legally

With this marriage God was not well pleased, but was thereupon angry at David; and he appeared to Nathan the prophet in his sleep, and complained of the king. Now Nathan was a fair and prudent man; and considering that kings, when they fall into a passion, are guided more by that passion than they are by justice, he resolved to conceal the threatenings that proceeded from God, and made a good-natured discourse to him, and this after the manner following:—He desired that the king would give him his opinion in the following case:—"There were," said he, "two men inhabiting the same city, the one of them was rich, and [the other poor]. The rich man had a great many flocks of cattle, of sheep, and of kine; but the poor man had but one ewe lamb. This he brought up with his children, and let her eat her food with them; and he had the same natural affection for her which any one might have for a daughter. Now upon the coming of a stranger to the rich man, he would not vouchsafe to kill any of his own flocks, and thence feast his friend; but he sent for the poor man's lamb, and took her away from him, and made her ready for food, and thence feasted the stranger." This discourse troubled the king exceedingly; and he denounced to Nathan, that "this man was a wicked man who could dare to do such a thing; and that it was but just that he should restore the lamb fourfold, and be punished with death for it also." Upon this Nathan immediately said that he was himself the man who ought to suffer those punishments, and that by his own sentence; and that it was he who had perpetrated this 'great and horrid crime.' He also revealed to him, and laid before him, the anger of God against him, who had made him king over the army of the Hebrews, and lord of all the nations, and those many and great nations round about him; who had formerly delivered him out of the hands of Saul, and had given him such wives as he had justly and legally married; and now this God was despised by him, and affronted by his impiety, when he had married, and now had, another man's wife; and by exposing her husband to the enemy, had really slain him; that God would inflict punishments upon him on account of those instances of wickedness; that his own wives should be forced by one of his sons; and that he should be treacherously supplanted by the same son; and that although he had perpetrated his wickedness secretly, yet should that punishment which he was to undergo be inflicted publicly upon him; "that, moreover," said he, "the child which was born to thee of her shall soon die." When the king was troubled at these messages, and sufficiently confounded, and said with tears and sorrow that he had sinned, [for he was without controversy a pious man, and guilty of no sin at all in his whole life, excepting those in the matter of Uriah,] God had compassion on him, and was reconciled to him, and promised that he would preserve to him both his life and his kingdom; for he said that, seeing he repented of the things he had done, he was no longer displeased with him. So Nathan, when he had delivered this prophecy to the king, returned home.

A partition of reeds: if between one reed and another there are less than three handbreadths, [the space] through which a kid (young goat) could enter, it counts as a [legally effective] partition. A [stone] fence which has been broken through up to [the length of] ten cubits, [the breach] is [regarded] as a doorway; more than that, opposite the breach it is prohibited [to sow seeds]. If there were many breaches in the fence, if that which remains standing exceeds that which is broken through, it is permitted [to sow there]. But if the breached sections exceed those which remain standing, it is forbidden [to sow opposite the breaches.]

The following are forbidden, but they do not prohibit [the seed sown there]: The remainder of a [legally inadequate] empty patch (karahat) of a vineyard. The remainder of a [legally inadequate] mehol of a vineyard. The remainder of a [legally inadequate] aris-gap. The [ground under the] remainder of papyrus-ropes [of a trellis]. But [the ground] beneath a vine, and within the place left to work a vine, and the [ground within] four cubits of a vineyard, these do prohibit the [seed sown there].

The following are forbidden, but they do not prohibit [the seed sown there]: The remainder of a [legally inadequate] empty patch (karahat) of a vineyard. The remainder of a [legally inadequate] mehol of a vineyard. The remainder of a [legally inadequate] aris-gap. The [ground under the] remainder of papyrus-ropes [of a trellis]. But [the ground] beneath a vine, and within the place left to work a vine, and the [ground within] four cubits of a vineyard, these do prohibit the [seed sown there].

The following are forbidden, but they do not prohibit [the seed sown there]: The remainder of a [legally inadequate] empty patch (karahat) of a vineyard. The remainder of a [legally inadequate] mehol of a vineyard. The remainder of a [legally inadequate] aris-gap. The [ground under the] remainder of papyrus-ropes [of a trellis]. But [the ground] beneath a vine, and within the place left to work a vine, and the [ground within] four cubits of a vineyard, these do prohibit the [seed sown there].

They may clear away stones until Rosh Hashanah. They may trim, prune and remove [excess parts of the tree] until Rosh Hashanah. Rabbi Joshua says: just as one may trim and remove in the fifth year so too may one perform this work in the sixth year. Rabbi Shimon says: as long as I may legally tend the tree itself, I may remove [excess parts of it].

If a shomeret yavam came into possession of money: Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel agree that she may sell it or give it away, and that her act is legally valid. If she dies, what shall be done with her ketubah and with property that comes in and goes out with her? Beth Shammai says: the heirs of her husband are to share it with the heirs of her father; Beth Hillel says: the property is to remain with those in whose possession it is, the ketubah is to remain in the possession of the heirs of the husband and the property which comes in and goes out with her remains in the possession of the heirs of her father.

If an orphan was given in marriage by her mother or her brothers with her consent and they gave her a dowry of a hundred, or fifty zuz, she may, when she reaches majority age, legally claim from them the amount that was due to her. Rabbi Judah says: if the father had given his first daughter in marriage, the second must receive as much as the first. The Sages say: sometimes a man is poor and becomes rich or rich and becomes poor. Rather the estate should evaluated and [the appropriate amount] given to her.

If a woman came into the possession of property before she was betrothed, Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that she may sell it or give it away and her act is legally valid. If she came into the possession of property after she was betrothed, Bet Shammai says: she may sell it, and Beth Hillel says: she may not sell it. Both agree that if she had sold it or given it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Judah said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also acquire her property?” If she came into the possession of property after she was married, both agree that, even if she had sold it or given it away, the husband may seize it from the buyers. [If she came into possession] before she married and then she married, Rabban Gamaliel says: if she sold it or gave it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Hanina ben Akavya said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also gain acquires her property?” He replied, “We are embarrassed with regard to her new possessions and you wish to roll over on us her old ones as well?”

If a woman came into the possession of property before she was betrothed, Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that she may sell it or give it away and her act is legally valid. If she came into the possession of property after she was betrothed, Bet Shammai says: she may sell it, and Beth Hillel says: she may not sell it. Both agree that if she had sold it or given it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Judah said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also acquire her property?” If she came into the possession of property after she was married, both agree that, even if she had sold it or given it away, the husband may seize it from the buyers. [If she came into possession] before she married and then she married, Rabban Gamaliel says: if she sold it or gave it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Hanina ben Akavya said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also gain acquires her property?” He replied, “We are embarrassed with regard to her new possessions and you wish to roll over on us her old ones as well?”

If a woman came into the possession of property before she was betrothed, Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel agree that she may sell it or give it away and her act is legally valid. If she came into the possession of property after she was betrothed, Bet Shammai says: she may sell it, and Beth Hillel says: she may not sell it. Both agree that if she had sold it or given it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Judah said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also acquire her property?” If she came into the possession of property after she was married, both agree that, even if she had sold it or given it away, the husband may seize it from the buyers. [If she came into possession] before she married and then she married, Rabban Gamaliel says: if she sold it or gave it away her act is legally valid. Rabbi Hanina ben Akavya said: they argued before Rabban Gamaliel, “Since the man acquires the woman does he not also gain acquires her property?” He replied, “We are embarrassed with regard to her new possessions and you wish to roll over on us her old ones as well?”

Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between one kind of property and another: Property that is known to the husband [the wife] may not sell, and if she has sold it or given it away her act is void; [Property] which is unknown to the husband she may not sell, but if she has sold it or given it away her act is legally valid.

If a woman awaiting yibbum came into possession of money: Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel agree that she may sell it or give it away, and that her act is legally valid. If she dies, what shall be done with her ketubah and with property that comes in and goes out with her? Beth Shammai says: the heirs of her husband are to share it with the heirs of her father; Beth Hillel says: the property is to remain with those in whose possession it is, the ketubah is to remain in the possession of the heirs of the husband and the property which comes in and goes out with her remains in the possession of the heirs of her father.

If one hired craftsmen and they deceived each other, they have no legally valid complaint against each other, but only cause for complaint. If one hired a donkey-driver or a wagon-driver to bring litter-bearers or pipers for a bride or for the dead, or laborers to take his flax out of the steep, or any matter that would be lost if delayed, and they retracted, if it was a place where there were no others [who could be hired for the same wage] he may hire others at their (the original workers) expense or he may deceive them.

Can something that is apt to be saved but was forgotten become legally forgotten? Let us hear from the following: “When he removed the first, second, and third sheaves but forgot the fourth, some state: If he took away the fifth one, it (the fourth) becomes legally forgotten, but some state: If he waited long enough that he could have taken away the fifth one, it becomes legally forgotten.” Rebbi Avin bar Ḥiyya said, he who says, “if he removed the fifth one,” (speaks of the case) where there is a sixth one, but he who says, “if he waited long enough that he could have removed the fifth one,” (speaks of the case) where there is no sixth one. Before he took away the fifth one, would not the fourth one be apt to be considered starting a row? That means that something that is apt to be saved but was forgotten can become legally forgotten.

Can something that is apt to be saved but was forgotten become legally forgotten? Let us hear from the following: “When he removed the first, second, and third sheaves but forgot the fourth, some state: If he took away the fifth one, it (the fourth) becomes legally forgotten, but some state: If he waited long enough that he could have taken away the fifth one, it becomes legally forgotten.” Rebbi Avin bar Ḥiyya said, he who says, “if he removed the fifth one,” (speaks of the case) where there is a sixth one, but he who says, “if he waited long enough that he could have removed the fifth one,” (speaks of the case) where there is no sixth one. Before he took away the fifth one, would not the fourth one be apt to be considered starting a row? That means that something that is apt to be saved but was forgotten can become legally forgotten.

Can something that is apt to be saved but was forgotten become legally forgotten? Let us hear from the following: “When he removed the first, second, and third sheaves but forgot the fourth, some state: If he took away the fifth one, it (the fourth) becomes legally forgotten, but some state: If he waited long enough that he could have taken away the fifth one, it becomes legally forgotten.” Rebbi Avin bar Ḥiyya said, he who says, “if he removed the fifth one,” (speaks of the case) where there is a sixth one, but he who says, “if he waited long enough that he could have removed the fifth one,” (speaks of the case) where there is no sixth one. Before he took away the fifth one, would not the fourth one be apt to be considered starting a row? That means that something that is apt to be saved but was forgotten can become legally forgotten.

Can something that is apt to be saved but was forgotten become legally forgotten? Let us hear from the following: “When he removed the first, second, and third sheaves but forgot the fourth, some state: If he took away the fifth one, it (the fourth) becomes legally forgotten, but some state: If he waited long enough that he could have taken away the fifth one, it becomes legally forgotten.” Rebbi Avin bar Ḥiyya said, he who says, “if he removed the fifth one,” (speaks of the case) where there is a sixth one, but he who says, “if he waited long enough that he could have removed the fifth one,” (speaks of the case) where there is no sixth one. Before he took away the fifth one, would not the fourth one be apt to be considered starting a row? That means that something that is apt to be saved but was forgotten can become legally forgotten.

Can something that is apt to save but was forgotten become legally forgotten? Let us hear from the following: “One seah of cut grain and one seah of uncut grain.” Here the cut grain should save the uncut grain. That means that something that is apt to save, but was forgotten, can become legally forgotten. Rebbi Jonah said, explain it if he was cutting and removing the sheaves row by row. He already forgot the standing grain before he might forget the sheaves.

Can something that is apt to save but was forgotten become legally forgotten? Let us hear from the following: “One seah of cut grain and one seah of uncut grain.” Here the cut grain should save the uncut grain. That means that something that is apt to save, but was forgotten, can become legally forgotten. Rebbi Jonah said, explain it if he was cutting and removing the sheaves row by row. He already forgot the standing grain before he might forget the sheaves.

Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, that which was said, if it was abandoned to the poor but grabbed by the rich is a difference between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Yose. According to Rebbi Meïr, who asserts that [it is legally abandoned] as soon as a person abandons anything from his property, [in our case] it is legally abandoned. According to Rebbi Yose, who says that nothing may leave the hands of its owners except if it is taken up [by another person, in our case] it is not legally abandoned.

Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, that which was said, if it was abandoned to the poor but grabbed by the rich is a difference between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Yose. According to Rebbi Meïr, who asserts that [it is legally abandoned] as soon as a person abandons anything from his property, [in our case] it is legally abandoned. According to Rebbi Yose, who says that nothing may leave the hands of its owners except if it is taken up [by another person, in our case] it is not legally abandoned.

Rebbi Abin bar Ḥiyya said, that which was said, if it was abandoned to the poor but grabbed by the rich is a difference between Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Yose. According to Rebbi Meïr, who asserts that [it is legally abandoned] as soon as a person abandons anything from his property, [in our case] it is legally abandoned. According to Rebbi Yose, who says that nothing may leave the hands of its owners except if it is taken up [by another person, in our case] it is not legally abandoned.

“The sheaf next to it proves.” How is that? (Tosephta Peah 3:4): “If he had ten rows of ten sheaves each and he removed one row of them in a North-South direction; when he forgot one of them it is not forgotten because it is considered East-West.” When he then removed the sheaves East-West and forgot one of them, let us hear from the following: When he removed the first, second, and third sheaves but forgot the fourth, some state: If he removed the fifth, it becomes legally forgotten, but some state: If he waited long enough that he could have removed the fifth, it becomes legally forgotten. Rebbi Avin bar Ḥiyya said, he who says, “if he removed the fifth” if there is a sixth, but he who says, “if he waited long enough that he could have removed the fifth” if there is no sixth. Before he took away the fifth, would not the fourth be apt to be considered starting a row? If this is named “forgotten,” then also in our case it is “forgotten.”

“The sheaf next to it proves.” How is that? (Tosephta Peah 3:4): “If he had ten rows of ten sheaves each and he removed one row of them in a North-South direction; when he forgot one of them it is not forgotten because it is considered East-West.” When he then removed the sheaves East-West and forgot one of them, let us hear from the following: When he removed the first, second, and third sheaves but forgot the fourth, some state: If he removed the fifth, it becomes legally forgotten, but some state: If he waited long enough that he could have removed the fifth, it becomes legally forgotten. Rebbi Avin bar Ḥiyya said, he who says, “if he removed the fifth” if there is a sixth, but he who says, “if he waited long enough that he could have removed the fifth” if there is no sixth. Before he took away the fifth, would not the fourth be apt to be considered starting a row? If this is named “forgotten,” then also in our case it is “forgotten.”

Then the cut grain should save the uncut grain. This means that something that is apt to save, but was forgotten, can become legally forgotten. Rebbi Jonathan said, explain it if he was cutting and removing the sheaves row by row. He already forgot the standing grain before he might forget the sheaves.

MISHNAH: An olive tree standing between three rows of two rectangles, when forgotten, is not subject to the law of forgotten sheaves. An olive tree which yields two seah, when forgotten, is not legally forgotten. When does this apply? Only if he did not start with it, but if he started harvesting it, even a dripping olive tree in its time, when forgotten, is subject to the law of the forgotten sheaf. Whenever he has under it, he has at its crown. Rebbi Meïr says, from the moment that the maḥba is used.

Hence, if it yields two seah, if it was forgotten it is not legally forgotten. It does not refer to this but to the first Mishnah: “Every olive tree that has a special name on the field, for example ‘a dripping olive tree’ in its time, if it was forgotten, it is not legally forgotten. Hence, if it yields two seah, if it was forgotten …”

Hence, if it yields two seah, if it was forgotten it is not legally forgotten. It does not refer to this but to the first Mishnah: “Every olive tree that has a special name on the field, for example ‘a dripping olive tree’ in its time, if it was forgotten, it is not legally forgotten. Hence, if it yields two seah, if it was forgotten …”

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Eleazar said, it is Rebbi Meïr’s, since Rebbi Meïr said, they permitted to sell demay only to the commissioned grain wholesaler. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is according to everybody; there is a difference because the one who takes it up takes it up in retail quantity and the one who abandons does not abandon wholesale. But does this not disagree with Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr is the one who says that as soon as a person abandons anything of his property, it is legally abandoned as soon as it leaves his power. There is a difference because the one who takes it up takes it up in retail quantity and the one who abandons does not abandon wholesale. It does not even disagree with Rebbi Yose, for Rebbi Yose says that nothing may leave the power of its owners except if it is taken up; otherwise it was not legally abandoned. There is a difference here, because the one who abandons abandons wholesale, and the one who takes it up, takes up only retail quantities.

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Eleazar said, it is Rebbi Meïr’s, since Rebbi Meïr said, they permitted to sell demay only to the commissioned grain wholesaler. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is according to everybody; there is a difference because the one who takes it up takes it up in retail quantity and the one who abandons does not abandon wholesale. But does this not disagree with Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr is the one who says that as soon as a person abandons anything of his property, it is legally abandoned as soon as it leaves his power. There is a difference because the one who takes it up takes it up in retail quantity and the one who abandons does not abandon wholesale. It does not even disagree with Rebbi Yose, for Rebbi Yose says that nothing may leave the power of its owners except if it is taken up; otherwise it was not legally abandoned. There is a difference here, because the one who abandons abandons wholesale, and the one who takes it up, takes up only retail quantities.

Rebbi Bun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does a widow need ḥalîṣah? He said to him, is it possible to say that her qiddushin are legally recognized and you say she may not need ḥalîṣah? He answered him: But qiddushin of a she-ram are legally recognized and one says that she does not need ḥalîṣah! He said to him, the she-ram was removed because of another reason: “she will bear”, this excludes the one who cannot have children.

Rebbi Bun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does a widow need ḥalîṣah? He said to him, is it possible to say that her qiddushin are legally recognized and you say she may not need ḥalîṣah? He answered him: But qiddushin of a she-ram are legally recognized and one says that she does not need ḥalîṣah! He said to him, the she-ram was removed because of another reason: “she will bear”, this excludes the one who cannot have children.

Levi bar Sisi asked before Rebbi: Should we not state “sixteen women”? One’s mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother. He said to him, it is evident that this person has no brain in his head. And why? He said to him, because of Rebbi Jehudah, because Rebbi Jehudah forbids the one who was raped or seduced by his father. Does Rebbi Jehudah not agree that if [the halfbrother] gave her qiddushin, the preliminary marriage is legally recognized? But because we have stated: “Six incest prohibitions more severe than these; because they are married to others their co-wives are free.” And Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thereupon: “If they may marry his brother without sin their co-wives are freed from ḥalîṣah and levirate.” And among all of them there is only his mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother. Why did we not state this? Because Rebbi Ḥiyya stated it, should we not state it? Certainly we should state it! But because we have stated: “Her sister who also is her sister-in-law either takes ḥalîṣah or accepts the levirate.” We find in all cases that her sister who also is her sister-in-law accepts the levirate except for his mother who was raped by his father married to his paternal halfbrother.

What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? “ A man may not take his father’s wife,” that refers to his father’s wife; “and he should not uncover his father’s wing,” that is his rape victim. How do the rabbis explain “his father’s wing”? There, they say and they do not know the origin of the tradition, that refers to a wing which leans on his father. Would he not anyhow be guilty for her because of his father’s wife? Rebbi Hila said, because of forewarning, that if he was warned because of his father’s wife, he will be whipped, and because of his father’s wing, he will be whipped. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about whipping. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about sacrifice. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about all other doubtful cases that he is free. Rebbi Jehudah agrees that if he gave her qiddušin that these qiddušin are legally valid.

Rav said, if he lowered it below ten [handbreadths] or increased above ten. Samuel said, even if he made a breach at a place where a breach was irrelevant or a fence where a fence was irrelevant, it is legally taking possession.

As we have stated: If somebody sells a field to another but the buyer was lazy and did not enter into possession when the seller went and legally took possession, the taking possession invalidates the sale or the gift.

HALAKHAH: “The following count for a claim of undisturbed possession,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, co-owners usually permit chickens to one another. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says otherwise: “Both of them are forbidden to put up there a grindstone or an oven, or to raise chickens there.” Rebbi Eleazar said, if somebody raised chickens in a courtyard which is not his, it is taking in possession. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. As you take it, if he has permission to raise chickens there, he raises them. If he does not have permission to raise, it would be legally taking in possession.

What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? A man may not take his father’s wife, and he should not uncover his father’s wing; that is his rape victim. How do the rabbis explain “his father’s wing”? There, they say and they do not know the origin of the tradition, that refers to a wing which is in need of his father. Would he not anyhow be [criminally] liable for her because of “his father’s wife”? Rebbi Hila said, because of forewarning; if he was warned because of his father’s wife he will be whipped, and because of his father’s wing he will be whipped. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about whipping. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about sacrifice. Rebbi Jehudah agrees about all other men that he is free. Rebbi Jehudah agrees that if he marries her preliminarily that the preliminary marriage is legally valid.

"From the eighth thereof until the close of the festival", etc. Why does he say "from the eighth thereof", why not from the ninth thereof, since the eighth is anyhow a holiday? Because if for some reason we should have to abolish the first seven days of Nisan as holidays, mourning would still be forbidden on the eighth because it immediately precedes the days on which the date for the Feast of Weeks was legally fixed. Now that you have arrived at this point, the matter becomes clear also regarding the twenty-ninth of Adar, for if it happened that we should have to abolish the twenty-eighth of Adar as a holiday, fasting on the twenty-ninth would still be prohibited on the ground that it immediately precedes the time during which the Daily Offering was established.