14299 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:22

HALAKHAH: “If he wrote in the name of an inappropriate government, in the name of the government of Media,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They declared the child a bastard because of the danger. Rav Huna in the name of Rav: This entire Chapter is Rebbi Meїr’s except for “if he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city.” Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yasa: Also “if somebody divorced his wife”? He said to him, not your Chapter but our Chapter.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:32

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorced his wife but she stayed with him,” etc. Rebbi Mana said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man may send away his wife with an old bill of divorce,” they say that she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai are consistent and the House of Hillel are consistent. Since the House of Shammai say that “a man shall not divorce his wife unless he found in her a matter of immorality,” thy say that she is dirty in his eyes and he is not suspected of having relations with her, therefore she does not need a second bill of divorce from him.. Since the House of Hillel say, “even if she spoiled his food”, they say that she is not dirty in his eyes, he is suspected of having relations with her, and she needs a second bill of divorce from him’.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:35

HALAKHAH: “Anybody can supplement a bald document,” etc. From where that a document can be knotted? Rebbi Immi said, it is written: “I took the document,” etc. “And [the sealed]”, that is the knotted [document]. “And the open,” that is the simple, part of the knotted. “And the orders and the rules”; orders and rules differ between these, for one is with two {witnesses], the other with three; one in it, the other on its back. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah, on a simple document, the witnesses sign parallel, on a knotted one the witnesses sign lengthwise. Rebbi Idi said, the witnesses sign between any two knots, but it must be on top. But should one not be afraid that maybe he falsifies? Rav Naḥman wanted to argue that witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that two times “I accept” makes it invalid. But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Does Rav Huna not consider that he might write another text, erase and change to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that an erasure makes invalid even if the correction is certified.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:8

MISHNAH: “You are permitted to any man except to my father and your father, to my brother and your brother, to a slave, a Gentile,” or anybody she is unable to contract a preliminary marriage with, it is valid. “You are permitted to any man except as a widow to the High Priest, a divorcee or one having received ḥalȋṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite girl to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a a bastard or a Gibeonite,” or anybody she could contract a preliminary marriage with even if it is sinful, it is invalid. The essence of the bill of divorce: You are herewith permitted to any man. Rebbi Jehudah says: This shall be for you from me a divorce scroll and a letter of abandonment, to enable you to marry any man you desire. The essence of the bill of manumission: You are a free person, you are on your own.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:8

MISHNAH: “You are permitted to any man except to my father and your father, to my brother and your brother, to a slave, a Gentile,” or anybody she is unable to contract a preliminary marriage with, it is valid. “You are permitted to any man except as a widow to the High Priest, a divorcee or one having received ḥalȋṣah to a common priest, a bastard or a Gibeonite girl to an Israel, the daughter of an Israel to a a bastard or a Gibeonite,” or anybody she could contract a preliminary marriage with even if it is sinful, it is invalid. The essence of the bill of divorce: You are herewith permitted to any man. Rebbi Jehudah says: This shall be for you from me a divorce scroll and a letter of abandonment, to enable you to marry any man you desire. The essence of the bill of manumission: You are a free person, you are on your own.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:15

“Three kinds of bills of divorce are invalid,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: All in handwriting. Rebbi Eleazar asked: There are witnesses; why do I need handwriting? Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: All in handwriting except if its witnesses are with it. Rav Hamnuna said, they testified to their own sin since they agreed to lie by signing on an undated bill of divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:18

HALAKHAH: “Rebbi Eleazar says, it is valid even if there are no signatures of witnesses on it,” etc. Rav and Samuel both say that practice follows Rebbi Eleazar. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: The words of the Sages: It is invalid. There came a case before Rebbi Joḥanan about a Cohen’s wife and he wanted to act on Rebbi Yannai’s statement when it was heard that Rav and Samuel disagreed. There came before him [another case] involving an Israel, and he listened to that. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, in the opinion of everybody it is valid. But did not Rebbi Eleazar say, it is valid, and the rabbis say, it is invalid? What is their disagreement? Rebbi Eleazar said, it is valid and she can collect from encumbered property. The rabbis said, it is invalid and she can collect only from unencumbered property.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:22

HALAKHAH: “Five who wrote collectively a bill of divorce,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “And I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he said “I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Joḥanan? X divorces Y and Z U. What means “collectively” for Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish? We, X and Z, divorce our wives at place A. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Joḥanan agrees that if he mentions divorce for each one separately he needs a text and witnesses for each one separately. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan is from the following: “ ‘That I shall not benefit, a qorbān for this one or that one’; each single one needs a separate opening.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he wrote a separate text for each of them and the witnesses signed at the end, [only] the one with which the witnesses are read is valid.” Samuel said, the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is the general statement for Rebbi Meїr. [Rebbi] Samuel said in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira, the words of the rabbis show that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is not the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah and the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “and I am greeting X,” one can assume that he signed regarding everything; “I am greeting X,” he signed only for the greeting. If you would say that the detailed statement for Rebbi Meїr is the general statement for Rebbi Jehudah, even if he said “and I am greeting X,” can one assume that he signed regarding everything? How is this? Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah implies that the detailed statement for Rebbi Jehudah is not the general statement for Rebbi Meїr, as we have stated there: “Rebbi Meїr says, even ‘wheat, and barley, and spelt’ makes him guilty for each one separately”, but nobody says “even” unless he refers to an earlier statement. How is this? Rebbi Ḥanina said, in Rebbi Meїr’s opinion, [whether] he said “wheat, and barley, and spelt”, [or “wheat, barley, spelt] is a general statement and particulars. [In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion,] if he said, “wheat grains, barley grains, and spelt grains”, it is a general statement without particulars.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:24

HALAKHAH: “If he wrote two bills of divorce side by side,” etc. “It is invalid if the witnesses are separated from the text by the width of two lines; less than that it is valid”. Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: An empty space of two lines in a text about one subject makes invalid in any case. Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said: The Mishnah says so: “One Hebrew- and one Greek-writing witness are under each of them, reaching from one column to the other, are all invalid.” Is not Hebrew combined with Greek one item? Rebbi Mana said, if he started at the end of the second line and ended at the fourth line, it is valid. “How far from the text should the witnesses sign? That they can be read with it, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says, one full line. Rebbi Dositheos ben Yannai says, the width of the witnesses’ handwriting.” What kind of writing does one use to estimate? Rebbi Yasa ben Rebbi Sabbatai says, the width of the witnesses’ handwriting. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Isaac ben Ḥaqula: Corresponding to לך ולך. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does the signature of Yose ben Yannai have equal weight with the signature of Shaul ben Barukh? He said to him: For that it is needed, that the signature of Yose ben Yannai has equal weight with the signature of Shaul ben Barukh.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:25

A document which has an erasure or insertion in its main part is invalid; in the routine matter it is valid; but if it was mentioned later it is valid even in the main part. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, one has to mention it at least in the second line before the end of the text. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav: One has to mention the essence of the document with it. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: If one did not mention the essence of the document with it. The argument of Rebbi Abba seems inverted. There, Rebbi Ba said in the name of Rav Jeremiah: Disqualified witnesses do not constitute remote testimony since they came only to support the document’s validity. And here, he says so? There, in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah, here in the name of Rav.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:35

MISHNAH: If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married; divorced, she is divorced, except if there was an excuse. What would be an excuse? Mr. X divorced his wife conditionally, or he threw valuables for preliminary marriage to her and it was doubtful whether it was closer to her than to him; that is an excuse.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:35

MISHNAH: If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married; divorced, she is divorced, except if there was an excuse. What would be an excuse? Mr. X divorced his wife conditionally, or he threw valuables for preliminary marriage to her and it was doubtful whether it was closer to her than to him; that is an excuse.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:35

MISHNAH: If it became public knowledge in town that she was preliminarily married, she is preliminarily married; divorced, she is divorced, except if there was an excuse. What would be an excuse? Mr. X divorced his wife conditionally, or he threw valuables for preliminary marriage to her and it was doubtful whether it was closer to her than to him; that is an excuse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:1

MISHNAH: A wife may be acquired in three ways; she regains her autonomy in two ways. She is acquired by money, or by a document, or by intercourse. By money, the House of Shammai say, by a denar or a denar’s value; but the House of Hillel say, by a peruṭa or a peruṭa’s value. How much is a peruṭa? One eighth of an Italic assarius. She regains her autonomy by a bill of divorce or by the husband’s death. A sister-in-law is acquired by intercourse; she regains her autonomy by ḥaliṣah or by the brother-in-law’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:6

Rebbi Abin said that Ḥisqiah stated: “After he acquires,” which means that she is acquired by money. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the Hebrew slave girl, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by money, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, should be acquired by money? This is proved by the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money but is acquired by intercourse. Therefore you would not be astonished if this one, who may be acquired by intercourse, might not be acquired by money. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:7

“And has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse. Would it not be an argument de minore ad majus? Since the sister-in-law, who cannot be acquired by money, can be acquired by intercourse, would it not be logical that this one, who may be acquired by money, should be acquired by intercourse? The Hebrew slave girl proves, who cannot be acquired by intercourse but is acquired by money. You likewise do not wonder that this one, who may be acquired by money, might not be acquired by intercourse. The verse says, “after he acquires,” this tells you that she is acquired by money; “and has marital relations with her,” this tells you that she is acquired by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:9

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:9

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:9

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:9

Rebbi Yudan said, an argument de minore ad majus that a free woman should be acquired by actual possession. Is it not logical that since a Gentile slave woman, who cannot be acquired by intercourse, can be acquired by actual possession, by an argument de minore ad majus a free woman, who can be acquired by intercourse, could be acquired by actual possession? The verse says, “and has marital relations with her.” She can be acquired by intercourse but cannot be acquired by actual possession. An argument de minore ad majus that a Gentile slave woman should be acquired by intercourse: Is it not logical that since a free woman, who cannot be acquired by actual possession, can be acquired by intercourse, by an argument de minore ad majus a Gentile slave woman, who can be acquired by actual possession, could be acquired by intercourse? The verse says, “you may leave them as inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit them as property.” She is acquired by actual possession; she is not acquired by intercourse. So we inferred that a woman can be acquired in three ways: by money, or by document, or by intercourse.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:13

If you say, by Jewish rules, he is guilty if he converted. If you say, by their rules, he cannot be prosecuted if he converted, as Rebbi Ḥanina said, a descendant of Noah who blasphemed and then converted cannot be prosecuted since the law changed for him. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The descendants of Noah are warned about nakedness as Jews are; the verse says, “he shall cling to his wife”, not to somebody else’s wife. “He shall cling to his wife”, not to a male, nor to an animal. Rebbi Samuel, Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: A descendant of Noah who had perverse intercourse with his wife is killed. What is the reason? “He shall cling to his wife so they become one flesh,” at the place where they together create one flesh.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:14

Rebbi Yose asked: What is the legal status of “touching” a male? What is the legal status of “touching” an animal? Were not all incest prohibitions inferred from the menstruating woman? The male is included; the animal is included. So far, for Israel. For Gentiles? Rebbi Mana said, not from this: “He shall cling to his wife”? Not in any way to somebody else’s wife, not in any way to a male or an animal.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:14

Rebbi Yose asked: What is the legal status of “touching” a male? What is the legal status of “touching” an animal? Were not all incest prohibitions inferred from the menstruating woman? The male is included; the animal is included. So far, for Israel. For Gentiles? Rebbi Mana said, not from this: “He shall cling to his wife”? Not in any way to somebody else’s wife, not in any way to a male or an animal.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:17

By a document. This means, by a document which is not worth a peruṭah, but a document which is worth a peruṭah is money’s worth. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated in this respect: “Not only a document which is worth a peruṭah since a woman can have herself preliminarily married by anything which is worth a peruṭah. But even if he wrote it on an ostrakon or on papyrus and gave it to her, she is preliminarily married.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:19

There, we have stated: “A judicial oath, for a claim of two silver pieces and a judicial acknowlegdment of a peruṭah. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolus, but the House of Hillel say, two obols.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolus. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say, “money” is a peruṭah, but here, they say that “money” is two obols. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The house of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said: “She leaves gratis, without silver.” Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, “without silver”? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolus and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left, and at the end of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolus, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:19

There, we have stated: “A judicial oath, for a claim of two silver pieces and a judicial acknowlegdment of a peruṭah. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolus, but the House of Hillel say, two obols.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolus. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say, “money” is a peruṭah, but here, they say that “money” is two obols. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The house of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said: “She leaves gratis, without silver.” Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, “without silver”? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolus and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left, and at the end of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolus, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:19

There, we have stated: “A judicial oath, for a claim of two silver pieces and a judicial acknowlegdment of a peruṭah. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolus, but the House of Hillel say, two obols.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolus. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say, “money” is a peruṭah, but here, they say that “money” is two obols. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The house of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said: “She leaves gratis, without silver.” Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, “without silver”? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolus and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left, and at the end of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolus, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:19

There, we have stated: “A judicial oath, for a claim of two silver pieces and a judicial acknowlegdment of a peruṭah. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolus, but the House of Hillel say, two obols.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolus. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say, “money” is a peruṭah, but here, they say that “money” is two obols. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The house of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said: “She leaves gratis, without silver.” Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, “without silver”? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolus and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left, and at the end of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolus, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:19

There, we have stated: “A judicial oath, for a claim of two silver pieces and a judicial acknowlegdment of a peruṭah. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolus, but the House of Hillel say, two obols.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolus. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say, “money” is a peruṭah, but here, they say that “money” is two obols. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The house of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said: “She leaves gratis, without silver.” Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, “without silver”? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolus and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left, and at the end of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolus, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:19

There, we have stated: “A judicial oath, for a claim of two silver pieces and a judicial acknowlegdment of a peruṭah. The claim, the House of Shammai say, an obolus, but the House of Hillel say, two obols.” The argument of the House of Shammai seems inverted. There, they say, “silver” is a denar, but here, they say that “silver” is an obolus. The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. There, they say, “money” is a peruṭah, but here, they say that “money” is two obols. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ḥanina: The house of Shammai learn from the initial sale of a Hebrew girl. Since her initial sale was by [at least] a denar, so her preliminary marriage is by [at least] a denar. The House of Hillel learn from the end of her diminution. Since the end of her diminution is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah. What is the reason of the House of Shammai? As it is said: “She leaves gratis, without silver.” Would we not know that it is without money? Why does the verse say, “without silver”? From there, that she is sold for more than silver. And what is more than silver? A denar. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Judah bar Pazi: For if she wants to diminish, she diminishes every year by an obolus and leaves. Could she not diminish by a peruṭah? Rebbi Abun said, think of it. If she wanted to compute the diminution at the start of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left, and at the end of the sixth year, there would be a peruṭah left. But the start of the diminution must be an obolus, the end of the diminution a peruṭah. If there is only one peruṭah left, can she not pay the diminished amount and leave? Just as the last diminished amount is a peruṭah, so her preliminary marriage should be a peruṭah! What is the reason of the House of Hillel? Since her last diminished amount is a peruṭah, you know that her preliminary marriage is by a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:20

The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. It is written: “If a person give to his neighbor money or vessels to watch over.” If to teach that the court will not act on less that a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written: “To incur liability for it”? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. (Why does the verse say, “without silver”?) From there, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two obols. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? “Or vessels”; since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret “or vessels”? As we have stated: Rebbi Nathan says, “or vessels”, to include all kinds of vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is guilty. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two perutot, that the claim should be about a perutah’s worth and the confession about a perutah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two obols, also “vessels” means two oboli’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:20

The argument of the House of Hillel seems inverted. It is written: “If a person give to his neighbor money or vessels to watch over.” If to teach that the court will not act on less that a peruṭah’s worth, is it not already written: “To incur liability for it”? To exclude anything not worth a peruṭah. (Why does the verse say, “without silver”?) From there, that it should be more than silver. And what is more than silver? Two obols. But maybe “silver” is a peruṭah, more than silver two peruṭot? The smallest silver coin is an obolus. So why is it not an obolus? “Or vessels”; since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. How do the House of Shammai interpret “or vessels”? As we have stated: Rebbi Nathan says, “or vessels”, to include all kinds of vessels. Samuel said, if he claimed from him two needles and he admitted to one, he is guilty. Rebbi Ḥinena said, only if they are worth two perutot, that the claim should be about a perutah’s worth and the confession about a perutah’s worth. This follows the House of Shammai who do not learn money’s worth from “vessels”. But following the House of Hillel who learn money’s worth from “vessels”, since “vessels” are two, also “money” is two. Similarly, since “money” means two obols, also “vessels” means two oboli’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:21

“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:23

“How much is a peruṭah? One eighth of an Italic as.” It was stated: The as is/24 of a silver denar; the silver denar is/24 of a gold denar. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “A tetradrachma is four denarii. Six silver oboli are in a denar. Two dupondii are an obolus. An obolus is two as. A pondius is two semisses. An as is two quadrantes. A semis is two peruṭot. It turns out that a quadrans is/32 of the above.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:23

“How much is a peruṭah? One eighth of an Italic as.” It was stated: The as is/24 of a silver denar; the silver denar is/24 of a gold denar. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “A tetradrachma is four denarii. Six silver oboli are in a denar. Two dupondii are an obolus. An obolus is two as. A pondius is two semisses. An as is two quadrantes. A semis is two peruṭot. It turns out that a quadrans is/32 of the above.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:23

“How much is a peruṭah? One eighth of an Italic as.” It was stated: The as is/24 of a silver denar; the silver denar is/24 of a gold denar. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “A tetradrachma is four denarii. Six silver oboli are in a denar. Two dupondii are an obolus. An obolus is two as. A pondius is two semisses. An as is two quadrantes. A semis is two peruṭot. It turns out that a quadrans is/32 of the above.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:23

“How much is a peruṭah? One eighth of an Italic as.” It was stated: The as is/24 of a silver denar; the silver denar is/24 of a gold denar. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “A tetradrachma is four denarii. Six silver oboli are in a denar. Two dupondii are an obolus. An obolus is two as. A pondius is two semisses. An as is two quadrantes. A semis is two peruṭot. It turns out that a quadrans is/32 of the above.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:24

Rebbi Ze‘ira said, in the days of Rebbi Simai and our teachers they made it/24 of an obolus, as it was stated: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, three dodrantes are an obolus, two besses are a dodrans, two semisses are a bes, two peruṭot a semis. It results in/24 of an obolus.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:24

Rebbi Ze‘ira said, in the days of Rebbi Simai and our teachers they made it/24 of an obolus, as it was stated: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, three dodrantes are an obolus, two besses are a dodrans, two semisses are a bes, two peruṭot a semis. It results in/24 of an obolus.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:24

Rebbi Ze‘ira said, in the days of Rebbi Simai and our teachers they made it/24 of an obolus, as it was stated: “Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, three dodrantes are an obolus, two besses are a dodrans, two semisses are a bes, two peruṭot a semis. It results in/24 of an obolus.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:26

Ḥilfai said: Bring me to the river’s edge. If I cannot derive Rebbi Ḥiyya the Elder’s baraita from the Mishnah, throw me into the river. They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “A tetradrachma are four denar.” He said to them, we also have stated: “By how much can a tetradrachma be deficient without being fraudulent? Rebbi Meïr said four as, one as per denar.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Six silver obols are a denar.” He said to him, I also have stated it: “Fraud is four silver coins for twenty-four silver coins, a tetradrachma, one sixth of the selling price.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two dupondii are an obolus.” He said to them, we also have stated thus: “He gives a tetradrachma and a dupondius per year.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two as are a dupondius”. He said to them, we also have stated thus: “He who put aside an as and ate for half of its worth, then went to another place where it is worth a dupondius, has to eat another as for it.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two semisses are an as, two quadrantes are a semis, two peruṭot are a quadrans.” He said to them, we also have stated thus: “How much is a peruṭah? One eighth of an Italic as.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:26

Ḥilfai said: Bring me to the river’s edge. If I cannot derive Rebbi Ḥiyya the Elder’s baraita from the Mishnah, throw me into the river. They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “A tetradrachma are four denar.” He said to them, we also have stated: “By how much can a tetradrachma be deficient without being fraudulent? Rebbi Meïr said four as, one as per denar.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Six silver obols are a denar.” He said to him, I also have stated it: “Fraud is four silver coins for twenty-four silver coins, a tetradrachma, one sixth of the selling price.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two dupondii are an obolus.” He said to them, we also have stated thus: “He gives a tetradrachma and a dupondius per year.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two as are a dupondius”. He said to them, we also have stated thus: “He who put aside an as and ate for half of its worth, then went to another place where it is worth a dupondius, has to eat another as for it.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two semisses are an as, two quadrantes are a semis, two peruṭot are a quadrans.” He said to them, we also have stated thus: “How much is a peruṭah? One eighth of an Italic as.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:26

Ḥilfai said: Bring me to the river’s edge. If I cannot derive Rebbi Ḥiyya the Elder’s baraita from the Mishnah, throw me into the river. They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “A tetradrachma are four denar.” He said to them, we also have stated: “By how much can a tetradrachma be deficient without being fraudulent? Rebbi Meïr said four as, one as per denar.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Six silver obols are a denar.” He said to him, I also have stated it: “Fraud is four silver coins for twenty-four silver coins, a tetradrachma, one sixth of the selling price.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two dupondii are an obolus.” He said to them, we also have stated thus: “He gives a tetradrachma and a dupondius per year.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two as are a dupondius”. He said to them, we also have stated thus: “He who put aside an as and ate for half of its worth, then went to another place where it is worth a dupondius, has to eat another as for it.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two semisses are an as, two quadrantes are a semis, two peruṭot are a quadrans.” He said to them, we also have stated thus: “How much is a peruṭah? One eighth of an Italic as.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:26

Ḥilfai said: Bring me to the river’s edge. If I cannot derive Rebbi Ḥiyya the Elder’s baraita from the Mishnah, throw me into the river. They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “A tetradrachma are four denar.” He said to them, we also have stated: “By how much can a tetradrachma be deficient without being fraudulent? Rebbi Meïr said four as, one as per denar.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Six silver obols are a denar.” He said to him, I also have stated it: “Fraud is four silver coins for twenty-four silver coins, a tetradrachma, one sixth of the selling price.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two dupondii are an obolus.” He said to them, we also have stated thus: “He gives a tetradrachma and a dupondius per year.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two as are a dupondius”. He said to them, we also have stated thus: “He who put aside an as and ate for half of its worth, then went to another place where it is worth a dupondius, has to eat another as for it.” They said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “Two semisses are an as, two quadrantes are a semis, two peruṭot are a quadrans.” He said to them, we also have stated thus: “How much is a peruṭah? One eighth of an Italic as.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:42

“Or the Jubilee,” as it is written, “in the Jubilee he shall leave.” “Or reduction of the amount,” as it is written: “If there still are many years.” Do we not know that if there are many there are not few, and if there are few there are not many? Rebbi Hila said, sometimes the years are worth more than the wages, sometimes the wages are worth more than the years. How do you explain the following? If he was sold for a mina each and improved so that now he is worth 200 each, from where that one computes for him only by a mina each? The verse says, “according to the years he shall compute his redemption.” We learned that one sold to a Gentile is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed. From where that one sold to an Israel is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed? “Hireling, hireling” for an equal cut. Since the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to a Gentile, so too the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to an Israel. Rebbi says, why does the verse say “he shall be redeemed, he shall be redeemed,” three times? To add all redemptions that they have to follow this order.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:42

“Or the Jubilee,” as it is written, “in the Jubilee he shall leave.” “Or reduction of the amount,” as it is written: “If there still are many years.” Do we not know that if there are many there are not few, and if there are few there are not many? Rebbi Hila said, sometimes the years are worth more than the wages, sometimes the wages are worth more than the years. How do you explain the following? If he was sold for a mina each and improved so that now he is worth 200 each, from where that one computes for him only by a mina each? The verse says, “according to the years he shall compute his redemption.” We learned that one sold to a Gentile is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed. From where that one sold to an Israel is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed? “Hireling, hireling” for an equal cut. Since the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to a Gentile, so too the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to an Israel. Rebbi says, why does the verse say “he shall be redeemed, he shall be redeemed,” three times? To add all redemptions that they have to follow this order.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:42

“Or the Jubilee,” as it is written, “in the Jubilee he shall leave.” “Or reduction of the amount,” as it is written: “If there still are many years.” Do we not know that if there are many there are not few, and if there are few there are not many? Rebbi Hila said, sometimes the years are worth more than the wages, sometimes the wages are worth more than the years. How do you explain the following? If he was sold for a mina each and improved so that now he is worth 200 each, from where that one computes for him only by a mina each? The verse says, “according to the years he shall compute his redemption.” We learned that one sold to a Gentile is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed. From where that one sold to an Israel is advantaged when he comes to be redeemed? “Hireling, hireling” for an equal cut. Since the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to a Gentile, so too the hireling is advantaged in redemption when he is sold to an Israel. Rebbi says, why does the verse say “he shall be redeemed, he shall be redeemed,” three times? To add all redemptions that they have to follow this order.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:49

If he was married to her sister who died. For him who says, he gives money for the allotment at the end, she needs additional money. For him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, she does not need additional money. Even for him who says, the money for allotment was given at the first hour, she needs additional money. Why? Everybody agrees that preliminary marriage is impossible in an incestuous relationship.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:51

“If he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother. He should be able to allot her to his brother by an argument de minore ad majus! If he may allot her to his son who may not take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate, should it not be logical that he may allot her to his brother who may take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate? No. If you would accept the son since he will take [the father’s] place in a field of inheritance, what can you say about his brother who will not take his place in a field of inheritance? Would it be reasonable that he may allot her to him? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to his brother.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:55

Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked before me: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:58

“As a slave girl.” Only as a slave girl: this teaches that he may sell her on condition that he not have the right of allotment over her, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, he did not do anything, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, “and the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid.” But does Rebbi Meïr not agree that “the stipulation of anybody who stipulates against what is written in the Torah is invalid”? He accepts it if it is impossible to keep the stipulation in the end, but here it is possible to keep the stipulation in the end. Do the rabbis not agree about a stipulation which it is possible to keep in the end? They agree to it in money matters, but this is a personal matter. But did we not state: A person may marry a woman and stipulate with her that she have no claim on him for food, clothing, or marital relations? One understands food and clothing. But are marital relations not a personal matter? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, explain it for an underage girl. How can that Tanna explain “as a slave girl”? He may sell her as a widow to the High Priest, as a divorcee or one who received ḥălîṣah to a common priest. How can that Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it by a widow from preliminary marriage. But was it not stated: A person may sell his daugher into marriage and repeat, into servitude and repeat, into marriage after servitude, but not into servitude after marriage? Rebbi Joḥanan said, these are different Tannaïm. He who states “a widow to the High Priest” agrees to servitude after marriage; he who does not state “a widow to the High Priest” does not agree to servitude after marriage. How does the latter Tanna explain “as a servant”? Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it if [the master] was married to her sister.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:60

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Should not the Hebrew slave girl leave by definitive marriage, by an argument de minore ad majus? Since indications [of puberty] which do not emancipate her from her father’s power, free her from her master’s power, is it not logical that definitive marriage, which emancipates her from her father’s power, shall free her from her master’s power? He said to him, I have only the Mishnah: “The Hebrew slave girl in addition regains her autonomy by indicators of puberty.” Bar Pedaiah said, the Hebrew slave girl leaves at the death of her master. What is the reason? “Also your slave girl you shall treat in the same way;” and it is written: “He shall be for you a permanent slave.” He bracketed the Hebrew slave girl with the “pierced slave”. Since the “pierced slave” leaves at his master’s death, the Hebrew slave girl also leaves at her master’s death. It turns out that Bar Pedaiah parallels the following Tanna, as it was stated: The Hebrew slave serves the son but not the daughter; the Hebrew slave girl serves the daughter but not the son. Some Tannaїm state: The Hebrew slave girl as well as the Hebrew slave serve neither the son nor the daughter. How does the Tanna confirm “your slave girl you also shall treat in the same way”? He explains it about the allowance, as it was stated: The following are given allowances: The one who leaves after six years or in the Jubilee, and the Hebrew slave girl who becomes autonomous by indicators of puberty. But one does not give allowances to one who leaves by the reduction of the amount or following the master’s death.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:61

It is written: “His master shall bring him to the judges, or he shall bring him to the door.” How is that? The one who was sold by the court, “his master shall bring him to the judges.” The one who sold himself, “or he shall bring him to the door.” Rebbi Immi asked: It is obvious that the court writes the contract for him who was sold by the court. Who is writing the contract for him who sells himself? It is written: “It shall not be hard in your eyes to send him away free from you; for twice the hire of a hireling he served you for six years.” The hired hand works during the day; he does not work in the night. The Hebrew slave works both day and night. It is written: “He shall not treat him harshly before your eyes,” and you say so? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: His master marries him to a Canaanite slave; it turns out that he serves him day and night. Rebbi Abba bar Mamai asked before Rebbi Immi: Think of it, if he was buying a Cohen! He answered him: Would the case of an Israel not also be permission of something prohibited following Rebbi Simeon? Rebbi Abba bar Mamai here changed his mind.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:62

Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi Abun preached: The earlobe was pierced, lest a Cohen become disqualified. Rebbi Meïr says, he was pierced at his cartilage. Therefore, Rebbi Meïr says that a Cohen cannot be pierced lest he become blemished and be disqualified for service. Could not the cartilage be pierced less than the size of a vetch seed? Maybe it would result in the size of a vetch seed. Let it be the size of a vetch! The Torah said, “he shall return to his inheritance,” as he was. He cannot be pierced unless he had a wife and children. “By an awl”. Not only an awl, from where even a buck-thorn, even a thorn, even glass? The verse says, “he pierces”. This follows Rebbi Aqiba.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:62

Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi Abun preached: The earlobe was pierced, lest a Cohen become disqualified. Rebbi Meïr says, he was pierced at his cartilage. Therefore, Rebbi Meïr says that a Cohen cannot be pierced lest he become blemished and be disqualified for service. Could not the cartilage be pierced less than the size of a vetch seed? Maybe it would result in the size of a vetch seed. Let it be the size of a vetch! The Torah said, “he shall return to his inheritance,” as he was. He cannot be pierced unless he had a wife and children. “By an awl”. Not only an awl, from where even a buck-thorn, even a thorn, even glass? The verse says, “he pierces”. This follows Rebbi Aqiba.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:63

Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: At three places teaching circumvents Scripture and at another place the interpretation.The Torah said, “in a scroll”, but practice said on anything separated from the ground. The Torah said, “in dust”, but practice said in anything on which plants grow. The Torah said, “with an awl”, but practice said, even a buck-thorn, even a thorn, even glass. And at one place the interpretation: Rebbi Ismael stated: “It shall be on the seventh day that he shave all his hair,” inclusion. “His head, his beard, and his eyebrows,” detail. Since it continues “and all his hair he shall shave,” it repeats inclusion. Inclusion, detail, and inclusion is judged only by what is similar to the detail. Since the detail is explained as place of bunching and exposed, it should refer only [hair growing] in bunches at exposed places. But practice is that he shaves to be like a gourd. “With an awl”, since an awl is made of metal, so anything made of metal. Rebbi Yose said, this is a large drill. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, that is the engraving-knife. “He shall bring him to the door.” I could think, even if it was lying flat. The verse says, “or to the door-post”. Since the door-post is upright, so also the door has to be upright: a shame to him and to his family.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:63

Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: At three places teaching circumvents Scripture and at another place the interpretation.The Torah said, “in a scroll”, but practice said on anything separated from the ground. The Torah said, “in dust”, but practice said in anything on which plants grow. The Torah said, “with an awl”, but practice said, even a buck-thorn, even a thorn, even glass. And at one place the interpretation: Rebbi Ismael stated: “It shall be on the seventh day that he shave all his hair,” inclusion. “His head, his beard, and his eyebrows,” detail. Since it continues “and all his hair he shall shave,” it repeats inclusion. Inclusion, detail, and inclusion is judged only by what is similar to the detail. Since the detail is explained as place of bunching and exposed, it should refer only [hair growing] in bunches at exposed places. But practice is that he shaves to be like a gourd. “With an awl”, since an awl is made of metal, so anything made of metal. Rebbi Yose said, this is a large drill. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, that is the engraving-knife. “He shall bring him to the door.” I could think, even if it was lying flat. The verse says, “or to the door-post”. Since the door-post is upright, so also the door has to be upright: a shame to him and to his family.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:63

Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: At three places teaching circumvents Scripture and at another place the interpretation.The Torah said, “in a scroll”, but practice said on anything separated from the ground. The Torah said, “in dust”, but practice said in anything on which plants grow. The Torah said, “with an awl”, but practice said, even a buck-thorn, even a thorn, even glass. And at one place the interpretation: Rebbi Ismael stated: “It shall be on the seventh day that he shave all his hair,” inclusion. “His head, his beard, and his eyebrows,” detail. Since it continues “and all his hair he shall shave,” it repeats inclusion. Inclusion, detail, and inclusion is judged only by what is similar to the detail. Since the detail is explained as place of bunching and exposed, it should refer only [hair growing] in bunches at exposed places. But practice is that he shaves to be like a gourd. “With an awl”, since an awl is made of metal, so anything made of metal. Rebbi Yose said, this is a large drill. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, that is the engraving-knife. “He shall bring him to the door.” I could think, even if it was lying flat. The verse says, “or to the door-post”. Since the door-post is upright, so also the door has to be upright: a shame to him and to his family.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:86

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: If somebody sell a cistern, when he handed over its pail [the buyer] took possession. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sell a house, when [the buyer] stored there, he took possession. Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi asked, what if he handed over the key? Rebbi Zachariah, son-in-law of Rebbi Levi, said: This is a disagreement between Rebbi Simeon and the Sages, as we have stated there: “If somebody hand over the key to his house to an ‘am ha’areṣ, the house is pure since he handed to him only the guarding of the key.” It was stated: “Rebbi Simeon declares impure.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:87

“Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: He who sells the tithes of his field to another person did not do anything; the future children of his slave girl to another person, he did not do anything; the fetus of his animal to another person, he did not do anything; the airspace of his dry land to another person, he did not do anything. But he may sell him a field and reserve the tithes for himself; a slave girl and reserve her children for himself; an animal and reserve her fetus for himself. Is it not impossible for a person to sell the airspace of his dry land to another person? Explain it if he tells him, tear out some grasses from that dry land to acquire its airspace. And here there is real estate before him and he says, pluck something from the ground so that one tenth of it be acquired by you.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:90

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:90

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:90

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:92

Rav Jehudah sent and asked Rebbi Eleazar: Brothers who split? He answered, they divide what they are wearing but not what their sons and daughters are wearing. Rebbi Immi said, if one makes an appraisal for his wife, this is counted for himself and becomes part of the common estate to be distributed. If one makes a necklace for his wife, this is not of the common estate to be distributed if it is to be used on weekdays. But if it is made to be used on holidays, it becomes part of the common estate to be distributed. Rebbi Mana said, holiday dresses are distributed. Sabbath dresses are problematic. It is obvious for Rebbi Abin that both holiday and Sabbath dresses become part of the common estate and are distributed. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Mana: What about spherules? He answered, you understand this since you own many spherules. He said to him, they become part of the common estate to be distributed.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:97

Then they changed it to clipping. What is clipping? If a man sold his inherited field, his relatives brought amphoras, filled them with roasted kernels and nuts and broke them before children. The children were collecting them and saying, X was clipped from his inheritance. When he brought it back, they were doing the same and saying, X returned to his inheritance. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, also if a man married an unsuitable woman, his relatives brought amphoras, filled them with roasted kernels and nuts and broke them before children. The children were collecting them and saying, X was clipped from his family. When he divorced her, they were doing the same and saying, X returned to his family.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:109

MISHNAH: If anything is given instead of money, if one entered in possession, the other is obligated for its exchange. How is this? If an ox was exchanged for a cow, or a donkey for an ox, if one entered in possession, the other is obligated for its exchange. Possession of Heaven is by money, possession of an individual by taking hold. A promise to Heaven is like delivery to an individual.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:109

MISHNAH: If anything is given instead of money, if one entered in possession, the other is obligated for its exchange. How is this? If an ox was exchanged for a cow, or a donkey for an ox, if one entered in possession, the other is obligated for its exchange. Possession of Heaven is by money, possession of an individual by taking hold. A promise to Heaven is like delivery to an individual.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:109

MISHNAH: If anything is given instead of money, if one entered in possession, the other is obligated for its exchange. How is this? If an ox was exchanged for a cow, or a donkey for an ox, if one entered in possession, the other is obligated for its exchange. Possession of Heaven is by money, possession of an individual by taking hold. A promise to Heaven is like delivery to an individual.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:109

MISHNAH: If anything is given instead of money, if one entered in possession, the other is obligated for its exchange. How is this? If an ox was exchanged for a cow, or a donkey for an ox, if one entered in possession, the other is obligated for its exchange. Possession of Heaven is by money, possession of an individual by taking hold. A promise to Heaven is like delivery to an individual.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:111

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: One has a cow and one a donkey. They exchanged one for the other. The donkey’s owner took the cow. When the cow’s owner came to take the donkey and found that it had died, the donkey’s owner has to bring proof that his donkey was alive at the moment he took the cow. For the burden of proof is on the claimant except for barter. And anybody who does not agree to this does not know anything about civil law. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, I do not agree. Rebbi Abba said to Rebbi Ze‘ira: A Mishnah disagrees with Samuel. “If she had bodily defects, as long as she is in her father’s house, the father has to prove.” Not the husband has to prove to regain the [money given] for preliminary marriage from the father. The students of Rebbi Jonah said, explain it if little money was involved. An example: Rebbi Ḥuna, Rebbi Phineas, and Rebbi Ḥizqiah went to visit Rebbi Yosef to learn from him. They said to him, the Mishnah supports Samuel: “Once she entered the husband’s domain, the husband has to prove.” Would not the father have to prove, to extract the ketubah from the husband’s possession? He answered them, does not Samuel agree that if the cow’s owner took possession of the donkey, he has to prove that it was defective before it came into his possession? And this one, when he took her in it is as if he drew close.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:114

“A promise to Heaven is like delivery to an individual.” How? If he bought a cow from the Temple for 200. If he did not have occasion to pay the 200 until the going rate was a mina, he has to pay 200. That means, a promise to Heaven is like delivery to an individual. A cow from the Temple for a mina. If he did not have occasion to pay the mina until the going rate was 200, he has to pay 200. That is what is written: “He has to add a fifth of its estimated value, then it is delivered to him.” Therefore, if he adds, it is delivered to him; if he does not add, it is not delivered to him. “ ‘This steer as elevation offering, or this house as a qorbān,’ they are in the Temple’s possession wherever they are, for it is written: “The Eternal’s are the earth and what fills it,” etc. But among private persons one obtains possession only be taking hold.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:114

“A promise to Heaven is like delivery to an individual.” How? If he bought a cow from the Temple for 200. If he did not have occasion to pay the 200 until the going rate was a mina, he has to pay 200. That means, a promise to Heaven is like delivery to an individual. A cow from the Temple for a mina. If he did not have occasion to pay the mina until the going rate was 200, he has to pay 200. That is what is written: “He has to add a fifth of its estimated value, then it is delivered to him.” Therefore, if he adds, it is delivered to him; if he does not add, it is not delivered to him. “ ‘This steer as elevation offering, or this house as a qorbān,’ they are in the Temple’s possession wherever they are, for it is written: “The Eternal’s are the earth and what fills it,” etc. But among private persons one obtains possession only be taking hold.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:128

Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Cahana: It is written (Prov. 5:6): “She does not smooth the way of life, her tracks deviate and you will not notice it.” The Holy One, praise to Him, moved the rewards of those who fulfill the commandments (to the future world) so that they should act in faith. Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Isaac: It is written (Prov. 4:23): “Observe carefully everything which must be kept, for from it comes life,” observe carefully all the things you were told in the Torah, for you do not know from which of them life will come to you. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana said, the verse equals the easiest commandment with the most difficult one. The easiest commandment is sending away [the mother] from the nest. The most difficult one is honoring father and mother. For both of them it is written: “Your days will be lengthened.” Rebbi Abun said, if for anything that is repayment of debt it is written (Deut. 5:16): “That you shall be well and that your days shall be lengthened,” so much more something that involves monetary loss and personal danger. Rebbi Levi said, this one is greater; repaying a debt is greater than fulfilling an obligation that does not involve repaying a debt. Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: Just as their rewards are the same, so their punishments are identical. (Prov. 30:17) “The eye that scoffs at the father and despises to obey the mother,” the eye that scoffs about honoring father and mother and despises the commandment not to take the mother with the chicks, “the river ravens should pick it out,” the cruel raven should come, pick it out, and not have any enjoyment from it, “the sons of the eagle should eat it,” the merciful eagle should come and enjoy it.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:132

Does it follow him who says the Pesaḥ of women is voluntary? It was stated: “A woman may make the First Pesaḥ by herself and the Second joining others, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, a woman may make the Second Pesaḥ by herself, and certainly the First. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, a woman may make the First Pesaḥ joining others but does not make the Second.” What is the reason of Rebbi Meïr? (Ex. 12:3) “Every man a sheep for the family,” if they want “a sheep for the house.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose, “Every man a sheep for the family,” a fortiori “a sheep for the house.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon? “Every man”, not woman. How do the rabbis uphold “man”? A man, not a minor. Rebbi Jonah said, even according to him who says it is an obligation, it is different here since the occasion was news, lest it become an obligation.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:132

Does it follow him who says the Pesaḥ of women is voluntary? It was stated: “A woman may make the First Pesaḥ by herself and the Second joining others, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Yose says, a woman may make the Second Pesaḥ by herself, and certainly the First. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says, a woman may make the First Pesaḥ joining others but does not make the Second.” What is the reason of Rebbi Meïr? (Ex. 12:3) “Every man a sheep for the family,” if they want “a sheep for the house.” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose, “Every man a sheep for the family,” a fortiori “a sheep for the house.” What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon? “Every man”, not woman. How do the rabbis uphold “man”? A man, not a minor. Rebbi Jonah said, even according to him who says it is an obligation, it is different here since the occasion was news, lest it become an obligation.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:134

“The Cohen puts his hands under hers and performs the weave.” Does the Cohen put his hands under hers? Is that not objectionable? He brings a kerchief. Does that not separate? He brings an elderly Cohen. You may even say, a young man, since bad inclinations do not happen at that hour. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: It happens. If the suspected wife has no hands, two priests weave in her stead.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:1

MISHNAH: A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent, and a woman may be taken in preliminary marriage either in person or through an agent. A man may give away his adolescent daughter in preliminary marriage himself or through his agent. If a man say to a woman: Be married to me preliminarily by this date fruit, be preliminarily married by that one, she is preliminarily married if one of them was worth a peruṭah, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. By this and by that one, she is preliminarily married if together they are worth a peruṭah, but if she was eating immediately what she received, she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:1

MISHNAH: A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent, and a woman may be taken in preliminary marriage either in person or through an agent. A man may give away his adolescent daughter in preliminary marriage himself or through his agent. If a man say to a woman: Be married to me preliminarily by this date fruit, be preliminarily married by that one, she is preliminarily married if one of them was worth a peruṭah, otherwise she is not preliminarily married. By this and by that one, she is preliminarily married if together they are worth a peruṭah, but if she was eating immediately what she received, she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:2

HALAKHAH: “A man may contract a premininary marriage either in person or through an agent,” etc. From where that a person’s agent may act in his stead? Rebbi Eleazar said: “The entirety of the assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the evening.” But do all of them slaughter? Does not one slaughter for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. And that would be the same as: “Everybody should take for himself a sheep for the family, a sheep to a house.” Did everyone take? Did not one take for the many? From here [it follows that] a person’s agent may act in his stead. Rebbi Yose said, there is a difference, for a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge. If you wanted to say that a person may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge, you cannot say so, for Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar that a person may slaughter the Passover sacrifice of another without the latter’s knowledge, but nobody may separate the Passover sacrifice for another without the latter’s knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:3

The House of Shammai say, an agent may not testify as witness. But the House of Hillel say, an agent may testify as witness. How is that? If he sent two, in the opinion of the House of Shammai there is an agent and two witnesses. In the opinion of the House of Hillel, all three can be agents and all three can be witnesses. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, the matter is reasonable if the preliminary marriage was executed by document. But if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he became an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Yose said, since the Torah made him trustworthy, even if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he did not become an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Abba said, there came a case before Rav who admitted the agent as witness. A person deposited his amphoras in another’s corral; [the latter] reneged. The case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who admitted the agent as witness and made him swear [by the testimony of] the porter.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:3

The House of Shammai say, an agent may not testify as witness. But the House of Hillel say, an agent may testify as witness. How is that? If he sent two, in the opinion of the House of Shammai there is an agent and two witnesses. In the opinion of the House of Hillel, all three can be agents and all three can be witnesses. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, the matter is reasonable if the preliminary marriage was executed by document. But if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he became an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Yose said, since the Torah made him trustworthy, even if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he did not become an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Abba said, there came a case before Rav who admitted the agent as witness. A person deposited his amphoras in another’s corral; [the latter] reneged. The case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who admitted the agent as witness and made him swear [by the testimony of] the porter.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:3

The House of Shammai say, an agent may not testify as witness. But the House of Hillel say, an agent may testify as witness. How is that? If he sent two, in the opinion of the House of Shammai there is an agent and two witnesses. In the opinion of the House of Hillel, all three can be agents and all three can be witnesses. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, the matter is reasonable if the preliminary marriage was executed by document. But if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he became an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Yose said, since the Torah made him trustworthy, even if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he did not become an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Abba said, there came a case before Rav who admitted the agent as witness. A person deposited his amphoras in another’s corral; [the latter] reneged. The case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who admitted the agent as witness and made him swear [by the testimony of] the porter.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:3

The House of Shammai say, an agent may not testify as witness. But the House of Hillel say, an agent may testify as witness. How is that? If he sent two, in the opinion of the House of Shammai there is an agent and two witnesses. In the opinion of the House of Hillel, all three can be agents and all three can be witnesses. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, the matter is reasonable if the preliminary marriage was executed by document. But if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he became an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Yose said, since the Torah made him trustworthy, even if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he did not become an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Abba said, there came a case before Rav who admitted the agent as witness. A person deposited his amphoras in another’s corral; [the latter] reneged. The case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who admitted the agent as witness and made him swear [by the testimony of] the porter.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:3

The House of Shammai say, an agent may not testify as witness. But the House of Hillel say, an agent may testify as witness. How is that? If he sent two, in the opinion of the House of Shammai there is an agent and two witnesses. In the opinion of the House of Hillel, all three can be agents and all three can be witnesses. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, the matter is reasonable if the preliminary marriage was executed by document. But if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he became an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Yose said, since the Torah made him trustworthy, even if he executed the preliminary marriage by money, he did not become an interested party in his testimony. Rebbi Abba said, there came a case before Rav who admitted the agent as witness. A person deposited his amphoras in another’s corral; [the latter] reneged. The case came before Rebbi Jeremiah who admitted the agent as witness and made him swear [by the testimony of] the porter.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:4

Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead. “If he definitively will substitute, if he himself will dissolve.” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:5

We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:5

We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:5

We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:5

We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:5

We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:5

We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:5

We have stated: “A preliminarily married adolescent girl, or her father, can accept her bill of divorce.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, like the disagreement about divorce is the disagreement about preliminary marriage. Rebbi Joḥanan said, everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees about a definitive marriage that she is not empowered to marry herself off and to let her father lose her earnings. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan she has no legal standing relative to her father and cannot appoint an agent. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish she does have legal standing relative to her father and can appoint an agent. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A man contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through his agent and a woman contracts a preliminary marriage either in person or through her agent.” He explains it about an adult woman. But did we not state: “If an underage girl said, accept the bill of divorce for me, it is no valid bill of divorce until it reaches her hand.” He explains it about an orphan. But did we not state: “If her father said to [an agent]: Go and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce, if [the husband] wants to retract he cannot retract.” He explains that the Mishnah deals with cases; the first part about an orphan and the second part if she has a father. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “A man may contract a preliminary marriage for his adolescent daughter either by himself or by his agent.” He explains that following Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah said, “no two hands can acquire together.” Rebbi Yose said, a rabbi came out from the assembly and said, a case was decided following Rebbi Joḥanan. Can one rely on that? It was no question of relying on him since it was as from the sea to the frying pan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:6

Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rebbi Assi: If an underage girl married herself off preliminarily with two pubic hairs, her father repudiates the marriage but not she herself. This follows neither Rebbi Joḥanan nor Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. If following Rebbi Joḥanan, there is no place for repudiation. If following Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, the marriage is valid by biblical standards. It follows only Rebbi Joḥanan. Even though Rebbi Joḥanan says that everybody agrees about preliminary marriage that her father contracts but not she herself, he agrees in this case that the father repudiates on her behalf.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:7

Rebbi Abba bar Cahana and Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: If she was preliminarily married with agreement but definitively married without agreement: there was such a case and the father came and removed her from the bridal chamber. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua: He had an indication that Rebbi Joshua ben Levi disagreed with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. But this does not disagree. Just as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said there, she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings, so Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said here, she is not empowered to marry herself off and let her father lose her earnings. Rebbi Abba bar Cahana and Rebbi Jacob bar Idi came in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: If she was preliminarily married without agreement and was being definitively married without agreement: there was such a case and the father came and annulled her preliminary marriage.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:8

If she was preliminarily married with agreement but definitively married without agreement, may she eat heave? Rav said, she does eat; but Samuel said, she may not eat. Rebbi Mana said, Rav’s reason is that if she was preliminarily married with agreement, the permanence of the status quo implies the assumption that he definitively married her with agreement. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav’s reason is that by the earlier Mishnah, a preliminarily married daughter of an Israel may eat heave. What is the difference between them? Her earnings. According to Rebbi Mana, for Rav her earnings belong to her husband; according to Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, for Rav her earnings belong to her father. If she should die, who inherits from her? According to Rebbi Mana, for Rav her husband inherits; according to Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, for Rav her father inherits if she dies. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun stated, for Rav her husband inherits if she dies. If she was preliminarily married without agreement and definitively married without agreement, may she eat heave? Samuel said, she does eat. Come and see: If she was preliminarily married with agreement and definitively married without agreement, Samuel says that she may not eat; here he says she may eat? Samuel treats her as an orphan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:8

If she was preliminarily married with agreement but definitively married without agreement, may she eat heave? Rav said, she does eat; but Samuel said, she may not eat. Rebbi Mana said, Rav’s reason is that if she was preliminarily married with agreement, the permanence of the status quo implies the assumption that he definitively married her with agreement. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav’s reason is that by the earlier Mishnah, a preliminarily married daughter of an Israel may eat heave. What is the difference between them? Her earnings. According to Rebbi Mana, for Rav her earnings belong to her husband; according to Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, for Rav her earnings belong to her father. If she should die, who inherits from her? According to Rebbi Mana, for Rav her husband inherits; according to Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, for Rav her father inherits if she dies. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun stated, for Rav her husband inherits if she dies. If she was preliminarily married without agreement and definitively married without agreement, may she eat heave? Samuel said, she does eat. Come and see: If she was preliminarily married with agreement and definitively married without agreement, Samuel says that she may not eat; here he says she may eat? Samuel treats her as an orphan.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:10

Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: “ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma after thirty [days].’ Even if she spent it within the thirty [days], she is preliminarily married; also Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar will agree to this.” What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was not given for preliminary marriage, while this was given from the start for preliminary marriage. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Then even if a peruṭah’s worth was not left, she should be preliminarily married! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “Be preliminarily married to me by the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meïr said that anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber, so Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says here, anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber. For he explains it to be for a loan when the lender said, buy wheat for me, but he bought barley for him. That is difficult: can one pay for a preliminary marriage with robbed money? Rebbi Yose asked: One understands that a person may invest a peruṭah to gain a denar; would he invest a peruṭah to gain a perutah? Some Tannaïm state: One may preliminarily marry with a robbed item; some Tannaïm state: One cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item. Rebbi Mana said, the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has a chance to recoup from her hand. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has no chance to remove from her hand. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner gave up hope to recover. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner did not give up hope to recover.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:10

Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: “ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma after thirty [days].’ Even if she spent it within the thirty [days], she is preliminarily married; also Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar will agree to this.” What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was not given for preliminary marriage, while this was given from the start for preliminary marriage. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Then even if a peruṭah’s worth was not left, she should be preliminarily married! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “Be preliminarily married to me by the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meïr said that anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber, so Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says here, anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber. For he explains it to be for a loan when the lender said, buy wheat for me, but he bought barley for him. That is difficult: can one pay for a preliminary marriage with robbed money? Rebbi Yose asked: One understands that a person may invest a peruṭah to gain a denar; would he invest a peruṭah to gain a perutah? Some Tannaïm state: One may preliminarily marry with a robbed item; some Tannaïm state: One cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item. Rebbi Mana said, the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has a chance to recoup from her hand. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has no chance to remove from her hand. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner gave up hope to recover. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner did not give up hope to recover.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:10

Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: “ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma after thirty [days].’ Even if she spent it within the thirty [days], she is preliminarily married; also Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar will agree to this.” What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was not given for preliminary marriage, while this was given from the start for preliminary marriage. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Then even if a peruṭah’s worth was not left, she should be preliminarily married! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “Be preliminarily married to me by the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meïr said that anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber, so Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says here, anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber. For he explains it to be for a loan when the lender said, buy wheat for me, but he bought barley for him. That is difficult: can one pay for a preliminary marriage with robbed money? Rebbi Yose asked: One understands that a person may invest a peruṭah to gain a denar; would he invest a peruṭah to gain a perutah? Some Tannaïm state: One may preliminarily marry with a robbed item; some Tannaïm state: One cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item. Rebbi Mana said, the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has a chance to recoup from her hand. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has no chance to remove from her hand. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner gave up hope to recover. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner did not give up hope to recover.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:10

Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: “ ‘Be preliminarily married to me by this tetradrachma after thirty [days].’ Even if she spent it within the thirty [days], she is preliminarily married; also Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar will agree to this.” What is the difference between this and a loan? A loan was not given for preliminary marriage, while this was given from the start for preliminary marriage. But did we not state: “If she was eating right away she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Then even if a peruṭah’s worth was not left, she should be preliminarily married! He explains that as earlier. If it refers to the earlier statement, did we not state: “If she was eating immediately she is not preliminarily married unless one of them was worth a peruṭah”? Rebbi Eleazar said, it follows Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar, as it was stated: “Be preliminarily married to me by the deposit you hold for me; if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, if there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married. By the loan you are holding from me, if she went and found that it was stolen or lost, even if there was no peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, a loan is like a deposit: If there was a peruṭah’s worth left, she is preliminarily married; otherwise, she is not preliminarily married.” Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar follows Rebbi Meïr. Just as Rebbi Meïr said that anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber, so Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says here, anybody who deviates from the orders of the owner is called a robber. For he explains it to be for a loan when the lender said, buy wheat for me, but he bought barley for him. That is difficult: can one pay for a preliminary marriage with robbed money? Rebbi Yose asked: One understands that a person may invest a peruṭah to gain a denar; would he invest a peruṭah to gain a perutah? Some Tannaïm state: One may preliminarily marry with a robbed item; some Tannaïm state: One cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item. Rebbi Mana said, the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has a chance to recoup from her hand. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which he has no chance to remove from her hand. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac: the one who said that one may preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner gave up hope to recover. The one who said that one cannot preliminarily marry with a robbed item refers to an item which the owner did not give up hope to recover.