11141 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:8

There, we have stated: “One writes a bill of divorce for a man even if his wife is not with him, and a receipt for a woman even if her husband is not with her, and the husband pays the fee.” Rebbi Abba said, he has to know both of them. Rebbi La said, he has to know the husband for the bill of divorce and the wife for her receipt. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi [ ]: Think of it, if he brought another woman and divorced by means of her. He said to him, let the witnesses come and testify. But did not Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say that they considered witnesses who signed a document as if their testimony had been cross-examined in court? There, if they said, we did not sign at all. But here if they say, we signed this but not that. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Abba: “In earlier times, his name and her name and the names of his and her towns could change.” If he knows them, why would he change their names? There are people who know others by sight but do not know their names. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Ilai: “Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that one should write Mr. X and all his names, Mrs. Y and all her names, because of the public good.” The Mishnah about one who is forced to divorce, Rebbi Ila speaks about one who divorces on his initiative; some want to say if he divorces at another place.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:10

MISHNAH: A widow can be paid from the orphans’ property only by an oath. When they avoided letting her swear, Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that she should make a vow on the instruction of the orphans for anything they would decide on and collect her ketubah, and that witnesses sign the bill of divorce because of the public good. Hillel instituted prozbol for the public good.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:12

Rav Huna said, why did they require a date on the bill of divorce? Because of an actual case. It so happened that a man was married to his sister’s daughter who committed adultery when she was still married. He predated the bill of divorce and said, it is better she should be judged as single rather than as a married woman.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:18

If [the master] blinded [the slave’s] two eyes simultaneously, or broke two of his teeth simultaneously, the slave thereby obtains his freedom. One after the other, he obtains his freedom from the first [injury] and [the master] has to pay for the second. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Following the opinion that [the master] does not have to write a bill of manumission for him. But following the opinion that [the master] has to write a bill of manumission for him, can you say that he has to pay him? Not only does this apply to one who gains his freedom for a tooth or an eye, from where also that he may gain his freedom by a cap, or הרנירק טיאונוס, or the king’s freedom? The verse says, “he shall send him to freedom”, in any way. What is the status of his children? The children of him who leaves for a tooth or an eye are slaves, the children of him who leaves by the loss of hope are free. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is unreasonable; it is the other way around. The children of one who leaves for a tooth or an eye are free because the Torah freed him. The children of one who leaves by the loss of hope are slaves because the Torah did not free him.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:18

If [the master] blinded [the slave’s] two eyes simultaneously, or broke two of his teeth simultaneously, the slave thereby obtains his freedom. One after the other, he obtains his freedom from the first [injury] and [the master] has to pay for the second. Rebbi Ila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Following the opinion that [the master] does not have to write a bill of manumission for him. But following the opinion that [the master] has to write a bill of manumission for him, can you say that he has to pay him? Not only does this apply to one who gains his freedom for a tooth or an eye, from where also that he may gain his freedom by a cap, or הרנירק טיאונוס, or the king’s freedom? The verse says, “he shall send him to freedom”, in any way. What is the status of his children? The children of him who leaves for a tooth or an eye are slaves, the children of him who leaves by the loss of hope are free. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, that is unreasonable; it is the other way around. The children of one who leaves for a tooth or an eye are free because the Torah freed him. The children of one who leaves by the loss of hope are slaves because the Torah did not free him.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:23

There, we have stated: “One does not marry women on a holiday.” Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because of refraining from being fruitful and increase. They asked before Rebbi Yose: May a slave marry a woman on a holiday? He told them, let us hear from the following: “Shall he be alone? But the world was created only for procreation and increase!” And Rebbi Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Anybody commanded to be fruitful and increase is forbidden to marry on a holiday.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:24

MISHNAH: If somebody sells his slave to Gentiles or outside the Land, the slave gains his freedom. One does not ransom kidnap victims for more than the going rate because of the public good. One does not smuggle kidnap victims out because of the public good; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, because of the welfare of the kidnap victims. One does not buy Torah scrolls, phylacteries, and mezuzot from Gentiles for more than their worth because of the public good.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:24

MISHNAH: If somebody sells his slave to Gentiles or outside the Land, the slave gains his freedom. One does not ransom kidnap victims for more than the going rate because of the public good. One does not smuggle kidnap victims out because of the public good; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, because of the welfare of the kidnap victims. One does not buy Torah scrolls, phylacteries, and mezuzot from Gentiles for more than their worth because of the public good.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:24

MISHNAH: If somebody sells his slave to Gentiles or outside the Land, the slave gains his freedom. One does not ransom kidnap victims for more than the going rate because of the public good. One does not smuggle kidnap victims out because of the public good; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, because of the welfare of the kidnap victims. One does not buy Torah scrolls, phylacteries, and mezuzot from Gentiles for more than their worth because of the public good.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:24

MISHNAH: If somebody sells his slave to Gentiles or outside the Land, the slave gains his freedom. One does not ransom kidnap victims for more than the going rate because of the public good. One does not smuggle kidnap victims out because of the public good; Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, because of the welfare of the kidnap victims. One does not buy Torah scrolls, phylacteries, and mezuzot from Gentiles for more than their worth because of the public good.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:27

“One does not ransom kidnap victims for more than the going rate because of the public good. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, because of the welfare of the kidnap victims.” That they should not be put in chains. “One does not smuggle kidnap victims out because of the public good.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:27

“One does not ransom kidnap victims for more than the going rate because of the public good. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, because of the welfare of the kidnap victims.” That they should not be put in chains. “One does not smuggle kidnap victims out because of the public good.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:27

“One does not ransom kidnap victims for more than the going rate because of the public good. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, because of the welfare of the kidnap victims.” That they should not be put in chains. “One does not smuggle kidnap victims out because of the public good.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:29

MISHNAH: If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation, he cannot take her back; because of a vow, he cannot take her back. Rebbi Jehudah says, for any vow known in public, he cannot take her back; not known in public, he can take her back. Rebbi Meїr says, for any vow which needs investigation by a Sage, he cannot take her back; if it does not need investigation by a Sage, he can take her back. Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other. Rebbi Yose ben Jehudah said, it happened in Sidon that one said to his wife, a qonam if I do not divorce you, and he divorced her, and the Sages permitted him to take her back, for the public good.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:29

MISHNAH: If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation, he cannot take her back; because of a vow, he cannot take her back. Rebbi Jehudah says, for any vow known in public, he cannot take her back; not known in public, he can take her back. Rebbi Meїr says, for any vow which needs investigation by a Sage, he cannot take her back; if it does not need investigation by a Sage, he can take her back. Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other. Rebbi Yose ben Jehudah said, it happened in Sidon that one said to his wife, a qonam if I do not divorce you, and he divorced her, and the Sages permitted him to take her back, for the public good.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:29

MISHNAH: If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation, he cannot take her back; because of a vow, he cannot take her back. Rebbi Jehudah says, for any vow known in public, he cannot take her back; not known in public, he can take her back. Rebbi Meїr says, for any vow which needs investigation by a Sage, he cannot take her back; if it does not need investigation by a Sage, he can take her back. Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other. Rebbi Yose ben Jehudah said, it happened in Sidon that one said to his wife, a qonam if I do not divorce you, and he divorced her, and the Sages permitted him to take her back, for the public good.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:30

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation,” etc. And it was stated: “Why did the Sages say that he who divorces his wife because of bad reputation cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of bad reputation, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the accusations were baseless and he said, if I had known that the accusations were baseless, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her children bastards. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:30

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation,” etc. And it was stated: “Why did the Sages say that he who divorces his wife because of bad reputation cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of bad reputation, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the accusations were baseless and he said, if I had known that the accusations were baseless, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her children bastards. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:30

HALAKHAH: “If somebody divorces his wife because of bad reputation,” etc. And it was stated: “Why did the Sages say that he who divorces his wife because of bad reputation cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of bad reputation, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the accusations were baseless and he said, if I had known that the accusations were baseless, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her children bastards. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:31

It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife because of a vow cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of a vow, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the vow was void and he said, if I had known that the vow was void, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which was not public knowledge! “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other.” The law should be that he can take her back even if it was a vow which needs investigation by a Sage, for the Elder uproots the vow. Why did they forbid a vow which needs investigation by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:31

It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife because of a vow cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of a vow, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the vow was void and he said, if I had known that the vow was void, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which was not public knowledge! “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other.” The law should be that he can take her back even if it was a vow which needs investigation by a Sage, for the Elder uproots the vow. Why did they forbid a vow which needs investigation by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:31

It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife because of a vow cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of a vow, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the vow was void and he said, if I had known that the vow was void, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which was not public knowledge! “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other.” The law should be that he can take her back even if it was a vow which needs investigation by a Sage, for the Elder uproots the vow. Why did they forbid a vow which needs investigation by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:31

It was stated: “Why did they say that he who divorces his wife because of a vow cannot take her back? For if he divorced his wife because of a vow, when she went, married another, and bore him children, after some time it turned out that the vow was void and he said, if I had known that the vow was void, even if somebody had offered me a hundred minas for my wife I would not have divorced her, then the bill of divorce would be invalidated and her child a bastard. But since he knows that if he divorces her, she will be forbidden to return to him, from the start he gives her a perfect bill of divorce.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage! Rebbi Ze‘ira said, you can see that he was looking for a pretext to divorce her since it must have been a vow which was not public knowledge! “Rebbi Eleazar said, they forbade one because of the other.” The law should be that he can take her back even if it was a vow which needs investigation by a Sage, for the Elder uproots the vow. Why did they forbid a vow which needs investigation by a Sage? Because of a vow which does not need investigation by a Sage.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:32

MISHNAH: If somebody divorces his wife because she is a she-ram, Rebbi Jehudah says, he cannot take her back, but the Sages say, he may take her back. If she was married to another man, had children by him, and requests her ketubah, Rebbi Jehudah says, he tells her: Your silence would be better than your talking.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:35

MISHNAH: If somebody sells himself and his children to Gentiles, one does not buy him back, but one buys his children back after their father’s death. If somebody sold his field to a Gentile and then a Jew bought it back from him, the buyer brings first fruits because of the public good.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:37

The Mishnah is Rebbi Meїr’s, since Rebbi Meїr says that a Gentile may not acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to remove it from tithes; Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Simeon say, a Gentile may acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to free it from tithes. Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: The reason of Rebbi Meïr (Lev. 25:46): “You shall transmit them by inheritance to your sons after you, to inherit by the rules of real estate.” This brackets slaves with real estate. Just as you may buy slaves from them but they cannot buy from you, so real estate you may buy from them but they cannot buy from you. Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yasa, the following supports Rebbi Meїr (Lev. 25:23): “The land shall not be sold permanently,” absolutely. He said to him, that in itself supports Rebbi Simeon. “It shall not be sold”, because if it was sold, it would be sold absolutely. Rebbi Huna from Sepphoris said, Rebbi Ḥanina instituted in Sepphoris following Rebbi Simeon.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 4:38

Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: Even though Rebbi Meїr said that a Gentile may not acquire real estate in the Land of Israel to remove it from tithes, he agrees that he has property rights. What are property rights? Rebbi Abba said, the usufruct; as we have stated: “the buyer brings First Fruits because of the public good,” otherwise he could have brought First Fruits by the word of the Torah.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:6

“The best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay,” i. e., the party responsible for the damage, the words of Rebbi Ismael. Rebbi Aqiba says, “the best of his field and the best of his vineyard”, of the person suffering the damage. It is difficult for Rebbi Aqiba, he suffered damage, and you say so? But the court see what the field was worth before it was damaged and estimates accordingly. As it was stated, it is possible if the grazing was on best quality land, one estimates from best quality, from lowest quality one estimates from lowest quality. How is this? The best of the lowest quality is quite good. If you say so you provide a windfall for the person suffering the damage. One looks at the field as if it was full of first quality [produce] and estimates for him from the best quality land; least quality one estimates from least quality land. It turns out that he pays with best quality for best quality and from least quality for least quality. From where has Rebbi Aqiba that “for tort victims one estimates with best quality land”? It is not from the Torah, it is a decree. “Why did they say, ‘for tort victims one estimates with best quality land’? Because of the robbers. That a man should say, why should I have robbed [land] in my hand, or land subject to a suit for damages on my hand? Tomorrow, the court will see my good field, take it from me, and support it by the verse, ‘the best of his field and the best of his vineyard he shall pay.’ ” So far his real estate. His pledge was inferred from his real estate. Since his real estate [is taken] from the best quality, also his pledge [is taken] from the best.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:7

” ‘For creditors, average quality,’ because of tricksters. That a man should not see a desirable field in his neighbor’s hand, lend him money, and contrives to take it from him. Then one should estimate only from the least quality! Rebbi Jehudah said, that is correct; but not to lock the door before people needing to borrow. For tomorrow he may need to borrow and does not find [a lender.]”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:13

HALAKHAH: “One cannot collect for usufruct,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: One pays from an orphan’s property only a document on which interest is due, and some say, also a woman’s ketubah. Rebbi Yannai said, because of her sustenance. Rebbi Mattaniah said, who is worried about sustenance? Rebbi Simeon! Since Rebbi Simeon said, it depends on the collection. What about it? For attraction, that everybody should be eager to marry her. Some say, also for robbery and torts. Rebbi Yose said, we stated both of these. Robbery from the following: “If it was mortgageable, he has to pay.” For torts from the following: “One pays from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable.” So is the Mishnah: One pays for torts from an orphan’s property only from the least valuable. But was it not stated: If the son took his father’s place, one estimates torts from the most valuable land, creditors from average quality, and a woman’s ketubah from the least valuable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, there about an adult orphan, here about an underage orphan.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:15

HALAKHAH: “One does not collect from encumbered property,” etc. Rebbi Ḥanina said, because they have no fixed amount.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:23

There, we have stated: “You have in your hand a mina of my father’s; you have to get from me only 50 denars. He does not have to swear since he is like a person who returns a find.” Rebbi Eleazar said, in this case they instituted a regulation as they instituted for a find, as we have stated: “The finder of a lost object shall not swear because of the public good.” Rebbi Abba said, this Mishnah [applies] when he said to him, you found my two oxen. But if he said, I found your two oxen and returned both of them, but the other said, you returned only one, in that case they did not institute the rule. Rebbi Pedat in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: In this case they did institute. But in the first case, it is a word of the Torah, as it was stated: I could think that if he said to him, you found my two oxen, but the other said, I found only one, should he be obligated [to swear]? The verse says, “or if he found a find and disowned it;” that excludes this one who did not disown. But if he said to him, I was standing on my roof when I saw you dragging away two tied oxen, two tied oxen you dragged away from me, and he says, only one I dragged away; in that case they made no regulation. Similarly: “I was standing with my father when he was dying and he claimed from you a mina and you agreed to it,” and the other says, “I agreed only for 50;” in that case they made no regulation.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:29

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yudan did not go to the assembly. He was standing with Rebbi Mana and asked him, what new was said? He said: So says Rebbi Yose, a person causing impurity does not have the status of a perpetrator, fromthe following: “Heave which became impure.” He answered: Explain it, if it became impure by itself; then you cannot infer anything, because of a Mishnah: “If somebody judged, absolved the guilty and obligated the innocent, declared the pure impure and the impure pure.” For Rav Jeremiah said in the name of Rav: If he touched it with his hand. Samuel said: If he touched it with his hand. Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi says, it should have been logical that even intentionally he should have been free. Why did they say that he is obligated? That he should tell. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, it should have been logical that even unintentionally he should have been obligated. Why did they say that he is free? Because of a fine. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan comes from this: “If someone causes anything to become impure, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “A person who puts a yoke on another’s cow is free in human law but guilty in Heaven’s law.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:29

HALAKHAH: Rebbi Yudan did not go to the assembly. He was standing with Rebbi Mana and asked him, what new was said? He said: So says Rebbi Yose, a person causing impurity does not have the status of a perpetrator, fromthe following: “Heave which became impure.” He answered: Explain it, if it became impure by itself; then you cannot infer anything, because of a Mishnah: “If somebody judged, absolved the guilty and obligated the innocent, declared the pure impure and the impure pure.” For Rav Jeremiah said in the name of Rav: If he touched it with his hand. Samuel said: If he touched it with his hand. Rebbi Jehudah ben Rebbi says, it should have been logical that even intentionally he should have been free. Why did they say that he is obligated? That he should tell. And Rebbi Joḥanan said, it should have been logical that even unintentionally he should have been obligated. Why did they say that he is free? Because of a fine. The strength of Rebbi Joḥanan comes from this: “If someone causes anything to become impure, or dema‘, or libation wine, if it was unintentional he is free, intentional he is obligated,” and Rebbi Joḥanan said, he pays a fine. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “A person who puts a yoke on another’s cow is free in human law but guilty in Heaven’s law.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:32

MISHNAH: Rebbi Joḥanan ben Gudguedah testified about a deaf-mute girl who was married off by her father, that she must be divorced by a bill of divorce, and about an underage girl who was married to a Cohen, that she may eat heave and her husband inherits from her if she dies, and about a stolen log which was used to build a house, that [the owner] has to take the value, and about a purification sacrifice of a stolen animal which was not known in public, that it atones because of the order of the altar.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:36

“If somebody stole a log and used it in building. The House of Shammai say, he has to tear down the entire building and return it. But the House of Hillel say, for the benefit of repenting sinners, that he has to pay its full value.” Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? If he stole it planed, but if he stole and planed it himself, he owes him money. If he stole and planed it on the spot, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody appropriates another person’s ruin and rebuilds it without prermission, one appraises it and his hand is weak. If he wants to take his logs and stones, one does not listen to him.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It was asked in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: If somebody stores his bundle in somebody else’s ruin and wants to take it from there, does one not listen to him? He had not heard that Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because of civilisation. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. We would have thought that they disagree only in the Land, but not outside the Land. Since Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, because of civilisation, this implies that there is no difference between the Land and outside the Land. If he wants to take [the value of] his logs and stones, what is the rule? One tells him, wait until he dwells in it. Samuel said, one pays him immediately.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:36

“If somebody stole a log and used it in building. The House of Shammai say, he has to tear down the entire building and return it. But the House of Hillel say, for the benefit of repenting sinners, that he has to pay its full value.” Rebbi Eleazar said, where do they disagree? If he stole it planed, but if he stole and planed it himself, he owes him money. If he stole and planed it on the spot, what is the rule? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody appropriates another person’s ruin and rebuilds it without prermission, one appraises it and his hand is weak. If he wants to take his logs and stones, one does not listen to him.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: It was asked in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: If somebody stores his bundle in somebody else’s ruin and wants to take it from there, does one not listen to him? He had not heard that Rebbi Jacob bar Idi said in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because of civilisation. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. We would have thought that they disagree only in the Land, but not outside the Land. Since Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, because of civilisation, this implies that there is no difference between the Land and outside the Land. If he wants to take [the value of] his logs and stones, what is the rule? One tells him, wait until he dwells in it. Samuel said, one pays him immediately.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:39

HALAKHAH: “There was no law of siqariqon in Judea” etc. In earlier times they decided on a persecution in Judea because they had a tradition from their forefathers that Jehudah had killed Esaw, as it is written: “Your hand is on your enemies’ neck.” They went and enslaved them, took their fields and sold them to third parties. The original owners could come and repossess; therefore the land was left absolutely in the hand of the siqariqon since they refrained from buying. “They decreed that the law of siqariqon should not apply in Jehudah. When was this said? About war killings before the war. But about anybody killed in and after the war, the notion of siqariqon does not apply.” But are those killed before the war not like those killed after the war? Explain it that a siqariqon came and robbed and suppressed; there was no time left to write the sales contract before murder engulfed the entire world, that practice should not be partial.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:46

HALAKHAH: “Ben Bathyra says, in pantomimes.” He hires and is hired. The artless, small children. Rebbi Joḥanan said, because of their livelihood. Rebbi Mana said, even though Rebbi Yose raises difficulties in collecting forfeits, he agrees that those who give their children to artisans that they collect forfeits because of the livelihood of people.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:46

HALAKHAH: “Ben Bathyra says, in pantomimes.” He hires and is hired. The artless, small children. Rebbi Joḥanan said, because of their livelihood. Rebbi Mana said, even though Rebbi Yose raises difficulties in collecting forfeits, he agrees that those who give their children to artisans that they collect forfeits because of the livelihood of people.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:48

HALAKHAH: “The following was said for communal peace,” etc. The saying of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai implies that it is of the words of the Torah, for Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated: “Moses wrote this Torah and gave it to the Cohanim, the Levites (etc.)” and afterwards “to all the Elders of Israel.” The saying of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi implies that it is of their words, as Rebbi Joshua said, never did I recite the benediction before a Cohen and I did not allow an Israel to do it before him. The saying of Rebbi Ḥanina implies that it is of their words, as Rebbi Ḥanina said, in a city of only Cohanim, an Israel reads first because of communal peace.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:52

Following the opinion of the rabbis there it is acceptable since there, they say in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: One to whom one gives a nut and he throws it away, a pebble and he keeps it, what is found in his hand is as if found on a garbage heap; a nut and he keeps it, a pebble and he throws it away, what is robbed from him is robbed because of communal peace; a nut or a pebble he takes, hides them, and produces them later, what is robbed from him is total robbery. He can acquire for himself but not for others. Rav Huna said, just as he can acquire for himself so he can acquire for others. Everybody agrees that his gift is not a gift since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “If a man give.” The gift of a man is a gift, but the gift of a minor is no gift, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, robbing from him is not clear unless he grew two pubic hairs. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that is, to recover from him by a law suit, but to have to bring a sacrifice for [a false] oath only if he grew two pubic hairs. But following the rabbis here, Rebbi Yose asked that even for himself he should not be able to acquire since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “A man to his neighbor”, until he be like his neighbor. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac explained it by the method of the artless. As we have stated there: “For underage children, their buying is buying and their selling selling, for movables.” But did we not state there: “He cannot make them acquire through his minor son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is like his hand.” The rabbis of Caesarea say, here a minor with knowledge, there a minor without knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:52

Following the opinion of the rabbis there it is acceptable since there, they say in the name of Rav Naḥman bar Jacob: One to whom one gives a nut and he throws it away, a pebble and he keeps it, what is found in his hand is as if found on a garbage heap; a nut and he keeps it, a pebble and he throws it away, what is robbed from him is robbed because of communal peace; a nut or a pebble he takes, hides them, and produces them later, what is robbed from him is total robbery. He can acquire for himself but not for others. Rav Huna said, just as he can acquire for himself so he can acquire for others. Everybody agrees that his gift is not a gift since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “If a man give.” The gift of a man is a gift, but the gift of a minor is no gift, the words of the Sages. Rebbi Jehudah bar Pazi in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, robbing from him is not clear unless he grew two pubic hairs. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, that is, to recover from him by a law suit, but to have to bring a sacrifice for [a false] oath only if he grew two pubic hairs. But following the rabbis here, Rebbi Yose asked that even for himself he should not be able to acquire since it is written (Ex. 22:6): “A man to his neighbor”, until he be like his neighbor. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac explained it by the method of the artless. As we have stated there: “For underage children, their buying is buying and their selling selling, for movables.” But did we not state there: “He cannot make them acquire through his minor son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is like his hand.” The rabbis of Caesarea say, here a minor with knowledge, there a minor without knowledge.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:56

A weaver asked Rebbi Immi, what about a Gentile wedding feast? He wanted to permit it to them from this: “Because of peaceful coexistence.” Rebbi Abba told them, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state that the holiday of a Gentile wedding feast is forbidden? Rebbi Immi said, if it had not been for Rebbi Abba, we would have come to permit their strange worship; praised be He Who separated us from them.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:57

MISHNAH: A woman may lend to her neighbor, whom she suspects in matters of the Sabbatical, a coarse sieve, a fine sieve, grindstones, or an oven, but she should neither cull nor grind with her. The wife of a Fellow may lend to the wife of a vulgar a coarse sieve and a fine sieve, she may cull, grind, and sift with her, but she may not touch hers once water has been put in because one does not support transgressors. All this has only been said for communal peace. One encourages Gentiles in the Sabbatical year but not Jews. One greets them for communal peace.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 5:62

Rebbi Ḥiyya, Rebbi Ammi. One said: “Plough it well then, I will rent it from you after the Sabbatical.” The other one said: “May you succeed” For him who says, plough it well, then I will rent it from you after the Sabbatical, what means “one greets them” in a Jewish way? “May you succeed.” For him who says to the Gentile “may you succeed”? Explanation: Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappa and Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman passed by one of the ploughmen in the Sabbatical. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman said to him, are you not Jewish? Rebbi Ḥinena bar Pappa said to him, did not Rebbi teach us (Ps. 129:8): “The passers-by did not say, the blessing of the Eternal be on you,” these are the nations of the world who pass out of the world, they did not say to Israel “the blessing of the Eternal is on you.” What does Israel say to them, “we bless you in the Name of the Eternal.” All blessings that come into the world because of us are not enough for you; not only do you not say, come and take from these blessings for yourselves, but you roll over us pro-rated contributions and fines, head taxes and annonae.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 6:31

Rebbi Hillel ben Valens asked before Rebbi: What reason did they have to say that practice follows Rebbi Yose? He said to him, because I never met him. If somebody questioned statements of Rebbi Yose, Rebbi said, we miserable ones asked against Rebbi Yose, for as there is a difference between the most holy and the most profane, so is there a difference between Rebbi Yose’s generation and ours. Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose said, the difference between my father’s generation and ours is like that between gold and dust.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:9

Rebbi Yudan said, there, if he said I did such and such, here, if he says do such and such. Rebbi Benjamin ben Levi inquired: He should have understanding for the future if he has understanding for the past; (if he has no understanding for the past,) he would not have understanding for the future! Rebbi Abba Mari said, here we deal with a mute; there is no agency for a mute. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, we deal with a sane person. Why is there no divorce? Because I say, he was occupied with his documents. We also stated thus: “When was this said? When he was paralyzed while being healthy. But if he was paralyzed by a prior sickness, once is enough.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:12

HALAKHAH: “If they said to him, shall we write a bill of divorce for your wife,” etc. If he said to two people, say to X that he shall write and to Y and Z that they shall sign. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah, this happened in the days of Rebbi, and he said, such a thing should not be done in Israel. Samuel said, it certainly should be done. Rav Jeremiah asked Samuel: If he said to two people, say to X that he write and you sign. He said to him, that is a bill of divorce but it needs study. The opinion of Samuel seems inverted. There, he said, it certainly should be done, and here, he says so? There is a difference, because they changed their testimony.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:17

“ ‘From today if I should die, from now if I should die,’ that is a bill of divorce. ‘From today after my death’ is no bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yudan said, the rabbis and our teachers [discussed.] Our teachers objected to the rabbis: Why do you say, it is a bill of divorce? Because he said, “if”! But in the last statement, he said “if” and you say, it is no bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “from today”. We also hold that “from today” is the main point. Rebbi objected to the rabbis. Why do you say, it is not a bill of divorce? Because he said, “from today”! But in the earlier statement, he said “from today” and you say, it is a bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “if”. I also am holding that “if” is the main point. There, they switch attributions. Both Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav say that the words of Rebbi [interpreted] there are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] here: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “on condition.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, “on condition that I die” or “on condition that it be after my death”? He said to him, “on condition that I die.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: The words of Rebbi [interpreted] here are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] there: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “after death.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:17

“ ‘From today if I should die, from now if I should die,’ that is a bill of divorce. ‘From today after my death’ is no bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yudan said, the rabbis and our teachers [discussed.] Our teachers objected to the rabbis: Why do you say, it is a bill of divorce? Because he said, “if”! But in the last statement, he said “if” and you say, it is no bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “from today”. We also hold that “from today” is the main point. Rebbi objected to the rabbis. Why do you say, it is not a bill of divorce? Because he said, “from today”! But in the earlier statement, he said “from today” and you say, it is a bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “if”. I also am holding that “if” is the main point. There, they switch attributions. Both Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav say that the words of Rebbi [interpreted] there are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] here: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “on condition.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, “on condition that I die” or “on condition that it be after my death”? He said to him, “on condition that I die.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: The words of Rebbi [interpreted] here are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] there: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “after death.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:17

“ ‘From today if I should die, from now if I should die,’ that is a bill of divorce. ‘From today after my death’ is no bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yudan said, the rabbis and our teachers [discussed.] Our teachers objected to the rabbis: Why do you say, it is a bill of divorce? Because he said, “if”! But in the last statement, he said “if” and you say, it is no bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “from today”. We also hold that “from today” is the main point. Rebbi objected to the rabbis. Why do you say, it is not a bill of divorce? Because he said, “from today”! But in the earlier statement, he said “from today” and you say, it is a bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “if”. I also am holding that “if” is the main point. There, they switch attributions. Both Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav say that the words of Rebbi [interpreted] there are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] here: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “on condition.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, “on condition that I die” or “on condition that it be after my death”? He said to him, “on condition that I die.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: The words of Rebbi [interpreted] here are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] there: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “after death.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:17

“ ‘From today if I should die, from now if I should die,’ that is a bill of divorce. ‘From today after my death’ is no bill of divorce.” Rebbi Yudan said, the rabbis and our teachers [discussed.] Our teachers objected to the rabbis: Why do you say, it is a bill of divorce? Because he said, “if”! But in the last statement, he said “if” and you say, it is no bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “from today”. We also hold that “from today” is the main point. Rebbi objected to the rabbis. Why do you say, it is not a bill of divorce? Because he said, “from today”! But in the earlier statement, he said “from today” and you say, it is a bill of divorce! But it must be because he said, “if”. I also am holding that “if” is the main point. There, they switch attributions. Both Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rav say that the words of Rebbi [interpreted] there are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] here: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “on condition.” Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa, “on condition that I die” or “on condition that it be after my death”? He said to him, “on condition that I die.” Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: The words of Rebbi [interpreted] here are the words of the rabbis [interpreted] there: Since he said “from today” it is as if he had said “after death.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:26

The opinion of Rebbi Jehudah seems to be inverted. There, he says that death is frequent but here, he says that death is not frequent. There in public, here in private, as it was stated: Rebbi Jehudah says there was no chest for nests in Jerusalem because of the mixing, maybe one of them would die and money for purification offerings destined to die would be mixed in with them.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 7:39

HALAKHAH: “If I should not return within twelve months from today,” etc. What is the reason of Rebbi Yose? Because he mentioned writing earlier. But did he not also mention delivering earlier, and you say that it is no bill of divorce?

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:10

HALAKHAH: “The same applies for preliminary marriages”, etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Abba Cohen Bar Dalaia: A person acquires a find within four cubits of himself. What is the reason? (1Chr. 22:14) “Look, in my poverty I prepared for the House of the Eternal 100’000 kikkar of gold, 1’000’000 kikkar of silver, bronze and iron unweighed because it was so much; I prepared wood and stones, and you should add to them.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:12

Rebbi Abun said, what means “in my poverty?” That there is no wealth before Him Who commanded and the world came into existence! Another explanation: בְּעוֹנְיִי “in my deprivation,” because he fasted and donated the price of his meal to Heaven.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:13

Rebbi Jacob bar Idi objected before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. Did we not state: (Mishnah Baba Meẓi‘a 1:4) “If somebody saw a find and fell on it, when another person came and grabbed it, he who grabbed it had the rights to it?” He answered him: Explain it if the first one did not say that his four cubits should acquire it for him. But did we not state: “If he fell on it or spread his talith on it, one removes him from it?” He said to him, that is the same, if he did not say that his four cubits should acquire it for him. But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: (Tosephta Peah 2:2) “If two were pushing one another because of a sheaf and another person came and grabbed it from before them, the one who grabbed is entitled to it. He said to him, it is the same, they did not say that our four cubits should acquire it for us.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:15

Rebbi Zeïra objected before Rebbi Yasa: But did we not state: The same applies to marriage? He answered him, divorce documents and marriage contracts have the same rules. But did we not state: The same applies to debt? He said to him, because if he said to him: Throw it into the sea and your debt will be forgiven, it would be forgiven. But if that is true, even if it fell down close to the debtor, the debtor should have the benefit! But we have stated, if it falls down close to the debtor, the debtor is still obligated. For he said to him, throw it so that it will enter my domain, but it did not yet enter his domain. Rebbi Abbahu said, all those objections that Rebbi Zeïra raised before Rebbi Yasa, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish raised before Rebbi Joḥanan. Did he accept them from him? He solved them with those same solutions.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:22

HALAKHAH: “If he wrote in the name of an inappropriate government, in the name of the government of Media,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They declared the child a bastard because of the danger. Rav Huna in the name of Rav: This entire Chapter is Rebbi Meїr’s except for “if he changed his or her name or the name of his or her city.” Rebbi Mana asked before Rebbi Yasa: Also “if somebody divorced his wife”? He said to him, not your Chapter but our Chapter.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:29

HALAKHAH: “If he wrote a bill to divorce his wife and then changed his mind,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: There is no problem because of the purity of the priestly line and the court will not denigrate her. There came a case before the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya and he acted following the House of Hillel. Rav asked him, why did you bring yourself into this great doubt? He answered, Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose was with me. He quoted about them: “Two are better than one.”

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:33

If somebody divorces his wife she should not live in the same courtyard or the same place. If the courtyard was the wife’s property, the husband has to move out, if the husband’s, the wife has to move out. If it was common property, who has to move because of whom? The woman because of the man, unless they can manage to have separate exits. When has this been said? If they were definitively married, not if they were not definitively married. But the wife of a Cohen if she was not definitively married, as well as the status of a preliminarily married woman in Jehudah, is that of one definitively married. Nobody has to move if a person gives ḥalȋṣah to his sister-in-law even if he had “bespoken” her since “bespeaking” does not fully acquire.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:33

If somebody divorces his wife she should not live in the same courtyard or the same place. If the courtyard was the wife’s property, the husband has to move out, if the husband’s, the wife has to move out. If it was common property, who has to move because of whom? The woman because of the man, unless they can manage to have separate exits. When has this been said? If they were definitively married, not if they were not definitively married. But the wife of a Cohen if she was not definitively married, as well as the status of a preliminarily married woman in Jehudah, is that of one definitively married. Nobody has to move if a person gives ḥalȋṣah to his sister-in-law even if he had “bespoken” her since “bespeaking” does not fully acquire.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 8:39

The condition of validity is stated here and was stated there. It was necessary to state it there. If it had been stated here but not there, we would have said that here it is invalid because of the restrictions connected with adultery but there, since no restrictions connected with adultery are involved, it would be valid. Or if it had been stated there but not here, we would have said that there it is invalid since one comes to collect money based on that document but here, where one does not collect money, it would be valid. Therefore, it was necessary both to state it here and to state it there.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:5

Another argument: “Assume that he said to her, ‘you are permitted to every man except Mr. X;’ she went and married another and had children by him. Then her [second] husband died; she went and married Mr. X. Will not her children by her second husband become bastards?” His argument implies that divorce does not permit what the first husband had forbidden. Rebbi Shammai said, do we find that a woman was not originally forbidden to a man because of adultery and then retroactively became forbidden as adulterous? Rebbi Mana said to him, to what can you compare this? To one who told his wife, “this is your bill of divorce on condition that you sleep with Mr. X.” At the start, he is forbidden to have sexual relations with her. If he transgressed and slept with her, the divorce was retroactively validated.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:14

It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents can be collected only from unincumbered property, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. [But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect. Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed,] he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership. Rebbi Abina said, because it is invalid And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abin asked, so far, if the old man took the loan [and the old man mortgaged. But if the old man took the loan and the son mortgaged,] can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun asked, was it not stated: The same holds for bills of divorce? Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:14

It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents can be collected only from unincumbered property, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. [But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect. Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed,] he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership. Rebbi Abina said, because it is invalid And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abin asked, so far, if the old man took the loan [and the old man mortgaged. But if the old man took the loan and the son mortgaged,] can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun asked, was it not stated: The same holds for bills of divorce? Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:14

It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents can be collected only from unincumbered property, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. [But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect. Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed,] he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership. Rebbi Abina said, because it is invalid And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abin asked, so far, if the old man took the loan [and the old man mortgaged. But if the old man took the loan and the son mortgaged,] can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun asked, was it not stated: The same holds for bills of divorce? Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:14

It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents can be collected only from unincumbered property, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. [But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect. Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed,] he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership. Rebbi Abina said, because it is invalid And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abin asked, so far, if the old man took the loan [and the old man mortgaged. But if the old man took the loan and the son mortgaged,] can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun asked, was it not stated: The same holds for bills of divorce? Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:14

It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents can be collected only from unincumbered property, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. [But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect. Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed,] he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership. Rebbi Abina said, because it is invalid And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abin asked, so far, if the old man took the loan [and the old man mortgaged. But if the old man took the loan and the son mortgaged,] can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun asked, was it not stated: The same holds for bills of divorce? Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:14

It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents can be collected only from unincumbered property, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. [But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect. Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed,] he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership. Rebbi Abina said, because it is invalid And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abin asked, so far, if the old man took the loan [and the old man mortgaged. But if the old man took the loan and the son mortgaged,] can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun asked, was it not stated: The same holds for bills of divorce? Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:14

It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents can be collected only from unincumbered property, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. [But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect. Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed,] he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership. Rebbi Abina said, because it is invalid And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abin asked, so far, if the old man took the loan [and the old man mortgaged. But if the old man took the loan and the son mortgaged,] can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun asked, was it not stated: The same holds for bills of divorce? Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:14

It was stated: [A claim based on] any of these three types of documents can be collected only from unincumbered property, not from mortgaged property. Rebbi Abba said, that means, if the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed. [But if the document in the hand of the lender has been confirmed, he may collect. Rebbi Yose asked: If the document in the hand of the lender has not been confirmed,] he should not be able to collect even from unincumbered property! But one must deal with a document confirmed in the hand of the lender. And why can he not collect? Rebbi Bisna said, because of action in partnership. Rebbi Abina said, because it is invalid And here, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abin asked, so far, if the old man took the loan [and the old man mortgaged. But if the old man took the loan and the son mortgaged,] can you say because of a conspiracy? No, because it is invalid. Rebbi Abun asked, was it not stated: The same holds for bills of divorce? Can you say there, because of action in partnership? No, because it is invalid. And here, because it is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:34

Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Jews who forced in the manner of Gentiles make invalid, even if he says, I shall not feed nor provide. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Gentiles who forced in the manner of Jews are valid, even if he says, I shall not feed nor provide. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says this: “Gentiles may tell him, whip him, and tell him, do what the Jews tell you to do.” Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Issy: If somebody says: “I shall not feed nor provide”, one forces him to divorce. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Abbahu: Does one force? He said to him, do you still have doubts? If one forces because of a foul smell, so much more because of sustenance! Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Yasa came in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody says: “I shall not feed and I shall not provide”, one tells him: Either feed and provide, or divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:34

Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Jews who forced in the manner of Gentiles make invalid, even if he says, I shall not feed nor provide. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Gentiles who forced in the manner of Jews are valid, even if he says, I shall not feed nor provide. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says this: “Gentiles may tell him, whip him, and tell him, do what the Jews tell you to do.” Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Issy: If somebody says: “I shall not feed nor provide”, one forces him to divorce. Rebbi Jeremiah asked before Rebbi Abbahu: Does one force? He said to him, do you still have doubts? If one forces because of a foul smell, so much more because of sustenance! Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Yasa came in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody says: “I shall not feed and I shall not provide”, one tells him: Either feed and provide, or divorce.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:38

HALAKHAH: Was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” How can the House of Shammai confirm this? Lest you say that one divorced because of immorality is forbidden, for anothercause she would be permitted. Rebbi Shila from Kefar-Tamarta said: The verse is difficult for the House of Shammai: “Her first husband, who had sent her away, cannot afterwards retake her.” Where do we hold? If to forbid her to him, is she not already forbidden to him? But we must hold, to burden him with a prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Gittin 9:38

HALAKHAH: Was it not stated in the name of the House of Shammai: Not only that the woman must leave because of incest; from where that she must leave if her head’s [hair] is loose, if the side seams of her dress are open, or her arms stripped bare? The verse says, “for he found in her a matter of nakedness.” How can the House of Shammai confirm this? Lest you say that one divorced because of immorality is forbidden, for anothercause she would be permitted. Rebbi Shila from Kefar-Tamarta said: The verse is difficult for the House of Shammai: “Her first husband, who had sent her away, cannot afterwards retake her.” Where do we hold? If to forbid her to him, is she not already forbidden to him? But we must hold, to burden him with a prohibition.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:10

So far for Israel. For the Gentiles? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It is written “you shall die because of the woman whom you took, since she is having marital relations with a husband.” They are guilty for those having marital relations; they are not guilty for the betrothed. The words of Rebbi Eleazar imply, only if he had intention of acquiring her; the words of Samuel imply, even if he had no intention of acquiring her; since Rebbi Jonah said in the name of Samuel: “A prostitute stands in a window. Two men sleep with her. The first one is not killed, the second one is killed because of him.” But did the first one intend to acquire her?

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:10

So far for Israel. For the Gentiles? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It is written “you shall die because of the woman whom you took, since she is having marital relations with a husband.” They are guilty for those having marital relations; they are not guilty for the betrothed. The words of Rebbi Eleazar imply, only if he had intention of acquiring her; the words of Samuel imply, even if he had no intention of acquiring her; since Rebbi Jonah said in the name of Samuel: “A prostitute stands in a window. Two men sleep with her. The first one is not killed, the second one is killed because of him.” But did the first one intend to acquire her?

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:36

“By money”. “The money of his sale price shall be;” he can be redeemed by money, not by produce nor by vessels. Everywhere you treat money’s worth like money, but here you do not treat money’s worth like money. Rebbi Abba Mari said, there is a difference, because the verse repeated “money, of money”. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada said, but if he wants to reduce, he can leave for the reduced amount even for produce, even for vessels. Rebbi Yudan, Rebbi Mattaniah’s father, said that this is only if he did not give them their money’s worth. But if he gave them their money’s worth, it is like money.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:55

Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked before me: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:55

Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked before me: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:55

Rebbi Yose asked: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? For Rebbi Abun it is obvious that he becomes a man retroactively, so certainly also for the future, for he explains the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah. Why does Rebbi Yose not explain the position of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish by Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah since he asked, when they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? Rebbi Mana said, because he had difficulty. Rebbi Yose asked before me: When they remained until the time of indicators, does he retroactively become a man or from that time onward? One understands the case of a widow. But a divorcee? Explain it if he copulated with her after he became an adult and divorced her. Ḥalîṣah? Explain it if he copulated with her, died, and the [adult] brothers performed ḥalîṣah; she had ḥalîṣah because of him. In that case, even if he was younger than nine [years]! Rebbi Samuel ben Eudaimon said, that is correct. But because in all cases one stated “nine”, one stated this with them.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:64

It was stated: Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob says, why at the door? Because by the door they went from servitude to freedom. The students asked Rabban Joḥanan ben Zakkai: Why should the slave be pierced in his ear rather than in any of his other body parts? He said to them, the ear which heard at Mount Sinai: “You shall have no other powers besides Me,” and removed from himself the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven but accepted the yoke of flesh and blood; the ear which heard before Mount Sinai: “For the Children of Israel are My servants,” and went and acquired another master; therefore the ear should come and be pierced for he did not follow what his ear heard.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:65

“His ear.” Since “his ear” mentioned there means the right ear, also here the right ear. “If the slave says saying”, two sayings, one at the end of the sixth year and one at the start of the seventh year. One at the end of the sixth year, while he still is in his servitude and one at the start of the seventh year, “I will not go free.” “I love my master, my wife, and my children.” This teaches that he cannot be pierced unless he have a wife and children, unless he love his master and his master love him; unless the property be blessed because of him as it is said: “For he feels well with you.”

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:76

Why did we not state: By important limbs that do not regenerate? Rebbi Joḥanan ben Marius said, because of the disagreement. Some Tannaīm state that he needs a bill of manumission; some Tannaīm state that he does not need a bill of manumission.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:77

It is obvious that a slave may accept a gift by one third party to another, by a third party to his master, [but] not from his master to himself. From a third party to himself is in dispute between Rebbi Meïr and the Sages. If one said: Here [I am giving] you this money on condition that your master have no power over it, the slave acquired it and with him his master, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, the slave acquired it [but not] his master. What is the problem? From his master to a third party. Since the slave may receive from a third party for his master, may he receive from his master for a third party? Let us hear from the following: “If somebody borrowed a cow and [the lender] sent her to him through his slave, his son, or his agent.” Does this not mean that the slave is able to transfer rights from his master to a third party? Rebbi Eleazar said, explain it for a Hebrew slave. Rebbi Joḥanan said, you have to explain if for a Canaanite slave; explain it that he said, open [the gate] for her and she will come by herself, as we have stated: “If he led her, drew her to himself, called her and she followed him, he is responsible as a borrower.” Rebbi Zeïra understood it from here: “But he cannot make them acquire through his underage son or daughter or his Canaanite male or female slave, because their hand is not like his hand.” Does this not imply that a slave is not able to transfer rights from his master to another person? Explain it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master. But did we not state “his wife”? Rebbi Meïr holds that the hand of the wife is the hand of her husband! Rebbi Ḥananiah said in the name of Rebbi Phineas, explain it following the Tanna who stated: “His wife cannot redeem Second Tithe for him. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar says in the name of Rebbi Meïr, his wife can redeem Second Tithe for him.” For that Tanna, Rebbi Meïr makes the hand of the slave the hand of his master but not the hand of the wife the hand of her husband!

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:90

Rav Jehudah sent to Rebbi Eleazar: If a keeper give to another keeper. He answered, the first is responsible. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the second is responsible. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, the second is responsible. There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee. Rebbi Yose said, how can this person make a deal with another’s cow? But the cow’s [price] has to be restituted to the owner.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease the entire time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abinna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, we hold that they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the Elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:91

Rav Jehudah sent asking from Rebbi Eleazar: If brothers split [the estate] and then one of them entered a levirate marriage? He answered, the property of the deceased is like common property. Ulla bar Ismael said, it is found that in Rebbi Eleazar’s opinion there is no difference whether they split and then one of them entered a levirate marriage or one of them entered a levirate marriage and then they split, but all of them share in the property of the deceased. Why did he not say so? He answered what was asked of him. And why did he not ask? Because of what Rebbi Abinna said in the name of Rebbi Assi: If a first-born shared as a common son, it is prima facie evidence that he renounced his prerogative.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:119

Commandments which the son is obligated to fulfill towards his father. What is fear? He may not sit in his place and may not speak in his stead nor contradict his words. What is honor? He feeds and gives him to drink, clothes him, covers him, and puts on his shoes, leads him out and in. From whose money? Huna bar Ḥiyya said, from the old man’s. Some want to say, from his own. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: From where do we know that even if his father tells him to throw the wallet into the sea that he should obey him? That is, if he has another one and if it helps to quiet his father’s spirit. Both men and women. Only the man has the power in his hand, but the woman does not have the power in her own hand because others have disposition over her. If she is widowed or divorced, the power is in her own hand.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:121

Rebbi Tarphon’s mother went to promenade in her backyard on the Sabbath when her slipper broke. Rebbi Tarphon went and put his two hands under her feet and she walked on them until she got to her couch. Once the Sages came to visit him. She told them: Pray for my son Tarphon because he honors me too much. They asked her, what did he do for you? She told them what had happened. They said to her, even if he did this a million times, he did not yet reach even half of the honor that the Torah requires.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:122

Rebbi Ismael’s mother came, spoke, and complained to our teachers about him. She said to them: Scold my son Ismael because he does not honor me! At that, the faces of our teachers became saffron colored. They said, is it possible that Rebbi Ismael does not honor his parents? They said to her, what did he do to you? She said, when he comes from the house of assembly, I want to wash his feet and drink from it, and he refuses. They said, since it is her wish it is her honor.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:127

The words of Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba disagree, for Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rebbi Yudan, son of Rebbi Simeon bar Ioḥai’s daughter, stated that Rebbi Simeon bar Ioḥai stated: Honoring father and mother is great because the Holy One, praise to Him, preferred it over His own honor. It is said (Ex. 20:12): “Honor your father and your mother,” and it is said (Prov. 3:9): “Honor the Eternal with your property.” How do you honor Him? From your property! One gives gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and peah, one gives terumah, the First and Second Tithes and the tithe for the poor, ḥallah, one makes a sukkah, and lulav,shofar, and tefillin, and ẓiẓit, one feeds the hungry and gives to drink to the thirsty. If you have the wherewhithal, you are obliged for all of these; if you have nothing, you are not obliged even for one of them. But when it comes to honoring father and mother, whether you own property or you do not, you must honor father and mother, even if you are a beggar at people’s doors.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:130

“What is a positive commandment that is activated by time? For example sukkah, and shofar, and lulab, and tefillin. What is a positive commandment that is not activated by time? For example lost articles, sending away the [mother from the] nest, railing, and ẓiẓit. Rebbi Simeon exempts women from ẓiẓit because it is a positive commandment activated by time.” Rebbi Simeon said to them: Do you not agree with me that it is a positive commandment activated by time? Because a nightgown is exempt from ẓiẓit. Rebbi Hila said: The reason of the rebbis is that, if a garment is designated both for daytime and for night, it needs ẓiẓit.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:130

“What is a positive commandment that is activated by time? For example sukkah, and shofar, and lulab, and tefillin. What is a positive commandment that is not activated by time? For example lost articles, sending away the [mother from the] nest, railing, and ẓiẓit. Rebbi Simeon exempts women from ẓiẓit because it is a positive commandment activated by time.” Rebbi Simeon said to them: Do you not agree with me that it is a positive commandment activated by time? Because a nightgown is exempt from ẓiẓit. Rebbi Hila said: The reason of the rebbis is that, if a garment is designated both for daytime and for night, it needs ẓiẓit.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:133

“Except ‘do not destroy’, ‘do not shear,’ and ‘do not become impure for the dead’.” Issy says, also because of “do not make a bald spot.” What is the reason? “They shall not make a bald spot.” One subject to the rules of the beard is subject to the rules of the bald spot; women who have no beard are free from the rules of the bald spot. And also from the following: “sons,” not daughters. Rebbi Eleazar said, women are obligated by the rules of the bald spot. What is the reason? “For you are a holy people for the Eternal, your God.” Both men and women. How does Rebbi Eleazar explain “sons”? When they do the will of the Holy One, praise to Him, they are called sons, but when they do not do the will of the Holy One, praise to Him, they are not called sons. Rav was ordering his students, there came Rav Hamnuna ordering the colleagues: Order you wives not to tear out their hair when standing by a deceased, that they should not make a bald spot. What is a bald spot? There are Tannaïm who stated: Any size. There are Tannaïm who state: The size of a peeled grain. The one who says, any size, because the meaning of “bald spot” is of any size. The one who says, a peeled grain, for it is said here “to make a bald spot”, and it says there, a bald spot. Since “bald spot” mentioned there means in the size of a peeled grain, here also it means the size of a peeled grain. Rebbi Yose bar Mamal: A Cohenet is permitted to leave the Land. What is the reason? “Say to the Cohanim,” not to the Cohanot. If it were otherwise, what would we say? Since she is included in the decision, she may not leave. If you say so, you push aside the paragraph of impurities.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:133

“Except ‘do not destroy’, ‘do not shear,’ and ‘do not become impure for the dead’.” Issy says, also because of “do not make a bald spot.” What is the reason? “They shall not make a bald spot.” One subject to the rules of the beard is subject to the rules of the bald spot; women who have no beard are free from the rules of the bald spot. And also from the following: “sons,” not daughters. Rebbi Eleazar said, women are obligated by the rules of the bald spot. What is the reason? “For you are a holy people for the Eternal, your God.” Both men and women. How does Rebbi Eleazar explain “sons”? When they do the will of the Holy One, praise to Him, they are called sons, but when they do not do the will of the Holy One, praise to Him, they are not called sons. Rav was ordering his students, there came Rav Hamnuna ordering the colleagues: Order you wives not to tear out their hair when standing by a deceased, that they should not make a bald spot. What is a bald spot? There are Tannaïm who stated: Any size. There are Tannaïm who state: The size of a peeled grain. The one who says, any size, because the meaning of “bald spot” is of any size. The one who says, a peeled grain, for it is said here “to make a bald spot”, and it says there, a bald spot. Since “bald spot” mentioned there means in the size of a peeled grain, here also it means the size of a peeled grain. Rebbi Yose bar Mamal: A Cohenet is permitted to leave the Land. What is the reason? “Say to the Cohanim,” not to the Cohanot. If it were otherwise, what would we say? Since she is included in the decision, she may not leave. If you say so, you push aside the paragraph of impurities.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:4

Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead. “If he definitively will substitute, if he himself will dissolve.” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:13

As it was stated: “One may say to his worker: Here you have a denar, use it for food, here you have a denar, use it for drink, and not be worried about either the Sabbatical year, tithes, or wine for libations. But if he told him, go and buy yourself a loaf and I shall give you the money, go and buy yourself a reviït of wine and I shall give you the money, he has to worry because of the Sabbatical year, tithes, and wine used for libations.” Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the grocer becomes the agent of the employer to let the worker acquire. [Rebbi Hila said, the worker] acquired for the employer from the grocer and then acquires it himself.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 2:15

What is the difference between them? If the grocer was deaf-mute. According to Rebbi Ze‘ira, he does not have to worry because a deaf-mute cannot become an agent; according to Rebbi Hila, he does have to worry.