14299 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:23

MISHNAH: Whether matters of himself, or matters of others, or material matters, or immaterial matters. How is this? An oath that I shall give to X, or that I shall not give, that I gave, or that I did not give, that I shall sleep, or that I shall not sleep, that I slept, or that I did not sleep, that I shall throw a pebble into the sea, or that I shall not throw, that I threw, or that I did not throw. Rebbi Ismael said, he is liable only for the future, for it is said to cause evil or cause good. Rebbi Aqiba said to him, if it is so then this refers only to matters of causing evil or good; from where matters which do not refer to causing evil or good? He answered him, from the additional text of the verse. He answered, just as the additional text of the verse is for this, the additional text of the verse is for the other.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:24

HALAKHAH: He wants to teach himself a pretext. “Whether matters of himself,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past. Rebbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional; this excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission. Anything which one will blurt out, excluding a minor. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting at his own will. And it will be forgotten by him, he will be oblivious of the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him; he is liable for forgetting the oath; he is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rebbi Ismael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional. I shall exclude one who swears to the detriment of another that he should not be liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:24

HALAKHAH: He wants to teach himself a pretext. “Whether matters of himself,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past. Rebbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional; this excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission. Anything which one will blurt out, excluding a minor. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting at his own will. And it will be forgotten by him, he will be oblivious of the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him; he is liable for forgetting the oath; he is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rebbi Ismael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional. I shall exclude one who swears to the detriment of another that he should not be liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:24

HALAKHAH: He wants to teach himself a pretext. “Whether matters of himself,” etc. Rebbi Abba in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave a mina to Y,” and it turns out that he did not give, since it was not in his power for the future, it is not in his power for the past. Rebbi Yose objected, about phylacteries there is nothing about the future but there is about the past! He told him, phylacteries came from another source. To cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional; this excludes anything involving a prohibition or anything involving a permission. Anything which one will blurt out, excluding a minor. A person in an oath, excluding a person not acting at his own will. And it will be forgotten by him, he will be oblivious of the oath. Or could I think that the object was forgotten by him? The verse says, in an oath and it was forgotten by him; he is liable for forgetting the oath; he is not liable for forgetting the object. Could one not add forgetting the object to forgetting the oath so that he should be liable? What is the difference between this and forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary so that he should be liable twice following Rebbi Ismael, who said forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary? There it is written it was forgotten by him, it was forgotten by him twice. Here it is written it was forgotten by him once. I could think that one who swears to the detriment of others should be liable: the verse says, to cause evil or cause good; just as doing good is optional so doing bad is optional. I shall exclude one who swears to the detriment of another that he should not be liable. For example, if one swears that he will not provide food for another. He saw him in convulsions and gave to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:26

MISHNAH: If he swore not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, he is not liable; to observe a commandment and did not observe it, he is not liable, though it would have been logical that he should be liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said, since he is liable for a permitted purpose, for which he is not sworn to from Mount Sinai, is it not logical that he should be liable about a commandment to which he is sworn from Mount Sinai? They said to him, no. What you say about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes”, can you say that about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”? Since one who swears not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:26

MISHNAH: If he swore not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, he is not liable; to observe a commandment and did not observe it, he is not liable, though it would have been logical that he should be liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said, since he is liable for a permitted purpose, for which he is not sworn to from Mount Sinai, is it not logical that he should be liable about a commandment to which he is sworn from Mount Sinai? They said to him, no. What you say about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes”, can you say that about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”? Since one who swears not to observe a commandment but failed not to observe it, is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:27

HALAKHAH: “If he swore not to observe a commandment,” etc. Rebbi Mani said, so is the Mishnah: “He is liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.” What Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said refers to prohibitions in general. “An oath that I shall eat carcass meat,” but he did not eat it. He is not liable. “An oath that I shall eat,” and he ate. If you would say that he is liable, they should have objected to him: No. You declare about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes” and “yes” equal to “no”, can you declare this about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:27

HALAKHAH: “If he swore not to observe a commandment,” etc. Rebbi Mani said, so is the Mishnah: “He is liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.” What Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said refers to prohibitions in general. “An oath that I shall eat carcass meat,” but he did not eat it. He is not liable. “An oath that I shall eat,” and he ate. If you would say that he is liable, they should have objected to him: No. You declare about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes” and “yes” equal to “no”, can you declare this about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:27

HALAKHAH: “If he swore not to observe a commandment,” etc. Rebbi Mani said, so is the Mishnah: “He is liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.” What Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said refers to prohibitions in general. “An oath that I shall eat carcass meat,” but he did not eat it. He is not liable. “An oath that I shall eat,” and he ate. If you would say that he is liable, they should have objected to him: No. You declare about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes” and “yes” equal to “no”, can you declare this about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:27

HALAKHAH: “If he swore not to observe a commandment,” etc. Rebbi Mani said, so is the Mishnah: “He is liable, the words of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra.” What Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra said refers to prohibitions in general. “An oath that I shall eat carcass meat,” but he did not eat it. He is not liable. “An oath that I shall eat,” and he ate. If you would say that he is liable, they should have objected to him: No. You declare about an oath for permitted purpose where He made “no” equal to “yes” and “yes” equal to “no”, can you declare this about an oath concerning a commandment, where He did not make “no” equal to “yes”?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:28

From where a warning about an oath for a permitted purpose? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he shall not profane his word, he shall not make his words profane.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:29

MISHNAH: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it, an oath that I shall not eat it;” he is liable only once. This is the blurted oath where in case it be intentional one is liable for flogging, and if unintentional for a variable sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:29

MISHNAH: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it, an oath that I shall not eat it;” he is liable only once. This is the blurted oath where in case it be intentional one is liable for flogging, and if unintentional for a variable sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:29

MISHNAH: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it, an oath that I shall not eat it;” he is liable only once. This is the blurted oath where in case it be intentional one is liable for flogging, and if unintentional for a variable sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:30

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf,” etc. “An oath that I shall eat this loaf today,” the day passed and then he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, he is not liable; not for the same reason. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan, because he cannot be duly warned. The reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, because it is a prohibition without action. What is the difference between them? He burned it or threw it into the sea. If you say, because he cannot be duly warned, he is not liable. If you say, because it is a prohibition without action, there is an action.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:30

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf,” etc. “An oath that I shall eat this loaf today,” the day passed and then he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, he is not liable; not for the same reason. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan, because he cannot be duly warned. The reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, because it is a prohibition without action. What is the difference between them? He burned it or threw it into the sea. If you say, because he cannot be duly warned, he is not liable. If you say, because it is a prohibition without action, there is an action.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:30

HALAKHAH: “An oath that I shall not eat this loaf,” etc. “An oath that I shall eat this loaf today,” the day passed and then he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, he is not liable; not for the same reason. The reason of Rebbi Joḥanan, because he cannot be duly warned. The reason of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, because it is a prohibition without action. What is the difference between them? He burned it or threw it into the sea. If you say, because he cannot be duly warned, he is not liable. If you say, because it is a prohibition without action, there is an action.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:32

Rebbi Yose asked, “an oath, an oath, an oath, that I shall not eat,” and he ate. What is the rule? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, let us hear from the following: “'An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it, an oath that I shall not eat it;' he is liable once.” Because he mentioned this. Therefore, if he did not mention this, he would be liable for each single one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:32

Rebbi Yose asked, “an oath, an oath, an oath, that I shall not eat,” and he ate. What is the rule? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, let us hear from the following: “'An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it, an oath that I shall not eat it;' he is liable once.” Because he mentioned this. Therefore, if he did not mention this, he would be liable for each single one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:32

Rebbi Yose asked, “an oath, an oath, an oath, that I shall not eat,” and he ate. What is the rule? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, let us hear from the following: “'An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it, an oath that I shall not eat it;' he is liable once.” Because he mentioned this. Therefore, if he did not mention this, he would be liable for each single one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:32

Rebbi Yose asked, “an oath, an oath, an oath, that I shall not eat,” and he ate. What is the rule? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, let us hear from the following: “'An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it, an oath that I shall not eat it;' he is liable once.” Because he mentioned this. Therefore, if he did not mention this, he would be liable for each single one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:32

Rebbi Yose asked, “an oath, an oath, an oath, that I shall not eat,” and he ate. What is the rule? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, let us hear from the following: “'An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it, an oath that I shall not eat it;' he is liable once.” Because he mentioned this. Therefore, if he did not mention this, he would be liable for each single one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:32

Rebbi Yose asked, “an oath, an oath, an oath, that I shall not eat,” and he ate. What is the rule? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Bun said, let us hear from the following: “'An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it, an oath that I shall not eat it;' he is liable once.” Because he mentioned this. Therefore, if he did not mention this, he would be liable for each single one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:33

Abime the brother of Ḥefa said, I had studied Nedarim and Ševuot; Ḥefa wanted to examine him. He had before him five loaves and said, an oath that I would not eat this loaf. He returned and said, these two. He returned and said, these three. He returned and said, these four. He returned and said, these five. Then he ate the first. He said to him, he is liable for each single one. He answered, he is liable only once, for when he mentioned the first he made it like carcass meat; the following make an oath fall on something prohibited and oaths cannot fall on prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:33

Abime the brother of Ḥefa said, I had studied Nedarim and Ševuot; Ḥefa wanted to examine him. He had before him five loaves and said, an oath that I would not eat this loaf. He returned and said, these two. He returned and said, these three. He returned and said, these four. He returned and said, these five. Then he ate the first. He said to him, he is liable for each single one. He answered, he is liable only once, for when he mentioned the first he made it like carcass meat; the following make an oath fall on something prohibited and oaths cannot fall on prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:34

Ḥefa continued to examine him. He had before him five loaves and said, an oath that I would not eat these five loaves. He returned and said, these four. He returned and said, these three. He returned and said, these two. He returned and said, this one, and ate the first one. He said to him, he is liable only once. He answered, he is liable for each single one; if somebody said “an oath if I would eat five loaves” and he ate four, is he not free from liability?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:34

Ḥefa continued to examine him. He had before him five loaves and said, an oath that I would not eat these five loaves. He returned and said, these four. He returned and said, these three. He returned and said, these two. He returned and said, this one, and ate the first one. He said to him, he is liable only once. He answered, he is liable for each single one; if somebody said “an oath if I would eat five loaves” and he ate four, is he not free from liability?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:36

MISHNAH: For an intentional vain oath one is liable to be flogged; if in error one is not liable. What is a vain oath? One swears to change what is known to man, about a stone pillar that it is of gold, a man that he is a woman, or a woman that she is a man. One swears about an impossibility, if I did not see a flying camel, if I did not see a snake like the beam of the olive press. If one said to witnesses come and testify for me, an oath that we shall not testify for you. One swears not to keep commandments: not to make a booth, not to take the lulav, not to put on phylacteries; these are vain oaths for which one is liable to be flogged if intentional, and free from prosecution of unintentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:36

MISHNAH: For an intentional vain oath one is liable to be flogged; if in error one is not liable. What is a vain oath? One swears to change what is known to man, about a stone pillar that it is of gold, a man that he is a woman, or a woman that she is a man. One swears about an impossibility, if I did not see a flying camel, if I did not see a snake like the beam of the olive press. If one said to witnesses come and testify for me, an oath that we shall not testify for you. One swears not to keep commandments: not to make a booth, not to take the lulav, not to put on phylacteries; these are vain oaths for which one is liable to be flogged if intentional, and free from prosecution of unintentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:36

MISHNAH: For an intentional vain oath one is liable to be flogged; if in error one is not liable. What is a vain oath? One swears to change what is known to man, about a stone pillar that it is of gold, a man that he is a woman, or a woman that she is a man. One swears about an impossibility, if I did not see a flying camel, if I did not see a snake like the beam of the olive press. If one said to witnesses come and testify for me, an oath that we shall not testify for you. One swears not to keep commandments: not to make a booth, not to take the lulav, not to put on phylacteries; these are vain oaths for which one is liable to be flogged if intentional, and free from prosecution of unintentional.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:37

HALAKHAH: “For an intentional vain oath one is liable to be flogged,” etc. There, we have stated: “If I did not see on this road [crowds] like those who left Egypt.” Is it impossible that crowds like those who left Egypt went by? But we are dealing with one look. Was it not the case that when Diocletian went there, 1’200’000 [men] went with him? But we must be dealing with one look.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:40

“An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” they are flogged because of witnesses’ oath. “An oath that we shall not testify for you;” they are flogged because of blurted oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:40

“An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” they are flogged because of witnesses’ oath. “An oath that we shall not testify for you;” they are flogged because of blurted oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:41

“An oath that I shall eat this loaf;” etc. Vain and untruth both were said together, which is impossible for the ear to hear and the mouth to say. Its desecrator shall be put to death and on the Sabbath day two sheep were said together. Do not wear ša`aṭnez, fringes you shall make for yourselves, both were said together. The nakedness of your brother’s wife and her brother-in-law shall come to her were said together. You shall not move property; any daughter inheriting real estate both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. And so it says, God spoke once, two I heard from this. And it says, is not My word like fire, says the Eternal.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:42

A vain oath, if one swears to change what is known to men; a false oath if he swears to substitute. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: anything known to two persons is a (vain) oath, to three it is (false). Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If it is known to two persons and another one at the end of the world, it is a vain oath. What is the difference between them? If he was untrue before two [persons], threw it into the sea, and they had warned him because of a vain oath; in the opinion of R. Joḥanan he is not flogged, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is flogged. If they had warned him because of a false oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is flogged, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is not flogged. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, even an egg and a pearl. What means “even”? But, for example, an egg and a pearl.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:42

A vain oath, if one swears to change what is known to men; a false oath if he swears to substitute. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: anything known to two persons is a (vain) oath, to three it is (false). Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If it is known to two persons and another one at the end of the world, it is a vain oath. What is the difference between them? If he was untrue before two [persons], threw it into the sea, and they had warned him because of a vain oath; in the opinion of R. Joḥanan he is not flogged, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is flogged. If they had warned him because of a false oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is flogged, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is not flogged. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jehudah, even an egg and a pearl. What means “even”? But, for example, an egg and a pearl.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:43

It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted, so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. You may even say in both cases if they insist; here it is about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in matters of flogging, he cannot be flogged. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted, so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in matters of flogging, he cannot be flogged.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:43

It was stated: “Just as vows of exaggeration are permitted, so oaths of exaggeration are permitted.” But was it not stated: Vows of exaggeration are forbidden? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rebbi Pedat: Here about those who insist, there about those who do not insist. You may even say in both cases if they insist; here it is about one who intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in matters of flogging, he cannot be flogged. Just as speeding-up vows are permitted, so speeding-up oaths are permitted. It is the same case; if he intends that his oath should fall on his property, “an oath that my property [should be forbidden] to me.” Then his property is forbidden [to him]. But in matters of flogging, he cannot be flogged.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:45

MISHNAH: “An oath that I shall eat this loaf; an oath that I shall not eat it.” The first one is a blurted oath, the second a vain oath. If he ate it he violated a vain oath, if he did not eat it he violated a blurted oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:45

MISHNAH: “An oath that I shall eat this loaf; an oath that I shall not eat it.” The first one is a blurted oath, the second a vain oath. If he ate it he violated a vain oath, if he did not eat it he violated a blurted oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:46

HALAKHAH: “A blurted oath,” etc. “ ‘An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it’, he is liable only once”. Something which would be forbidden for vows and is permitted for oaths. Not on this was it said but on the following: “Whether matters of himself, or matters of others,” as Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: ‘An oath that X gave a mina to Y.’ If it turns out that he had not given, since it is not in his hand for the future it is not in his hand for the past. It was found stated on both cases: This is more stringent for the past than for the future: If he says “I shall not eat, I shall not eat,” he is liable only once. “I did not eat, I did not eat,” he is liable for each single time.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:46

HALAKHAH: “A blurted oath,” etc. “ ‘An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it’, he is liable only once”. Something which would be forbidden for vows and is permitted for oaths. Not on this was it said but on the following: “Whether matters of himself, or matters of others,” as Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: ‘An oath that X gave a mina to Y.’ If it turns out that he had not given, since it is not in his hand for the future it is not in his hand for the past. It was found stated on both cases: This is more stringent for the past than for the future: If he says “I shall not eat, I shall not eat,” he is liable only once. “I did not eat, I did not eat,” he is liable for each single time.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:46

HALAKHAH: “A blurted oath,” etc. “ ‘An oath that I shall not eat this loaf, an oath that I shall not eat it’, he is liable only once”. Something which would be forbidden for vows and is permitted for oaths. Not on this was it said but on the following: “Whether matters of himself, or matters of others,” as Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: ‘An oath that X gave a mina to Y.’ If it turns out that he had not given, since it is not in his hand for the future it is not in his hand for the past. It was found stated on both cases: This is more stringent for the past than for the future: If he says “I shall not eat, I shall not eat,” he is liable only once. “I did not eat, I did not eat,” he is liable for each single time.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:47

“An oath that I shall eat this loaf; an oath that I shall not eat it.” The first one is a blurted oath, the second a vain oath. How does one deal with him? One tells him to eat; it is better to break a vain oath than a blurted one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:47

“An oath that I shall eat this loaf; an oath that I shall not eat it.” The first one is a blurted oath, the second a vain oath. How does one deal with him? One tells him to eat; it is better to break a vain oath than a blurted one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:48

“An oath that I shall not eat this loaf; an oath that I shall eat it.” The first one is a blurted oath, the second a vain oath. How does one deal with him? One tells him not to eat; it is better to break a vain oath than to break a vain and a blurted one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:48

“An oath that I shall not eat this loaf; an oath that I shall eat it.” The first one is a blurted oath, the second a vain oath. How does one deal with him? One tells him not to eat; it is better to break a vain oath than to break a vain and a blurted one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:49

“An oath that I shall eat this loaf today; an oath that I shall not eat it today.” Then he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he kept the first oath and invalidated the second. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he invalidated the first one and did not keep the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:49

“An oath that I shall eat this loaf today; an oath that I shall not eat it today.” Then he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he kept the first oath and invalidated the second. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he invalidated the first one and did not keep the second.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:50

“An oath that I shall not eat this loaf today; an oath that I shall eat it today.” Then he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he invalidated the first oath and kept the second. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he invalidated the first one. One tells him to keep the second with another loaf.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:50

“An oath that I shall not eat this loaf today; an oath that I shall eat it today.” Then he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he invalidated the first oath and kept the second. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he invalidated the first one. One tells him to keep the second with another loaf.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:51

“An oath that I shall eat this loaf today; an oath that I shall eat it today.” Then he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he kept both of them. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he kept the first one and one tells him to keep the second with another loaf.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:51

“An oath that I shall eat this loaf today; an oath that I shall eat it today.” Then he ate it. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he kept both of them. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, he kept the first one and one tells him to keep the second with another loaf.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:52

“An oath that I shall not eat this loaf today; an oath that I shall not eat it today.” Then he ate it. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is twice liable. Is he only once liable in Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion? Even Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that he only emphasizes the prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:52

“An oath that I shall not eat this loaf today; an oath that I shall not eat it today.” Then he ate it. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is twice liable. Is he only once liable in Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion? Even Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish agrees that he only emphasizes the prohibitions.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:54

HALAKHAH: “A vain oath,” etc. A person, a person. Since by a person which was said for an oath of testimony He made the one at whom the oath was directed like one swearing, so also by a person which was said for an oath of deposit He made the one at whom the oath was directed like one swearing.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:54

HALAKHAH: “A vain oath,” etc. A person, a person. Since by a person which was said for an oath of testimony He made the one at whom the oath was directed like one swearing, so also by a person which was said for an oath of deposit He made the one at whom the oath was directed like one swearing.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 3:55

This is the principle: One flogs for any prohibition involving an action, but one does not flog if there is no action except for one who substitutes, or swears, or curses a fellow man by the Name. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This does not include one who substitutes; substituting implies speech and action. From where one who swears falsely? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: For the Eternal will not cleanse; but the judges will cleanse him. From where one who cursed his fellow man by the Name? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: To fear the Name, etc. The one who swears falsely in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he swore falsely, he does not fear. The one who cursed his fellow man by the Name in the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish from where? Since he cursed, he does not fear. What is the difference between them? If one swore falsely and cursed a fellow man by the Name. In Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion he is liable for two [punishments]. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion he is only liable for one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:1

MISHNAH: An oath about testimony applies to men but not to women, to unrelated persons but not to relatives, to qualified but not to disqualified ones; it applies only to those admitted to testify, in court and out of court, and by the person’s own words. By the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court, the words of Rebbi Meїr. But the Sages say, whether by the person’s own words or by the words of others they only become liable if they renege before a court. They are liable both for intentional [violation of the] oath and for erroneous one, and for intentional [refusal of] testimony, but one is not liable unintentionally. What is one liable for if intentional? A variable value sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:2

HALAKHAH: “An oath about testimony,” etc. Rams, the minimum of rams are two. Why does the verse say two? That they be equal.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:6

Rebbi Ḥaggai objected to Rebbi Yose. Is there not written: The two men shall stand? Now, is not two the minimum of “men”? Why does the verse say two? That both be equal? But it is written: Do not bend the lawsuit of the proselyte, the orphan, … That means that a proselyte can have a lawsuit against one who is not a proselyte, an orphan may have a lawsuit against one who is not an orphan, a widow against a married woman. Then why is there written two? It is free to be combined and to infer from it an equal cut. It is said here two and it is said there two men were left. Since there one speaks of men but not women nor underaged, also here men but not women nor underaged. From this we learn that a woman may not be a judge; consequently a woman may not be a witness.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:6

Rebbi Ḥaggai objected to Rebbi Yose. Is there not written: The two men shall stand? Now, is not two the minimum of “men”? Why does the verse say two? That both be equal? But it is written: Do not bend the lawsuit of the proselyte, the orphan, … That means that a proselyte can have a lawsuit against one who is not a proselyte, an orphan may have a lawsuit against one who is not an orphan, a widow against a married woman. Then why is there written two? It is free to be combined and to infer from it an equal cut. It is said here two and it is said there two men were left. Since there one speaks of men but not women nor underaged, also here men but not women nor underaged. From this we learn that a woman may not be a judge; consequently a woman may not be a witness.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:6

Rebbi Ḥaggai objected to Rebbi Yose. Is there not written: The two men shall stand? Now, is not two the minimum of “men”? Why does the verse say two? That both be equal? But it is written: Do not bend the lawsuit of the proselyte, the orphan, … That means that a proselyte can have a lawsuit against one who is not a proselyte, an orphan may have a lawsuit against one who is not an orphan, a widow against a married woman. Then why is there written two? It is free to be combined and to infer from it an equal cut. It is said here two and it is said there two men were left. Since there one speaks of men but not women nor underaged, also here men but not women nor underaged. From this we learn that a woman may not be a judge; consequently a woman may not be a witness.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:20

From where two witnesses? And he is a witness, this makes two. Following Rebbi Ismael, who said, any place where the Torah mentions a witness without further determination it implies two witnesses; unless the verse informs you that a single witness is meant. It was found stated in the name of Rebbi Ismael: “Two witnesses.” Can a single witness be found guilty of a blurted oath? Since it is possible to say that one person could team up with him, then he would be subject to the oath of testimony, you could find him liable for an oath of testimony. How could you find him guilty of a blurted oath?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:21

Should a relative be found guilty of a blurted oath? Does it follow what Rebbi Abba said in the name of Samuel: “An oath that X gave to Y,” and it turns out that X had not given; since there is nothing in the future there is nothing in the past. Or the following: “Where is my ox?” He responded, “I do not know what you are referring to.” Rebbi declares him not liable for a keeper’s oath but liable because of a blurted oath. Rebbi Joḥanan said, since it is a religious duty to appease him, he is not liable because of a blurted oath. In the rabbis’ opinion, is there no religious duty to appease him? One appeases with truthful statements, not with lies.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:24

MISHNAH: What is an oath about testimony? One said to witnesses, come and testify for me. “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” or they said to him, we do not know any testimony for you, “I am asking you to take an oath upon this;” if they said “Amen”, they are liable. If he asked them five times outside of court to take an oath; when they came to court and admitted it they are not liable. If they deny, they are liable for each single one. If he asked them five times in court to take an oath and the refused, they are liable only once. Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:24

MISHNAH: What is an oath about testimony? One said to witnesses, come and testify for me. “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” or they said to him, we do not know any testimony for you, “I am asking you to take an oath upon this;” if they said “Amen”, they are liable. If he asked them five times outside of court to take an oath; when they came to court and admitted it they are not liable. If they deny, they are liable for each single one. If he asked them five times in court to take an oath and the refused, they are liable only once. Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:24

MISHNAH: What is an oath about testimony? One said to witnesses, come and testify for me. “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” or they said to him, we do not know any testimony for you, “I am asking you to take an oath upon this;” if they said “Amen”, they are liable. If he asked them five times outside of court to take an oath; when they came to court and admitted it they are not liable. If they deny, they are liable for each single one. If he asked them five times in court to take an oath and the refused, they are liable only once. Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:24

MISHNAH: What is an oath about testimony? One said to witnesses, come and testify for me. “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” or they said to him, we do not know any testimony for you, “I am asking you to take an oath upon this;” if they said “Amen”, they are liable. If he asked them five times outside of court to take an oath; when they came to court and admitted it they are not liable. If they deny, they are liable for each single one. If he asked them five times in court to take an oath and the refused, they are liable only once. Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:24

MISHNAH: What is an oath about testimony? One said to witnesses, come and testify for me. “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” or they said to him, we do not know any testimony for you, “I am asking you to take an oath upon this;” if they said “Amen”, they are liable. If he asked them five times outside of court to take an oath; when they came to court and admitted it they are not liable. If they deny, they are liable for each single one. If he asked them five times in court to take an oath and the refused, they are liable only once. Rebbi Simeon said, what is the reason? Because they cannot come back and admit.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:25

HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about testimony,” etc. A person, a person. Since there it is from his own words, also here from his own words. Since here it is from others’ words, also there it is from others’ words. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut which was said here: Since there it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said here. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:26

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative liable for an oath about testimony formulated by himself? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by himself for an oath about testimony only from oaths about deposits, and since there relatives are liable, so they also are here? Rebbi Yose said, can relatives here be inferred from relatives there?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:26

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Is a relative liable for an oath about testimony formulated by himself? Can we hear it from the following: since they inferred formulation by himself for an oath about testimony only from oaths about deposits, and since there relatives are liable, so they also are here? Rebbi Yose said, can relatives here be inferred from relatives there?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:28

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he made him swear five times in his own words and let him swear five times by the mouth of others, what? Since Rebbi Meїr considered “in his own words” as if in court, would they determine the sacrifice on the first occasion, even without request? It should come like the following: “Why do you go after us? An oath that we do not know any testimony relevant for you. Should they be liable? The verse says, and he heard the voice of an imprecation. Only one who hears an imprecation. This excludes those who did not hear a voice.” Would he be liable from his own mouth for real estate? From his own mouth would he be liable for fines? From his own mouth would he be liable for a variable value sacrifice?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:28

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he made him swear five times in his own words and let him swear five times by the mouth of others, what? Since Rebbi Meїr considered “in his own words” as if in court, would they determine the sacrifice on the first occasion, even without request? It should come like the following: “Why do you go after us? An oath that we do not know any testimony relevant for you. Should they be liable? The verse says, and he heard the voice of an imprecation. Only one who hears an imprecation. This excludes those who did not hear a voice.” Would he be liable from his own mouth for real estate? From his own mouth would he be liable for fines? From his own mouth would he be liable for a variable value sacrifice?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:28

Rebbi Jeremiah asked: If he made him swear five times in his own words and let him swear five times by the mouth of others, what? Since Rebbi Meїr considered “in his own words” as if in court, would they determine the sacrifice on the first occasion, even without request? It should come like the following: “Why do you go after us? An oath that we do not know any testimony relevant for you. Should they be liable? The verse says, and he heard the voice of an imprecation. Only one who hears an imprecation. This excludes those who did not hear a voice.” Would he be liable from his own mouth for real estate? From his own mouth would he be liable for fines? From his own mouth would he be liable for a variable value sacrifice?

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:34

MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I have a claim against X for a deposit, and a loan, and robbery, and a lost object.” “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” they are liable only once. “An oath that we do not know that you have a claim against X for a deposit, and a common venture, and robbery, and a lost object;” they are liable for each single one. “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I have a claim against X for a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt.” “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” they are liable only once. “An oath that we do not know that you have a claim against X for a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt;” they are liable for each single one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:34

MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I have a claim against X for a deposit, and a loan, and robbery, and a lost object.” “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” they are liable only once. “An oath that we do not know that you have a claim against X for a deposit, and a common venture, and robbery, and a lost object;” they are liable for each single one. “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I have a claim against X for a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt.” “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” they are liable only once. “An oath that we do not know that you have a claim against X for a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt;” they are liable for each single one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:34

MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I have a claim against X for a deposit, and a loan, and robbery, and a lost object.” “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” they are liable only once. “An oath that we do not know that you have a claim against X for a deposit, and a common venture, and robbery, and a lost object;” they are liable for each single one. “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I have a claim against X for a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt.” “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” they are liable only once. “An oath that we do not know that you have a claim against X for a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt;” they are liable for each single one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:34

MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I have a claim against X for a deposit, and a loan, and robbery, and a lost object.” “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” they are liable only once. “An oath that we do not know that you have a claim against X for a deposit, and a common venture, and robbery, and a lost object;” they are liable for each single one. “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I have a claim against X for a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt.” “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” they are liable only once. “An oath that we do not know that you have a claim against X for a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt;” they are liable for each single one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:34

MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I have a claim against X for a deposit, and a loan, and robbery, and a lost object.” “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” they are liable only once. “An oath that we do not know that you have a claim against X for a deposit, and a common venture, and robbery, and a lost object;” they are liable for each single one. “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I have a claim against X for a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt.” “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” they are liable only once. “An oath that we do not know that you have a claim against X for a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt;” they are liable for each single one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:34

MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I have a claim against X for a deposit, and a loan, and robbery, and a lost object.” “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” they are liable only once. “An oath that we do not know that you have a claim against X for a deposit, and a common venture, and robbery, and a lost object;” they are liable for each single one. “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I have a claim against X for a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt.” “An oath that we do not know testimony for you;” they are liable only once. “An oath that we do not know that you have a claim against X for a deposit of wheat, and barley, and spelt;” they are liable for each single one.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:35

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:35

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:35

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:35

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:35

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:35

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me,” etc. From where that this only refers to monetary claims? Rebbi Eliezer said, it uses here “or” and it uses “or” with a deposit. Since the “or” used with a deposit only refers to monetary claims, also the “or” used here only refers to monetary claims. The “or” of the homicide will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath from “or” accompanied by an oath; the “or” of the homicide cannot disprove since they are not accompanied by an oath. The “or” of the deviant woman will disprove since they are accompanied by an oath and do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” accompanied by an oath not accompanied by a Cohen from similar “or”; the “or” of the deviant woman cannot disprove since they are accompanied by a Cohen. The “or” of blurting lips will disprove since they do not refer to monetary claims. One argues about “or” where He made intent equal to error from similar “or”; the “or” of blurting lips cannot disprove since there He did not make intent equal to error. Rebbi Aqiba says, for some of these one is liable, for some one is not liable. For monetary claims one is liable; for non-monetary claims one is not liable. Rebbi Simeon says, He made liable here and he made liable for a deposit. Since deposits only refer to monetary claims, so here also it only refers to monetary claims.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:36

MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that X owes me full damages or half damages, double restitution or quadruple and quintuple restitution, that X raped or seduced my daughter, or that my son hit me, or that my neighbor injured me, or that he set fire to my grain stack on the Day of Atonement;” these are liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:37

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. It was stated: Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, why does the verse say, and he is a witness, or saw, or knew, etc.? I said this only for testimony which may be accepted about knowing without seeing, or seeing without knowing. How is knowing without seeing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did you not confess before X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to knowing without seeing. They came and said, whether he confessed to him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he gave him a loan we do not know. How is seeing without knowing in monetary claims? “Give me my 200 zuz which you are holding.” “I do not have anything of yours.” “But did I not count them for you in a meeting with X and Y”? “They should testify and I shall pay.” This refers to seeing without knowing. They came and said, whether he counted for him or whether he robbed him, we do not know. Whether he took a loan from him, we do not know. “Give me the fine for my daughter which you owe me.” But he says, “I never in my life was found liable for a fine.” Witnesses testify that he was found liable for a fine, but we do not know whether the fine was for his daughter or the fine for another woman. “You raped or you seduced my daughter.” But he says, “I never in my life did rape or seduce a woman.” Witnesses testify that he raped a woman, but we do not know whether it was his daughter or another woman. “You killed my ox and cut down my orchard.” But he says, “I do not know.” He is liable. “You told me to kill and cut down,” one follows the majority of orchards. What means, one follows the majority of orchards? Rebbi Ḥaggai said, if his ox was goring, he would have told him; if the orchard was barren, he would have told him. Rebbi Yudan said, in matters of monetary claims, since he may tell him, you told me to kill and cut down, even if he told him “I did not kill, I did not cut down,” he is not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:38

MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that I am a Cohen, that I am a Levite, that I am not the son of a divorcee, that I am not the son of a woman having received ḥalîṣah, that X raped or seduced his daughter, or that my son injured me, or that my neighbor injured me or set fire to my grain stack on the Sabbath:” these are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:39

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Halakhah 8: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. A person who would sin, a person who would sin as an equal cut. Since a person who would sin which was said further on refers to an active monetary claim, also a person who would sin must refer to an active monetary claim.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:39

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Halakhah 8: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. A person who would sin, a person who would sin as an equal cut. Since a person who would sin which was said further on refers to an active monetary claim, also a person who would sin must refer to an active monetary claim.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:39

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Halakhah 8: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. A person who would sin, a person who would sin as an equal cut. Since a person who would sin which was said further on refers to an active monetary claim, also a person who would sin must refer to an active monetary claim.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:39

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Halakhah 8: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. A person who would sin, a person who would sin as an equal cut. Since a person who would sin which was said further on refers to an active monetary claim, also a person who would sin must refer to an active monetary claim.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:39

HALAKHAH: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Halakhah 8: “I am putting an oath on you,” etc. A person who would sin, a person who would sin as an equal cut. Since a person who would sin which was said further on refers to an active monetary claim, also a person who would sin must refer to an active monetary claim.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:40

“I am putting an oath on you,” etc. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who said, there is no money when there is flogging. He explains it following Rebbi Meїr who said, he is flogged and he pays. In any case he did not make him lose money. Is it not that since he wanted to give him but did not give to him; it is as if he made him lose money.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:41

MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that Mr. X promised to give me 200 zuz but did not give them to me.” These are not liable since one is liable only for an (oath about) money similar to a deposit. “I am putting an oath on you, that you shall come and testify for me when you know testimony for me.” These are not liable since the oath preceded the testimony. If he stood in the synagogue and said, “I am putting an oath on you, that you shall come and testify for me if you know testimony for me.” These are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:41

MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that Mr. X promised to give me 200 zuz but did not give them to me.” These are not liable since one is liable only for an (oath about) money similar to a deposit. “I am putting an oath on you, that you shall come and testify for me when you know testimony for me.” These are not liable since the oath preceded the testimony. If he stood in the synagogue and said, “I am putting an oath on you, that you shall come and testify for me if you know testimony for me.” These are not liable.

Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot 4:41

MISHNAH: “I am putting an oath on you that you should come and testify for me that Mr. X promised to give me 200 zuz but did not give them to me.” These are not liable since one is liable only for an (oath about) money similar to a deposit. “I am putting an oath on you, that you shall come and testify for me when you know testimony for me.” These are not liable since the oath preceded the testimony. If he stood in the synagogue and said, “I am putting an oath on you, that you shall come and testify for me if you know testimony for me.” These are not liable.