being
4565 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
MISHNAH: The House of Shammai are saying, one brings well-being offerings and does not lean on them, but no elevation offerings. But the House of Hillel are saying one brings well-being and elevation offerings and leans on them.
MISHNAH: The House of Shammai are saying, one brings well-being offerings and does not lean on them, but no elevation offerings. But the House of Hillel are saying one brings well-being and elevation offerings and leans on them.
HALAKHAH: The House of Shammai say, irregular leaning-on was permitted. But the House of Hillel say, irregular leaning-on was not permitted. What is irregular leaning-on? From the day before. Rebbi Ze`ira said, everybody agrees that he did not fulfill his obligation regarding the reparation offering of a sufferer from skin disease if he leaned on the day before; he fulfilled his obligation with voluntary well-being offerings for which he leaned on the day before. Where do they disagree? The festival well-being offerings. The House of Shammai treat them like voluntary well-being offerings; the House of Hillel treat them like the reparation offering of a sufferer from skin disease. Rebbi Yasa said, that what you are saying, he did not fulfill his obligation regarding the reparation offering of a sufferer from skin disease if he leaned on the day before, {only} on time. If its time has passed it becomes like holiday well-being offerings.
HALAKHAH: The House of Shammai say, irregular leaning-on was permitted. But the House of Hillel say, irregular leaning-on was not permitted. What is irregular leaning-on? From the day before. Rebbi Ze`ira said, everybody agrees that he did not fulfill his obligation regarding the reparation offering of a sufferer from skin disease if he leaned on the day before; he fulfilled his obligation with voluntary well-being offerings for which he leaned on the day before. Where do they disagree? The festival well-being offerings. The House of Shammai treat them like voluntary well-being offerings; the House of Hillel treat them like the reparation offering of a sufferer from skin disease. Rebbi Yasa said, that what you are saying, he did not fulfill his obligation regarding the reparation offering of a sufferer from skin disease if he leaned on the day before, {only} on time. If its time has passed it becomes like holiday well-being offerings.
HALAKHAH: The House of Shammai say, irregular leaning-on was permitted. But the House of Hillel say, irregular leaning-on was not permitted. What is irregular leaning-on? From the day before. Rebbi Ze`ira said, everybody agrees that he did not fulfill his obligation regarding the reparation offering of a sufferer from skin disease if he leaned on the day before; he fulfilled his obligation with voluntary well-being offerings for which he leaned on the day before. Where do they disagree? The festival well-being offerings. The House of Shammai treat them like voluntary well-being offerings; the House of Hillel treat them like the reparation offering of a sufferer from skin disease. Rebbi Yasa said, that what you are saying, he did not fulfill his obligation regarding the reparation offering of a sufferer from skin disease if he leaned on the day before, {only} on time. If its time has passed it becomes like holiday well-being offerings.
HALAKHAH: The House of Shammai say, irregular leaning-on was permitted. But the House of Hillel say, irregular leaning-on was not permitted. What is irregular leaning-on? From the day before. Rebbi Ze`ira said, everybody agrees that he did not fulfill his obligation regarding the reparation offering of a sufferer from skin disease if he leaned on the day before; he fulfilled his obligation with voluntary well-being offerings for which he leaned on the day before. Where do they disagree? The festival well-being offerings. The House of Shammai treat them like voluntary well-being offerings; the House of Hillel treat them like the reparation offering of a sufferer from skin disease. Rebbi Yasa said, that what you are saying, he did not fulfill his obligation regarding the reparation offering of a sufferer from skin disease if he leaned on the day before, {only} on time. If its time has passed it becomes like holiday well-being offerings.
Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish was passing by the school when he heard them reciting the verse, they sacrificed animal sacrifices and brought elevation sacrifices the next day. He said, he who interrupts follows the House of Shammai; he who reads it as one sentence follows the House of Hillel. One understands elevation sacrifices the next day; but well-being sacrifices the next day? Are not well-being sacrifices brought following the House of Shammai? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, David died on Pentecost; all of Israel were deep mourners and they brought the next day.
Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish was passing by the school when he heard them reciting the verse, they sacrificed animal sacrifices and brought elevation sacrifices the next day. He said, he who interrupts follows the House of Shammai; he who reads it as one sentence follows the House of Hillel. One understands elevation sacrifices the next day; but well-being sacrifices the next day? Are not well-being sacrifices brought following the House of Shammai? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, David died on Pentecost; all of Israel were deep mourners and they brought the next day.
“It happened that Hillel the Elder brought his elevation offering to the Temple courtyard and leaned on it. The students of the House of Shammai ganged up on him. He started to wag its tail, said to them, look, it is a female and I brought it as well-being sacrifice, and kept them talking about other matters until they left. After some time the House of Shammai became strong and they wanted to fix practice following their words. There was there Bava ben Buta from the students of the House of Shammai who realized that practice followed the House of Hillel. Once he entered the Temple courtyard and found it desolate. He said, the house of those who make our God’s House desolate shall be desolate. What did he do? He sent and brought 3’000 young lambs from Qedar sheep, checked them for defects, and displayed them on the Temple Mount. He said to them, listen to me my brothers, the House of Israel. Anybody who wants to bring an elevation sacrifice may bring it and lean on it, to bring a well-being sacrifice may bring it and lean on it. At that moment, practice was fixed following the House of Hillel; and nobody said anything.” Rebbi Isaac ben Rebbi Eleazar said, this cup for breakfast has to be full; the worm in the wood comes from itself; any coal which does not cause a burn at the start will not cause one. “Again it happened that a student of Hillel brought his elevation offering to the Temple courtyard and leaned on it. A student of Shammai saw him and said to him, what is this leaning-on? He said to him, what about being silent? He silenced him by a reprimand and he left.”
“It happened that Hillel the Elder brought his elevation offering to the Temple courtyard and leaned on it. The students of the House of Shammai ganged up on him. He started to wag its tail, said to them, look, it is a female and I brought it as well-being sacrifice, and kept them talking about other matters until they left. After some time the House of Shammai became strong and they wanted to fix practice following their words. There was there Bava ben Buta from the students of the House of Shammai who realized that practice followed the House of Hillel. Once he entered the Temple courtyard and found it desolate. He said, the house of those who make our God’s House desolate shall be desolate. What did he do? He sent and brought 3’000 young lambs from Qedar sheep, checked them for defects, and displayed them on the Temple Mount. He said to them, listen to me my brothers, the House of Israel. Anybody who wants to bring an elevation sacrifice may bring it and lean on it, to bring a well-being sacrifice may bring it and lean on it. At that moment, practice was fixed following the House of Hillel; and nobody said anything.” Rebbi Isaac ben Rebbi Eleazar said, this cup for breakfast has to be full; the worm in the wood comes from itself; any coal which does not cause a burn at the start will not cause one. “Again it happened that a student of Hillel brought his elevation offering to the Temple courtyard and leaned on it. A student of Shammai saw him and said to him, what is this leaning-on? He said to him, what about being silent? He silenced him by a reprimand and he left.”
“It happened that Hillel the Elder brought his elevation offering to the Temple courtyard and leaned on it. The students of the House of Shammai ganged up on him. He started to wag its tail, said to them, look, it is a female and I brought it as well-being sacrifice, and kept them talking about other matters until they left. After some time the House of Shammai became strong and they wanted to fix practice following their words. There was there Bava ben Buta from the students of the House of Shammai who realized that practice followed the House of Hillel. Once he entered the Temple courtyard and found it desolate. He said, the house of those who make our God’s House desolate shall be desolate. What did he do? He sent and brought 3’000 young lambs from Qedar sheep, checked them for defects, and displayed them on the Temple Mount. He said to them, listen to me my brothers, the House of Israel. Anybody who wants to bring an elevation sacrifice may bring it and lean on it, to bring a well-being sacrifice may bring it and lean on it. At that moment, practice was fixed following the House of Hillel; and nobody said anything.” Rebbi Isaac ben Rebbi Eleazar said, this cup for breakfast has to be full; the worm in the wood comes from itself; any coal which does not cause a burn at the start will not cause one. “Again it happened that a student of Hillel brought his elevation offering to the Temple courtyard and leaned on it. A student of Shammai saw him and said to him, what is this leaning-on? He said to him, what about being silent? He silenced him by a reprimand and he left.”
HALAKHAH: “If Pentecost falls on a Friday, the House of Shammai are saying that its slaughter-day is after the Sabbath, but the House of Hillel are saying that it has no slaughter-day.” But its day is its slaughter-day. Here the House of Shammai are saying, its slaughter-day is after the Sabbath, and the High Priest (wears) [does not wear] his garments (?)[.] It is an argument de minore ad majus. Since in a time where there are well-being and elevation offerings following the House of Hillel the High Priest does not wear his garments, in a time when there are no well-being and elevation offerings following the House of Shammai, not so much more?
HALAKHAH: “If Pentecost falls on a Friday, the House of Shammai are saying that its slaughter-day is after the Sabbath, but the House of Hillel are saying that it has no slaughter-day.” But its day is its slaughter-day. Here the House of Shammai are saying, its slaughter-day is after the Sabbath, and the High Priest (wears) [does not wear] his garments (?)[.] It is an argument de minore ad majus. Since in a time where there are well-being and elevation offerings following the House of Hillel the High Priest does not wear his garments, in a time when there are no well-being and elevation offerings following the House of Shammai, not so much more?
HALAKHAH: “One waters irrigated plots,” etc. One understands a well which does not flow newly. A well which flows newly? Is that not requiring effort? But it follows Rebbi Meïr, as Rebbi Meïr says, one uses it to irrigate even a field depending on rain water. Rebbi Yose said, it is the opinion of everybody if it was one and became two or its waters were few and it was blessed. We have stated thus: “From a well which flowed newly one irrigates even a field depending on rain water, the words of Rebbi Meïr; but the Sages are saying one uses it to irrigate only an irrigated plot which dried up.” In the opinion of Rebbi Meïr one irrigates from it something not in danger of loss and something requiring effort. In the opinion of the rabbis one irrigates from it only something in danger of loss and only if not requiring effort. What do the rabbis say if there is danger of loss but it requires effort? Let us hear from the following: Anything which is continuously losing value is an irrigated plot. When it stopped weakening it is a field depending on rain water; the disagreement between Rebbi Meïr and the Sages. How long does it have to be irrigated to become an irrigated field? Only if was irrigated two, three days before the holiday? Let us hear from the following: The Qabray dried up three days before the holiday, and it came back on the holiday. The case came before Rav Ḥuna who said, those weakened shall be irrigated, those not weakened may not be irrigated. Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose instructed about that cool shadowy place which was sown with barley that it should be cut on the holiday to avoid their cracking and being lost.
HALAKHAH: Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because of refraining from being fruitful and increase. They asked before Rebbi Yose: May a slave marry a woman on a holiday? He told them, let us hear from the following: “One who is half a slave and half a free man.” And Rebbi Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because of refraining from being fruitful and increase. This implies that a slave is commanded to be fruitful and multiply and anybody commanded to be fruitful and multiply is forbidden to marry on a holiday
HALAKHAH: Simeon bar Abba in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because of refraining from being fruitful and increase. They asked before Rebbi Yose: May a slave marry a woman on a holiday? He told them, let us hear from the following: “One who is half a slave and half a free man.” And Rebbi Simeon bar Abba said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Because of refraining from being fruitful and increase. This implies that a slave is commanded to be fruitful and multiply and anybody commanded to be fruitful and multiply is forbidden to marry on a holiday
MISHNAH: And the following shave on the holiday: He who comes from overseas, or from being kidnapped, or leaves jail, and one whose excommunication was lifted by the Sages, and also who asked the Sages and was permitted, and the nazir, and the sufferer from skin disease between his impurity and his purity.
HALAKHAH: “And the following shave on the holiday: He who comes from overseas, or from being kidnapped, or leaves jail.” Therefore all other people are forbidden? Rebbi Simon said, they decreed about them so they should not enter the holiday badly groomed. There, we have stated: “The people of the watch and those of the bystanders are forbidden to shave and to wash their garments, but on Thursday they are permitted because of the honor of the Sabbath.” Therefore on all other days they are forbidden? Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan; Rebbi Abun, <rebbi yasa> in the name of Ḥizqiah: They decreed about them so they should not enter their week badly groomed.
MISHNAH: And the following may wash on the holiday: He who comes from overseas, or from being kidnapped, or leaves jail, and one whose excommunication was lifted by the Sages, and also who asked the Sages and was permitted. Hand towels, and barber’s cloths, and body towels, and all who ascend from impurity to purity are permitted to wash, but anybody else is forbidden.
From where in the Torah that mourning is seven {days}? He organized seven days of mourning for his father. Can you infer anything from before the giving of the Torah? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Ze`ira understood it from the following: At the door of the Tent of Meeting you shall sit day and night for seven days, and keep the watch of the Eternal’ s sanctuary. Just as the Holy One, praise to Him, watched over His World for seven {days}, so you shall watch for your brothers for seven {days}. And from where that the Holy One, praise to Him, watched over His World for seven {days}? It was after seven days that the Deluge came over the world. May one mourn before the dying person dies? Only flesh and blood who do not know what will be in the future do not mourn until the dying person dies. But the Holy One, praise to Him, Who knows what will be in the future did first watch for His world. Some want to say, these are the seven days of mourning for Methusela the Just. Rebbi Hoshaia said, for the Eternal’s anointing oil is on you. Just as you were anointed with the anointing oil all of seven, so watch for your brothers all of seven. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: please let her not be like the dead. She shall be locked away. Just as the day of isolation for the dead are seven, so the days of quarantine are seven. One student reported this from Rebbi Joḥanan before Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, who did not accept it. He said, here he uses it for isolation, but there he uses it for making absolute, as Rebbi Joḥanan said in the name of Rebbi Yannai, please let her not be like the dead: just as the days of the dead are not counted, so the days of being absolute are not counted. Rebbi Jeremiah and Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish; Rebbi Abbahu, Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: the days of crying of the mourning for Moses ended. “The days”, seven. “Of crying”, two. “Mourning”, thirty. Some switch, “the days”, two, “of crying”, seven, “mourning”, thirty. Rebbi Yose, Rebbi Ḥiyya, and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Rebbi Judah the Patriarch: I shall turn your holiday into mourning. Since the days of Tabernacles are seven, also the days of mourning are seven. Rebbi Immi said to Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Maybe since the days of Tabernacles are eight, also the days of mourning are eight? He answered him, the eighth day is a separate holiday Or since Pentecost is one day, also mourning is one day? He answered him, from here about a deferred information. And it was stated such: Current information requires Seven and Thirty. Deferred information does not require Seven and Thirty.
The Torah said: “Do not take a woman in addition to her sister”. Not only her, her co-wife from where? The verse says “to ‘bundle’ together”, not her co-wife nor her co-wife’s co-wife. Not only his wife’s sister, all other incest prohibition from where? Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: A conclusion de minore ad majus. Since his wife’s sister, who is under an incest prohibition which may be lifted after being imposed, nevertheless is prohibited from the levirate, all other women under incest prohibitions which cannot be lifted after being imposed not much more so! Since in the first case the incest prohibition exempts the prohibited co-wife, all other incest prohibitions also exempt their co-wives. This follows Rebbi Aqiba.
The Torah said: “Do not take a woman in addition to her sister”. Not only her, her co-wife from where? The verse says “to ‘bundle’ together”, not her co-wife nor her co-wife’s co-wife. Not only his wife’s sister, all other incest prohibition from where? Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: A conclusion de minore ad majus. Since his wife’s sister, who is under an incest prohibition which may be lifted after being imposed, nevertheless is prohibited from the levirate, all other women under incest prohibitions which cannot be lifted after being imposed not much more so! Since in the first case the incest prohibition exempts the prohibited co-wife, all other incest prohibitions also exempt their co-wives. This follows Rebbi Aqiba.
Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated an argument de minore ad majus. Since his wife’s sister is particular being under incest prohibition for whose violation one is punished if intentional by extirpation, if in error by an obligation to bring a purification offering, and is barred from the levirate, all other women under incest prohibitions for whose violation one is sanctioned if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation to bring a purification offering, should be barred from the levirate.
What is the difference between them? A widow for the High Priest. For him who says, a woman under an incest prohibition which may be lifted after being imposed, this one, not being permitted after being prohibited, should be barred from the levirate. For him who says, a woman under an incest prohibition for which one is punished if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation to bring a purification offering, is barred from the levirate, in this case since one is not sanctioned if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation of a purification offering, should be permitted for the levirate.
What is the difference between them? A widow for the High Priest. For him who says, a woman under an incest prohibition which may be lifted after being imposed, this one, not being permitted after being prohibited, should be barred from the levirate. For him who says, a woman under an incest prohibition for which one is punished if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation to bring a purification offering, is barred from the levirate, in this case since one is not sanctioned if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation of a purification offering, should be permitted for the levirate.
What is the difference between them? A widow for the High Priest. For him who says, a woman under an incest prohibition which may be lifted after being imposed, this one, not being permitted after being prohibited, should be barred from the levirate. For him who says, a woman under an incest prohibition for which one is punished if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation to bring a purification offering, is barred from the levirate, in this case since one is not sanctioned if intentional by extirpation, if in error by the obligation of a purification offering, should be permitted for the levirate.
Rebbi Ayvu bar Naggari, Crispus, in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “The dead man’s wife should not be outside, to a strange man.” That is a wife who is a stranger to him. The Torah said, she should not be his wife even in case of a commandment. That being, she should not need ḥalîṣah! Rebbi Jeremiah said: “his sister-in-law, his sister-in-law”, the Torah increased the cases of ḥalîṣah! If from “his sister-in-law, his sister-in-law”, did the Torah not increase the cases of levirate? Rebbi Ismael stated: “My levir refuses”. That is, my levir refused, not that Heaven refused for him. In that case, she should not need ḥalîṣah! That means, the statement of Rebbi Jeremiah is needed, “his sister-in-law, his sister-in-law”, the Torah increased the cases of ḥalîṣah!
“His maternal halfsister,” married to his paternal halfbrother. “His mother’s sister,” a man and his son married two sisters. “His wife’s sister,” two brothers being married to two sisters.
Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, did not Rebbi Yose say correctly before he changed his mind? Once a man’s daughter is married without being a she-ram, her co-wife is forbidden. If in addition she is a she-ram, does her co-wife become permitted? He said to him, the she-ram is as if non-existent. If there are two sisters-in-law, one a she-ram and one not a she-ram, if the levir comes and performs ḥalîṣah or has intercourse with the first, did he free her companion of anything? That shows that the she-ram is as if non-existent.
HALAKHAH: “Any person who has a child anywhere”, etc. Rebbi Avin asked: “His child in every respect”, even for being fruitful and multiplying? Is there no difference between a Gentile who came to a Jewish woman and she gave birth and a Jew who came to a Gentile woman and she gave birth? “When she became Jewish and gave birth it is a first-born for inheritance but not a first-born for the Cohen.”
What if there is a co-wife? Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Avina: It is an inference de minore ad majus. If the Sages gave a co-wife to the sister of a woman with whom one performed ḥalîṣah, which is rabbinic, here, where there is the prohibition of sisters, not so much more? It is obvious that the rule of co-wives applies to his daughter. Rebbi Abun in the name of Rebbi Avina: One has stated there, “if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed; if the sisters performed ḥalîṣah, the co-wives were not freed.” But as you say, if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed, so it should be that even if the sisters performed ḥalîṣah, the co-wives should be freed. But it must follow Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri, since Rebbi Joḥanan ben Nuri said, come and let us institute that the co-wife perform ḥalîṣah without being admitted to levirate. Did they institute that? Was it not stated: They did not manage to institute this before the time became unsuitable. But it must follow the House of Shammai since the House of Shammai permit the co-wives to the brothers. Rebbi Phineas said to Rebbi Yose: If it follows the House of Shammai, even if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sistersshould not be freed! But we have stated: Rebbi Eliezer said, the House of Shammai say, they shall keep them, but the House of Hillel say, they have to divorce. There are two Tannaïm interpreting the House of Shammai, one said if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were freed, the other one said if the co-wives performed ḥalîṣah, the sisters were not freed.
HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.
HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.
HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.
HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.
HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.
HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.
HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.
HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.
MISHNAH: A man should not rest from being fruitful and multiply unless he has children. The House of Shammai say two males, but the House of Hillel say a male and a female, as it is said “male and female He created them.” If he married a wife and she stayed with him for ten years and had no child he is not permitted to rest. If he divorced her, she is permitted to marry another and the second [husband] is permitted to stay with her for ten years, and if she had a miscarriage she counts from the moment of the miscarriage. The man is commanded to be fruitful and multiply but not the woman. Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa said, for both of them it says “God blessed them and God said to them, be fruitful and multiply,” etc.
HALAKHAH: “A man should not rest from being fruitful and multiply,” etc. The House of Shammai say two males, since “Gershom and Eliezer” are mentioned for Moses. The House of Hillel say a male and a female the way the world was created, as it is said “male and female He created them.” Rebbi Abun said, one has to understand “even a male and a female”. If it were not so, it should have been a Mishnah about the leniencies of the House of Shammai and the stringencies of the House of Hillel. Sons of sons are counted as sons, sons of daughters are not counted as sons. The son’s son and the daughter’s daughter count; the son’s daughter and the daughter’s son do not count. A she-ram, a castrate, and those who cannot have children are not counted.
If she had intercourse and saw blood repeatedly. Some Tannaïm state, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not. But some Tannaïm state, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah. But he who says, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. If one gave birth to male childen and they died when being circumcised. Some Tannaïm state, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise. Some Tannaïm state, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah He who says, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. Even he, who says that the third time she has ketubah agrees here that one should not circumcise because of the danger. It was stated: Rebbi Nathan said, it happened that I went to Kappadokian Caesarea, and there was a woman who gave birth to male children and they died when being circumcised. She circumcised the first [child] and he died, the second and he died, the third and he died. She brought the fourth one before me, I looked at him and saw that he did not have enough blood for circumcision. I told them, wait for later. They waited, circumsised him, he turned out to be living, and they called him Nathan after me.
If she had intercourse and saw blood repeatedly. Some Tannaïm state, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not. But some Tannaïm state, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time she may have intercourse, a third time she may not, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah. But he who says, a third time she may have intercourse, a fourth time she may not, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. If one gave birth to male childen and they died when being circumcised. Some Tannaïm state, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise. Some Tannaïm state, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise. They wanted to say that he who says, a second time one should circumcise, a third time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that a third time she has no ketubah He who says, a third time one should circumcise, a fourth time one should not circumcise, holds with him who says that the third time she has ketubah. Even he, who says that the third time she has ketubah agrees here that one should not circumcise because of the danger. It was stated: Rebbi Nathan said, it happened that I went to Kappadokian Caesarea, and there was a woman who gave birth to male children and they died when being circumcised. She circumcised the first [child] and he died, the second and he died, the third and he died. She brought the fourth one before me, I looked at him and saw that he did not have enough blood for circumcision. I told them, wait for later. They waited, circumsised him, he turned out to be living, and they called him Nathan after me.
“A wooden sandal.” The colleagues in the name of Rav: If only the edges are wooden. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: If only the bottom of the sole is wooden. There, they say in the name of Rav: If only the loops are wooden. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even if it is entirely of wood it is valid. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “ A straw sandal becomes impure by being stepped on and a woman may use it for ḥalîṣah, the words of Rebbi Aqiba, but the Sages do not agree about impurity by being stepped on.”
“A wooden sandal.” The colleagues in the name of Rav: If only the edges are wooden. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav: If only the bottom of the sole is wooden. There, they say in the name of Rav: If only the loops are wooden. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Even if it is entirely of wood it is valid. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: “ A straw sandal becomes impure by being stepped on and a woman may use it for ḥalîṣah, the words of Rebbi Aqiba, but the Sages do not agree about impurity by being stepped on.”
Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, did not Rebbi Yose say correctly before he changed his mind? Once a man’s daughter is married without being a she-ram, her co-wife is forbidden. If in addition she is a she-ram, does her co-wife become permitted? He said to him, the she-ram is as if non-existent. If there are two sisters-in-law, one a she-ram and one not a she-ram, if the levir comes and performs ḥalîṣah or has intercourse with the first, did he free her companion of anything? That shows that the she-ram is as if non-existent.
Does a court convene for repudiation? Was it not stated: Flee from three and cling to three. Cling to ḥalîṣah, annulling vows, and making peace. But flee from repudiations, from being a guarantor, and from receiving deposits. Rebbi Simeon bar Abba said, its name is not פקדון “deposit” but פק דון “go to court”. Rebbi Berekhiah said, “My son, if you became guanrantor for your neighbor.” Does a court convene for repudiation? Explain it that they were sitting in another matter and the case came before them.
Rebbi Aḥa bar Ḥinena in the name of Cahana: Following the opinion that someone who cannot give heave cannot dedicate to the Temple. Why did he not say: following the opinion that he can give heave, can he dedicate to the Temple? Because of Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah says he can give heave but cannot dedicate. Rebbi Joḥanan says, even following the opinion that he cannot give heave, he can dedicate. What can he dedicate? Holocaust and well-being offerings. He cannot bring a sin sacrifice for fat because he is not obligated to a sin sacrifice for fat. He cannot bring a sin sacrifice for blood because he is not obligated to a sin sacrifice for blood. May he bring a sacrifice relating to gonorrhea and skin disease? Since it is obligatory can’t he bring it, or since he becomes impure by these can he bring it? If it is obvious for you that he brings, can he become an agent for these? Since he may become impure by these, may he become an agent, or since he cannot become an agent for anything else, can’t he become an agent for these? Rebbi Yudan objected: His produce is ṭevel from the Torah but he can free his ṭevel by Torah law! But here, even though he may become impure by them, he cannot become an agent. May he bring First Fruits following Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah says that First Fruits have the status of territorial consecrated things? He may not bring following the rabbis who say they have the status of things consecrated to the Temple. May he bring a sacrifice of pilgrimage? Since it is obligatory can’t he bring it, or since he may change its name to well-being offering, may he bring it? May he bring a Passover sacrifice? Since it is obligatory can’t he bring it, or since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, a person may bring a Passover sacrifice any day of the year when he changes its name to well-being offering, may he bring it? May he bring tithes of cereals? If he holds with Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said (Num.18:28): “From all your tithes,” that all tithes were bracketed together, then since he cannot bring tithes of grain he cannot bring tithes of animals. May he make substitutions? If Rebbi Meïr is of the opinion that all tithes were bracketed together, then since he cannot bring tithes of grain he cannot bring tithes of animals; since he cannot bring tithes of animals he cannot make substitutions. One may hold with Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says that tithes of animals teach you for all sacrifices about substitutions. That means, since he cannot bring tithes of grain he cannot bring tithes of animals; since he cannot bring tithes of animals he cannot make substitutions; since he cannot make substitutions for these he cannot make substitutions for any sacrifices. Is one guilty sacrificing for him outside the Temple? Cahana said, one cannot be guilty sacrificing for him outside the Temple. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, one is guilty sacrificing for him outside the Temple. The statement of Cahana disagrees with Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah frees his ṭevel as biblical law. And you say so? We can say he [Cahana] is following him who says they accepted tithes voluntarily.
Rebbi Aḥa bar Ḥinena in the name of Cahana: Following the opinion that someone who cannot give heave cannot dedicate to the Temple. Why did he not say: following the opinion that he can give heave, can he dedicate to the Temple? Because of Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah says he can give heave but cannot dedicate. Rebbi Joḥanan says, even following the opinion that he cannot give heave, he can dedicate. What can he dedicate? Holocaust and well-being offerings. He cannot bring a sin sacrifice for fat because he is not obligated to a sin sacrifice for fat. He cannot bring a sin sacrifice for blood because he is not obligated to a sin sacrifice for blood. May he bring a sacrifice relating to gonorrhea and skin disease? Since it is obligatory can’t he bring it, or since he becomes impure by these can he bring it? If it is obvious for you that he brings, can he become an agent for these? Since he may become impure by these, may he become an agent, or since he cannot become an agent for anything else, can’t he become an agent for these? Rebbi Yudan objected: His produce is ṭevel from the Torah but he can free his ṭevel by Torah law! But here, even though he may become impure by them, he cannot become an agent. May he bring First Fruits following Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah says that First Fruits have the status of territorial consecrated things? He may not bring following the rabbis who say they have the status of things consecrated to the Temple. May he bring a sacrifice of pilgrimage? Since it is obligatory can’t he bring it, or since he may change its name to well-being offering, may he bring it? May he bring a Passover sacrifice? Since it is obligatory can’t he bring it, or since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, a person may bring a Passover sacrifice any day of the year when he changes its name to well-being offering, may he bring it? May he bring tithes of cereals? If he holds with Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said (Num.18:28): “From all your tithes,” that all tithes were bracketed together, then since he cannot bring tithes of grain he cannot bring tithes of animals. May he make substitutions? If Rebbi Meïr is of the opinion that all tithes were bracketed together, then since he cannot bring tithes of grain he cannot bring tithes of animals; since he cannot bring tithes of animals he cannot make substitutions. One may hold with Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says that tithes of animals teach you for all sacrifices about substitutions. That means, since he cannot bring tithes of grain he cannot bring tithes of animals; since he cannot bring tithes of animals he cannot make substitutions; since he cannot make substitutions for these he cannot make substitutions for any sacrifices. Is one guilty sacrificing for him outside the Temple? Cahana said, one cannot be guilty sacrificing for him outside the Temple. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, one is guilty sacrificing for him outside the Temple. The statement of Cahana disagrees with Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah frees his ṭevel as biblical law. And you say so? We can say he [Cahana] is following him who says they accepted tithes voluntarily.
Rebbi Aḥa bar Ḥinena in the name of Cahana: Following the opinion that someone who cannot give heave cannot dedicate to the Temple. Why did he not say: following the opinion that he can give heave, can he dedicate to the Temple? Because of Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah says he can give heave but cannot dedicate. Rebbi Joḥanan says, even following the opinion that he cannot give heave, he can dedicate. What can he dedicate? Holocaust and well-being offerings. He cannot bring a sin sacrifice for fat because he is not obligated to a sin sacrifice for fat. He cannot bring a sin sacrifice for blood because he is not obligated to a sin sacrifice for blood. May he bring a sacrifice relating to gonorrhea and skin disease? Since it is obligatory can’t he bring it, or since he becomes impure by these can he bring it? If it is obvious for you that he brings, can he become an agent for these? Since he may become impure by these, may he become an agent, or since he cannot become an agent for anything else, can’t he become an agent for these? Rebbi Yudan objected: His produce is ṭevel from the Torah but he can free his ṭevel by Torah law! But here, even though he may become impure by them, he cannot become an agent. May he bring First Fruits following Rebbi Jehudah, for Rebbi Jehudah says that First Fruits have the status of territorial consecrated things? He may not bring following the rabbis who say they have the status of things consecrated to the Temple. May he bring a sacrifice of pilgrimage? Since it is obligatory can’t he bring it, or since he may change its name to well-being offering, may he bring it? May he bring a Passover sacrifice? Since it is obligatory can’t he bring it, or since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia, a person may bring a Passover sacrifice any day of the year when he changes its name to well-being offering, may he bring it? May he bring tithes of cereals? If he holds with Rebbi Meïr, since Rebbi Meïr said (Num.18:28): “From all your tithes,” that all tithes were bracketed together, then since he cannot bring tithes of grain he cannot bring tithes of animals. May he make substitutions? If Rebbi Meïr is of the opinion that all tithes were bracketed together, then since he cannot bring tithes of grain he cannot bring tithes of animals; since he cannot bring tithes of animals he cannot make substitutions. One may hold with Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon says that tithes of animals teach you for all sacrifices about substitutions. That means, since he cannot bring tithes of grain he cannot bring tithes of animals; since he cannot bring tithes of animals he cannot make substitutions; since he cannot make substitutions for these he cannot make substitutions for any sacrifices. Is one guilty sacrificing for him outside the Temple? Cahana said, one cannot be guilty sacrificing for him outside the Temple. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, one is guilty sacrificing for him outside the Temple. The statement of Cahana disagrees with Rebbi Jehudah, since Rebbi Jehudah frees his ṭevel as biblical law. And you say so? We can say he [Cahana] is following him who says they accepted tithes voluntarily.
So is the Mishnah: The underage girl should wait until she grows up, reaches puberty, and is being married. Rebbi Eleazar said, there is no “being married” here, only “being betrothed.” Rebbi Joḥanban said, these are the words of Rabban Gamliel: If somebody gave qiddušin to his sister-in-law’s sister, his sister-in-law was freed from ḥalîṣah and levirate. It follows that what we had stated there, “if somebody gave qiddušin to the sister of a woman waiting for her levir” does not follow Rabban Gamliel.
So is the Mishnah: The underage girl should wait until she grows up, reaches puberty, and is being married. Rebbi Eleazar said, there is no “being married” here, only “being betrothed.” Rebbi Joḥanban said, these are the words of Rabban Gamliel: If somebody gave qiddušin to his sister-in-law’s sister, his sister-in-law was freed from ḥalîṣah and levirate. It follows that what we had stated there, “if somebody gave qiddušin to the sister of a woman waiting for her levir” does not follow Rabban Gamliel.
So is the Mishnah: The underage girl should wait until she grows up, reaches puberty, and is being married. Rebbi Eleazar said, there is no “being married” here, only “being betrothed.” Rebbi Joḥanban said, these are the words of Rabban Gamliel: If somebody gave qiddušin to his sister-in-law’s sister, his sister-in-law was freed from ḥalîṣah and levirate. It follows that what we had stated there, “if somebody gave qiddušin to the sister of a woman waiting for her levir” does not follow Rabban Gamliel.
Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan: The wife of a deaf-mute or an insane? He said to him, that does not even need a reparation sacrifice for a possible sin. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It does not even need a reparation sacrifice for a possible sin. Since you say, it does not even need a reparation sacrifice for a possible sin; if another man came and gave her qiddušin, they take hold of her. If he divorced, is she permitted to remarry the first [husband]? That is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: About the wife of a deaf-mute who after being divorced by the deaf-mute went and married a deaf-mute or a hearing person, I am reading: “Her first husband who sent her away cannot come to take her back.” About the wife of a hearing person who after being divorced went and married a deaf-mute or a hearing person, I am reading: “Her first husband who sent her away cannot … ” If a deaf-mute’s husband went overseas and they came and told his wife, your husband has died, and she went and married a deaf-mute or a hearing person, and then her husband returned, she has to leave both of them. If the husband of a hearing wife went overseas and they came and told her, your husband has died, and she went and married a deaf-mute, and then her hearing [husband] returned, we would think that the deaf-mute should divorce her but the hearing person can keep her. She is still under these disabilities.
Rebbi Eleazar asked Rebbi Joḥanan: The wife of a deaf-mute or an insane? He said to him, that does not even need a reparation sacrifice for a possible sin. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It does not even need a reparation sacrifice for a possible sin. Since you say, it does not even need a reparation sacrifice for a possible sin; if another man came and gave her qiddušin, they take hold of her. If he divorced, is she permitted to remarry the first [husband]? That is what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: About the wife of a deaf-mute who after being divorced by the deaf-mute went and married a deaf-mute or a hearing person, I am reading: “Her first husband who sent her away cannot come to take her back.” About the wife of a hearing person who after being divorced went and married a deaf-mute or a hearing person, I am reading: “Her first husband who sent her away cannot … ” If a deaf-mute’s husband went overseas and they came and told his wife, your husband has died, and she went and married a deaf-mute or a hearing person, and then her husband returned, she has to leave both of them. If the husband of a hearing wife went overseas and they came and told her, your husband has died, and she went and married a deaf-mute, and then her hearing [husband] returned, we would think that the deaf-mute should divorce her but the hearing person can keep her. She is still under these disabilities.
Witnesses of a declaration of jealousy who were found to be false are whipped. About witnesses concerning her being in a secluded place who were found to be false, you say that they are whipped; why should they not pay? It is not through their action that she loses her ketubah. Or it might be, following what Rebbi Abba, Rav Jehudah, said in the name of Samuel: One does not infer one thing from another in the matter of false witnesses. And here it is so.
If she was seen going to a secluded place by one witness in the morning and by one witness in the evening, it is to be treated like the following: “If she was together alone with him by the testimony of two witnesses, she needs a second bill of divorce from him; if there was a single witness she does not need a second bill of divorce from him. With one witness in the morning and one witness in the evening, such a case happened and Rebbi Eleazar ben Thaddeus asked the Sages, who told him that this is not being together alone.” If he declared his jealousy before one witness in the morning and before one witness in the evening; since he is a man and she is a woman, his declaration is nothing. Or is it to be treated like the following: “One accepts the witnesses’ testimony only if they saw it together. Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah says, even if they saw it one after the other.” Rebbi Jeremiah, Rebbi Samuel bar [Rav] Isaac in the name of Rav: The Sages agree with Rebbi Joshua ben Qorḥah with regard to witnesses of firstlings and witnesses of squatters’ rights. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah. The same holds for testimony regarding signs. In that case, it is obvious if one says, I saw two hairs on his back and the other says, I saw two hairs on his back. If one says, I saw one hair on her back and the other says, I saw one hair on her back, that is nothing; similarly on his back and on his back. If two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun and Rebbi Hoshaia the son of Rebbi Shammai, one said, it is invalid, but the other said, it is valid. He who says it is invalid considers him as one who testifies to half a sign. He who says it is valid? I say, maybe they were rubbed off. Two say, we saw one hair on his back and two others say, we saw one hair on his belly. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, everybody agrees that this is invalid [testimony]. Rebbi Abba said, everybody agrees that this is valid. Rebbi Yudan said, this is in disagreement; Rebbi Yose said, this is in disagreement. Rebbi Yose said, does not Rebbi Yudan follow my opinion? He answered, I am disagreeing with his teacher, so much more with him. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Ḥaggai was correct. If a document was signed by four witnesses and it was disputed, if one person verified the signature of two [witnesses] and another that of the other two, is that worth anything? Does not every single signature need two witnesses? And here, every single hair needs two witnesses. Rebbi Ḥanania learns it from the years of squatting rights. If one [witness] testified that he ate from the property the first, second, and third years and another [witness] testified that he ate from it the fourth, fifth, and sixth, is that worth anything? Does not every single year need two witnesses? And here, ever single hair needs two witnesses.
It was stated: “Rebbi Jehudah says, her husband is believed about her by an argument de minore ad majus. Since he is believed about her when she is menstruating, when he would be subject to extirpation because of her, but for this one he is not subject to extirpation because of her, is it not logical that he should be believed about her? They said to him, no. If you mention the menstruating, she will be permitted after being forbidden, what can you say about this one who may not be permitted after being forbidden? And it says, “stolen waters are sweet”. Rebbi Jehudah said to them, it is a decree of the verse: “The man shall bring his wife to the priest”, etc. They said to him, only with witnesses.
It was stated: “Rebbi Jehudah says, her husband is believed about her by an argument de minore ad majus. Since he is believed about her when she is menstruating, when he would be subject to extirpation because of her, but for this one he is not subject to extirpation because of her, is it not logical that he should be believed about her? They said to him, no. If you mention the menstruating, she will be permitted after being forbidden, what can you say about this one who may not be permitted after being forbidden? And it says, “stolen waters are sweet”. Rebbi Jehudah said to them, it is a decree of the verse: “The man shall bring his wife to the priest”, etc. They said to him, only with witnesses.
HALAKHAH: “It would have been logical: Since the first testimony,” etc. The first testimony is about being in a secluded place; the last testimony is about impurity. The Mishnah follows Rebbi Joshua, since Rebbi Joshua says, “he declares his jealousy and warns her by the testimony of two [witnesses], and makes her drink by the testimony of two [witnesses].” Rebbi Mana said, it even follows the Tanna, about whom was stated: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah says in the name of Rebbi Eliezer: He declares his jealousy before one witness or by himself, but makes her drink by the testimony of two [witnesses].”
Also, it was stated: They all have to bring proof except from this one whose witnesses are with him. This follows him who said that he cannot stand in military engagements and see a drawn sword. But following him who says that he is one who is fearful because of his sins, he has to bring proof. Therefore the Torah appended him to all of these that he should return because of them, not to publicize the sinners. This comes as Rebbi Levi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “At the place where the elevation offering is being slaughtered, the purification offering is being slaughtered before the Eternal,” not to publicize the sinners.
Also, it was stated: They all have to bring proof except from this one whose witnesses are with him. This follows him who said that he cannot stand in military engagements and see a drawn sword. But following him who says that he is one who is fearful because of his sins, he has to bring proof. Therefore the Torah appended him to all of these that he should return because of them, not to publicize the sinners. This comes as Rebbi Levi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “At the place where the elevation offering is being slaughtered, the purification offering is being slaughtered before the Eternal,” not to publicize the sinners.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody eats at his father-in-law’s,” etc. In earlier times they decided on a persecution in Judea because they had a tradition from their forefathers that Jehudah had killed Esaw, as it is written: “Your hand is on your enemies’ neck.” They went and enslaved them and raped their daughters; they decided that a soldier would have sex with her first. They decreed that her husband should come to her when still in her father’s house; for when she knows that her husband’s fear is on her she is drawn after him. But is she not in the end being used for sex by a soldier? She is raped, and a rape victim is permitted to her husband. What did Cohanot do? They were hiding them. Why did they not also hide the daughters of Israel? That becomes talk and the government hears it; then these and those will be taken together. What kind of a sign did they have? The talk of a cook in town: There is a wedding meal, there is a wedding meal; there is light in Beror-Ḥayil: a week for a son, a week for a son. When the persecution ended, the custom did not end. Rebbi Hoshaia’s daughter-in-law was pregnant when she married definitively.
Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rav Ada bar Aḥawa: She cannot be executed unless she is an adolescent at the time of the execution. What is the reason? “They shall execute the adolescent at her father’s door.” But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: If she whored in her father’s house and [the husband] calumniated her after she became an adult, he is not flogged nor does he pay 100 tetradrachmas but either she or the witnesses are executed by stoning. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav Ada bar Aḥawa: “If he escaped after being sentenced and then his pubic hair grew fully.” There, you can say “they shall execute the adolescent” who whored; can you say here “they shall execute him”, the son?
HALAKHAH: “She always remains in the father’s power,” etc. Not only to the bridal chamber but to a house where the bridal chamber is. In which way? A banquet hall and a bedroom, the bridal chamber being the bedroom, and she entered the banquest hall. In which respect? Rebbi Eleazar said, to inherit from her. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, to dissolve her vows. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even though Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, to dissolve her vows, he agrees that he does not actually dissolve them until she enters the bridal chamber. Rebbi Huna said, a baraita supports Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “To whore in her father’s house,” that excludes the case that the father’s emissaries entrusted her to the husband’s emissaries, after which she should not be stoned but strangled.
HALAKHAH: ““The female children you will have by me,” etc. Rav Ḥisda said, if they became adults, they lost the support. If they married, they lost their dowries. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “If they became adults without being married or were married without being adults, they lost their support but not their dowries.” Rebbi Abin in the name of Hila: They all agree on the following: If a widow sues the heirs, she says I did not receive my ketubah, but the heirs say you received your ketubah. Before she remarried, the burden of proof is on the heirs that she received her ketubah. After she remarried, the burden of proof is on her that she had not received her ketubah. But did we not state: “If an orphan was married off by her mother or her brother and they wrote her [a dowry of] 150 zuz, after she grows up she can extract from them.” The reason, because she was underage. Therefore, a grown up gave up her claim. Explain it that she had received partial payment. Did not Rebbi Avina say in the name of Rebbi Assi: If a firstborn took as a simple [brother], this is prima facie evidence that he gave up his claim. Still, if she had received part payment. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this one did not take anything from his primogeniture. There came a case before Rebbi Mana, who wanted to act following Rav Ḥisda. Rebbi Ḥananiah said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “if they became adults without being married or were married without being adults, they lost their support but not their dowries”? He said to him: I quoted a tradition, you quoted a Baraita. Let the tradition be disregarded before the Baraita.
HALAKHAH: ““The female children you will have by me,” etc. Rav Ḥisda said, if they became adults, they lost the support. If they married, they lost their dowries. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “If they became adults without being married or were married without being adults, they lost their support but not their dowries.” Rebbi Abin in the name of Hila: They all agree on the following: If a widow sues the heirs, she says I did not receive my ketubah, but the heirs say you received your ketubah. Before she remarried, the burden of proof is on the heirs that she received her ketubah. After she remarried, the burden of proof is on her that she had not received her ketubah. But did we not state: “If an orphan was married off by her mother or her brother and they wrote her [a dowry of] 150 zuz, after she grows up she can extract from them.” The reason, because she was underage. Therefore, a grown up gave up her claim. Explain it that she had received partial payment. Did not Rebbi Avina say in the name of Rebbi Assi: If a firstborn took as a simple [brother], this is prima facie evidence that he gave up his claim. Still, if she had received part payment. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this one did not take anything from his primogeniture. There came a case before Rebbi Mana, who wanted to act following Rav Ḥisda. Rebbi Ḥananiah said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “if they became adults without being married or were married without being adults, they lost their support but not their dowries”? He said to him: I quoted a tradition, you quoted a Baraita. Let the tradition be disregarded before the Baraita.
HALAKHAH: ““The female children you will have by me,” etc. Rav Ḥisda said, if they became adults, they lost the support. If they married, they lost their dowries. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “If they became adults without being married or were married without being adults, they lost their support but not their dowries.” Rebbi Abin in the name of Hila: They all agree on the following: If a widow sues the heirs, she says I did not receive my ketubah, but the heirs say you received your ketubah. Before she remarried, the burden of proof is on the heirs that she received her ketubah. After she remarried, the burden of proof is on her that she had not received her ketubah. But did we not state: “If an orphan was married off by her mother or her brother and they wrote her [a dowry of] 150 zuz, after she grows up she can extract from them.” The reason, because she was underage. Therefore, a grown up gave up her claim. Explain it that she had received partial payment. Did not Rebbi Avina say in the name of Rebbi Assi: If a firstborn took as a simple [brother], this is prima facie evidence that he gave up his claim. Still, if she had received part payment. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this one did not take anything from his primogeniture. There came a case before Rebbi Mana, who wanted to act following Rav Ḥisda. Rebbi Ḥananiah said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “if they became adults without being married or were married without being adults, they lost their support but not their dowries”? He said to him: I quoted a tradition, you quoted a Baraita. Let the tradition be disregarded before the Baraita.
HALAKHAH: ““The female children you will have by me,” etc. Rav Ḥisda said, if they became adults, they lost the support. If they married, they lost their dowries. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: “If they became adults without being married or were married without being adults, they lost their support but not their dowries.” Rebbi Abin in the name of Hila: They all agree on the following: If a widow sues the heirs, she says I did not receive my ketubah, but the heirs say you received your ketubah. Before she remarried, the burden of proof is on the heirs that she received her ketubah. After she remarried, the burden of proof is on her that she had not received her ketubah. But did we not state: “If an orphan was married off by her mother or her brother and they wrote her [a dowry of] 150 zuz, after she grows up she can extract from them.” The reason, because she was underage. Therefore, a grown up gave up her claim. Explain it that she had received partial payment. Did not Rebbi Avina say in the name of Rebbi Assi: If a firstborn took as a simple [brother], this is prima facie evidence that he gave up his claim. Still, if she had received part payment. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this one did not take anything from his primogeniture. There came a case before Rebbi Mana, who wanted to act following Rav Ḥisda. Rebbi Ḥananiah said to him, did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state, “if they became adults without being married or were married without being adults, they lost their support but not their dowries”? He said to him: I quoted a tradition, you quoted a Baraita. Let the tradition be disregarded before the Baraita.
It was stated: A baby suckles continuously until 24 months; after that he is as if an unclean creature would suckle, the words of Rebbi Eliezer. But Rebbi Joshua says, he suckles continuously even four or five years. If he stopped, one does not return him. How long? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa, Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: From hour to hour. Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Three days from hour to hour. It was stated: From hour to hour. Rebbi Hizqiyah, Rav: When has this been said? If he stopped while being healthy. But if he stopped because of sickness, one does return him. When there was no danger. But if it was because of danger, one returns him even after a number of days.
“Students can go to study Torah for thirty days without their wives’ permission.” Therefore, with permission even longer. Rebbi Samuel bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “He sent them to the Libanon, ten thousand per month.” Rebbi Abin said, the Holy One, praise to Him, preferred being fruitful and multiplying over the Temple. What is the reason? “One month they would be in Libanon, two months each in his house.” Rav said, “the one entering and the one leaving, month for month for all months of the year.”
Rebbi Bar Qiria and Rebbi Eleazar were taking a walk on the road when they saw coffins being brought into the Land from abroad. Rebbi Bar Qiria said to Rebbi Eleazar: What good is that going to do them? I am reading for them (Jer. 2:7) “My inheritance your considered an abomination” during your lifetime, “you came and made My Land impure” in your death. He said to him, when they arrive in the Land, one takes a lump of earth and puts it on the coffin, as it is written (Deut. 32:43) “His earth atones for His people.”
HALAKHAH: “All the time she lives in her father’s house,” etc. For the good she received; her properties became delivered during her husband’s lifetime and after 25 years she gave up the claim to her ketubah. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi La: One understands for a woman who has no ketubah. But should a woman who has a ketubah not be able to collect forever? He answered him, it tells you more: Even a woman who has a ketubah collects only up to 25 years. The statement of Rebbi Eleazar says, the creditor collects forever. He said only, “the creditor”; but a woman can collect only up to years. Rebbi Abin said, this is reasonable only for a woman who is not being supported. But for a woman who is being supported, I say that she did not claim it because of her support.
HALAKHAH: “All the time she lives in her father’s house,” etc. For the good she received; her properties became delivered during her husband’s lifetime and after 25 years she gave up the claim to her ketubah. Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi in the name of Rav Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi La: One understands for a woman who has no ketubah. But should a woman who has a ketubah not be able to collect forever? He answered him, it tells you more: Even a woman who has a ketubah collects only up to 25 years. The statement of Rebbi Eleazar says, the creditor collects forever. He said only, “the creditor”; but a woman can collect only up to years. Rebbi Abin said, this is reasonable only for a woman who is not being supported. But for a woman who is being supported, I say that she did not claim it because of her support.
HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.
HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.
HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.
HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “ Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.
“Mushy”. There is no difference whether mushy for an elevation offering or mushy for a well-being offering. The leftover of an elevation offering [never] had a time when it was usable, the leftover of an elevation offering (never) had a time when it was usable. If he said, this is for me as a leftover of a well-being offering, what is it?
“Mushy”. There is no difference whether mushy for an elevation offering or mushy for a well-being offering. The leftover of an elevation offering [never] had a time when it was usable, the leftover of an elevation offering (never) had a time when it was usable. If he said, this is for me as a leftover of a well-being offering, what is it?
MISHNAH: If somebody says sacrifice, elevation offering, or flour offering, purification offering, or well-being offering, that I will not eat with you, he is forbidden; Rebbi Jehudah permits. The sacrifice, like a sacrifice, sacrifice if I would eat with you, he is forbidden. It is for sacrifice what I will not eat with you, Rebbi Meїr forbids. If somebody says to another person, a qônām that my mouth speaks with you, that my hand works with you, that my foot goes with you, he is forbidden.
HALAKHAH: “One who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food,” etc. A Mishnah states that scalding is called cooking, as we have stated: “If he cooked the well-being offering or scalded it.” A verse [states] that “roasted” is called “cooked”: “They cooked the pesaḥ” etc. If you say, against the rules, Rebbi Jonah from Bostra said, “as is the rule”. A Mishnah states that scalded is called cooked, and a verse that roasted is called cooked; but did we not state: “One who makes a vow to abstain from cooked food is permitted roasted and scalded food”? Rebbi Joḥanan said, in matters of vows one follows common usage. Rebbi Joshia said, in matters of vows one follows biblical usage. What is the difference between them? ‘A qônām that I shall not taste wine on Tabernacles.’ In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan he is forbidden on the last day of the holiday. In the opinion of Rebbi Joshia, is he permitted? Also Rebbi Joshia agrees that he is prohibited. Rebbi Joshia said it only for restrictions.
If the husband died, his power is voided in favor of the husband.” They wanted to say, after the husband had dissolved his part. But if the husband had not dissolved his part when he died, the power is not voided in favor of the father. Let us hear from the following: “If she made a vow while being preliminarily married. If she was divorced on the same day, preliminarily married on the same day, even a hundred times, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows.” That means, even if the husband had not dissolved his part and died, his power is voided in favor of the father.
HALAKHAH: “If she made a vow while preliminarily married,” etc. Rebbi Hila said, “being she will be”, even for a hundred beings, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says so: “Her father and her last husband dissolve her vows”.
It was stated: One is asked about vows only while sitting and wrapped. The one who is asked must be sitting and the one who is asking is standing; from the following: “And the two people who have the dispute shall stand.” “Standing” means only “being judged”. That is for asking legal rules. Asking about sermons from where? The verse says “shall stand, and shall stand”. Rebbi Aḥa bar Pappus went to permit the vow of Rebbi Immi. He remained standing to say “there is no vow”. Rebbi Mana went to permit the vow of the older Gamliel. He remained standing to say “there is no vow, there is no oath”. Rebbi Mana went to permit the vow of Gamliel the grandson. He said to him, do not treat me as you treated my grandfather, but sit down and I shall remain standing.
If a woman made a vow to be a nazir; her husband heard and did not dissolve it: Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Jehudah say, he put his finger between her teeth, for if he wants to confirm, he can confirm. If he said, I cannot stand her being a nazir, he should divorce her and pay the ketubah. Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon say, she put her finger between her teeth, for if he wants to confirm, he can confirm. If she said, I can stand it to be a nazir, he may divorce her without paying the ketubah.” Remove this, how can Rebbi Meïr and Rebbi Jehudah say so in the Mishnah? Even in the later Mishnah, why did he not dissolve? Rebbi Yose and Rebbi Simeon follow the later Mishnah. But you might say, the earlier Mishnah. Why did she make the vow?
MISHNAH: A woman who had made a vow of nazir and designated her animal when her husband dissolved her vow, if the animal was his, it leaves and grazes with the herd. But if the animal was hers, the purification offering shall die, the elevation offering shall be brought as an elevation offering, the well-being offering as a well-being offering, to be eaten on one day; it does not need bread. If she had money not designated, it should be given as a donation. If the monies were designated, the value of the purification offering shall be thrown into the Dead Sea; one may not use it but there can be no larceny. For the value of the elevation offering, they shall bring an elevation offering; it is subject to the law of larceny. For the value of the well-being offering, they shall bring a well-being offering, to be eaten on one day; it does not need bread.
MISHNAH: A woman who had made a vow of nazir and designated her animal when her husband dissolved her vow, if the animal was his, it leaves and grazes with the herd. But if the animal was hers, the purification offering shall die, the elevation offering shall be brought as an elevation offering, the well-being offering as a well-being offering, to be eaten on one day; it does not need bread. If she had money not designated, it should be given as a donation. If the monies were designated, the value of the purification offering shall be thrown into the Dead Sea; one may not use it but there can be no larceny. For the value of the elevation offering, they shall bring an elevation offering; it is subject to the law of larceny. For the value of the well-being offering, they shall bring a well-being offering, to be eaten on one day; it does not need bread.
MISHNAH: A woman who had made a vow of nazir and designated her animal when her husband dissolved her vow, if the animal was his, it leaves and grazes with the herd. But if the animal was hers, the purification offering shall die, the elevation offering shall be brought as an elevation offering, the well-being offering as a well-being offering, to be eaten on one day; it does not need bread. If she had money not designated, it should be given as a donation. If the monies were designated, the value of the purification offering shall be thrown into the Dead Sea; one may not use it but there can be no larceny. For the value of the elevation offering, they shall bring an elevation offering; it is subject to the law of larceny. For the value of the well-being offering, they shall bring a well-being offering, to be eaten on one day; it does not need bread.
MISHNAH: A woman who had made a vow of nazir and designated her animal when her husband dissolved her vow, if the animal was his, it leaves and grazes with the herd. But if the animal was hers, the purification offering shall die, the elevation offering shall be brought as an elevation offering, the well-being offering as a well-being offering, to be eaten on one day; it does not need bread. If she had money not designated, it should be given as a donation. If the monies were designated, the value of the purification offering shall be thrown into the Dead Sea; one may not use it but there can be no larceny. For the value of the elevation offering, they shall bring an elevation offering; it is subject to the law of larceny. For the value of the well-being offering, they shall bring a well-being offering, to be eaten on one day; it does not need bread.
It was stated: They need neither bread nor foreleg. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Do well-being sacrifices which are brought after death need bread? He turned around and said, is it not the same during his lifetime, do they not come for nothing? You say, they need bread, and here they need bread. Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya that well-being sacrifices which are brought after dissolution do not need bread. What is the difference between death and dissolution? In the case of death, they already were prepared to need bread; In the case of dissolution, they never were prepared to need bread. It was stated: There is a reparation sacrifice after dissolution; there is no reparation sacrifice after death. If she died, her reparation sacrifice is not offered, since there is no reparation sacrifice after death. If he dissolved for her, her reparation sacrifice is offered since that reparation sacrifice does not come for nothing.
It was stated: They need neither bread nor foreleg. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: Do well-being sacrifices which are brought after death need bread? He turned around and said, is it not the same during his lifetime, do they not come for nothing? You say, they need bread, and here they need bread. Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya that well-being sacrifices which are brought after dissolution do not need bread. What is the difference between death and dissolution? In the case of death, they already were prepared to need bread; In the case of dissolution, they never were prepared to need bread. It was stated: There is a reparation sacrifice after dissolution; there is no reparation sacrifice after death. If she died, her reparation sacrifice is not offered, since there is no reparation sacrifice after death. If he dissolved for her, her reparation sacrifice is offered since that reparation sacrifice does not come for nothing.
There, we have stated: “Leftovers for nezirim are for nezirim; what is left over from a nazir is for donation.” Rav Ḥisda said, only if his purification offering was presented last. But if his well-being offering waspresented last, what is left over is for a well-being offering. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if his well-being offering was presented last, it is a general rule for a nazir that his leftover be for donation. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “The following are undesignated monies: any which contain money for purification offerings that should die. Even if he designated money for purification offerings that should die, it remains undesignated.” A baraita supports Rav Ḥisda: “This is for my purification offering and the rest for my nezirut. Then he died. One commits larceny with all of them but not with part of them.” It does not say, when he died it should be given for donation.
There, we have stated: “Leftovers for nezirim are for nezirim; what is left over from a nazir is for donation.” Rav Ḥisda said, only if his purification offering was presented last. But if his well-being offering waspresented last, what is left over is for a well-being offering. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if his well-being offering was presented last, it is a general rule for a nazir that his leftover be for donation. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “The following are undesignated monies: any which contain money for purification offerings that should die. Even if he designated money for purification offerings that should die, it remains undesignated.” A baraita supports Rav Ḥisda: “This is for my purification offering and the rest for my nezirut. Then he died. One commits larceny with all of them but not with part of them.” It does not say, when he died it should be given for donation.
There, we have stated: “Leftovers for nezirim are for nezirim; what is left over from a nazir is for donation.” Rav Ḥisda said, only if his purification offering was presented last. But if his well-being offering waspresented last, what is left over is for a well-being offering. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, even if his well-being offering was presented last, it is a general rule for a nazir that his leftover be for donation. A baraita supports one and a baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Ze‘ira: “The following are undesignated monies: any which contain money for purification offerings that should die. Even if he designated money for purification offerings that should die, it remains undesignated.” A baraita supports Rav Ḥisda: “This is for my purification offering and the rest for my nezirut. Then he died. One commits larceny with all of them but not with part of them.” It does not say, when he died it should be given for donation.
MISHNAH: A man can declare his son a nazir but a woman cannot declare her son a nazir. How is this? If he shaved him or relatives shaved him; if he protested or relatives protested, if he had designated animals, the purification offering shall die; the elevation offering shall be brought as elevation offering; the well-being offering shall be brought as elevation offering; it may be eaten for one day and does not need bread. If he had money not designated, it should be given as donation. If the monies were designated, the money’s worth of the purification offering shall be thrown into the Dead Sea; one may not use it but there can be no larceny. For the value of the elevation offering, he shall bring an elevation offering; it is subject to the law of larceny. For the value of the well-being offering, he shall bring a well-being offering, to be eaten on one day; it does not need bread. A man may shave on the basis of his father’s nezirut, but a woman may not shave on the basis of her father’s nezirut. How is this? If his father was a nazir and had set aside unspecified money for his nezirut when he died, and he said, I am a nazir on condition that I may shave on my father’s money, Rebbi Yose said, the money shall be given as donation, for he cannot shave on his father’s money. Who may shave based on his father’s nezirut? If both he and his father were nezirim and his father had set aside unspecified money for his nezirut when he died; this one shaves on his father’s nezirut.
MISHNAH: A man can declare his son a nazir but a woman cannot declare her son a nazir. How is this? If he shaved him or relatives shaved him; if he protested or relatives protested, if he had designated animals, the purification offering shall die; the elevation offering shall be brought as elevation offering; the well-being offering shall be brought as elevation offering; it may be eaten for one day and does not need bread. If he had money not designated, it should be given as donation. If the monies were designated, the money’s worth of the purification offering shall be thrown into the Dead Sea; one may not use it but there can be no larceny. For the value of the elevation offering, he shall bring an elevation offering; it is subject to the law of larceny. For the value of the well-being offering, he shall bring a well-being offering, to be eaten on one day; it does not need bread. A man may shave on the basis of his father’s nezirut, but a woman may not shave on the basis of her father’s nezirut. How is this? If his father was a nazir and had set aside unspecified money for his nezirut when he died, and he said, I am a nazir on condition that I may shave on my father’s money, Rebbi Yose said, the money shall be given as donation, for he cannot shave on his father’s money. Who may shave based on his father’s nezirut? If both he and his father were nezirim and his father had set aside unspecified money for his nezirut when he died; this one shaves on his father’s nezirut.
MISHNAH: A man can declare his son a nazir but a woman cannot declare her son a nazir. How is this? If he shaved him or relatives shaved him; if he protested or relatives protested, if he had designated animals, the purification offering shall die; the elevation offering shall be brought as elevation offering; the well-being offering shall be brought as elevation offering; it may be eaten for one day and does not need bread. If he had money not designated, it should be given as donation. If the monies were designated, the money’s worth of the purification offering shall be thrown into the Dead Sea; one may not use it but there can be no larceny. For the value of the elevation offering, he shall bring an elevation offering; it is subject to the law of larceny. For the value of the well-being offering, he shall bring a well-being offering, to be eaten on one day; it does not need bread. A man may shave on the basis of his father’s nezirut, but a woman may not shave on the basis of her father’s nezirut. How is this? If his father was a nazir and had set aside unspecified money for his nezirut when he died, and he said, I am a nazir on condition that I may shave on my father’s money, Rebbi Yose said, the money shall be given as donation, for he cannot shave on his father’s money. Who may shave based on his father’s nezirut? If both he and his father were nezirim and his father had set aside unspecified money for his nezirut when he died; this one shaves on his father’s nezirut.
May his own vow of nazir and that of his father fall on him together? It happened that Rebbi Ḥanina ben Ḥanina’s father made him a nazir and Rebbi Simeon ben Gamliel checked him whether he had grown two pubic hairs. He said to him, why are you checking me? If my father’s nezirut is on me, I am a nazir; otherwise, I declare being a nazir. Rabban Gamliel stood up and kissed him on his head and said, I am sure that you will not die from old age before you taught instruction in Israel. Rebbi Eleazar bar Ṣadoq said, I saw him sitting and explaining in Jabneh.
HALAKHAH: “The House of Shammai say, dedication in error is dedication.” There, we have stated: “If somebody intends to say heave but says tithe, tithe but says heave, fire offering but says well-being offering, well-being offering but says fire offering.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if he intends to say “profane” and says “fire sacrifice”, he dedicated it. Rebbi Yose said, we consider only whether he intended to dedicate but erred because of something else. What is the status of this Mishnah? In the opinion of Rebbi Jeremiah it is in dispute, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose it is everybody’s opinion.