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1267 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
MISHNAH: If four brothers were married to four women and died, if their oldest [brother] wants to marry all of them in levirate, he is permitted to do so. If somebody was married to two women and he died, intercourse or ḥalîṣah with one of them frees the co-wife. If one was acceptable and the other blemished, if he performs ḥalîṣah, he performs it with the blemished; if he takes in levirate, he takes the acceptable one.
MISHNAH: He who takes back his divorcee, or marries the woman with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, or marries a relative of the woman with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, has to divorce her and any child is a bastard, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. But the Sages say, it is not a bastard. But they agree that the child of one who marries a relative of his divorcee is a bastard.
MISHNAH: He who takes back his divorcee, or marries the woman with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, or marries a relative of the woman with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, has to divorce her and any child is a bastard, the words of Rebbi Aqiba. But the Sages say, it is not a bastard. But they agree that the child of one who marries a relative of his divorcee is a bastard.
MISHNAH: If his wife died, her sister is permitted to him. If he divorced her and she died, her sister is permitted to him. If she had married another man and died, her sister is permitted to him. If his sister-in-law died, her sister is permitted to him. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her and she died, her sister is permitted to him.
HALAKHAH: “If his wife died, her sister is permitted to him,” etc. That means, her mother is forbidden to him. Did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa say in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If a woman waiting for her levir died, her mother is permitted to him. But since we stated: “If he performed ḥalîṣah with her and she died, her sister is permitted to him,” therefore he stated “her sister.”
MISHNAH: Rabban Gamliel says, there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce, no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, no copulation after copulation, and no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah. But the Sages say, there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce and “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, but nothing after copulation or after ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: Rabban Gamliel says, there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce, no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, no copulation after copulation, and no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah. But the Sages say, there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce and “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, but nothing after copulation or after ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: Rabban Gamliel says, there is no bill of divorce after a bill of divorce, no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, no copulation after copulation, and no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah. But the Sages say, there is a bill of divorce after a bill of divorce and “bespeaking” after “bespeaking”, but nothing after copulation or after ḥalîṣah.
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
Since the rabbis say, “bespeaking” acquires but not completely, so they say, a bill of divorce frees but not completely. Should not a bill of divorce completely free a sister-in-law by an argument de minore ad majus? Since ḥalîṣah does not free a wife but a bill of divorce does, is it not logical that a sister-in-law, who is freed by ḥalîṣah, should be freed by a bill of divorce? The verse says, “she shall pull off.” By pulling off she is freed; she is not freed by a bill of divorce. So it should free anything! It is written: “She shall not belong … to a strange man.” Where do we hold? If he came upon her, she is his wife. If he performed ḥalîṣah with her, she should go and marry an outsider. So we must hold that he gave her a bill of divorce. Also Ḥizqiah stated thus: From where that the sister-in-law is forbidden to himself and his brothers if he gave her a bill of divorce? For him, I read “whom he had sent away”. For the brothers, I read “whom he had sent away”. Then should not ḥalîṣah free a wife by an argument de minore ad majus? Since a bill of divorce does not free a sister-in-law but ḥalîṣah does, is it not logical that a wife, who is freed by a bill of divorce, should be freed by ḥalîṣah? The verse says, “ he shall write her a bill of divorce.” By a bill of divorce she is freed; she is not freed by ḥalîṣah. So [ḥalîṣah] should free partially! There, it is written, “she shall not belong … to a strange man.” Here, what do you have?
MISHNAH: How? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law and gave her a bill of divorce, she needs ḥalîṣah from him. If he “bespoke” and participated in ḥalîṣah, she needs a bill of divorce from him. If he “bespoke” her and copulated, that is as it is commanded.
MISHNAH: How? If he “bespoke” his sister-in-law and gave her a bill of divorce, she needs ḥalîṣah from him. If he “bespoke” and participated in ḥalîṣah, she needs a bill of divorce from him. If he “bespoke” her and copulated, that is as it is commanded.
Ḥalîṣah against the rules frees. In which respect? That if an outsider comes and gives qiddushin to her co-wife, they will lay hold of her. If an outsider came and gave her qiddushin, since the candidacy from the deceased was removed from her, the qiddushin will lay hold of her, or maybe, since she still needs a bill of divorce for her “bespeaking”, the qiddushin will not lay hold of her?
MISHNAH: If he delivered a bill of divorce and then “bespoke”, she needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he delivered a bill of divorce and then cohabited, she needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he delivered a bill of divorce and then performed ḥalîṣah, after ḥalîṣah nothing more is needed.
MISHNAH: If he delivered a bill of divorce and then “bespoke”, she needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he delivered a bill of divorce and then cohabited, she needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he delivered a bill of divorce and then performed ḥalîṣah, after ḥalîṣah nothing more is needed.
MISHNAH: If he delivered a bill of divorce and then “bespoke”, she needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he delivered a bill of divorce and then cohabited, she needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he delivered a bill of divorce and then performed ḥalîṣah, after ḥalîṣah nothing more is needed.
MISHNAH: If he delivered a bill of divorce and then “bespoke”, she needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he delivered a bill of divorce and then cohabited, she needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he delivered a bill of divorce and then performed ḥalîṣah, after ḥalîṣah nothing more is needed.
HALAKHAH: “If he delivered a bill of divorce and then “bespoke”, etc. A bill of divorce for his “bespeaking” and ḥalîṣah for her candidacy.
That means that invalid intercourse does not free. Come and see, invalid ḥalîṣah frees but invalid intercourse does not free! Since the purpose of ḥalîṣah is invalidation, it frees. Intercourse, whose purpose is not invalidation, does not free. It should not free for leniency but might free for restriction. In which respect? If somebody came and gave qiddushin to the co-wife, these should lay hold on her. Rebbi Yudan said, I explained it. Any sister-in-law who is not totally outside remains inside until she leaves for the outside.
That means that invalid intercourse does not free. Come and see, invalid ḥalîṣah frees but invalid intercourse does not free! Since the purpose of ḥalîṣah is invalidation, it frees. Intercourse, whose purpose is not invalidation, does not free. It should not free for leniency but might free for restriction. In which respect? If somebody came and gave qiddushin to the co-wife, these should lay hold on her. Rebbi Yudan said, I explained it. Any sister-in-law who is not totally outside remains inside until she leaves for the outside.
MISHNAH: If he performed ḥalîṣah, “bespoke” her, gave a bill of divorce, and cohabited, or cohabited, “bespoke”, gave a bill of divorce, and performed ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah. There is no difference between one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law.
MISHNAH: If he performed ḥalîṣah, “bespoke” her, gave a bill of divorce, and cohabited, or cohabited, “bespoke”, gave a bill of divorce, and performed ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah. There is no difference between one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law.
MISHNAH: If he performed ḥalîṣah, “bespoke” her, gave a bill of divorce, and cohabited, or cohabited, “bespoke”, gave a bill of divorce, and performed ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah. There is no difference between one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥalîṣah, ‘bespoke’,” etc. Even though they said there is no ḥalîṣah after ḥalîṣah, intercourse after ḥalîṣah disables her from priesthood. Is she not disabled from priesthood anyhow? But she is disabled from eating heave. If he had intercourse with the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, did he disable her from eating heave? It must be that his brothers copulated with her. That agrees with the position that he is not guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah, but his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah? It must be that he had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that everybody agrees that he is guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the co-wife? It must be that his brothers had intercourse with the co-wife. That agrees with the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah but are guilty about the co-wife. But following the position that neither he nor his brothers are guilty about either the woman with whom he had performed ḥalîṣah or the co-wife? It must follow Rebbi Aqiba, since Rebbi Aqiba says that a bastard may come from a woman who had performed ḥalîṣah. Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the levir was a Cohen, had intercourse with her and desecrated her.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
“If he gave a bill of divorce, and ḥalîṣah, nothing is valid after ḥalîṣah,” etc. Did we not state already “there is nothing after ḥalîṣah”? Because we stated after that, “whether there is one sister-in-law or two sisters-in-law”. If somebody gave qiddushin to the one with whom he performed ḥalîṣah, would they not lay hold on her? Explain it either following Rebbi if he did not intend it or according to everybody if he intended to acquire as “bespeaking” of a sister-in-law but she was not his sister-in-law. Rebbi Abba said, this was stated: “ ‘Bespeaking’ acquires whether intentional or not intentional, the words of Rebbi. But the Sages say, it acquires only with intention. Rebbi agrees that qiddushin acquire only with intention.” What is Rebbi’s reason? Intercourse acquires, “bespeaking” acquires. Just as intercourse acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional. And just as Rebbi says, “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional, so he says the bill of divorce frees whether intentional or not intentional. And why does Rebbi say that “bespeaking” acquires whether intentional or not intentional? Since intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. Even if the bill of divorce would free even if not intentional, ḥalîṣah can free only if it is intentional.
MISHNAH: How? If he “bespoke” both of them, they need two bills of divorce and a ḥalîṣah . If he “bespoke” one and copulated with the other, they need two bills of divorce and a ḥalîṣah. If he “bespoke” one and gave a bill of divorce to the other, [the first one] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he “bespoke” one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, the first one needs a bill of divorce.
MISHNAH: How? If he “bespoke” both of them, they need two bills of divorce and a ḥalîṣah . If he “bespoke” one and copulated with the other, they need two bills of divorce and a ḥalîṣah. If he “bespoke” one and gave a bill of divorce to the other, [the first one] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he “bespoke” one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, the first one needs a bill of divorce.
MISHNAH: How? If he “bespoke” both of them, they need two bills of divorce and a ḥalîṣah . If he “bespoke” one and copulated with the other, they need two bills of divorce and a ḥalîṣah. If he “bespoke” one and gave a bill of divorce to the other, [the first one] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he “bespoke” one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, the first one needs a bill of divorce.
MISHNAH: How? If he “bespoke” both of them, they need two bills of divorce and a ḥalîṣah . If he “bespoke” one and copulated with the other, they need two bills of divorce and a ḥalîṣah. If he “bespoke” one and gave a bill of divorce to the other, [the first one] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he “bespoke” one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, the first one needs a bill of divorce.
MISHNAH: If there are bills of divorce for both of them, they need a ḥalîṣah. If there is a bill of divorce to one and he copulated with the other, [the latter] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he gave a bill of divorce to one and “bespoke” the other, [the second one] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he gave a bill of divorce to one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, nothing follows after ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: If there are bills of divorce for both of them, they need a ḥalîṣah. If there is a bill of divorce to one and he copulated with the other, [the latter] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he gave a bill of divorce to one and “bespoke” the other, [the second one] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he gave a bill of divorce to one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, nothing follows after ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: If there are bills of divorce for both of them, they need a ḥalîṣah. If there is a bill of divorce to one and he copulated with the other, [the latter] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he gave a bill of divorce to one and “bespoke” the other, [the second one] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he gave a bill of divorce to one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, nothing follows after ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: If there are bills of divorce for both of them, they need a ḥalîṣah. If there is a bill of divorce to one and he copulated with the other, [the latter] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he gave a bill of divorce to one and “bespoke” the other, [the second one] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he gave a bill of divorce to one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, nothing follows after ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: If there are bills of divorce for both of them, they need a ḥalîṣah. If there is a bill of divorce to one and he copulated with the other, [the latter] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he gave a bill of divorce to one and “bespoke” the other, [the second one] needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah. If he gave a bill of divorce to one and performed ḥalîṣah with the other, nothing follows after ḥalîṣah.
HALAKHAH: “How? If he ‘bespoke’,” etc. In the opinion of Rebbi, what about his “bespeaking”, may a nine-year-old “bespeak”? The intercourse of an adult is final; his “bespeaking” partially acquires. The intercourse of a minor is final; does his “bespeaking” partially acquire? What is the difference between his intercourse and his “bespeaking”? But some want to formulate: What is the difference between “bespeaking” of an adult and “bespeaking” of a minor? Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.
HALAKHAH: “How? If he ‘bespoke’,” etc. In the opinion of Rebbi, what about his “bespeaking”, may a nine-year-old “bespeak”? The intercourse of an adult is final; his “bespeaking” partially acquires. The intercourse of a minor is final; does his “bespeaking” partially acquire? What is the difference between his intercourse and his “bespeaking”? But some want to formulate: What is the difference between “bespeaking” of an adult and “bespeaking” of a minor? Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.
HALAKHAH: “How? If he ‘bespoke’,” etc. In the opinion of Rebbi, what about his “bespeaking”, may a nine-year-old “bespeak”? The intercourse of an adult is final; his “bespeaking” partially acquires. The intercourse of a minor is final; does his “bespeaking” partially acquire? What is the difference between his intercourse and his “bespeaking”? But some want to formulate: What is the difference between “bespeaking” of an adult and “bespeaking” of a minor? Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.
HALAKHAH: “How? If he ‘bespoke’,” etc. In the opinion of Rebbi, what about his “bespeaking”, may a nine-year-old “bespeak”? The intercourse of an adult is final; his “bespeaking” partially acquires. The intercourse of a minor is final; does his “bespeaking” partially acquire? What is the difference between his intercourse and his “bespeaking”? But some want to formulate: What is the difference between “bespeaking” of an adult and “bespeaking” of a minor? Samuel said, the words of Rebbi Meïr: They made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. And as you said, they made the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult, they made the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult. But the rabbis said, the ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day is nothing. And why did they make the intercourse of a child of nine years and one day like “bespeaking” of an adult? Because the intercourse of an adult acquires whether intentional or not intentional. The ḥalîṣah of a child of nine years and one day was made like a bill of divorce by an adult. But ḥalîṣah by an adult can free only if it is intentional.
MISHNAH: If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and copulated, or copulated with both of them, or copulated and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and performed ḥaliṣah, nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, whether there are two sisters-in-law and one levir or two levirs with one sister-in-law.
MISHNAH: If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and copulated, or copulated with both of them, or copulated and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and performed ḥaliṣah, nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, whether there are two sisters-in-law and one levir or two levirs with one sister-in-law.
MISHNAH: If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and copulated, or copulated with both of them, or copulated and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and performed ḥaliṣah, nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, whether there are two sisters-in-law and one levir or two levirs with one sister-in-law.
MISHNAH: If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and copulated, or copulated with both of them, or copulated and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and performed ḥaliṣah, nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, whether there are two sisters-in-law and one levir or two levirs with one sister-in-law.
MISHNAH: If he performed ḥaliṣah and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and copulated, or copulated and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and performed ḥaliṣah, nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, whether at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end. But in the case of copulation, nothing comes after it when it is at the start’. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, nothing comes after copulation or ḥalîṣah, whether at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end.
MISHNAH: If he performed ḥaliṣah and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and copulated, or copulated and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and performed ḥaliṣah, nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, whether at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end. But in the case of copulation, nothing comes after it when it is at the start’. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, nothing comes after copulation or ḥalîṣah, whether at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end.
MISHNAH: If he performed ḥaliṣah and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and copulated, or copulated and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and performed ḥaliṣah, nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, whether at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end. But in the case of copulation, nothing comes after it when it is at the start’. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, nothing comes after copulation or ḥalîṣah, whether at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end.
MISHNAH: If he performed ḥaliṣah and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and copulated, or copulated and “bespoke”, gave a divorce document and performed ḥaliṣah, nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, whether at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end. But in the case of copulation, nothing comes after it when it is at the start’. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, nothing comes after copulation or ḥalîṣah, whether at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end.
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”
HALAKHAH: “If he performed ḥaliṣah with both of them, performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. “If he performed ḥaliṣah and ‘bespoke’,” etc. There, they say: The words of Rebbi Neḥemiah that an improper copulation frees. In the opinion of the rabbis there copulation frees, whether after “bespeaking” or after a bill of divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, intercourse after “bespeaking” frees; after a bill of divorce it does not free. They did not hear that Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Neḥemiah, Rebbi Simeon, and Rebbi Ismael all said the same. As it was stated: “If there were three sisters-in-law for one levir, he ‘bespoke’ one, copulated with the second, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, the first one needs a bill of divorce and ḥalîṣah, but after copulation there is nothing. An argument de minore ad majus. If nothing comes after ḥalîṣah, which excludes her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah, then it is only logical that nothing should come after intercourse which does not exclude her from the priesthood, whether she copulated or performed ḥalîṣah. But for the rabbis he is forbidden the relatives of all three of them and they need three bills of divorce and ḥalîṣah for one of them.”
MISHNAH: Similarly, anybody who comes upon any of the incest-prohibited women specified in the Torah, or of the disqualified ones, [i. e.,] a widow for the High Priest or a divorcee or one who had participated in ḥalîṣah for a private Cohen, a bastard or Gibeonite female for an Israel, or an Israel woman for a male bastard or Gibeonite, disqualified her and there is no difference between intercourse and intercourse.
MISHNAH: A widow betrothed to the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had participated in ḥalîṣah to a private Cohen are not permitted to eat heave; Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon declare them able. When they were widowed or divorced, after marriage they are disabled, after betrothal they are enabled.
MISHNAH: The High Priest shall not marry a widow, whether a widow from betrothal or a widow from marriage. He shall not marry an adult; Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon enable the adult. He shall not marry one injured by a piece of wood. If he gave qiddushin and afterwards was elected High Priest, he shall marry her; it happened that Joshua ben Gamla had given qiddushin to Martha bat Boetos when the king appointed him as High Priest and he married her. If a woman was waiting for her Cohen levir when he was elected High Priest, even though he “bespoke” her, he may not marry her. If the brother of a High Priest died, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.
“If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah?
“If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah?
“If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah?
MISHNAH: If a widow [married] to a High Priest, or a divorcee or one freed by ḥalîṣah [married] to a simple priest, brought him slaves as paraphernalia or as mortmain: The slaves of separate property may not eat heave, the slaves of mortmain may eat heave. These are slaves of paraphernalia: If they died, they died as her property, if they increased, they increased as her property. Even though he is responsible for their upkeep, they may not eat heave. These are slaves of mortmain: If they died, they died as his property, if they increased, they increased as his property. Since he guarantees them, they may eat heave.
MISHNAH: The fetus, the levir, the betrothal, the deaf-and-dumb, and the male nine years and one day old disable but do not enable to eat. If there was a doubt whether or not he had reached nine years and one dayt; whether or not he had grown two pubic hairs; when the house fell on him and his brother’s daughter and it is not known who of them died first, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.
“When the house fell on him and his brother’s daughter and it is not known who of them died first, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” Why do we come here to state doubts? Since we had stated [the rules for] co-wives, we now state for doubts concerning co-wives.
It was stated: As long as he is occupied with the circumcision, he may return both to fibers which invalidate the circumcision as also to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Once he has stopped, he may return only to fibers which invalidate the circumcision. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Which [statement of] Rebbi Yose? That which we had stated there: “Rebbi Yose said, if the first day of Tabernacles falls on a Sabbath and somebody forgot [that it was the Sabbath] and took the palm branch into the public domain he is free [from punishment] since he took it out with permission.” Is it the same for the knife of circumcision, for a maṣṣah? Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision, that means the same holds for the knife of circumcision, for a maṣṣah.
It was stated: As long as he is occupied with the circumcision, he may return both to fibers which invalidate the circumcision as also to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Once he has stopped, he may return only to fibers which invalidate the circumcision. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision. Which [statement of] Rebbi Yose? That which we had stated there: “Rebbi Yose said, if the first day of Tabernacles falls on a Sabbath and somebody forgot [that it was the Sabbath] and took the palm branch into the public domain he is free [from punishment] since he took it out with permission.” Is it the same for the knife of circumcision, for a maṣṣah? Since Rebbi Joḥanan said, the words of Rebbi Yose imply that even after he has stopped he may return even to fibers that do not invalidate the circumcision, that means the same holds for the knife of circumcision, for a maṣṣah.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua said, I heard that the castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife, and that the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife, and I cannot explain. Rebbi Aqiba said, I shall explain it. A castrate by human action performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he had been qualified; a congenital castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he never had been qualified. Rebbi Eliezer said, it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he might be healed, a castrate by human action does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he cannot be healed. Rebbi Joshua ben Bathyra testified about Ben Megisa in Jerusalem that he was a castrate by human action and they instructed that levirate be performed for his wife, to endorse the words of Rebbi Aqiba.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua said, I heard that the castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife, and that the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife, and I cannot explain. Rebbi Aqiba said, I shall explain it. A castrate by human action performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he had been qualified; a congenital castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he never had been qualified. Rebbi Eliezer said, it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he might be healed, a castrate by human action does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he cannot be healed. Rebbi Joshua ben Bathyra testified about Ben Megisa in Jerusalem that he was a castrate by human action and they instructed that levirate be performed for his wife, to endorse the words of Rebbi Aqiba.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua said, I heard that the castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife, and that the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife, and I cannot explain. Rebbi Aqiba said, I shall explain it. A castrate by human action performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he had been qualified; a congenital castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he never had been qualified. Rebbi Eliezer said, it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he might be healed, a castrate by human action does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he cannot be healed. Rebbi Joshua ben Bathyra testified about Ben Megisa in Jerusalem that he was a castrate by human action and they instructed that levirate be performed for his wife, to endorse the words of Rebbi Aqiba.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua said, I heard that the castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife, and that the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife, and I cannot explain. Rebbi Aqiba said, I shall explain it. A castrate by human action performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he had been qualified; a congenital castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he never had been qualified. Rebbi Eliezer said, it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he might be healed, a castrate by human action does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he cannot be healed. Rebbi Joshua ben Bathyra testified about Ben Megisa in Jerusalem that he was a castrate by human action and they instructed that levirate be performed for his wife, to endorse the words of Rebbi Aqiba.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua said, I heard that the castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife, and that the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife, and I cannot explain. Rebbi Aqiba said, I shall explain it. A castrate by human action performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he had been qualified; a congenital castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he never had been qualified. Rebbi Eliezer said, it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he might be healed, a castrate by human action does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he cannot be healed. Rebbi Joshua ben Bathyra testified about Ben Megisa in Jerusalem that he was a castrate by human action and they instructed that levirate be performed for his wife, to endorse the words of Rebbi Aqiba.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua said, I heard that the castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife, and that the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife, and I cannot explain. Rebbi Aqiba said, I shall explain it. A castrate by human action performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he had been qualified; a congenital castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he never had been qualified. Rebbi Eliezer said, it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he might be healed, a castrate by human action does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he cannot be healed. Rebbi Joshua ben Bathyra testified about Ben Megisa in Jerusalem that he was a castrate by human action and they instructed that levirate be performed for his wife, to endorse the words of Rebbi Aqiba.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua said, I heard that the castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife, and that the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife, and I cannot explain. Rebbi Aqiba said, I shall explain it. A castrate by human action performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he had been qualified; a congenital castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he never had been qualified. Rebbi Eliezer said, it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he might be healed, a castrate by human action does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he cannot be healed. Rebbi Joshua ben Bathyra testified about Ben Megisa in Jerusalem that he was a castrate by human action and they instructed that levirate be performed for his wife, to endorse the words of Rebbi Aqiba.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua said, I heard that the castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife, and that the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife, and I cannot explain. Rebbi Aqiba said, I shall explain it. A castrate by human action performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he had been qualified; a congenital castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he never had been qualified. Rebbi Eliezer said, it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he might be healed, a castrate by human action does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he cannot be healed. Rebbi Joshua ben Bathyra testified about Ben Megisa in Jerusalem that he was a castrate by human action and they instructed that levirate be performed for his wife, to endorse the words of Rebbi Aqiba.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua said, I heard that the castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife, and that the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife, and I cannot explain. Rebbi Aqiba said, I shall explain it. A castrate by human action performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he had been qualified; a congenital castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he never had been qualified. Rebbi Eliezer said, it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he might be healed, a castrate by human action does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he cannot be healed. Rebbi Joshua ben Bathyra testified about Ben Megisa in Jerusalem that he was a castrate by human action and they instructed that levirate be performed for his wife, to endorse the words of Rebbi Aqiba.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua said, I heard that the castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife, and that the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife, and I cannot explain. Rebbi Aqiba said, I shall explain it. A castrate by human action performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he had been qualified; a congenital castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he never had been qualified. Rebbi Eliezer said, it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he might be healed, a castrate by human action does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he cannot be healed. Rebbi Joshua ben Bathyra testified about Ben Megisa in Jerusalem that he was a castrate by human action and they instructed that levirate be performed for his wife, to endorse the words of Rebbi Aqiba.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua said, I heard that the castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife, and that the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife, and I cannot explain. Rebbi Aqiba said, I shall explain it. A castrate by human action performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he had been qualified; a congenital castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he never had been qualified. Rebbi Eliezer said, it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he might be healed, a castrate by human action does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he cannot be healed. Rebbi Joshua ben Bathyra testified about Ben Megisa in Jerusalem that he was a castrate by human action and they instructed that levirate be performed for his wife, to endorse the words of Rebbi Aqiba.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Joshua said, I heard that the castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife, and that the castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife, and I cannot explain. Rebbi Aqiba said, I shall explain it. A castrate by human action performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he had been qualified; a congenital castrate does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he never had been qualified. Rebbi Eliezer said, it is not so, but a congenital castrate performs ḥalîṣah and one performs ḥalîṣah for his wife since he might be healed, a castrate by human action does not perform ḥalîṣah and one does not perform ḥalîṣah for his wife since he cannot be healed. Rebbi Joshua ben Bathyra testified about Ben Megisa in Jerusalem that he was a castrate by human action and they instructed that levirate be performed for his wife, to endorse the words of Rebbi Aqiba.
MISHNAH: The castrate does not perform either ḥalîṣah or levirate; similarly, the she-ram does not perform either ḥalîṣah or levirate. The castrate who performed ḥalîṣah for his sister-in-law did not disable her; if he copulated with her he disabled her because it is incestuous. Similarly, if the brothers performed ḥalîṣah for a she-ram, they did not disable her; if they copulated with her they disabled her because it is incestuous.
MISHNAH: The castrate does not perform either ḥalîṣah or levirate; similarly, the she-ram does not perform either ḥalîṣah or levirate. The castrate who performed ḥalîṣah for his sister-in-law did not disable her; if he copulated with her he disabled her because it is incestuous. Similarly, if the brothers performed ḥalîṣah for a she-ram, they did not disable her; if they copulated with her they disabled her because it is incestuous.
MISHNAH: The castrate does not perform either ḥalîṣah or levirate; similarly, the she-ram does not perform either ḥalîṣah or levirate. The castrate who performed ḥalîṣah for his sister-in-law did not disable her; if he copulated with her he disabled her because it is incestuous. Similarly, if the brothers performed ḥalîṣah for a she-ram, they did not disable her; if they copulated with her they disabled her because it is incestuous.