slaughtering

Blood of sheep-slaughtering outrage, thus to give

But the man whom thou sawest slaughtering — that is he who inciteth murderous sacrifices, of which are a witness to me of the final judgement, even at the beginning of creation."

And now, when the multitude were gotten together to an assembly, and every one was in indignation at these men's seizing upon the sanctuary, at their rapine and murders, but had not yet begun their attacks upon them, [the reason of which was this, that they imagined it to be a difficult thing to suppress these zealots, as indeed the case was,] Ananus stood in the midst of them, and casting his eyes frequently at the temple, and having a flood of tears in his eyes, he said, "Certainly it had been good for me to die before I had seen the house of God full of so many abominations, or these sacred places, that ought not to be trodden upon at random, filled with the feet of these blood-shedding villains; yet do I, who am clothed with the vestments of the high priesthood, and am called by that most venerable name [of high priest], still live, and am but too fond of living, and cannot endure to undergo a death which would be the glory of my old age; and if I were the only person concerned, and as it were in a desert, I would give up my life, and that alone for God's sake; for to what purpose is it to live among a people insensible of their calamities, and where there is no notion remaining of any remedy for the miseries that are upon them? for when you are seized upon, you bear it! and when you are beaten, you are silent! and when the people are murdered, nobody dare so much as send out a groan openly! O bitter tyranny that we are under! But why do I complain of the tyrants? Was it not you, and your sufferance of them, that have nourished them? Was it not you that overlooked those that first of all got together, for they were then but a few, and by your silence made them grow to be many; and by conniving at them when they took arms, in effect armed them against yourselves? You ought to have then prevented their first attempts, when they fell a reproaching your relations; but by neglecting that care in time, you have encouraged these wretches to plunder men. When houses were pillaged, nobody said a word, which was the occasion why they carried off the owners of those houses; and when they were drawn through the midst of the city, nobody came to their assistance. They then proceeded to put those whom you have betrayed into their hands into bonds. I do not say how many and of what characters those men were whom they thus served; but certainly they were such as were accused by none, and condemned by none; and since nobody succored them when they were put into bonds, the consequence was, that you saw the same persons slain. We have seen this also; so that still the best of the herd of brute animals, as it were, have been still led to be sacrificed, when yet nobody said one word, or moved his right hand for their preservation. Will you bear, therefore, will you bear to see your sanctuary trampled on? and will you lay steps for these profane wretches, upon which they may mount to higher degrees of insolence? Will not you pluck them down from their exaltation? for even by this time they had proceeded to higher enormities, if they had been able to overthrow any thing greater than the sanctuary. They have seized upon the strongest place of the whole city; you may call it the temple, if you please, though it be like a citadel or fortress. Now, while you have tyranny in so great a degree walled in, and see your enemies over your heads, to what purpose is it to take counsel? and what have you to support your minds withal? Perhaps you wait for the Romans, that they may protect our holy places: are our matters then brought to that pass? and are we come to that degree of misery, that our enemies themselves are expected to pity us? O wretched creatures! will not you rise up and turn upon those that strike you? which you may observe in wild beasts themselves, that they will avenge themselves on those that strike them. Will you not call to mind, every one of you, the calamities you yourselves have suffered? nor lay before your eyes what afflictions you yourselves have undergone? and will not such things sharpen your souls to revenge? Is therefore that most honorable and most natural of our passions utterly lost, I mean the desire of liberty? Truly we are in love with slavery, and in love with those that lord it over us, as if we had received that principle of subjection from our ancestors; yet did they undergo many and great wars for the sake of liberty, nor were they so far overcome by the power of the Egyptians, or the Medes, but that still they did what they thought fit, notwithstanding their commands to the contrary. And what occasion is there now for a war with the Romans? [I meddle not with determining whether it be an advantageous and profitable war or not.] What pretense is there for it? Is it not that we may enjoy our liberty? Besides, shall we not bear the lords of the habitable earth to be lords over us, and yet bear tyrants of our own country? Although I must say that submission to foreigners may be borne, because fortune hath already doomed us to it, while submission to wicked people of our own nation is too unmanly, and brought upon us by our own consent. However, since I have had occasion to mention the Romans, I will not conceal a thing that, as I am speaking, comes into my mind, and affects me considerably; it is this, that though we should be taken by them, [God forbid the event should be so!] yet can we undergo nothing that will be harder to be borne than what these men have already brought upon us. How then can we avoid shedding of tears, when we see the Roman donations in our temple, while we withal see those of our own nation taking our spoils, and plundering our glorious metropolis, and slaughtering our men, from which enormities those Romans themselves would have abstained? to see those Romans never going beyond the bounds allotted to profane persons, nor venturing to break in upon any of our sacred customs; nay, having a horror on their minds when they view at a distance those sacred walls; while some that have been born in this very country, and brought up in our customs, and called Jews, do walk about in the midst of the holy places, at the very time when their hands are still warm with the slaughter of their own countrymen. Besides, can any one be afraid of a war abroad, and that with such as will have comparatively much greater moderation than our own people have? For truly, if we may suit our words to the things they represent, it is probable one may hereafter find the Romans to be the supporters of our laws, and those within ourselves the subverters of them. And now I am persuaded that every one of you here comes satisfied before I speak that these overthrowers of our liberties deserve to be destroyed, and that nobody can so much as devise a punishment that they have not deserved by what they have done, and that you are all provoked against them by those their wicked actions, whence you have suffered so greatly. But perhaps many of you are affrighted at the multitude of those zealots, and at their audaciousness, as well as at the advantage they have over us in their being higher in place than we are; for these circumstances, as they have been occasioned by your negligence, so will they become still greater by being still longer neglected; for their multitude is every day augmented, by every ill man's running away to those that are like to themselves, and their audaciousness is therefore inflamed, because they meet with no obstruction to their designs. And for their higher place, they will make use of it for engines also, if we give them time to do so; but be assured of this, that if we go up to fight them, they will be made tamer by their own consciences, and what advantages they have in the height of their situation they will lose by the opposition of their reason; perhaps also God himself, who hath been affronted by them, will make what they throw at us return against themselves, and these impious wretches will be killed by their own darts: let us but make our appearance before them, and they will come to nothing. However, it is a right thing, if there should be any danger in the attempt, to die before these holy gates, and to spend our very lives, if not for the sake of our children and wives, yet for God's sake, and for the sake of his sanctuary. I will assist you both with my counsel and with my hand; nor shall any sagacity of ours be wanting for your support; nor shall you see that I will be sparing of my body neither."

And how is [a koy] neither like a behemah nor like a hayyah? It is forbidden because of kilayim [to yoke it] with either a behemah or a hayyah. One who deeds his son his behemah and his hayyah he has not [thereby] given him the koy. If one says, “I will become a nazirite if this is [not] a hayyah or a behemah”, he is a nazirite. In all other ways it is like a behemah and a hayyah: It requires slaughtering (shehitah) like them both; It carries carrion impurity; And to it applies the law relating to a limb of a living being like them both.

The primary labors are forty less one: sowing, plowing, reaping, binding sheaves, threshing, winnowing, selecting, grinding, sifting, kneading, baking, shearing wool, bleaching, hackling, dyeing, spinning, weaving, the making of two loops, weaving two threads, dividing two threads, tying and untying, sewing two stitches, tearing in order to sew two stitches, capturing a deer, slaughtering, or flaying, or salting it, curing its hide, scraping it [of its hair], cutting it up, writing two letters, erasing in order to write two letters [over the erasure], building, tearing down, extinguishing, kindling, striking with a hammer, [and] carrying out from one domain to another, These are the forty primary labors less one.

These things in [connection with] the pesah override Shabbat: its slaughtering and the sprinkling of its blood and the cleansing of its innards and the burning of its fat. But its roasting and the washing of its innards do not override Shabbat. Carrying it and bringing it from outside the Shabbat border and cutting off its wart do not override Shabbat. R. Eliezer says they do override [Shabbat].

Rabbi Eliezer said: is it not logical: if slaughtering, which is [usually forbidden] as a labor, overrides Shabbat, shouldn’t these, which are [only forbidden] as mandated rest (shevut), override Shabbat? Rabbi Joshua said to him: let the festival prove this, for they permitted labor [on the festival] and forbade [activities forbidden because of] shevut. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: what is this, Joshua? What proof is a voluntary act in respect of a commandment! Rabbi Akiva answered and said: let sprinkling [purificatory waters] prove it, which is [performed] because it is a commandment and is [forbidden only] as a shevut, yet it does not override Shabbat; so you too, do not wonder at these, that though they are [required] on account of a commandment and are [forbidden only] as shevut, yet they do not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: but in respect of that I am arguing: if slaughtering, which is a labor, overrides Shabbat, is it not logical that sprinkling, which is [only] a shevut, should override Shabbat! Rabbi Akiva said to him: or the opposite: if sprinkling, which is [forbidden] as a shevut, does not override Shabbat, then slaughtering, which is [normally forbidden] on account of labor, is it not logical that it should not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva! You are uprooting what is written in the Torah, “at twilight, offer it at its set time” (Numbers 9:3), both on week-days and on Shabbat. He said to him: master, give me an appointed time for these as there is an appointed season for slaughtering! Rabbi Akiva stated a general rule: work which could be done on the eve of Shabbat does not override Shabbat; slaughtering, which could not be done on the eve of Shabbat, does override Shabbat.

Rabbi Eliezer said: is it not logical: if slaughtering, which is [usually forbidden] as a labor, overrides Shabbat, shouldn’t these, which are [only forbidden] as mandated rest (shevut), override Shabbat? Rabbi Joshua said to him: let the festival prove this, for they permitted labor [on the festival] and forbade [activities forbidden because of] shevut. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: what is this, Joshua? What proof is a voluntary act in respect of a commandment! Rabbi Akiva answered and said: let sprinkling [purificatory waters] prove it, which is [performed] because it is a commandment and is [forbidden only] as a shevut, yet it does not override Shabbat; so you too, do not wonder at these, that though they are [required] on account of a commandment and are [forbidden only] as shevut, yet they do not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: but in respect of that I am arguing: if slaughtering, which is a labor, overrides Shabbat, is it not logical that sprinkling, which is [only] a shevut, should override Shabbat! Rabbi Akiva said to him: or the opposite: if sprinkling, which is [forbidden] as a shevut, does not override Shabbat, then slaughtering, which is [normally forbidden] on account of labor, is it not logical that it should not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva! You are uprooting what is written in the Torah, “at twilight, offer it at its set time” (Numbers 9:3), both on week-days and on Shabbat. He said to him: master, give me an appointed time for these as there is an appointed season for slaughtering! Rabbi Akiva stated a general rule: work which could be done on the eve of Shabbat does not override Shabbat; slaughtering, which could not be done on the eve of Shabbat, does override Shabbat.

Rabbi Eliezer said: is it not logical: if slaughtering, which is [usually forbidden] as a labor, overrides Shabbat, shouldn’t these, which are [only forbidden] as mandated rest (shevut), override Shabbat? Rabbi Joshua said to him: let the festival prove this, for they permitted labor [on the festival] and forbade [activities forbidden because of] shevut. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: what is this, Joshua? What proof is a voluntary act in respect of a commandment! Rabbi Akiva answered and said: let sprinkling [purificatory waters] prove it, which is [performed] because it is a commandment and is [forbidden only] as a shevut, yet it does not override Shabbat; so you too, do not wonder at these, that though they are [required] on account of a commandment and are [forbidden only] as shevut, yet they do not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: but in respect of that I am arguing: if slaughtering, which is a labor, overrides Shabbat, is it not logical that sprinkling, which is [only] a shevut, should override Shabbat! Rabbi Akiva said to him: or the opposite: if sprinkling, which is [forbidden] as a shevut, does not override Shabbat, then slaughtering, which is [normally forbidden] on account of labor, is it not logical that it should not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva! You are uprooting what is written in the Torah, “at twilight, offer it at its set time” (Numbers 9:3), both on week-days and on Shabbat. He said to him: master, give me an appointed time for these as there is an appointed season for slaughtering! Rabbi Akiva stated a general rule: work which could be done on the eve of Shabbat does not override Shabbat; slaughtering, which could not be done on the eve of Shabbat, does override Shabbat.

Rabbi Eliezer said: is it not logical: if slaughtering, which is [usually forbidden] as a labor, overrides Shabbat, shouldn’t these, which are [only forbidden] as mandated rest (shevut), override Shabbat? Rabbi Joshua said to him: let the festival prove this, for they permitted labor [on the festival] and forbade [activities forbidden because of] shevut. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: what is this, Joshua? What proof is a voluntary act in respect of a commandment! Rabbi Akiva answered and said: let sprinkling [purificatory waters] prove it, which is [performed] because it is a commandment and is [forbidden only] as a shevut, yet it does not override Shabbat; so you too, do not wonder at these, that though they are [required] on account of a commandment and are [forbidden only] as shevut, yet they do not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: but in respect of that I am arguing: if slaughtering, which is a labor, overrides Shabbat, is it not logical that sprinkling, which is [only] a shevut, should override Shabbat! Rabbi Akiva said to him: or the opposite: if sprinkling, which is [forbidden] as a shevut, does not override Shabbat, then slaughtering, which is [normally forbidden] on account of labor, is it not logical that it should not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva! You are uprooting what is written in the Torah, “at twilight, offer it at its set time” (Numbers 9:3), both on week-days and on Shabbat. He said to him: master, give me an appointed time for these as there is an appointed season for slaughtering! Rabbi Akiva stated a general rule: work which could be done on the eve of Shabbat does not override Shabbat; slaughtering, which could not be done on the eve of Shabbat, does override Shabbat.

Rabbi Eliezer said: is it not logical: if slaughtering, which is [usually forbidden] as a labor, overrides Shabbat, shouldn’t these, which are [only forbidden] as mandated rest (shevut), override Shabbat? Rabbi Joshua said to him: let the festival prove this, for they permitted labor [on the festival] and forbade [activities forbidden because of] shevut. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: what is this, Joshua? What proof is a voluntary act in respect of a commandment! Rabbi Akiva answered and said: let sprinkling [purificatory waters] prove it, which is [performed] because it is a commandment and is [forbidden only] as a shevut, yet it does not override Shabbat; so you too, do not wonder at these, that though they are [required] on account of a commandment and are [forbidden only] as shevut, yet they do not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: but in respect of that I am arguing: if slaughtering, which is a labor, overrides Shabbat, is it not logical that sprinkling, which is [only] a shevut, should override Shabbat! Rabbi Akiva said to him: or the opposite: if sprinkling, which is [forbidden] as a shevut, does not override Shabbat, then slaughtering, which is [normally forbidden] on account of labor, is it not logical that it should not override Shabbat. Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva! You are uprooting what is written in the Torah, “at twilight, offer it at its set time” (Numbers 9:3), both on week-days and on Shabbat. He said to him: master, give me an appointed time for these as there is an appointed season for slaughtering! Rabbi Akiva stated a general rule: work which could be done on the eve of Shabbat does not override Shabbat; slaughtering, which could not be done on the eve of Shabbat, does override Shabbat.

Rabbi Joshua said: I have heard that the substitute of a pesah is sacrificed, and that the substitute of a pesah is not sacrificed, and I cannot explain. Rabbi Akiva said: I will explain: The pesah which was found before the slaughtering of the pesah must be left to graze until it becomes unfit, and then it may be sold, and one brings a peace-offering with the money; and the same applies to its substitute. [If found] after the slaughtering of the pesah, it is offered as a wellbeing offering, and the same applies to it substitute.

Rabbi Joshua said: I have heard that the substitute of a pesah is sacrificed, and that the substitute of a pesah is not sacrificed, and I cannot explain. Rabbi Akiva said: I will explain: The pesah which was found before the slaughtering of the pesah must be left to graze until it becomes unfit, and then it may be sold, and one brings a peace-offering with the money; and the same applies to its substitute. [If found] after the slaughtering of the pesah, it is offered as a wellbeing offering, and the same applies to it substitute.

There were thirteen tables in the Temple: Eight of marble in the place of slaughtering and on them they would rinse the entrails. And two to the west of the ramp [which ascends the altar], one of marble and one of silver; on that of marble they would place the limbs [of the offerings], and on that of silver the ministering vessels. And there were two tables in the Porch on the inside of the entrance to the Temple, one of marble and the other of gold; on that of marble they would place the showbread placed when it was brought in, and on that of gold [they would place the showbread] when it was taken out, because things sacred may be raised [in honor] but not lowered. And there was one [table] of gold on the inside of the Sanctuary on which the showbread lay continually.

A [slaughtering] knife which was found on the fourteenth [of Nisan] he may slaughter with it immediately. [If it was found] on the thirteenth [of Nisan] he must immerse it again. But a chopping knife whether [found] on the fourteenth or on the thirteenth, he must immerse it again. If the fourteenth fell on Shabbat, he may slaughter with it immediately. [If found] on the fifteenth, he may slaughter with it immediately. If [the chopping knife] was found tied to a [slaughtering] knife it may be treated as the knife.

A [slaughtering] knife which was found on the fourteenth [of Nisan] he may slaughter with it immediately. [If it was found] on the thirteenth [of Nisan] he must immerse it again. But a chopping knife whether [found] on the fourteenth or on the thirteenth, he must immerse it again. If the fourteenth fell on Shabbat, he may slaughter with it immediately. [If found] on the fifteenth, he may slaughter with it immediately. If [the chopping knife] was found tied to a [slaughtering] knife it may be treated as the knife.

If he wished to sleep, young priests would snap their middle finger before him and say: “Sir high priest, stand up and drive the sleep away by standing once on this [cold] floor. They would keep him busy until the time for the slaughtering [of the daily morning offering] would arrive.

The officer said to them: “Go out and see whether the time for slaughtering [the morning sacrifice] has arrived.” If it had arrived then he who saw it said: “It is daylight!” Matitya ben Shmuel says: “The whole east is light.” Even unto Hebron? And he answered “Yes.”

He bound a thread of crimson wool on the head of the goat which was to be sent away, and he placed it at the gate where it was later to be sent away, and on the goat that was to be slaughtered [he placed a thread of crimson wool on its neck] at the place of the slaughtering. He came to his bull a second time, pressed his two hands upon it and made confession. And thus he would say: “Please, ‘Hashem’! I have done wrong, I have transgressed, I have sinned before You, I and my house and the sons of Aaron Your holy people. Please, ‘Hashem’! Forgive the wrongdoings, the transgressions, the sins which I have committed and transgressed and sinned before You, I and my house and the sons of Aaron Your holy people, as it is written in the torah of Moses Your servant: “For on this day shall atonement be made for you [to cleanse you of all your sins; you shall be clean before the Lord”] (Leviticus 16:30). And they answered after him: “Blessed be the name of His glorious kingdom for ever and ever!”

The whole day is a valid time for reading the Megillah; reciting Hallel; for the blowing of the shofar; for taking up the lulav; for the Musaf prayer; for Musaf sacrifices; for confession over the oxen; for the confession over the tithe; for the confession of sins on Yom HaKippurim; for laying on of hands; for slaughtering [the sacrifices]; for waving [them]; for bringing near [the vessel with the minhah-offering to the altar]; for taking a handful; for placing it on the fire; for pinching off [the head of a bird-offering]; for receiving the blood [in a vessel]; for sprinkling [the blood on the altar]; for making the sotah drink [the bitter waters]; for breaking the neck of the heifer; and for purifying the metzora.

If a man stole [an ox or a sheep] according to the evidence of two witnesses, and killed or sold it according to their evidence, and they are found to be false witnesses, they must pay the whole penalty. If he stole it according to the evidence of two witnesses, and killed it or sold it according to the evidence of two others, and both pairs are found to be false witnesses, the first pay twofold restitution and the last pay threefold restitution. If the second [only] were found to be false witnesses, the thief must make twofold restitution and they threefold restitution. If one of the second set of witnesses was found to be a false witness, the evidence of the other is void. If one of the first set of witnesses was found to be a false witness, the entire evidence is void, since if there is no evidence for stealing there is no evidence for slaughtering or selling.

A pesah and a hatat which were slaughtered not in their own name, or he received [the blood], and carried it [to the altar] and sprinkled [it] not in their own name, Or in their own name and not in their own name, or not in their own name and in their own name, they are disqualified. What is the case of ‘in their own name and not in their own name’? In the name of it being a pesah [first] and [then] in the name of it being a shelamim. ‘Not in their own name and in their own name:’ in the name of a shelamim [first] and [then] in the name of a pesah. For a sacrifice can be disqualified in [any one of] the four elements: slaughtering, receiving, carrying and sprinkling. Rabbi Shimon declares it valid if carried [with the wrong intent], for Rabbi Shimon said: it is impossible [to have a valid sacrifice] without slaughtering, without receiving and without sprinkling, but it is possible without carrying. [How so]? One slaughters it at the side of the altar and sprinkles. Rabbi Eliezer says: if one goes where he needs to go, an [illegitimate] intention disqualifies [it]; where he doesn’t need to go, an [illegitimate] intention does not disqualify [it].

A pesah and a hatat which were slaughtered not in their own name, or he received [the blood], and carried it [to the altar] and sprinkled [it] not in their own name, Or in their own name and not in their own name, or not in their own name and in their own name, they are disqualified. What is the case of ‘in their own name and not in their own name’? In the name of it being a pesah [first] and [then] in the name of it being a shelamim. ‘Not in their own name and in their own name:’ in the name of a shelamim [first] and [then] in the name of a pesah. For a sacrifice can be disqualified in [any one of] the four elements: slaughtering, receiving, carrying and sprinkling. Rabbi Shimon declares it valid if carried [with the wrong intent], for Rabbi Shimon said: it is impossible [to have a valid sacrifice] without slaughtering, without receiving and without sprinkling, but it is possible without carrying. [How so]? One slaughters it at the side of the altar and sprinkles. Rabbi Eliezer says: if one goes where he needs to go, an [illegitimate] intention disqualifies [it]; where he doesn’t need to go, an [illegitimate] intention does not disqualify [it].

All unfit persons who slaughtered, their slaughtering is valid, for slaughtering is valid [even when performed] by non-priests, and by women, and by slaves, and by the unclean, even in the case of most-holy sacrifices, provided that unclean [persons] do not touch the flesh. Therefore they invalidate [the sacrifice] by an [illegitimate] intention. And in all of these cases, if they received the blood [in order to eat the sacrifice] after the prescribed time, or outside of the prescribed place, if there remains [in the animal] life-blood, a fit person should go back and receive the blood.

All unfit persons who slaughtered, their slaughtering is valid, for slaughtering is valid [even when performed] by non-priests, and by women, and by slaves, and by the unclean, even in the case of most-holy sacrifices, provided that unclean [persons] do not touch the flesh. Therefore they invalidate [the sacrifice] by an [illegitimate] intention. And in all of these cases, if they received the blood [in order to eat the sacrifice] after the prescribed time, or outside of the prescribed place, if there remains [in the animal] life-blood, a fit person should go back and receive the blood.

As for the bullocks which were burnt and the goats which were burnt, their slaughtering is [done] at the north, and the reception of their blood is [done] at the north, and their blood requires sprinkling on the veil, and on the golden altar; [The omission of] a single one of these applications invalidates [the sacrifice]. He [the priest] pours the remainder of the blood on the western base of the altar; but if he did not pour it out, he did not invalidate [the sacrifice]. Both of these were burnt at the ash pit.

If one performed melikah, and he found it [the bird] to be a terefah: Rabbi Meir said: it does not defile in the gullet; Rabbi Judah said: it does defile in the gullet. Rabbi Meir said: if with regard to a beast, when it is carrion (a nevelah) it defiles through contact or carrying, yet slaughtering it purifies its terefah from defiling, when it comes to carrion (nevelah) of a bird which does not defile through contact or carriage, is it not logical that slaughtering would cleanse its terefah? Now, just as we have found that slaughtering, which makes it [a bird of hullin] fit for eating, cleanses its terefah from its uncleanness; so melikah (nipping), which makes it [a bird sacrifice] fit for eating, cleanses its terefah. Rabbi Yose says: it is sufficient for it to be like the nevelah of a beast, which is cleansed by slaughtering, but not by melikah (nipping).

If one performed melikah, and he found it [the bird] to be a terefah: Rabbi Meir said: it does not defile in the gullet; Rabbi Judah said: it does defile in the gullet. Rabbi Meir said: if with regard to a beast, when it is carrion (a nevelah) it defiles through contact or carrying, yet slaughtering it purifies its terefah from defiling, when it comes to carrion (nevelah) of a bird which does not defile through contact or carriage, is it not logical that slaughtering would cleanse its terefah? Now, just as we have found that slaughtering, which makes it [a bird of hullin] fit for eating, cleanses its terefah from its uncleanness; so melikah (nipping), which makes it [a bird sacrifice] fit for eating, cleanses its terefah. Rabbi Yose says: it is sufficient for it to be like the nevelah of a beast, which is cleansed by slaughtering, but not by melikah (nipping).

If one performed melikah, and he found it [the bird] to be a terefah: Rabbi Meir said: it does not defile in the gullet; Rabbi Judah said: it does defile in the gullet. Rabbi Meir said: if with regard to a beast, when it is carrion (a nevelah) it defiles through contact or carrying, yet slaughtering it purifies its terefah from defiling, when it comes to carrion (nevelah) of a bird which does not defile through contact or carriage, is it not logical that slaughtering would cleanse its terefah? Now, just as we have found that slaughtering, which makes it [a bird of hullin] fit for eating, cleanses its terefah from its uncleanness; so melikah (nipping), which makes it [a bird sacrifice] fit for eating, cleanses its terefah. Rabbi Yose says: it is sufficient for it to be like the nevelah of a beast, which is cleansed by slaughtering, but not by melikah (nipping).

If one performed melikah, and he found it [the bird] to be a terefah: Rabbi Meir said: it does not defile in the gullet; Rabbi Judah said: it does defile in the gullet. Rabbi Meir said: if with regard to a beast, when it is carrion (a nevelah) it defiles through contact or carrying, yet slaughtering it purifies its terefah from defiling, when it comes to carrion (nevelah) of a bird which does not defile through contact or carriage, is it not logical that slaughtering would cleanse its terefah? Now, just as we have found that slaughtering, which makes it [a bird of hullin] fit for eating, cleanses its terefah from its uncleanness; so melikah (nipping), which makes it [a bird sacrifice] fit for eating, cleanses its terefah. Rabbi Yose says: it is sufficient for it to be like the nevelah of a beast, which is cleansed by slaughtering, but not by melikah (nipping).

He who slaughters and offers up outside [the Temple courtyard] is liable in respect of slaughtering and in respect of offering. Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: if he slaughtered inside and offered up outside, [he is liable]; if he slaughtered outside and offered up outside, he is not liable [for offering up], because he offered up only that which was unfit. They said to him: even when one slaughters inside and offers up outside, since he carries it out, he renders it unfit.

Slaughtering [outside the Temple] is more stringent than offering up [outside], and offering up [is more stringent] than slaughtering. Slaughtering is more stringent, for he who slaughters [a sacrifice] to a man is liable, whereas he who offers up to a man is not liable. Offering up is more stringent: two who hold a knife and slaughter are not liable, [whereas] if two take hold of a limb and offer it up, they are liable. If one offered up, then offered up again, then offered up again, he is liable in respect of each [act of] offering up, the words of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yose says: he is liable for only one. He is liable only when he offers up on the top of an altar. Rabbi Shimon says: he is liable even if he offers up on the top of a rock or a stone.

Slaughtering [outside the Temple] is more stringent than offering up [outside], and offering up [is more stringent] than slaughtering. Slaughtering is more stringent, for he who slaughters [a sacrifice] to a man is liable, whereas he who offers up to a man is not liable. Offering up is more stringent: two who hold a knife and slaughter are not liable, [whereas] if two take hold of a limb and offer it up, they are liable. If one offered up, then offered up again, then offered up again, he is liable in respect of each [act of] offering up, the words of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yose says: he is liable for only one. He is liable only when he offers up on the top of an altar. Rabbi Shimon says: he is liable even if he offers up on the top of a rock or a stone.

Slaughtering [outside the Temple] is more stringent than offering up [outside], and offering up [is more stringent] than slaughtering. Slaughtering is more stringent, for he who slaughters [a sacrifice] to a man is liable, whereas he who offers up to a man is not liable. Offering up is more stringent: two who hold a knife and slaughter are not liable, [whereas] if two take hold of a limb and offer it up, they are liable. If one offered up, then offered up again, then offered up again, he is liable in respect of each [act of] offering up, the words of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yose says: he is liable for only one. He is liable only when he offers up on the top of an altar. Rabbi Shimon says: he is liable even if he offers up on the top of a rock or a stone.

The following sacrifices were offered in the Tabernacle sacrifices consecrated for the Tabernacle: Public sacrifices were offered in the Tabernacle, and private sacrifices were offered at a bamah. If private sacrifices were consecrated for the Tabernacle, they must be offered in the Tabernacle; yet if one offered them at a bamah, he is not liable. What is the difference between the bamah of an individual and the bamah of the congregation? Laying [of hands], slaughtering in the north, sprinkling around [the altar], waving and presenting, (Rabbi Judah says: there were no meal-offerings at the bamah); priesthood, sacrificial vestments, ministering vessels, a sweet fragrance, a line of demarcation for [the sprinkling of] the blood, and the washing of hands and feet. But [the prohibitions of] time, remnant and defilement were the same in both.

All lay hands on the offering except a deaf-mute, an imbecile, a minor, a blind man, a gentile, a slave, an agent, or a woman. The laying on of hands is outside the commandment. [One must lay] the hands: On the head of the animal, Both hands In the place where one lays on the hands there the animal must be slaughtered; And the slaughtering must immediately follow the laying on of hands.

All may slaughter, and their slaughtering is valid, except a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor, lest they mess up [the animal] through their slaughtering. And if any of these slaughtered while others were standing over them, their slaughtering is valid. That which is slaughtered by a non-Jew is a nevelah and defiles by carrying. If one slaughtered at night, and also a blind man that slaughtered, the slaughtering is valid. One who slaughtered on Shabbat or Yom Kippur, even though he is liable for his own life, the slaughtering is valid.

All may slaughter, and their slaughtering is valid, except a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor, lest they mess up [the animal] through their slaughtering. And if any of these slaughtered while others were standing over them, their slaughtering is valid. That which is slaughtered by a non-Jew is a nevelah and defiles by carrying. If one slaughtered at night, and also a blind man that slaughtered, the slaughtering is valid. One who slaughtered on Shabbat or Yom Kippur, even though he is liable for his own life, the slaughtering is valid.

All may slaughter, and their slaughtering is valid, except a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor, lest they mess up [the animal] through their slaughtering. And if any of these slaughtered while others were standing over them, their slaughtering is valid. That which is slaughtered by a non-Jew is a nevelah and defiles by carrying. If one slaughtered at night, and also a blind man that slaughtered, the slaughtering is valid. One who slaughtered on Shabbat or Yom Kippur, even though he is liable for his own life, the slaughtering is valid.

All may slaughter, and their slaughtering is valid, except a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor, lest they mess up [the animal] through their slaughtering. And if any of these slaughtered while others were standing over them, their slaughtering is valid. That which is slaughtered by a non-Jew is a nevelah and defiles by carrying. If one slaughtered at night, and also a blind man that slaughtered, the slaughtering is valid. One who slaughtered on Shabbat or Yom Kippur, even though he is liable for his own life, the slaughtering is valid.

All may slaughter, and their slaughtering is valid, except a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor, lest they mess up [the animal] through their slaughtering. And if any of these slaughtered while others were standing over them, their slaughtering is valid. That which is slaughtered by a non-Jew is a nevelah and defiles by carrying. If one slaughtered at night, and also a blind man that slaughtered, the slaughtering is valid. One who slaughtered on Shabbat or Yom Kippur, even though he is liable for his own life, the slaughtering is valid.

If one slaughtered with [the smooth edge of] a hand sickle, with a flint or with a reed, the slaughtering is valid. All may slaughter; at all times one may slaughter; and with any implement one may slaughter, except a scythe, a saw, teeth or a finger nail, since these strangle. One who slaughtered with a scythe, moving it forward only: Bet Shammai declare it invalid, But Bet Hillel declare it valid. If the teeth of the scythe were filed away it is regarded as an ordinary knife.

If one slaughtered [by cutting] at the [top] ring [of the trachea] and left a hair's breadth of its entire circumference [towards the head], the slaughtering is valid. Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah says: if there was only left [towards the head] a hair's breadth of the greater part of its circumference, [the slaughtering is valid].

If one slaughtered [by cutting] at the [top] ring [of the trachea] and left a hair's breadth of its entire circumference [towards the head], the slaughtering is valid. Rabbi Yose son of Rabbi Judah says: if there was only left [towards the head] a hair's breadth of the greater part of its circumference, [the slaughtering is valid].

If one cut at the side [of the neck], the slaughtering is valid. If one nipped off [the head of a bird sacrifice] from the side of the neck, the nipping is invalid. If one cut at the back of the neck, the slaughtering is invalid. If one nipped off [the head] from the back of the neck, the nipping is valid. If one cut at the front of the neck, the slaughtering is valid. If one nipped off [the head] from the front of the neck, the nipping is invalid. For the whole of the back of the neck is the appropriate place for nipping, and the whole of the front of the neck is the appropriate place for slaughtering. It follows, therefore, that the place which is appropriate for slaughtering is inappropriate for nipping, and the place which is appropriate for nipping is inappropriate for slaughtering.

If one cut at the side [of the neck], the slaughtering is valid. If one nipped off [the head of a bird sacrifice] from the side of the neck, the nipping is invalid. If one cut at the back of the neck, the slaughtering is invalid. If one nipped off [the head] from the back of the neck, the nipping is valid. If one cut at the front of the neck, the slaughtering is valid. If one nipped off [the head] from the front of the neck, the nipping is invalid. For the whole of the back of the neck is the appropriate place for nipping, and the whole of the front of the neck is the appropriate place for slaughtering. It follows, therefore, that the place which is appropriate for slaughtering is inappropriate for nipping, and the place which is appropriate for nipping is inappropriate for slaughtering.

If one cut at the side [of the neck], the slaughtering is valid. If one nipped off [the head of a bird sacrifice] from the side of the neck, the nipping is invalid. If one cut at the back of the neck, the slaughtering is invalid. If one nipped off [the head] from the back of the neck, the nipping is valid. If one cut at the front of the neck, the slaughtering is valid. If one nipped off [the head] from the front of the neck, the nipping is invalid. For the whole of the back of the neck is the appropriate place for nipping, and the whole of the front of the neck is the appropriate place for slaughtering. It follows, therefore, that the place which is appropriate for slaughtering is inappropriate for nipping, and the place which is appropriate for nipping is inappropriate for slaughtering.

If one cut at the side [of the neck], the slaughtering is valid. If one nipped off [the head of a bird sacrifice] from the side of the neck, the nipping is invalid. If one cut at the back of the neck, the slaughtering is invalid. If one nipped off [the head] from the back of the neck, the nipping is valid. If one cut at the front of the neck, the slaughtering is valid. If one nipped off [the head] from the front of the neck, the nipping is invalid. For the whole of the back of the neck is the appropriate place for nipping, and the whole of the front of the neck is the appropriate place for slaughtering. It follows, therefore, that the place which is appropriate for slaughtering is inappropriate for nipping, and the place which is appropriate for nipping is inappropriate for slaughtering.

If one cut at the side [of the neck], the slaughtering is valid. If one nipped off [the head of a bird sacrifice] from the side of the neck, the nipping is invalid. If one cut at the back of the neck, the slaughtering is invalid. If one nipped off [the head] from the back of the neck, the nipping is valid. If one cut at the front of the neck, the slaughtering is valid. If one nipped off [the head] from the front of the neck, the nipping is invalid. For the whole of the back of the neck is the appropriate place for nipping, and the whole of the front of the neck is the appropriate place for slaughtering. It follows, therefore, that the place which is appropriate for slaughtering is inappropriate for nipping, and the place which is appropriate for nipping is inappropriate for slaughtering.

If one cut at the side [of the neck], the slaughtering is valid. If one nipped off [the head of a bird sacrifice] from the side of the neck, the nipping is invalid. If one cut at the back of the neck, the slaughtering is invalid. If one nipped off [the head] from the back of the neck, the nipping is valid. If one cut at the front of the neck, the slaughtering is valid. If one nipped off [the head] from the front of the neck, the nipping is invalid. For the whole of the back of the neck is the appropriate place for nipping, and the whole of the front of the neck is the appropriate place for slaughtering. It follows, therefore, that the place which is appropriate for slaughtering is inappropriate for nipping, and the place which is appropriate for nipping is inappropriate for slaughtering.

If one cut one [of the organs of the throat] in the case of a bird, or both organs in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is valid. The greater part of an organ is equivalent to [the whole of] it. Rabbi Judah says: he must cut through the veins. [If one cut] half of one organ in the case of a bird, or one and a half organs in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is invalid. [If one man cut] the greater part of one organ in the case of a bird, or the greater part of each organ in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is valid.

If one cut one [of the organs of the throat] in the case of a bird, or both organs in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is valid. The greater part of an organ is equivalent to [the whole of] it. Rabbi Judah says: he must cut through the veins. [If one cut] half of one organ in the case of a bird, or one and a half organs in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is invalid. [If one man cut] the greater part of one organ in the case of a bird, or the greater part of each organ in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is valid.

If one cut one [of the organs of the throat] in the case of a bird, or both organs in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is valid. The greater part of an organ is equivalent to [the whole of] it. Rabbi Judah says: he must cut through the veins. [If one cut] half of one organ in the case of a bird, or one and a half organs in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is invalid. [If one man cut] the greater part of one organ in the case of a bird, or the greater part of each organ in the case of cattle, the slaughtering is valid.

If one slaughtered two animals simultaneously, the slaughtering is valid. If two persons held the knife and slaughtered, even if one cut higher up and the other cut lower down [in the neck], the slaughtering is valid.

If one slaughtered two animals simultaneously, the slaughtering is valid. If two persons held the knife and slaughtered, even if one cut higher up and the other cut lower down [in the neck], the slaughtering is valid.

If he chopped off the head with one stroke, the slaughtering is invalid. He was slaughtering and he cut through the neck with one stroke, if the knife was as long as the neck, the slaughtering is valid. If he was slaughtering and he cut off two heads at the same time, if the knife is as long as the neck it is valid. When is this so? When the slaughterer moved the knife forward and not backward, or backward and not forward; but if he moved the knife to and fro, however small it was, even if it was a scalpel, the slaughtering is valid. If a knife fell down and slaughtered [an animal], even though it slaughtered it in the proper way, the slaughtering is invalid, for it is said, "And you shall slaughter and eat," that which you slaughter, you may eat. If [while slaughtering] the knife fell and he picked it up, if his clothes fell and he picked them up, if he sharpened the knife, or if he got tired and his friend came and [continued] slaughtering, if he delayed the time that it takes to slaughter, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon says: if he delayed the time it takes to examine the slaughtering.

If he chopped off the head with one stroke, the slaughtering is invalid. He was slaughtering and he cut through the neck with one stroke, if the knife was as long as the neck, the slaughtering is valid. If he was slaughtering and he cut off two heads at the same time, if the knife is as long as the neck it is valid. When is this so? When the slaughterer moved the knife forward and not backward, or backward and not forward; but if he moved the knife to and fro, however small it was, even if it was a scalpel, the slaughtering is valid. If a knife fell down and slaughtered [an animal], even though it slaughtered it in the proper way, the slaughtering is invalid, for it is said, "And you shall slaughter and eat," that which you slaughter, you may eat. If [while slaughtering] the knife fell and he picked it up, if his clothes fell and he picked them up, if he sharpened the knife, or if he got tired and his friend came and [continued] slaughtering, if he delayed the time that it takes to slaughter, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon says: if he delayed the time it takes to examine the slaughtering.

If he chopped off the head with one stroke, the slaughtering is invalid. He was slaughtering and he cut through the neck with one stroke, if the knife was as long as the neck, the slaughtering is valid. If he was slaughtering and he cut off two heads at the same time, if the knife is as long as the neck it is valid. When is this so? When the slaughterer moved the knife forward and not backward, or backward and not forward; but if he moved the knife to and fro, however small it was, even if it was a scalpel, the slaughtering is valid. If a knife fell down and slaughtered [an animal], even though it slaughtered it in the proper way, the slaughtering is invalid, for it is said, "And you shall slaughter and eat," that which you slaughter, you may eat. If [while slaughtering] the knife fell and he picked it up, if his clothes fell and he picked them up, if he sharpened the knife, or if he got tired and his friend came and [continued] slaughtering, if he delayed the time that it takes to slaughter, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon says: if he delayed the time it takes to examine the slaughtering.

If he chopped off the head with one stroke, the slaughtering is invalid. He was slaughtering and he cut through the neck with one stroke, if the knife was as long as the neck, the slaughtering is valid. If he was slaughtering and he cut off two heads at the same time, if the knife is as long as the neck it is valid. When is this so? When the slaughterer moved the knife forward and not backward, or backward and not forward; but if he moved the knife to and fro, however small it was, even if it was a scalpel, the slaughtering is valid. If a knife fell down and slaughtered [an animal], even though it slaughtered it in the proper way, the slaughtering is invalid, for it is said, "And you shall slaughter and eat," that which you slaughter, you may eat. If [while slaughtering] the knife fell and he picked it up, if his clothes fell and he picked them up, if he sharpened the knife, or if he got tired and his friend came and [continued] slaughtering, if he delayed the time that it takes to slaughter, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon says: if he delayed the time it takes to examine the slaughtering.

If he chopped off the head with one stroke, the slaughtering is invalid. He was slaughtering and he cut through the neck with one stroke, if the knife was as long as the neck, the slaughtering is valid. If he was slaughtering and he cut off two heads at the same time, if the knife is as long as the neck it is valid. When is this so? When the slaughterer moved the knife forward and not backward, or backward and not forward; but if he moved the knife to and fro, however small it was, even if it was a scalpel, the slaughtering is valid. If a knife fell down and slaughtered [an animal], even though it slaughtered it in the proper way, the slaughtering is invalid, for it is said, "And you shall slaughter and eat," that which you slaughter, you may eat. If [while slaughtering] the knife fell and he picked it up, if his clothes fell and he picked them up, if he sharpened the knife, or if he got tired and his friend came and [continued] slaughtering, if he delayed the time that it takes to slaughter, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon says: if he delayed the time it takes to examine the slaughtering.

If he chopped off the head with one stroke, the slaughtering is invalid. He was slaughtering and he cut through the neck with one stroke, if the knife was as long as the neck, the slaughtering is valid. If he was slaughtering and he cut off two heads at the same time, if the knife is as long as the neck it is valid. When is this so? When the slaughterer moved the knife forward and not backward, or backward and not forward; but if he moved the knife to and fro, however small it was, even if it was a scalpel, the slaughtering is valid. If a knife fell down and slaughtered [an animal], even though it slaughtered it in the proper way, the slaughtering is invalid, for it is said, "And you shall slaughter and eat," that which you slaughter, you may eat. If [while slaughtering] the knife fell and he picked it up, if his clothes fell and he picked them up, if he sharpened the knife, or if he got tired and his friend came and [continued] slaughtering, if he delayed the time that it takes to slaughter, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon says: if he delayed the time it takes to examine the slaughtering.

If he chopped off the head with one stroke, the slaughtering is invalid. He was slaughtering and he cut through the neck with one stroke, if the knife was as long as the neck, the slaughtering is valid. If he was slaughtering and he cut off two heads at the same time, if the knife is as long as the neck it is valid. When is this so? When the slaughterer moved the knife forward and not backward, or backward and not forward; but if he moved the knife to and fro, however small it was, even if it was a scalpel, the slaughtering is valid. If a knife fell down and slaughtered [an animal], even though it slaughtered it in the proper way, the slaughtering is invalid, for it is said, "And you shall slaughter and eat," that which you slaughter, you may eat. If [while slaughtering] the knife fell and he picked it up, if his clothes fell and he picked them up, if he sharpened the knife, or if he got tired and his friend came and [continued] slaughtering, if he delayed the time that it takes to slaughter, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon says: if he delayed the time it takes to examine the slaughtering.

If he chopped off the head with one stroke, the slaughtering is invalid. He was slaughtering and he cut through the neck with one stroke, if the knife was as long as the neck, the slaughtering is valid. If he was slaughtering and he cut off two heads at the same time, if the knife is as long as the neck it is valid. When is this so? When the slaughterer moved the knife forward and not backward, or backward and not forward; but if he moved the knife to and fro, however small it was, even if it was a scalpel, the slaughtering is valid. If a knife fell down and slaughtered [an animal], even though it slaughtered it in the proper way, the slaughtering is invalid, for it is said, "And you shall slaughter and eat," that which you slaughter, you may eat. If [while slaughtering] the knife fell and he picked it up, if his clothes fell and he picked them up, if he sharpened the knife, or if he got tired and his friend came and [continued] slaughtering, if he delayed the time that it takes to slaughter, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon says: if he delayed the time it takes to examine the slaughtering.

If he chopped off the head with one stroke, the slaughtering is invalid. He was slaughtering and he cut through the neck with one stroke, if the knife was as long as the neck, the slaughtering is valid. If he was slaughtering and he cut off two heads at the same time, if the knife is as long as the neck it is valid. When is this so? When the slaughterer moved the knife forward and not backward, or backward and not forward; but if he moved the knife to and fro, however small it was, even if it was a scalpel, the slaughtering is valid. If a knife fell down and slaughtered [an animal], even though it slaughtered it in the proper way, the slaughtering is invalid, for it is said, "And you shall slaughter and eat," that which you slaughter, you may eat. If [while slaughtering] the knife fell and he picked it up, if his clothes fell and he picked them up, if he sharpened the knife, or if he got tired and his friend came and [continued] slaughtering, if he delayed the time that it takes to slaughter, it is invalid. Rabbi Shimon says: if he delayed the time it takes to examine the slaughtering.

If one first sliced the esophagus and then cut away the windpipe, or first cut away the windpipe and then sliced the esophagus; or if he sliced one of these organs and paused until the animal died; or if he thrust the knife underneath the second organ and cut it: [In all these cases] Rabbi Yeshevav says: the animal is nevelah; Rabbi Akiva says: it is terefah. Rabbi Yeshevav stated this general rule in the name of Rabbi Joshua: whenever an animal is rendered invalid by a fault in the slaughtering it is nevelah; whenever an animal has been duly slaughtered but is rendered invalid by some other defect it is terefah. And Rabbi Akiba [ultimately] agreed with him.

If one slaughtered cattle or a wild beast or a bird and no blood came out, they are valid and may be eaten by him whose hands have not been washed, for they have not been rendered susceptible to impurity by blood. Rabbi Shimon says: they have been rendered susceptible to impurity by the slaughtering.

One who slaughtered a dying animal: Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked its foreleg and its hind leg. Rabbi Eliezer says: it is enough if it spurted [the blood]. Rabbi Shimon said: even if one slaughtered [a dying animal] by night and the following morning he got up early and found the sides [of the throat] full of blood, the slaughtering is valid, for this proves that it spurted [the blood], as is Rabbi Eliezer's measure. The sages say: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked either its foreleg or its hind leg, or it moved its tail to and fro. This is the test both with regard to large and small animals. If a small animal stretched out its foreleg [at the end of the slaughtering] but did not withdraw it, [the slaughtering] is invalid, for this was just an indication of the expiration of its life. When do these rules apply? To case of an animal which was believed to be dying. But if it was believed to be sound, even though it did not show any of these signs, the slaughtering is valid.

One who slaughtered a dying animal: Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked its foreleg and its hind leg. Rabbi Eliezer says: it is enough if it spurted [the blood]. Rabbi Shimon said: even if one slaughtered [a dying animal] by night and the following morning he got up early and found the sides [of the throat] full of blood, the slaughtering is valid, for this proves that it spurted [the blood], as is Rabbi Eliezer's measure. The sages say: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked either its foreleg or its hind leg, or it moved its tail to and fro. This is the test both with regard to large and small animals. If a small animal stretched out its foreleg [at the end of the slaughtering] but did not withdraw it, [the slaughtering] is invalid, for this was just an indication of the expiration of its life. When do these rules apply? To case of an animal which was believed to be dying. But if it was believed to be sound, even though it did not show any of these signs, the slaughtering is valid.

One who slaughtered a dying animal: Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked its foreleg and its hind leg. Rabbi Eliezer says: it is enough if it spurted [the blood]. Rabbi Shimon said: even if one slaughtered [a dying animal] by night and the following morning he got up early and found the sides [of the throat] full of blood, the slaughtering is valid, for this proves that it spurted [the blood], as is Rabbi Eliezer's measure. The sages say: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked either its foreleg or its hind leg, or it moved its tail to and fro. This is the test both with regard to large and small animals. If a small animal stretched out its foreleg [at the end of the slaughtering] but did not withdraw it, [the slaughtering] is invalid, for this was just an indication of the expiration of its life. When do these rules apply? To case of an animal which was believed to be dying. But if it was believed to be sound, even though it did not show any of these signs, the slaughtering is valid.

One who slaughtered a dying animal: Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked its foreleg and its hind leg. Rabbi Eliezer says: it is enough if it spurted [the blood]. Rabbi Shimon said: even if one slaughtered [a dying animal] by night and the following morning he got up early and found the sides [of the throat] full of blood, the slaughtering is valid, for this proves that it spurted [the blood], as is Rabbi Eliezer's measure. The sages say: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked either its foreleg or its hind leg, or it moved its tail to and fro. This is the test both with regard to large and small animals. If a small animal stretched out its foreleg [at the end of the slaughtering] but did not withdraw it, [the slaughtering] is invalid, for this was just an indication of the expiration of its life. When do these rules apply? To case of an animal which was believed to be dying. But if it was believed to be sound, even though it did not show any of these signs, the slaughtering is valid.

One who slaughtered a dying animal: Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked its foreleg and its hind leg. Rabbi Eliezer says: it is enough if it spurted [the blood]. Rabbi Shimon said: even if one slaughtered [a dying animal] by night and the following morning he got up early and found the sides [of the throat] full of blood, the slaughtering is valid, for this proves that it spurted [the blood], as is Rabbi Eliezer's measure. The sages say: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked either its foreleg or its hind leg, or it moved its tail to and fro. This is the test both with regard to large and small animals. If a small animal stretched out its foreleg [at the end of the slaughtering] but did not withdraw it, [the slaughtering] is invalid, for this was just an indication of the expiration of its life. When do these rules apply? To case of an animal which was believed to be dying. But if it was believed to be sound, even though it did not show any of these signs, the slaughtering is valid.

One who slaughtered a dying animal: Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked its foreleg and its hind leg. Rabbi Eliezer says: it is enough if it spurted [the blood]. Rabbi Shimon said: even if one slaughtered [a dying animal] by night and the following morning he got up early and found the sides [of the throat] full of blood, the slaughtering is valid, for this proves that it spurted [the blood], as is Rabbi Eliezer's measure. The sages say: [the slaughtering is invalid] unless it jerked either its foreleg or its hind leg, or it moved its tail to and fro. This is the test both with regard to large and small animals. If a small animal stretched out its foreleg [at the end of the slaughtering] but did not withdraw it, [the slaughtering] is invalid, for this was just an indication of the expiration of its life. When do these rules apply? To case of an animal which was believed to be dying. But if it was believed to be sound, even though it did not show any of these signs, the slaughtering is valid.

If one slaughtered for a non-Jew, the slaughtering is valid. Rabbi Eliezer declares it invalid. Rabbi Eliezer said: even if one slaughtered a beast with the intention that a non-Jew should eat [only] its liver, the slaughtering is invalid, for the thoughts of a non-Jew are usually directed towards idolatry. Rabbi Yose said: is there not a kal vehomer argument? For if in the case of consecrated animals, where a wrongful intention can render invalid, it is established that everything depends solely upon the intention of him who performs the service, how much more in the case of unconsecrated animals, where a wrongful intention cannot render invalid, is it not logical that everything should depend solely upon the intention of him who slaughters!

If one slaughtered for a non-Jew, the slaughtering is valid. Rabbi Eliezer declares it invalid. Rabbi Eliezer said: even if one slaughtered a beast with the intention that a non-Jew should eat [only] its liver, the slaughtering is invalid, for the thoughts of a non-Jew are usually directed towards idolatry. Rabbi Yose said: is there not a kal vehomer argument? For if in the case of consecrated animals, where a wrongful intention can render invalid, it is established that everything depends solely upon the intention of him who performs the service, how much more in the case of unconsecrated animals, where a wrongful intention cannot render invalid, is it not logical that everything should depend solely upon the intention of him who slaughters!

If one slaughtered [an animal] as a sacrifice to mountains, hills, seas, rivers, or deserts, the slaughtering is invalid. If two persons held a knife and slaughtered [an animal], one intending it as a sacrifice to one of these things and the other for a legitimate purpose, the slaughtering is invalid.

If one slaughtered [an animal] as a sacrifice to mountains, hills, seas, rivers, or deserts, the slaughtering is invalid. If two persons held a knife and slaughtered [an animal], one intending it as a sacrifice to one of these things and the other for a legitimate purpose, the slaughtering is invalid.

If one slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court] for it to be an olah or a shelamim or an asham for a doubtful sin or as a Pesah or a todah, the slaughtering is invalid. But Rabbi Shimon declares it valid. If two persons held one knife and slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court], one declaring it to be one of the above and the other intending it for a legitimate purpose, the slaughtering is invalid. If one slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court] for it to be a hatat or an asham or a first-born or the tithe [of cattle] or a substitute offering, the slaughtering is valid. This is the general rule: if one slaughtered an animal declaring it to be a sacrifice which can be brought either as a voluntary or a freewill-offering it is invalid, but if he declares it to be a sacrifice which cannot be brought either as a votive or a freewill-offering it is valid.

If one slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court] for it to be an olah or a shelamim or an asham for a doubtful sin or as a Pesah or a todah, the slaughtering is invalid. But Rabbi Shimon declares it valid. If two persons held one knife and slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court], one declaring it to be one of the above and the other intending it for a legitimate purpose, the slaughtering is invalid. If one slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court] for it to be a hatat or an asham or a first-born or the tithe [of cattle] or a substitute offering, the slaughtering is valid. This is the general rule: if one slaughtered an animal declaring it to be a sacrifice which can be brought either as a voluntary or a freewill-offering it is invalid, but if he declares it to be a sacrifice which cannot be brought either as a votive or a freewill-offering it is valid.

If one slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court] for it to be an olah or a shelamim or an asham for a doubtful sin or as a Pesah or a todah, the slaughtering is invalid. But Rabbi Shimon declares it valid. If two persons held one knife and slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court], one declaring it to be one of the above and the other intending it for a legitimate purpose, the slaughtering is invalid. If one slaughtered [an unconsecrated animal outside the Temple court] for it to be a hatat or an asham or a first-born or the tithe [of cattle] or a substitute offering, the slaughtering is valid. This is the general rule: if one slaughtered an animal declaring it to be a sacrifice which can be brought either as a voluntary or a freewill-offering it is invalid, but if he declares it to be a sacrifice which cannot be brought either as a votive or a freewill-offering it is valid.

If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean. If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah, for just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean. Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself? From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean? [For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean? No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]? Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb? [Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter? [Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind.

If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean. If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah, for just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean. Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself? From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean? [For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean? No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]? Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb? [Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter? [Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind.

If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean. If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah, for just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean. Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself? From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean? [For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean? No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]? Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb? [Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter? [Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind.

If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean. If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah, for just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean. Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself? From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean? [For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean? No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]? Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb? [Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter? [Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind.

If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean. If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah, for just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean. Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself? From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean? [For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean? No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]? Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb? [Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter? [Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind.

If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean. If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah, for just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean. Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself? From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean? [For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean? No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]? Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb? [Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter? [Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind.

If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean. If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah, for just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean. Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself? From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean? [For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean? No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]? Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb? [Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter? [Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind.

If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean. If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah, for just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean. Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself? From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean? [For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean? No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]? Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb? [Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter? [Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind.

If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean. If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah, for just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean. Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself? From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean? [For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean? No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]? Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb? [Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter? [Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind.

If an animal was having difficulty in labor and the fetus put forth its limb and a person immediately cut if off and then slaughtered the mother, the flesh [of the fetus] is clean. If he slaughtered the mother first and then cut if off, the flesh [of the fetus] is unclean like that which had touched nevelah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, it is like that which had touched a slaughtered terefah, for just as we find that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean, so the slaughtering of the animal renders the limb clean. Rabbi Meir said to them: No, for when you say that the slaughtering of a terefah [animal] renders it clean you are concerned with [the animal] itself, but can you say that it will render clean the limb which is not part of [the animal] itself? From where do we learn that the slaughtering of a terefah animal renders it clean? [For we could have argued to the contrary:] An unclean animal may not be eaten, and a terefah also may not be eaten; just as slaughtering does not render an unclean animal clean so slaughtering should not render a terefah animal clean? No, if you said this of an unclean animal for at no time was it fit [for slaughtering]; can you also say this of a terefah animal which had a time when it was fit [for slaughtering]? Take away with this argument that you brought forth! For where would we know this of an animal that was born terefah from the womb? [Substitute therefore this argument]: No, if you said this of an unclean animal for none of its kind may be validly slaughtered; can you also state this of a terefah for whose kind there is valid slaughter? [Accordingly], the slaughtering of a live eight months birth does not render it clean, since there is no slaughtering of its kind.

If one slaughtered an animal and found in it an eight months’ fetus, either living or dead, or a dead nine months’ fetus, he need only tear it open and take out the blood. If he found in it a living nine months’ fetus it must be slaughtered, and he would thereby [possibly] incur the penalty for “it and its young,” the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: the slaughtering of its mother renders it permitted. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: even if it is eight years old and is plowing the field, the slaughtering of its mother renders it permitted. If he ripped open [the mother] and found in it a living nine months’ fetus, it must be slaughtered, since its mother has not been slaughtered.

If one slaughtered an animal and found in it an eight months’ fetus, either living or dead, or a dead nine months’ fetus, he need only tear it open and take out the blood. If he found in it a living nine months’ fetus it must be slaughtered, and he would thereby [possibly] incur the penalty for “it and its young,” the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say: the slaughtering of its mother renders it permitted. Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: even if it is eight years old and is plowing the field, the slaughtering of its mother renders it permitted. If he ripped open [the mother] and found in it a living nine months’ fetus, it must be slaughtered, since its mother has not been slaughtered.

If the hind legs of an animal were cut off below the joint, it is permitted; If above the joint, it is terefah. So too if the juncture of the tendons was gone, [it is terefah]. If the bone was broken but the greater part of the flesh [around the fracture] remained, it is rendered clean by the slaughtering; otherwise it is not rendered clean by the slaughtering.

If the hind legs of an animal were cut off below the joint, it is permitted; If above the joint, it is terefah. So too if the juncture of the tendons was gone, [it is terefah]. If the bone was broken but the greater part of the flesh [around the fracture] remained, it is rendered clean by the slaughtering; otherwise it is not rendered clean by the slaughtering.

If a person slaughtered an animal and found in it an amniotic sac, he who is not fastidious may eat it. It does not contract uncleanness, either food uncleanness or the uncleanness of nevelah. If he intended to eat it, it can contract food uncleanness but not the uncleanness of nevelah. If part of the amniotic sac emerged [before the slaughtering of the mother], it may not be eaten; for it is a sign of birth in a woman and also a sign of birth in an animal. If an animal which was pregnant for the first time miscarried an amniotic sac, it may be thrown to dogs. But in the case of a consecrated animal it must be buried. It may not be buried at cross-roads or hung on a tree, for these are amorite practices.

Limbs or pieces of flesh which hang loose from a [living] animal are susceptible to food uncleanness while they are in their place. And [in order to become unclean] they must be first rendered susceptible to uncleanness. If the animal was slaughtered, they have by the blood [of the slaughtering] become susceptible to uncleanness, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says: they have not become susceptible to uncleanness. If the animal died, the hanging flesh must be rendered susceptible to uncleanness. The limb is unclean as a limb severed from a living creature, but is not unclean as the limb of a nevelah (carcass), the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon declares it clean.

There are never less than twenty-one blasts in the Temple and never more than forty-eight. There are never less than two harps, nor more than six. There are never less than two flutes, nor more than twelve. On twelve days in the year the flute was played before the altar: At the slaughtering of the first pesah, At the killing of the second pesah, On the first festival day of Pesah, On the festival day of Atzeret (Shavuot), And on the eight days of Sukkot. And they did not play on a pipe [abuv] of bronze but on a pipe of reed, because its tune is sweeter. Nor was anything but a single pipe used for closing a tune, because it makes a pleasant finale.

Ordinary harps are susceptible to impurity, but the harps of Levites are clean. All liquids are susceptible to impurity, but the liquids in the Temple slaughtering house are clean. All scrolls convey impurity to the hands, excepting the scroll of the Temple courtyard. A wooden toy horse is clean. The belly-lute, the donkey-shaped musical instrument and the erus are susceptible to impurity. Rabbi Judah says: the erus is susceptible to sitting impurity since the wailing woman sits on it. A weasel-trap is susceptible to impurity, but a mouse-trap is clean.

Thirteen rulings govern the carrion of a clean bird: There must be intention; It need not be rendered susceptible; It conveys food uncleanness if its minimum bulk is that of an egg; And it conveys uncleanness when in one's gullet if its minimum bulk is that of an olive; He that eats of it must wait until sunset [to be clean]; Guilt is incurred on account of it for entering the sanctuary; Terumah is burned on account of it; He who eats a limb of it while it is alive suffers forty lashes; Slaughtering it or nipping [off its neck] cleanses it even if it is terefah, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: they do not cleanse it. Rabbi Yose says: the slaughtering does cleanse it but nipping does not.

Thirteen rulings govern the carrion of a clean bird: There must be intention; It need not be rendered susceptible; It conveys food uncleanness if its minimum bulk is that of an egg; And it conveys uncleanness when in one's gullet if its minimum bulk is that of an olive; He that eats of it must wait until sunset [to be clean]; Guilt is incurred on account of it for entering the sanctuary; Terumah is burned on account of it; He who eats a limb of it while it is alive suffers forty lashes; Slaughtering it or nipping [off its neck] cleanses it even if it is terefah, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: they do not cleanse it. Rabbi Yose says: the slaughtering does cleanse it but nipping does not.

The carrion of an unclean bird requires intention; and it must be rendered susceptible; It conveys food uncleanness if its minimum bulk is that of an egg; The consumption of half a loaf's bulk of it renders one's person unfit to eat terumah; There is no rule that an olive's worth defiles in the gullet; He who eats of it need not wait for sunset; No guilt is incurred on account of it for entering the sanctuary; But on account of it terumah must be burnt. He who eats a limb of it while it is alive is not subject to the penalty of forty stripes; Slaughtering it does not render it fit. The large feathers and the down contract uncleanness and convey uncleanness and combine with the flesh to constitute the prescribed minimum. The beak and the claws contract uncleanness and convey uncleanness and combine [with the flesh to make up the prescribed minimum].