attribution
14 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Abun [said it] in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Jehudah stays with his opinion, the rabbis stay with their opinion, as we have stated: “Olives which somebody crushed with impure hands are not prepared, to let them soak up salt they are prepared, to know whether they contain sap they are not prepared; Rebbi Jehudah says they are prepared.” The rabbis say, he checks their sap. Rebbi Jehudah says, he checks their body. Here, the rabbis say he polishes with their sap, Rebbi Jehudah says, he polishes with what he has.
There, we have stated: “What means one species with itself? Wheat does not go together with anything but spelt. Barley goes together with everything except wheat.” Rebbi Yose said it without attribution, Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “There if it bites, here if it was mixed. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: All those which he mixed as grains, flour, or dough, go together.” If he mixed the ends of doughs together? Rebbi Yose said, is biting not like mixing together? You say they do not go together, so here they do not go together.
HALAKHAH: Mishnah: “A tailor should not leave with his needle close to sundown lest he forget and leave,” etc. It was stated: “A tailor should not leave with a needle in his garment, nor a scribe with the pen behind his ear, nor a dyer with a sample behind his ear, nor a money-changer with a denar behind his ear. If one of these left they are not liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr. Rebbi Jehudah says, a craftsman in the ways of his craft is liable, therefore everybody else may leave with one of these.”The argument of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted, as we have stated there: “If she left she is liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr,” and here he says so? Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There women usually do it, but here only children leave with this. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted, as we have stated there: “But the Sages declare not liable with a plate of make-up or a flask of perfume.” Therefore with a needle with ear she is liable. Is that a craftsman who is liable in the way of his craft? Rebbi Yose ben Abun said, explain it for a woman hairdresser.
HALAKHAH: It was stated: “A tailor should not leave with a needle in his garment, nor a scribe with the pen behind his ear, nor a dyer with a sample behind his ear, nor a money-changer with a denar behind his ear. If any of these left they are not liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, a craftsman in the ways of his craft is liable, therefore everybody else may leave with one of these.” The argument of Rebbi Meïr seems inverted, as we have stated there: “If she left she is liable, the words of Rebbi Meïr,” and here he says so? Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There women usually do it, but here only children leave with this. The argument of the rabbis seems inverted, as we have stated there: “But the Sages declare not liable with a plate of make-up or a flask of perfume.” Therefore with a needle without ear one is liable. Is that a craftsman who is liable in the way of his craft? Rebbi Abun said, explain it for a woman hairdresser.
HALAKHAH: 6. It is difficult for Rabban Gamliel. If one harvested the volume of a dried fig in the morning and the volume of a dried fig in the evening in one oblivion, would he not be liable? Since oblivions do not divide, so they should not combine! Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The reason of Rabban Gamliel there is that there is no awareness for half a work, and similarly, there is no intent for half a work. If one ate half the volume of an olive intentionally and half the volume of an olive in error, would this combine?
HALAKHAH: “An alley which is higher than twenty,” etc. Rebbi Yose said it without attribution, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rav: The rabbis inferred it from the door of the Sanctuary, but Rebbi Jehudah inferred it from the door of the Hall. An argument from the door of the Hall is sufficient only up to forty cubits, as we have stated there: “The door of the Hall was forty cubits high and twenty cubits wide.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, even forty or fifty cubits; Bar Qappara stated, even a hundred cubits. Rebbi Abin said, Rebbi Jehudah follows his opinion and the rabbis follow their opinion, as we have stated there, “and similarly one carries under panelled bridges on the Sabbath, the words of Rebbi Jehudah, but the Sages forbid it.” As you are saying there, one considers the cross-beam as if it came down and closed, here also one considers the roof as if it came down and closed. This is the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah in the case of a sukkah, this is his opinion in the case of an alley. Also the opinion of the rabbis in the case of a sukkah is their opinion in the case of an alley. But they do not compare. There are items qualified for a sukkah which are disqualified for an alley and those qualified for an alley but disqualified for a sukkah. Double pointed stakes are qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley, and it was stated thus: If he brought four double pointed stakes and thatched over them it is qualified as a sukkah but disqualified for an alley. That is, if they are higher by more than three [hand-breadths] than the walls of the alley. But if they are not higher by more than three [hand-breadths] than the walls of the alley it is qualified. If they are not, but if they are four [hand-breadths] wide they are qualified even if arbitrarily high. Walls may be qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley, and it was stated thus: “Two regular and the third even one hand-breadth is qualified.” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Two of four hand-breadths each and the third even one hand-breadth is qualified. But for an alley only if it is closed in its four directions. Wider than ten cubits is qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley. “If he drew a vine or squash.” That means, up to an area of two bet se’ah. But more than an area of two bet se’ah it is a partition made for agriculture where one may transport only four cubits. If its sunshine is more than its shadow it is disqualified as sukkah but qualified for an alley. A roofed sukkah is disqualified, a roofed alley is qualified. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rav Oshaia: Not only roofed, but if he put there a cross beam four hand-breadths wide, it makes the alley permitted.
HALAKHAH: “An alley which is higher than twenty,” etc. Rebbi Yose said it without attribution, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rav: The rabbis inferred it from the door of the Sanctuary, but Rebbi Jehudah inferred it from the door of the Hall. An argument from the door of the Hall is sufficient only up to forty cubits, as we have stated there: “The door of the Hall was forty cubits high and twenty cubits wide.” Rebbi Ḥiyya stated, even forty or fifty cubits; Bar Qappara stated, even a hundred cubits. Rebbi Abin said, Rebbi Jehudah follows his opinion and the rabbis follow their opinion, as we have stated there, “and similarly one carries under panelled bridges on the Sabbath, the words of Rebbi Jehudah, but the Sages forbid it.” As you are saying there, one considers the roof as if it came down and closed, here also one considers the cross-beam as if it came down and closed. This is the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah in the case of a sukkah, this is his opinion in the case of an alley. Also the opinion of the rabbis in the case of a sukkah is their opinion in the case of an alley. But they are not comparable. There are items qualified for a sukkah which are disqualified for an alley and those qualified for an alley but disqualified for a sukkah. Double pointed poles are qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley, and it was stated thus: If he brought four double pointed stakes and thatched over them it is qualified as a sukkah but disqualified for an alley. That is, if they are higher by more than three {hand-breadths} than the walls of the alley. But if they are not higher by more than three {hand-breadths} than the walls of the alley it is qualified. If they are not, but if they are four [hand-breadths] wide they are qualified even if arbitrarily high. Walls may be qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley, and it was stated thus: “Two regular and the third even one hand-breadth is qualified.” Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Two of four hand-breadths each and the third even one hand-breadth is qualified. But for an alley only if it is closed in its four directions. Wider than ten cubits is qualified for a sukkah but disqualified for an alley. “If he drew a vine, or squash, or ivy, and used it as roofing it is disqualified.” That means, up to an area of two bet se’ah. But more than an area of two bet se’ah it is a partition made for agriculture where one may transport only four cubits. If its sunshine is more than its shade it is disqualified as sukkah but qualified for an alley. A roofed sukkah is disqualified, a roofed alley is qualified. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: Not only roofed, but if he put there a cross beam four hand-breadths wide, it makes the alley permitted.
It was stated: “Rebbi Yose says, one does not cover the Koy’s blood because it is a doubtful case.” Since circumcision whose certainty pushes aside the Sabbath, in doubt does not push aside the holiday, then for covering the blood which in case of certainty does not push aside the Sabbath it only is logical that in a case of doubt it not push aside the holiday. But is it permitted to slaughter on a Sabbath? Rebbi Yose said it without attribution, Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he slaughtered for a sick person. They told him, does not the shofar in the countryside disprove it? For in case of certainty it does not push aside the Sabbath, but in a case of doubt it pushes aside the holiday. What kind of doubt is there? If it is a weekday, he may blow, if it is a holiday, he may blow. Rebbi Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Aḥa: In case of a hermaphrodite who blew. And it was stated so: “The hermaphrodite frees his own kind [but does not free persons not of his own kind.] The sexless frees neither his kind nor not his kind.” Rebbi Yose asked, if in the case of a hermaphrodite who blew, is that where we stated, it has no counter argument? Rebbi (Abbaye) [Abbin] said, that is one of four cases when the Great Rebbi Ḥiyya said, there is no counter-argument. But Rebbi Eleazar the son of Rebbi Eleazar the caper grower found a counter-argument. Since circumcision which in a case of doubt does not push aside the holiday, in a case of certainty pushes aside holiday night, you can say about covering the blood where in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, since in case of certainly it pushes aside holiday night, in a case of doubt it should push aside the holiday. This establishes that what was problematic to the earlier rabbis and was difficult for them, so it is problematic to the later rabbis and is a difficulty for them. In the opinion of Rebbi Aḥa, the hermaphrodite frees his own kind a priori, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose, a posteriori.
HALAKHAH: “If a woman’s husband and son went overseas,” etc. How do you consider this situation, comparing to witnesses of death or witnesses of divorce? If you compare it to witnesses of death, it disagrees with the (rabbis there). If you compare it to witnesses of divorce, it disagrees (both with the rabbis here and those there). Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses said, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses said, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave. There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he comes he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certain testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, and two say his father died while not in possession, that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was married, divorced, and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave.
Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Isaac the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya came to it in the name of Rebbi Jonah: It is Rebbi Meїr’s who said that one does not perform ḥalîṣah or levirate with an underage girl because she might turn out to be a she-ram.
“Rebbi Eleazar says, one teaches the underage girl that she should repudiate him.” After the fact. Therefore, not from the start! Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Isaac the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya the Scribe in the name of Rebbi Yoḥanan: This is Rebbi Meїr’s, since Rebbi Meїr said that one does not perform levirate or ḥalîṣah with an underage girl, since she might be found to be a she-ram.
HALAKHAH: A woman pregnant by another man or nursing another man’s [child],” etc. A man should not marry a woman pregnant by another man or nursing another man’s [child], but if he did marry her, the verse says about him: “Do not remove the eternal boundaries and do not enter the orphans’ field.” He who marries a woman pregnant by another man or nursing another man’s [child] has to divorce her and should never retake her, the words of Rebbi Meĩr, but the Sages say, he may separate from her and take her back later. Does Rebbi Meїr always fine people? Let us hear from the following: “The underage woman who performed ḥalîṣah should repeat ḥalîṣah once she becomes of age but if she did not repeat it, the ḥalîṣah is valid.” Rebbi Mana said it without attribution, Rebbi Isaac the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya the scribe in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is Rebbi Meїr who said that one does not perform ḥalîṣah or levirate with an underage girl because she might turn out to be a she-ram.
Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.
Rebbi Mana said it without attribution; Rebbi Abin in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: We did state two principles which do not compare. “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds”; one has to bring four sacrifices. “There are two kinds of appearances of skin disease which are four kinds”; one has to bring two sacrifices. Rebbi Eleazar in the name of Rebbi Abin explained it otherwise: “There are two kinds of oaths which are four kinds” was said by Rebbi Aqiba; “there are two kinds of appearances of skin disease which are four kinds” by Rebbi Ismael. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: why do I need to follow Rebbi Ismael? Does it not come even following Rebbi Aqiba? Knowing and forgetting about impurity of the Sanctuary is the same as knowing and forgetting about impurity of sancta. He told him, does not Rebbi Ismael have forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary, and we want to follow Rebbi Aqiba? Sometimes there is forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary but he is liable for only one sacrifice. How is this? If one became impure, realized it, then forgot about impurity, entered the Sanctuary, and left; then he became aware. Here is forgetting impurity and forgetting the Sanctuary but he is liable for only one sacrifice. Sometimes there are many forgettings of impurity and many forgettings of the Sanctuary but he is liable for only one [sacrifice]. How [is this]? If one became impure and realized it, then forgot and while being oblivious of impurity entered the Sanctuary and left; then he became aware. He said, there is no sacrifice due for this impurity. Again he became impure and realized it, then forgot and while being oblivious of impurity entered the Sanctuary and left even several times; in the end he became aware. Here are many forgettings of impurity and forgettings of the Sanctuary but he is liable for only one [sacrifice].