unintentional

73 occurrences across the corpus

The Mishnah

Mishnah Shevuot 1:6

For intentional transgressions of the laws of impurity in connection with the temple and holy food, the goat offered inside [the Holy of Holies] on the Day of Atonement together with the Day of Atonement itself bring atonement. For other transgressions of the Torah, light and grave, intentional and unintentional, known and unknown, positive and negative, those punishable by kareth and those punishable by death imposed by the court for all these the scapegoat [sent out on the Day of Atonement] brings atonement.

Mishnah Shevuot 3:8

What is a vain oath? If he swore that which is contrary to the facts known to people, saying of a pillar of stone that it is of gold; or of a man that he is a woman; or of a woman that she is a man. If he swore concerning a thing which is impossible, [for instance if he said,] “If I have not seen a camel flying in the air”, or “If I have not seen a serpent as thick as the beam of the olive press”. If he said to witnesses, “Come and bear testimony for me”, [and they replied,] “We swear that we will not bear testimony for you”. If he swore to annul a commandment, [for example] not to make a sukkah, or not to take a lulav, or not to put on tefillin. These are vain oaths, for which one is liable, for intentional transgression, lashes, and for unintentional transgression one is exempt.

Mishnah Shevuot 3:10

The oath of utterance applies to men and women, to relatives and non-relatives, to those qualified [to bear witness] and those not qualified, [whether uttered] before the court, or not before the court, [but it must be uttered] with a man’s own mouth. And he is liable, for intentional transgression, lashes, and for unintentional transgression, a sliding scale sacrifice.

Mishnah Shevuot 3:11

A vain oath applies to men and women, to relatives and non-relatives, to those qualified [to bear witness] and those not qualified, [whether uttered] before the court, or not before the court, [but it must be uttered] with a man's own mouth. And he is liable, for intentional transgression, stripes, and for unintentional transgression he is exempt. [In the case of] both this and that [oath], if he was adjured by the mouth of others, he is liable. How so? If he said, “I have not eaten today,” or, “I have not put on tefillin today” [and the another person said,] “I adjure thee,” and he said, “Amen!”, he is liable [if his oath was false].

Mishnah Shevuot 4:2

And they are liable for intentional transgression of the oath, and for its unintentional transgression coupled with intentional [denial of knowledge of] testimony, but they are not liable for unintentional transgression. And what are they liable for the intentional transgression of the oath? A sliding scale sacrifice.

Mishnah Shevuot 4:2

And they are liable for intentional transgression of the oath, and for its unintentional transgression coupled with intentional [denial of knowledge of] testimony, but they are not liable for unintentional transgression. And what are they liable for the intentional transgression of the oath? A sliding scale sacrifice.

Mishnah Shevuot 5:1

The oath of deposit applies to men and women, to non-relatives and relatives, to those qualified [to bear testimony] and those unqualified; before the court and not before the court, [if uttered] from his own mouth. And [if adjured] by the mouth of others, he is not liable unless he denies it before the court, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say, whether [uttered] from his own mouth or [adjured] by the mouth of others since he denied it, he is liable. And he is liable for intentional transgression of the oath, and for its unintentional transgression coupled with intentional [denial of having received the] deposit, but he is not liable for unintentional transgression. And what is he liable for the intentional transgression of the oath? A guilt offering of [the value of] two shekels of silver.

Mishnah Shevuot 5:1

The oath of deposit applies to men and women, to non-relatives and relatives, to those qualified [to bear testimony] and those unqualified; before the court and not before the court, [if uttered] from his own mouth. And [if adjured] by the mouth of others, he is not liable unless he denies it before the court, according to the words of Rabbi Meir. But the Sages say, whether [uttered] from his own mouth or [adjured] by the mouth of others since he denied it, he is liable. And he is liable for intentional transgression of the oath, and for its unintentional transgression coupled with intentional [denial of having received the] deposit, but he is not liable for unintentional transgression. And what is he liable for the intentional transgression of the oath? A guilt offering of [the value of] two shekels of silver.

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Peah 5:2

HALAKHAH: Here you say that “one estimates what amount of gleanings that would have yielded, and he gives that to the poor.” But there, you say “all ears that touch the ground are for the poor.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They fined him because he put the stack on the gleanings of the poor. That is for intentional transgression; it is also for unintentional error, for sheaves, for a wheat stack on top of barley, even if it was stacked by others without his knowledge, even if he called the poor and they did not come.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 2:19

Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: “Unintentionally”, when it is forbidden, “intentionally” when it is forbidden. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah states this: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if unintentionally it may be eaten, if intentionally it may not be eaten”; “unintentionally”, when it is forbidden, “intentionally”, when it is [equally] forbidden. It was stated: “What was cooked on the Sabbath, if it was done unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah said, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath, intentionally never. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath by others but not by himself, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” Samuel followed Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. Rav in his own group instructed following Rebbi Meïr, in public following Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. Rebbi Simeon bar Karsana said, he instructed us following Rebbi Ismael, the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. As it was stated: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said, in any case where an intentional sin is punished by extirpation and an unintentional sin by an expiatory offering, if the sin was committed on the Sabbath unintentionally or intentionally, the result is forbidden both for him and for others; it may not be eaten. In any case an intentional sin is not punished by extirpation and for the unintentional sin no expiatory offering is due; if it was done on the Sabbath unintentionally the result may be eaten by others after the end of the Sabbath but not by him, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: What do you say? He said, I have only the Mishnah: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if in error it may be eaten, if intentionally it may not be eaten”. Rav Ḥisda heard this and said, the Sabbaths have been permitted! Did not Rav Huna say in the name of Rav and did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “In earlier times they said, one who forgets some dish on his stove on the Sabbath, unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten. People were suspected that they left it intentionally and said, it was forgotten; they forbade it to them when it was forgotten.” And here, you say so? Rebbi Ila said, they were suspected to leave it on, they were not suspected to cook. They imposed a fine for forgetting but not for cooking.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 2:19

Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Abbahu: “Unintentionally”, when it is forbidden, “intentionally” when it is forbidden. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah states this: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if unintentionally it may be eaten, if intentionally it may not be eaten”; “unintentionally”, when it is forbidden, “intentionally”, when it is [equally] forbidden. It was stated: “What was cooked on the Sabbath, if it was done unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah said, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath, intentionally never. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath by others but not by himself, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” Samuel followed Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. Rav in his own group instructed following Rebbi Meïr, in public following Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. Rebbi Simeon bar Karsana said, he instructed us following Rebbi Ismael, the son of Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. As it was stated: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said, in any case where an intentional sin is punished by extirpation and an unintentional sin by an expiatory offering, if the sin was committed on the Sabbath unintentionally or intentionally, the result is forbidden both for him and for others; it may not be eaten. In any case an intentional sin is not punished by extirpation and for the unintentional sin no expiatory offering is due; if it was done on the Sabbath unintentionally the result may be eaten by others after the end of the Sabbath but not by him, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: What do you say? He said, I have only the Mishnah: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if in error it may be eaten, if intentionally it may not be eaten”. Rav Ḥisda heard this and said, the Sabbaths have been permitted! Did not Rav Huna say in the name of Rav and did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “In earlier times they said, one who forgets some dish on his stove on the Sabbath, unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten. People were suspected that they left it intentionally and said, it was forgotten; they forbade it to them when it was forgotten.” And here, you say so? Rebbi Ila said, they were suspected to leave it on, they were not suspected to cook. They imposed a fine for forgetting but not for cooking.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 2:21

It was stated: “A woman should not fill a pot with ‘assasiot and lupines and put them into the oven at the start of the Sabbath, at nightfall. If she did, they are forbidden after the end of the Sabbath until the time they could have been done.” Rebbi Aḥa said: intentionally, following Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said: unintentionally, following Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Mana said, that is correct, did not Rebbi Yose say, “ He who is planting on the Sabbath, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. In the Sabbatical year, he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the other way around. In the Sabbatical, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out, on the Sabbath he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional because the profit of the Sabbath [is forbidden] to him.” And here, since you say that after the end of the Sabbath he has to wait until the time it could have been done, he did not gain anything from the Sabbath. What is the reason of the rabbis? People are suspected about the Sabbatical but not about the Sabbath. Another explanation: One counts Sabbaticals, one does not count Sabbaths. What is this about? If somebody planted less than thirty days before the Sabbatical and now it is the Sabbatical, if it is because of suspicion, there is no suspicion; if it is for counting, it is counted. Less than thirty days before the eighth year and now it is the eighth year, if it is because of suspicion, there is suspicion; can it be explained for counting? But you have to say because of suspicion; they fined for the unintentional because of the intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 2:21

It was stated: “A woman should not fill a pot with ‘assasiot and lupines and put them into the oven at the start of the Sabbath, at nightfall. If she did, they are forbidden after the end of the Sabbath until the time they could have been done.” Rebbi Aḥa said: intentionally, following Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said: unintentionally, following Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Mana said, that is correct, did not Rebbi Yose say, “ He who is planting on the Sabbath, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. In the Sabbatical year, he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the other way around. In the Sabbatical, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out, on the Sabbath he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional because the profit of the Sabbath [is forbidden] to him.” And here, since you say that after the end of the Sabbath he has to wait until the time it could have been done, he did not gain anything from the Sabbath. What is the reason of the rabbis? People are suspected about the Sabbatical but not about the Sabbath. Another explanation: One counts Sabbaticals, one does not count Sabbaths. What is this about? If somebody planted less than thirty days before the Sabbatical and now it is the Sabbatical, if it is because of suspicion, there is no suspicion; if it is for counting, it is counted. Less than thirty days before the eighth year and now it is the eighth year, if it is because of suspicion, there is suspicion; can it be explained for counting? But you have to say because of suspicion; they fined for the unintentional because of the intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 2:21

It was stated: “A woman should not fill a pot with ‘assasiot and lupines and put them into the oven at the start of the Sabbath, at nightfall. If she did, they are forbidden after the end of the Sabbath until the time they could have been done.” Rebbi Aḥa said: intentionally, following Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said: unintentionally, following Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Mana said, that is correct, did not Rebbi Yose say, “ He who is planting on the Sabbath, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. In the Sabbatical year, he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the other way around. In the Sabbatical, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out, on the Sabbath he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional because the profit of the Sabbath [is forbidden] to him.” And here, since you say that after the end of the Sabbath he has to wait until the time it could have been done, he did not gain anything from the Sabbath. What is the reason of the rabbis? People are suspected about the Sabbatical but not about the Sabbath. Another explanation: One counts Sabbaticals, one does not count Sabbaths. What is this about? If somebody planted less than thirty days before the Sabbatical and now it is the Sabbatical, if it is because of suspicion, there is no suspicion; if it is for counting, it is counted. Less than thirty days before the eighth year and now it is the eighth year, if it is because of suspicion, there is suspicion; can it be explained for counting? But you have to say because of suspicion; they fined for the unintentional because of the intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 2:21

It was stated: “A woman should not fill a pot with ‘assasiot and lupines and put them into the oven at the start of the Sabbath, at nightfall. If she did, they are forbidden after the end of the Sabbath until the time they could have been done.” Rebbi Aḥa said: intentionally, following Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said: unintentionally, following Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Mana said, that is correct, did not Rebbi Yose say, “ He who is planting on the Sabbath, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. In the Sabbatical year, he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the other way around. In the Sabbatical, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out, on the Sabbath he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional because the profit of the Sabbath [is forbidden] to him.” And here, since you say that after the end of the Sabbath he has to wait until the time it could have been done, he did not gain anything from the Sabbath. What is the reason of the rabbis? People are suspected about the Sabbatical but not about the Sabbath. Another explanation: One counts Sabbaticals, one does not count Sabbaths. What is this about? If somebody planted less than thirty days before the Sabbatical and now it is the Sabbatical, if it is because of suspicion, there is no suspicion; if it is for counting, it is counted. Less than thirty days before the eighth year and now it is the eighth year, if it is because of suspicion, there is suspicion; can it be explained for counting? But you have to say because of suspicion; they fined for the unintentional because of the intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 2:21

It was stated: “A woman should not fill a pot with ‘assasiot and lupines and put them into the oven at the start of the Sabbath, at nightfall. If she did, they are forbidden after the end of the Sabbath until the time they could have been done.” Rebbi Aḥa said: intentionally, following Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said: unintentionally, following Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Mana said, that is correct, did not Rebbi Yose say, “ He who is planting on the Sabbath, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. In the Sabbatical year, he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the other way around. In the Sabbatical, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out, on the Sabbath he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional because the profit of the Sabbath [is forbidden] to him.” And here, since you say that after the end of the Sabbath he has to wait until the time it could have been done, he did not gain anything from the Sabbath. What is the reason of the rabbis? People are suspected about the Sabbatical but not about the Sabbath. Another explanation: One counts Sabbaticals, one does not count Sabbaths. What is this about? If somebody planted less than thirty days before the Sabbatical and now it is the Sabbatical, if it is because of suspicion, there is no suspicion; if it is for counting, it is counted. Less than thirty days before the eighth year and now it is the eighth year, if it is because of suspicion, there is suspicion; can it be explained for counting? But you have to say because of suspicion; they fined for the unintentional because of the intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 6:3

Did not Rabbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he is in error about fat but intentional about a sacrifice, he can be warned, is whipped, and brings a sacrifice. Say also here, if he has intention about heave but is inadvertent about the fifth, one should warn him and he should be whipped and bring a fifth. Rebbi Zeїra said, it is a decision of the verse, “if somebody eats heave in error,” that all his eating should be in error. If he is intentional in doubt it is as if he is unintentional in his certainty. Rebbi Yose said, this means that if somebody forgot after he knew, he is guilty unintentionally.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 7:4

Everybody agrees that there is no money payment in capital cases, as it is written (Lev. 24:21): “The slayer of a living animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him [from paying]. Where do they differ? About money in a flogging case. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no money in a capital case but there is money in a flogging case, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, just as there is no money in a capital case so there is no money in a flogging case.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 7:4

Everybody agrees that there is no money payment in capital cases, as it is written (Lev. 24:21): “The slayer of a living animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him [from paying]. Where do they differ? About money in a flogging case. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no money in a capital case but there is money in a flogging case, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, just as there is no money in a capital case so there is no money in a flogging case.

Jerusalem Talmud Terumot 7:7

Our Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish! Did we not state “If somebody eats heave in error”? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said, he is whipped and pays. But did we not state: “If somebody eats heave intentionally”? In the opinion of Nathan bar Hoshaiah who said, when he pays he is not flogged, it is understandable. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan who said, if he was cautioned he is flogged, but if he was not cautioned he pays, he explains it as intentional without cautioning. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish there is no difference between intentional and unintentional, between cautioned or not cautioned. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish holds with Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr says, he is flogged and he pays.

Jerusalem Talmud Orlah 3:37

HALAKHAH: If they fell down and broke, whether unintentionally or intentionally they should not be lifted, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, whether unintentionally or intentionally they may be lifted. Rebbi Yose says, unintentionally they may be lifted, intentionally they may not be lifted. What is the reason of Rebbi Meïr? They fined for the unintentional because of the intentional. What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? He already paid his fine. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? As Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, any prohibited item to which [something permitted] was added, unintentionally it is permitted, intentionally it is forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:42

There, we have stated: “All who destroy are not liable,” except the incendiary and one causing an injury. Bar Qappara said, even if he did not need the blood, even if he did not need the ashes. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable.” If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable. Is that not for no purpose? So here if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable, even if it was for no purpose. Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel said, since it was for no purpose, did he commit a capital crime? But here even it was for no purpose he should be free from paying restitution, from the following: The slayer of an animal shall pay for it; the slayer of a human shall die. Since for the slayer of an animal you did not differentiate between unintentional and intentional to make him liable for money, so for the slayer of a human you cannot differentiate between unintentional and intentional to free him from liability for money.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 2:42

There, we have stated: “All who destroy are not liable,” except the incendiary and one causing an injury. Bar Qappara said, even if he did not need the blood, even if he did not need the ashes. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable, but if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable.” If his bull set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath; he is liable. Is that not for no purpose? So here if he set fire to a stack of sheaves on the Sabbath, he is not liable, even if it was for no purpose. Rebbi Ḥanania the son of Rebbi Hillel said, since it was for no purpose, did he commit a capital crime? But here even it was for no purpose he should be free from paying restitution, from the following: The slayer of an animal shall pay for it; the slayer of a human shall die. Since for the slayer of an animal you did not differentiate between unintentional and intentional to make him liable for money, so for the slayer of a human you cannot differentiate between unintentional and intentional to free him from liability for money.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 3:10

As it was stated: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if it was done unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath, intentionally it may not be eaten. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath by others but not by himself, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” Samuel followed Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. When Rav was instructing his own group he said following Rebbi Meïr; in public he instructed following Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. Rebbi Simeon bar Karsana said, he explained to us following Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose, as it was stated: “Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said in his father’s name, in any case where for an intentional sin one is liable for extirpation and an unintentional sin for a purification offering, if it was committed on the Sabbath unintentionally or intentionally, the result is forbidden both to him and to others. In any case where for an intentional sin one is not liable for extirpation and an unintentional sin no purification offering is due, if it was committed on the Sabbath unintentionally or intentionally, the result unintentional it may be eaten by others after the end of the Sabbath but not by him, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, what do you say? He said, I have only the Mishnah: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if in error it may be eaten, if intentionally it may not be eaten.” Rav Ḥisda heard this and said, the Sabbaths have been permitted! Rav Huna in the name of Rav, and Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “In earlier times they said, one who forgets some dish on his stove on the Sabbath, unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten. People were suspected that they left it intentionally and said, it was forgotten; they forbade it to them when it was forgotten.” And here, you say so? Rebbi Ila said, they were suspected to leave it on, they were not suspected to cook. They imposed a fine for forgetting but not for cooking.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 3:10

As it was stated: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if it was done unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath, intentionally it may not be eaten. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath by others but not by himself, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” Samuel followed Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. When Rav was instructing his own group he said following Rebbi Meïr; in public he instructed following Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. Rebbi Simeon bar Karsana said, he explained to us following Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose, as it was stated: “Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said in his father’s name, in any case where for an intentional sin one is liable for extirpation and an unintentional sin for a purification offering, if it was committed on the Sabbath unintentionally or intentionally, the result is forbidden both to him and to others. In any case where for an intentional sin one is not liable for extirpation and an unintentional sin no purification offering is due, if it was committed on the Sabbath unintentionally or intentionally, the result unintentional it may be eaten by others after the end of the Sabbath but not by him, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, what do you say? He said, I have only the Mishnah: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if in error it may be eaten, if intentionally it may not be eaten.” Rav Ḥisda heard this and said, the Sabbaths have been permitted! Rav Huna in the name of Rav, and Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “In earlier times they said, one who forgets some dish on his stove on the Sabbath, unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten. People were suspected that they left it intentionally and said, it was forgotten; they forbade it to them when it was forgotten.” And here, you say so? Rebbi Ila said, they were suspected to leave it on, they were not suspected to cook. They imposed a fine for forgetting but not for cooking.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 3:10

As it was stated: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if it was done unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath, intentionally it may not be eaten. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, unintentionally it may be eaten at the end of the Sabbath by others but not by himself, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” Samuel followed Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. When Rav was instructing his own group he said following Rebbi Meïr; in public he instructed following Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian. Rebbi Simeon bar Karsana said, he explained to us following Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose, as it was stated: “Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said in his father’s name, in any case where for an intentional sin one is liable for extirpation and an unintentional sin for a purification offering, if it was committed on the Sabbath unintentionally or intentionally, the result is forbidden both to him and to others. In any case where for an intentional sin one is not liable for extirpation and an unintentional sin no purification offering is due, if it was committed on the Sabbath unintentionally or intentionally, the result unintentional it may be eaten by others after the end of the Sabbath but not by him, intentionally neither by him nor by others.” They asked before Rebbi Joḥanan, what do you say? He said, I have only the Mishnah: “He who tithes or cooks on the Sabbath, if in error it may be eaten, if intentionally it may not be eaten.” Rav Ḥisda heard this and said, the Sabbaths have been permitted! Rav Huna in the name of Rav, and Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “In earlier times they said, one who forgets some dish on his stove on the Sabbath, unintentionally it may be eaten, intentionally it may not be eaten. People were suspected that they left it intentionally and said, it was forgotten; they forbade it to them when it was forgotten.” And here, you say so? Rebbi Ila said, they were suspected to leave it on, they were not suspected to cook. They imposed a fine for forgetting but not for cooking.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 3:12

It was stated: “A woman should not fill a pot with ˋassisiot and lupines and put them into the oven at the start of the Sabbath, at nightfall. If she did, they are forbidden after the end of the Sabbath until the time they could have been done.” Rebbi Aḥa said: intentionally, following Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said: unintentionally, following Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Mana said, what my teacher Rebbi Yose said is correct: “He who is planting on the Sabbath, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. In the Sabbatical year, he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the other way around. If he was planting on the Sabbath he must tear it out whether it was unintentional or intentional; in the Sabbatical, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. Why? Because the profit of the Sabbath [is forbidden] to him.” And here, since you say that after the end of the Sabbath he has to wait until the time it could have been done, he did not gain anything from the Sabbath. What is the reason of the rabbis? People are suspected about the Sabbatical but not about the Sabbath. Another explanation: One counts Sabbaticals, one does not count Sabbaths. What is this about? If somebody planted less than thirty days before the Sabbatical and now it is the Sabbatical, if it is because of suspicion, there is no suspicion; if it is for counting, it is not counted. Less than thirty days before the eighth year and now it is the eighth year, if it is because of suspicion, there is suspicion; if it is because of counting, there is counting. It follows him who says because of suspicion, but for him who says because of counting they fined the unintentional because of the intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 3:12

It was stated: “A woman should not fill a pot with ˋassisiot and lupines and put them into the oven at the start of the Sabbath, at nightfall. If she did, they are forbidden after the end of the Sabbath until the time they could have been done.” Rebbi Aḥa said: intentionally, following Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said: unintentionally, following Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Mana said, what my teacher Rebbi Yose said is correct: “He who is planting on the Sabbath, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. In the Sabbatical year, he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the other way around. If he was planting on the Sabbath he must tear it out whether it was unintentional or intentional; in the Sabbatical, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. Why? Because the profit of the Sabbath [is forbidden] to him.” And here, since you say that after the end of the Sabbath he has to wait until the time it could have been done, he did not gain anything from the Sabbath. What is the reason of the rabbis? People are suspected about the Sabbatical but not about the Sabbath. Another explanation: One counts Sabbaticals, one does not count Sabbaths. What is this about? If somebody planted less than thirty days before the Sabbatical and now it is the Sabbatical, if it is because of suspicion, there is no suspicion; if it is for counting, it is not counted. Less than thirty days before the eighth year and now it is the eighth year, if it is because of suspicion, there is suspicion; if it is because of counting, there is counting. It follows him who says because of suspicion, but for him who says because of counting they fined the unintentional because of the intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 3:12

It was stated: “A woman should not fill a pot with ˋassisiot and lupines and put them into the oven at the start of the Sabbath, at nightfall. If she did, they are forbidden after the end of the Sabbath until the time they could have been done.” Rebbi Aḥa said: intentionally, following Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said: unintentionally, following Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Mana said, what my teacher Rebbi Yose said is correct: “He who is planting on the Sabbath, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. In the Sabbatical year, he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the other way around. If he was planting on the Sabbath he must tear it out whether it was unintentional or intentional; in the Sabbatical, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. Why? Because the profit of the Sabbath [is forbidden] to him.” And here, since you say that after the end of the Sabbath he has to wait until the time it could have been done, he did not gain anything from the Sabbath. What is the reason of the rabbis? People are suspected about the Sabbatical but not about the Sabbath. Another explanation: One counts Sabbaticals, one does not count Sabbaths. What is this about? If somebody planted less than thirty days before the Sabbatical and now it is the Sabbatical, if it is because of suspicion, there is no suspicion; if it is for counting, it is not counted. Less than thirty days before the eighth year and now it is the eighth year, if it is because of suspicion, there is suspicion; if it is because of counting, there is counting. It follows him who says because of suspicion, but for him who says because of counting they fined the unintentional because of the intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 3:12

It was stated: “A woman should not fill a pot with ˋassisiot and lupines and put them into the oven at the start of the Sabbath, at nightfall. If she did, they are forbidden after the end of the Sabbath until the time they could have been done.” Rebbi Aḥa said: intentionally, following Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said: unintentionally, following Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Mana said, what my teacher Rebbi Yose said is correct: “He who is planting on the Sabbath, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. In the Sabbatical year, he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the other way around. If he was planting on the Sabbath he must tear it out whether it was unintentional or intentional; in the Sabbatical, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. Why? Because the profit of the Sabbath [is forbidden] to him.” And here, since you say that after the end of the Sabbath he has to wait until the time it could have been done, he did not gain anything from the Sabbath. What is the reason of the rabbis? People are suspected about the Sabbatical but not about the Sabbath. Another explanation: One counts Sabbaticals, one does not count Sabbaths. What is this about? If somebody planted less than thirty days before the Sabbatical and now it is the Sabbatical, if it is because of suspicion, there is no suspicion; if it is for counting, it is not counted. Less than thirty days before the eighth year and now it is the eighth year, if it is because of suspicion, there is suspicion; if it is because of counting, there is counting. It follows him who says because of suspicion, but for him who says because of counting they fined the unintentional because of the intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 3:12

It was stated: “A woman should not fill a pot with ˋassisiot and lupines and put them into the oven at the start of the Sabbath, at nightfall. If she did, they are forbidden after the end of the Sabbath until the time they could have been done.” Rebbi Aḥa said: intentionally, following Rebbi Meïr; Rebbi Yose said: unintentionally, following Rebbi Jehudah. Rebbi Mana said, what my teacher Rebbi Yose said is correct: “He who is planting on the Sabbath, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. In the Sabbatical year, he must tear it out whether [planting was] unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the other way around. If he was planting on the Sabbath he must tear it out whether it was unintentional or intentional; in the Sabbatical, if unintentional, he may keep it, if intentional, he must tear it out. Why? Because the profit of the Sabbath [is forbidden] to him.” And here, since you say that after the end of the Sabbath he has to wait until the time it could have been done, he did not gain anything from the Sabbath. What is the reason of the rabbis? People are suspected about the Sabbatical but not about the Sabbath. Another explanation: One counts Sabbaticals, one does not count Sabbaths. What is this about? If somebody planted less than thirty days before the Sabbatical and now it is the Sabbatical, if it is because of suspicion, there is no suspicion; if it is for counting, it is not counted. Less than thirty days before the eighth year and now it is the eighth year, if it is because of suspicion, there is suspicion; if it is because of counting, there is counting. It follows him who says because of suspicion, but for him who says because of counting they fined the unintentional because of the intentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 11:25

MISHNAH: One who throws and remembers before it leaves his hand, if another person caught it, or a dog caught it, or it was burned, he is not liable. If one threw with the intention of causing an injury whether on a human or an animal and he remembered before it caused an injury, he is not liable. This is the principle: All who are liable for a purification sacrifice are liable only if beginning and end were in error. If the beginning was unintentional but the end criminal or the beginning criminal and the end unintentional they are not liable unless beginning and end be unintentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 11:25

MISHNAH: One who throws and remembers before it leaves his hand, if another person caught it, or a dog caught it, or it was burned, he is not liable. If one threw with the intention of causing an injury whether on a human or an animal and he remembered before it caused an injury, he is not liable. This is the principle: All who are liable for a purification sacrifice are liable only if beginning and end were in error. If the beginning was unintentional but the end criminal or the beginning criminal and the end unintentional they are not liable unless beginning and end be unintentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 11:25

MISHNAH: One who throws and remembers before it leaves his hand, if another person caught it, or a dog caught it, or it was burned, he is not liable. If one threw with the intention of causing an injury whether on a human or an animal and he remembered before it caused an injury, he is not liable. This is the principle: All who are liable for a purification sacrifice are liable only if beginning and end were in error. If the beginning was unintentional but the end criminal or the beginning criminal and the end unintentional they are not liable unless beginning and end be unintentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 11:27

Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, unintentionally a prohibition, intentionally a prohibition. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, unintentionally extirpation, intentionally extirpation. Rebbi Simeon ben Yoḥai stated, a support of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: He blasphemes the Eternal and will be extirpated. Think of it; even if he was intentional in a matter of extirpation and he was warned and is being flogged, may he bring a sacrifice? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he was unintentional about fat but intentional about the purification sacrifice one warns him and he is flogged.

Jerusalem Talmud Eruvin 1:13

Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish were staying in Rebbi Isaac’s street. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish carried, according to his opinion, Rebbi Joḥanan did not carry, according to his opinion. Rebbi Joḥanan neither forbade nor carried; he said, let the dwellers in the alley be in error, lest they be intentional. What, did he carry or did he not carry? If you say that he carried, then Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion did change. If you say that he did not carry, it should be forbidden to the dwellers in the alley. Rebbi Joḥanan annulled his rights. Rebbi Aḥa said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish forced Rebbi Joḥanan and he carried. Rebbi Mattaniah said, this is correct. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? They considered him as unintentional compared to intentional. What is the rabbis’ opinion? Since they are suspected of carrying they are as if intentional. They told him, if this be so then the haters of Rebbi Joḥanan should be considered like a Sadducee for the dwellers in the alley and it should become forbidden for the dwellers in the alley. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, a Sadducee is suspected of carrying; here what can you say? What is the difference between them? If it was built like a χ. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he puts a beam or a lath on one side and makes a door frame on the other side. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even many beams do not make it permitted.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 7:16

It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, atonement is mentioned inside and atonement is mentioned outside. Since in atonement mentioned inside cattle atones for spillers of blood, also in atonement mentioned outside cattle atones for spillers of blood. Here unintentional, there intentional. There is a difference for the calf whose neck is broken, whether unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Yose said, here for known offense, there for unknown offense.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 7:16

It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, atonement is mentioned inside and atonement is mentioned outside. Since in atonement mentioned inside cattle atones for spillers of blood, also in atonement mentioned outside cattle atones for spillers of blood. Here unintentional, there intentional. There is a difference for the calf whose neck is broken, whether unintentional or intentional. Rebbi Yose said, here for known offense, there for unknown offense.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 8:44

HALAKHAH: There we stated: Intentional [impurity] of the Sanctuary and its sancta is atoned by the he-goat whose blood is brought inside and the Day of Atonement. The remainder of the transgressions mentioned in the Torah, minor or severe ones, intentional and unintentional, [known and unknown, positive commandments and prohibitions, extirpations and capital crimes, the scapegoat atones.]

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 8:45

Are not minor sins positive commandments and prohibitions; are not serious ones extirpations and capital crimes? Rebbi Jehudah said, so is the Mishnah: “Minor or serious ones. Those minor ones, whether he committed them intentionally or did not commit them intentionally. Those severe ones, whether he obtained knowledge of them or did not obtain knowledge of them. The following are minor sins: positive commandments and prohibitions. Severe ones, extirpations and capital crimes. Just as the he-goat whose blood is brought inside atones for intentional infractions and suspends for the unintentional ones in cases where a sacrifice is required, also the scapegoat atones in the same way.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 8:47

There, we have stated: “For these one is liable for extirpation in case of intentional transgression, or a purification sacrifice for unintentional transgression, and for what was not certainly known in their cases a suspended sacrifice.” But did not the day of Atonement already atone? Rebbi Simeon in the name of Rebbi Levi from Sokho: The Mishnah refers to one who rebels on the Day of Atonement.

Jerusalem Talmud Yoma 8:49

MISHNAH: If somebody say, “I shall sin and repent, I shall sin and repent,” one does not let him achieve to repent. “I shall sin and the day of Atonement will atone,” the Day of Atonement does not atone. Transgressions between a person and the Omnipresent the Day of Atonement atones; but those between him and his neighbor the Day of Atonement does not atone unless he placated his neighbor. The following did Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah explain: Of all your unintentional sins before the Eternal you shall be cleansed. Transgressions between a person and the Omnipresent the Day of Atonement atones; but those between him and his neighbor the Day of Atonement does not atone unless he placated his neighbor. Rebbi Aqiba said, blessed are you, Israel. Before whom do you cleanse yourselves, and who cleanses you? Your Father Who is in Heaven, as it is said, I shall sprinkle on you pure water, so you shall be pure. And it is said Israel’s hope is the Eternal, since a miqweh purifies the impure people, so the Holy One, praise to Him, cleanses Israel.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 16:19

MISHNAH: It is sufficient even if somebody heard women say, the man X died. Rebbi Jehudah said, even if he heard children say, we go to lament and bury X, whether intentional or unintentional. Rebbi Jehudah ben Baba said, if he is a Jew, only if he intends [to testify]; but if a Gentile intends to testify, it is no testimony.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 1:16

There, we have stated: “In all matters of incest, He made him who touches equal to him who completes and one is guilty for each single intercourse. He was more stringent with the slave girl since in her case He treated the intentional as unintentional.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abba bar Mamai in the name of Rav: “Flow of semen,” until he ejaculates. Here is written “flow of semen”, and here is written “flow of semen.” Here, you say “flow of semen” until he ejaculates. And here, you say so? Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for it is written: “She was hidden and became impure.” From the moment she was hidden, the Torah calls her “impure”. But here, “flow of semen,” until he ejaculates. For what reason is written “flow of semen”? For measures, as it is stated: “She was hidden and became impure”; what is counted as hiding? Time to become impure. What is the time for impurity? Time for intercourse. What is the time for intercourse? Time for ‘touching’.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 9:27

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: “One which never had been used for work,” a general statement, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” a detailed statement. If a general statement is followed by a detail, the general does not contain more than the detail. He said to him, if it were written “which never had worked, which never had drawn,” you would be justified; but it is written “one which never had been used for work.” This does not describe general and detail, but the additional reference to “yoke” for an equal cut. Since relative to “yoke” said for the calf He treated all work as a yoke, so for the “yoke” said for the cow we have to treat all work as a yoke. Since relative to “yoke” said for the calf work disables whether intentional or unintentional, so for the “yoke” said for the cow work disables whether intentional or unintentional. Since relative to “yoke” said for the cow, the yoke disables, also for the “yoke” said for the calf the yoke disables. Then since for the “yoke” said for the cow blemishes disable, so also for the “yoke” said for the calf blemishes disable? The verse says, “where this one has no blemish.” Blemishes disable the cow, blemishes do not disable the calf. Then it also says “one which never had been used for work,” for this one work disables, does for the cow work not disable? Can you say there, “where this one has no blemish,” this one is disabled by blemishes, sacrifices are not disabled by blemishes?

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 9:27

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: “One which never had been used for work,” a general statement, “which never had drawn under a yoke,” a detailed statement. If a general statement is followed by a detail, the general does not contain more than the detail. He said to him, if it were written “which never had worked, which never had drawn,” you would be justified; but it is written “one which never had been used for work.” This does not describe general and detail, but the additional reference to “yoke” for an equal cut. Since relative to “yoke” said for the calf He treated all work as a yoke, so for the “yoke” said for the cow we have to treat all work as a yoke. Since relative to “yoke” said for the calf work disables whether intentional or unintentional, so for the “yoke” said for the cow work disables whether intentional or unintentional. Since relative to “yoke” said for the cow, the yoke disables, also for the “yoke” said for the calf the yoke disables. Then since for the “yoke” said for the cow blemishes disable, so also for the “yoke” said for the calf blemishes disable? The verse says, “where this one has no blemish.” Blemishes disable the cow, blemishes do not disable the calf. Then it also says “one which never had been used for work,” for this one work disables, does for the cow work not disable? Can you say there, “where this one has no blemish,” this one is disabled by blemishes, sacrifices are not disabled by blemishes?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:8

Everybody agrees that there is no money payment in capital cases, as it is written (Lev. 24:21): “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money. Where do they differ? About money in a flogging case. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no money in a capital case but there is money in a flogging case, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, just as there is no money in a capital case so there is no money in a flogging case.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:8

Everybody agrees that there is no money payment in capital cases, as it is written (Lev. 24:21): “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money. Where do they differ? About money in a flogging case. Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is no money in a capital case but there is money in a flogging case, but Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, just as there is no money in a capital case so there is no money in a flogging case.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:11

Our Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish! “If somebody eats heave intentionally he pays the principal but not the fifth.” In the opinion of Nathan bar Hoshaiah who said he pays, it is understandable. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan who said, if he was cautioned he is flogged, but if he was not cautioned he pays, he explains it as intentional without cautioning. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish there is no difference between intentional and unintentional, between cautioned or not cautioned. He explains following Rebbi Meïr who says, he is flogged and he pays.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:24

Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: We understand that, since it said “if there is no case of murder, a fine shall be imposed”, that if it is a case of murder, you shall take life for life? Why does the verse say, it is a case of murder? To add the case of premeditation and warning. Rebbi Yose said, is that not a Mishnah, “for anybody committing a capital crime does not pay cash”, that it deals not only with cases of error. Ḥizqiah said, one states a baraita: “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:24

Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: We understand that, since it said “if there is no case of murder, a fine shall be imposed”, that if it is a case of murder, you shall take life for life? Why does the verse say, it is a case of murder? To add the case of premeditation and warning. Rebbi Yose said, is that not a Mishnah, “for anybody committing a capital crime does not pay cash”, that it deals not only with cases of error. Ḥizqiah said, one states a baraita: “The slayer of an animal must pay for it but the slayer of a human shall be put to death.” Just as you did not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of an animal to force him to pay money, so you should not make a difference between unintentional and intentional action of a slayer of a human to free him from paying money.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:28

MISHNAH: If someone causes impurity, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated. If Cohanim in the Temple intentionally made [a sacrifice] piggul, they have to pay.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:29

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yudan did not go to the assembly. He was standing with Rebbi Mana and asked him, what new was said? He said: So says Rebbi Yose, a person causing impurity does not have the status of a perpetrator, fromthe following: “Heave which became impure.” He answered: Explain it, if it became impure by itself; then you cannot infer anything, because of a Mishnah: “If somebody judged, absolved the guilty and obligated the innocent, declared the pure impure and the impure pure.” For Rav Jeremiah said in the name of Rav: If he touched it with his hand. Samuel said: If he touched it with his hand. Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi says, it should have been logical that even intentionally he should have been free. Why did they say that he is obligated? That he should tell. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, it should have been logical that even unintentionally he should have been obligated. Why did they say that he is free? Because of a fine. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan comes from this: “If someone causes anything to become impure, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “A person who puts a yoke on another’s cow is free in human law but guilty in Heaven’s law.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:31

Rav Huna in the name of Rav: If he mixed. If he made a libation and then mixed it, at the start he committed a capital crime and at the end he has to pay? Rebbi Abba objected: Think of it, if he killed somebody and broke the flask, at the start he committed a capital crime and in the end he has to pay? Rebbi Yose objected: Think of it, if he set fire to somebody’s grain stack on the Day of Atonement, at the start he committed a capital crime and in the end he has to pay? “If someone causes anything to become impure, or turn into dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:24

Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.

Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma 4:24

Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:14

HALAKHAH: “If there is no knowledge at the start,” etc. What can you see to say? Does the one inside suspend and the one outside atone, or the one outside suspend and the one inside atone, or both of them suspend, or both of them atone? What about it? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, I saw something. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish was asking before Rebbi Joḥanan and asked him, what are the differences in atoning? I do not know what he answered him. Rebbi Ze`ira said to him, maybe it is the following: How did you understand to explain it? About an impure person who ate pure [meat], or a pure person who ate impure [meat]? The verse says: his impurity is on him. Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Or both of them atone? What about it? He should over it confess sins, these are intentional sins, their crimes, these are rebellions, their mistakes, these are unintentional sins. Then He said, he will atone. Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the he-goat will carry all their sins, he grabbed intentional sins and left out unintentional sins, to indicate that just as intentional sins do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice, so those unintentional sins which do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice. And why did they come here? Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa, for suspension. Would it be understood to suspend for those who eat abominations and crawling things? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira: Their mistakes, their mistakes. Since their mistakes mentioned there are those which carry the obligation of a sacrifice, also their mistakes mentioned here are those which carry the obligation of a sacrifice. This excludes intentional sins which do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice. What is left out by the he-goat brought inside the Day of Atonement suspends. What did it leave out? If there is no knowledge at the start but there is knowledge at the end.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:14

HALAKHAH: “If there is no knowledge at the start,” etc. What can you see to say? Does the one inside suspend and the one outside atone, or the one outside suspend and the one inside atone, or both of them suspend, or both of them atone? What about it? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, I saw something. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish was asking before Rebbi Joḥanan and asked him, what are the differences in atoning? I do not know what he answered him. Rebbi Ze`ira said to him, maybe it is the following: How did you understand to explain it? About an impure person who ate pure [meat], or a pure person who ate impure [meat]? The verse says: his impurity is on him. Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Or both of them atone? What about it? He should over it confess sins, these are intentional sins, their crimes, these are rebellions, their mistakes, these are unintentional sins. Then He said, he will atone. Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the he-goat will carry all their sins, he grabbed intentional sins and left out unintentional sins, to indicate that just as intentional sins do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice, so those unintentional sins which do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice. And why did they come here? Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa, for suspension. Would it be understood to suspend for those who eat abominations and crawling things? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira: Their mistakes, their mistakes. Since their mistakes mentioned there are those which carry the obligation of a sacrifice, also their mistakes mentioned here are those which carry the obligation of a sacrifice. This excludes intentional sins which do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice. What is left out by the he-goat brought inside the Day of Atonement suspends. What did it leave out? If there is no knowledge at the start but there is knowledge at the end.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:14

HALAKHAH: “If there is no knowledge at the start,” etc. What can you see to say? Does the one inside suspend and the one outside atone, or the one outside suspend and the one inside atone, or both of them suspend, or both of them atone? What about it? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, I saw something. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish was asking before Rebbi Joḥanan and asked him, what are the differences in atoning? I do not know what he answered him. Rebbi Ze`ira said to him, maybe it is the following: How did you understand to explain it? About an impure person who ate pure [meat], or a pure person who ate impure [meat]? The verse says: his impurity is on him. Impurity of the body, not impurity of the meat. Or both of them atone? What about it? He should over it confess sins, these are intentional sins, their crimes, these are rebellions, their mistakes, these are unintentional sins. Then He said, he will atone. Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the he-goat will carry all their sins, he grabbed intentional sins and left out unintentional sins, to indicate that just as intentional sins do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice, so those unintentional sins which do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice. And why did they come here? Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Yasa, for suspension. Would it be understood to suspend for those who eat abominations and crawling things? Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira: Their mistakes, their mistakes. Since their mistakes mentioned there are those which carry the obligation of a sacrifice, also their mistakes mentioned here are those which carry the obligation of a sacrifice. This excludes intentional sins which do not carry the obligation of a sacrifice. What is left out by the he-goat brought inside the Day of Atonement suspends. What did it leave out? If there is no knowledge at the start but there is knowledge at the end.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:23

MISHNAH: Intentional impurity of the Sanctuary and its sancta is atoned by the he-goat whose blood is brought inside and the Day of Atonement. The remainder of the transgressions mentioned in the Torah, minor or serious ones, intentional and unintentional, known and unknown, positive commandments and prohibitions, extirpations and capital crimes, the scapegoat atones.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:24

HALAKHAH: “Intentional impurity of the Sanctuary.” etc. That means it atones for intentional infractions and suspends for the unintentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 1:25

Are not minor sins [positive commandments and] prohibitions; are not serious ones extirpations and capital crimes? Rav Jehudah said, so is the Mishnah: “Minor or serious ones. Those minor ones, whether he committed them intentionally or committed them unintentionally. Those intentional ones, whether he obtained knowledge of them or did not obtain knowledge of them. The following are minor sins: positive commandments and prohibitions. Serious ones, extirpations and capital crimes. Just as the he-goat whose blood is brought inside atones for intentional infractions and suspends for the unintentional, the same holds for the scapegoat.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:29

MISHNAH: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it, an oath that I shall not eat it;” he is liable only once. This is the blurted oath where in case it be intentional one is liable for flogging, and if unintentional for a variable sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:36

MISHNAH: For an intentional vain oath one is liable to be flogged; if in error one is not liable. What is a vain oath? One swears to change what is known to man, about a stone pillar that it is of gold, a man that he is a woman, or a woman that she is a man. One swears about an impossibility, if I did not see a flying camel, if I did not see a snake like the beam of the olive press. If one said to witnesses come and testify for me, an oath that we shall not testify for you. One swears not to keep commandments: not to make a booth, not to take the lulav, not to put on phylacteries; these are vain oaths for which one is liable to be flogged if intentional, and free from prosecution of unintentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:53

MISHNAH: A blurted oath applies to men and women, relatives and unrelated persons, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for unintentional [to bring] a variable sacrifice. A vain oath applies to men and women, to relatives and unrelated persons, to qualified and disqualified ones, in court and out of court, and by his own words. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for unintentional he is not prosecutable. In both cases, one who is sworn to by another person can be liable. How is this? One said, “I did not eat today, I did not put on phylacteries today.” “I want you to swear to it,” if he said “Amen” he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:53

MISHNAH: A blurted oath applies to men and women, relatives and unrelated persons, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for unintentional [to bring] a variable sacrifice. A vain oath applies to men and women, to relatives and unrelated persons, to qualified and disqualified ones, in court and out of court, and by his own words. For intentional violation one is liable to flogging, for unintentional he is not prosecutable. In both cases, one who is sworn to by another person can be liable. How is this? One said, “I did not eat today, I did not put on phylacteries today.” “I want you to swear to it,” if he said “Amen” he is liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:29

Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: in error, a sacrifice; intentional, a sacrifice. But if he said, I was of the opinion that this oath does not exist, he is free. Ḥizqiah stated: At any place where the Torah mentions sin without attribute you include intentional equally with unintentional unless Scripture inform you that it is unintentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:29

Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: in error, a sacrifice; intentional, a sacrifice. But if he said, I was of the opinion that this oath does not exist, he is free. Ḥizqiah stated: At any place where the Torah mentions sin without attribute you include intentional equally with unintentional unless Scripture inform you that it is unintentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Makkot 2:1

MISHNAH: The following are exiled: the unintentional homicide. If he was rolling with the roller when it fell on somebody and killed him, or lowering an amphora when it fell on somebody and killed him, or was descending on a ladder when he fell on somebody and killed him, he is exiled. But if he was drawing the roller when it fell on somebody and killed him, or lifting an amphora when it fell on somebody and killed him, or was climbing a ladder when he fell on somebody and killed him, he is not exiled. This is the principle, by anything lowered, he is exiled, if it is not lowered, he is not exiled.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:8

MISHNAH: They are liable only for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation and when unintentional by a purification sacrifice. The same applies to the Anointed. Also for idolatry only for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation and when unintentional by a purification sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:8

MISHNAH: They are liable only for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation and when unintentional by a purification sacrifice. The same applies to the Anointed. Also for idolatry only for something which when intentional is punishable by extirpation and when unintentional by a purification sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 2:18

MISHNAH: For all commandments of the Torah where one is liable to extirpation for willful infraction and a purification sacrifice for unintentional infraction, the individual brings a sheep or a she-goat, the Prince a he-goat, and the Anointed or the Court bring a bull. For idolatry the individual, the Prince, and the Anointed bring a she-goat, the Court bring a bull as elevation offering and a goat as purification sacrifice. For a suspended reparation sacrifice the individual and the Prince are liable but the Anointed and the Court are not liable. For a certain reparation sacrifice the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable but the Court is not liable. For hearing a sound, or expression of the lips, or the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the Court is not liable, the individual, and the Prince, and the Anointed are liable but the Anointed is not liable for the impurity of the Temple and its sancta, the words of Rebbi Simeon. What do they bring? A variable sacrifice. Rebbi Eliezer says, the Prince brings a goat.

The Babylonian Talmud

Babylonian Talmud Makkot 2:84

Rabbi Yose bar Yehudah says: 'Originally, both unintentional and intentional [murderers] would rush to the cities of refuge, and the courts would send for them and bring them out of there [for judgement]. One who was liable for death by the court, they would put him to death; one who was not liable for death they would exempt him; one who was liable for exile, they would return him to his place, as it is said: "The congregation will return him to the city of his refuge" (Numbers 35:25).'"