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The Jerusalem Talmud
“As vows of the wicked, he vowed as nazir, a sacrifice, and an oath.” Samuel said, the Mishnah speaks about several cases, either as nazir, or a sacrifice, or an oath. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, he is a nazir in all three of them. Rebbi Abin said, if somebody wants to explain that of Rebbi Ze‘ira, it is such: There was before him a bunch of grapes and another person came and said, there is an oath on me, then there is an oath on him. Another person came and said, that is qorbān for me, it is qorbān for him. Another person came and said, there is an oath on me, then there is an oath on him. Another person came and said, what these three said is on me, does it not turn out that this one is obligated for qorbān and oath?
“As vows of the wicked, he vowed as nazir, a sacrifice, and an oath.” Samuel said, the Mishnah speaks about several cases, either as nazir, or a sacrifice, or an oath. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, he is a nazir in all three of them. Rebbi Abin said, if somebody wants to explain that of Rebbi Ze‘ira, it is such: There was before him a bunch of grapes and another person came and said, there is an oath on me, then there is an oath on him. Another person came and said, that is qorbān for me, it is qorbān for him. Another person came and said, there is an oath on me, then there is an oath on him. Another person came and said, what these three said is on me, does it not turn out that this one is obligated for qorbān and oath?
“As vows of the wicked, he vowed as nazir, a sacrifice, and an oath.” Samuel said, the Mishnah speaks about several cases, either as nazir, or a sacrifice, or an oath. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, he is a nazir in all three of them. Rebbi Abin said, if somebody wants to explain that of Rebbi Ze‘ira, it is such: There was before him a bunch of grapes and another person came and said, there is an oath on me, then there is an oath on him. Another person came and said, that is qorbān for me, it is qorbān for him. Another person came and said, there is an oath on me, then there is an oath on him. Another person came and said, what these three said is on me, does it not turn out that this one is obligated for qorbān and oath?
It was stated: “As to their free-will offerings, he did not say anything.” Does that mean that the wicked give free-will offerings? Since he gave a free-will offering, he is not wicked. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Jehudah, since it was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah: “It is better that you should not make a vow than that you make a vow but do not pay,” better in any case is that you should not make a vow at all. Rebbi Meїr says, “it is better that you should not make a vow than that you make a vow but do not pay,” better in any case is that you should make a vow and pay. And so it says, “make vows and pay to your God.” How does one handle a free-will offering? He brings his sheep to the Temple courtyard and says, that one is an elevation offering. Rebbi Abin said, Rebbi Jehudah used to open a door: If you had known that one who makes a vow is called wicked, would you have vowed? Rebbi Yannai said, “it is a trap for a human to call ‘sanctified’ and afterwards to check out the vows,” if one started to make vows, his account book is opened. Another explanation: “it is a trap for a human to call ‘sanctified’ and to be late to check out the vows,” if a person is in arrears with his vows, his account book is opened. It happened to one who said, I undertake to bring an elevation offering and he tarried to bring it. His ship sank at sea.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says qônām, or qônāḥ,” etc. So far for himself. Can one dedicate to Heaven by saying qônām? Let us hear from the following: One said to another, lend me your spade. He said, qônām the spade if I have it, qônām my property on me. If he has a spade, his property would be forbidden for this one “has no spade”. Rebbi Taḥlifa from Caesarea said, there is a difference, for he used the same expression to attach the spade and to attach his property. As you look at it, if the spade is sanctified, so is his property. If the spade is not sanctified, neither is his property. If he said, qônām the spade if I have it, and added qônām my property on me, if he owns a spade, his property is forbidden. That is correct. Rebbi Joshua ben Ḥananiah said, if he had said “my property”, it would be permitted for he stopped. That is correct. He only asserted that the person had no spade. Therefore, if he has a spade, his property is forbidden. That means that the spade was sanctified. That means that the property was sanctified. This means that a person may dedicate to Heaven using the expression qônām.
MISHNAH: If somebody says sacrifice, elevation offering, or flour offering, purification offering, or well-being offering, that I will not eat with you, he is forbidden; Rebbi Jehudah permits. The sacrifice, like a sacrifice, sacrifice if I would eat with you, he is forbidden. It is for sacrifice what I will not eat with you, Rebbi Meїr forbids. If somebody says to another person, a qônām that my mouth speaks with you, that my hand works with you, that my foot goes with you, he is forbidden.
MISHNAH: The following vows are permitted: Profane I would eat with you; like pork, like idolatry, like carcasses, like meat from a torn animal, like abominations, like crawling things, like Aaron’s ḥallah and his heave, are permitted. One who says to his wife, you are for me like my mother, one finds for him an opening from another place that he should not be flippant about this. A qônām that I shall not sleep, that I shall not speak, that I shall not walk, or one who says to his wife, a qônām that I shall not sleep with you, he is under the obligation “he shall not profanate his word.” An oath that I shall not sleep, that I shall not speak, that I shall not walk, he is forbidden.
MISHNAH: If somebody made a vow of ḥerem and said, I referred the vow only to mariner’s nets, or made a vow of qorbān and said, I referred the vow only to the gifts for kings, or said, my bone is qorbān and said, I referred the vow only to the bone that I keep in my house for purposes of vows, [or said] a qônām that my wife may not have any use from me and said, I referred the vow only to my first wife whom I divorced, all these do not need a question. If they do question, one punishes them and makes it difficult for them, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, one finds for them an opening from another place and teaches them that they should not be flippant about vows.
Do the Sages permit all kinds of vows? “Four kinds of vows did the Sages dissolve”! Rebbi Eleazar in the name of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya: Those do not need the permission of a Sage. Rav and Samuel both say that these need the permission of a Sage. Issy objected: Did we not find an opening for vows from there only? Samuel said to him, bind a rope on it. A Mishnah disagrees with Issy: “This one also can dissolve his vow without asking a Sage.” He explains it, that all vows need an opening from another place but these have their openings in themselves. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that is, if they do not insist. But if they did insist they need the permission of a Sage. If one did insist but the other did not insist, since this one’s is invalid, the other one’s also should be invalid. A student of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus said [after] Rebbi Yudan: If one asked a tetradrachma, one was ready to give him three, and another one said a sheqel. (Does he insist?) Since he renounces one denar for this one he may renounce another one for the other one and give it to him for two.
Do the Sages permit all kinds of vows? “Four kinds of vows did the Sages dissolve”! Rebbi Eleazar in the name of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya: Those do not need the permission of a Sage. Rav and Samuel both say that these need the permission of a Sage. Issy objected: Did we not find an opening for vows from there only? Samuel said to him, bind a rope on it. A Mishnah disagrees with Issy: “This one also can dissolve his vow without asking a Sage.” He explains it, that all vows need an opening from another place but these have their openings in themselves. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that is, if they do not insist. But if they did insist they need the permission of a Sage. If one did insist but the other did not insist, since this one’s is invalid, the other one’s also should be invalid. A student of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus said [after] Rebbi Yudan: If one asked a tetradrachma, one was ready to give him three, and another one said a sheqel. (Does he insist?) Since he renounces one denar for this one he may renounce another one for the other one and give it to him for two.
Do the Sages permit all kinds of vows? “Four kinds of vows did the Sages dissolve”! Rebbi Eleazar in the name of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya: Those do not need the permission of a Sage. Rav and Samuel both say that these need the permission of a Sage. Issy objected: Did we not find an opening for vows from there only? Samuel said to him, bind a rope on it. A Mishnah disagrees with Issy: “This one also can dissolve his vow without asking a Sage.” He explains it, that all vows need an opening from another place but these have their openings in themselves. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that is, if they do not insist. But if they did insist they need the permission of a Sage. If one did insist but the other did not insist, since this one’s is invalid, the other one’s also should be invalid. A student of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Julianus said [after] Rebbi Yudan: If one asked a tetradrachma, one was ready to give him three, and another one said a sheqel. (Does he insist?) Since he renounces one denar for this one he may renounce another one for the other one and give it to him for two.
“Vain” and “untruth” both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. “Remember” and “keep” both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. “Its desecrator shall be put to death” and “two unblemished one year old sheep” both were said together, which is impossible for the mouth to say and the ear to hear. “The nakedness of your brother’s wife you shall not uncover”, “her brother-in-law shall come to her”, both were said together. “You shall not move real property from one tribe to another,” “any daughter inheriting real property,” both together. “Fringes you shall make for yourself,” “do not wear sha‘ṭnez”, both were said together. And so it says, “God spoke once, two I heard from this.” And it is written: “Is not my word like fire, says the Eternal, and like a hammer which shatters a rock.”
A vain oath, if one swears to change what is known to men; a false oath if he swears and changes. What is vain and what is false? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If it is known to two persons, that is a false oath, to three, it is vain. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: If it is known to two persons and another one at the end of the earth knows about it, that is a vain oath. What is the difference between them? If he was untrue before two [persons], threw it into the sea, and they had warned him because of a vain oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is not whipped, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is whipped. If they had warned him because of a false oath, in the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is whipped, in the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar he is not whipped. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah: Even an egg and a pearl. What means even? But, for example an egg and a pearl.
Ḥizqiah said, if he redeemed them they revert to their sanctity. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he redeemed them they are redeemed. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “These have no redemption.” He explains thus: After they have been cut they do not need redemption. Rebbi Yose said, what Ḥizqiah said refers to the case that he himself redeemed them. But if another person redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them. The argument of Rebbi Yose is switched: There, he says that if [another] redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them, but here, he says that if she was married to another man the qiddušin [of the first] were not removed! All that is questionable for him is if he gave her two peruṭot, one for the moment and one for after he has divorced her, what is the situation?
Ḥizqiah said, if he redeemed them they revert to their sanctity. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he redeemed them they are redeemed. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “These have no redemption.” He explains thus: After they have been cut they do not need redemption. Rebbi Yose said, what Ḥizqiah said refers to the case that he himself redeemed them. But if another person redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them. The argument of Rebbi Yose is switched: There, he says that if [another] redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them, but here, he says that if she was married to another man the qiddušin [of the first] were not removed! All that is questionable for him is if he gave her two peruṭot, one for the moment and one for after he has divorced her, what is the situation?
Ḥizqiah said, if he redeemed them they revert to their sanctity. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he redeemed them they are redeemed. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “These have no redemption.” He explains thus: After they have been cut they do not need redemption. Rebbi Yose said, what Ḥizqiah said refers to the case that he himself redeemed them. But if another person redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them. The argument of Rebbi Yose is switched: There, he says that if [another] redeemed them, the sanctity is removed from them, but here, he says that if she was married to another man the qiddušin [of the first] were not removed! All that is questionable for him is if he gave her two peruṭot, one for the moment and one for after he has divorced her, what is the situation?
MISHNAH: A qônām that I shall not enjoy from the uncircumcized, he is permitted uncircumcized Jews and forbidden circumcized peoples of the world. That I shall not enjoy from the circumcized, he is forbidden uncircumcized Jews and permitted circumcized peoples of the world, since the prepuce is simply a name for Gentiles as it was said: “For all Gentiles are uncircumcized and all the House of Israel are uncircumcised of heart.” Rebbi Ismael says, circumcision is great, for its covenant was concluded thirteenfold. Rebbi Yose says, circumcision is great, for it pushes aside the stringencies of the Sabbath. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, circumcision is great, for it was not suspended even one hour for Moses the Just. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, Rebbi Yose says, circumcision is great, for it pushes aside skin disease. Rebbi says, circumcision is great, for with all the commandments which Abraham fulfilled he was not called whole until he circumcized himself as it is written: “Walk before me and be perfect.” Another word: Circumcision is great, for without it the Holy One, praise to Him, would not have created his world as it is said: “So says the Eternal, if it were not for my covenant day and night, I would not have put in place the laws of heaven and earth.” Another word: Circumcision is great, for it is weighty corresponding to all other commandments of the Torah, as it is said: “Behold the blood of the covenant which the Eternal concluded with you about all these words.”
MISHNAH: A qônām that I shall not enjoy from the uncircumcized, he is permitted uncircumcized Jews and forbidden circumcized peoples of the world. That I shall not enjoy from the circumcized, he is forbidden uncircumcized Jews and permitted circumcized peoples of the world, since the prepuce is simply a name for Gentiles as it was said: “For all Gentiles are uncircumcized and all the House of Israel are uncircumcised of heart.” Rebbi Ismael says, circumcision is great, for its covenant was concluded thirteenfold. Rebbi Yose says, circumcision is great, for it pushes aside the stringencies of the Sabbath. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥa says, circumcision is great, for it was not suspended even one hour for Moses the Just. Rebbi Neḥemiah says, Rebbi Yose says, circumcision is great, for it pushes aside skin disease. Rebbi says, circumcision is great, for with all the commandments which Abraham fulfilled he was not called whole until he circumcized himself as it is written: “Walk before me and be perfect.” Another word: Circumcision is great, for without it the Holy One, praise to Him, would not have created his world as it is said: “So says the Eternal, if it were not for my covenant day and night, I would not have put in place the laws of heaven and earth.” Another word: Circumcision is great, for it is weighty corresponding to all other commandments of the Torah, as it is said: “Behold the blood of the covenant which the Eternal concluded with you about all these words.”
Because Moses was lazy for circumcision, the angel tried to kill kim. That is what is written: “The Eternal met him and wanted to kill him.” Rebbi Yose said, far be the thought that Moses was lazy for circumcision but he argued on his own: To perform circumcision and leave would be dangerous. To wait, the Holy One, praise to Him, told him: “Go, return to Egypt.” But because he was lazy in preparing for the overnight stay before circumcision; that is what is written: “It was on the way, at the overnight stay.” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, far be the thought that the angel wanted to kill Moses; it was the baby. Come and see, who is called ḥātān? Moses or the baby? There are Tannaïm who state that Moses is called ḥātān. There are Tannaïm who state that the baby is called ḥātān. He who said that Moses is called ḥātān: Ḥātān, blood is required from you. And he said that the baby is called ḥātān: Ḥātān, in blood you are preserved for me. “Ṣippora took a flintstone and cut her son’s prepuce and touched his feet.” Rebbi Jehudah, Rebbi Neḥemiah, and the rabbis. One said, Moses’s feet. Another said, the angel’s feet. Another said, the baby’s feet. He who said Moses’s feet: Here I cut your obligation for you. He who said, the angel’s feet: Here your mission was accomplished. He who said the baby’s feet, she touched the baby’s body. “He left off from him; then she said, a blood ḥātān for circumcisions.” From here that there are two circumcisions; one for baring the gland and one for the fibers.
Because Moses was lazy for circumcision, the angel tried to kill kim. That is what is written: “The Eternal met him and wanted to kill him.” Rebbi Yose said, far be the thought that Moses was lazy for circumcision but he argued on his own: To perform circumcision and leave would be dangerous. To wait, the Holy One, praise to Him, told him: “Go, return to Egypt.” But because he was lazy in preparing for the overnight stay before circumcision; that is what is written: “It was on the way, at the overnight stay.” Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel said, far be the thought that the angel wanted to kill Moses; it was the baby. Come and see, who is called ḥātān? Moses or the baby? There are Tannaïm who state that Moses is called ḥātān. There are Tannaïm who state that the baby is called ḥātān. He who said that Moses is called ḥātān: Ḥātān, blood is required from you. And he said that the baby is called ḥātān: Ḥātān, in blood you are preserved for me. “Ṣippora took a flintstone and cut her son’s prepuce and touched his feet.” Rebbi Jehudah, Rebbi Neḥemiah, and the rabbis. One said, Moses’s feet. Another said, the angel’s feet. Another said, the baby’s feet. He who said Moses’s feet: Here I cut your obligation for you. He who said, the angel’s feet: Here your mission was accomplished. He who said the baby’s feet, she touched the baby’s body. “He left off from him; then she said, a blood ḥātān for circumcisions.” From here that there are two circumcisions; one for baring the gland and one for the fibers.
MISHNAH: The only difference between one who is under a vow [not to have] usufruct from another and one who is under a vow about use of food is passing through his real estate and vessels that cannot be used to prepare food. One who is under a vow about use of food should not borrow from him a fine or coarse sieve, a grindstone, or an oven. But he may borrow from him a robe or a stole, nose rings and finger rings, and anything that is not used to prepare food. At a place where one rents out any of these it is forbidden.
HALAKHAH: “The only difference between one who is under a vow [not to have] usufruct from another,” etc. This means that vessels used to prepare food are forbidden. But did he not make the vow about food? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, so is the Mishnah: The only difference between one who is under a vow [not to have] usufruct from another and one who is under a vow about use for food. In the House of Rebbi it was stated thus: “One who is under a vow about use of food should not borrow from him a fine or coarse sieve, a grindstone, or an oven.” It was stated: But he may borrow from him cups and bowls and fruit bowls, since these are not used to prepare food, only to serve food. Pans and pots are forbidden. To mill and to press is forbidden. Cutting is a problem, harvesting is a problem. What kind of usufruct? It was stated: But he may borrow a spade from him. We wanted to say, a spade of a digger. Explain it by a spade for weeding, and you cannot infer anything. Rebbi Abuna said, that ysṭ’, since one removes and separates the bran from flour with it, it is forbidden to borrow from him.
HALAKHAH: “The only difference between one who is under a vow [not to have] usufruct from another,” etc. This means that vessels used to prepare food are forbidden. But did he not make the vow about food? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, so is the Mishnah: The only difference between one who is under a vow [not to have] usufruct from another and one who is under a vow about use for food. In the House of Rebbi it was stated thus: “One who is under a vow about use of food should not borrow from him a fine or coarse sieve, a grindstone, or an oven.” It was stated: But he may borrow from him cups and bowls and fruit bowls, since these are not used to prepare food, only to serve food. Pans and pots are forbidden. To mill and to press is forbidden. Cutting is a problem, harvesting is a problem. What kind of usufruct? It was stated: But he may borrow a spade from him. We wanted to say, a spade of a digger. Explain it by a spade for weeding, and you cannot infer anything. Rebbi Abuna said, that ysṭ’, since one removes and separates the bran from flour with it, it is forbidden to borrow from him.
MISHNAH: If one is under a vow [not to have] usufruct from another, [the other] may give his šeqel, pay his debt and return what he has lost. At a place where one takes a fee for this, the gain should be given to the sacred fund.
HALAKHAH: “If one is under a vow [not to have] usufruct from another,” etc. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked: If somebody pays off somebody else’s debt without the latter’s knowledge, is that the disagreement of Ḥanan and the High Priests’ sons? Rebbi Yose said, there the reason of the High Priest’s sons is that nobody expects his wife to die from hunger. But here, [the debtor could say:] “I could negotiate with him and he would forgive some.” Think of it, if [the loan] was on a pledge! “I could negotiate with him and he would return my pledge.” So far about a creditor who does not push [for repayment]. Even for a creditor who pushes, we can hear from the following: “He may give his šeqel. If somebody does not pay his šeqel, does one not take a pledge from him? This says, even for a creditor who pushes. You should know that this is so, as we have stated: “He can bring for him nests for males or females suffering from genital discharges, nests for childbirth, purification and reparation offerings” since nothing of these comes to [the other person’s] hand. And here also, that nothing should come into his hand.
Who is the Tanna of “the gain should be given to the sacred fund”? Rebbi Meïr! For Rebbi Meïr said, one commits sacrilege with prohibitions. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands? Let us hear from the following: “If he said, this loaf shall be dedicated, if he or another person ate it, they committed sacrilege; therefore, it can be redeemed. But if he said, it is for me [as if dedicated], if he ate it he committed sacrilege on goodwill but others would not commit sacrilege.” He said only, if he ate it. Therefore, to warm his hands is permitted. The students of Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya: That is if he said I shall not eat it nor taste it; if he forbade only eating to himself. But the question was, if somebody made a vow [to forbid] a loaf to himself, can he use it to warm his hands?
HALAKHAH: “Also he can separate his heave” etc. If somebody fixes the harvest of another person without the latter’s knowledge, who receives the goodwill from the tithes? Rebbi Abbahu says, the one who does the fixing. Rebbi Ze‘ira says, the owner of the produce. Rebbi Ze‘ira is consistent since Rebbi Ze‘ira said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, if somebody gave the sacrifice of a nazir or of a [healed] person afflicted with skin disease, the person purged makes (heave). The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “Also he can separate his heave and tithes with his knowledge.” Explain it, that [it was stipulated] that the other should not get the goodwill.
MISHNAH: If somebody is forbidden by a vow any profit from another person and that one comes to make a visit, he may stand but not sit down. He heals him in the sense of personal healing but not in the sense of financial healing, and may bathe with him in a large pool but not in a small one, and he may sleep with him on the same couch. Rebbi Jehudah says, in summer but not in the rainy season because he would profit. He can lie with him [at a dinner] on the same couch and eat with him at one table but not from the same pot. But he may eat with him from a returning pot.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody is forbidden by a vow any profit from another person,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim said, that he should not stay long.
MISHNAH: If somebody is forbidden any profit from another person by a vow made before the Sabbatical year, he cannot enter that person’s field nor can he eat from the overhang. In the Sabbatical year, he cannot enter his field but he can eat from the overhang. If he vowed not to eat from the other before the Sabbatical year, he can enter his field but he cannot eat of its fruits. During the Sabbatical year he enters and eats.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody is forbidden any profit from another person by a vow made before the Sabbatical year,” etc. Why can he not enter? As Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim said, that he should not stay long.
Rebbi Joḥanan explained the Mishnah: If somebody is forbidden any profit from another person by a vow made before the Sabbatical year, he cannot enter that person’s field nor can he eat from the overhang. In the Sabbatical year, he can enter his field and eat of the fruits. If he vowed during the Sabbatical year, he enters and eats. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish explains the Mishnah: If somebody is forbidden any profit from another person by a vow made before the Sabbatical year, he cannot enter that person’s field nor can he eat of its fruits. If he made the vow in the Sabbatical year, he cannot enter his field but he can eat of the fruits. If he vowed not to eat from the other before the Sabbatical year, he can enter his field but he cannot eat of its fruits. If he made the vow during the Sabbatical year he enters and eats. That statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows Rebbi Yose, for Rebbi Yose said, for his vow preceded his abandoning, his abandoning his vow. Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose agrees that he is permitted in the case of biblical abandoning.
Rebbi Joḥanan explained the Mishnah: If somebody is forbidden any profit from another person by a vow made before the Sabbatical year, he cannot enter that person’s field nor can he eat from the overhang. In the Sabbatical year, he can enter his field and eat of the fruits. If he vowed during the Sabbatical year, he enters and eats. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish explains the Mishnah: If somebody is forbidden any profit from another person by a vow made before the Sabbatical year, he cannot enter that person’s field nor can he eat of its fruits. If he made the vow in the Sabbatical year, he cannot enter his field but he can eat of the fruits. If he vowed not to eat from the other before the Sabbatical year, he can enter his field but he cannot eat of its fruits. If he made the vow during the Sabbatical year he enters and eats. That statement of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follows Rebbi Yose, for Rebbi Yose said, for his vow preceded his abandoning, his abandoning his vow. Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose agrees that he is permitted in the case of biblical abandoning.
MISHNAH: If somebody is forbidden any profit from another person by a vow, he should not borrow from him nor ask him for anything, should not give him a loan nor take a loan for him, should not sell to him nor buy from him. If he said, lend me your cow, he says: she is not available. If he said, a qônam that I shall never plough with her, if he usually ploughs, he is forbidden, the rest of the world is permitted. If he does not usually plough, he and the rest of the world are forbidden.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody is forbidden any profit from another person by a vow, he should not lend him,” etc. If somebody says, a qônām that I shall never plough, it is the same as if he said, a qônām that my field should never be ploughed.
MISHNAH: If somebody is forbidden any profit from another person by a vow and he has nothing to eat, the other person goes to the grocer and tells him, X is forbidden any profit from me by a vow and I do not know what to do. Then he pays him and X comes and takes from him.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody is forbidden any profit from another person by a vow and he has nothing to eat,” etc. For he cannot recover from him in a court of law.
HALAKHAH: It was stated: Rebbi Meïr says that as soon as a person abandons anything from his property, it is no longer in his possession. Rebbi Yose says, nothing may leave the hands of its owners except if it is taken up by another person. Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Abba bar Ḥiyya, both say, Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: The words of Rebbi Yose [deal with the case] that a person gave a gift to ten people and this one was one of them. If somebody abandoned his field, some Tannaïm say, he can retract, but some Tannaïm say, he cannot retract. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The one who says that he can retract follows Rebbi Yose. But the one who says that he cannot retract follows Rebbi Meïr. Does this mean that abandoned property in the sense of Rebbi Yose is subject to tithes? What did he say? Abandoned property, not gift! Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa came in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Abandoned property in the sense of Rebbi Yose is subject to tithes. There, they say that abandoned property in the sense of Rebbi Yose is not subject to tithes, since Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: “The Levite shall come,” etc. You are obliged to give him from what you have but he has not. This excludes abandoned property for which your and his hands are equal. Gleanings, forgotten sheaves, peah, and abandoned property are all equal.
So far, if he abandoned it for a longer period of time. But if he abandoned only for a short time? Let us hear from the following: “If he abandoned his field, he may cancel his action during three days.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, it says only “three days”. Therefore, after three days he may not cancel his action. Rebbi Simeon Dayana stated before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Even after three he may cancel his action. He said to him, since you say after three days, is it the same after three or after many? A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “About when is this said? If he abandoned in an unspecified way. But if he said: My field shall be abandoned one day, one week, one month, one year, a sabbatical period, as long as nobody took it over, either he or another person, he may cancel. But after somebody acquired it, either he or somebody else, he cannot cancel.” This means that short or long periods are the same. It also means that they were not worried about dishonesty. This means that a person may abandon and reacquire. That obviously answers Rebbi Zeïra’s question, since Rebbi Zeira had said, are short and long times the same?
MISHNAH: Partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another are forbidden to enter the courtyard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, each one enters into what is his. Both are forbidden to put up there a grindstone or an oven, or to raise chickens there. If one of them made a vow not to have usufruct from the other, he cannot enter the courtyard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, one can say to the other, I enter into my property, I do not enter into yours. One forces the one who made the vow to sell his part.
HALAKHAH: “Partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another,” etc. The rabbis say, every single [square] hand-breadth is common property of the partners. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, each one enters into what is his. If the courtyard was divided by pebbles, even the rabbis agree. If one of them went and sold his part, even Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees. If they contracted between themselves to concede, it is still in the hands of the partners. It is only needed if they did not contract between themselves to concede; what is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he buys higher and sells lower”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And did we not state there, “he should not lend him nor ask him for anything,”? What is the position of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob? And what Rebbi Simeon ben Yaqim said, that he should not stay long?
“Both are forbidden to put a grindstone or an oven up there, or to raise chickens there.” This is needed for Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, for what he states about “partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another.” Because they mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another, does this imply that if they had not made vows not to have usufruct from one another, they would be presumed to concede one to the other? Rebbi Jeremiah said, partners have the custom to concede one to the other in these matters. There, we have stated: “The following establish presumption of ownership.” Rebbi Eleazar said, if somebody raises chickens in a courtyard in which he does not dwell, this establishes presumption of ownership. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. As you look at it, if he had the right to raise them, he raised them. If he had no right to raise them, he established a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Benaiah: Partners can veto any activity of the other party in a courtyard except for washing, for the honor of the daughters of Israel. Rebbi Mattaniah said, that is, at a place where women wash, but not at a place where men wash. And what you say except for washing in the courtyard [applies to] the entire courtyard except for the four cubits of that party where one cannot hinder anything. But if the place was at an incline, one can veto even within the four cubits of another party since one might say to him, you pour out and it flows down to my place. It was stated: The place of an oven or a hearth does not establish a presumption of ownership, but roofing of any size on top of them establishes a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, only if the wall is useful for the oven.
“Both are forbidden to put a grindstone or an oven up there, or to raise chickens there.” This is needed for Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, for what he states about “partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another.” Because they mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another, does this imply that if they had not made vows not to have usufruct from one another, they would be presumed to concede one to the other? Rebbi Jeremiah said, partners have the custom to concede one to the other in these matters. There, we have stated: “The following establish presumption of ownership.” Rebbi Eleazar said, if somebody raises chickens in a courtyard in which he does not dwell, this establishes presumption of ownership. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. As you look at it, if he had the right to raise them, he raised them. If he had no right to raise them, he established a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Benaiah: Partners can veto any activity of the other party in a courtyard except for washing, for the honor of the daughters of Israel. Rebbi Mattaniah said, that is, at a place where women wash, but not at a place where men wash. And what you say except for washing in the courtyard [applies to] the entire courtyard except for the four cubits of that party where one cannot hinder anything. But if the place was at an incline, one can veto even within the four cubits of another party since one might say to him, you pour out and it flows down to my place. It was stated: The place of an oven or a hearth does not establish a presumption of ownership, but roofing of any size on top of them establishes a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, only if the wall is useful for the oven.
“Both are forbidden to put a grindstone or an oven up there, or to raise chickens there.” This is needed for Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, for what he states about “partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another.” Because they mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another, does this imply that if they had not made vows not to have usufruct from one another, they would be presumed to concede one to the other? Rebbi Jeremiah said, partners have the custom to concede one to the other in these matters. There, we have stated: “The following establish presumption of ownership.” Rebbi Eleazar said, if somebody raises chickens in a courtyard in which he does not dwell, this establishes presumption of ownership. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. As you look at it, if he had the right to raise them, he raised them. If he had no right to raise them, he established a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Benaiah: Partners can veto any activity of the other party in a courtyard except for washing, for the honor of the daughters of Israel. Rebbi Mattaniah said, that is, at a place where women wash, but not at a place where men wash. And what you say except for washing in the courtyard [applies to] the entire courtyard except for the four cubits of that party where one cannot hinder anything. But if the place was at an incline, one can veto even within the four cubits of another party since one might say to him, you pour out and it flows down to my place. It was stated: The place of an oven or a hearth does not establish a presumption of ownership, but roofing of any size on top of them establishes a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, only if the wall is useful for the oven.
“Both are forbidden to put a grindstone or an oven up there, or to raise chickens there.” This is needed for Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, for what he states about “partners who mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another.” Because they mutually made vows not to have usufruct from one another, does this imply that if they had not made vows not to have usufruct from one another, they would be presumed to concede one to the other? Rebbi Jeremiah said, partners have the custom to concede one to the other in these matters. There, we have stated: “The following establish presumption of ownership.” Rebbi Eleazar said, if somebody raises chickens in a courtyard in which he does not dwell, this establishes presumption of ownership. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. As you look at it, if he had the right to raise them, he raised them. If he had no right to raise them, he established a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Benaiah: Partners can veto any activity of the other party in a courtyard except for washing, for the honor of the daughters of Israel. Rebbi Mattaniah said, that is, at a place where women wash, but not at a place where men wash. And what you say except for washing in the courtyard [applies to] the entire courtyard except for the four cubits of that party where one cannot hinder anything. But if the place was at an incline, one can veto even within the four cubits of another party since one might say to him, you pour out and it flows down to my place. It was stated: The place of an oven or a hearth does not establish a presumption of ownership, but roofing of any size on top of them establishes a presumption of ownership. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, only if the wall is useful for the oven.
MISHNAH: If one was under a vow not to have usufruct from another and he owns a bathhouse or an olive press leased out in town; if he retains the grip of a hand on them, the other one is forbidden; if he retains no grip of a hand on them, the other one is permitted. If a person says to another, a qônām that I shall not enter your house, or that I shall not buy your field, if the owner died or sold it, the other one is permitted. That I shall not enter this house, or that I shall not buy this field, if the owner died or sold it, the other one is forbidden.
MISHNAH: If one was under a vow not to have usufruct from another and he owns a bathhouse or an olive press leased out in town; if he retains the grip of a hand on them, the other one is forbidden; if he retains no grip of a hand on them, the other one is permitted. If a person says to another, a qônām that I shall not enter your house, or that I shall not buy your field, if the owner died or sold it, the other one is permitted. That I shall not enter this house, or that I shall not buy this field, if the owner died or sold it, the other one is forbidden.
“A person who makes a vow ‘to forbid himself the people of the town,’ if another person came and dwelled there for thirty days, [the vower] is permitted to deal with him. ‘From the inhabitants of the town,’ if another person came and dwelled there for thirty days, [the vower] is prohibited from dealing with him.” ‘A qônām that the people of my town cannot have any usufruct from me,’ he cannot ask the local rabbi. ‘The usufruct of the people of my town [is forbidden] to me’, he can ask the local rabbi. Some Tannaïm state, even in the first case he can ask, for it does not mean that [the rabbi] would dissolve his own vow. A vow of the community cannot be dissolved. A vow made in public cannot be dissolved. “If somebody made a vow that another should not have usufruct from him, if the vow was made in the other’s presence, he can request the vow to be dissolved only in the other’s presence; if the vow was not made in the other’s presence, he can request the dissolution either in the other’s presence or in his absence.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, because of the shame; Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, because of the suspicion.
“A person who makes a vow ‘to forbid himself the people of the town,’ if another person came and dwelled there for thirty days, [the vower] is permitted to deal with him. ‘From the inhabitants of the town,’ if another person came and dwelled there for thirty days, [the vower] is prohibited from dealing with him.” ‘A qônām that the people of my town cannot have any usufruct from me,’ he cannot ask the local rabbi. ‘The usufruct of the people of my town [is forbidden] to me’, he can ask the local rabbi. Some Tannaïm state, even in the first case he can ask, for it does not mean that [the rabbi] would dissolve his own vow. A vow of the community cannot be dissolved. A vow made in public cannot be dissolved. “If somebody made a vow that another should not have usufruct from him, if the vow was made in the other’s presence, he can request the vow to be dissolved only in the other’s presence; if the vow was not made in the other’s presence, he can request the dissolution either in the other’s presence or in his absence.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, because of the shame; Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, because of the suspicion.
“A person who makes a vow ‘to forbid himself the people of the town,’ if another person came and dwelled there for thirty days, [the vower] is permitted to deal with him. ‘From the inhabitants of the town,’ if another person came and dwelled there for thirty days, [the vower] is prohibited from dealing with him.” ‘A qônām that the people of my town cannot have any usufruct from me,’ he cannot ask the local rabbi. ‘The usufruct of the people of my town [is forbidden] to me’, he can ask the local rabbi. Some Tannaïm state, even in the first case he can ask, for it does not mean that [the rabbi] would dissolve his own vow. A vow of the community cannot be dissolved. A vow made in public cannot be dissolved. “If somebody made a vow that another should not have usufruct from him, if the vow was made in the other’s presence, he can request the vow to be dissolved only in the other’s presence; if the vow was not made in the other’s presence, he can request the dissolution either in the other’s presence or in his absence.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, because of the shame; Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, because of the suspicion.
MISHNAH: If a person who by a vow was forbidden usufruct from another has nothing to eat, the other donates [food] as a gift to a third party and the person is permitted it. It happened in Bet Ḥoron with a person whose father was by a vow forbidden usufruct from him; when he married off his son he said to a friend, here the courtyard and the meal are given to you as a gift and they shall be yours until my father has come and eaten with us at the [wedding] meal. He said to him, if they are mine, they are dedicated to Heaven. He said, I did not give you my property that you should dedicate it to Heaven. He said to him, you gave me your property only that you and your father should eat, drink, and be friendly with one another and let the sin hang on my head. When the case came before the Sages they said, any gift with the proviso that if [the recipient] dedicated, it was not sanctified, is no gift.
MISHNAH: If a person who by a vow was forbidden usufruct from another has nothing to eat, the other donates [food] as a gift to a third party and the person is permitted it. It happened in Bet Ḥoron with a person whose father was by a vow forbidden usufruct from him; when he married off his son he said to a friend, here the courtyard and the meal are given to you as a gift and they shall be yours until my father has come and eaten with us at the [wedding] meal. He said to him, if they are mine, they are dedicated to Heaven. He said, I did not give you my property that you should dedicate it to Heaven. He said to him, you gave me your property only that you and your father should eat, drink, and be friendly with one another and let the sin hang on my head. When the case came before the Sages they said, any gift with the proviso that if [the recipient] dedicated, it was not sanctified, is no gift.
HALAKHAH: “If a person who by a vow was forbidden usufruct from another,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, it is obvious that this one was learned.
“This is the rule Rebbi Simeon declared in the name of Rebbi Joshua: For everything that may become permitted through some action, such as ṭevel, Second Tithe, donations to the Temple, and “new grain”, the Sages did not fix any limits, but a kind with its own is forbidden in the minutest amount, a kind with a different kind if it can be tasted. But for everything that cannot become permitted through any action, such as heave, ḥallah, orlah, and kilaim in a vineyard, the Sages did fix as limit both a kind with itself or with a different kind if it can be tasted.” How do you treat vows? As referring to something that can become permitted or to something that cannot become permitted? It seems reasonable that we treat them as referring to things that can become permitted, as we have stated there “for the Elder uproots the vow from the start.” They said, he only uproots for the future. Certainly a Mishnah treats it as referring to something that cannot become permitted, as we have stated there: “The growth from heave is heave; the growth from their growth is profane. But the growths from ṭevel, First Tithe, aftergrowth of the Sabbatical, heaves from outside the Land, dema‘, and First Fruits are profane as are growths from their growths. Growths from dedicated [seeds] and Second Tithe become profane; one redeems them corresponding to the time of sowing.” We have stated on this: When has this been said? Anything whose seeds disappear. But in produce whose seeds do not disappear, the growth from their growth is forbidden. There is a restriction on growth, as Rebbi Zeïra said in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: An onion of kilaim in a vineyard, taken out of the ground and replanted, stays forbidden even if it grows enormously because growth of something forbidden cannot neutralize the prohibition. But another Mishnah treats it as something that can become permitted, as we have stated there: “For if somebody vowed not to have a certain thing and it became mixed with something else, if it can be tasted it is forbidden.” This explains that it was mixed with another kind, following the rules of something that can become permitted.
“This is the rule Rebbi Simeon declared in the name of Rebbi Joshua: For everything that may become permitted through some action, such as ṭevel, Second Tithe, donations to the Temple, and “new grain”, the Sages did not fix any limits, but a kind with its own is forbidden in the minutest amount, a kind with a different kind if it can be tasted. But for everything that cannot become permitted through any action, such as heave, ḥallah, orlah, and kilaim in a vineyard, the Sages did fix as limit both a kind with itself or with a different kind if it can be tasted.” How do you treat vows? As referring to something that can become permitted or to something that cannot become permitted? It seems reasonable that we treat them as referring to things that can become permitted, as we have stated there “for the Elder uproots the vow from the start.” They said, he only uproots for the future. Certainly a Mishnah treats it as referring to something that cannot become permitted, as we have stated there: “The growth from heave is heave; the growth from their growth is profane. But the growths from ṭevel, First Tithe, aftergrowth of the Sabbatical, heaves from outside the Land, dema‘, and First Fruits are profane as are growths from their growths. Growths from dedicated [seeds] and Second Tithe become profane; one redeems them corresponding to the time of sowing.” We have stated on this: When has this been said? Anything whose seeds disappear. But in produce whose seeds do not disappear, the growth from their growth is forbidden. There is a restriction on growth, as Rebbi Zeïra said in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: An onion of kilaim in a vineyard, taken out of the ground and replanted, stays forbidden even if it grows enormously because growth of something forbidden cannot neutralize the prohibition. But another Mishnah treats it as something that can become permitted, as we have stated there: “For if somebody vowed not to have a certain thing and it became mixed with something else, if it can be tasted it is forbidden.” This explains that it was mixed with another kind, following the rules of something that can become permitted.
HALAKHAH: Does Rebbi Aqiba think “I found, I did not find”? Then one who forbids meat to himself should be forbidden fish and grasshopper meat since, if a man says to another, buy meat for us, he will return and say, I found only fish! But Rebbi Aqiba must think that squash are vegetables, but the rabbis think that squash are not vegetables. That applies to legal situations. “The vegetables of this garden are sold;” if squash were there, they would be sold in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba, not sold in the opinion of the rabbis. The same applies to declarations of abandonment or dedications.
Rebbi Mana asked, does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows they follow the vernacular? Is it not the way of a person who sees another one outside the gate to say, I saw him in Tiberias?
HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine today,’ ” etc. This implies that he is permitted at nightfall. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage? It is not usual that a man should say to another in the evening, I did not eat until evening. Would he say, yesterday? Refer to the following and it does disagree: It is not usual that a man should say to another in the morning, I did not eat in the evening. Would he say, the same day? Does the following not disagree? This day from this week, or this week from this day? What is the difference between “this day” and “today”? That is, following the opinion that in matters of vows one follows common usage. But here, one follows the opinion that in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, it is the way of people to say to another, bear with me this day.
HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine today,’ ” etc. This implies that he is permitted at nightfall. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage? It is not usual that a man should say to another in the evening, I did not eat until evening. Would he say, yesterday? Refer to the following and it does disagree: It is not usual that a man should say to another in the morning, I did not eat in the evening. Would he say, the same day? Does the following not disagree? This day from this week, or this week from this day? What is the difference between “this day” and “today”? That is, following the opinion that in matters of vows one follows common usage. But here, one follows the opinion that in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, it is the way of people to say to another, bear with me this day.
HALAKHAH: “ ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine today,’ ” etc. This implies that he is permitted at nightfall. Does this not disagree with Rebbi Joḥanan, since Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage? It is not usual that a man should say to another in the evening, I did not eat until evening. Would he say, yesterday? Refer to the following and it does disagree: It is not usual that a man should say to another in the morning, I did not eat in the evening. Would he say, the same day? Does the following not disagree? This day from this week, or this week from this day? What is the difference between “this day” and “today”? That is, following the opinion that in matters of vows one follows common usage. But here, one follows the opinion that in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, it is the way of people to say to another, bear with me this day.
HALAKHAH: “ ‘Until the rains,’ ” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked: If one said ‘until the rain’, is he forbidden until another rainfall came down? There, we have stated: “One who said, I take upon me [the obligation to bring] wood, should not bring less that two cut logs.” Rebbi Yose the important said that Rebbi Abba bar Mamai asked, if he said, I take upon me [the obligation to bring] to bring wood, does he bring one cut log? Rebbi Eleazar said, a Mishnah explains that each one is a separate sacrifice, as we have stated there: “Two in whose hands are two cut logs.” In order to increase the number of logs.
MISHNAH: If the father died, his power is not voided in favor of the husband. If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the father. In this, He strengthened the father’s power over the husband. In another matter, He strengthened the husband’s power over the father since the husband dissolves in adulthood but the father does not dissolve in adulthood.
HALAKHAH: “He answered to the words of Rebbi Eliezer: Let the miqweh prove it! It frees the impure from their impurities but it cannot save pure ones. Rebbi Eliezer argued another track: Since in a situation where he cannot dissolve his own vows before he made them, he dissolves his wife’s vows before she made them, in a situation where he can dissolve his own vows after he made them, would it not be logical that he could dissolve his wife’s vows before she made them? No! Why can he not dissolve his own vows before he made them? For if he wants to confirm them, he confirms them. Could he dissolve his wife’s vows after she made them, when if he wanted to confirm them, he could not confirm them?” “But it says, ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them’. What can be confirmed can be dissolved,; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.”
Jehudah from Ḥusa hid himself in a cave for three days because he wanted to find the reason why the necessities of life of one’s town have precedence over the necessities of life of another town. He came to Rabbi Yose bar Ḥalaphta and said, I was hiding in a cave for three days because I wanted to find the reason why the necessities of life of one’s town have precedence over the necessities of life of another town. He called his son Rebbi Abba and asked him about the reason why the necessities of life of one’s town have precedence over the necessities of life of another town. He said to him (Num. 35:15): “These [six] cities shall be”, each town shall be, and only afterwards their surroundings around them. He [R. Yose] said to him [Jehudah from Huṣa], what did cause you [this emharassment]? That you did not study with your companions!
Jehudah from Ḥusa hid himself in a cave for three days because he wanted to find the reason why the necessities of life of one’s town have precedence over the necessities of life of another town. He came to Rabbi Yose bar Ḥalaphta and said, I was hiding in a cave for three days because I wanted to find the reason why the necessities of life of one’s town have precedence over the necessities of life of another town. He called his son Rebbi Abba and asked him about the reason why the necessities of life of one’s town have precedence over the necessities of life of another town. He said to him (Num. 35:15): “These [six] cities shall be”, each town shall be, and only afterwards their surroundings around them. He [R. Yose] said to him [Jehudah from Huṣa], what did cause you [this emharassment]? That you did not study with your companions!
Jehudah from Ḥusa hid himself in a cave for three days because he wanted to find the reason why the necessities of life of one’s town have precedence over the necessities of life of another town. He came to Rabbi Yose bar Ḥalaphta and said, I was hiding in a cave for three days because I wanted to find the reason why the necessities of life of one’s town have precedence over the necessities of life of another town. He called his son Rebbi Abba and asked him about the reason why the necessities of life of one’s town have precedence over the necessities of life of another town. He said to him (Num. 35:15): “These [six] cities shall be”, each town shall be, and only afterwards their surroundings around them. He [R. Yose] said to him [Jehudah from Huṣa], what did cause you [this emharassment]? That you did not study with your companions!
MISHNAH: The following are vows of mortification. If she said, all produce of the world is qônām for me, he may dissolve. The produce of this province [is qônām] for me, he can buy for her from another province. The produce of this grocery store [is qônām] for me, he cannot dissolve. If he can get the necessities of life only from that grocery, he may dissolve, the words of Rebbi Yose.
A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥaninah: “A vow that no Cohanim or Levites should have any advantage from me, they should take against his will.” He explains it about a person who says, I cannot possibly give them any gifts. You should know that this is so, since we have stated: “These Cohanim and Levites should [not] have any advantage from me, let others take.” A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “An Israel can say to another Israel, here you have a tetradrachma and give this firstling to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.” He explains, if he already wanted to give it to two [Cohanim] and that daughter’s son was one of them; then one said, here you have a tetradrachma and give it whole to my daughter’s son, a Cohen.
MISHNAH: Earlier they said, three categories of women have to be divorced and collect their ketubah: The one who says, I am impure for you, or Heaven is between you and me, or I am separated from the Jews. They changed to say that a woman should not be encouraged to want another man and cause trouble to her husband. If she says, I am impure for you, she should bring proof. Heaven is between you and me, they should try to mediate. I am separated from the Jews, he shall dissolve his part, she shall live with him and be separated from the Jews.
“Heaven is between you and me”: as Heaven is far from earth, so this woman should be far from that man. “They should try to mediate.” Rav Huna said, they should make a dinner and they will get used to be with one another by the dinner.
If he had counted six months when he became impure, does he count another six months or does he start anew counting twelve months? If he completed his term as nazir but did not manage to shave until two or three days had passed when he became impure. Rebbi Mani asked: Since he did not sanctify his hair, but what permits him to shave? “I am a nazir after two days, already a nazir in perpetuity.” Since he may shave, he is a nazir. “I am a nazir after [20] days, already a nazir in perpetuity.” Since he may shave, is he a nazir, or since if he became impure he has no time to cancel, is he no nazir?.
MISHNAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” if another heard him and said: “I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,” if they are clever, they will shave one another; otherwise they have to shave other nezirim.
MISHNAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” if another heard him and said: “I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,” if they are clever, they will shave one another; otherwise they have to shave other nezirim.
MISHNAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” if another heard him and said: “I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,” if they are clever, they will shave one another; otherwise they have to shave other nezirim.
HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.
HALAKHAH: “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,” etc. This “I also”, what do you subsume under it? Does “I also” refer to the entire sentence, or does “I also” only refer to part of the sentence? If “I also” refers to the entire sentence, he says “I also am a nazir.” If “I also” only refers to part of the sentence, he said “I am a nazir.” It was stated in the House of Rebbi: “ ‘I also’ refers to the entire sentence.” Rebbi Yose said, this implies that if some person said, I am a nazir for 100 days, and another person heard him and said, “I also”; the first one is a nazir for 100 days, the other is a nazir for 30 days unless he says, “I am like him, I am the same as he is.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “I am obligated to shave half [a nazir]. Then he said, I am a nazir. If he shaved after 30 days he has fulfilled his obligation.” Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah implies this: “ ‘I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir,’ if another heard him and said: ‘I also shall be and I obligate myself to shave another nazir,’ if they are clever, they will shave one another.” But not themselves. Because he said, “I shall be a nazir and obligate myself to shave a nazir”. But if he said, “I obligate myself to shave half a nazir” and then he said, “I shall be a nazir,” if he shaved himself he has acquitted himself of his obligation. One understands that the second one can shave the first, but can the first shave the second? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira: This means that a person can take upon himself the sacrifice of a nazir who only in the future will make his vow. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Ze‘ira inferred three [statements]: It implies that if he shaved himself he acquitted himself. It implies that a person obligates himself for another’s nezirut sacrifices of a future vow. It implies that a person chooses another’s nezirut sacrifices without the other’s knowledge. But he cannot dedicate [the animals] without the other’s knowledge.
Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “Nazir after twenty days and nazir 100 days from now on.” He counts twenty days, interrupts and counts another 30 days, and counts another 80 to complete his first nezirut.
Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “Nazir after twenty days and nazir 100 days from now on.” He counts twenty days, interrupts and counts another 30 days, and counts another 80 to complete his first nezirut.
If he is still there, Rebbi Joḥanan said, one warns him about everything for every possible leaving, and he is whipped. Rebbi Eleazar said, he does not accept [warning] unless he leaves and returns. Rebbi Abba said: So did Rebbi Joḥanan answer Rebbi Eleazar: Is it not written, “he shall not come” and “he may not defile himself”? He said to him, if they warned him because of “he shall not come”, he is whipped; because of “he shall not defile himself” he is not whipped. Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Joḥanan learned from prostrating, as we have stated there: “If he prostrated himself or stayed there long enough to prostrate himself.” Rebbi Mattaniah said, we thought that was where they do disagree? About lashes, but not about a sacrifice. Since Rebbi Hila said, Rebbi Joḥanan learned from prostrating, that means that lashes and sacrifices are one and the same. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “A nazir who drank wine the entire day is guilty only once.” He explains it, that his throat was never empty. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he was defiling himself for the dead the entire day, he is guilty only once.” He explains it about one who waits before every leaving, who is whipped. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: If a Cohen was standing in a cemetery and they were handing another corpse to him, could he accept? The verse says, “the husband shall be defiled for his family.” If he accepted it, I could think that he was guilty. The verse says, “to be profaned”. One who adds impurity to the impurity; that excludes him who does not add impurity to his impurity. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, Rebbi Neḥemiah said, “to be profaned”, that excludes him who does not add impurity to his impurity, lest he say, because I became defiled for my father I may go and collect the bones of X. “To be profaned”, at the time of death; Rebbi said, also “in their death.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, they disagree. It follows that Rebbi Simeon bar Abba follows Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. When Simeon bar Abba was dying, he said, this should be taken out here, that should be taken out there.
MISHNAH: If somebody vowed a lengthy nezirut, finished his nezirut, and then came to the Land, the House of Shammai say, he is a nazir for 30 days, but the House of Hillel say, he is a nazir from the start. It happened to Queen Helena that her son went to war and she said, if my son returns from the war, I shall be a nezirah for seven years. Her son returned from war and she was a nezirah for seven years. At the end of seven years, she came to the Land, and the House of Hillel instructed her to be a nezirah for another seven years. At the end of seven years she became impure and was nezirah for a total of 21 years. Rebbi Jehudah said, she was a nezirah only for fourteen years.
HALAKHAH: “If two groups of witnesses,” etc. Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that five contains two, and that he has to be a nazir for two periods. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that the testimonies contradict one another and there is no nezirut. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four, five. Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent in what he said, since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that refer [to] the facts, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Eliezer concedes in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to that of her companion. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.
HALAKHAH: “If two groups of witnesses,” etc. Rav said, they differ in the overall testimony. But in detail, everybody agrees that five contains two, and that he has to be a nazir for two periods. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they differ in counting. But in an overall testimony, everybody agrees that the testimonies contradict one another and there is no nezirut. What is overall and what is counting? Overall, this one says two, the other one says five. Counting, this one says one, two, the other one says three, four, five. Rav said, if testimony was contradictory in its essence, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if testimony was contradictory in itself, the testimony is void. In the opinion of everybody, if testimony was contradictory in some aspects that belong after the fact, the testimony is not void. Rebbi Joḥanan is consistent in what he said, since Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya, said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, if it was agreed that he counted but one [witness] said, he counted from a wallet and the other said, he counted from a bundle, that contradicts the essence of the testimony, and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he counted from a wallet and the others say he counted from a bundle. That contradicts the essence of the testimony, the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If one [witness] said, he killed him with a mace, the other [witness] said, he killed him with a sword, that contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void and Rav will agree that the testimony is void. Where do they disagree? If there were two groups of witnesses, these say he killed him with a mace and the others say, he killed him with a sword. That contradicts the essence of the testimony; the testimony is void, but according to Rav, the testimony is not void. If these say, he ran away to the South and those say, he ran away to the North, everybody agrees that the testimony was contradictory in some aspects that refer [to] the facts, the testimony is not void. The strength of Rav comes from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, since both agree that he is not alive they can remarry.” He did nor hear that Rebbi Eleazar said, Rebbi Eliezer concedes in the case of witnesses. What is the difference between witnesses and the co-wife? They do not consider the co-wife’s words compared to that of her companion. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “Both in investigations and in cross examinations, if they contradict one another their testimony is void.” Rebbi Mana said, Rav will explain that as referring to single witness against single witness. Rebbi Abun said, even if you say groups and groups. There is a difference in criminal cases, as it is written: “Justice, justice you shall pursue”.
MISHNAH: If somebody said “I am a nazir” and another person heard it and said, “and so am I”, “and so am I”, “and so am I”, all of them are nezirim. If the first one was permitted, all are permitted; if the last was permitted, the last is permitted and all others forbidden. “I am a nazir” and another person heard it and said, “my mouth is as his mouth and my hair as his hair,” he is a nazir. “I am a nazir” and his wife heard it and said, “and so am I”, he can dissolve hers but his vow remains. “I am a nezirah” and her husband heard it and said, “and so am I”, he cannot dissolve.
MISHNAH: If somebody said “I am a nazir” and another person heard it and said, “and so am I”, “and so am I”, “and so am I”, all of them are nezirim. If the first one was permitted, all are permitted; if the last was permitted, the last is permitted and all others forbidden. “I am a nazir” and another person heard it and said, “my mouth is as his mouth and my hair as his hair,” he is a nazir. “I am a nazir” and his wife heard it and said, “and so am I”, he can dissolve hers but his vow remains. “I am a nezirah” and her husband heard it and said, “and so am I”, he cannot dissolve.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody said ‘I am a nazir’ and another person heard it and said, ‘and so am I’,” etc. So is the Mishnah: “and so am I”, “and so am I”. Who is the Tanna of conjunctions? Rebbi Jehudah. But following Rebbi Meïr, “I am,” “I am”. Does the Mishnah require that all of them follow immediately after the speaking of the first? It was stated: If the middle one was permitted, all following him are permitted, all preceding him are forbidden. The Mishnah applies even if not all of them follow immediately after the speaking of the first, but each one follows immediately after the speaking of the preceding person. What means “to follow immediately after the speaking”? Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: The time needed for greeting between two people. Abba bar bar Ḥana in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The time needed for greeting between teacher and student, that he say to him, “peace upon you, my master.”
If one said, “I am a nazir for 100 days, and another heard it and said, “so am I for 100 days”, and repeated and said, “so am I”, the main [statement] becomes an accessory. If one said, “I am a nazir;” somebody said “and I” following immediately the first, another heard it and said, “so am I” following immediately the second. If the first became permitted, so does the second. If the second became permitted, the third was not permitted. If one said, “I am a nazir twice,” and two people heard it and said, “so are we”, are they two nezirim or is each of them a nazir twice? If he was permitted, they were permitted. He was not permitted. If two said, “we are nezirim,” another heard it and said, “so am I,” did he make a vow regarding both of them or did he make a vow parallel to each of them? If they were permitted, [he] was permitted; if [he] was permitted, they were not permitted.
If one said, “I am a nazir for 100 days, and another heard it and said, “so am I for 100 days”, and repeated and said, “so am I”, the main [statement] becomes an accessory. If one said, “I am a nazir;” somebody said “and I” following immediately the first, another heard it and said, “so am I” following immediately the second. If the first became permitted, so does the second. If the second became permitted, the third was not permitted. If one said, “I am a nazir twice,” and two people heard it and said, “so are we”, are they two nezirim or is each of them a nazir twice? If he was permitted, they were permitted. He was not permitted. If two said, “we are nezirim,” another heard it and said, “so am I,” did he make a vow regarding both of them or did he make a vow parallel to each of them? If they were permitted, [he] was permitted; if [he] was permitted, they were not permitted.
If one said, “I am a nazir for 100 days, and another heard it and said, “so am I for 100 days”, and repeated and said, “so am I”, the main [statement] becomes an accessory. If one said, “I am a nazir;” somebody said “and I” following immediately the first, another heard it and said, “so am I” following immediately the second. If the first became permitted, so does the second. If the second became permitted, the third was not permitted. If one said, “I am a nazir twice,” and two people heard it and said, “so are we”, are they two nezirim or is each of them a nazir twice? If he was permitted, they were permitted. He was not permitted. If two said, “we are nezirim,” another heard it and said, “so am I,” did he make a vow regarding both of them or did he make a vow parallel to each of them? If they were permitted, [he] was permitted; if [he] was permitted, they were not permitted.
Rav Ḥisda said, a nazir’s leftover bread shall be left to decay. Rebbi Yose said, that is correct. You cannot sacrifice it by itself since (reparation sacrifices) cannot be brought alone. You cannot sacrifice it together with another nazir’s since no nazir sacrifices without bread. Therefore, it was necessary to say that a nazir’s leftover bread shall be left to decay. They wanted to say, the same rule applies to his leftover bread as to his leftover wine offering. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, his leftover wine offering is most holy; it should be given to donation accounts. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun, Samuel, Rav Ḥisda, and Rebbi Eleazar, all three said the same. Rav Ḥisda, as quoted here. Samuel, as Rebbi Yasa said, when I still was there, I heard the voice of Rav Jehudah asking our teacher Samuel: If he designated his sheqel and died? He said, it should be given as donation. The leftover of his tenth of an epha: Rebbi Joḥanan said, he should bring it to the Dead Sea; Rebbi Eleazar said, it should be given as donation.
MISHNAH: If they were walking on the road and a person came towards them when one said, “I am a nazir unless he is Mr. X”, and another said, “I am a nazir if it is not he”; “I am a nazir unless one of you is a nazir”, “unless both of you are nezirim”, “unless all of you are nezirim”. The House of Shammai say, they are all nezirim, but the House of Hillel say, only those whose assertions prove wrong are nezirim. Rebbi Ṭarphon said, none of them is a nazir. If he suddenly returned, no one is a nazir. Rebbi Simeon says, one should say: If it was as I said, I am a nazir by obligation, otherwise I am a nazir voluntarily. If one saw a koy and said, “I am a nazir if this is a wild animal”, “I am a nazir if this is not a wild animal”, “I am a nazir if this is a domestic animal”, “I am a nazir if this is a not a domestic animal”, “I am a nazir if this is a wild and domestic animal”, “I am a nazir if this is neither a wild nor a domestic animal”, “I am a nazir if one of you is a nazir”, “if one of you is not a nazir”, “if both of you are nezirim”, then all of them are nezirim.
Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.
Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.
Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting, he is guilty for each action separately. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands and were broken. He is guilty only once! {Before he broke in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. Also here: “Do not worship them,” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty. He answered: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether [He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven.
But here, skins and seeds were understood in the principle, and were listed separately. Should they not be separate rather than common? But there, the principle is at one place and the details are at another place. But did not the colleagues say: It makes no difference: Whether he stated the principle and then a detail or the detail and after that the principle. And here, he stated the principle and then a detail. But did not Rebbi Yose say, there is no difference whether He gave principle, detail, and principle, it is the principle and then a detail, it is counted as the principle and then a detail. There, the detail was not necessary. Why were they detailed? To exclude leaves and twigs. But was it not stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: “From anything coming from the wine-vine, from skins to seeds, he shall not eat;” leaves and twigs are also understood. There, they are mentioned for a need, but here, they are mentioned without need. Why? For additions.
HALAKHAH: It is written: “He has to vow to the Eternal the days of his nezirut,” from the day he brings his sacrifices, the words of Rebbi. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, from the time of his shaving. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hoshaia, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Where do they disagree? If he shaved on the seventh and brought his sacrifices on the eighth. But if he shaved on the eighth and brought his sacrifices on the same day, everybody agrees on the day he brings his sacrifices. Rebbi Yose said, that is, if he immersed himself on the seventh. But if he immersed himself on the eighth, the eighth takes the place of the seventh and the seventh of the eighth; he counts only from that “seventh”. If he became impure and impure again, he brings a sacrifice for each occurrence. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, that statement follows Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah, but following Rebbi this person still stays in impure nezirut. Rebbi Hila said, where do they disagree? To count nezirut in purity. “He has to vow to the Eternal the days of his nezirut and bring.” Rebbi said, until he actually brought. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says, even if he was enabled to bring the sacrifice for impurity. Everybody agrees that he brings a sacrifice for impurity. It was stated thus: If he became impure on the seventh, and again impure on the eighth, he brings a sacrifice for each occurrence. In Rebbi Ze‘ira’s opinion, following Rebbi the first sacrifice is superseded and he brings the second; following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah it was not superseded. In Rebbi Hila’s opinion, everybody agrees that nothing is superseded and he brings another.
Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi said, the Holy One, praise to Him, took a spoonful from the place of the altar and created Adam from it. He said, he shall have been created from the place of the altar so that he should be able to stand up. That is what is written: “The Eternal Omnipotent formed Adam the first of dust from the earth”, and it is written: “You shall build for me an altar of earth.” Since “earth” there means an altar, here also [it means] an altar. “His days should be a hundred and twenty years.” Adam the first lived close to a thousand years and you say, “his days should be a hundred and twenty years”! But after 120 years he returns to be a spoonful of decay. That is difficult. For Og, the king of Bashan, 120 years, and for a newborn baby 120 years? Og [becomes] a spoonful of decay, and a newborn baby becomes a spoonful of decay. “ The spoonful of decay which they mentioned is from his finger joints and upwards, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, from a fully developed hand.” Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi was illustrating that of Rebbi Meïr one way, that of the rabbis in another way.