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The Mishnah
[A wife] who was pregnant by a former husband or was nursing a child by a former husband does not drink and does not receive the ketubah, the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages says: he may separate her [from himself] and take her back after the period [of two years]. An aylonit [who is incapable of giving birth], an old woman, and one who is unfit to bear children do not drink and do not receive the ketubah. Rabbi Eliezer says: he may marry another wife and be fruitful and multiply with her. All other women either drink or do not receive the ketubah.
On that day, Rabbi Akiva expounded, “And every earthen vessel, into which any of them falls, everything in it shall be unclean” (Leviticus 11:33), it does not state tame (is unclean) but yitma’, (shall make unclean). This teaches that a loaf which is unclean in the second degree, makes unclean [food and liquids which come into contact with it] in the third degree. Rabbi Joshua said: who will remove the dust from your eyes, Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai, since you used to say that in the future another generation will pronounce clean a loaf which is unclean in the third degree on the grounds that there is no text in the Torah according to which it is unclean! Has not Rabbi Akiva your student brought a text from the Torah according to which it is unclean, as it is said “everything in it shall be unclean.”
On that day Rabbi Akiva expounded, “You shall measure off two thousand cubits outside the town on the east side” (Numbers 35:5). But another verse states, “from the wall of the city outward a thousand cubits around” (vs. It is impossible to say that it was a thousand cubits since it has been already stated two thousand cubits; and it is impossible to say that it was two thousand cubits since it has been already stated a thousand cubits! How then is this so? A thousand cubits for the field [surrounding the city] and two thousand cubits for the Sabbath-limits. Rabbi Eliezer the son of Rabbi Yose the Galilean says: a thousand cubits for the field [surrounding the city] and two thousand cubits for fields and vineyards.
If a man warned his wife and she secluded herself [with another man], even if he heard [that she had done so] from a flying bird, he must divorce her and give her the ketubah, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Joshua says: until women who spin by moonlight discuss her.
If one witness says that she was defiled and another witness says that she was not defiled; Or if a woman says [of her] that she was defiled and another woman says that she was not defiled, she drinks. If one witness says that she was defiled and two say that she was not defiled, she drinks. If two say that she was defiled and one says that she did not, she does not drink.
If one witness says that she was defiled and another witness says that she was not defiled; Or if a woman says [of her] that she was defiled and another woman says that she was not defiled, she drinks. If one witness says that she was defiled and two say that she was not defiled, she drinks. If two say that she was defiled and one says that she did not, she does not drink.
If the head was found in one place and the body in another place, they bring the head to the body, the words of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Akiva says: [they bring] the body to the head.
If one witness says “I saw the murderer” and one witness says “You did not see him”; or if a woman says “I saw him” and another woman says “You did not see him”, they break its neck. If one witness says “I saw him” and two say “You did not see him”, they break its neck. If two say “We saw him” and one says to them “You did not see him”, they do not break its neck.
One who brings a get from abroad [to the Land of Israel] must declare, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.” Rabban Gamaliel says: even one who brings it from Rekem or from Heger. Rabbi Eliezer says: even one who brings it from Kefar Ludim to Lud. The sages, however, say: declaration “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed” is required only from one who brings a get from abroad or who takes it there. One who brings [a get] from one province to another province in foreign lands is also required to declare, “In my presence it was written, and in my presence it was signed.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even from one hegemony to another hegemony.
One who brings a get from abroad [to the Land of Israel] must declare, “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed.” Rabban Gamaliel says: even one who brings it from Rekem or from Heger. Rabbi Eliezer says: even one who brings it from Kefar Ludim to Lud. The sages, however, say: declaration “In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed” is required only from one who brings a get from abroad or who takes it there. One who brings [a get] from one province to another province in foreign lands is also required to declare, “In my presence it was written, and in my presence it was signed.” Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: even from one hegemony to another hegemony.
If one brings a get from abroad and declares: “It was written in my presence” but not, “It was signed in my presence”; “It was signed in my presence” but not “It was written in my presence”; “All of it was written in my presence and in my presence but only one of the witnesses signed in my presence”; “Half was written in my presence but both witnesses signed in my presence”; [in all these cases] the get is invalid. If one says “It was written in my presence” and another says, “It was signed in my presence”, the get is invalid. If two say, “It was written in our presence” and another says, “It was signed in my presence”, it is invalid. Rabbi Judah declares it valid. If one says, “It was written in my presence” and two say, “It was signed in our presence”, it is valid.
If one brings a get from abroad and declares: “It was written in my presence” but not, “It was signed in my presence”; “It was signed in my presence” but not “It was written in my presence”; “All of it was written in my presence and in my presence but only one of the witnesses signed in my presence”; “Half was written in my presence but both witnesses signed in my presence”; [in all these cases] the get is invalid. If one says “It was written in my presence” and another says, “It was signed in my presence”, the get is invalid. If two say, “It was written in our presence” and another says, “It was signed in my presence”, it is invalid. Rabbi Judah declares it valid. If one says, “It was written in my presence” and two say, “It was signed in our presence”, it is valid.
If one bringing a get in the land of Israel becomes sick, he can send it with another. But if [the husband] said to him, “Take for me from her such-and-such an object”, he may not send it [the get] with another, since the husband may not want his deposit in the hand of another.
If one bringing a get in the land of Israel becomes sick, he can send it with another. But if [the husband] said to him, “Take for me from her such-and-such an object”, he may not send it [the get] with another, since the husband may not want his deposit in the hand of another.
If one bringing a get in the land of Israel becomes sick, he can send it with another. But if [the husband] said to him, “Take for me from her such-and-such an object”, he may not send it [the get] with another, since the husband may not want his deposit in the hand of another.
A [non-Jewish] slave [of a Jew] was taken captive and then ransomed [by a third party]: If [he is ransomed] to be a slave he goes back to slavery. If [he is ransomed] as a free man he does not go back to slavery. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: in either case he goes back to slavery. If a man makes his slave a pledge [for a debt] to another man and then he emancipates him, according to the “letter of the law” the slave is not liable to do anything. But because of tikkun olam we force his [second] master to emancipate him and he [the slave] writes a document for his purchase price. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says that the slave does not write the document but rather the one who emancipates him.
A woman may lend to another woman who is suspected of not observing the sabbatical year a fan or a sieve or a handmill or a stove, but she should not sift or grind with her. The wife of a “haver” may lend to the wife of an “am ha-aretz” a fan or a sieve and may winnow and grind and sift with her, but once she has poured water over the flour she should not touch anything with her, because we do not assist those who commit a transgression. All these rules were only said because of the ways of peace. Gentiles may be wished luck in the Sabbatical year but not Israelites and greeting may be given to them, because of the ways of peace.
If a young girl says, “Receive my get for me”, it is not a get until the get reaches her hand. Therefore, if [the husband] wishes to retract, he may retract, since a minor cannot appoint an agent. But if her father said to him, “Go and receive a get for my daughter”, the husband may not retract. If a man says, “Give this get to my wife in such-and-such a place” and he gives it to her in another place, [the get is] invalid. [If he says,] “She is in such-and-such a place”, and he gives it to her in another place, [it is] valid. If a woman says, “Receive my get in such-and-such a place” and he receives it for her in another place, [it is] invalid. Rabbi Eliezer says it valid. [If she says,] “Bring me my get from such-and-such a place” and he brings it from somewhere else, [it is] valid.
If a young girl says, “Receive my get for me”, it is not a get until the get reaches her hand. Therefore, if [the husband] wishes to retract, he may retract, since a minor cannot appoint an agent. But if her father said to him, “Go and receive a get for my daughter”, the husband may not retract. If a man says, “Give this get to my wife in such-and-such a place” and he gives it to her in another place, [the get is] invalid. [If he says,] “She is in such-and-such a place”, and he gives it to her in another place, [it is] valid. If a woman says, “Receive my get in such-and-such a place” and he receives it for her in another place, [it is] invalid. Rabbi Eliezer says it valid. [If she says,] “Bring me my get from such-and-such a place” and he brings it from somewhere else, [it is] valid.
If a young girl says, “Receive my get for me”, it is not a get until the get reaches her hand. Therefore, if [the husband] wishes to retract, he may retract, since a minor cannot appoint an agent. But if her father said to him, “Go and receive a get for my daughter”, the husband may not retract. If a man says, “Give this get to my wife in such-and-such a place” and he gives it to her in another place, [the get is] invalid. [If he says,] “She is in such-and-such a place”, and he gives it to her in another place, [it is] valid. If a woman says, “Receive my get in such-and-such a place” and he receives it for her in another place, [it is] invalid. Rabbi Eliezer says it valid. [If she says,] “Bring me my get from such-and-such a place” and he brings it from somewhere else, [it is] valid.
If a man marries his sister-in-law and her rival wife goes and marries another man and it was found that the first is an aylonit, the other must leave both husbands and all these consequences apply to her.
If two gittin are written [on the same sheet] side by side and the signatures of two witnesses in Hebrew [stretch] from under one to under the other and then signatures of two witnesses in Greek [stretch] from under one get to under the other, the one with which the two first signatures are read is valid. If there is one signature in Hebrew and one in Greek and then another signature in Hebrew and a signature in Greek [stretching] from under one [get] to under the other, both are invalid.
If he left over some of the get [from the first sheet] and he wrote the rest of the get on the next column and the witnesses [sign] below, [the get is] valid. If the witnesses have signed at the top of the sheet or at the side or on the back of a simple get, it is invalid. If he connected the top of one get to the top of another and the witnesses’ signatures are between the two, both of them are invalid. If the end of one is connected to the end of the other and the witnesses’ signatures are between, the one with which the witnesses’ signatures reads is valid. If the top of one is connected to the bottom of the other and the witnesses’ signatures are in the middle, the one with which the witnesses’ signatures reads is valid.
Bet Shammai says: a man should not divorce his wife unless he has found her guilty of some unseemly conduct, as it says, “Because he has found some unseemly thing in her.” Bet Hillel says [that he may divorce her] even if she has merely burnt his dish, since it says, “Because he has found some unseemly thing in her.” Rabbi Akiva says, [he may divorce her] even if he finds another woman more beautiful than she is, as it says, “it cometh to pass, if she find no favour in his eyes”.
Whatever can be used as payment for another object, as soon as this one takes possession [of the object], the other one assumes liability for what is given in exchange. How so? If one exchanges an ox for a cow, or a donkey for an ox, as soon as this one takes possession, the other one assumes liability for what is given in exchange. The sanctuary’s title to property [is acquired] by money; the title of an ordinary person to property by hazakah. Dedication to the sanctuary is equal to delivery to an ordinary person.
If he says to his fellow, “Go out and betroth me such-and-such a woman,” and he goes and betroths her to himself, she is betrothed. Similarly, if he says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me after thirty days,” and another comes and betroths her within the thirty days, she is betrothed to the second, [and in such cases] an Israelite’s daughter [betrothed] to a priest may eat terumah. [But if he says, “Be betrothed to me] from now and after thirty days,” and another comes and betroths her within the thirty days, she is betrothed and not betrothed [to both]: [and in such cases] an Israelite’s daughter [betrothed] to a priest, or a priest’s daughter [betrothed] to an Israelite, may not eat terumah.
If he says to his fellow, “Go out and betroth me such-and-such a woman,” and he goes and betroths her to himself, she is betrothed. Similarly, if he says to a woman, “Be betrothed to me after thirty days,” and another comes and betroths her within the thirty days, she is betrothed to the second, [and in such cases] an Israelite’s daughter [betrothed] to a priest may eat terumah. [But if he says, “Be betrothed to me] from now and after thirty days,” and another comes and betroths her within the thirty days, she is betrothed and not betrothed [to both]: [and in such cases] an Israelite’s daughter [betrothed] to a priest, or a priest’s daughter [betrothed] to an Israelite, may not eat terumah.
[If a father declares,] “I have given my daughter in betrothal, but do not know to whom I have betrothed her,” and then a man comes and states, “I betrothed her,” he is believed. If one says, “I betrothed her,” and another [man] says, “I betrothed her,” both must give a get; but if they want, one may give a get and the other marry her.
Wherever there is kiddushin and there is no transgression, the child goes after the status of the male. And what case is this? When the daughter of a priest, a Levite or an Israelite is married to a priest, a Levite or an Israelite. And wherever there is kiddushin and there is transgression, the child goes after the status of the flawed parent. And what case is this? When a widow is married to a high priest, or a divorced woman or a halutzah to an ordinary priest, or a mamzeret or a netinah to an Israelite, and the daughter of an Israelite to a mamzer or a natin. And any [woman] who cannot contract kiddushin with that particular person but can contract kiddushin with another person, the child is a mamzer. And what case is this? One who has intercourse with any relation prohibited in the Torah. And any [woman] who can not contract kiddushin with that particular person or with others, the child follows her status. And what case is this? The child issue of a female slave or a gentile woman.
If a man gives permission to his agent to give his daughter in betrothal, and then he himself goes and gives her in betrothal to another, if his [betrothal] was first, his betrothal is valid; if the agent’s was first, his betrothal is valid. And if it is unknown, both must give her a divorce. And if they wish, one gives a divorce, and the other marries her. Similarly, if a woman gives permission to her agent to give her in betrothal, and she goes and betroths herself [to another]: if her own preceded, her betrothal is valid; if her agent’s preceded, his betrothal is valid. And if they do not know, both must give her a divorce. And if they wish, one gives a divorce and the other marries her.
If a man gives permission to his agent to give his daughter in betrothal, and then he himself goes and gives her in betrothal to another, if his [betrothal] was first, his betrothal is valid; if the agent’s was first, his betrothal is valid. And if it is unknown, both must give her a divorce. And if they wish, one gives a divorce, and the other marries her. Similarly, if a woman gives permission to her agent to give her in betrothal, and she goes and betroths herself [to another]: if her own preceded, her betrothal is valid; if her agent’s preceded, his betrothal is valid. And if they do not know, both must give her a divorce. And if they wish, one gives a divorce and the other marries her.
How is the leg [of a beast] an attested danger to break [what it tramples upon] as it walks along? A beast is an attested danger [only] in so far as it goes along in its usual way and breaks [an object]. If it kicked, or if small stones were tossed out from beneath its feet and it thus broke other vessels, one pays half damages. If it trampled upon a vessel and broke it, and this [broken vessel] fell upon another vessel and broke it, for the first one pays full damages and for the other half damages. Fowls (chickens and roosters) are an attested danger in so far as they go along in their usual way and break [objects]. But if the fowl had its feet entangled, or if it was jumping and it thereby broke any vessel one pays half damages.
“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages. But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.” Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed]. He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the sages) said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].
If a man left a jug in the public domain and another came and stumbled over it and broke it, he is exempt. And if he was injured by it, the owner of the jug is liable for his injury. If a man’s jug broke in the public domain, and another slipped on the water, or was hurt by the potsherds, he is liable. Rabbi Judah says: “If he [broke the jug] with intention, he is liable, But if he broke it without intention he is not liable.”
If a man left a jug in the public domain and another came and stumbled over it and broke it, he is exempt. And if he was injured by it, the owner of the jug is liable for his injury. If a man’s jug broke in the public domain, and another slipped on the water, or was hurt by the potsherds, he is liable. Rabbi Judah says: “If he [broke the jug] with intention, he is liable, But if he broke it without intention he is not liable.”
1. If a man poured out water in the public domain, and another was injured thereby, he is liable for his injury. 2. If a man hid thorns or glass [in the public domain] or made his fence out of thorns, or if his fence fell into the public domain and others were thereby injured, he is obligated for their injury.
If a man put out his chopped straw and stubble into the public domain to make them into fertilizer, and another was injured thereby, he is liable for his injury, and whoever comes first may take possession of them. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “Whoever leaves things that are disruptive in the public domain, and these cause damage, must make restitution, and whoever comes first may take possession of them. If a man turned over a piece of cattle dung in the public domain and another was injured thereby, he is liable for injury.
If a man put out his chopped straw and stubble into the public domain to make them into fertilizer, and another was injured thereby, he is liable for his injury, and whoever comes first may take possession of them. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “Whoever leaves things that are disruptive in the public domain, and these cause damage, must make restitution, and whoever comes first may take possession of them. If a man turned over a piece of cattle dung in the public domain and another was injured thereby, he is liable for injury.
This one comes carrying his jar and another one comes carrying his beam: this one’s jar is broken by that one’s beam, [The owner of the beam] is exempt, since this one has the right to walk along and this one has the right to walk along. If the owner of the beam came first and the owner of the jar came after, and the jar was broken by the beam, the owner of the beam is exempt. If the owner of the beam stopped [walking suddenly], he is liable. If [the owner of the beam had said] “Stop” to the owner of the jar, he is exempt. If the owner of the jar came first and owner of the beam came after, and the jar was broken by the beam, [the owner of the beam] is liable. If the owner of the jar stopped [walking suddenly],he is exempt. If [the owner of the jar had said] “Stop” to the owner of the beam, he is liable. So too when one comes with his candle and one with his flax.
[If] two were walking along in the public domain, the one running and the other walking, or both running and they injured one another, neither is liable.
[If] a man was splitting wood in the private domain and injured anyone in the public domain, or if he was in the public domain and injured anyone in the private domain, or if he was in a private domain and injured anyone in another private domain, he is liable.
If two oxen which were accounted harmless hurt one another, the owner pays half-damages for that one which suffered the greater hurt. If both were attested dangers full damages are payable for that one which suffered the greater hurt. If one was accounted harmless and the other was an attested danger, that which was an attested danger as against that which was accounted harmless must pay full damages for the greater hurt that the other has suffered, while that which was accounted harmless, as against that which was an attested danger, pays only half damages for the greater hurt that the other has suffered. So, too, if two men hurt one another, full damages are payable for that one which suffered the greater hurt. If a man and an ox which was accounted harmless hurt one another, the man as against the ox accounted harmless must pay full damages for the greater hurt that the other has suffered, while the ox accounted harmless, as against the man, pays only half damages for the greater hurt that the other suffered. Rabbi Akiva says: “Even if an ox accounted harmless hurt a man, full damages must be paid for that one which suffered the greater hurt.
If two oxen which were accounted harmless hurt one another, the owner pays half-damages for that one which suffered the greater hurt. If both were attested dangers full damages are payable for that one which suffered the greater hurt. If one was accounted harmless and the other was an attested danger, that which was an attested danger as against that which was accounted harmless must pay full damages for the greater hurt that the other has suffered, while that which was accounted harmless, as against that which was an attested danger, pays only half damages for the greater hurt that the other has suffered. So, too, if two men hurt one another, full damages are payable for that one which suffered the greater hurt. If a man and an ox which was accounted harmless hurt one another, the man as against the ox accounted harmless must pay full damages for the greater hurt that the other has suffered, while the ox accounted harmless, as against the man, pays only half damages for the greater hurt that the other suffered. Rabbi Akiva says: “Even if an ox accounted harmless hurt a man, full damages must be paid for that one which suffered the greater hurt.
If two oxen which were accounted harmless hurt one another, the owner pays half-damages for that one which suffered the greater hurt. If both were attested dangers full damages are payable for that one which suffered the greater hurt. If one was accounted harmless and the other was an attested danger, that which was an attested danger as against that which was accounted harmless must pay full damages for the greater hurt that the other has suffered, while that which was accounted harmless, as against that which was an attested danger, pays only half damages for the greater hurt that the other has suffered. So, too, if two men hurt one another, full damages are payable for that one which suffered the greater hurt. If a man and an ox which was accounted harmless hurt one another, the man as against the ox accounted harmless must pay full damages for the greater hurt that the other has suffered, while the ox accounted harmless, as against the man, pays only half damages for the greater hurt that the other suffered. Rabbi Akiva says: “Even if an ox accounted harmless hurt a man, full damages must be paid for that one which suffered the greater hurt.
There is one who is obligated for the act of his ox and exempt from his own act, and one who is exempt from the act of his ox and obligated on his own act. [If] his ox caused embarrassment [to another person], he is exempt; [If, however] he caused embarrassment [to another person] he is obligated. [If] his ox put out the eye of his slave or knocked out his [slave’s] tooth, he is exempt [from freeing the slave]; [If, however] he put out the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is obligated to free the slave. [If] his ox injured his father or mother he is obligated; [If, however] he injured his father or mother he is exempt. [If] his ox lit a heap of produce on fire on Shabbat, he is obligated; [If, however] he lit a heap of produce on Shabbat he is exempt, because he is liable for his life.
There is one who is obligated for the act of his ox and exempt from his own act, and one who is exempt from the act of his ox and obligated on his own act. [If] his ox caused embarrassment [to another person], he is exempt; [If, however] he caused embarrassment [to another person] he is obligated. [If] his ox put out the eye of his slave or knocked out his [slave’s] tooth, he is exempt [from freeing the slave]; [If, however] he put out the eye of his slave or knocked out his tooth, he is obligated to free the slave. [If] his ox injured his father or mother he is obligated; [If, however] he injured his father or mother he is exempt. [If] his ox lit a heap of produce on fire on Shabbat, he is obligated; [If, however] he lit a heap of produce on Shabbat he is exempt, because he is liable for his life.
If an ox was pursuing another ox and [the latter ox] was injured: this one claims “Your ox caused the injury, and this one claims “No, it was injured by a rock.” on the one who wishes to exact compensation lies the burden of proof. If two oxen were pursuing a third ox: this one claims “Your ox caused the injury”, and this one claims “Your ox caused the injury”, they are both exempt. However, if they were both owned by one man, they are both obligated. If one was big and was small: the [owner] of injured [ox] says that “The large one caused the injury”, and the [owner] of the injuring [ox] says, “The small one caused the injury”, [or] if one was a harmless ox and one was an attested danger (muad) the [owner] of the injured ox says, “The [ox which is an] attested danger caused the injury, and the owner of the injuring ox says, “The [ox which is] harmless caused the injury”, on the one who wishes to exact compensation lies the burden of proof. If two oxen were injured, one big and one small, and two oxen caused the injury, one big and one small: [the owner] of the injured oxen says, “The big ox injured the big ox and small ox injured the small ox,” and the [owner] of the injuring oxen says, “The small ox injured the big ox and the big ox injured the small ox”; [or] if one was harmless and one was an attested danger: the [owner] of the injured oxen says, “The [ox which is an] attested danger injured the big ox, and the harmless [ox] injured the small ox”, the owner of injuring oxen says, “No rather the harmless [ox] injured the large ox and the [ox which is an] attested danger injured the small ox”, on the one who wishes to exact compensation lies the burden of proof.
[If] an ox has gored four or five other oxen, this one after this one: the owner shall pay to [the owner of] the last ox injured. If money remains, it will go to the [the owner of] the previously [injured ox]. If money still remains, it will go to the [the owner of the ox injured] previous to the previously [injured ox]. [The owner of] the last [injured ox] benefits, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says, “[If] an ox worth 200 gores an ox worth 200 and the carcass is not worth anything, this one gets 100 and this one gets 100. [If] it injures another ox worth 200, the [owner of the] ox last injured receives 100 and the owner of the previously injured ox receives 50. [If] it injures another ox worth 200, the [owner of the] ox last injured receives 100, the [owner of the] previously injured ox receives 50, and the first two receive 25.
[If] an ox has gored four or five other oxen, this one after this one: the owner shall pay to [the owner of] the last ox injured. If money remains, it will go to the [the owner of] the previously [injured ox]. If money still remains, it will go to the [the owner of the ox injured] previous to the previously [injured ox]. [The owner of] the last [injured ox] benefits, according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Shimon says, “[If] an ox worth 200 gores an ox worth 200 and the carcass is not worth anything, this one gets 100 and this one gets 100. [If] it injures another ox worth 200, the [owner of the] ox last injured receives 100 and the owner of the previously injured ox receives 50. [If] it injures another ox worth 200, the [owner of the] ox last injured receives 100, the [owner of the] previously injured ox receives 50, and the first two receive 25.
If an ox intended [to gore] another ox and struck a woman and her offspring came forth [as a miscarriage], its owner is not liable for the value of the offspring. But if a man intended to strike his fellow and struck a woman and her offspring came forth [as a miscarriage], he must pay the value of the offspring. How does he pay the value of the offspring? They assess the value of the woman before she gave birth and the value after she gave birth. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel said: “If so, once a woman gives birth she is more valuable. Rather, they assess how much the offspring would be worth, and he pays it to the husband, or if she has no husband to his heirs.” If she was a freed bondwoman or a proselyte no penalty is incurred.
If a man dug a pit in a private domain and opened it into the public domain, or if he dug it in the public domain and opened it into a private domain, or if he dug it in a private domain and opened it into another private domain, he is liable [if any is injured by the pit]. If he dug a pit in the public domain and an ox or ass fell into and died, he is liable. No matter whether he digs a pit, trench, or cavern, or ditches or channels he is liable. If so, why does it say “a pit” (Exodus 21:33)? Just as a pit which is deep enough to cause death is ten handbreadths deep, so anything is deep enough to cause death if it is ten handbreadths deep. If they were less than ten handbreadths deep and an ox or an ass fell in and died, the owner is not liable; but if it was damaged he is liable.
If a person sends forth fire in the hands of a deaf-mute, an idiot or a minor he is not liable by the laws of man, but he is liable by the laws of Heaven. If he sent it forth in the hands of a person of sound senses, the one of sound senses is liable. If one brought the fire, and then another brought the wood, he that brought the wood is liable. If one brought the wood and then another brought fire, he that brought the fire is liable. If another came and fanned the flames, the one who fanned the flame is liable. If the wind fanned the flame, they are all exempt. If a man sent forth fire, and it consumed wood or stones or dust, he is liable, for it says: “When a fire breaks out and spreads to thorns so that the stacked corn is consumed, or the standing corn, or the field, he that kindled the fire shall surely make restitution.” If it passed over a fence four cubits high, or over a public way, or over a river, he is exempt. If a man kindled fire within his own domain, how far may it spread [and he will still be liable]? Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah says: “It is looked at as if it was in the middle of a kor’s space.” [ Rabbi Eliezer says: “Sixteen cubits [in every direction] like a public highway.” Rabbi Akiva says: “Fifty cubits.” Rabbi Shimon says: “[It is said] ‘He that kindled the fire shall surely make restitution’, all is in accordance with the nature of the fire.”
If a person sends forth fire in the hands of a deaf-mute, an idiot or a minor he is not liable by the laws of man, but he is liable by the laws of Heaven. If he sent it forth in the hands of a person of sound senses, the one of sound senses is liable. If one brought the fire, and then another brought the wood, he that brought the wood is liable. If one brought the wood and then another brought fire, he that brought the fire is liable. If another came and fanned the flames, the one who fanned the flame is liable. If the wind fanned the flame, they are all exempt. If a man sent forth fire, and it consumed wood or stones or dust, he is liable, for it says: “When a fire breaks out and spreads to thorns so that the stacked corn is consumed, or the standing corn, or the field, he that kindled the fire shall surely make restitution.” If it passed over a fence four cubits high, or over a public way, or over a river, he is exempt. If a man kindled fire within his own domain, how far may it spread [and he will still be liable]? Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah says: “It is looked at as if it was in the middle of a kor’s space.” [ Rabbi Eliezer says: “Sixteen cubits [in every direction] like a public highway.” Rabbi Akiva says: “Fifty cubits.” Rabbi Shimon says: “[It is said] ‘He that kindled the fire shall surely make restitution’, all is in accordance with the nature of the fire.”
If a person sends forth fire in the hands of a deaf-mute, an idiot or a minor he is not liable by the laws of man, but he is liable by the laws of Heaven. If he sent it forth in the hands of a person of sound senses, the one of sound senses is liable. If one brought the fire, and then another brought the wood, he that brought the wood is liable. If one brought the wood and then another brought fire, he that brought the fire is liable. If another came and fanned the flames, the one who fanned the flame is liable. If the wind fanned the flame, they are all exempt. If a man sent forth fire, and it consumed wood or stones or dust, he is liable, for it says: “When a fire breaks out and spreads to thorns so that the stacked corn is consumed, or the standing corn, or the field, he that kindled the fire shall surely make restitution.” If it passed over a fence four cubits high, or over a public way, or over a river, he is exempt. If a man kindled fire within his own domain, how far may it spread [and he will still be liable]? Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah says: “It is looked at as if it was in the middle of a kor’s space.” [ Rabbi Eliezer says: “Sixteen cubits [in every direction] like a public highway.” Rabbi Akiva says: “Fifty cubits.” Rabbi Shimon says: “[It is said] ‘He that kindled the fire shall surely make restitution’, all is in accordance with the nature of the fire.”
If he [who had stolen from the convert] gave the money to the men of the priestly watch and then died, his inheritors cannot recover it from their [the priests] hands, as it says, “Whatsoever a man gives to a priest shall be his” (Numbers 5:10). If he gave the money to Yehoyariv, and the Guilt-offering to Yedayah, he has fulfilled his obligation. If he gave the Guilt-offering to Yehoyariv and the money to Yedayah: if the Guilt-offering still remains, the sons of Yedayah shall offer it; otherwise, he must bring another Guilt-offering. For if a man brought what he had stolen before he offered his Guilt-offering, he has fulfilled his obligation. But if he brought his Guilt-offering before he brought what he had stolen, he has not yet fulfilled his obligation. If he gave the value but not the [added] fifth, the [added] fifth does not prevent [him from offering the Guilt-offering].
If excise collectors took his donkey and gave him another donkey, or if bandits robbed a man of his coat and gave him another coat, they are his own, since the original owners gave up hope of recovering them. If a man saved something from a flood or from marauding troops or from bandits: if the owner gave up hope of recovering [the item], it belongs to him. So too with a swarm of bees: if the owner gave up hope of recovering [the swarm], it belongs to him. Rabbi Yochanan ben Baroka said: “A woman or child may be believed if they say, ‘The swarm of bees went away from here.’” A man may go into his fellow’s field to save his swarm and if he causes damage he must pay for the damage that he has caused; but he may not cut off a branch of the tree [to save his swarm] even on condition that he pay its value. Rabbi Yishmael, the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Baroka, says: “He may even cut off [the branch] and repay the value.”
If excise collectors took his donkey and gave him another donkey, or if bandits robbed a man of his coat and gave him another coat, they are his own, since the original owners gave up hope of recovering them. If a man saved something from a flood or from marauding troops or from bandits: if the owner gave up hope of recovering [the item], it belongs to him. So too with a swarm of bees: if the owner gave up hope of recovering [the swarm], it belongs to him. Rabbi Yochanan ben Baroka said: “A woman or child may be believed if they say, ‘The swarm of bees went away from here.’” A man may go into his fellow’s field to save his swarm and if he causes damage he must pay for the damage that he has caused; but he may not cut off a branch of the tree [to save his swarm] even on condition that he pay its value. Rabbi Yishmael, the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Baroka, says: “He may even cut off [the branch] and repay the value.”
If a man recognized his utensils or books in another’s hands and a report of theft had gone out in the town, the purchaser swears how much he paid and takes this price [from the owner and restores the goods]. But if [such a report had] not [gone out], he [the original owner] does not have the power, for I might say that he had first sold them to another and this one bought it from him.
If a man recognized his utensils or books in another’s hands and a report of theft had gone out in the town, the purchaser swears how much he paid and takes this price [from the owner and restores the goods]. But if [such a report had] not [gone out], he [the original owner] does not have the power, for I might say that he had first sold them to another and this one bought it from him.
If a man stole a field from his fellow and tyrants came and took it from him, if the whole district suffered, he may say to him, “Here, what is yours is in front of you.” But if it was on account of the robber [that the tyrants took the field], he must provide him with another field. If a flood swept away [the field], he may say to him, “Here, what is yours is in front of you.”
If he found scrolls he must read them once every thirty days, and if he does not know how to read he should unroll them. But he may not learn from them something he has not yet learned, nor may another read with him. If he found clothing he must shake it out once every thirty days, and spread it out for [the clothing’s] own good, but not for his own honor. [If he found] silver or copper vessels he must use them for their own good but not so as to wear them out. [If he found] vessels of gold or glass he may not touch them until Elijah comes. If he found a sack or a large basket or anything that is not generally carried about, he may not carry it.
If a man rented a cow from his fellow and lent it to another, and it died a natural death, the hirer must swear that it died a natural death and the borrower must repay [its value] to the renter. Rabbi Yose said: “How can this one make business out of his friend’s cow? Rather [the value of the cow] returns to the owner.”
Just as the laws of fraud apply to buying and selling, so to do they apply to the spoken word. One may not say, “How much is this object?, if he does not wish to buy it. If one had repented, another should not say to him, “Remember your earlier deeds”. If one descended from converts, another should not say to him, “Remember the deeds of your ancestors”. For it is said (Exodus 22:21), “And a stranger you shall not wrong or oppress.”
Just as the laws of fraud apply to buying and selling, so to do they apply to the spoken word. One may not say, “How much is this object?, if he does not wish to buy it. If one had repented, another should not say to him, “Remember your earlier deeds”. If one descended from converts, another should not say to him, “Remember the deeds of your ancestors”. For it is said (Exodus 22:21), “And a stranger you shall not wrong or oppress.”
If a man sold a field, and the buyer gave him part of the price and he said to the buyer, “Pay me the rest of the price whenever you wish and then take what is yours”, this is forbidden. If a man lent another money on the security of his field and said to him, “If you do not pay me within three years it will be mine”, then it becomes his. This is what Boethus the son of Zunin used to do with the consent of the Sages.
One may not set up a shopkeeper on the condition of receiving half the profit, or give him the money to buy produce on the condition of receiving half the profit, unless he pays him his wage as a laborer. One may not set out his hens [for another to raise them and hatch their eggs] in order to share the profits, nor evaluate calves or foals [and give them to his fellow to raise] in order to share the profit, unless he pays him a wage for his labor and cost of the food. But one may receive the care of calves and foals in return for half the profits, and rear them until they reach a third of their growth, and donkeys until they can carry a burden.
One may not set a price for produce before its market-price is known. After its market-price is known, one may set a price, for even though this one does not have [the produce] another does have it. If he was the first to harvest his crop, he may set a price with his fellow over grain stacked in a heap, or over grapes in their harvesting basket, or over olives in a vat, or over the clay-balls of the potter, or over lime as soon as the limestone is sunk in the kiln. One may set a price for manure at any time of the year. Rabbi Yose says: “One may not set a price over manure unless the seller has manure on the dungheap.” But the Sages permit it. One may set the price at the cheapest rate [that will be at the time of delivery]. Rabbi Judah says: “Even if he didn’t set the price at the cheapest rate he may say, “Give me at the such a price or give me back my money.”
One may say to his fellow, “Help me weed and I will help you weed” or “Help me hoe and I will help you hoe.” But one may not say, “Help me weed and I will help you hoe”, or “Help me hoe and I will help you weed”. All days of the dry season are accounted alike, and all days of the rainy season are accounted alike. One may not say to another, “Help me plow in the dry season and I will help you plow in the rainy season.” Rabban Gamaliel says: “There is interest that is paid in advance and interest that is paid afterward. How is this so? If a one intended to borrow from another and made him a present and said, “This is so that you will lend to me”, this is interest that is paid in advance. If one borrowed from another and repaid it to him, and then sent a present and said, “This is for your money of which you have not had use while it was with me”, this is interest that is paid afterward. Rabbi Shimon says: “There is interest paid in words: one may not say to his creditor, “Know that such and such a person has come form such and such a place.”
One may say to his fellow, “Help me weed and I will help you weed” or “Help me hoe and I will help you hoe.” But one may not say, “Help me weed and I will help you hoe”, or “Help me hoe and I will help you weed”. All days of the dry season are accounted alike, and all days of the rainy season are accounted alike. One may not say to another, “Help me plow in the dry season and I will help you plow in the rainy season.” Rabban Gamaliel says: “There is interest that is paid in advance and interest that is paid afterward. How is this so? If a one intended to borrow from another and made him a present and said, “This is so that you will lend to me”, this is interest that is paid in advance. If one borrowed from another and repaid it to him, and then sent a present and said, “This is for your money of which you have not had use while it was with me”, this is interest that is paid afterward. Rabbi Shimon says: “There is interest paid in words: one may not say to his creditor, “Know that such and such a person has come form such and such a place.”
One may say to his fellow, “Help me weed and I will help you weed” or “Help me hoe and I will help you hoe.” But one may not say, “Help me weed and I will help you hoe”, or “Help me hoe and I will help you weed”. All days of the dry season are accounted alike, and all days of the rainy season are accounted alike. One may not say to another, “Help me plow in the dry season and I will help you plow in the rainy season.” Rabban Gamaliel says: “There is interest that is paid in advance and interest that is paid afterward. How is this so? If a one intended to borrow from another and made him a present and said, “This is so that you will lend to me”, this is interest that is paid in advance. If one borrowed from another and repaid it to him, and then sent a present and said, “This is for your money of which you have not had use while it was with me”, this is interest that is paid afterward. Rabbi Shimon says: “There is interest paid in words: one may not say to his creditor, “Know that such and such a person has come form such and such a place.”
All craftsmen are accounted paid guardians. But all that have said, “Take what is yours and give me the money”, are accounted unpaid guardians. If one man said to another, “Guard that for me and I will guard this for you”, he is accounted a paid guardian. If one said, “Guard this for me”, and the other said “Put it down in front of me”, he is accounted an unpaid guardian.
If one was working with figs he may not eat grapes, and if among grapes he may not eat figs. But he may refrain [from eating] until he reaches the best produce and then eat. In no case have they said [that he may eat] save during the time of his work. But because of the principle of restoring lost property to its owner they have said, “Field laborers may eat as they go from one furrow to another or as they return from the winepress. And a donkey [may eat] while it is unloading.”
If one borrowed a cow, and borrowed it for half a day and hired it for half a day; or borrowed it for one day and hired it for the next; or if he borrowed one cow, and hired another and the cow died if he that lent the cow says: “It was the borrowed cow that died”, [or] “On the day when it was borrowed it died”, [or] “During the time when it was borrowed it died” and the other one says: “I don’t know”, he is liable. If the hirer says, “It is the hired one that died”, [or] “On the day when it was hired it died”, and the other says, “I do not know”, he is not liable. If the one says, “It was borrowed”, and the other says, “It was hired”, the hirer must take an oath that it was the hired one that died. If the one says, “I do not know”, and the other says, “I do not know”, they share in the loss.
So, too, if an olive press was built in a rock and another had a garden on top of it, and [the olive press] was in part broken down, the owner of the garden may come down and sow below until the other rebuilds the ceiling of his olive press. If a wall or a tree fell into the public domain and caused damage, the owner is not liable to make restitution. If a set time had been given to him to cut down the tree or pull down the wall, and they fell down within the time, he is not liable. If after that time, he is liable.
If one’s wall was near his fellow’s garden and it fell down and his fellow said to him, “Clear away your stones”, and he answered, “They have become yours”, they do not listen to him. If after the other (the owner of the garden) had accepted he (the owner of the wall) said to him, “Here is your expenditures and I will take back what is mine”, they do not listen to him. If one hired a laborer to help him in his work with chopped straw and stubble, and the laborer said to him, “Give me my wages”, and he said to him, “Take as your wages that with which you have labored”, they do not listen to him. If after the other (the employee) had accepted he (the employer) said to him, “Here are your wages and I will take what is mine”, they do not listen to him. One who removes his manure into the public domain: from the time he removes it another may take it to manure [his fields]. One may not soak clay or make bricks in the public domain, but clay may be kneaded in the public domain but not bricks. One who builds in the public domain: one brings the stones and another builds (immediately). And if he causes damage, he pays what he has damaged. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “He may, indeed, make preparation for his work for thirty days [in the public domain].
If one’s wall was near his fellow’s garden and it fell down and his fellow said to him, “Clear away your stones”, and he answered, “They have become yours”, they do not listen to him. If after the other (the owner of the garden) had accepted he (the owner of the wall) said to him, “Here is your expenditures and I will take back what is mine”, they do not listen to him. If one hired a laborer to help him in his work with chopped straw and stubble, and the laborer said to him, “Give me my wages”, and he said to him, “Take as your wages that with which you have labored”, they do not listen to him. If after the other (the employee) had accepted he (the employer) said to him, “Here are your wages and I will take what is mine”, they do not listen to him. One who removes his manure into the public domain: from the time he removes it another may take it to manure [his fields]. One may not soak clay or make bricks in the public domain, but clay may be kneaded in the public domain but not bricks. One who builds in the public domain: one brings the stones and another builds (immediately). And if he causes damage, he pays what he has damaged. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “He may, indeed, make preparation for his work for thirty days [in the public domain].
If the wall of a courtyard fell down they obligate each of the partners to help in building it up to a height of four cubits. He is presumed to have paid [his share] unless the other brings proof that he has not paid. [If the fence was built] four cubits or higher, they do not obligate him [to help in building it.] If [the one who did not contribute] built another wall near it, even if he did not put a roof upon it, they obligate him to share in all of the costs. He is presumed not to have paid [his share] unless he brings proof that he has.
One may not open a bakery or a dyer’s shop under his fellow’s storehouse, nor a cattle stall. In truth, they have permitted these things under a winestore but not a cattle stall. A man may protest against [another that opens] a shop within the courtyard and say to him, “I cannot sleep because of the noise of them that go in and out.” One who makes utensils, should go outside and sell them in the market. But none may protest and say to him, “I cannot sleep because of the noise of the hammer” or “because of the noise of the mill-stones” or “because of the noise of children.”
If one’s wall was adjacent to his friend’s wall he may not build another wall adjoining it unless it is at a distance of four cubits. And [if he builds a wall opposite his friend’s] windows, whether it is higher or lower than them or level with them, it may not be within four cubits.
A person may not plant a tree near another’s field unless it is four cubits away, no matter whether it be a vine or any other kind of tree. If there was a wall between, each may plant up to the wall on either side. If its roots entered within the other’s property, the other may cut them away to a depth of three handbreadths so that they shall not hinder the plough. If he dug a cistern, trench or cave, he may cut them away as far down as he digs, and the wood shall belong to him.
If a tree stretches into another’s field, he may cut it away as far as is reached by an ox-goad held over the plough, or, if it is a carob or sycamore, [he may cut it away] according to the plumb line’s measure. All trees that stretch over irrigated fields may be cut away according to the plumb line’s measure. Abba Shaul says: “All trees that bear no fruit may be cut away according to the plumb line’s measure.”
There are three regions with regards to possession: Judea, beyond the Jordan and the Galilee. If the owner was in Judea and another took possession [of his property] in the Galilee; Or if he was in the Galilee and another took possession [of his property] in Judea, such possession does not demonstrate ownership, until he is in the same region. Rabbi Judah said: “They have specified a period of three years so that if the owner was in Spain and another took possession [of his property] during one year, they could make it known to the owner during the next year and he could return in the third year.”
There are three regions with regards to possession: Judea, beyond the Jordan and the Galilee. If the owner was in Judea and another took possession [of his property] in the Galilee; Or if he was in the Galilee and another took possession [of his property] in Judea, such possession does not demonstrate ownership, until he is in the same region. Rabbi Judah said: “They have specified a period of three years so that if the owner was in Spain and another took possession [of his property] during one year, they could make it known to the owner during the next year and he could return in the third year.”
There are three regions with regards to possession: Judea, beyond the Jordan and the Galilee. If the owner was in Judea and another took possession [of his property] in the Galilee; Or if he was in the Galilee and another took possession [of his property] in Judea, such possession does not demonstrate ownership, until he is in the same region. Rabbi Judah said: “They have specified a period of three years so that if the owner was in Spain and another took possession [of his property] during one year, they could make it known to the owner during the next year and he could return in the third year.”
If two testify that he has had the use [of property] during three years and they are found to be false witnesses, they must make full restitution to the owner. If two [false witnesses] testify of the first year, two of the second, and two of the third, they divide up the costs of restitution between them. If three brothers testify and another is included with them, they offer three different acts of testimony, but their words count as a single act of testimony when the evidence is proved false.
One may not make a window to open into a jointly held courtyard. If he bought a house in another [and adjoining] courtyard he may not open it into a jointly held courtyard. If he built an upper room over his house he may not make it open into the jointly held courtyard; But, if he wishes, he may build another room within his house or build an upper room over his house and make it open into his own house. In a jointly held courtyard a man may not build a door directly opposite another’s door, or a window directly opposite another’s window. If the window was small he may not make it larger; if it was a single window he may not make it into two. But in the public domain he may open a door opposite another’s door, or a window opposite another’s window. If the window was small he may make it larger; if it was a single window he may make it into two.
One may not make a window to open into a jointly held courtyard. If he bought a house in another [and adjoining] courtyard he may not open it into a jointly held courtyard. If he built an upper room over his house he may not make it open into the jointly held courtyard; But, if he wishes, he may build another room within his house or build an upper room over his house and make it open into his own house. In a jointly held courtyard a man may not build a door directly opposite another’s door, or a window directly opposite another’s window. If the window was small he may not make it larger; if it was a single window he may not make it into two. But in the public domain he may open a door opposite another’s door, or a window opposite another’s window. If the window was small he may make it larger; if it was a single window he may make it into two.
One may not make a window to open into a jointly held courtyard. If he bought a house in another [and adjoining] courtyard he may not open it into a jointly held courtyard. If he built an upper room over his house he may not make it open into the jointly held courtyard; But, if he wishes, he may build another room within his house or build an upper room over his house and make it open into his own house. In a jointly held courtyard a man may not build a door directly opposite another’s door, or a window directly opposite another’s window. If the window was small he may not make it larger; if it was a single window he may not make it into two. But in the public domain he may open a door opposite another’s door, or a window opposite another’s window. If the window was small he may make it larger; if it was a single window he may make it into two.
One may not make a window to open into a jointly held courtyard. If he bought a house in another [and adjoining] courtyard he may not open it into a jointly held courtyard. If he built an upper room over his house he may not make it open into the jointly held courtyard; But, if he wishes, he may build another room within his house or build an upper room over his house and make it open into his own house. In a jointly held courtyard a man may not build a door directly opposite another’s door, or a window directly opposite another’s window. If the window was small he may not make it larger; if it was a single window he may not make it into two. But in the public domain he may open a door opposite another’s door, or a window opposite another’s window. If the window was small he may make it larger; if it was a single window he may make it into two.
One may not make a window to open into a jointly held courtyard. If he bought a house in another [and adjoining] courtyard he may not open it into a jointly held courtyard. If he built an upper room over his house he may not make it open into the jointly held courtyard; But, if he wishes, he may build another room within his house or build an upper room over his house and make it open into his own house. In a jointly held courtyard a man may not build a door directly opposite another’s door, or a window directly opposite another’s window. If the window was small he may not make it larger; if it was a single window he may not make it into two. But in the public domain he may open a door opposite another’s door, or a window opposite another’s window. If the window was small he may make it larger; if it was a single window he may make it into two.
One may not make a window to open into a jointly held courtyard. If he bought a house in another [and adjoining] courtyard he may not open it into a jointly held courtyard. If he built an upper room over his house he may not make it open into the jointly held courtyard; But, if he wishes, he may build another room within his house or build an upper room over his house and make it open into his own house. In a jointly held courtyard a man may not build a door directly opposite another’s door, or a window directly opposite another’s window. If the window was small he may not make it larger; if it was a single window he may not make it into two. But in the public domain he may open a door opposite another’s door, or a window opposite another’s window. If the window was small he may make it larger; if it was a single window he may make it into two.
Nor [has he sold] the cistern or the cellar, even though he had written in the deed of sale, “the depth and height”. And he [the seller] must buy himself a path [from the new owner to reach the cellar or cistern], according to Rabbi Akiva. But the Sages say: “He need not buy himself a path.” And Rabbi Akiva agrees that if he had said to him, “Excepting these [the cistern or cellar]” that he need not buy himself a path. If he sold them [the cellar or cistern] to another, Rabbi Akiva says: “He need not buy himself a path.” But the Sages say: “He must buy himself a path.”
But [one who sold a field] has not sold the stones that are not necessary to it or the canes in a vineyard that are not necessary to it or the produce that is already picked from the ground. But if he had said, “It and all that is in it” all of these are sold also. But in neither case has he sold any partition of reeds that covers a quarter-kav’s space of ground, or the watchman’s hut if it was not fastened down with mortar, or grafted carob trees or cropped sycamores, or any cistern or winepress or dovecote, whether they are lying waste or in use. And [the seller] must purchase [from the buyer] a way thereto, according to Rabbi Akiva. But the sages say: “He need not.” And Rabbi Akiva agrees that if he had said, “Excepting these”, he need not buy himself a way thereto. If he had sold them (the cistern, winepress or dovecote) to another, Rabbi Akiva says: “He [that bought them] need not buy himself a way thereto. But the Sages say: “He must buy himself a way thereto.” When is this so? With regards to he that sells his field. But if he gives it as a gift, he gives everything that is in it. If brothers who divided [an inheritance] came into possession of a field, they come into possession of everything that is in it. If a man secured title by possession of the property of a convert, and secured title by possession of the [convert’s] field, he secures title to everything that is in it. If a man dedicated a field [to the Temple] he has dedicated everything in it. Rabbi Shimon says: “If a man dedicated a field, he has dedicated only the grafted carob trees and cropped sycamores.”
If a man sold produce to his fellow and the buyer drew it towards him but did not measure it, [the buyer] has acquired [the produce]. If [the seller] had measured it but [the buyer] did not draw it towards him, he has not acquired [the produce]. If [the buyer] is clever he will rent the place [in which the produce is located]. If a man bought flax from his fellow he has not acquired it until he has moved it from one place to another. If it was still attached to the ground, and he plucked any small quantity of it, he has acquired possession.
If he had a garden behind his fellow’s garden, he may go in and out only at the time when others are accustomed to go in and out. And he may not bring in merchants, or enter through it into another field. [The owner of] the outer garden may plant seeds on the path. But, if with the other’s consent, he has been given a path at the side [of the other’s garden] he may go in and out when he wishes. And he may bring in merchants, but he may not enter through it into another field. And neither of them has the right to plant seeds on the path.
If he had a garden behind his fellow’s garden, he may go in and out only at the time when others are accustomed to go in and out. And he may not bring in merchants, or enter through it into another field. [The owner of] the outer garden may plant seeds on the path. But, if with the other’s consent, he has been given a path at the side [of the other’s garden] he may go in and out when he wishes. And he may bring in merchants, but he may not enter through it into another field. And neither of them has the right to plant seeds on the path.
If a public path passed through a man’s field and he took it and gave them [another path] by the side of the field, what he has given he has given and what he has taken for himself does not become his. A private path is four cubits. A public path is sixteen cubits. The king’s path has no prescribed measure. The path to a grave has no prescribed measure. The halting places, according to the judges of Tzippori, should be four kab’s space of ground.
If a man says, “So and so, my firstborn son, shall not receive a double portion”, or “So and so, my son, shall not inherit with his brothers”, he has said nothing, for he has made a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah. If a man apportioned his property to his sons by word of mouth, and gave much to one and little to another, or made them equal to the firstborn, his words are valid. But if he had said [that it should be so] “by inheritance”, he has said nothing. If he had written down, whether at the beginning or in the middle or at the end [of his will] that it should be as a gift, his words are valid. If a man said, “So and so a man shall inherit from me” and he has a daughter; or “My daughter shall inherit from me”, and he has a son, he has said nothing, for he has made a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah. Rabbi Johanan ben Baroka says: “If he said [that so and so shall inherit from me] of one that was qualified to inherit from him, his words are valid, but if of one that was not qualified to inherit from him his words do not remain valid.” If a man wrote away his property to others and passed over his sons, what he has done is done, but the Sages are not comfortable with it. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If has sons did not behave properly, it should be counted to his credit.”
If a man said, “This is my son”, he is believed. If [he said], “This is my brother”, he is not believed, yet the other may join him in his portion. If he died the property returns to its place. If he inherited property from elsewhere the other’s brothers inherit it together with him. If a man died and a testament was found bound to his thigh, this counts as nothing. But if [he had delivered it and] through it granted title to another, whether of his heirs or of those who are not his heirs, his words are valid.
If there were two brothers, one poor and one rich, and their father left them a bath house or an olive press, if the father had made them for hire, the profit is split equally. But if he made them for his own use alone, the rich brother may say to the poor brother, “Buy for yourself slaves and they can wash in the bath house” or “Buy for yourself olives and prepare them in the olive press.” If there were two in the same town, and one’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon and other’s name was Joseph the son of Shimon, neither can bring forth a debt document on the other, and another person cannot bring forth a debt document against them. And if some person finds amongst his documents a document that states, “The [debt] document of Joseph ben Shimon is paid”, both of their [debt] documents are paid. What should they do? They should write their names to the third generation. And if the names are the same through the third generation, they should give themselves a sign. And if their signs are the same, they should write “Cohen”. If a man said to his son, “One of my debt documents is paid and I do not know which one”, then all are deemed to be paid. If two documents were found [amongst his documents] written to the same debtor, then the large one is paid and the small one is not paid. If a man lent money to his fellow on a guarantor’s security, he may not exact payment from the guarantor. But if he had said, “On the condition that I may exact payment from whom I wish”, then he may exact payment from the guarantor. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: “If the borrower had property, in neither case can he exact payment from the guarantor.” Moreover, Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel used to say: “If a man was a guarantor for a woman’s ketubah and her husband divorced her, the husband must vow to derive no further benefit from her, lest he make a conspiracy against the property of the guarantor and take his wife back again.”