishnah deals with a notorious animal. “Its foot is sold to you,” he sold half. “Its second foot is sold to you,” he sold half of the [remaining] half. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, all these traditions are Levi’s.

“If an ox and its equipment fell in and broke, a donkey and its equipment and was torn, he is liable for the animal but not liable for the equipment.” Samuel said, when it became disoriented because of the air, but if it hit the ground he is liable. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, even if it hit the ground, he is not liable: The Torah absolved from liability when it fell down. “An ox or a donkey fell in there;” “an ox” and not an ox and its equipment; “a donkey” and not a donkey and its equipment. Since it looked logical: If a pit of damages, where one is not liable for death, one is liable for vessels; would it not be logical that for a pit ten handbreadths deep, for which one is liable for death, should one not be liable for vessels? The verse says, “an ox or a donkey fell in there;” “an ox” and not an ox and its equipment; “a donkey” and not a donkey and its equipment.

“Wild animals and birds follow the same rules.” Samuel said, the sea goose is kilaim with domesticated goose. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah does not say so, but an ox and a bison are kilaim with one another; a donkey and a wild donkey are kilaim with one another. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, Rebbi stated a complete Mishnah: “Wild animals and birds follow the same rules.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, and I brought this from the House of Levi: A rooster with a pheasant, a rooster with a peacock-hen are kilaim even though they are similar one to the other.

HALAKHAH: “He who brings a flock into a corral,” etc. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Yannai: In disagreement. Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion. Rebbi La said, Rebbi Eleazar’s statement is convincing since watching the animal itself is written only for “horn”. What about it? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, in disagreement. Rebbi Eleazar said, it is everybody’s opinion. Some say, it follows Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob who said, in no case is he liable.

HALAKHAH: It was stated: “If a shepherd handed his flock over to another shepherd, the first is liable, the second is not liable.” Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both said, since he handed it over to a responsible person, he is not liable.

“If it entered in due course, he pays for what it damaged.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina said, on that field itself he is not liable, but for another field he is liable. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both said, even if it grazed on that entire field he is not liable; he only is liable if it left the field for the public domain and from the public domain entered another field. But what is the rule if it fell into a garden and then entered another garden? In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina who said, on that field itself he is not liable, here he will be liable. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who both said, even if it grazed on that entire field he is not liable; he only is liable if it left the field for the public domain and from the public domain entered another field. But if it fell into a place which it could have entered, or it entered a place into which it could have fallen? Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, that is the Mishnah; it fell into a place into which it only could have fallen. But if it fell into a place which it could have entered? Each case is problematic for one of them. One needs the first case, that he pays what it profited; the other needs the other case, that he pays what it damaged.

“If it entered in due course, he pays for what it damaged.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina said, on that field itself he is not liable, but for another field he is liable. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both said, even if it grazed on that entire field he is not liable; he only is liable if it left the field for the public domain and from the public domain entered another field. But what is the rule if it fell into a garden and then entered another garden? In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina who said, on that field itself he is not liable, here he will be liable. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who both said, even if it grazed on that entire field he is not liable; he only is liable if it left the field for the public domain and from the public domain entered another field. But if it fell into a place which it could have entered, or it entered a place into which it could have fallen? Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, that is the Mishnah; it fell into a place into which it only could have fallen. But if it fell into a place which it could have entered? Each case is problematic for one of them. One needs the first case, that he pays what it profited; the other needs the other case, that he pays what it damaged.

There, they say, the Mishnah speaks of a catastrophic wind, but in case of normal wind he is liable. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, even in case of normal wind he is not liable; for sometimes it blows, sometimes it does not blow.

Rebbi Justus ben Rebbi Matton asked: If somebody redeems a string of dry figs from the Temple treasurer, does it become ṭevel for tithes? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked: Did we not state about him who “stole, dedicated it, and afterwards slaughtered or sold”? As you say there, the one who dedicates is not like a seller, so one who redeems is not like a buyer. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implies that selling is like redeeming. They said, he has the choice of redeeming and eating it.

Rebbi Justus ben Rebbi Matton asked: If somebody redeems a string of dry figs from the Temple treasurer, does it become ṭevel for tithes? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked: Did we not state about him who “stole, dedicated it, and afterwards slaughtered or sold”? As you say there, the one who dedicates is not like a seller, so one who redeems is not like a buyer. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implies that selling is like redeeming. They said, he has the choice of redeeming and eating it.

HALAKHAH: “He who hits another pays him a tetradrachma.” “Rebbi Aqiba said, even the poorest in Israel,” etc. Rav Qarni stated: For a kick, one. For an elbow, three. For sqlvnqyt fifteen. Somebody said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: He who puts an Elder to shame has fully to pay for his shame. A person insulted Rebbi Jehudah ben Ḥanina. The case came before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who fined him a pound of gold.

HALAKHAH: “He who hits another pays him a tetradrachma.” “Rebbi Aqiba said, even the poorest in Israel,” etc. Rav Qarni stated: For a kick, one. For an elbow, three. For sqlvnqyt fifteen. Somebody said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: He who puts an Elder to shame has fully to pay for his shame. A person insulted Rebbi Jehudah ben Ḥanina. The case came before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who fined him a pound of gold.

HALAKHAH: “If one say: Blind my eye, cut off my hand,” etc. “If he says, blind my eye because it damages me, cut off my hand because it damages me, he is liable. On condition not to be liable, he is liable.” Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah deals with a “yes” which really means “no”. But for a “yes” which does mean “yes” he is not liable. The statement of Rebbi Eleazar is about the family’s loss of standing. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with a “yes” which means “yes”. But for a “yes” which means “no”, he is liable. The statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish imples that one estimates the relatives’ loss of standing. It was stated: “If Gentiles forced a Jew and took from him another person’s money in his presence, he is not liable. If he handed it over, he is liable.” Rebbi Yose said, that means if they simply demanded “money”. But “X’s money”, he is not liable even if he handed it over.

HALAKHAH: “If one say: Blind my eye, cut off my hand,” etc. “If he says, blind my eye because it damages me, cut off my hand because it damages me, he is liable. On condition not to be liable, he is liable.” Rebbi Eleazar said, the Mishnah deals with a “yes” which really means “no”. But for a “yes” which does mean “yes” he is not liable. The statement of Rebbi Eleazar is about the family’s loss of standing. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the Mishnah deals with a “yes” which means “yes”. But for a “yes” which means “no”, he is liable. The statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish imples that one estimates the relatives’ loss of standing. It was stated: “If Gentiles forced a Jew and took from him another person’s money in his presence, he is not liable. If he handed it over, he is liable.” Rebbi Yose said, that means if they simply demanded “money”. But “X’s money”, he is not liable even if he handed it over.

HALAKHAH: “One who robbed from a proselyte,” etc. Ḥilfai and Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, this is Rebbi Yose the Galilean’s, as Rebbi Yose the Galiean explained: Of what does the verse speak? About one who robbed from a proselyte, swore to him, who then died, that he would pay the capital and the fifth to the priests and the reparation offering to the altar. “If the man have no relative,” he who needs atonement is obligated; this excludes the one who does not need atonement. Rebbi Aqiba explained when he came from Zephyrium: About one who robbed from a proselyte, swore to him, who then died, that he would pay the capital and the fifth to the priests and the reparation offering to the altar, as it is said: “If the man have no relative,” etc. The only person in Israel who has no relative is the proselyte. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is Rebbi Aqiba’s who said that the wrongly acquired property has to be returned in any case.

“If it was mortgageable property they have to return it.” What is mortgageable property? Rebbi Jonathan says, if they inherited real estate. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if they inherited robbed items. Rav said, an heir is like the holder of encumbered property. Just as a loan executed before witnesses cannot be collected from encumbered property, so it cannot be collected from heirs. Samuel said, what was received cannot be foreclosed on mortgaged property, but on free property it can be foreclosed. But does [the Mishnah] not disagree with Rav? Since Rav said, an heir is like a holder of encumbered property; just as a loan executed before witnesses cannot be collected from encumbered property, so it cannot be foreclosed from heirs. Explain it if he left them real estate. But might it not disagree with Samuel? Did not Samuel say, what was received cannot be foreclosed on mortgaged property? Explain it if they inherited robbed items.

HALAKHAH: “If a river washed away his donkey,” etc. It was stated: If he abandoned his to save the other’s, but the other’s climbed out by himself, he does not owe him anything. But if he abandoned his to save the other’s, and his own climbed out by himself, may he say, “I did not abandon hope of recovery”? Let us hear from the following: If a river washed away his donkey and he was crying: “I did not abandon hope of recovery!” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, as long as he is crying he did not abandon hope of recovery. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is a presumption that he had abandoned hope.