7384 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:3

Where do we hold? If about one who said, an oath that I shall eat according to Torah standards, even Rebbi Aqiba will agree. And if about one who says, an oath that I shall not taste, even the rabbis will agree. But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating. What is the difference between them? “An oath that I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is not liable. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba he is not liable, in the opinion of the rabbis he is liable. Also for blurted oaths it is so: “An oath that my wife may not have any usufruct from me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is forbidden [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his wife is permitted [to have usufruct], in the opinion of the rabbis his wife is forbidden. Also with property it is the same. “An oath that my properties be forbidden to me if I shall eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba they are forbidden, in the opinion of the rabbis his properties are permitted. “That I shall not eat this loaf,” and he ate it except a minute amount. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba his properties are permitted, in the opinion of the rabbis they are forbidden.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:6

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate,” etc. Drinking is subsumed under eating but eating is not subsumed under drinking. Rebbi Jonah understood all this from: Therefore, I told the Children of Israel, none of you shall eat blood. Where do we hold? If about congealed blood, was it not stated that congealed blood is neither food nor drink? (But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating.) And was it not stated: If one liquefied the blood and swallowed it, or froze fat and ate it, if there is the volume of an olive he is liable. What does Rebbi Jonah do with this? It is not food to become impure in the impurity of food, or fluid to become impure in the impurity of fluids. Rebbi Jonah changed and explained the Mishnah: You shall spend the money for anything you desire. Where do we hold? If about one who gives the taste of wine into a cooked dish, is that not spoiling the taste? But we hold with everything and the Merciful called it “eating.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain if about gomraya and orzaraya, since anything that is auxiliary to food is like food.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:6

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate,” etc. Drinking is subsumed under eating but eating is not subsumed under drinking. Rebbi Jonah understood all this from: Therefore, I told the Children of Israel, none of you shall eat blood. Where do we hold? If about congealed blood, was it not stated that congealed blood is neither food nor drink? (But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating.) And was it not stated: If one liquefied the blood and swallowed it, or froze fat and ate it, if there is the volume of an olive he is liable. What does Rebbi Jonah do with this? It is not food to become impure in the impurity of food, or fluid to become impure in the impurity of fluids. Rebbi Jonah changed and explained the Mishnah: You shall spend the money for anything you desire. Where do we hold? If about one who gives the taste of wine into a cooked dish, is that not spoiling the taste? But we hold with everything and the Merciful called it “eating.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain if about gomraya and orzaraya, since anything that is auxiliary to food is like food.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:6

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate,” etc. Drinking is subsumed under eating but eating is not subsumed under drinking. Rebbi Jonah understood all this from: Therefore, I told the Children of Israel, none of you shall eat blood. Where do we hold? If about congealed blood, was it not stated that congealed blood is neither food nor drink? (But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating.) And was it not stated: If one liquefied the blood and swallowed it, or froze fat and ate it, if there is the volume of an olive he is liable. What does Rebbi Jonah do with this? It is not food to become impure in the impurity of food, or fluid to become impure in the impurity of fluids. Rebbi Jonah changed and explained the Mishnah: You shall spend the money for anything you desire. Where do we hold? If about one who gives the taste of wine into a cooked dish, is that not spoiling the taste? But we hold with everything and the Merciful called it “eating.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain if about gomraya and orzaraya, since anything that is auxiliary to food is like food.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:6

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat; when he ate,” etc. Drinking is subsumed under eating but eating is not subsumed under drinking. Rebbi Jonah understood all this from: Therefore, I told the Children of Israel, none of you shall eat blood. Where do we hold? If about congealed blood, was it not stated that congealed blood is neither food nor drink? (But we hold, about minute amounts. Are minute amounts eating? Explain it following Rebbi Aqiba who said that a minute amount is eating.) And was it not stated: If one liquefied the blood and swallowed it, or froze fat and ate it, if there is the volume of an olive he is liable. What does Rebbi Jonah do with this? It is not food to become impure in the impurity of food, or fluid to become impure in the impurity of fluids. Rebbi Jonah changed and explained the Mishnah: You shall spend the money for anything you desire. Where do we hold? If about one who gives the taste of wine into a cooked dish, is that not spoiling the taste? But we hold with everything and the Merciful called it “eating.” The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain if about gomraya and orzaraya, since anything that is auxiliary to food is like food.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:17

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Why did he not say, “an oath that I shall eat of the slaughter of X”? Is there not fat? If he slaughters deer. Is there not the hip sinew? About fowl. Is there not blood?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:24

HALAKHAH: He wants to teach himself a pretext. “Whether matters of himself,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past. Rebbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional; this excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission. Anything which one will blurt out, excluding a minor. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting at his own will. And it will be forgotten by him, he will be oblivious of the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him; he is liable for forgetting the oath; he is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rebbi Ismael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional. I shall exclude one who swears to the detriment of another that he should not be liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:24

HALAKHAH: He wants to teach himself a pretext. “Whether matters of himself,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past. Rebbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional; this excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission. Anything which one will blurt out, excluding a minor. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting at his own will. And it will be forgotten by him, he will be oblivious of the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him; he is liable for forgetting the oath; he is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rebbi Ismael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional. I shall exclude one who swears to the detriment of another that he should not be liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:24

HALAKHAH: He wants to teach himself a pretext. “Whether matters of himself,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past. Rebbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional; this excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission. Anything which one will blurt out, excluding a minor. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting at his own will. And it will be forgotten by him, he will be oblivious of the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him; he is liable for forgetting the oath; he is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rebbi Ismael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional. I shall exclude one who swears to the detriment of another that he should not be liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:26

MISHNAH: If he swore not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, he is not liable; to observe a commandment and did not observe it, he is not liable, though it would have been logical that he should be liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said, since he is liable for a permitted purpose, for which he is not sworn to from Mount Sinai, is it not logical that he should be liable about a commandment to which he is sworn from Mount Sinai? They said to him, no. What you say about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes”, can you say that about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”? Since one who swears not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:26

MISHNAH: If he swore not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, he is not liable; to observe a commandment and did not observe it, he is not liable, though it would have been logical that he should be liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said, since he is liable for a permitted purpose, for which he is not sworn to from Mount Sinai, is it not logical that he should be liable about a commandment to which he is sworn from Mount Sinai? They said to him, no. What you say about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes”, can you say that about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”? Since one who swears not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:26

MISHNAH: If he swore not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, he is not liable; to observe a commandment and did not observe it, he is not liable, though it would have been logical that he should be liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said, since he is liable for a permitted purpose, for which he is not sworn to from Mount Sinai, is it not logical that he should be liable about a commandment to which he is sworn from Mount Sinai? They said to him, no. What you say about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes”, can you say that about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”? Since one who swears not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:27

HALAKHAH: “If he swore not to observe a commandment,” etc. Rebbi Mani said, so is the Mishnah: “He is liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.” What Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said refers to prohibitions in general. “An oath that I shall eat carcass meat,” but he did not eat it. He is not liable. “An oath that I shall eat,” and he ate. If you would say that he is liable, they should have objected to him: No. You declare about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes” and “yes” equal to “no”, can you declare this about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:27

HALAKHAH: “If he swore not to observe a commandment,” etc. Rebbi Mani said, so is the Mishnah: “He is liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.” What Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said refers to prohibitions in general. “An oath that I shall eat carcass meat,” but he did not eat it. He is not liable. “An oath that I shall eat,” and he ate. If you would say that he is liable, they should have objected to him: No. You declare about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes” and “yes” equal to “no”, can you declare this about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:28

From where a warning about an oath for a permitted purpose? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he shall not profane his word, he shall not make his words profane.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:36

MISHNAH: For an intentional vain oath one is liable to be flogged; if in error one is not liable. What is a vain oath? One swears to change what is known to man, about a stone pillar that it is of gold, a man that he is a woman, or a woman that she is a man. One swears about an impossibility, if I did not see a flying camel, if I did not see a snake like the beam of the olive press. If one said to witnesses come and testify for me, an oath that we shall not testify for you. One swears not to keep commandments: not to make a booth, not to take the lulav, not to put on phylacteries; these are vain oaths for which one is liable to be flogged if intentional, and free from prosecution of unintentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:36

MISHNAH: For an intentional vain oath one is liable to be flogged; if in error one is not liable. What is a vain oath? One swears to change what is known to man, about a stone pillar that it is of gold, a man that he is a woman, or a woman that she is a man. One swears about an impossibility, if I did not see a flying camel, if I did not see a snake like the beam of the olive press. If one said to witnesses come and testify for me, an oath that we shall not testify for you. One swears not to keep commandments: not to make a booth, not to take the lulav, not to put on phylacteries; these are vain oaths for which one is liable to be flogged if intentional, and free from prosecution of unintentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:39

It was stated: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, there is nothing square from the six Days of Creation. Rebbi Berekhiah objected: Did we not state: “The body of baheret is like a square Cilician grit. The place for a grit is nine lentils. The space for a lentil is four hairwidths; in all 36 hairwidths.” Rebbi (Yosna) said, that in itself says that there is no square. Why was it stated “squared”? That he should square it. And כגעה? It is full of knots. But there is the bunch of pila! It is round below. Some wanted to say, Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said this only about creatures, There is square in foods, there is no square in creatures.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:43

It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted, so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. You may even say in both cases if they insist; here it is about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in matters of flogging, he cannot be flogged. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted, so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in matters of flogging, he cannot be flogged.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:43

It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted, so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. You may even say in both cases if they insist; here it is about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in matters of flogging, he cannot be flogged. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted, so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in matters of flogging, he cannot be flogged.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:43

It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted, so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. You may even say in both cases if they insist; here it is about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in matters of flogging, he cannot be flogged. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted, so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in matters of flogging, he cannot be flogged.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:1

MISHNAH: An oath about testimony applies to men but not to women, to unrelated persons but not to relatives, to qualified but not to disqualified ones; it applies only to those admitted to testify, in court and out of court, and by the person’s own words. By the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by the person’s own words or by the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court. They are liable both for intentional [violation of the] oath and for erroneous one, and for intentional [refusal of] testimony, but one is not liable unintentionally. What is one liable for if intentional? A variable value sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:2

HALAKHAH: “An oath about testimony,” etc. Rams, the minimum of rams are two. Why does the verse say two? That they be equal.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:24

MISHNAH: What is an oath about testimony? One said to witnesses, come and testify for me. “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” or they said to him, we do not know any testimony for you, “I am asking you to take an oath upon this;” if they said “Amen”, they are liable. If he asked them five times outside of court to take an oath; when they came to court and admitted it they are not liable. If they deny, they are liable for each single one. If he asked them five times in court to take an oath and the refused, they are liable only once. Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:25

HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about testimony,” etc. A person, a person. Since there it is from his own words, also here from his own words. Since here it is from others’ words, also there it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut which was said here: Since there it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said here. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:25

HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about testimony,” etc. A person, a person. Since there it is from his own words, also here from his own words. Since here it is from others’ words, also there it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut which was said here: Since there it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said here. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:25

HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about testimony,” etc. A person, a person. Since there it is from his own words, also here from his own words. Since here it is from others’ words, also there it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut which was said here: Since there it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said here. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:26

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative liable for an oath about testimony formulated by himself? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by himself for an oath about testimony only from oaths about deposits, and since there relatives are liable, so they also are here? Rebbi Yose said, can relatives here be inferred from relatives there?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:26

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative liable for an oath about testimony formulated by himself? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by himself for an oath about testimony only from oaths about deposits, and since there relatives are liable, so they also are here? Rebbi Yose said, can relatives here be inferred from relatives there?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:26

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative liable for an oath about testimony formulated by himself? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by himself for an oath about testimony only from oaths about deposits, and since there relatives are liable, so they also are here? Rebbi Yose said, can relatives here be inferred from relatives there?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:35

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:35

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:35

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:37

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness, or saw, or knew, etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did you not confess before X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did I not count them for you in a meeting with X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me.” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine, but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman, but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable. “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What means, one follows the majority of orchards? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him; if the orchard was barren, he would have told him. Rebbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:41

MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that Mr. X promised to give me 200 zuz but did not give them to me.” These are not liable since one is liable only for an (oath about) money similar to a deposit. “I am putting an oath on you, that you shall come and testify for me when you know testimony for me.” These are not liable since the oath preceded the testimony. If he stood in the synagogue and said, “I am putting an oath on you, that you shall come and testify for me if you know testimony for me.” These are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:51

“One who curses himself or another person by any of these violates a prohibition.” What about flogging? The colleagues say, he cannot be flogged. Rebbi Yose said to them, why? Because it is a prohibition not involving an action. But is not one who substitutes and one who swears falsely also a prohibition which involves no action?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:1

MISHNAH: An oath about a deposit applies to men and women, unrelated persons and relatives, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. From the mouth of another he is liable only if he denies in court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by his own mouth or the mouth of others, from the moment that he denies, he is liable. He is liable for intent about the oath, or error about it with intent about the deposit, but he is not liable for error about the latter. What is he liable for in case of intentional violation? A reparation offering in the value of two Šeqalim.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:1

MISHNAH: An oath about a deposit applies to men and women, unrelated persons and relatives, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. From the mouth of another he is liable only if he denies in court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by his own mouth or the mouth of others, from the moment that he denies, he is liable. He is liable for intent about the oath, or error about it with intent about the deposit, but he is not liable for error about the latter. What is he liable for in case of intentional violation? A reparation offering in the value of two Šeqalim.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:1

MISHNAH: An oath about a deposit applies to men and women, unrelated persons and relatives, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. From the mouth of another he is liable only if he denies in court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by his own mouth or the mouth of others, from the moment that he denies, he is liable. He is liable for intent about the oath, or error about it with intent about the deposit, but he is not liable for error about the latter. What is he liable for in case of intentional violation? A reparation offering in the value of two Šeqalim.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:1

MISHNAH: An oath about a deposit applies to men and women, unrelated persons and relatives, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. From the mouth of another he is liable only if he denies in court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by his own mouth or the mouth of others, from the moment that he denies, he is liable. He is liable for intent about the oath, or error about it with intent about the deposit, but he is not liable for error about the latter. What is he liable for in case of intentional violation? A reparation offering in the value of two Šeqalim.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:1

MISHNAH: An oath about a deposit applies to men and women, unrelated persons and relatives, qualified and disqualified persons, before a court or out of court, from his own mouth. From the mouth of another he is liable only if he denies in court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by his own mouth or the mouth of others, from the moment that he denies, he is liable. He is liable for intent about the oath, or error about it with intent about the deposit, but he is not liable for error about the latter. What is he liable for in case of intentional violation? A reparation offering in the value of two Šeqalim.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:2

HALAKHAH: “An oath about a deposit,” etc. It was stated: Is an oath in his own formulation of an oath of testimony like an imprecation; in his own words is an oath about a deposit like an imprecation? Rebbi Yose said, since it is written “a person, a person”, everything is here and everything is there. Rebbi Mana said, an imprecation made in court is the topic of disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and the Sages. He lied to his fellow man, if his confession was eliminated by the oath. It excludes one who lied to one of partners; it excludes one who lied where there are witnesses and a document. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if two people took a loan from one person, even if they did not write “we are responsible and warrantors for one another”, they are responsible and warrantors for one another; but one does not act on this. If two made a joint deposit and one came to retrieve his property, one does not listen to him. Should he not be treated as denying his part and be liable? If one made a deposit with two people. If one denied it, he is liable. If the other denied it, he is liable. If the deposit was worth one peruṭa, does this not result in each of them bringing a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? What here? If one would swear, and swear, and swear, would he not bring a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? There, each oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth. Here no oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:2

HALAKHAH: “An oath about a deposit,” etc. It was stated: Is an oath in his own formulation of an oath of testimony like an imprecation; in his own words is an oath about a deposit like an imprecation? Rebbi Yose said, since it is written “a person, a person”, everything is here and everything is there. Rebbi Mana said, an imprecation made in court is the topic of disagreement between Rebbi Meїr and the Sages. He lied to his fellow man, if his confession was eliminated by the oath. It excludes one who lied to one of partners; it excludes one who lied where there are witnesses and a document. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if two people took a loan from one person, even if they did not write “we are responsible and warrantors for one another”, they are responsible and warrantors for one another; but one does not act on this. If two made a joint deposit and one came to retrieve his property, one does not listen to him. Should he not be treated as denying his part and be liable? If one made a deposit with two people. If one denied it, he is liable. If the other denied it, he is liable. If the deposit was worth one peruṭa, does this not result in each of them bringing a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? What here? If one would swear, and swear, and swear, would he not bring a sacrifice for half a peruṭa? There, each oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth. Here no oath refers to a peruṭa’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:4

He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:4

He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:4

He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:4

He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:4

He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:4

He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:4

He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:4

He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:4

He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:4

He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:4

He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:4

He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:4

He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:4

He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:4

He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:4

He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:4

He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:4

He denied it, not him. “Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:5

MISHNAH: What is an oath about a deposit? He said to him, “give me the deposit which you hold for me.” “An oath that I am holding nothing of yours;” or that he said to him, “I am holding nothing of yours;” “I am putting an oath upon you” and he said “Amen”; this one is liable. If he made him swear five times whether in court or out of court and he denied, he is liable for each single one. Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because he may return and admit.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:6

HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about a deposit,” etc. A person, a person. Since here it is from his own words, also there from his own words. Since there it is from others’ words, also here it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut at the place it comes from: Since here it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said about it. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:6

HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about a deposit,” etc. A person, a person. Since here it is from his own words, also there from his own words. Since there it is from others’ words, also here it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut at the place it comes from: Since here it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said about it. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:6

HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about a deposit,” etc. A person, a person. Since here it is from his own words, also there from his own words. Since there it is from others’ words, also here it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut at the place it comes from: Since here it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said about it. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:6

HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about a deposit,” etc. A person, a person. Since here it is from his own words, also there from his own words. Since there it is from others’ words, also here it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut at the place it comes from: Since here it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said about it. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:7

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative not liable for an oath about deposits formulated by others? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by others for an oath about deposits only from oaths about testimony, and since there relatives are not liable, so they neither are here? Rebbi Yose said, relatives here can be inferred from non-relatives there.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:7

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative not liable for an oath about deposits formulated by others? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by others for an oath about deposits only from oaths about testimony, and since there relatives are not liable, so they neither are here? Rebbi Yose said, relatives here can be inferred from non-relatives there.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:7

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative not liable for an oath about deposits formulated by others? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by others for an oath about deposits only from oaths about testimony, and since there relatives are not liable, so they neither are here? Rebbi Yose said, relatives here can be inferred from non-relatives there.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:9

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he made him swear five times, since Rebbi Meїr considered “by his own words” as in court, would this determine the sacrifice on the first occasion, even without request? It should come like the following: “Why do you go after us? An oath that we do not know any testimony relevant for you. He pays the value plus a fifth and brings a reparation sacrifice for two tetradrachmas, in distinction from an oath about testimony.”

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:12

HALAKHAH: “If five people were claiming from him,” etc. I could think that also for an oath about a deposit He did not make one assenting to an oath like making an oath? Rebbi Eleazar said, this is not so. But also for an oath about a deposit we are treating one assenting to an oath like one formulating an oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:12

HALAKHAH: “If five people were claiming from him,” etc. I could think that also for an oath about a deposit He did not make one assenting to an oath like making an oath? Rebbi Eleazar said, this is not so. But also for an oath about a deposit we are treating one assenting to an oath like one formulating an oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:14

Rebbi Yudan from Cappadocia asked: What about “an oath that neither wheat, nor barley, nor spelt I am holding for you”? Is it as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. “I am not holding for you wheat, or barley, or spelt, an oath,” is this as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. Is it so if this were a blurted oath? “An oath that I shall not eat; I shall not eat, an oath”? In the rabbis’ opinion he brings a sacrifice for each one. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion does he bring one for the entirety? Even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that he is only emphasizing the prohibitions. It only would be problematic if it were about the past. “An oath that I did not eat; I did not eat, an oath.” In the rabbis’ opinion he brings two sacrifices (for each one). In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one (for each).

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:14

Rebbi Yudan from Cappadocia asked: What about “an oath that neither wheat, nor barley, nor spelt I am holding for you”? Is it as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. “I am not holding for you wheat, or barley, or spelt, an oath,” is this as if he had mentioned “oath” at beginning and end? Since the oath would be confirmed by any one of them, he is liable only once. Is it so if this were a blurted oath? “An oath that I shall not eat; I shall not eat, an oath”? In the rabbis’ opinion he brings a sacrifice for each one. In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion does he bring one for the entirety? Even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that he is only emphasizing the prohibitions. It only would be problematic if it were about the past. “An oath that I did not eat; I did not eat, an oath.” In the rabbis’ opinion he brings two sacrifices (for each one). In Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion he brings one (for each).

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 5:24

HALAKHAH: “You raped or seduced my daughter,” etc. Rebbi Ze`ira, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The words of Rebbi Simeon [imply that] the main claim is for the fine, which is not so for the words of the Sages. Rebbi Illa said, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he claims the fine, shame and diminution; the words of the Sages if he claims shame, diminution, and fine. The rabbis say, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he advances three claims; the words of the Sages if he advances one claim. Rebbi Ze`ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, did you hear explicitly from Rebbi Joḥanan, or from his word? Rebbi Yasa said, for he is of the rabbis’ opinion. Rebbi Mana said, even if he is of Rebbi Illa’s opinion, the words of Rebbi Simeon if he advances one claim; the words of the Sages if he advances three claims. “Not only matters for which he has to pay the capital, from where double payment, quadruple and quintuple payment, the rapist, and the seducer, and the calumniator? The verse says, everything about which one would swear falsely.” Is the calumniator’s not a fine? Rebbi Jeremiah says, this is Rebbi Simeon’s who said, all depends on the collection.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:1

MISHNAH: A judicial oath is about a claim of two silver coins and the acknowledgment of one peruṭah. If the acknowledgment is not of the kind of the claim he is not liable. How is this? “You are holding two silver coins for me;” “I am holding only one peruṭah.” He is not liable. “You are holding two silver coins and a peruṭah for me;” “I am holding only one peruṭah.” He is liable. “You are holding a mina for me,” “I am not holding anything for you,” he is not liable. “You are holding a mina for me,” “I am holding only 50 denar for you,” he is liable. “You are holding a mina for my father,” “I am holding only 50 denar for you,” he is not liable since he is like one returning a lost object.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:3

The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. If a person give to his neighbor, etc. If to teach that the court will not act on less than a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written, to incur liability for it? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. From here, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two oboloi. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Or vessels; since vessels are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret or vessels? Following what Rebbi Nathan stated, or vessels, including clay vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is liable. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two peruṭot, that the claim should be about a peruṭah’s worth and the confession about a peruṭah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since vessels are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two oboloi, also “vessels” means two oboloi’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:3

The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. If a person give to his neighbor, etc. If to teach that the court will not act on less than a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written, to incur liability for it? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. From here, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two oboloi. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot. The smallest silver coin is an obolos. So why is it not an obolos? Or vessels; since vessels are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret or vessels? Following what Rebbi Nathan stated, or vessels, including clay vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is liable. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two peruṭot, that the claim should be about a peruṭah’s worth and the confession about a peruṭah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since vessels are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two oboloi, also “vessels” means two oboloi’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:4

Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: In any case where two [witnesses] make him liable to pay money, a single witness sets him up for an oath. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for real estate? It is a difference since one does not swear about real estate. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for a fine? There is a difference since one does not swear about a fine. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for a peruṭah? Is it so? Have we not stated: “A judicial oath is about a claim of two silver coins and the acknowledgment of one peruṭah.” Our Mishnah, when he swears by his own formulation. What (Rebbi) Samuel said, when he swears by the formulation of others. Rav Ḥisda and his group disagree. “A judicial oath”, any judicial oath. There is no difference whether he swears by his own formulation or he swears by the formulation of others, he cannot be liable except for a claim.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:4

Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: In any case where two [witnesses] make him liable to pay money, a single witness sets him up for an oath. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for real estate? It is a difference since one does not swear about real estate. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for a fine? There is a difference since one does not swear about a fine. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for a peruṭah? Is it so? Have we not stated: “A judicial oath is about a claim of two silver coins and the acknowledgment of one peruṭah.” Our Mishnah, when he swears by his own formulation. What (Rebbi) Samuel said, when he swears by the formulation of others. Rav Ḥisda and his group disagree. “A judicial oath”, any judicial oath. There is no difference whether he swears by his own formulation or he swears by the formulation of others, he cannot be liable except for a claim.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:4

Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: In any case where two [witnesses] make him liable to pay money, a single witness sets him up for an oath. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for real estate? It is a difference since one does not swear about real estate. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for a fine? There is a difference since one does not swear about a fine. But do not two [witnesses] make him liable for a peruṭah? Is it so? Have we not stated: “A judicial oath is about a claim of two silver coins and the acknowledgment of one peruṭah.” Our Mishnah, when he swears by his own formulation. What (Rebbi) Samuel said, when he swears by the formulation of others. Rav Ḥisda and his group disagree. “A judicial oath”, any judicial oath. There is no difference whether he swears by his own formulation or he swears by the formulation of others, he cannot be liable except for a claim.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:16

MISHNAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” “I am holding for you only a letek of legumes;” he is not liable. “You are holding for me a kor of produce;” “I am holding for you only a letek of legumes;” he is liable since legumes are subsumed under produce. If one sued for wheat and the other acknowledged barley, he is not liable, but Rebbi Simeon declares him liable. Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and the other admitted to pitchers, Admon says since he admitted of the kind of the claim he has to swear. But the Sages say, the admission is not of the kind of the claim. Rabban Gamliel said, I see the words of Admon. If somebody sued for both vessels and real estate; if [the other] admitted the vessels but denied the real estate, or the real estate and denied the vessels, he is not liable. If he admitted part of the real estate he is not liable. Part of the vessels he is liable since non-guaranteed property obligates guaranteed property to be sworn about.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:17

HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:17

HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:17

HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:17

HALAKHAH: “You are holding for me a kor of grain;” etc. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Our Mishnah if he sued him for wheat and he admitted barley; but if he sued him for two kinds and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that he is not liable. Rebbi Abbahu said about that of Rebbi Immi: Why did we state, “Rabban Gamliel declares him liable”? It comes to inform you of the power of Rabban Gamliel, how far he declares liable. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Not only if he claimed wheat and he admitted barley to him, but if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, the words of the Sages are that he is not liable. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it is only if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, but if he sued for wheat and he admitted barley according to everybody he is liable. Following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: A person went to court before Rav: When he claimed from another wheat, barley, and spelt. Rav told him, wait until he charged you with anything he has to charge, and in the end you will swear one oath about everything. Rebbi Abbahu said, so argued Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish against Rebbi Joḥanan: In your opinion, since you say that if he claimed two kinds and he admitted one of them, according to the Sages he is not liable, did we not state “if he claimed vessels and real estate; if he admitted the vessels and denied the real estate, the real estate and denied the vessels”? For vessels about vessels he is liable, not so much more for vessels and real estate? He answered him, to transfer an oath to him by the following Mishnah, “since guaranteed property obligates non-guaranteed property to be sworn about.” This does not even disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But did we not state: “Somebody who sued for amphoras of oil and he admitted to vessels”? How do we hold? If he sued him for vessels and oil, and he admitted one of them, everybody agrees that this refers to the claim. But if he sued him for vessels and he did (not) admit oil, everybody agrees that what he admitted did not refer to the claim. Rebbi Ze`ira and Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Samuel: If he sued for vessels full of oil, one said vessels but not oil, the other said oil but not vessels. (Thrown) vessels but not oil. Oil but not vessels? Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin formulates it as oil buckets. Can one not ask him? If he was paralyzed.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:20

HALAKHAH: “One does not swear on the claim of a deaf-and-dumb person, an insane person, or a minor,” etc. It is written: If a man give to his neighbor, to exclude the minor. So far if a minor gave to him and the minor requested from him. If he gave it as a minor and requested it as an adult? The verse says, his neighbor; only if giving and requesting are equal. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, is that not obvious by what Rebbi Joḥanan said, one who claims a claim of theft in respect of his neighbor’s lost object is liable? “Where is my lost object?” He told him, it was stolen. Rebbi Abba said, explain it if he told him, you already asked me when you were underage and I was freed from swearing for you. An oath of the Eternal shall be between both of them, to exclude the heir. Rebbi Illa in the name of Rebbi Yasa: The baraita is about the heir.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:21

Between both of them it will never move from between them. If the one forcing the oath forces the oath lying, at the end it will come over him. If the one swearing swears lying, at the end it will come over him. What is the reason? I shall take it out, oracle of the Eternal Sabaot, and it will come into the house of the thief and the house of him who swears falsely in My Name, etc. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, destructive angels have no joints. What is the reason? From roving about the Earth and walking there. But here, it will destroy its wood and its stones. Come and see, things which the fire will not burn, a vain oath will destroy. Rebbi Jonah said, about falsehood. Rebbi Yose said, even on truth. Ḥaggai was preaching following Rebbi Yose. There was a case about a woman who went to knead dough with another and had two denarii bound into the seam of her head cover. These fell out and were rolled into a loaf. She went back to he house, wanted them and did not find them. She returned to her and said to her, give me the two denarii which fell from me in your house. She told her, I do not know. If she would know of it, she should bury her son. She buried him. When they returned from his grave, she heard a voice saying, if she had not known about them she would not have buried him. She said, if this woman knows about them, she should bury her other son. She buried him. They came to console her and cut one loaf and found two denarii rolled into the loaf. This says, whether innocent or guilty, never swear an oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:21

Between both of them it will never move from between them. If the one forcing the oath forces the oath lying, at the end it will come over him. If the one swearing swears lying, at the end it will come over him. What is the reason? I shall take it out, oracle of the Eternal Sabaot, and it will come into the house of the thief and the house of him who swears falsely in My Name, etc. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, destructive angels have no joints. What is the reason? From roving about the Earth and walking there. But here, it will destroy its wood and its stones. Come and see, things which the fire will not burn, a vain oath will destroy. Rebbi Jonah said, about falsehood. Rebbi Yose said, even on truth. Ḥaggai was preaching following Rebbi Yose. There was a case about a woman who went to knead dough with another and had two denarii bound into the seam of her head cover. These fell out and were rolled into a loaf. She went back to he house, wanted them and did not find them. She returned to her and said to her, give me the two denarii which fell from me in your house. She told her, I do not know. If she would know of it, she should bury her son. She buried him. When they returned from his grave, she heard a voice saying, if she had not known about them she would not have buried him. She said, if this woman knows about them, she should bury her other son. She buried him. They came to console her and cut one loaf and found two denarii rolled into the loaf. This says, whether innocent or guilty, never swear an oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:21

Between both of them it will never move from between them. If the one forcing the oath forces the oath lying, at the end it will come over him. If the one swearing swears lying, at the end it will come over him. What is the reason? I shall take it out, oracle of the Eternal Sabaot, and it will come into the house of the thief and the house of him who swears falsely in My Name, etc. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, destructive angels have no joints. What is the reason? From roving about the Earth and walking there. But here, it will destroy its wood and its stones. Come and see, things which the fire will not burn, a vain oath will destroy. Rebbi Jonah said, about falsehood. Rebbi Yose said, even on truth. Ḥaggai was preaching following Rebbi Yose. There was a case about a woman who went to knead dough with another and had two denarii bound into the seam of her head cover. These fell out and were rolled into a loaf. She went back to he house, wanted them and did not find them. She returned to her and said to her, give me the two denarii which fell from me in your house. She told her, I do not know. If she would know of it, she should bury her son. She buried him. When they returned from his grave, she heard a voice saying, if she had not known about them she would not have buried him. She said, if this woman knows about them, she should bury her other son. She buried him. They came to console her and cut one loaf and found two denarii rolled into the loaf. This says, whether innocent or guilty, never swear an oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:21

Between both of them it will never move from between them. If the one forcing the oath forces the oath lying, at the end it will come over him. If the one swearing swears lying, at the end it will come over him. What is the reason? I shall take it out, oracle of the Eternal Sabaot, and it will come into the house of the thief and the house of him who swears falsely in My Name, etc. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, destructive angels have no joints. What is the reason? From roving about the Earth and walking there. But here, it will destroy its wood and its stones. Come and see, things which the fire will not burn, a vain oath will destroy. Rebbi Jonah said, about falsehood. Rebbi Yose said, even on truth. Ḥaggai was preaching following Rebbi Yose. There was a case about a woman who went to knead dough with another and had two denarii bound into the seam of her head cover. These fell out and were rolled into a loaf. She went back to he house, wanted them and did not find them. She returned to her and said to her, give me the two denarii which fell from me in your house. She told her, I do not know. If she would know of it, she should bury her son. She buried him. When they returned from his grave, she heard a voice saying, if she had not known about them she would not have buried him. She said, if this woman knows about them, she should bury her other son. She buried him. They came to console her and cut one loaf and found two denarii rolled into the loaf. This says, whether innocent or guilty, never swear an oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:21

Between both of them it will never move from between them. If the one forcing the oath forces the oath lying, at the end it will come over him. If the one swearing swears lying, at the end it will come over him. What is the reason? I shall take it out, oracle of the Eternal Sabaot, and it will come into the house of the thief and the house of him who swears falsely in My Name, etc. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, destructive angels have no joints. What is the reason? From roving about the Earth and walking there. But here, it will destroy its wood and its stones. Come and see, things which the fire will not burn, a vain oath will destroy. Rebbi Jonah said, about falsehood. Rebbi Yose said, even on truth. Ḥaggai was preaching following Rebbi Yose. There was a case about a woman who went to knead dough with another and had two denarii bound into the seam of her head cover. These fell out and were rolled into a loaf. She went back to he house, wanted them and did not find them. She returned to her and said to her, give me the two denarii which fell from me in your house. She told her, I do not know. If she would know of it, she should bury her son. She buried him. When they returned from his grave, she heard a voice saying, if she had not known about them she would not have buried him. She said, if this woman knows about them, she should bury her other son. She buried him. They came to console her and cut one loaf and found two denarii rolled into the loaf. This says, whether innocent or guilty, never swear an oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:22

MISHNAH: About the following one does not swear: slaves, and documents, and real estate, and gifts to the Temple. Not about double restitution, nor quadruple or quintuple; the unpaid trustee does not swear, the paid trustee does not pay. Rebbi Simeon says, one swears about things for which he is responsible if they be alienated, but does not swear if he is not responsible if they be alienated. Rebbi Meїr says, there are things which are like real estate and they are not like real estate but the Sages do not agree with him. How is this? “Ten bearing vines did I hand over to you,” but the other says, “they are only five.” Rebbi Meїr declares liable for an oath but the Sages say, anything connected to the ground is like ground.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:22

MISHNAH: About the following one does not swear: slaves, and documents, and real estate, and gifts to the Temple. Not about double restitution, nor quadruple or quintuple; the unpaid trustee does not swear, the paid trustee does not pay. Rebbi Simeon says, one swears about things for which he is responsible if they be alienated, but does not swear if he is not responsible if they be alienated. Rebbi Meїr says, there are things which are like real estate and they are not like real estate but the Sages do not agree with him. How is this? “Ten bearing vines did I hand over to you,” but the other says, “they are only five.” Rebbi Meїr declares liable for an oath but the Sages say, anything connected to the ground is like ground.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:22

MISHNAH: About the following one does not swear: slaves, and documents, and real estate, and gifts to the Temple. Not about double restitution, nor quadruple or quintuple; the unpaid trustee does not swear, the paid trustee does not pay. Rebbi Simeon says, one swears about things for which he is responsible if they be alienated, but does not swear if he is not responsible if they be alienated. Rebbi Meїr says, there are things which are like real estate and they are not like real estate but the Sages do not agree with him. How is this? “Ten bearing vines did I hand over to you,” but the other says, “they are only five.” Rebbi Meїr declares liable for an oath but the Sages say, anything connected to the ground is like ground.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:23

HALAKHAH: “About the following one does not swear,” etc. If he transgressed and swore, Rebbi Joḥanan said he brings a sacrifice for the oath; Rebbi Eleazar says, he does not bring. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, so does Rebbi Johanan answer Rebbi Eleazar. No. If you pronounced about an oath about testimony which may apply to slaves, documents, and real estate, what can you say about oaths concerning deposits which do not apply to slaves, documents, and real estate? But an oath for testimony is not in court. Would the court admit an oath of a suspect person? Only when he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath; here also if he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:23

HALAKHAH: “About the following one does not swear,” etc. If he transgressed and swore, Rebbi Joḥanan said he brings a sacrifice for the oath; Rebbi Eleazar says, he does not bring. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, so does Rebbi Johanan answer Rebbi Eleazar. No. If you pronounced about an oath about testimony which may apply to slaves, documents, and real estate, what can you say about oaths concerning deposits which do not apply to slaves, documents, and real estate? But an oath for testimony is not in court. Would the court admit an oath of a suspect person? Only when he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath; here also if he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:23

HALAKHAH: “About the following one does not swear,” etc. If he transgressed and swore, Rebbi Joḥanan said he brings a sacrifice for the oath; Rebbi Eleazar says, he does not bring. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, so does Rebbi Johanan answer Rebbi Eleazar. No. If you pronounced about an oath about testimony which may apply to slaves, documents, and real estate, what can you say about oaths concerning deposits which do not apply to slaves, documents, and real estate? But an oath for testimony is not in court. Would the court admit an oath of a suspect person? Only when he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath; here also if he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 6:23

HALAKHAH: “About the following one does not swear,” etc. If he transgressed and swore, Rebbi Joḥanan said he brings a sacrifice for the oath; Rebbi Eleazar says, he does not bring. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, so does Rebbi Johanan answer Rebbi Eleazar. No. If you pronounced about an oath about testimony which may apply to slaves, documents, and real estate, what can you say about oaths concerning deposits which do not apply to slaves, documents, and real estate? But an oath for testimony is not in court. Would the court admit an oath of a suspect person? Only when he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath; here also if he transgressed and swore, you say that he brings a sacrifice for his oath.