argue
158 occurrences across the corpus
Apostolic Fathers
I, O King, by the grace of God came into this world; and when I had considered the heaven and the earth and the seas, and had surveyed the sun and the rest of creation, I marvelled at the beauty of the world. And I perceived that the world and all that is therein are moved by the power of another; and I understood that he who moves them is God, who is hidden in them, and veiled by them. And it is manifest that that which causes motion is more powerful than that which is moved. But that I should make search concerning this same mover of all, as to what is his nature (for it seems to me, he is indeed unsearchable in his nature), and that I should argue as to the constancy of his government, so as to grasp it fully — this is a vain effort for me; for it is not possible that a man should fully comprehend it. I say, however, concerning this mover of the world, that he is God of all, who made all things for the sake of mankind. And it seems to me that this is reasonable, that one should fear God and should not oppress man.
Kebra Nagast
And the King said unto them, "Go ye and argue your case before your King `Adrami, and whatsoever he shall say unto you that do."
The Works of Flavius Josephus
There was also another disturbance at Cesarea,--those Jews who were mixed with the Syrians that lived there rising a tumult against them. The Jews pretended that the city was theirs, and said that he who built it was a Jew, meaning king Herod. The Syrians confessed also that its builder was a Jew; but they still said, however, that the city was a Grecian city; for that he who set up statues and temples in it could not design it for Jews. On which account both parties had a contest with one another; and this contest increased so much, that it came at last to arms, and the bolder sort of them marched out to fight; for the elders of the Jews were not able to put a stop to their own people that were disposed to be tumultuous, and the Greeks thought it a shame for them to be overcome by the Jews. Now these Jews exceeded the others in riches and strength of body; but the Grecian part had the advantage of assistance from the soldiery; for the greatest part of the Roman garrison was raised out of Syria; and being thus related to the Syrian part, they were ready to assist it. However, the governors of the city were concerned to keep all quiet, and whenever they caught those that were most for fighting on either side, they punished them with stripes and bands. Yet did not the sufferings of those that were caught affright the remainder, or make them desist; but they were still more and more exasperated, and deeper engaged in the sedition. And as Felix came once into the market-place, and commanded the Jews, when they had beaten the Syrians, to go their ways, and threatened them if they would not, and they would not obey him, he sent his soldiers out upon them, and slew a great many of them, upon which it fell out that what they had was plundered. And as the sedition still continued, he chose out the most eminent men on both sides as ambassadors to Nero, to argue about their several privileges.
The Writings of Origen
And as if the sun, uttering a voice, were to say, “I liquefy and dry up,” liquefaction and drying up being opposite things, he would not speak falsely as regards the point in question; wax being melted and mud being dried by the same heat; so the same operation, which was performed through the instrumentality of Moses, proved the hardness of Pharaoh on the one hand, the result of his wickedness, and the yielding of the mixed Egyptian multitude who took their departure with the Hebrews. And the brief statement that the heart of Pharaoh was softened, as it were, when he said, “But ye shall not go far: ye will go a three days’ journey, and leave your wives,” and anything else which he said, yielding little by little before the signs, proves that the wonders made some impression even upon him, but did not accomplish all [that they might]. Yet even this would not have happened, if that which is supposed by the many—the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart—had been produced by God Himself. And it is not absurd to soften down such expressions agreeably to common usage: for good masters often say to their slaves, when spoiled by their kindness and forbearance, “I have made you bad, and I am to blame for offences of such enormity.” For we must attend to the character and force of the phrase, and not argue sophistically, disregarding the meaning of the expression. Paul accordingly, having examined these points clearly, says to the sinner: “Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and forbearance, and long-suffering; not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance? but, after thy hardness and impenitent heart, treasurest up unto thyself wrath against the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God.” Now, let what the apostle says to the sinner be addressed to Pharaoh, and then the announcements made to him will be understood to have been made with peculiar fitness, as to one who, according to his hardness and unrepentant heart, was treasuring up to himself wrath; seeing that his hardness would not have been proved nor made manifest unless miracles had been performed, and miracles, too, of such magnitude and importance.
Now if this is a true account of what constitutes the right and the wrong use of personification, have we not grounds for holding Celsus up to ridicule for thus ascribing to Christians words which they never uttered? For if those whom he represents as speaking are the unlearned, how is it possible that such persons could distinguish between “sense” and “reason,” between “objects of sense” and “objects of the reason?” To argue in this way, they would require to have studied under the Stoics, who deny all intellectual existences, and maintain that all that we apprehend is apprehended through the senses, and that all knowledge comes through the senses. But if, on the other hand, he puts these words into the mouth of philosophers who search carefully into the meaning of Christian doctrines, the statements in question do not agree with their character and principles. For no one who has learnt that God is invisible, and that certain of His works are invisible, that is to say, apprehended by the reason, can say, as if to justify his faith in a resurrection, “How can they know God, except by the perception of the senses?” or, “How otherwise than through the senses can they gain any knowledge?” For it is not in any secret writings, perused only by a few wise men, but in such as are most widely diffused and most commonly known among the people, that these words are written: “The invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.” From whence it is to be inferred, that though men who live upon the earth have to begin with the use of the senses upon sensible objects, in order to go on from them to a knowledge of the nature of things intellectual, yet their knowledge must not stop short with the objects of sense. And thus, while Christians would not say that it is impossible to have a knowledge of intellectual objects without the senses, but rather that the senses supply the first means of obtaining knowledge, they might well ask the question, “Who can gain any knowledge without the senses?” without deserving the abuse of Celsus, when he adds, “This is not the language of a man; it comes not from the soul, but from the flesh.”
The Zohar (selections)
(But in the book which is called “The Treatise of the School of Rav Yeyeva the Elder,” the letter He is located in the mouth, and he doth not argue in the same manner as in the text, neither doth he bring about the same combination, although the matter eventuateth in the same manner.)
The Mishnah
A sheaf that has two seahs and he forgot it it is not considered “forgotten.” Two sheaves that together comprise two seahs: Rabban Gamaliel says: they belong to the owner; But the sages say: they belong to the poor. Rabban Gamaliel said: “Are the rights of the owner strengthened or weakened according to the greater number of the sheaves?” They replied, “His rights are strengthened.” He said to them: “If in a case of one sheaf of two seahs it is not deemed “forgotten,” then how much more should be the case of two sheaves that together contain two seahs?” They replied: “No. If you argue in the case of one sheaf it is because it is large enough to be considered a stack. Are you going to argue likewise in the case of two sheaves which are like bundles?”
A sheaf that has two seahs and he forgot it it is not considered “forgotten.” Two sheaves that together comprise two seahs: Rabban Gamaliel says: they belong to the owner; But the sages say: they belong to the poor. Rabban Gamaliel said: “Are the rights of the owner strengthened or weakened according to the greater number of the sheaves?” They replied, “His rights are strengthened.” He said to them: “If in a case of one sheaf of two seahs it is not deemed “forgotten,” then how much more should be the case of two sheaves that together contain two seahs?” They replied: “No. If you argue in the case of one sheaf it is because it is large enough to be considered a stack. Are you going to argue likewise in the case of two sheaves which are like bundles?”
Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.
Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.
Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.
Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.
Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.
Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.
Both non-capital and capital cases require examination and inquiry [of the witnesses], as it says, “You shall have one manner of law” (Lev. 24:22). How do non-capital cases differ from capital cases? Non-capital cases [are decided] by three and capital cases by twenty three. Non-capital cases may begin either with reasons for acquittal or for conviction; capital cases begin with reasons for acquittal and do not begin with reasons for conviction. In non-capital cases they may reach a verdict of either acquittal or conviction by the decision of a majority of one; in capital cases they may reach an acquittal by the majority of one but a verdict of conviction only by the decision of a majority of two. In non-capital cases they may reverse a verdict either [from conviction] to acquittal or [from acquittal] to conviction; in capital cases they may reverse a verdict [from conviction] to acquittal but not [from acquittal] to conviction. In non-capital cases all may argue either in favor of conviction or of acquittal; in capital cases all may argue in favor of acquittal but not all may argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal, or he that had argued in favor of acquittal may afterward argue in favor of conviction; in capital cases he that had argued in favor of conviction may afterward argue in favor of acquittal but he that had argued in favor of acquittal cannot afterward argue in favor of conviction. In non-capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict may be reached during the night; in capital cases they hold the trial during the daytime and the verdict also must be reached during the daytime. In non-capital cases the verdict, whether of acquittal or of conviction, may be reached the same day; in capital cases a verdict of acquittal may be reached on the same day, but a verdict of conviction not until the following day. Therefore trials may not be held on the eve of a Sabbath or on the eve of a Festival.
They afterward bring in the second witness and examine him. If their words were found to agree together they begin [to examine the evidence] in favor of acquittal. If one of the witnesses said, “I have something to argue in favor of his acquittal”, or if one of the disciples said, “I have something to argue in favor of his conviction”, they silence him. If one of the disciples said, “I have something to argue in favor of his acquittal”, they bring him up and set him among them and he does not come down from there all day. If there is anything of substance in his words they listen to him. Even if the accused said, “I have something to argue in favor of my acquittal”, they listen to him, provided that there is substance to his words.
They afterward bring in the second witness and examine him. If their words were found to agree together they begin [to examine the evidence] in favor of acquittal. If one of the witnesses said, “I have something to argue in favor of his acquittal”, or if one of the disciples said, “I have something to argue in favor of his conviction”, they silence him. If one of the disciples said, “I have something to argue in favor of his acquittal”, they bring him up and set him among them and he does not come down from there all day. If there is anything of substance in his words they listen to him. Even if the accused said, “I have something to argue in favor of my acquittal”, they listen to him, provided that there is substance to his words.
They afterward bring in the second witness and examine him. If their words were found to agree together they begin [to examine the evidence] in favor of acquittal. If one of the witnesses said, “I have something to argue in favor of his acquittal”, or if one of the disciples said, “I have something to argue in favor of his conviction”, they silence him. If one of the disciples said, “I have something to argue in favor of his acquittal”, they bring him up and set him among them and he does not come down from there all day. If there is anything of substance in his words they listen to him. Even if the accused said, “I have something to argue in favor of my acquittal”, they listen to him, provided that there is substance to his words.
They afterward bring in the second witness and examine him. If their words were found to agree together they begin [to examine the evidence] in favor of acquittal. If one of the witnesses said, “I have something to argue in favor of his acquittal”, or if one of the disciples said, “I have something to argue in favor of his conviction”, they silence him. If one of the disciples said, “I have something to argue in favor of his acquittal”, they bring him up and set him among them and he does not come down from there all day. If there is anything of substance in his words they listen to him. Even if the accused said, “I have something to argue in favor of my acquittal”, they listen to him, provided that there is substance to his words.
If they find him not guilty, he is discharged, if not, it [the trial] is adjourned till the following day. During this time they [the judges] go about in pairs, practice moderation in food, drink no wine the whole day, and discuss the case throughout the night. Early next morning they reassemble in court. He who is in favor of acquittal states, ‘I declare him innocent and I stand by my opinion.’ While he who is in favor of condemnation says: ‘I declare him guilty and stand by my opinion.’ One who [previously] argued for conviction may now argue for acquittal, but one who [previously] argued for acquittal may not now argue for conviction. If they have made any mistake, the two judges’ scribes are to remind them. If they find him not guilty, they discharge him. If not, they take a vote. If twelve acquit and eleven condemn, he is acquitted. If twelve condemn and eleven acquit, or if eleven condemn and eleven acquit and one says, ‘I do not know,’ or even if twenty-two acquit or condemn and a single one says, ‘I do not know,’ they add to the judges. Up to what number is the court increased? By twos up to the limit of seventy-one. If thirty-six acquit and thirty-five condemn, he is acquitted. But if thirty-six condemn and thirty-five acquit, the two sides debate the case together until one of those who condemn agrees with the view of those who are for acquittal.
If they find him not guilty, he is discharged, if not, it [the trial] is adjourned till the following day. During this time they [the judges] go about in pairs, practice moderation in food, drink no wine the whole day, and discuss the case throughout the night. Early next morning they reassemble in court. He who is in favor of acquittal states, ‘I declare him innocent and I stand by my opinion.’ While he who is in favor of condemnation says: ‘I declare him guilty and stand by my opinion.’ One who [previously] argued for conviction may now argue for acquittal, but one who [previously] argued for acquittal may not now argue for conviction. If they have made any mistake, the two judges’ scribes are to remind them. If they find him not guilty, they discharge him. If not, they take a vote. If twelve acquit and eleven condemn, he is acquitted. If twelve condemn and eleven acquit, or if eleven condemn and eleven acquit and one says, ‘I do not know,’ or even if twenty-two acquit or condemn and a single one says, ‘I do not know,’ they add to the judges. Up to what number is the court increased? By twos up to the limit of seventy-one. If thirty-six acquit and thirty-five condemn, he is acquitted. But if thirty-six condemn and thirty-five acquit, the two sides debate the case together until one of those who condemn agrees with the view of those who are for acquittal.
If he gave him two perutahs and said, “Bring me for them an etrog,” and he brought for one perutah an etrog and for the other a pomegranate, both are guilty of sacrilege. Rabbi Judah says: the employer is not guilty of sacrilege for he could say, “I wanted a large etrog and you brought me a small and bad one.” If he gave him a golden denar and said to him, “Bring me a shirt,” and he brought him for three [silver selas] a shirt and for the other three a cloak, both are guilty of sacrilege. Rabbi Judah says: the employer is not guilty of sacrilege, for he can argue, “I wanted a large shirt and you brought me a small and bad one.”
If the hatats belonged to one and the olot to another, and the priest offered them all above, then half are valid and half disqualified. If he offered them all below, half are valid and half disqualified. If he offered half of them above and half below, then all of them are disqualified, because I can argue that the hatats were offered above and the olot below.
A woman's milk renders unclean whether [its flow is] desired or is not desired, but the milk of cattle renders unclean only if [its flow is] desired. Rabbi Akiva said: there is a kal vehomer argument here: if a woman's milk, which is specifically for infants, can render unclean whether [its flow is] desired or is not desired, all the more should the milk of cattle, which is for infants and adults, should render unclean both when [its flow is] desired and when it is not desired. They said to him: No; a woman's milk renders unclean when [its flow is] not desired, because the blood issuing from her wound is unclean; but how could the milk of cattle render unclean when [its flow is] not desired, seeing that the blood issuing from its wound is clean? He said to them: I am stricter in the case of milk than in the case of blood, for if one milks for healing, [the milk] is unclean, whereas if one lets blood for healing, [the blood] is clean. They said to him: let baskets of olives and grapes prove it; for liquids flowing from them are unclean only when [the flow is] desired, but when [the flow is] not desired they are clean. He said to them: No; if you say [thus] of baskets of olives and grapes which are at first a solid food and at the end become a liquid, could you say [the same] of milk which remains a liquid from beginning to end? Thus far was the argument. Rabbi Shimon said: from here on in we used to argue before him: let rain water prove it, for it remains a liquid from beginning to end, and renders unclean only when [its flow is] desired. But he said to us: No; if you say [thus] of rain water, it is because most of it is intended not for human usage but for the soil and for trees, whereas most milk is intended for human usage.
The Sadducees say: we complain against you, Pharisees, that you declare an uninterrupted flow of a liquid to be clean. The Pharisees say: we complain against you, Sadducees, that you declare a stream of water which flows from a burial-ground to be clean? The Sadducees say: we complain against you, Pharisees, that you say, my ox or donkey which has done injury is liable, yet my male or female slave who has done injury is not liable. Now if in the case of my ox or my donkey for which I am not responsible if they do not fulfill religious duties, yet I am responsible for their damages, in the case of my male or female slave for whom I am responsible to see that they fulfill mitzvot, how much more so that I should be responsible for their damages? They said to them: No, if you argue about my ox or my donkey which have no understanding, can you deduce from there anything concerning a male or female slave who do have understanding? So that if I were to anger either of them and they would go and burn another person's stack, should I be liable to make restitution?
The Jerusalem Talmud
Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “Rebbi Meïr follows the argument of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says that moist and dry are two different kinds, so Rebbi Meïr says that moist and dry are two different kinds.” The colleagues said before Rebbi Yose: Why should he argue like Rebbi Aqiba? He could argue even like the Rabbis since we have stated there (Mishnah 3:3): “He who rips out moist onions for the market and keeps dry ones for storage!” Rebbi Yose answered: We understand that market and storage make two kinds, are moist and dry two kinds?
Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “Rebbi Meïr follows the argument of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says that moist and dry are two different kinds, so Rebbi Meïr says that moist and dry are two different kinds.” The colleagues said before Rebbi Yose: Why should he argue like Rebbi Aqiba? He could argue even like the Rabbis since we have stated there (Mishnah 3:3): “He who rips out moist onions for the market and keeps dry ones for storage!” Rebbi Yose answered: We understand that market and storage make two kinds, are moist and dry two kinds?
Rebbi Joḥanan said: It is by Rebbi Jehudah ben Ḥagra, as it was stated: “A Gentile who converted but had cut grain before he converted is free; after he converted, he is obligated. If it is in doubt, he is free. Rebbi Jehudah ben Ḥagra obligates him.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it agrees with everybody: A Jew, who is obligated in principle, is also obligated in doubtful cases; a Gentile, who is not obligated in principle, is not obligated in doubt. Rebbi Joḥanan said: So did Rebbi Meïr argue with Rebbi Jehudah ben Ḥagra, do you not agree with me that gleanings in doubt are gleanings? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: So did Rebbi Meïr argue with the Sages, do you not agree with me that gleanings in doubt are gleanings?
Rebbi Joḥanan said: It is by Rebbi Jehudah ben Ḥagra, as it was stated: “A Gentile who converted but had cut grain before he converted is free; after he converted, he is obligated. If it is in doubt, he is free. Rebbi Jehudah ben Ḥagra obligates him.” Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, it agrees with everybody: A Jew, who is obligated in principle, is also obligated in doubtful cases; a Gentile, who is not obligated in principle, is not obligated in doubt. Rebbi Joḥanan said: So did Rebbi Meïr argue with Rebbi Jehudah ben Ḥagra, do you not agree with me that gleanings in doubt are gleanings? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: So did Rebbi Meïr argue with the Sages, do you not agree with me that gleanings in doubt are gleanings?
The reason of Rebbi Eliezer (Lev. 11:34): “Any drink.” What is the reason of the rabbis? “That can be drunk.” Does Rebbi Eliezer hold with Rebbi Ismael, that for a particular statement after a general one, everything is included? He assumes more than Rebbi Ismael, in that even if there is a second general statement, all is included. Rebbi Paregoros from Caesarea: Rebbi Eliezer ben Rebbi Ismael said: So did Rebbi Eliezer answer the Sages: Since you interpret (Lev. 11:34): “That can be eaten,” to exclude stinking food, so I hold “that can be drunk,” to exclude stinking drinks. They said to him, solid food and drinks are not comparable. If you argue about food, which is pure if stinking from the start, what can you infer for drinks since drinks stinking from the start can become impure? Another approach: If you argue about food, when human food does not need thinking about, what can you infer for drinks since human drink needs thinking about? Because they need thinking about them, should drinks stinking from the start become impure? Because they need thinking about them, drinks stinking from the start should be pure! Another approach. They said to him: If you argue about food, animal feed for humans is not created by thought, what can you infer for drinks since animal drinks for humans need thought? We have stated thus: (Lev. 11:34) “Any drink,” why does the verse have to add “that can be drunk”? This excludes stinking drinks, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. They said to him, no drink is rejected by birds or a cow.
The reason of Rebbi Eliezer (Lev. 11:34): “Any drink.” What is the reason of the rabbis? “That can be drunk.” Does Rebbi Eliezer hold with Rebbi Ismael, that for a particular statement after a general one, everything is included? He assumes more than Rebbi Ismael, in that even if there is a second general statement, all is included. Rebbi Paregoros from Caesarea: Rebbi Eliezer ben Rebbi Ismael said: So did Rebbi Eliezer answer the Sages: Since you interpret (Lev. 11:34): “That can be eaten,” to exclude stinking food, so I hold “that can be drunk,” to exclude stinking drinks. They said to him, solid food and drinks are not comparable. If you argue about food, which is pure if stinking from the start, what can you infer for drinks since drinks stinking from the start can become impure? Another approach: If you argue about food, when human food does not need thinking about, what can you infer for drinks since human drink needs thinking about? Because they need thinking about them, should drinks stinking from the start become impure? Because they need thinking about them, drinks stinking from the start should be pure! Another approach. They said to him: If you argue about food, animal feed for humans is not created by thought, what can you infer for drinks since animal drinks for humans need thought? We have stated thus: (Lev. 11:34) “Any drink,” why does the verse have to add “that can be drunk”? This excludes stinking drinks, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. They said to him, no drink is rejected by birds or a cow.
The reason of Rebbi Eliezer (Lev. 11:34): “Any drink.” What is the reason of the rabbis? “That can be drunk.” Does Rebbi Eliezer hold with Rebbi Ismael, that for a particular statement after a general one, everything is included? He assumes more than Rebbi Ismael, in that even if there is a second general statement, all is included. Rebbi Paregoros from Caesarea: Rebbi Eliezer ben Rebbi Ismael said: So did Rebbi Eliezer answer the Sages: Since you interpret (Lev. 11:34): “That can be eaten,” to exclude stinking food, so I hold “that can be drunk,” to exclude stinking drinks. They said to him, solid food and drinks are not comparable. If you argue about food, which is pure if stinking from the start, what can you infer for drinks since drinks stinking from the start can become impure? Another approach: If you argue about food, when human food does not need thinking about, what can you infer for drinks since human drink needs thinking about? Because they need thinking about them, should drinks stinking from the start become impure? Because they need thinking about them, drinks stinking from the start should be pure! Another approach. They said to him: If you argue about food, animal feed for humans is not created by thought, what can you infer for drinks since animal drinks for humans need thought? We have stated thus: (Lev. 11:34) “Any drink,” why does the verse have to add “that can be drunk”? This excludes stinking drinks, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. They said to him, no drink is rejected by birds or a cow.
“If he was eating when night fell Friday evening or when he gave it to another person it did not become ṭevel.” Rebbi Jeremiah wanted to say, when it was put on pitta bread or into a bowl, but when it was in a flask it became ṭevel. Rebbi Yose said, even in a flask it did not become ṭevel. Rebbi Jeremiah said to him, does not the Sabbath create ṭevel? He answered him, does not buying create ṭevel? He retorted, following what Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rebbi Zeїra, Rebbi Jonah, Rebbi Zeїra in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, even what is in a flask did not become ṭevel, in case it was not fully processed, since he would in the end return it. The strength of Rebbi Jeremiah is from the following: “In addition, Rebbi Eliezer said a person may stand near the muqẓeh on a Friday of a Sabbatical year and say, from here I shall eat tomorrow.” He mentioned only the Sabbatical year; that exludes the other years of the Sabbatical cycle. How does Rebbi Jeremiah argue about this? You cannot return it to its place as muqẓeh, therefore it creates ṭevel. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi (Jeremiah): There are no snacks on the Sabbath. He explains it, anything that has muqẓeh. In the opinion of Rebbi Jeremiah, whether it has muqẓeh or does not have muqẓeh.
These are the ones who argue: Ben Azai and Ben Zoma. These are the students: Ḥanina ben Haḵiniah and Rebbi Eleazar ben Mathia. The holy group, Rebbi Yose ben Hameshullam and Rebbi Simeon ben Menasiah.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. Rebbi Zeïra said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted are not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Zeïra: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from seeds to grape skins he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? That means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; is it not logical that for all prohibitions of the Torah, whose prohibition is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition cannot be lifted, that we treat taste like the thing itself? From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Zeïra who says everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here he says, “even if he did not taste.”
It is written, let us go and argue, says the Eternal, etc. It was stated, Rebbi Eliezer said, If your sins were like years, etc., like the years from Heaven to Earth, they will be snow white; more than that, they shall be like wool. Rebbi Joshua said, if your sins were like years, like the years of the patriarchs, they will be snow white; more than that, they shall be like wool. Rebbi Yudan bar Pazi said, If your sins were like years they will be snow white, the first time, if they were like purple they shall be like wool, the second time. But the rabbis said, If the sins of a person are like his years, they will be snow white; more than that, they shall be like wool. Rebbi Yudan Antordiyya said, at a time when a person’s sins are light, they will be snow white; at a time when they are serious, they shall be like wool.
Rebbi Yasa asked: Why does Rebbi Yose say, this is not the implication? Rebbi Yasa had heard that Rebbi Joḥanan said, “from the words of Rebbi Aqiba and Rebbi Ḥananiah the executive officer of the Cohanim,” and he had heard that Bar Qappara said, “original impurity is a word from the Torah, derivative impurity is of their words.” But he had not heard that Rebbi Joḥanan had said, “both these and those are words of the Torah.” Therefore, he was asking: Just as it is permitted to burn what is (rabbinically) [biblically] forbidden with what is biblically impure, since one burns what is (rabbinically) [biblically] impure with what is biblically impure, so it should be permitted to burn what is (biblically) [rabbinically] forbidden with what is biblically impure since one burns what is (biblically) [rabbinically] impure with what is biblically impure. But there must be a difference between prohibition and impurity. And Rebbi Yasa said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Everybody agrees that on the Sixteenth one burns pure and impure heave [together]. Just as you did not make a difference for us between biblical prohibition and biblical impurity since one burns what is biblically impure with what is biblically impure, so you should not make a difference for us between what is rabbinically forbidden with what is biblically impure since one burns what is rabbinically impure with what is biblically impure. But it must be that both these and those are words of the Torah. There came Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba from Tyre and said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: both these and those are words of the Torah, and I said, it is correct. There (rabbinic) [biblical] impurity with biblical impurity but here biblical disqualification with biblical impurity. Therefore Rebbi Yose said, this is not the implication. The position of Rebbi Joḥanan is difficult for Rebbi Meïr; therefore Rebbi Yose said, this is not the implication. Bar Qappara must argue like Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, from the words of Rebbi Eliezer and the words of Rebbi Joshua. Then the opinion of Bar Qappara is difficult for Rebbi Yose based on what Rebbi Meïr said, “from their words we learned.” Rebbi Abbin said, Rebbi Meïr is consistent since Rebbi Meïr is restrictive in their words as in words of the Torah. Where do we find that Rebbi Meïr is restrictive in their words as in words of the Torah? Rebbi Ḥinena said, as we have stated there: “A woman who sees a stain is out of order and worries because of flux[, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, nothing in stains implies flux].”
It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah says, leavened matter may only be eliminated by burning. It is an argument de minore ad majus. Since piggul and leftover, which are not under an injunction not to be seen and not to be found, only may be disposed of by burning, for leavened matter which is under an injunction not to be seen and not to be found, it is only logical that it only may be disposed by burning. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency, is no argument de minore ad majus. It would imply that if he does not find fire he could sit and not dispose of it. The Torah said, eliminate sour dough from your houses.
Similarly said Rebbi Jehudah, if a woman carries seed and gives birth to a male. What does the verse imply? Since it is said, she shall be impure for seven days,and on the eighth day one shall circumcise, I understand that a live birth makes his mother impure by the impurity of birth. From where that a stillbirth makes his mother impure by the impurity of birth? Rebbi Jehudah said, I am presenting an argument de minore ad majus. Since a live birth, who does not make impure for seven days his mother, and those who come with him, [or who comes with his mother,] into a tent, the stillbirth who makes impure for seven days his mother, and those who come with him, [or who comes with his mother,] into a tent, it is only logical that he should make his mother impure by the impurity of birth. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency is no argument de minore ad majus. As a consequence, since a live birth purifies his mother, also the stillbirth should purify his mother? Since I cannot prove it by an argument de minore ad majus, [therefore} the Torah said a male, to include the stillbirth.
Similarly said Rebbi Jehudah, “you should dwell in huts,” a hut made of anything. For Rebbi Jehudah was saying, it is an argument de minore ad majus that the hut should come only from the Four Kinds. Since the lulav which is not used in nights as in days may come only from the Four Kinds, it is only logical that a hut which is used by nights as well as by days should come only from the Four Kinds. They told Rebbi Jehudah, any argument de minore ad majus which you argue in the beginning as a restriction but it turns out in the end to be a leniency is no argument de minore ad majus. As a consequence, if he did not find of the Four Kinds, should he sit without a hut? But the Torah said, “you should dwell in huts,” a hut made of anything. [And so Ezra said, they informed and did proclaim in all cities and in Jerusalem, go to the mountain, etc.]
From where that a Pesaḥ must be in the name of its owner? Is it not a logical argument? Since a purification sacrifice, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does not invalidate it, needs to be in the name of the owner, Pesaḥ, where intent for the uncircumcised or impure does invalidate it, is it not logical that it needs to be in the name of its owner? No. If you are saying about purification sacrifice which is most holy, would you say that about Pesaḥ which is a simple sanctum? Rebbi Yose said, did you not argue about intent? The Torah insisted about intent for Pesaḥ more than for purification sacrifice. Rebbi Ḥananiah said before Rebbi Mana: Do we infer this from the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease? But is not the purification sacrifice of the sufferer from skin disease separate for something new? And one cannot infer from anything which is separate for something new. He told him, from where do you infer that it be invalid if not for its purpose? Not from the following verse, he shall slaughter it as purification sacrifice, and it is written: this is the doctrine of the purification sacrifice. There is one doctrine for all purification sacrifices. But from the place where it is being inferred, there it permits inferences.
The rabbis of Caesarea asked: I could think that the one who receives or carries [the blood] on leavened matter be liable. The verse says, sacrifice. Since slaughtering for sacrifice is particular in that one is liable for it outside [the Sanctuary], this excludes the one who receives or carries on leavened matter for which one is not liable outside. I could think that one who burns parts on leavened matter be liable. The verse says, and he atones. Since pouring is particular in that it is indispensable for atonement, this excludes burning of the parts, which is not indispensable for atonement. Rebbi Jacob bar Zavdi asked before Rebbi Yose. Instead of arguing for absence of liability, argue for liability. I could think that the one who receives or carries [the blood] on leavened matter not be liable. The verse says, sacrifice. Since slaughtering for sacrifice is particular in that for it one is liable outside [the Sanctuary], I also am adding burning of the parts for which one is liable outside. I could think that one who burns parts on leavened matter not be liable. The verse says, and he atones. Since pouring is particular in that it is indispensable for atonement, I also am adding the one who receives or carries who is indispensable for atonement. He said to him, anything equal in both respects instructs; anything not equal in both respects does not instruct. Sacrifice. Since slaughtering for sacrifice is particular in that it is indispensable for atonement and for it one is liable outside [the Sanctuary], this excludes the one who receives or carries on leavened matter for which one is not liable outside; it excludes burning of the parts, which is not indispensable for atonement.
Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: If a person could construct an equal cut by himself, he could make a creeping animal causing impurity in a tent and a corpse causing impurity in the volume of a lentil, by explaining textile, leather; textile, leather. So if a creeping animal is in a person’s hand, even if he immerses himself in the waters of the Siloam, or in waters of a primeval ocean, he never can achieve purity. If he throws it away, immediately he becomes pure. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: A person may use an equal cut to confirm what he has learned; nobody may use an equal cut to invalidate what he has learned. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: A person may argue de minore ad majus by himself; a person may not argue an equal cut by himself. Therefore one can contradict an argument de minore ad majus; one cannot contradict an equal cut.
Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: If a person could construct an equal cut by himself, he could make a creeping animal causing impurity in a tent and a corpse causing impurity in the volume of a lentil, by explaining textile, leather; textile, leather. So if a creeping animal is in a person’s hand, even if he immerses himself in the waters of the Siloam, or in waters of a primeval ocean, he never can achieve purity. If he throws it away, immediately he becomes pure. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: A person may use an equal cut to confirm what he has learned; nobody may use an equal cut to invalidate what he has learned. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: A person may argue de minore ad majus by himself; a person may not argue an equal cut by himself. Therefore one can contradict an argument de minore ad majus; one cannot contradict an equal cut.
MISHNAH: He who slaughters the Pesaḥ not for its purpose on the Sabbath is for this liable for a purification sacrifice. For any other sacrifice which he slaughtered for the purpose of Pesaḥ, if they are not suitable he is liable, if suitable, Rebbi Eliezer declares him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares not liable. Rebbi Eliezer said to him, since for Pesaḥ, which is permitted for its purpose, he is liable if he changed its purpose, sacrifices which are forbidden for their purpose, it should be logical that he be liable if he changed their purpose. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about Pesaḥ, which he changed to something forbidden, what can you infer about sacrifices which he changed to something permitted? Rebbi Eliezer said to him, public parts should prove it, which are permitted for their purpose and he who slaughters for their purpose is liable. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about public parts which are fixed in number, what can you infer about Pesaḥ which is not fixed in number? Rebbi Meïr says, also he who slaughters for the purpose of public parts is not liable.
MISHNAH: He who slaughters the Pesaḥ not for its purpose on the Sabbath is for this liable for a purification sacrifice. For any other sacrifice which he slaughtered for the purpose of Pesaḥ, if they are not suitable he is liable, if suitable, Rebbi Eliezer declares him liable for a purification sacrifice but Rebbi Joshua declares not liable. Rebbi Eliezer said to him, since for Pesaḥ, which is permitted for its purpose, he is liable if he changed its purpose, sacrifices which are forbidden for their purpose, it should be logical that he be liable if he changed their purpose. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about Pesaḥ, which he changed to something forbidden, what can you infer about sacrifices which he changed to something permitted? Rebbi Eliezer said to him, public parts should prove it, which are permitted for their purpose and he who slaughters for their purpose is liable. Rebbi Joshua answered him, no. If you argue about public parts which are fixed in number, what can you infer about Pesaḥ which is not fixed in number? Rebbi Meïr says, also he who slaughters for the purpose of public parts is not liable.
HALAKHAH: Who is the Tanna of “majority”? Rebbi Meïr, as it was stated: Either half of the tribes or half of each tribe, if only it be a majority. Rebbi Jehudah says, half of each tribe, but only a majority of entire tribes. One tribe drags all tribes. Rebbi Meïr says, all tribes are called “the public”. Rebbi Jehudah says, each single tribe is called “public”. What is between them? Dragging. Rebbi Meïr says, a single tribe does not drag all tribes, but Rebbi Jehudah says, one tribe drags all tribes. And Rebbi Jehudah follows Rebbi Simeon. Just as Rebbi Simeon said, one tribe drags all tribes, so Rebbi Jehudah says, one tribe drags all tribes. Even though Rebbi Jehudah says, one tribe drags all tribes, he agrees that only if the ruling came from the ashlar hall. Rebbi Yose said, the reason of that Tanna: From this place which the Eternal will choose. What is the reason of Rebbi Jehudah? The entire community of the Children of Israel will be forgiven. What is the reason of Rebbi Simeon? Since the entire people acted in error. How does Rebbi Simeon uphold Rebbi Jehudah’s reason, the entire community of the Children of Israel will be forgiven? Except women and children. How does Rebbi Jehudah uphold Rebbi Simeon’s reason, since the entire people acted in error? Except if the beginning was criminal and the conclusion in error. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Benjamin bar Levi: The verse supports him who said that each tribe is called “public”, as it is written: A people and a public of peoples will come from you, and Benjamin was not yet born. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said, just as they differ here, so they differ about impurity, as it was stated: If the public was half pure and half impure; pure [people] celebrate the first [Pesaḥ] and impure the second, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, the pure ones celebrate for themselves, and the impure ones celebrate for themselves. They told him, there is no split Passover; either all celebrate in purity or all celebrate in impurity. Who is “they told him”? Rebbi Meïr. The argument of Rebbi Jehudah seems inverted, as we have stated there: “If one of the loaves or one of the orders became impure, Rebbi Jehudah said, both have to be brought to be burned for a public offering cannot be split. But the Sages say, the impure in its impurity, and the pure shall be eaten.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: who is “they told him”? The Sages who argue like Rebbi Meïr.
There, we have stated: “All sacrifices whose blood was collected by a non-Cohen, a deep mourner, one immersed on this day, missing garments, missing atonement, with unwashed hands or feet, uncircumcised, impure, sitting, standing on utensils, on [an animal, on] another person, disqualified it.” The Southerners say, we hold this for those impure by the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, but impurity of the dead does not desecrate since it was permitted in case of the impurity of the many for the Pesaḥ. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish objected to the Southerners: Since for the owner, where you clarified to his advantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, you clarified to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ, for the officiant, where you clarified to his disadvantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, it is only logical that you should clarify to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ. In addition to what Rebbi stated, “the diadem makes impurity of the blood acceptable but not impurity of the body.” If you want to say that this refers to the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, you cannot, since we have stated, “if the impurity was caused by impurity of the abyss, the diadem makes acceptable.” What are the Southerners doing with this? They explain if for the owner. But did we not state “a nazir”? They explain it for the officiant. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, there is no difference; it is equal for owner or officiant. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is an argument de minore ad maius that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, what can you say about the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, this is an argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are indispensable for him, what can you say about the officiating, for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are not indispensable. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid.
There, we have stated: “All sacrifices whose blood was collected by a non-Cohen, a deep mourner, one immersed on this day, missing garments, missing atonement, with unwashed hands or feet, uncircumcised, impure, sitting, standing on utensils, on [an animal, on] another person, disqualified it.” The Southerners say, we hold this for those impure by the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, but impurity of the dead does not desecrate since it was permitted in case of the impurity of the many for the Pesaḥ. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish objected to the Southerners: Since for the owner, where you clarified to his advantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, you clarified to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ, for the officiant, where you clarified to his disadvantage in case of all other impurities during the course of the year, it is only logical that you should clarify to his disadvantage in case of impurity of the dead for Pesaḥ. In addition to what Rebbi stated, “the diadem makes impurity of the blood acceptable but not impurity of the body.” If you want to say that this refers to the impurity of gonorrhea or the impurity of skin disease, you cannot, since we have stated, “if the impurity was caused by impurity of the abyss, the diadem makes acceptable.” What are the Southerners doing with this? They explain if for the owner. But did we not state “a nazir”? They explain it for the officiant. In Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish’s opinion, there is no difference; it is equal for owner or officiant. Rebbi Jeremiah said, this is an argument de minore ad maius that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner whose position you clarified to his disadvantage in the case of the infirm and the aged, what can you say about the officiating, whose position you clarified to his advantage in the case of the infirm and the aged. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, this is an argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, for they can say to him, no. If you argue about the owner for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are indispensable for him, what can you say about the officiating, for whom the circumcision of his males and his slaves are not indispensable. And any argument de minore ad majus that can be contradicted, the argument de minore ad majus is invalid.
“He shall sprinkle it, [in front of the cover], this teaches that he gives a single one upwards. In front of the cover, I do not know how many. So I am arguing: It mentions giving the bull’s blood downwards, and it mentions giving the he-goat’s blood downwards. Since giving the bull’s blood downwards as mentioned is seven times, so giving the he-goat’s blood downwards as mentioned must be seven times. Or go in the following way: Blood is mentioned upwards and blood is mentioned downwards. Since the blood mentioned upwards is once, so the blood mentioned downwards must be once. Let us see to what it is comparable. One argues downwards from downwards; one does not argue downwards from upwards. Or go in the following way: One argues he-goat’s blood from he-goat’s blood; but one does not argue he-goat’s blood from bull’s blood. The verse says, he shall treat its blood as he treated the bull’s blood. Since the bull’s blood is downwards seven times, also the he-goat’s blood is downwards seven times. But I do not know how many times to give the bull’s blood upwards. Giving the blood upwards is mentioned for the he-goat and giving the blood upwards is mentioned for the bull. Since giving the blood upwards as mentioned for the he-goat is once, so giving the blood upwards as mentioned for the bull is once. Or go in the following way: Blood is mentioned downwards; blood is mentioned upwards. Since the blood mentioned downwards is seven, so the blood mentioned upwards must be seven. Let us see to what it is similar. One argues upwards from upwards; one does not argue upwards from downwards. Or go in the following way: One argues bull’s blood from bull’s blood; but one does not argue bull’s blood from he-goat’s blood. The verse says, he shall treat its blood as he treated the bull’s blood, that all its works be the same. Since the bull’s blood is seven times downwards, also the he-goat’s blood is seven times downwards. Since the he-goat’s blood is once upwards, also the bull’s blood is once upwards.”
“He shall sprinkle it, [in front of the cover], this teaches that he gives a single one upwards. In front of the cover, I do not know how many. So I am arguing: It mentions giving the bull’s blood downwards, and it mentions giving the he-goat’s blood downwards. Since giving the bull’s blood downwards as mentioned is seven times, so giving the he-goat’s blood downwards as mentioned must be seven times. Or go in the following way: Blood is mentioned upwards and blood is mentioned downwards. Since the blood mentioned upwards is once, so the blood mentioned downwards must be once. Let us see to what it is comparable. One argues downwards from downwards; one does not argue downwards from upwards. Or go in the following way: One argues he-goat’s blood from he-goat’s blood; but one does not argue he-goat’s blood from bull’s blood. The verse says, he shall treat its blood as he treated the bull’s blood. Since the bull’s blood is downwards seven times, also the he-goat’s blood is downwards seven times. But I do not know how many times to give the bull’s blood upwards. Giving the blood upwards is mentioned for the he-goat and giving the blood upwards is mentioned for the bull. Since giving the blood upwards as mentioned for the he-goat is once, so giving the blood upwards as mentioned for the bull is once. Or go in the following way: Blood is mentioned downwards; blood is mentioned upwards. Since the blood mentioned downwards is seven, so the blood mentioned upwards must be seven. Let us see to what it is similar. One argues upwards from upwards; one does not argue upwards from downwards. Or go in the following way: One argues bull’s blood from bull’s blood; but one does not argue bull’s blood from he-goat’s blood. The verse says, he shall treat its blood as he treated the bull’s blood, that all its works be the same. Since the bull’s blood is seven times downwards, also the he-goat’s blood is seven times downwards. Since the he-goat’s blood is once upwards, also the bull’s blood is once upwards.”
“He shall sprinkle it, [in front of the cover], this teaches that he gives a single one upwards. In front of the cover, I do not know how many. So I am arguing: It mentions giving the bull’s blood downwards, and it mentions giving the he-goat’s blood downwards. Since giving the bull’s blood downwards as mentioned is seven times, so giving the he-goat’s blood downwards as mentioned must be seven times. Or go in the following way: Blood is mentioned upwards and blood is mentioned downwards. Since the blood mentioned upwards is once, so the blood mentioned downwards must be once. Let us see to what it is comparable. One argues downwards from downwards; one does not argue downwards from upwards. Or go in the following way: One argues he-goat’s blood from he-goat’s blood; but one does not argue he-goat’s blood from bull’s blood. The verse says, he shall treat its blood as he treated the bull’s blood. Since the bull’s blood is downwards seven times, also the he-goat’s blood is downwards seven times. But I do not know how many times to give the bull’s blood upwards. Giving the blood upwards is mentioned for the he-goat and giving the blood upwards is mentioned for the bull. Since giving the blood upwards as mentioned for the he-goat is once, so giving the blood upwards as mentioned for the bull is once. Or go in the following way: Blood is mentioned downwards; blood is mentioned upwards. Since the blood mentioned downwards is seven, so the blood mentioned upwards must be seven. Let us see to what it is similar. One argues upwards from upwards; one does not argue upwards from downwards. Or go in the following way: One argues bull’s blood from bull’s blood; but one does not argue bull’s blood from he-goat’s blood. The verse says, he shall treat its blood as he treated the bull’s blood, that all its works be the same. Since the bull’s blood is seven times downwards, also the he-goat’s blood is seven times downwards. Since the he-goat’s blood is once upwards, also the bull’s blood is once upwards.”
“He shall sprinkle it, [in front of the cover], this teaches that he gives a single one upwards. In front of the cover, I do not know how many. So I am arguing: It mentions giving the bull’s blood downwards, and it mentions giving the he-goat’s blood downwards. Since giving the bull’s blood downwards as mentioned is seven times, so giving the he-goat’s blood downwards as mentioned must be seven times. Or go in the following way: Blood is mentioned upwards and blood is mentioned downwards. Since the blood mentioned upwards is once, so the blood mentioned downwards must be once. Let us see to what it is comparable. One argues downwards from downwards; one does not argue downwards from upwards. Or go in the following way: One argues he-goat’s blood from he-goat’s blood; but one does not argue he-goat’s blood from bull’s blood. The verse says, he shall treat its blood as he treated the bull’s blood. Since the bull’s blood is downwards seven times, also the he-goat’s blood is downwards seven times. But I do not know how many times to give the bull’s blood upwards. Giving the blood upwards is mentioned for the he-goat and giving the blood upwards is mentioned for the bull. Since giving the blood upwards as mentioned for the he-goat is once, so giving the blood upwards as mentioned for the bull is once. Or go in the following way: Blood is mentioned downwards; blood is mentioned upwards. Since the blood mentioned downwards is seven, so the blood mentioned upwards must be seven. Let us see to what it is similar. One argues upwards from upwards; one does not argue upwards from downwards. Or go in the following way: One argues bull’s blood from bull’s blood; but one does not argue bull’s blood from he-goat’s blood. The verse says, he shall treat its blood as he treated the bull’s blood, that all its works be the same. Since the bull’s blood is seven times downwards, also the he-goat’s blood is seven times downwards. Since the he-goat’s blood is once upwards, also the bull’s blood is once upwards.”
It is written, let us go and argue, etc. It was stated, Rebbi Eliezer said, If your sins were like years, etc., like the years from Heaven to Earth, they will be snow white; more than that, they shall be like wool. Rebbi Joshua said, if your sins were like years, like the years of the patriarchs, they will be snow white; more than that, they shall be like wool. Rebbi Yuda bar Pazi said, if your sins were like years they will be snow white, the first time, if they were like purple they shall be like wool, the second time. But the rabbis said, If the sins of a person are like his years, they will be snow white.]
“Rebbi Jehudah said:, testified” etc. Rebbi Berekhiah said, the reason of Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai is, this they shall give, twelve tribes shall give. Rebbi Tabi in the name of Rav Hamnuna: So answer the Sages to Rebbi Jehudah. A private purification sacrifice is let to die; a public purification sacrifice is not left to die. A private flour offering is brought totally, but no public flour offering is brought totally. This is difficult, how can one argue with a person about something with which he does not agree? “For no public purification sacrifice is left to die; Rebbi Jehudah says, it shall be left to die.” And he objects to them, are these not private flour offerings? They answer him, from the moment when it is delivered to the public, it is treated as a public offering. It is written, everybody being counted, Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Neḥemiah. One said, everyone who crossed the Sea shall give, the other one said, everyone being counted shall give. He who said, everyone who crossed the Sea shall give, supports Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai; he who said, everyone being counted shall give, supports Ben Kovri.
HALAKHAH: And following Ben Azzai, why the [poor] sinner? He brought his log with him, and following the rabbis he brings a lamb. What are the libations for a mother sheep? Since we stated, “ ‘lamb’ serves for the libations of sheep and goats, large or small, male or female,” this implies that the libations of a mother sheep are like the libations of a lamb. It is written, so you shall do for one bull, or for one ram, or an animal from sheep or goats. This tells that He did not differentiate between libations for a calf and libations for a bull. Since one could argue, an animal from the flock needs libations, a bovine animal needs libations. Since we find that He distinguished between the libations for a sheep and the libations for a ram, so we should differentiate between libations for a calf and libations for a bull. The verse says, so you shall do for one bull; this implies that He did not distinguish between libations for a calf and libations for a bull. Why was it said, or for a ram? Since one could argue, if we find that He differentiated between libations for a yearling and libations for a two-year old, so we should differentiate between libations for a two-years old and a three-years old. The verse says, or for one ram. Why was it said, or for an animal from sheep? Since one could argue, if we find that He differentiated between libations for a sheep and libations for a ram, so we should differentiate between libations for a young female sheep and libations for a mother sheep. The verse says, or for an animal from sheep. Why was it said, or a goat? Since one could argue, if we find that He differentiated between libations for a sheep and libations for a ram, so we should differentiate between libations for a kid goat and libations for a bellwether. The verse says, or for a goat, it compared the smallest kid goat to the largest bellwether. Since one needs three log, so the other needs three log.
HALAKHAH: And following Ben Azzai, why the [poor] sinner? He brought his log with him, and following the rabbis he brings a lamb. What are the libations for a mother sheep? Since we stated, “ ‘lamb’ serves for the libations of sheep and goats, large or small, male or female,” this implies that the libations of a mother sheep are like the libations of a lamb. It is written, so you shall do for one bull, or for one ram, or an animal from sheep or goats. This tells that He did not differentiate between libations for a calf and libations for a bull. Since one could argue, an animal from the flock needs libations, a bovine animal needs libations. Since we find that He distinguished between the libations for a sheep and the libations for a ram, so we should differentiate between libations for a calf and libations for a bull. The verse says, so you shall do for one bull; this implies that He did not distinguish between libations for a calf and libations for a bull. Why was it said, or for a ram? Since one could argue, if we find that He differentiated between libations for a yearling and libations for a two-year old, so we should differentiate between libations for a two-years old and a three-years old. The verse says, or for one ram. Why was it said, or for an animal from sheep? Since one could argue, if we find that He differentiated between libations for a sheep and libations for a ram, so we should differentiate between libations for a young female sheep and libations for a mother sheep. The verse says, or for an animal from sheep. Why was it said, or a goat? Since one could argue, if we find that He differentiated between libations for a sheep and libations for a ram, so we should differentiate between libations for a kid goat and libations for a bellwether. The verse says, or for a goat, it compared the smallest kid goat to the largest bellwether. Since one needs three log, so the other needs three log.
HALAKHAH: And following Ben Azzai, why the [poor] sinner? He brought his log with him, and following the rabbis he brings a lamb. What are the libations for a mother sheep? Since we stated, “ ‘lamb’ serves for the libations of sheep and goats, large or small, male or female,” this implies that the libations of a mother sheep are like the libations of a lamb. It is written, so you shall do for one bull, or for one ram, or an animal from sheep or goats. This tells that He did not differentiate between libations for a calf and libations for a bull. Since one could argue, an animal from the flock needs libations, a bovine animal needs libations. Since we find that He distinguished between the libations for a sheep and the libations for a ram, so we should differentiate between libations for a calf and libations for a bull. The verse says, so you shall do for one bull; this implies that He did not distinguish between libations for a calf and libations for a bull. Why was it said, or for a ram? Since one could argue, if we find that He differentiated between libations for a yearling and libations for a two-year old, so we should differentiate between libations for a two-years old and a three-years old. The verse says, or for one ram. Why was it said, or for an animal from sheep? Since one could argue, if we find that He differentiated between libations for a sheep and libations for a ram, so we should differentiate between libations for a young female sheep and libations for a mother sheep. The verse says, or for an animal from sheep. Why was it said, or a goat? Since one could argue, if we find that He differentiated between libations for a sheep and libations for a ram, so we should differentiate between libations for a kid goat and libations for a bellwether. The verse says, or for a goat, it compared the smallest kid goat to the largest bellwether. Since one needs three log, so the other needs three log.
HALAKHAH: And following Ben Azzai, why the [poor] sinner? He brought his log with him, and following the rabbis he brings a lamb. What are the libations for a mother sheep? Since we stated, “ ‘lamb’ serves for the libations of sheep and goats, large or small, male or female,” this implies that the libations of a mother sheep are like the libations of a lamb. It is written, so you shall do for one bull, or for one ram, or an animal from sheep or goats. This tells that He did not differentiate between libations for a calf and libations for a bull. Since one could argue, an animal from the flock needs libations, a bovine animal needs libations. Since we find that He distinguished between the libations for a sheep and the libations for a ram, so we should differentiate between libations for a calf and libations for a bull. The verse says, so you shall do for one bull; this implies that He did not distinguish between libations for a calf and libations for a bull. Why was it said, or for a ram? Since one could argue, if we find that He differentiated between libations for a yearling and libations for a two-year old, so we should differentiate between libations for a two-years old and a three-years old. The verse says, or for one ram. Why was it said, or for an animal from sheep? Since one could argue, if we find that He differentiated between libations for a sheep and libations for a ram, so we should differentiate between libations for a young female sheep and libations for a mother sheep. The verse says, or for an animal from sheep. Why was it said, or a goat? Since one could argue, if we find that He differentiated between libations for a sheep and libations for a ram, so we should differentiate between libations for a kid goat and libations for a bellwether. The verse says, or for a goat, it compared the smallest kid goat to the largest bellwether. Since one needs three log, so the other needs three log.
HALAKHAH: “One does not reduce to less than ten verses of Kingdom,” corresponding to the ten praises which David formulated, Hallelujah, praise God in his Sanctuary, praise Him in His mighty heaven, etc., up to every soul praise Jah, hallelujah. Ten verses of Remembrance, corresponding to the ten confessions formulated by Isaiah, wash, cleanse, remove, etc.,learn to do good, seek justice, etc. What is written after this? Come and let us argue, says the Eternal, etc. Ten verses of Shofar, corresponding to the seven sheep, one ox, one ram, and one goat.
Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: At first they were saying, one curdles neither with the stomach content of the carcass nor with the stomach contents of the Gentile. They changed to say, one curdles with the stomach content of the carcass but not with the stomach contents of the Gentile. Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, Samuel bar Abba asked: Does this follow Rebbi Eliezer, since Rebbi Eliezer said, the thoughts of the Non-Jew are about pagan worship? Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Originally, they said, one does curdle neither with carcass stomach contents nor with Gentile’s stomach contents. They changed to say, one does curdle with carcass stomach contents and with Gentile’s stomach contents. Rebbi Yose said, the language of a baraita supports Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Stomach contents of a Gentile or a carcass is forbidden following the original teaching. The stomach contents of a qualified animal which suckled from a ṭerefa are forbidden following the former teaching, and the stomach contents of a ṭerefa which suckled from a qualified one are permitted following the later teaching. And even if the House of Shammai would argue like the House of Hillel in the first teaching, an egg is a growth of its body; the contents of the stomach come from the outside. It parallels what Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It happened to the sons of Jehudah ben Shamuai that wolves tore more than 300 of their flock. The case came before the Sages who permitted their stomach contents. They said, an egg is a growth of its body; the contents of the stomach come from the outside.
HALAKHAH: It is written: The glory of the Eternal dwelt on Mount Sinai; the cloud covered it for six days; He called to Moses on the Seventh Day. Moses ascended. The Seventh after the Ten Commandments, the start of the Forty. Moses said to them, I shall be occupied on the Mountain for 40 days. When the fortieth day came and he did not come, immediately the people saw that Moses tarried in descending from the Mountain. When noontime came and he did not come, immediately the people congregated on Aaron and said to him, rise and make us gods which shall go before us, etc. The Eternal said to Moses, descend, for your people corrupted, etc. And Joshua heard the sound of the people in its dealings; he said to Moses, there is sound of war in the camp. Moses said, a man who in the future will rule over 600’000 does not know to distinguish between sound and sound? He said, there is no sound of shouts of strength nor sound of sounds of weakness, a sound of shouts I am hearing. Rebbi Yasa said, a sound of acclaim of foreign worship I am hearing. Rebbi Yudan in the name of Rebbi Yasa: There is no generation in which there is not an ounce of the sin of the Calf. It was when he approached the camp that he saw the Calf and fifes. Rebbi Ḥilkiah in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: From here that a person should not argue from guesses. Moses made an argument de minore ad majus. Since for the pesaḥ sacrifice, which is an isolated obligation, it is said no uncircumcised may eat from it, the Torah in which all commandments are contained not so much more? Moses got angry and he threw the tablets from his hand and broke them below the Mountain. Rebbi Ismael stated, the Holy One, praise to Him, told him to break them, [as it is said,] I shall write on the tablets the words which were on the first tablets luckily you broke. He said to him, you did well that you broke. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Jonathan: The tablets were six hand-breadths long and three wide. Moses held two hand-breadth, the Holy One, praise to Him two hand-breadth, and two hand-breadths of space were between them. When Israel sinned in that way, the Holy One wanted to seize them from Moses’s hand, but Moses’s hand had the better of it and seized them from Him. That is what the verse praises him at the end and says, and all the strong hand, peace shall be on the hand which had the better on mine. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Abbai: the tablets wanted to fly off but Moses held them, [as is written,] I grabbed the two tablets. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Nehemiah, the writing itself flew off. Rebbi Ezra in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi Simon: The tablets were a load of forty seah but the writing was carrying them. When the writing flew off they were too heavy for Moses’s hands, they fell, and broke.
If it spread while in quarantine, Rebbi Joḥanan said, he needs birds. Rebbi Eleazar said, he does not need birds. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, a baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “From the sufferer from skin disease; to include one on whom it spread on his entire person that he needs birds. Is that not a logical argument? If a person became pure and the signs of what made him impure are not on him shall need birds, (should not) [is it not logical that] one who became pure and the signs of what made him impure are on him [shall] need birds? [But] the one on whom it was stable for two weeks shall disprove it, since he became pure and the signs of what made him impure are on him, but he does not need birds. So do not wonder if one on whom it spread while in quarantine and the signs of what made him impure are on him does not need birds. The verse says, from the sufferer of skin disease to include one on whom it spread on his entire person that he needs birds.” If you would say that one becoming pure in quarantine does not need birds, should he not have objected that it would have been better to argue spreading against spreadings and not staying stable against spreadings? Rebbi Ḥananiah the colleague of the rabbis: the baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan since the Tanna answers his colleague, no. If you are saying about this one who never was up to be declared absolute, what can you say about the one who was to be declared absolute? Because he was to be declared absolute, he needs birds. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, the closing statement supports Rebbi Eleazar. The one becoming pure in quarantine is not liable for torn clothing, and untended hair, and shaving, and birds. All of this is what we are considering here, about spreadings. Rebbi Samuel bar Eudaimon said, all they are disagreeing is about bringing birds. But in the matter of bringing a sacrifice everybody agrees that he does not bring a sacrifice. It was stated thus: On the seventh he has to shave, on the eighth he shall bring; one who needs shaving brings a sacrifice, one who does not need shaving does not bring a sacrifice. Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: All days on which the skin disease is on him he will be impure, one whose impurity is caused by his skin disease. This excludes him whose (purity) [impurity] depends on the count of his days. So far torn clothing and unkempt hair. From where shaving and birds? Rebbi Eleazar the Southerner in the name of Rebbi Shammai: This shall be the doctrine of the sufferer from skin disease on the day. One who may become impure and pure on one day; this excludes one who cannot become impure and pure on one day.
Why did they say, practice follows Rebbi Simeon from Timna? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from a place where all incest prohibitions were taken as one set [of sins] causing extirpation, the father’s wife came out to tell you about the bastard. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members. As we have stated: “The commandments of the Eternal,” I could think that this includes also those who eat abominations and crawling things. You argue, saying that here it says “from the eyes” and there it says “from the eyes”. Just as “from the eyes” mentioned there means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin, also “from the eyes” mentioned here means something for which one is obligated for a purification sacrifice in case of inadvertent sin and extirpation in case of intentional sin. But since “from the eyes” mentioned there is a case involving the death penalty, does “from the eyes” mentioned here involve the death penalty? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, from the place from which idolatry was singled out to teach about all who are subject to extirpation, there was no mention of anything but extirpation. But the death penalty is written elsewhere. The method of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina seems inverted. There, he infers from the set and here he infers from one of its members! There, all incest prohibitions were taken together as to the duty of sacrifice. Idolatry was singled out to teach who is obligated for a sacrifice. What can you say? Here, all incest prohibitions were taken together concerning of bastards. The father’s wife was singled out to teach about the bastard.
HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.
“They said to him: If it is practice, we shall accept this; if it is a logical argument, there is a counter-argument.” What could they have argued? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: Are not his grandchildren forbidden for three generations, both male and female? Rebbi Abbahu said that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish questioned, does one argue a matter concerning bastardy in a matter not concerning bastardy? Rebbi Ḥaggai said that Rebbi Abbahu questioned, does one argue a matter concerning extirpation in a matter not concerning extirpation? He said to them, in fact, I am declaring practice and a verse supports me. “Sons,” not daughters.
“They said to him: If it is practice, we shall accept this; if it is a logical argument, there is a counter-argument.” What could they have argued? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: Are not his grandchildren forbidden for three generations, both male and female? Rebbi Abbahu said that Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish questioned, does one argue a matter concerning bastardy in a matter not concerning bastardy? Rebbi Ḥaggai said that Rebbi Abbahu questioned, does one argue a matter concerning extirpation in a matter not concerning extirpation? He said to them, in fact, I am declaring practice and a verse supports me. “Sons,” not daughters.
What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? “Before the Elders’ eyes.” How do the rabbis uphold “before the Elders’ eyes”? That excludes a court of blind people. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems to be inverted. There, he says that the right hand is obligatory, but here, he says that the right hand is not obligatory. Rebbi Yose said, there it is written “the right hand”, the right hand is obl;igatory, but here, where “the right hand” is not written, the right hand is notobligatory. Rebbi Yose from Sidon stated before Rebbi Jeremiah: “His ear”, “his ear”. Since “his ear” mentioned there refers to the right ear, so “his ear” mentioned here means the right ear. It also says “his foot”, “his foot”. He who infers from “his ear”, “his ear” infers from “his foot”, “his foot”; he who does not infer from “his ear”, “his ear” does not infer from “his foot”, “his foot”. But it was stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: “his foot”, “his foot”. That means, there are two statements about the words of Rebbi Eliezer. He who argues from “his ear”, “his ear” argues from “his foot”, “his foot”; he who does not argue from “his ear”, “his ear” does not argue from “his foot”. And this Mishnah accepts neither “his ear”, “his ear” nor “his foot”, “his foot”.
What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? “Before the Elders’ eyes.” How do the rabbis uphold “before the Elders’ eyes”? That excludes a court of blind people. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the argument of Rebbi Eliezer seems to be inverted. There, he says that the right hand is obligatory, but here, he says that the right hand is not obligatory. Rebbi Yose said, there it is written “the right hand”, the right hand is obl;igatory, but here, where “the right hand” is not written, the right hand is notobligatory. Rebbi Yose from Sidon stated before Rebbi Jeremiah: “His ear”, “his ear”. Since “his ear” mentioned there refers to the right ear, so “his ear” mentioned here means the right ear. It also says “his foot”, “his foot”. He who infers from “his ear”, “his ear” infers from “his foot”, “his foot”; he who does not infer from “his ear”, “his ear” does not infer from “his foot”, “his foot”. But it was stated in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: “his foot”, “his foot”. That means, there are two statements about the words of Rebbi Eliezer. He who argues from “his ear”, “his ear” argues from “his foot”, “his foot”; he who does not argue from “his ear”, “his ear” does not argue from “his foot”. And this Mishnah accepts neither “his ear”, “his ear” nor “his foot”, “his foot”.
Rebbi Aqiba explained: “Elihu Ben Barakhel the Buzite from the family Ram got angry.” Elihu that is Bileam. Ben Barakhel, who came to curse Israel but blessed them. The Buzite, whose prophecy was degraded, “who falls down open-eyed.” From the family Ram, “from Aram did Balaq lead me.” Rebbi Eleazar ben Azariah said to him, if he is he, then the Omnipresent already covered it up. If he is not he, in the future [world] he will argue with you. But Elihu that is Isaac. Ben Barakhel, the son whom God blessed, as it was said: “The Eternal had blessed him”. The Buzite, who degraded all temples of foreign worship at the moment he was bound on the altar. From the family Ram, the son of Abram.
There, we have stated: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa says, if he speaks about somebody who is a legal heir, his statements are valid, but about somebody who is not a legal heir, his statements are invalid.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Ben Beroqa spoke only about a son among sons or a (daughter) son among daughters, not about a daughter and brother or a brother among daughters. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There was a case and Rebbi decided following Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi asked Nathan the Babylonian, why did they say that practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa? Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the reason? He asked Nathan the Babylonian, why did the Sages say that practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa? Are you not the one who stated “shall inherit”? (He said to him, you stated “shall take”; he came to him). He said to him, there is no “shall inherit” but “shall take”. When he came to his father, he said to him: you disadvantaged Nathan the Bablylonian; there is no “shall take” but “shall inherit”. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is what he told him: I made an error in what I taught you; there is no “shall take” but “shall inherit”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is one of the leniencies of the ketubah stipulations. In general, a person can transfer rights only by a document; here even verbally. In general, a person cannot transfer rights to somebody not yet existing; here to the non-existing. Rebbi Jeremiah said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: I am wondering how the rabbis can compare ketubah to inheritance, for inheritance is a biblical law but ketubah is from their words; how can one argue this? Even if you say that ketubah is a biblical law, do they not agree that the stipulations of the ketubah are from their words?
HALAKHAH: “If somebody vowed two neziriot,” etc. If he finished his first period of nezirut and started to lean on the second, when they did not find an opening for the first while they found an opening for the second, the second can be used for the first. Where do we hold? If he said, “I am a nazir twice,” a vow which is partially annulled is totally annulled. If he said, “I am a nazir for these 30 days and those 30 days,” in this case the second cannot be used for the first. But we must hold that he said, “I am a nazir and nazir.” If he said, “these are for nezirut.” But if he said, “these are for my nezirut; those are for the other nezirut,” in this case the second cannot be used for the first. Rebbi Eleazar said, if he finished the first nezirut, as soon as he brought a sacrifice and shaved, the first is credited for the second. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa commanded the colleagues: If you hear anything formulated by Rebbi Eleazar, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees: not unless he brings all his sacrifices, following the rabbis; but following Rebbi Simeon even if he brings only one sacrifice. If he dedicated both together, he has only one in his hand. If he dedicated each of them separately or brought each of them for the other, he did not acquit himself [of his obligation]. This means that as far as holiness goes, they became holy. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: “His sacrifice to the Eternal for his nezirut,” i. e., that his vow of nazir should precede his sacrifice, rather than that his sacrifice precede his vow of nazir. It is different, because he still is in nezirut. One understands the second for the first. The first for the second? Rebbi Jehudah said, this supports Rebbi Eleazar. But did not Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa command the colleagues: If you hear anything formulated by Rebbi Eleazar, you should know that Rebbi Joḥanan disagrees; not unless he brings all his sacrifices. They wanted to say, following the rabbis. But here, we hold with Rebbi Simeon. Rebbi Ḥinena in the name of Rebbi Phineas: Explain it for his nezirut and the nezirut he pledged for his son. In that, the second can be used for the first. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, did we not argue about one who said, “I am a nazir”? He really should be a nazir only once. You were severe with him and obligated him to be a nazir twice. Is it not enough that you were severe with him and obligated him to be a nazir twice, that now you say, he has nothing in his hands?
There, we have stated: “If he called the ninth tenth, and the tenth ninth, and the eleventh tenth, all three are sanctified. The ninth may be eaten when it develops a defect, the tenth is tithe, the eleventh is brought as well-being sacrifice.” “It shall be holy”, this teaches that holiness falls on the ninth and the eleventh. I could think that both of them should be sacrificed, the verse says “cattle”, “cattle” to include the eleventh. “From the cattle”, to exclude the ninth. What reason do you have to include the eleventh and to exclude the ninth? After the verse included, it excluded. You can argue, when are sanctified [animals] subject to substitution? Before or after? One has to say, afterwards. I am including the eleventh which is after sanctification and I am excluding the ninth which is before sanctification.
Rebbi Samuel bar Sosarti asked: Then one who eats a limb from a kosher living animal should be guilty on two counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh.” Does one argue from kosher abour non-kosher animals? But did not Rebbi Eleazar argue from kosher about non-kosher animals? Then one who eats a limb from a non-kosher living animal should be guilty on three counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh”; and because of “you shall not eat from their flesh.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If somebody ate five ants together, in one forgetting, he is guilty for each one separately because of “creature”. If he fragmented and ate them, he is guilty only once, if together they amount to the volume of an olive. If he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive, he is guilty; if he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive and an ant, he is guilty twice. If this is correct, then if he ate of the fragments less than the volume of an olive and an ant completed the volume of an olive, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, if the ate an ant the size of an olive, is he guilty twice? The same rule applies to combinations of a nazir. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive, he is guilty. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive and a grape berry, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, then if he ate a grape berry for the volume ofan olive, is he guilty twice? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All [food] prohibitions combine together to be whipped for the volume of an olive, but for an ant one is guilty twice. Then if he ate prohibited food and an ant completed the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice. Then if he ate an ant the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice.
Rebbi Samuel bar Sosarti asked: Then one who eats a limb from a kosher living animal should be guilty on two counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh.” Does one argue from kosher abour non-kosher animals? But did not Rebbi Eleazar argue from kosher about non-kosher animals? Then one who eats a limb from a non-kosher living animal should be guilty on three counts, because of “you shall not eat any carcass meat;” and because of “you shall not eat of life with the flesh”; and because of “you shall not eat from their flesh.” Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: If somebody ate five ants together, in one forgetting, he is guilty for each one separately because of “creature”. If he fragmented and ate them, he is guilty only once, if together they amount to the volume of an olive. If he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive, he is guilty; if he ate of the fragments in the volume of an olive and an ant, he is guilty twice. If this is correct, then if he ate of the fragments less than the volume of an olive and an ant completed the volume of an olive, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, if the ate an ant the size of an olive, is he guilty twice? The same rule applies to combinations of a nazir. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive, he is guilty. If he ate of the combinations in the volume of an olive and a grape berry, is he guilty twice? If this is correct, then if he ate a grape berry for the volume ofan olive, is he guilty twice? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All [food] prohibitions combine together to be whipped for the volume of an olive, but for an ant one is guilty twice. Then if he ate prohibited food and an ant completed the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice. Then if he ate an ant the volume of an olive, he is guilty twice.
Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: One does not whip for anything imparting taste except imparting taste for the nazir. [Rebbi Ze‘ira said, one does not whip for anything imparting taste until he tasted the forbidden thing itself] except the nazir even if he did not taste the forbidden thing itself. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for food imparting taste what is forbidden and what is permitted is not combined, but for the nazir forbidden and permitted do combine. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: If wine in the volume of an olive fell into a dish and he ate from it, he cannot be prosecuted unless he ate the entire dish. In the opinion of Rebbi Abba bar Mamal, if he ate the volume of an olive from it he is guilty. A baraita supports Rebbi Abba bar Mamal: “What do we understand when it is said (Num. 6:3): ‘Anything in which grapes were soaked he shall not eat, and fresh or dried grape berries he shall not eat’? What did the verse leave out that was not said? But since it was said (Num. 6:4): ‘anything made from the wine-vine, from grape skins to seeds he should not eat;’ (Num. 6:3) ‘from wine and liquor he shall abstain.’ Why does the verse say ‘anything in which grapes were soaked he should not eat’? It means that if he soaked grapes and then soaked his bread in that, if it adds up to the volume of an olive, he is guilty. From here you argue about all prohibitions of the Torah. Since for all that comes from the vine, whose prohibition is neither permanent, nor a prohibition of usufruct, and whose prohibition can be lifted, He made taste like the thing itself; it is logical that for every prohibition of the Torah which is permanent, is a prohibition of usufruct, whose prohibition cannot be lifted, taste is treated like the thing itself. From here, the Sages inferred that everything imparting taste is forbidden.” This is difficult for Rebbi Ze‘ira: you say everywhere “unless he tasted”, and here you say, “even if he did not taste.”
HALAKHAH: “Anybody can supplement a bald document,” etc. From where that a document can be knotted? Rebbi Immi said, it is written: “I took the document,” etc. “And [the sealed]”, that is the knotted [document]. “And the open,” that is the simple, part of the knotted. “And the orders and the rules”; orders and rules differ between these, for one is with two {witnesses], the other with three; one in it, the other on its back. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah, on a simple document, the witnesses sign parallel, on a knotted one the witnesses sign lengthwise. Rebbi Idi said, the witnesses sign between any two knots, but it must be on top. But should one not be afraid that maybe he falsifies? Rav Naḥman wanted to argue that witnesses never sign below unless they first read before them: “I X son of Y accept everything written above.” But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that two times “I accept” makes it invalid. But should one not be afraid that he erased and changed to falsify? Does Rav Huna not consider that he might write another text, erase and change to falsify? Rav Huna is of the opinion that an erasure makes invalid even if the correction is certified.
There, we have stated: “The father bestows on his son beauty, strength, riches, wisdom, and years.” From where beauty? “May Your deeds appear on Your servants, and Your glory on their sons.” Strength, “strong on earth will be his descendants.” Riches, “I was young and became old, but never saw a just man abandoned and his descendants in need of bread.” Wisdom, “you shall teach your sons to argue about them.” Years, “that your and your sons’ days be many.” And just as he inherits five qualities, so he owes him the following five things. He feeds him, he gives him to drink, he clothes him, he puts on his shoes, he leads him. That is what is written: “This should fall on Joab’s head: sufferer from flux and from skin disease, holding the distaff, falling by the sword, and senseless.” Sufferer from flux, weak. From skin disease, abandoned. Holding the distaff, uneducated. Falling by the sword, short lived. Without bread, poor. When Solomon came to kill Joab, he said to him: Your father gave me five sentences; accept them and I can be killed. He accepted them and all of them came to pass on the House of David. Sufferer from flux was Rehabeam: “King Rehabeam with difficulty climbed on his chariot to flee to Jerusalem;” some say, he suffered from flux; some say, he was weak. Suffering from skin disease was Uziahu: “King Uziahu suffered from skin disease until the day of his death.” Holding the distaff was Joash: “They punished Joash.” Rebbi Ismael stated: This teaches that they gave him over to hardened hoodlums who had never known a woman and they raped him the way women are raped. That is what is written: “Israel’s pride will testify against it,” Israel’s pride will be raped in its face. Falling by the sword, this is Josiah, as is written: “The archers shot at king Josia,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, this teaches that they made his body like a sieve. Rebbi Ismael stated: 300 arrows were shot at the Eternal’s anointed. Without bread, that is Jehoiachin: “And his meal, a permanent meal was given to him,.”
MISHNAH: How does one treat the bull of the person causing the damage in the domain of the person sustaining the damage? If it gored, hit, bit, wallowed, or kicked, in the public domain he pays half of the damages. In the domain of the person sustaining the damage, Rebbi Ṭarphon said, full damages; but the Sages say, half damages. Rebbi Tarphon said to them: Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, where one is free, He was restrictive for them in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, when full damages must be paid, and He was restrictive regarding damage by the horn in the public domain, where one has to pay half damages; is it not logical that we should be restrictive in this case in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, that full damages must be paid? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages. He said to them, I do not argue horn from horn, I argue horn from foot! Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, He was restrictive for damage by the horn, when He was restrictive with [damage by] tooth or foot in the domain of the person sustaining the damage; is it not logical that we should be restrictive [in case of damage] by the horn? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages.
MISHNAH: How does one treat the bull of the person causing the damage in the domain of the person sustaining the damage? If it gored, hit, bit, wallowed, or kicked, in the public domain he pays half of the damages. In the domain of the person sustaining the damage, Rebbi Ṭarphon said, full damages; but the Sages say, half damages. Rebbi Tarphon said to them: Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, where one is free, He was restrictive for them in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, when full damages must be paid, and He was restrictive regarding damage by the horn in the public domain, where one has to pay half damages; is it not logical that we should be restrictive in this case in the domain of the person sustaining the damage, that full damages must be paid? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages. He said to them, I do not argue horn from horn, I argue horn from foot! Since in a case where He was lenient with [damage by] tooth or foot in the public domain, He was restrictive for damage by the horn, when He was restrictive with [damage by] tooth or foot in the domain of the person sustaining the damage; is it not logical that we should be restrictive [in case of damage] by the horn? They said to him, it is sufficient for the result of an argument de minore ad majus that it should be like the premiss. Since in the public domain [one pays] half damages, also in the domain of the person sustaining the damage half damages.
Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Can one argue for him an argument which does not apply to him? Let us hear from the following: Bar Ziza’s sharecropper deposited a pound of gold with somebody. Bar Ziza and Bar Ziza’s sharecropper died; the case came before Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose. He said, does not everybody know that all Bar Ziza’s sharecrooper had was Bar Ziza’s property? It should be given to Bar Ziza’s sons. Bar Ziza had adult and underage sons. He said, the adult one should take half and when the underage ones grow up, they should receive half. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose died; the case came before Rebbi Ḥiyya who said, that argument means nothing [since there are people who do not flout their wealth]; it should be given to the sharecropper’s sons. The trustee told him, I already disbursed half of it. He told him, what you gave, you gave by court order and what you will give, you will give by court order. May the sharecropper’s sons say to Bar Ziza’s sons, give us what you took? They can tell them, what was done was done by court order. May the underage ones say to the adult, let us share with you? May they tell them, we found a find? Rebbi Isaac said, the case between the adult and underaged ones is compared to one who gave a gift.
It was stated: “If somebody robbed to feed his children, whether adult or underage, they are not liable to pay. If they inherited from him, both adult and underage are liable to pay. Symmachos says, the adults are liable, the underaged are not liable. If they said, we do not know whether our father accounted for it at the end, they are not liable.” Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected: Think of it, if they inherited real estate, they are not able to say, we do not know whether our father accounted for it at the end. Rav Hamnuna objected: Think of it, if it was a notorious robbery; they are not able to say, we do not know whether our father accounted for it at the end. Rav Sheshet objected: For the underaged the court will argue. What can you say? Rebbi Mana said, explain it if they argue, we do not know, etc., we know that our father was in dispute with you on this account, but we do not know how it was resolved.
It was stated: “If somebody robbed to feed his children, whether adult or underage, they are not liable to pay. If they inherited from him, both adult and underage are liable to pay. Symmachos says, the adults are liable, the underaged are not liable. If they said, we do not know whether our father accounted for it at the end, they are not liable.” Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected: Think of it, if they inherited real estate, they are not able to say, we do not know whether our father accounted for it at the end. Rav Hamnuna objected: Think of it, if it was a notorious robbery; they are not able to say, we do not know whether our father accounted for it at the end. Rav Sheshet objected: For the underaged the court will argue. What can you say? Rebbi Mana said, explain it if they argue, we do not know, etc., we know that our father was in dispute with you on this account, but we do not know how it was resolved.
HALAKHAH: “Any time one produces a proof,” etc. Rebbi Oshaiah said, there, where it is possible to add, they continue to argue. But here it is impossible to add. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both teach that even here it is possible to add.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, anybody who cannot argue for the crawling animal to make it pure a hundred times cannot start arguing for acquittal. How does one argue about a crawling animal? Rebbi Joḥanan said, since a snake which kills is pure, a rat which does not kill logically should be pure. Since a rat which does not kill is impure, a snake which kills logically should be impure. Rebbi Phineas objected: Is there not the scorpion which kills and is pure? It was found that a Tanna said, snake and scorpion both follow the same rules.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, anybody who cannot argue for the crawling animal to make it pure a hundred times cannot start arguing for acquittal. How does one argue about a crawling animal? Rebbi Joḥanan said, since a snake which kills is pure, a rat which does not kill logically should be pure. Since a rat which does not kill is impure, a snake which kills logically should be impure. Rebbi Phineas objected: Is there not the scorpion which kills and is pure? It was found that a Tanna said, snake and scorpion both follow the same rules.
“In civil suits, anybody may argue for credit or debit,” etc. Rebbi Immi asked before Rebbi Joḥanan: Even an adulterer and an adulteress? He told him, your patch came off.
MISHNAH: In civil suits, anybody may argue for credit or debit. In criminal suits, anybody may argue for acquittal but not everybody may argue for conviction. In civil suits, one who argued for credit may argue for debit and one who argued for debit may argue for credit; but in criminal suits one who argued for conviction may argue for acquittal but one who argued for acquittal is barred from arguing for conviction.
MISHNAH: In civil suits, anybody may argue for credit or debit. In criminal suits, anybody may argue for acquittal but not everybody may argue for conviction. In civil suits, one who argued for credit may argue for debit and one who argued for debit may argue for credit; but in criminal suits one who argued for conviction may argue for acquittal but one who argued for acquittal is barred from arguing for conviction.
MISHNAH: In civil suits, anybody may argue for credit or debit. In criminal suits, anybody may argue for acquittal but not everybody may argue for conviction. In civil suits, one who argued for credit may argue for debit and one who argued for debit may argue for credit; but in criminal suits one who argued for conviction may argue for acquittal but one who argued for acquittal is barred from arguing for conviction.
MISHNAH: In civil suits, anybody may argue for credit or debit. In criminal suits, anybody may argue for acquittal but not everybody may argue for conviction. In civil suits, one who argued for credit may argue for debit and one who argued for debit may argue for credit; but in criminal suits one who argued for conviction may argue for acquittal but one who argued for acquittal is barred from arguing for conviction.
MISHNAH: In civil suits, anybody may argue for credit or debit. In criminal suits, anybody may argue for acquittal but not everybody may argue for conviction. In civil suits, one who argued for credit may argue for debit and one who argued for debit may argue for credit; but in criminal suits one who argued for conviction may argue for acquittal but one who argued for acquittal is barred from arguing for conviction.
MISHNAH: In civil suits, anybody may argue for credit or debit. In criminal suits, anybody may argue for acquittal but not everybody may argue for conviction. In civil suits, one who argued for credit may argue for debit and one who argued for debit may argue for credit; but in criminal suits one who argued for conviction may argue for acquittal but one who argued for acquittal is barred from arguing for conviction.
HALAKHAH: “Civil suits are decided on the same day,” etc. It was stated: A witness may not argue either for acquittal or conviction. From where this? A witness shall not argue about anybody on trial for his life. And from where that he himself may not argue either for acquittal or conviction? The verse says, one shall not argue about anybody on trial for his life. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, sometimes a person sees himself set up by perjured witnesses and he speaks much lest he be put to death.
HALAKHAH: “Civil suits are decided on the same day,” etc. It was stated: A witness may not argue either for acquittal or conviction. From where this? A witness shall not argue about anybody on trial for his life. And from where that he himself may not argue either for acquittal or conviction? The verse says, one shall not argue about anybody on trial for his life. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, sometimes a person sees himself set up by perjured witnesses and he speaks much lest he be put to death.
HALAKHAH: “Civil suits are decided on the same day,” etc. It was stated: A witness may not argue either for acquittal or conviction. From where this? A witness shall not argue about anybody on trial for his life. And from where that he himself may not argue either for acquittal or conviction? The verse says, one shall not argue about anybody on trial for his life. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, sometimes a person sees himself set up by perjured witnesses and he speaks much lest he be put to death.
HALAKHAH: “Civil suits are decided on the same day,” etc. It was stated: A witness may not argue either for acquittal or conviction. From where this? A witness shall not argue about anybody on trial for his life. And from where that he himself may not argue either for acquittal or conviction? The verse says, one shall not argue about anybody on trial for his life. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, sometimes a person sees himself set up by perjured witnesses and he speaks much lest he be put to death.
HALAKHAH: “In cases of money matters, purity, and impurity,” etc. Rebbi says, do not argue about a quarrel. It is written against the greatest, that one does not argue after the greatest, only prior to the greatest. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, do not argue about a quarrel. It is written before the greatest, that one does not argue prior to the greatest, only after the greatest. Rav said, do not argue, even after a hundred, the words of Rebbi Phineas.
HALAKHAH: “In cases of money matters, purity, and impurity,” etc. Rebbi says, do not argue about a quarrel. It is written against the greatest, that one does not argue after the greatest, only prior to the greatest. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, do not argue about a quarrel. It is written before the greatest, that one does not argue prior to the greatest, only after the greatest. Rav said, do not argue, even after a hundred, the words of Rebbi Phineas.
HALAKHAH: “In cases of money matters, purity, and impurity,” etc. Rebbi says, do not argue about a quarrel. It is written against the greatest, that one does not argue after the greatest, only prior to the greatest. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, do not argue about a quarrel. It is written before the greatest, that one does not argue prior to the greatest, only after the greatest. Rav said, do not argue, even after a hundred, the words of Rebbi Phineas.