after
9564 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.
Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.
HALAKHAH: “If he wrote to her: “I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about properties over which she exercised control during her husband’s lifetime but even about properties over which she exercised control after her husband’s death are the heirs prevented from making her swear.
HALAKHAH: ““I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah said, only if she was made a steward during her husband’s lifetime. But if she was appointed as a steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can(not) make her swear. That is the Mishnah: if she was not appointed a steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If she was appointed a steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past. What is “about the past”? From the time of death to the time of burial. And Rebbi Yose said, even if he appointed her as steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can make her swear. But did we not state: “If he did not appoint her as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If he appointed her as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future but cannot make her swear for the past.” He explains it about the first case. But if it is about the first case, Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about property over which she had control during her husband’s lifetime but even about property over which she acquired control after her husband’s death the heirs cannot make her swear. Explain it, from the time of death to the time of burial. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The heirs cannot make her swear from the time of death to the time of burial. Bar Qappara stated: That she should not abandon him and leave for her family.
HALAKHAH: ““I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah said, only if she was made a steward during her husband’s lifetime. But if she was appointed as a steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can(not) make her swear. That is the Mishnah: if she was not appointed a steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If she was appointed a steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past. What is “about the past”? From the time of death to the time of burial. And Rebbi Yose said, even if he appointed her as steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can make her swear. But did we not state: “If he did not appoint her as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If he appointed her as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future but cannot make her swear for the past.” He explains it about the first case. But if it is about the first case, Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about property over which she had control during her husband’s lifetime but even about property over which she acquired control after her husband’s death the heirs cannot make her swear. Explain it, from the time of death to the time of burial. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The heirs cannot make her swear from the time of death to the time of burial. Bar Qappara stated: That she should not abandon him and leave for her family.
HALAKHAH: ““I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah said, only if she was made a steward during her husband’s lifetime. But if she was appointed as a steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can(not) make her swear. That is the Mishnah: if she was not appointed a steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If she was appointed a steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past. What is “about the past”? From the time of death to the time of burial. And Rebbi Yose said, even if he appointed her as steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can make her swear. But did we not state: “If he did not appoint her as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If he appointed her as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future but cannot make her swear for the past.” He explains it about the first case. But if it is about the first case, Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about property over which she had control during her husband’s lifetime but even about property over which she acquired control after her husband’s death the heirs cannot make her swear. Explain it, from the time of death to the time of burial. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The heirs cannot make her swear from the time of death to the time of burial. Bar Qappara stated: That she should not abandon him and leave for her family.
Alexis said before Rebbi Mana: We act much better than you do. We send edicts. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He answered him, we also act in this way, we have the herald announce for thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He said to him, think of it, if he was in distant corners. He said to him, we send three letters, one after thirty days, one after the next thirty days, and one after the next thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. Rebbi Ḥanina said, that is, if he was present at the trial and then fled. But if he was not present at the trial, we cannot irrevocably give away, but only announce.
Alexis said before Rebbi Mana: We act much better than you do. We send edicts. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He answered him, we also act in this way, we have the herald announce for thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He said to him, think of it, if he was in distant corners. He said to him, we send three letters, one after thirty days, one after the next thirty days, and one after the next thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. Rebbi Ḥanina said, that is, if he was present at the trial and then fled. But if he was not present at the trial, we cannot irrevocably give away, but only announce.
Alexis said before Rebbi Mana: We act much better than you do. We send edicts. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He answered him, we also act in this way, we have the herald announce for thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. He said to him, think of it, if he was in distant corners. He said to him, we send three letters, one after thirty days, one after the next thirty days, and one after the next thirty days. If he comes, it is good. If he does not come, we irrevocably give away his properties. Rebbi Ḥanina said, that is, if he was present at the trial and then fled. But if he was not present at the trial, we cannot irrevocably give away, but only announce.
HALAKHAH: “From encumbered property, how is that?” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody disputes a court document, he is not trustworthy. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said to him: Is that not the Mishnah? “If she produced her bill of divorce without a ketubah, she collects her ketubah”! Rebbi Joḥanan said to him: Babylonian, after I removed the clay from the pearl, you say to me: Is that not the Mishnah? Rav said, at a place where one does not write a ketubah. But at a place where one writes a ketubah, what she produces she collects. He changed his mind and said, she collects even at a place where one writes a ketubah; let anyone powerful object to this! Rebbi Yose objected: Was it not stated: She might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, and collect a second time? If those died. Are there not witnesses? Bring them! They went overseas. Is there not an agreement? Is there no registrar of agreements? There is a registrar of agreements; as you say, if a document is lost, one writes a replacement. This is what one says, if the ketubah was lost, one writes a new one. Rebbi Abba objected: Was it not stated, she might collect on her divorce document, hide her ketubah, wait until he dies, and collect a second time? Rebbi Yose bar Abun said to him: Would she not have to prove that she lived with him until he died?
One understands a proselyte. A minor? Can a minor divorce? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I explained it following what Rebbi Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: Only if he slept with her when he regained sight or became sane mentally. And here, if he slept with her after he reached adulthood.
How is that? If he preliminarily married Rachel, definitively married Leah, and only then definitively married Rachel. In the opinion of the rabbis, Rachel has precedence; in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah she does not have precedence. They say, even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that since in the end he definitively married Rachel, Rachel has precedence. To what can this be compared? To one who took out a loan from another person and said to him, if I have not paid it back by twelve months, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you. If the twelfth month arrived and he has not paid back, his properties become mortgaged from that moment on. But if he said, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you only after twelve months, they become mortgaged only after twelve months. The status of the days in between is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the rabbis. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the properties became pledged by the document. In the rabbis’ opinion, the properties became pledged by the money.
How is that? If he preliminarily married Rachel, definitively married Leah, and only then definitively married Rachel. In the opinion of the rabbis, Rachel has precedence; in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah she does not have precedence. They say, even Rebbi Eleazar will agree that since in the end he definitively married Rachel, Rachel has precedence. To what can this be compared? To one who took out a loan from another person and said to him, if I have not paid it back by twelve months, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you. If the twelfth month arrived and he has not paid back, his properties become mortgaged from that moment on. But if he said, all my properties shall be mortgaged to you only after twelve months, they become mortgaged only after twelve months. The status of the days in between is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the rabbis. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the properties became pledged by the document. In the rabbis’ opinion, the properties became pledged by the money.
“Similarly, if three who invested together lost or gained they would split in this manner.” Rebbi Eleazar said: You say that in case the tetradrachma lost or added value. But for earnings or losses they split evenly. That is difficult! One gave 100 denars and the other gave ten, and you say so? The colleagues say, he may say to him, by my contribution the merchandise rose. So far, if they ran after little merchandise. If there was much merchandise? Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, he may say to him, by the time you sold one piece, I am selling ten. That is, at a nearby place. If it was far away? Rebbi Hila said, he may say to him, by the time you go and return once, I am going and returning ten times. There, we have stated: “If [the ox] gored an ox worth 200, the last one takes 100, the one before him 50, and the two first ones a gold denar.” Rebbi Samuel in the name of Rebbi [Ze‘ira]: The same holds for earnings. Rebbi Yose said, the statement of Rebbi Ze‘ira disagrees with Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yudan: Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree if they contracted between themselves that each can take according to his contribution? Oxen are as if contracted. He turned around and said, they disagree explicitly: Rebbi Eleazar said, if nothing was said, they split evenly; Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if nothing was said, each takes according to his contribution.
MISHNAH: If somebody was married to four women when he died, the first one precedes the second, the second the third, and the third the fourth. The first one swears to the second, the second to the third, and the third to the fourth; the fourth is paid out without an oath. Ben Nanas said, should she be preferred because she is the last one? She also should be paid only after an oath. If all [ketubot] were executed on the same day, one who precedes another one even if only by an hour has acquired [precedence]; therefore in Jerusalem one used to note hours. If [the documents] were all executed at the same hour and there is only one mina, they split evenly.
MISHNAH: A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage, may sell without court supervision. Rebbi Simeon says, after definitive marriage she may sell without court supervision; after preliminary marriage, she may sell only under court supervision since she has no sustenance and any person who has no claim to sustenance may sell only under court supervision.
MISHNAH: A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage, may sell without court supervision. Rebbi Simeon says, after definitive marriage she may sell without court supervision; after preliminary marriage, she may sell only under court supervision since she has no sustenance and any person who has no claim to sustenance may sell only under court supervision.
MISHNAH: A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage, may sell without court supervision. Rebbi Simeon says, after definitive marriage she may sell without court supervision; after preliminary marriage, she may sell only under court supervision since she has no sustenance and any person who has no claim to sustenance may sell only under court supervision.
HALAKHAH: “A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage,” etc. Rebbi Simeon is of the opinion that everything depends on sustenance. If he had agreed to sustain her after preliminary marriage, she may sell without court supervision If he had agreed to sustain her after definitive marriage, she may sell only under court supervision. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person is concerned for his widow’s dignity whether after preliminary or after definitive marriage.
HALAKHAH: “A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage,” etc. Rebbi Simeon is of the opinion that everything depends on sustenance. If he had agreed to sustain her after preliminary marriage, she may sell without court supervision If he had agreed to sustain her after definitive marriage, she may sell only under court supervision. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person is concerned for his widow’s dignity whether after preliminary or after definitive marriage.
HALAKHAH: “A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage,” etc. Rebbi Simeon is of the opinion that everything depends on sustenance. If he had agreed to sustain her after preliminary marriage, she may sell without court supervision If he had agreed to sustain her after definitive marriage, she may sell only under court supervision. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person is concerned for his widow’s dignity whether after preliminary or after definitive marriage.
HALAKHAH: “A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage,” etc. Rebbi Simeon is of the opinion that everything depends on sustenance. If he had agreed to sustain her after preliminary marriage, she may sell without court supervision If he had agreed to sustain her after definitive marriage, she may sell only under court supervision. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person is concerned for his widow’s dignity whether after preliminary or after definitive marriage.
HALAKHAH: “A widow, whether after preliminary or definitive marriage,” etc. Rebbi Simeon is of the opinion that everything depends on sustenance. If he had agreed to sustain her after preliminary marriage, she may sell without court supervision If he had agreed to sustain her after definitive marriage, she may sell only under court supervision. The words of the Sages? Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A person is concerned for his widow’s dignity whether after preliminary or after definitive marriage.
Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If she requested her ketubah in court, she lost her claim to sustenance. Rebbi Yose said, but only from a clear mind; not if forced. As in the case of the widow of Rebbi Eudaimon from Mozva to whom they said, Rebbi Abba bar Cohen wants you. She requested her ketubah and lost her sustenance. After the matter became known, it was brought before Rebbi Yose and she returned to her sustenance.
There, we have stated: “A forced bill of divorce is valid in Israel; it is invalid from Gentiles.” Samuel said, it is invalid and disqualifies for the priesthood. Samuel said, one does not force, only disqualify. Samuel said, one does not force except for example a widow married to a High Priest, a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah for a simple priest. But did we not state: “Secondarily forbidden”? Did he not say “for example”? But did we not state: “A person who by a vow forbids his wife to have any usufruct from him, up to 30 days he shall appoint a caretaker; after 30 days he shall divorce her and pay ketubah”! We heard that he shall divorce; did we hear that one forces him?
What is the difference between these and those? Since these are words of the Torah and the words of the Torah [do not] need support, therefore they have ketubah. Those, because they are words of the Sopherim and the words of the Sopherim need support, therefore they do not have ketubah. Some want to say since these are punished together with the child, they did not fine them, therefore they have ketubah. Those, since they are not punished together with the child, they fined them, therefore they do not have ketubah. What is the difference between them? He who remarried his divorced wife after she had remarried. For him who says since these are words of the Torah, and this case is a word of the Torah, therefore she has ketubah. For him who says since these are punished together with the child, this one, since neither she nor the child is punished, therefore, she has no ketubah.
When Rav Huna, the Head of the Diaspora, died they brought him here. They said, where shall we put him? They said, let us put him next to Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder for he is one of them. They said, who might want to bring him there? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I shall go up to put him there. They said to him, you are looking for a pretext, for you are an old man and you want to go to rest there yourself. He said to them, put some string on my feet and when I shall be weak you pull. He went in and found the three arguing. “Jehudah my son, after you, and no more. Ḥizqiah my son, after you, and no more. Joseph ben Israel, after you, and no more.” He [R. Ḥaggai] lifted his eyes to look, it was said to him lower [your eyes], turn around. Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder [who said to] his son Jehudah, make space for Rav Ḥuna that he may rest there. But [Rav Ḥuna] did not accept this. They said, since he did not accept that one made space for him, so his descendants will never end. He [R. Ḥaggai] exited from there eighty years old and his years were doubled.
When Rav Huna, the Head of the Diaspora, died they brought him here. They said, where shall we put him? They said, let us put him next to Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder for he is one of them. They said, who might want to bring him there? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I shall go up to put him there. They said to him, you are looking for a pretext, for you are an old man and you want to go to rest there yourself. He said to them, put some string on my feet and when I shall be weak you pull. He went in and found the three arguing. “Jehudah my son, after you, and no more. Ḥizqiah my son, after you, and no more. Joseph ben Israel, after you, and no more.” He [R. Ḥaggai] lifted his eyes to look, it was said to him lower [your eyes], turn around. Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder [who said to] his son Jehudah, make space for Rav Ḥuna that he may rest there. But [Rav Ḥuna] did not accept this. They said, since he did not accept that one made space for him, so his descendants will never end. He [R. Ḥaggai] exited from there eighty years old and his years were doubled.
When Rav Huna, the Head of the Diaspora, died they brought him here. They said, where shall we put him? They said, let us put him next to Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder for he is one of them. They said, who might want to bring him there? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, I shall go up to put him there. They said to him, you are looking for a pretext, for you are an old man and you want to go to rest there yourself. He said to them, put some string on my feet and when I shall be weak you pull. He went in and found the three arguing. “Jehudah my son, after you, and no more. Ḥizqiah my son, after you, and no more. Joseph ben Israel, after you, and no more.” He [R. Ḥaggai] lifted his eyes to look, it was said to him lower [your eyes], turn around. Rebbi Ḥiyya the elder [who said to] his son Jehudah, make space for Rav Ḥuna that he may rest there. But [Rav Ḥuna] did not accept this. They said, since he did not accept that one made space for him, so his descendants will never end. He [R. Ḥaggai] exited from there eighty years old and his years were doubled.
HALAKHAH: “All the time she lives in her father’s house,” etc. For the good she received; her properties became delivered during her husband’s lifetime and after 25 years she gave up the claim to her ketubah. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi La: One understands for a woman who has no ketubah. But should a woman who has a ketubah not be able to collect forever? He answered him, it tells you more: Even a woman who has a ketubah collects only up to 25 years. The statement of Rebbi Eleazar says, the creditor collects forever. He said only, “the creditor”; but a woman can collect only up to years. Rebbi Abin said, this is reasonable only for a woman who is not being supported. But for a woman who is being supported, I say that she did not claim it because of her support.
As you say, after deduction for her ketubah, after deduction of burial costs, after deduction of loans by witnesses or by contract. After deduction for daughters’ dowries? For him who says, one forecloses from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are privileged. For him who says, one does not foreclose from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are not privileged. Let us hear from the following: The widow and the sons are of equal rank. The widow and the daughters are of equal rank. The widow does not push the sons aside and the widow does not push the daughters aside. How is that? If there was enough for 12 months sustenance and a widow to sustain. That explains that sometimes the widow pushes out the sons by means of the daughters. Just as she pushes out the sons by means of the daughters, should she not push them out by means of the sons? She might claim her ketubah and lose her right to sustenance.
As you say, after deduction for her ketubah, after deduction of burial costs, after deduction of loans by witnesses or by contract. After deduction for daughters’ dowries? For him who says, one forecloses from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are privileged. For him who says, one does not foreclose from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are not privileged. Let us hear from the following: The widow and the sons are of equal rank. The widow and the daughters are of equal rank. The widow does not push the sons aside and the widow does not push the daughters aside. How is that? If there was enough for 12 months sustenance and a widow to sustain. That explains that sometimes the widow pushes out the sons by means of the daughters. Just as she pushes out the sons by means of the daughters, should she not push them out by means of the sons? She might claim her ketubah and lose her right to sustenance.
As you say, after deduction for her ketubah, after deduction of burial costs, after deduction of loans by witnesses or by contract. After deduction for daughters’ dowries? For him who says, one forecloses from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are privileged. For him who says, one does not foreclose from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are not privileged. Let us hear from the following: The widow and the sons are of equal rank. The widow and the daughters are of equal rank. The widow does not push the sons aside and the widow does not push the daughters aside. How is that? If there was enough for 12 months sustenance and a widow to sustain. That explains that sometimes the widow pushes out the sons by means of the daughters. Just as she pushes out the sons by means of the daughters, should she not push them out by means of the sons? She might claim her ketubah and lose her right to sustenance.
As you say, after deduction for her ketubah, after deduction of burial costs, after deduction of loans by witnesses or by contract. After deduction for daughters’ dowries? For him who says, one forecloses from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are privileged. For him who says, one does not foreclose from mortgaged property for daughters’ dowries, the dowries are not privileged. Let us hear from the following: The widow and the sons are of equal rank. The widow and the daughters are of equal rank. The widow does not push the sons aside and the widow does not push the daughters aside. How is that? If there was enough for 12 months sustenance and a widow to sustain. That explains that sometimes the widow pushes out the sons by means of the daughters. Just as she pushes out the sons by means of the daughters, should she not push them out by means of the sons? She might claim her ketubah and lose her right to sustenance.
Do the Sages permit all kinds of vows? “Four kinds of vows did the Sages dissolve”! Rebbi Eleazar in the name of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya: Those do not need the permission of a Sage. Rav and Samuel both say that these need the permission of a Sage. Issy objected: Did we not find an opening for vows from there only? Samuel said to him, bind a rope on it. A Mishnah disagrees with Issy: “This one also can dissolve his vow without asking a Sage.” He explains it, that all vows need an opening from another place but these have their openings in themselves. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that is, if they do not insist. But if they did insist they need the permission of a Sage. If one did insist but the other did not insist, since this one’s is invalid, the other one’s also should be invalid. A student of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus said [after] Rebbi Yudan: If one asked a tetradrachma, one was ready to give him three, and another one said a sheqel. (Does he insist?) Since he renounces one denar for this one he may renounce another one for the other one and give it to him for two.
Ḥizqiah said, if he redeemed them they revert to their sanctity. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he redeemed them they are redeemed. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “These have no redemption.” He explains thus: After they have been cut they do not need redemption. Rebbi Yose said, what Ḥizqiah said refers to the case that he himself redeemed them. But if another person redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them. The argument of Rebbi Yose is switched: There, he says that if [another] redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them, but here, he says that if she was married to another man the qiddušin [of the first] were not removed! All that is questionable for him is if he gave her two peruṭot, one for the moment and one for after he has divorced her, what is the situation?
Ḥizqiah said, if he redeemed them they revert to their sanctity. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he redeemed them they are redeemed. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “These have no redemption.” He explains thus: After they have been cut they do not need redemption. Rebbi Yose said, what Ḥizqiah said refers to the case that he himself redeemed them. But if another person redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them. The argument of Rebbi Yose is switched: There, he says that if [another] redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them, but here, he says that if she was married to another man the qiddušin [of the first] were not removed! All that is questionable for him is if he gave her two peruṭot, one for the moment and one for after he has divorced her, what is the situation?
HALAKHAH: “One who makes a vow away from the seafaring men,” etc. That you should not say, not from those who go from Acco to Jaffa but those who frequently take to the sea. “From the dwellers on dry land he is forbidden the seafaring men,” not only those who go from Acco to Jaffa but even those who frequently take to the sea. But did he not make a vow regarding the dwellers on dry land? This implies that the seafaring men are part of the dwellers on dry land. If he made a vow away from the seafaring men after thirty days but [a certain mariner] became a land dweller, there is a dispute between Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba. For Rebbi Ismael says, after the vow, and Rebbi Aqiba says, after the prohibition. And about children it is a problem.
HALAKHAH: “One who makes a vow away from the seafaring men,” etc. That you should not say, not from those who go from Acco to Jaffa but those who frequently take to the sea. “From the dwellers on dry land he is forbidden the seafaring men,” not only those who go from Acco to Jaffa but even those who frequently take to the sea. But did he not make a vow regarding the dwellers on dry land? This implies that the seafaring men are part of the dwellers on dry land. If he made a vow away from the seafaring men after thirty days but [a certain mariner] became a land dweller, there is a dispute between Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba. For Rebbi Ismael says, after the vow, and Rebbi Aqiba says, after the prohibition. And about children it is a problem.
HALAKHAH: “One who makes a vow away from the seafaring men,” etc. That you should not say, not from those who go from Acco to Jaffa but those who frequently take to the sea. “From the dwellers on dry land he is forbidden the seafaring men,” not only those who go from Acco to Jaffa but even those who frequently take to the sea. But did he not make a vow regarding the dwellers on dry land? This implies that the seafaring men are part of the dwellers on dry land. If he made a vow away from the seafaring men after thirty days but [a certain mariner] became a land dweller, there is a dispute between Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba. For Rebbi Ismael says, after the vow, and Rebbi Aqiba says, after the prohibition. And about children it is a problem.
HALAKHAH: “If he had his house to build, his fence to repair,” etc. May he say, he who works will not lose? Let us hear from the following. In the days of Rebbi Immi there was a fire in the village. Rebbi Immi sent a crier to the markets of the Gentiles saying: “He who works will not lose.” Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said, that was danger to life. But if there was danger to life, Rebbi Immi himself should have fought the fire! Did we not state, in any case of danger to life one does not say that [the necessary work] be done by Gentiles or minors, but [it should be done] even by important Jewish persons. It happened that there was a fire in the courtyard of Yose ben Simai in Šiḥin, and the garrison of the barracks of Sepphoris came to fight it but he did not let them fight it; he said, let the collector collect his due. Immediately there formed a cloud, there was rain which extinguished it. After the Sabbath he sent to each of them a tetradrachma and to their commander 50 denarii. Rebbi Ḥanina said, there was no need for him to do that A Samaritan was a neighbor of Rebbi Jonah. There was a fire in Rebbi Jonah’s neighborhood; he wanted to fight it but Rebbi Jonah did not let him. He said to him, because of my property! He said, yes. And everything was saved. Rebbi Jonah from Kefar-Immi spread his garment over the grain stack and the fire retreated from it.
So far, if he abandoned it for a longer period of time. But if he abandoned only for a short time? Let us hear from the following: “If he abandoned his field, he may cancel his action during three days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it says only “three days”. Therefore, after three days he may not cancel his action. Rebbi Simeon Dayana stated before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Even after three he may cancel his action. He said to him, since you say after three days, is it the same after three or after many? A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “About when is this said? If he abandoned in an unspecified way. But if he said: My field shall be abandoned one day, one week, one month, one year, a sabbatical period, as long as nobody took it over, either he or another person, he may cancel. But after somebody acquired it, either he or somebody else, he cannot cancel.” This means that short or long periods are the same. It also means that they were not worried about dishonesty. This means that a person may abandon and reacquire. That obviously answers Rebbi Zeïra’s question, since Rebbi Zeira had said, are short and long times the same?
So far, if he abandoned it for a longer period of time. But if he abandoned only for a short time? Let us hear from the following: “If he abandoned his field, he may cancel his action during three days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it says only “three days”. Therefore, after three days he may not cancel his action. Rebbi Simeon Dayana stated before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Even after three he may cancel his action. He said to him, since you say after three days, is it the same after three or after many? A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “About when is this said? If he abandoned in an unspecified way. But if he said: My field shall be abandoned one day, one week, one month, one year, a sabbatical period, as long as nobody took it over, either he or another person, he may cancel. But after somebody acquired it, either he or somebody else, he cannot cancel.” This means that short or long periods are the same. It also means that they were not worried about dishonesty. This means that a person may abandon and reacquire. That obviously answers Rebbi Zeïra’s question, since Rebbi Zeira had said, are short and long times the same?
So far, if he abandoned it for a longer period of time. But if he abandoned only for a short time? Let us hear from the following: “If he abandoned his field, he may cancel his action during three days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it says only “three days”. Therefore, after three days he may not cancel his action. Rebbi Simeon Dayana stated before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Even after three he may cancel his action. He said to him, since you say after three days, is it the same after three or after many? A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “About when is this said? If he abandoned in an unspecified way. But if he said: My field shall be abandoned one day, one week, one month, one year, a sabbatical period, as long as nobody took it over, either he or another person, he may cancel. But after somebody acquired it, either he or somebody else, he cannot cancel.” This means that short or long periods are the same. It also means that they were not worried about dishonesty. This means that a person may abandon and reacquire. That obviously answers Rebbi Zeïra’s question, since Rebbi Zeira had said, are short and long times the same?
So far, if he abandoned it for a longer period of time. But if he abandoned only for a short time? Let us hear from the following: “If he abandoned his field, he may cancel his action during three days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it says only “three days”. Therefore, after three days he may not cancel his action. Rebbi Simeon Dayana stated before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Even after three he may cancel his action. He said to him, since you say after three days, is it the same after three or after many? A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “About when is this said? If he abandoned in an unspecified way. But if he said: My field shall be abandoned one day, one week, one month, one year, a sabbatical period, as long as nobody took it over, either he or another person, he may cancel. But after somebody acquired it, either he or somebody else, he cannot cancel.” This means that short or long periods are the same. It also means that they were not worried about dishonesty. This means that a person may abandon and reacquire. That obviously answers Rebbi Zeïra’s question, since Rebbi Zeira had said, are short and long times the same?
So far, if he abandoned it for a longer period of time. But if he abandoned only for a short time? Let us hear from the following: “If he abandoned his field, he may cancel his action during three days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it says only “three days”. Therefore, after three days he may not cancel his action. Rebbi Simeon Dayana stated before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Even after three he may cancel his action. He said to him, since you say after three days, is it the same after three or after many? A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “About when is this said? If he abandoned in an unspecified way. But if he said: My field shall be abandoned one day, one week, one month, one year, a sabbatical period, as long as nobody took it over, either he or another person, he may cancel. But after somebody acquired it, either he or somebody else, he cannot cancel.” This means that short or long periods are the same. It also means that they were not worried about dishonesty. This means that a person may abandon and reacquire. That obviously answers Rebbi Zeïra’s question, since Rebbi Zeira had said, are short and long times the same?
So far, if he abandoned it for a longer period of time. But if he abandoned only for a short time? Let us hear from the following: “If he abandoned his field, he may cancel his action during three days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it says only “three days”. Therefore, after three days he may not cancel his action. Rebbi Simeon Dayana stated before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Even after three he may cancel his action. He said to him, since you say after three days, is it the same after three or after many? A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “About when is this said? If he abandoned in an unspecified way. But if he said: My field shall be abandoned one day, one week, one month, one year, a sabbatical period, as long as nobody took it over, either he or another person, he may cancel. But after somebody acquired it, either he or somebody else, he cannot cancel.” This means that short or long periods are the same. It also means that they were not worried about dishonesty. This means that a person may abandon and reacquire. That obviously answers Rebbi Zeïra’s question, since Rebbi Zeira had said, are short and long times the same?
“This, your house,” because of what do you catch him? Because of “your house,” “this”? If it collapsed and he himself rebuilt it, is it not “this”? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody said to his heirs, give a wedding house to my son or a widow’s house to my daughter, if it collapsed, the heirs are required to rebuild it.” There, we have stated: “If somebody says to his son, ‘a qônām that you can not enjoy anything from me,’ if he dies, [the son] inherits. ‘During my lifetime and after my death,’ if he dies, [the son] does not inherit.” [Did we not state, ‘during my lifetime’, [the son] inherits; ‘after my death’, [the son] inherits?] What is the difference between the one who says it one by one and the one who says it by twos? Rav Jeremiah and Rebbi Yose [ben Ḥanina] both say, ‘a qônām that I cannot enjoy these my properties during my lifetime and after my death,’ from the moment he said “these” he forbade to him during his lifetime and after his death. Rebbi Yose said, we have stated in Nedarim what we did not state in S̄ebuot: “A qônām that I shall not enter your house, or that I shall not buy your field, if the owner died or sold it, the other is permitted. That I shall not enter this house, or that I shall not buy this field, if the owner died or sold it, the other is forbidden.” Because he said “this”. Therefore, if he had not said “this”, he would have forbidden to him both during his lifetime and after his death.
“This, your house,” because of what do you catch him? Because of “your house,” “this”? If it collapsed and he himself rebuilt it, is it not “this”? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody said to his heirs, give a wedding house to my son or a widow’s house to my daughter, if it collapsed, the heirs are required to rebuild it.” There, we have stated: “If somebody says to his son, ‘a qônām that you can not enjoy anything from me,’ if he dies, [the son] inherits. ‘During my lifetime and after my death,’ if he dies, [the son] does not inherit.” [Did we not state, ‘during my lifetime’, [the son] inherits; ‘after my death’, [the son] inherits?] What is the difference between the one who says it one by one and the one who says it by twos? Rav Jeremiah and Rebbi Yose [ben Ḥanina] both say, ‘a qônām that I cannot enjoy these my properties during my lifetime and after my death,’ from the moment he said “these” he forbade to him during his lifetime and after his death. Rebbi Yose said, we have stated in Nedarim what we did not state in S̄ebuot: “A qônām that I shall not enter your house, or that I shall not buy your field, if the owner died or sold it, the other is permitted. That I shall not enter this house, or that I shall not buy this field, if the owner died or sold it, the other is forbidden.” Because he said “this”. Therefore, if he had not said “this”, he would have forbidden to him both during his lifetime and after his death.
“This, your house,” because of what do you catch him? Because of “your house,” “this”? If it collapsed and he himself rebuilt it, is it not “this”? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody said to his heirs, give a wedding house to my son or a widow’s house to my daughter, if it collapsed, the heirs are required to rebuild it.” There, we have stated: “If somebody says to his son, ‘a qônām that you can not enjoy anything from me,’ if he dies, [the son] inherits. ‘During my lifetime and after my death,’ if he dies, [the son] does not inherit.” [Did we not state, ‘during my lifetime’, [the son] inherits; ‘after my death’, [the son] inherits?] What is the difference between the one who says it one by one and the one who says it by twos? Rav Jeremiah and Rebbi Yose [ben Ḥanina] both say, ‘a qônām that I cannot enjoy these my properties during my lifetime and after my death,’ from the moment he said “these” he forbade to him during his lifetime and after his death. Rebbi Yose said, we have stated in Nedarim what we did not state in S̄ebuot: “A qônām that I shall not enter your house, or that I shall not buy your field, if the owner died or sold it, the other is permitted. That I shall not enter this house, or that I shall not buy this field, if the owner died or sold it, the other is forbidden.” Because he said “this”. Therefore, if he had not said “this”, he would have forbidden to him both during his lifetime and after his death.
“This, your house,” because of what do you catch him? Because of “your house,” “this”? If it collapsed and he himself rebuilt it, is it not “this”? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody said to his heirs, give a wedding house to my son or a widow’s house to my daughter, if it collapsed, the heirs are required to rebuild it.” There, we have stated: “If somebody says to his son, ‘a qônām that you can not enjoy anything from me,’ if he dies, [the son] inherits. ‘During my lifetime and after my death,’ if he dies, [the son] does not inherit.” [Did we not state, ‘during my lifetime’, [the son] inherits; ‘after my death’, [the son] inherits?] What is the difference between the one who says it one by one and the one who says it by twos? Rav Jeremiah and Rebbi Yose [ben Ḥanina] both say, ‘a qônām that I cannot enjoy these my properties during my lifetime and after my death,’ from the moment he said “these” he forbade to him during his lifetime and after his death. Rebbi Yose said, we have stated in Nedarim what we did not state in S̄ebuot: “A qônām that I shall not enter your house, or that I shall not buy your field, if the owner died or sold it, the other is permitted. That I shall not enter this house, or that I shall not buy this field, if the owner died or sold it, the other is forbidden.” Because he said “this”. Therefore, if he had not said “this”, he would have forbidden to him both during his lifetime and after his death.
“This, your house,” because of what do you catch him? Because of “your house,” “this”? If it collapsed and he himself rebuilt it, is it not “this”? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody said to his heirs, give a wedding house to my son or a widow’s house to my daughter, if it collapsed, the heirs are required to rebuild it.” There, we have stated: “If somebody says to his son, ‘a qônām that you can not enjoy anything from me,’ if he dies, [the son] inherits. ‘During my lifetime and after my death,’ if he dies, [the son] does not inherit.” [Did we not state, ‘during my lifetime’, [the son] inherits; ‘after my death’, [the son] inherits?] What is the difference between the one who says it one by one and the one who says it by twos? Rav Jeremiah and Rebbi Yose [ben Ḥanina] both say, ‘a qônām that I cannot enjoy these my properties during my lifetime and after my death,’ from the moment he said “these” he forbade to him during his lifetime and after his death. Rebbi Yose said, we have stated in Nedarim what we did not state in S̄ebuot: “A qônām that I shall not enter your house, or that I shall not buy your field, if the owner died or sold it, the other is permitted. That I shall not enter this house, or that I shall not buy this field, if the owner died or sold it, the other is forbidden.” Because he said “this”. Therefore, if he had not said “this”, he would have forbidden to him both during his lifetime and after his death.
HALAKHAH: “ “I am ḥerem for you”, etc. ‘A qônām that I shall not have any usufruct from you and anyone I would ask about you’, he has to ask about the first but not the second. Some Tannaïm state: He has to ask both about the first and the second. Samuel the son of Rebbi Joseph ben Rebbi Abun said, that follows the one who said “after the prohibition”. But for the one who said “after the vow”, a vow which is partially invalid is totally invalid.
HALAKHAH: “ “I am ḥerem for you”, etc. ‘A qônām that I shall not have any usufruct from you and anyone I would ask about you’, he has to ask about the first but not the second. Some Tannaïm state: He has to ask both about the first and the second. Samuel the son of Rebbi Joseph ben Rebbi Abun said, that follows the one who said “after the prohibition”. But for the one who said “after the vow”, a vow which is partially invalid is totally invalid.
“Rabbi Joḥanan said, it is obvious that this one was learned.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is what happened: Jonathan ben Uzziel’s father vowed not to let him have any usufruct from him and in his will gave his part to Shammai. What did Shammai do? He sold some, gave some to the sacred fund, gave him the remainder as a gift, and said: He who wants to attack this gift, let him first get back [the merchandise] from the buyers and from the sacred fund; after that he can get [the remainder] back from this one.
It was stated: “One intercalates for a year neither in a Sabbatical nor in the year after the Sabbatical; but if they intercalated it is intercalated.” Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Abbahu said: That means, as long as Rebbi did not permit to buy vegetables for importation into the Land. But since Rebbi permitted to buy vegetables for importation into the Land there is no difference between the Sabbatical and the remaining years of the Sabbatical cycle.
“Rebbi Meïr used to teach: It says, ‘A man came from Baal-Shalishah and brought to the man of God bread from first grain, etc.’ At no place in the Land of Israel does produce ripen earlier than at Baal-Shalishah, and only that kind ripened early.” ‘He brought to the man of God,’ when did he bring it? After the ‘Omer ceremony, since it is said: ‘Give to the people to eat.’ “But since the year was in need of an intercalation, why did Elisha not intercalate? This teaches you that the year was one of famine and everybody was jumping to the threshing floors.”
One does not intercalate for a year before New Year’s Day; if they did intercalate it would be invalid. But for an urgent need one may intercalate immediately after New Year’s Day. Nevertheless, only Adar is intercalated. Rebbi says, Nisan never was lengthened. But did we not state: “If the New Moon appeared in time”? If it would appear, it did not appear. Rav said, Tishre was never lengthened. But did we not state: “If the month was long”? If it would be, it never was.
If they sanctified it before its time or after its lengthening, should I assume it was lengthened? The verse says (Lev. 23:2) “them”, “them”, “these are My holidays.” Before its time is not “My holidays.” Before its time, the 29th day, after its lengthening, the 32nd day. From where that one intercalates for the year because of the [men of the] diaspora who set out but did not yet arrive? The verse says (Num. 23:44), “Moses spoke about the holidays of the Eternal to the Children of Israel”. Make the holidays so they can be observed by all of Israel. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, only if they had reached the river Euphrates.
If they sanctified it before its time or after its lengthening, should I assume it was lengthened? The verse says (Lev. 23:2) “them”, “them”, “these are My holidays.” Before its time is not “My holidays.” Before its time, the 29th day, after its lengthening, the 32nd day. From where that one intercalates for the year because of the [men of the] diaspora who set out but did not yet arrive? The verse says (Num. 23:44), “Moses spoke about the holidays of the Eternal to the Children of Israel”. Make the holidays so they can be observed by all of Israel. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said, only if they had reached the river Euphrates.
Jeremiah intercalated outside the Land. Ezechiel intercalated outside the Land. Baruch intercalated outside the Land. Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua intercalated outside the Land. Rebbi sent him three letters through Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Nathan. In one he wrote, to His holiness Ḥanania. And in one he wrote, the kid goats you left behind became rams. And in one he wrote, if you do not accept, go to the thistle desert, do slaughter and let Onias sprinkle. After the first [letter], he honored them. After the second, he honored them. After the third, he wanted to disgrace them. They said to him, you cannot do that since you already did honor us. Rebbi Isaac rose and quoted, it is written in the Torah: These are the holidays of Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. They said to him, “the holdays of the Eternal”. He said to them, that is with us. Rebbi Nathan rose and finished: “For from Babylonia will go Torah forth and the Eternal’s word from Nahar-Peqod.” They said to him, “for from Zion will Torah go forth and the Eternal’s word from Jerusalem”. He said to them, that is with us. He went to complain about them to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis. He said to him, follow them, follow them. He said to him, I do not know whom I left there. Who would tell me that they are wise to the computations as I am? If he had said, they are not wise, they should listen to him. Since they are wise to the computations as he is, he has to listen to them. He got up and rode on a horse. Where he reached, he reached. Where he did not reach, they continued following the corrupt [calendar].
Jeremiah intercalated outside the Land. Ezechiel intercalated outside the Land. Baruch intercalated outside the Land. Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua intercalated outside the Land. Rebbi sent him three letters through Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Nathan. In one he wrote, to His holiness Ḥanania. And in one he wrote, the kid goats you left behind became rams. And in one he wrote, if you do not accept, go to the thistle desert, do slaughter and let Onias sprinkle. After the first [letter], he honored them. After the second, he honored them. After the third, he wanted to disgrace them. They said to him, you cannot do that since you already did honor us. Rebbi Isaac rose and quoted, it is written in the Torah: These are the holidays of Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. They said to him, “the holdays of the Eternal”. He said to them, that is with us. Rebbi Nathan rose and finished: “For from Babylonia will go Torah forth and the Eternal’s word from Nahar-Peqod.” They said to him, “for from Zion will Torah go forth and the Eternal’s word from Jerusalem”. He said to them, that is with us. He went to complain about them to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis. He said to him, follow them, follow them. He said to him, I do not know whom I left there. Who would tell me that they are wise to the computations as I am? If he had said, they are not wise, they should listen to him. Since they are wise to the computations as he is, he has to listen to them. He got up and rode on a horse. Where he reached, he reached. Where he did not reach, they continued following the corrupt [calendar].
Jeremiah intercalated outside the Land. Ezechiel intercalated outside the Land. Baruch intercalated outside the Land. Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua intercalated outside the Land. Rebbi sent him three letters through Rebbi Isaac and Rebbi Nathan. In one he wrote, to His holiness Ḥanania. And in one he wrote, the kid goats you left behind became rams. And in one he wrote, if you do not accept, go to the thistle desert, do slaughter and let Onias sprinkle. After the first [letter], he honored them. After the second, he honored them. After the third, he wanted to disgrace them. They said to him, you cannot do that since you already did honor us. Rebbi Isaac rose and quoted, it is written in the Torah: These are the holidays of Ḥanania the nephew of Rebbi Joshua. They said to him, “the holdays of the Eternal”. He said to them, that is with us. Rebbi Nathan rose and finished: “For from Babylonia will go Torah forth and the Eternal’s word from Nahar-Peqod.” They said to him, “for from Zion will Torah go forth and the Eternal’s word from Jerusalem”. He said to them, that is with us. He went to complain about them to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis. He said to him, follow them, follow them. He said to him, I do not know whom I left there. Who would tell me that they are wise to the computations as I am? If he had said, they are not wise, they should listen to him. Since they are wise to the computations as he is, he has to listen to them. He got up and rode on a horse. Where he reached, he reached. Where he did not reach, they continued following the corrupt [calendar].
“From cabbage, he is forbidden cabbage shoot,” etc. “From groats, he is forbidden groat soup,” only if most of it is groats. “From soup he is forbidden garlic,” only if most of it is garlic? In that case, you go after the taste, in the other after the main ingredient.
“From cabbage, he is forbidden cabbage shoot,” etc. “From groats, he is forbidden groat soup,” only if most of it is groats. “From soup he is forbidden garlic,” only if most of it is garlic? In that case, you go after the taste, in the other after the main ingredient.
What is a couch and what is a dargesh? Rebbi Jeremiah said, one that one plaits on its body is a couch and one that one does not plait on its body is a dargesh. But have we not stated (Kelim 16:1) “Bed and crib after he rubs them with fish skin.” If it is plaited on its body, why does he rub? Rebbi Eleazar said, explain it with those Caesarean cribs that have holes.
MISHNAH: If one says to his wife, a qônām shall be anything you work for, a qônām shall it be for my mouth, a qônām shall it be to my mouth; he is forbidden what is exchanged for it or what grows from it. ‘That I shall not eat, that I shall not taste,’ he is permitted what is exchanged for them, or what grows from them if the seed disappears. But if the seed does not disappear, even second generation growth is forbidden. ‘What you prepare I would eat until Passover, what you make I would wear until Passover,’ if she made before Passover, he may eat or wear after Passover.
MISHNAH: ‘What you prepare until Passover I would eat what you make until Passover I would wear if she made before Passover, he is forbidden to eat or wear after Passover.
MISHNAH: ‘That you provide me with usufruct until Passover if you would go to your father’s house until Tabernacles.’ If she went before Passover, she is forbidden to deliver usufruct to him until Passover, after Passover “he should not profane his word.”
HALAKHAH: “That you would have usufruct from me,” etc. He is forbidden to have usufruct from her immediately, for maybe she would go after Passover and it would turn out that his having usufruct would be retroactively [forbidden].
MISHNAH: ‘That you provide me with usufruct from you until Tabernacles if you would go to your father’s house until Passover.’ If she went before Passover, she is forbidden to deliver usufruct to him until Tabernacles; but she is permitted to go after Passover.
HALAKHAH: “That you would have usufruct from me until Tabernacles,” etc. He is forbidden to have usufruct from her immediately, for maybe she would go after Passover and it would turn out that his having usufruct would be retroactively [forbidden].
Rebbi Aḥa, Rebbi Abbahu, in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: On the Sabbath, a person is forbidden to fast until the sixth hour. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah states this: “If they fasted when it started to rain, before noon they should not finish,” because until then it is morning; “after noon they should finish,” since most of the day already was spent in holiness.
A private person who committed himself for a fast day, eats and drinks after nightfall. But if he said a public fast day, he eats and drinks only during daytime. If he made a vow to fast and it turned out to fall on Sabbath days or holidays, he is whipped but does not need permission from a Sage. If he made a vow to fast and it turned out to fall on days written in the Scroll of Fasts, Rebbi Ḥizqia and Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: One said, he fasts but does not finish, but the other one said, he is whipped but does not need permission from a Sage. That is, you say that before the scroll of fasts was abolished. But when the Scroll of Fasts was abolished, all this was abolished. Rebbi Ḥanania and Rebbi Joḥanan both say that the Scroll of Fasts was abolished. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, the Scroll of Fasts was abolished. Rebbi Joḥanan said, yesterday I was sitting and stating: “It happened that they decreed a fast day at Lod during Ḥanukka. Rebbi Eliezer went and had a haircut, Rebbi Joshua went and took a hot bath. Rebbi Joshua said to them, go and fast for what you fasted.” And you say, the Scroll of Fasts was abolished? Rebbi Abba said, even though you say that the Scroll of Fasts was abolished, Ḥanukka and Purim were not abolished. The acts of the rabbis imply that the Scroll of Fasts was abolished: Rebbi Jonathan fasted on the day before New Year’s Day. Rebbi Abin fasted on the day before Tabernacles. Rebbi Ze‘ira fasted 300 fast days, and some say 900 fast days and did not care about the Scroll of Fasts. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa told the scribes: If a woman comes to ask you, tell her that one may fast any day except Sabbaths, holidays, New Moons, the intermediary days of holidays, Ḥanukka, and Purim.
MISHNAH: ‘Until the rains, until there be rain,’ until the second rainy spell; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, until the time of the second rainy spell. ‘Until the rains stop’, until the end of the Month of Nisan, the words of Rebbi Meїr; Rebbi Jehudah says, until after Passover.
“A qônām wine,” etc. Rebbi Meїr follows his opinion and Rebbi Jehudah follows his opinion, as we have stated there: “Until when does one pray for rain? Rebbi Jehudah says, until after Passover; Rebbi Meїr says until the end of the Month of Nisan.”
Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: That is only if he vowed before they intercalated. But if they intercalated and then he vowed, that is not so. Is it no different for rent of houses? If one said, the First Adar, and the other one says, the Second Adar, they should split the intercalary month. Come and see, for vows you have no problem but for money matters you have a problem? Rebbi Hila said, that is, if they intercalated and after that he leased. But if he leased and after that they intercalated, that is not so. And in matters of documents one writes First Adar, Second Adar, only that for Second Adar one writes תניין. Rebbi Jehudah says, for Second Adar one writes ת̇ and that is enough.
Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Hila: That is only if he vowed before they intercalated. But if they intercalated and then he vowed, that is not so. Is it no different for rent of houses? If one said, the First Adar, and the other one says, the Second Adar, they should split the intercalary month. Come and see, for vows you have no problem but for money matters you have a problem? Rebbi Hila said, that is, if they intercalated and after that he leased. But if he leased and after that they intercalated, that is not so. And in matters of documents one writes First Adar, Second Adar, only that for Second Adar one writes תניין. Rebbi Jehudah says, for Second Adar one writes ת̇ and that is enough.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer says, one opens for a man,” etc. The rabbis say, a man resists the honor of his father and mother. Rebbi Eliezer says, sometimes he resists, sometimes he does not resist. Rebbi Eliezer agrees that after their death he does not resist. Everybody agrees that nobody resists the honor of his teacher, as we stated: “And the fear of your teacher shall be like the fear of Heaven.”
(As) we have stated there: “One sells a synagogue only conditionally”. So far if it was built as a synagogue. How is the situation if the building was first built for profane use and then dedicated? Let us hear from the following: “A qônām that I shall not enter this house and it was turned into a synagogue.” That implies that if it was built as a courtyard and afterwards was dedicated that it becomes holy. How? When does it become holy, immediately or when it is used? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody makes a chest for a Torah scroll, or wrappings for a Torah scroll, before they were used for a Torah scroll they may be used for private use; after they were used for a Torah scroll they may not be used for private use.” Since these were made for holy use but became holy only when used, that which was built as a courtyard not so much more? What is the status of those if they were made for profane use and then dedicated? They become holy.
HALAKHAH: “An adolescent girl,” etc. It is written, “if she should be a man’s”. What are we speaking about? If a married one, it already is written “if she vowed in her husband’s house”. If about an unmarried one, it already is written “if she vows a vow to the Eternal”. Why does the verse say, ““if she should be a man’s with her vows on her”? That refers to the preliminarily married adolescent girl whose vows are dissolved by father and husband. So far for vows which she vowed after she was prelinimarily married. Vows which she vowed before she was prelinimarily married? “With her vows on her,” to include the vows which come with her from her father’s house.
It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: “If she should be a man’s”, the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl. The colleagues say, Rebbi Eleazar says it correctly. Is it not difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: Did she not leave her father’s power the moment she became an adult? Who may dissolve the vows of an orphan whose father had died? The husband dissolves. It is difficult for the rabbis: If he may dissolve before she entered his power, is it not obvious [that he may dissolve] after she entered? How do the rabbis explain “with her vows on her”? What are we talking about? If about vows which she made before she was preliminarily married and she became preliminarily married, already the father and the husband had the power to dissolve. But we must talk about a vow which she made before her father died, then the father died and she became an adult. From where does Rebbi Eleazar obtain: “The father and the husband dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl.” “Between a man and his wife.” That deals with the husband. The father? “Between a father and his daughter.” How do the rabbis interpret “between a man and his wife”? Not what is between her and others. “Between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others. Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree with this? He agrees; he understands everything from there: “Between a man and his wife”, not what is between her and others; “between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others.
If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the husband.” They wanted to say, after the husband had dissolved his part. But if the husband had not dissolved his part when he died, the power is not voided in favor of the father. Let us hear from the following: “If she made a vow while being preliminarily married. If she was divorced on the same day, preliminarily married on the same day, even a hundred times, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows.” That means, even if the husband had not dissolved his part and died, his power is voided in favor of the father.
“If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.” Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose. So far for vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married; if the father died, was his power not voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? Why do you have to say, if the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband? That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married, if the father died, was his power voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? You say, “if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father”! That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married, if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father!
“If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.” Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose. So far for vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married; if the father died, was his power not voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? Why do you have to say, if the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband? That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married, if the father died, was his power voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? You say, “if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father”! That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married, if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father!
“If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband.” Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose. So far for vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married; if the father died, was his power not voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? Why do you have to say, if the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband? That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married. Vows she made before she was preliminarily married, if the father died, was his power voided in favor of the husband? He said to him, is it not true that vows she made before she was preliminarily married already could be dissolved by father and husband? You say, “if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father”! That means, even vows she made after she was preliminarily married, if the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father!
MISHNAH: “The way of learned people is that, before his daughter left his house, he told her: ‘Any vows which you had vowed in my house are dissolved’. Similarly, the husband tells her before she enters his domain: ‘Any vows which you had vowed before you enter my domain are dissolved,’ for after she enters his domain he cannot dissolve. An adult girl and one who had waited twelve months and a widow 30 days, Rebbi Eliezer says, since her husband is responsible for her upkeep he may dissolve but the Sages say that the husband dissolves only after she enters his domain.
MISHNAH: “The way of learned people is that, before his daughter left his house, he told her: ‘Any vows which you had vowed in my house are dissolved’. Similarly, the husband tells her before she enters his domain: ‘Any vows which you had vowed before you enter my domain are dissolved,’ for after she enters his domain he cannot dissolve. An adult girl and one who had waited twelve months and a widow 30 days, Rebbi Eliezer says, since her husband is responsible for her upkeep he may dissolve but the Sages say that the husband dissolves only after she enters his domain.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.
HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eliezer said,” etc. “Rebbi Eliezer said, since a woman on whom I had no claim before she entered into my domain, becomes absolutely mine after she entered my domain, is it not logical that a woman on whom I had some claim before she entered my domain, shall become absolutely mine when she enters my domain? Rebbi Aqiba told him, no. If you speak about a woman on whom you had no claim before she entered into your domain, but after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, then just as you had no part in her so no other man had any part in her. What can you conclude about a woman on whom you had some claim before she entered your domain, and after she entered your domain she became absolutely yours, but just as you had some rights to her so others had the same rights to her! Rebbi Joshua told him, Aqiba, your argument holds for two levirs. What do you respond in the case of a single levir? He said to him, just as you make no difference in the rules of one waiting for one levir or for two levirs, whether he ‘bespoke’ her or did not ‘bespeak’ her, can it not be the same for vows and oaths? He said to him, that is true. He said to him, if you had lived in the times of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh, he would have said that ‘bespeaking’ does not acquire completely since he would agree that he cannot dissolve until she enters his domain.
HALAKHAH: “He answered to the words of Rebbi Eliezer: Let the miqweh prove it! It frees the impure from their impurities but it cannot save pure ones. Rebbi Eliezer argued another track: Since in a situation where he cannot dissolve his own vows before he made them, he dissolves his wife’s vows before she made them, in a situation where he can dissolve his own vows after he made them, would it not be logical that he could dissolve his wife’s vows before she made them? No! Why can he not dissolve his own vows before he made them? For if he wants to confirm them, he confirms them. Could he dissolve his wife’s vows after she made them, when if he wanted to confirm them, he could not confirm them?” “But it says, ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them’. What can be confirmed can be dissolved,; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.”
HALAKHAH: “He answered to the words of Rebbi Eliezer: Let the miqweh prove it! It frees the impure from their impurities but it cannot save pure ones. Rebbi Eliezer argued another track: Since in a situation where he cannot dissolve his own vows before he made them, he dissolves his wife’s vows before she made them, in a situation where he can dissolve his own vows after he made them, would it not be logical that he could dissolve his wife’s vows before she made them? No! Why can he not dissolve his own vows before he made them? For if he wants to confirm them, he confirms them. Could he dissolve his wife’s vows after she made them, when if he wanted to confirm them, he could not confirm them?” “But it says, ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them’. What can be confirmed can be dissolved,; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.”
MISHNAH: The dissolution of vows may take place the entire day; this can imply a lenient or a stringent implementation. How is that? If she made the vow Friday night, he may dissolve during the night and the next day until [the next] nightfall. If she made the vow shortly before nightfall, he dissolves until it becomes dark; for after dark he cannot dissolve.
May one appoint Elders for selected topics? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi appointed Rav to invalidate vows and to see stains. After his death, [Rav] asked his son for [permission to see] defects of firstlings. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he gave him everything: To sit in judgment alone, to invalidate vows, to see stains, and to see outside blemishes. After his death, [Rav] asked his son for [permission to see] hidden defects. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Even though you say, one appoints Elders for selected topics, only if he is competent for everything. As the following: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi ordained all his students, but he was sorry about one who had a defect in his eye and he could not ordain him; so he ordained him for selected topics. That implies that one who is competent in one thing has to be competent in everything, and one who is not competent in everything cannot be declared competent in one thing.
May one appoint Elders for selected topics? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi appointed Rav to invalidate vows and to see stains. After his death, [Rav] asked his son for [permission to see] defects of firstlings. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he gave him everything: To sit in judgment alone, to invalidate vows, to see stains, and to see outside blemishes. After his death, [Rav] asked his son for [permission to see] hidden defects. He said to him, I shall not add to what my father gave you. Even though you say, one appoints Elders for selected topics, only if he is competent for everything. As the following: Rebbi Joshua ben Levi ordained all his students, but he was sorry about one who had a defect in his eye and he could not ordain him; so he ordained him for selected topics. That implies that one who is competent in one thing has to be competent in everything, and one who is not competent in everything cannot be declared competent in one thing.
We understand “if I wash”. “If I do not wash”? Let her wash! Rebbi Mana said, if she said: “Any benefit from me shall be qônām for you after I shall have washed myself, if I ever wash myself.” Why should he not dissolve for her? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, only when she said, “any benefit from my body shall be qônām for you after I shall have washed myself.” Why can he not force? Did not Rebbi Huna say, [if she vowed] any benefit from me [shall be forbidden] to you, he forces her and sleeps with her. Any benefit from you [shall be forbidden] to me, he has to dissolve. There is a difference because it is a benefit for him and her. Rebbi Abba Mari said, If I wash [today], I shall not wash forever. If I wear jewellery [today], I shall not wear jewellery forever. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Nasa: If I wash I shall not wear jewellery; if I wear jewellery I shall not wash.
We understand “if I wash”. “If I do not wash”? Let her wash! Rebbi Mana said, if she said: “Any benefit from me shall be qônām for you after I shall have washed myself, if I ever wash myself.” Why should he not dissolve for her? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, only when she said, “any benefit from my body shall be qônām for you after I shall have washed myself.” Why can he not force? Did not Rebbi Huna say, [if she vowed] any benefit from me [shall be forbidden] to you, he forces her and sleeps with her. Any benefit from you [shall be forbidden] to me, he has to dissolve. There is a difference because it is a benefit for him and her. Rebbi Abba Mari said, If I wash [today], I shall not wash forever. If I wear jewellery [today], I shall not wear jewellery forever. The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Nasa: If I wash I shall not wear jewellery; if I wear jewellery I shall not wash.
HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not work according to the wishes of my father,’ etc. There, we have stated: “If somebody dedicates his wife’s work, she works and eats. The excess? Rebbi Meїr says, it is dedicated; Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, it is profane.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree about the excess over five tetradrachmas. He explains it in the case of one who supports his wife with food but does not give her an obolus for her needs, as we stated: “If he does not give her an obolus for her needs, what she earns is hers”. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they disagree about the excess left after [the husband’s] death; for he explains it if he does not support her with food. But if he supports her with food, everybody agrees that it became dedicated. And here, he cannot dissolve! Rebbi Meїr says. he does not have to dissolve. Rebbi Joḥanan the Alexandrian said, hers. Rebbi Aqiba said, hers. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, his.
MISHNAH: “The vow of a widow or a divorcee, anything she forbids to herself shall be confirmed.” How is that? If she said, I shall be a nazir after thirty days, even if she married within these thirty days he cannot dissolve. If she made the vow under her husband’s authority and he dissolved it, if she had said, I shall be a nazir after thirty days, even if she should become a widow or a divorcee within the next 30 days, it remains dissolved. If she made a vow, was on the same day divorced, and taken back, he cannot dissolve. This is the principle: He cannot dissolve for any one who was on her own for one moment.