318 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 14:28

Rebbi Huna said, a baraita implies that one does not heal through uncovering nakedness, as it was stated: The Sabbath was permitted in exceptional cases; the betrothed maiden was never permitted in exceptional cases. Was not the Sabbath permitted in exceptional cases for healing? The betrothed maiden was never permitted, not even for healing. Not only if one said to another, bring me a married woman, but even to hear her voice, as the following: In the days of Rebbi Eleazar a man loved a woman and fell dangerously ill. They came and asked him, should she parade before him that he may live? He said, he should die but not this. May he hear her voice and live? He said, he should die but not this. How was it? Rebbi Jacob bar Idi and Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman, one said, she was a married woman, but one said, she was single. One who said that she was a married woman we understand. But the one who said that she was single? Did not Bar Koḥa the carpenter love a woman in the days of Rebbi Eleazar and he permitted him? One case about a married woman and the other about a single one. Even you may say, here and here about a single one; explain it that he became infatuated with her when she still was married. Some want to say, she was a woman of substance and did not want to marry. Everything which he did was forbidden; therefore he did permit nothing to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat 14:28

Rebbi Huna said, a baraita implies that one does not heal through uncovering nakedness, as it was stated: The Sabbath was permitted in exceptional cases; the betrothed maiden was never permitted in exceptional cases. Was not the Sabbath permitted in exceptional cases for healing? The betrothed maiden was never permitted, not even for healing. Not only if one said to another, bring me a married woman, but even to hear her voice, as the following: In the days of Rebbi Eleazar a man loved a woman and fell dangerously ill. They came and asked him, should she parade before him that he may live? He said, he should die but not this. May he hear her voice and live? He said, he should die but not this. How was it? Rebbi Jacob bar Idi and Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman, one said, she was a married woman, but one said, she was single. One who said that she was a married woman we understand. But the one who said that she was single? Did not Bar Koḥa the carpenter love a woman in the days of Rebbi Eleazar and he permitted him? One case about a married woman and the other about a single one. Even you may say, here and here about a single one; explain it that he became infatuated with her when she still was married. Some want to say, she was a woman of substance and did not want to marry. Everything which he did was forbidden; therefore he did permit nothing to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 10:3

Rebbi Levi said, he who eats mazzah on Passover Eve is like one who sleeps with his betrothed in his father-in-law’s house, and he who sleeps with his betrothed in his father-in-law’s house is flogged. It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra says, both bread and mazzah are forbidden. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Rebbi ate neither bread nor mazzah. No mazzah because of that of Rebbi Levi, and no bread because of that of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Was Rebbi a student of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra? No, he was a student of Rebbi Jacob ben Qorshai. But it was because he was a firstborn. Rebbi Mana said, my father Rebbi Jonah was a firstborn and he ate. Rebbi Tanḥuma said, it is neither for this nor for that reason; Rebbi was asthenic and when he ate during the day, he could not eat in the night. Why did he not eat during this day? To enter the Sabbath with appetite.

Jerusalem Talmud Pesachim 10:3

Rebbi Levi said, he who eats mazzah on Passover Eve is like one who sleeps with his betrothed in his father-in-law’s house, and he who sleeps with his betrothed in his father-in-law’s house is flogged. It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra says, both bread and mazzah are forbidden. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Rebbi ate neither bread nor mazzah. No mazzah because of that of Rebbi Levi, and no bread because of that of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra. Was Rebbi a student of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra? No, he was a student of Rebbi Jacob ben Qorshai. But it was because he was a firstborn. Rebbi Mana said, my father Rebbi Jonah was a firstborn and he ate. Rebbi Tanḥuma said, it is neither for this nor for that reason; Rebbi was asthenic and when he ate during the day, he could not eat in the night. Why did he not eat during this day? To enter the Sabbath with appetite.

Jerusalem Talmud Chagigah 2:22

We have stated: Jehudah ben Ṭabbai was Patriarch, and Simeon ben Shetaḥ President of the Court; there are Tannaim who switch. What happened in Alexandria supports him who said, Jehudah ben Tabbai was Patriarch. [The people of Jerusalem] wanted to appoint him Patriarch in Jerusalem. The people from Jerusalem did write: From the great Jerusalem to the small Alexandria: How long still will my betrothed live in your midst and I am sitting sorrowful about him? He took leave and started on a ship. He said, I remember the lady of the house who received us; what is she missing? One of his students told him, her eye is damaged. He told him, you have sinned twice; first that you suspected me, and second that you looked at her. Did I say that she was beautiful in looks? I only said that about her deeds. He was taking offense and he left.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:47

HALAKHAH: “The House of Shammai permit the co-wives to the brothers,” etc. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Yose in the name ofNehorai: The reason of the House of Shammai, “the outside wife of the deceased shall not belong to a strange man,” the “outer one” should not be another man’s. It turns out that the House of Shammai hold like those Samaritans who perform levirate with the betrothed but remove the married, for they explain “outside” as “the outer one.” How do the House of Shammai confirm “when he has no child”? Rebbi Jacob the Southerner said before Rebbi Yose, “when he has no child” from the married one, “the outer one shall not belong outside to a strange man.” He said to him, will not the Samaritans love you that you confirm their interpretations! Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar stated: I told the learned Samaritans, what did cause you to err? That you did not explain following Rebbi Neḥemiah, since it was stated in the name of Rebbi Neḥemiah: Anything which needs a ל as a prefix but did not get it, we give it a ה at the end, e. g., to the outside חוּצָה, to Se‘ir שְׂעִירָה, to Succoth סוּכּוֹתָה. They objected to Rebbi Neḥemiah, is it not written: “The wicked shall return to the pit לִשְׁאוֹלָה.” Rabba bar Zabda said, to the lowest living space in Sheol.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:53

“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and one who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, i. e., he who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and that a woman receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and the child of the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and the child of the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai says unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel, one said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed its own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 1:53

“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and one who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, i. e., he who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and that a woman receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and the child of the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and the child of the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai says unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel, one said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed its own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:5

Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for qiddushin of a woman. Just as qiddushin acquire completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:42

HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case. What means, one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In qiddushin, the same holds. “ I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I gave her qiddushin,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry the wife.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “ This one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says, I gave her qiddushin. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betroth her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says. I gave her qiddushin and one of them jumped the gun and married her. But if he said, I gave her qiddushin and married her, and another one comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 2:42

HALAKHAH: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says”, etc. About what is he trustworthy? Samuel says, he is trusted to give a bill of divorce. Assi said, he is trusted to marry. Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: He is trusted to marry. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he is trusted to marry but one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case. What means, one does not infer from this ruling anything for another case? I sold one of my fields but I do not remember to whom I sold it. If someone comes and says, I bought it, he is not trusted in any way. In qiddushin, the same holds. “ I betrothed one of my daughters but I do not remember to whom I betrothed her. If someone comes and says, I gave her qiddushin,” he is not trusted in any way. The Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If somebody brings a bill of divorce from overseas and says, it was written and signed in my presence, he shall not marry the wife.” There, she is considered by everybody to be a married woman. Here, she is considered to be a married woman only by two persons. One waits until these two come and say, this is the man who gave her qiddushin. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “ This one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says, I gave her qiddushin. Both of them give a bill of divorce, but if they agree, one gives a bill of divorce and the other one marries.” He explains this, if [the father] says, I did betroth her to one of these two but I do not remember which one it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If one of them jumped the gun and married her, one does remove her from him. That is, if this one says, I gave her qiddushin, and that one says. I gave her qiddushin and one of them jumped the gun and married her. But if he said, I gave her qiddushin and married her, and another one comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way. It was stated thus: If after the marriage another man comes and says, I gave her qiddushin, he is not trusted in any way.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:19

Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna said: A betrothed woman who died does not have a ketubah since she was not permitted to marry outside. That you should not say [the case] should be considered as if he divorced her and she should have a ketubah; therefore it was necessary to say that she does not have a ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 4:34

MISHNAH: No sister-in-law should be a party to ḥalîṣah or levirate until after three months. Similarly, no woman should be married or receive qiddushin until after three months, whether virgin or not virgin, widow or divorcee, married or betrothed. Rebbi Jehudah says, those that had been married may receive qiddushin and those that had received qiddushin can be married except those that had received qiddushin in Judea because he is familiar with her. Rebbi Yose said, any woman may receive qiddushin except a widow because of her mourning.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 5:4

Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for qiddushin of a woman. Just as qiddushin acquire completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:6

“He acquired her and there is no difference between intercourse and intercourse.” What did he acquire? Samuel said, he acquired only the things spelled out in the paragraph: To inherit the deceased’s property, (to be betrothed by a brother), and to permit her co-wife to the outside. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he acquired everything. Rebbi Isaac ben Eleazar said, when do they disagree? If he touched her. But if he completed the intercourse, everybody agrees that he acquired everything. Rebbi Mattaniah said, when do they disagree? If he had intercourse with her still in her father’s house. But if he had intercourse with her still in her husband’s house, everybody agrees that he acquired everything. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah said: If he married her, she is his wife in every respect.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:10

MISHNAH: A widow betrothed to the High Priest, a divorcee or one who had participated in ḥalîṣah to a private Cohen are not permitted to eat heave; Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon declare them able. When they were widowed or divorced, after marriage they are disabled, after betrothal they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:11

HALAKHAH: “A widow to the High Priest,” etc. What is the reason of the rabbis? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if a girl will be betrothed to a man.” Just as “being” there means betrothal, so “being” here means betrothal. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon? “Being” is mentioned here and “being” is mentioned there, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”. Just as “being” there means marriage, so “being” here means marriage. Rebbi Yosa said, from where do Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon know that the daughter of a Cohen betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave? Not from that verse, “if the daughter of a Cohen will be an outside man’s”? Here they make it betrothal, there they make it marriage! What is the reason of the rabbis? “A man’s”, the man who enables to eat. Is it not an argument de minore ad majus? Since an Israel, whose intercourse does not disable her from the priesthood, by intercourse will disable her from eating heave, the High Priest, whose intercourse does disable her from the priesthood, it should be logical that his intercourse will disable her from eating heave. No. If you argue about an Israel who cannot enable others to eat, what can you say about the High Priest who can enable others to eat? Since he can enable others to eat, his intercourse should not disable her from eating heave. The argument de minore ad majus is broken, and one has to return to the verse. Therefore, it must say “a man’s”; viz., the man who enables her to eat. What is the reason of Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon, because he may eat or because he may enable to eat? Let us hear from the following: “If he did not know her after his testicles became injured or his penis cut off, these they enable to eat.” Rebbi Eleazar said, this follows Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon. You have to say, here it is because he enables to eat, there because he cannot enable to eat. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, not really from betrothal or marriage. If they had copulated whether betrothed or married, they are disabled; if they had not copulated whether betrothed or married, they are enabled.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:15

A sister injured by a piece of wood, Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon say, he shall not defile himself for her, but the Sages say, he must defile himself for her. Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon follow well what they have stated, but the argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “a girl”, not an adult, “a virgin”, not one injured by a piece of wood; and here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. There, “and for his virgin sister”, that excludes the raped and the seduced one. Or maybe I should exclude the one injured by a piece of wood? The verse says, “who had not been a man’s.” Who became [deflowered] through the action of a man, not one who became it through something else. “The close one”, to include the betrothed one. “To him”, to include the adult. The argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “the close one”, to exclude the betrothed one, “to him”, to exclude the divorcee. And here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. “His sister” is always inside [the family] until she leaves; his betrothed is always outside until she enters.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:15

A sister injured by a piece of wood, Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon say, he shall not defile himself for her, but the Sages say, he must defile himself for her. Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon follow well what they have stated, but the argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “a girl”, not an adult, “a virgin”, not one injured by a piece of wood; and here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. There, “and for his virgin sister”, that excludes the raped and the seduced one. Or maybe I should exclude the one injured by a piece of wood? The verse says, “who had not been a man’s.” Who became [deflowered] through the action of a man, not one who became it through something else. “The close one”, to include the betrothed one. “To him”, to include the adult. The argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “the close one”, to exclude the betrothed one, “to him”, to exclude the divorcee. And here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. “His sister” is always inside [the family] until she leaves; his betrothed is always outside until she enters.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:15

A sister injured by a piece of wood, Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon say, he shall not defile himself for her, but the Sages say, he must defile himself for her. Rebbi Meїr and Rebbi Simeon follow well what they have stated, but the argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “a girl”, not an adult, “a virgin”, not one injured by a piece of wood; and here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. There, “and for his virgin sister”, that excludes the raped and the seduced one. Or maybe I should exclude the one injured by a piece of wood? The verse says, “who had not been a man’s.” Who became [deflowered] through the action of a man, not one who became it through something else. “The close one”, to include the betrothed one. “To him”, to include the adult. The argument of Sages seems inverted. There, they say “the close one”, to exclude the betrothed one, “to him”, to exclude the divorcee. And here, they say so? Rebbi Hila said, every interpretation follows its context. “His sister” is always inside [the family] until she leaves; his betrothed is always outside until she enters.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:18

He tricked her. He borrowed a בדיומה and seated his mother next to her. She heard and accepted. And we have stated: “If she has a reputation in town to be betrothed, then she is betrothed.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 6:18

He tricked her. He borrowed a בדיומה and seated his mother next to her. She heard and accepted. And we have stated: “If she has a reputation in town to be betrothed, then she is betrothed.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:14

“If there are males they enable to eat, females do not enable to eat.” If there are males, they enable to eat since there is one doubt, whether he is male or female. A doubt in biblical matters forces restriction. Females do not enable to eat since there are two doubts, whether he is male or female, (after she was betrothed or maybe before she was betrothed.) A doubt regarding their words forces leniency. However you take it, if he is male, everything is his. Female, she takes her part with them.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:14

“If there are males they enable to eat, females do not enable to eat.” If there are males, they enable to eat since there is one doubt, whether he is male or female. A doubt in biblical matters forces restriction. Females do not enable to eat since there are two doubts, whether he is male or female, (after she was betrothed or maybe before she was betrothed.) A doubt regarding their words forces leniency. However you take it, if he is male, everything is his. Female, she takes her part with them.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 7:16

HALAKHAH: “The fetus, the levir, the betrothal,” etc. Rebbi Simeon said, here the logic is deficient, for if it is action to disable it also should be action to enable, and if it is not action to disable it also should not be action to enable. Rebbi Simeon is correct; what is the reason of the rabbis? “They shall eat”, they shall enable to eat. The one who may eat enables to eat, the one who may not eat cannot enable to eat. They objected: there is the bastard who may not eat and he enables to eat! There is a difference, since it is written “born in the house”. Then the born should enable, the not born should not enable! There is a difference, since it is written “and she returns to her father’s house”, to exclude the one waiting for the levir, “in her youth”, to exclude the pregnant one. Rebbi Yose said, that means that they considered pregnancy to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat. The words of the rabbis disagree since Ze‘ira said, there they state that the betrothed, the one waiting for the levir, and the pregnant, pay the capital but not the fifth. What are we speaking about? If about the daughter of a Cohen married to an Israel, even if she had children from him she is not an outsider for it. But we must deal with the daughter of an Israel married to a Cohen. If you say, they considered the fetus to be real to disable but did not consider it real to enable to eat, why does she pay the capital but not the fifth, should she not pay capital and fifth?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:51

Is there nobody who disagrees with Rebbi Jehudah? Since Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rebbi Hila, one marries his wife in levirate, that means that nobody disagrees with Rebbi Jehudah. If he betrothed, his betrothal is not problematic. If he was betrothed, his betrothal is problematic. If he was copulated with, he becomes disabled from heave like a woman. That is difficult. Rebbi Niḥa bar Rebbi Sava, Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rav Hamnuna: Even with his own kind in any case. That is difficult, if he is a male, no male disables a male. If she is a female, no female disables a female. The male aspect of one disables the female aspect of the other. He enables his wives to eat but does not enable his slaves. He enables his wives to eat by his male aspect. But he does not enable his slaves because of his double aspect; his female aspect was desecrated.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 8:51

Is there nobody who disagrees with Rebbi Jehudah? Since Rebbi Yose said in the name of Rebbi Hila, one marries his wife in levirate, that means that nobody disagrees with Rebbi Jehudah. If he betrothed, his betrothal is not problematic. If he was betrothed, his betrothal is problematic. If he was copulated with, he becomes disabled from heave like a woman. That is difficult. Rebbi Niḥa bar Rebbi Sava, Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rav Hamnuna: Even with his own kind in any case. That is difficult, if he is a male, no male disables a male. If she is a female, no female disables a female. The male aspect of one disables the female aspect of the other. He enables his wives to eat but does not enable his slaves. He enables his wives to eat by his male aspect. But he does not enable his slaves because of his double aspect; his female aspect was desecrated.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:1

MISHNAH: There exist women permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their levirs, permitted to their levirs but forbidden to their husbands, permitted to both of them, or forbidden to both. The following are permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their levirs: If a simple priest was betrothed to a widow and has a brother who is High Priest, or a qualified man married a qualified woman and has a disqualified brother, or an Israel married an Israelite woman and has a bastard brother, or a bastard married a bastard woman and has an Israel brother, [the women] are permitted to their husbands and forbidden for their levirs.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:2

HALAKHAH: “There exist women permitted to their husbands,” etc. Rebbi Niḥa bar Sava asked before Rebbi Jonah: Why “married”? Even “betrothed”! Why a widow? even a virgin! Are these all? She and her co-wife. I also have others: The co-wife of one suspected of adultery is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. If his brother had slept with the sister of one who had performed ḥalîṣah with him, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. This supports Rebbi Jonah, since Rebbi Jonah said, the groupings of Rebbi are not exhaustive.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:4

MISHNAH: These are permitted to their levirs and forbidden to their husbands: If a High Priest was betrothed to a widow and has a brother who is a simple priest, or qualified [priest] married a disqualified woman and has a disqualified brother, or an Israel married a bastard woman and has a bastard brother, or a bastard who married an Israel woman and has an Israel brother; [the women] are permitted to their levirs and forbidden to their husbands.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:5

HALAKHAH: “The following are permitted to their husbands,” etc. He only said “betrothed”, but if he copulated with her, the copulation disqualifies her. That is what we stated: “Forbidden to both of them.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:18

MISHNAH: An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave. An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite, or pregnant from a Levite, or waiting for her Levite levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat tithe. A Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen may not eat either heave or tithe.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:18

MISHNAH: An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave. An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite, or pregnant from a Levite, or waiting for her Levite levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat tithe. A Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen may not eat either heave or tithe.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:18

MISHNAH: An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave. An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite, or pregnant from a Levite, or waiting for her Levite levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat tithe. A Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen may not eat either heave or tithe.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:18

MISHNAH: An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave. An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite, or pregnant from a Levite, or waiting for her Levite levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat tithe. A Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen may not eat either heave or tithe.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:18

MISHNAH: An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave. An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite, or pregnant from a Levite, or waiting for her Levite levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat tithe. A Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen may not eat either heave or tithe.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:18

MISHNAH: An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat heave. An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite, or pregnant from a Levite, or waiting for her Levite levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to an Israel may not eat tithe. A Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen, or pregnant from a Cohen, or waiting for her Cohen levir, and also a Levite woman betrothed to a Cohen may not eat either heave or tithe.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:19

HALAKHAH: “An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen.” “Any pure person in your house may eat it,” but she is not in his house. “From a Cohen”, for the one born in his house; this one is not born in his house. “The one waiting for her Cohen levir,” “any pure person in your house may eat it,” but she is not in his house. “And also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel,” “a daughter of a Cohen when she will belong to an outside man.” One pregnant from an Israel or waiting for an Israel levir: “When she returns to her father’s house,” that excludes the one waiting for her levir, “as in her youth,” that excludes the pregnant one.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:19

HALAKHAH: “An Israel woman betrothed to a Cohen.” “Any pure person in your house may eat it,” but she is not in his house. “From a Cohen”, for the one born in his house; this one is not born in his house. “The one waiting for her Cohen levir,” “any pure person in your house may eat it,” but she is not in his house. “And also a Cohen woman betrothed to an Israel,” “a daughter of a Cohen when she will belong to an outside man.” One pregnant from an Israel or waiting for an Israel levir: “When she returns to her father’s house,” that excludes the one waiting for her levir, “as in her youth,” that excludes the pregnant one.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:20

“An Israel woman betrothed to a Levite,” “you and your house” but she is not in his house. “Pregnant from a Levite,” “born in the house,” this one is not born in his house. Rebbi Yose said, is not “born in the house” written only for a Cohen? As you say there, whoever is born lets eat, whoever is not born does not let eat; here also whoever is born lets eat, whoever is not born does not let eat. “Waiting for her Levite levir,” “you and your house,” but he is not in her house. “And also a Levite woman”: “And a daughter of a Cohen when she will belong to an outside man.” Is there not written “daughter of a Cohen”? Rebbi Yose said “daughter”, whether she is a Cohen’s or a Levi’s. The daughter of a Cohen who was married to an Israel may return and eat, the daughter of an Israel who was married to a Cohen may return and not eat. One pregnant from an Israel or waiting for an Israel levir: “When she returns to her father’s house,” that excludes the one waiting for her levir, “as in her youth,” that excludes the pregnant one.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:21

“A Levitic woman betrothed to a Cohen.” “Any pure person in your house may eat it,” but he is not in her house. “From a Cohen”, for the one born in his house; this one is not born in his house. “The one waiting for her Cohen levir,” “any pure person in your house may eat it,” but she is not in his house. “Similarly, the daughter of a Cohen [betrothed] to a Levite should eat neither heave nor tithe.” We understand that she should not eat heave. But tithe any way you take it, if she is a Cohen’s daughter she should eat, if she is a Levite’s wife she should eat. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: [It follows] him who says one does not give tithe to Cohanim. That means, he himself says one gives heave to Cohanim.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 9:21

“A Levitic woman betrothed to a Cohen.” “Any pure person in your house may eat it,” but he is not in her house. “From a Cohen”, for the one born in his house; this one is not born in his house. “The one waiting for her Cohen levir,” “any pure person in your house may eat it,” but she is not in his house. “Similarly, the daughter of a Cohen [betrothed] to a Levite should eat neither heave nor tithe.” We understand that she should not eat heave. But tithe any way you take it, if she is a Cohen’s daughter she should eat, if she is a Levite’s wife she should eat. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: [It follows] him who says one does not give tithe to Cohanim. That means, he himself says one gives heave to Cohanim.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:2

HALAKHAH: “A woman’s husband went overseas,” etc. As you say there, “these women one separates for three months to see whether they are pregnant. If they were minors not yet able to have a child one returns them at once.” Should one not say the same here? There is a difference, since there others deceived them. Did here not also others deceive them? They instituted a fine so that she should investigate carefully. Then they should fine her with respect to the second [husband] but not with respect to the first! Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Then she should not need a bill of divorce from him! There is a difference since she was married to him in a lawful manner. Samuel said, I say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas. Rebbi Ḥaggai objected before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Did we not state: “If they said to her, your husband has died, she was betrothed and then her husband came, she is permitted to return to him.” If you say, maybe he sent her a bill of divorce from overseas; should she not be forbidden to return to him? But it must follow Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, as Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, from betrothal it is permitted. Did Rebbi Yose ben Kipper not agree that if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce that she was not disabled from priesthood? As we have stated, “even if the second husband gave her a bill of divorce, she was not disabled from priesthood.” The rabbis of Caesarea in the name of Rebbi Hila: In order to make clear the prohibition of the first.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:20

A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was betrothed, and two are saying, she was not betrothed, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was betrothed and divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others would come and identify the man who was betrothed to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:20

A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was betrothed, and two are saying, she was not betrothed, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was betrothed and divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others would come and identify the man who was betrothed to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:20

A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was betrothed, and two are saying, she was not betrothed, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was betrothed and divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others would come and identify the man who was betrothed to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:20

A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was betrothed, and two are saying, she was not betrothed, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was betrothed and divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not be married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others would come and identify the man who was betrothed to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:22

If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two would say, X ate fat, and two would say, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not be married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:22

If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two would say, X ate fat, and two would say, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not be married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:22

If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two would say, X ate fat, and two would say, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not be married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:22

If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two would say, X ate fat, and two would say, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not be married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:25

MISHNAH: If they told her, your husband died, and she remarried, and then they told her, he was alive but died, she must leave and the first child is a bastard, but the last is not a bastard. If they told her, your husband died; she was betrothed and after that her husband returned, she is permitted to return to him. Even though the second [husband] gave her a bill of divorce he did not disable her from priesthood. This Rebbi Eleazar ben Matthew explained, “a woman divorced from her husband,” and not a woman divorced from a non-husband.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:26

HALAKHAH: “If they told her, your husband died,” etc. “If they told her, your husband died; she was betrothed,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Her only problem would be aspersion on the priesthood, but the court will not tolerate aspersion.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:33

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 10:33

The elder Rebbi Hoshaia said, the baraita is about someone who takes back his divorcee after she had been married to another. Why after she had been married, not also after she had been betrothed? Because of Rebbi Yose ben Kipper, since Rebbi Yose ben Kipper said, she is permitted after betrothal. Rebbi Eleazar said, the baraita is about a sister-in-law who became eligible before two levirs, when one of them “bespoke” her and then the other copulated with her. Why when one of them “bespoke” her, even if he had not “bespoken” her! Why if he copulated with her, even if he did not copulate with her! Because of the House of Shammai, because of Rebbi Simeon. As it was stated, Rebbi Simeon said, the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel did not disagree that one who copulates with his wife’s sister disables his wife. Where did they disagree? If he copulates with his mother-in-law; where the House of Shammai say, he disabled her, but the House of Hillel say, he did not disable her. The House of Hillel were arguing: A man is permitted all women, a woman is permitted all men. When he becomes betrothed to her, he forbids her and she forbids him. The prohibition through which he forbids her is greater than the prohibition through which she forbids him, since he forbids her to go to marry any other man but she forbids him only her relatives. And is that not an argument de minore ad majus? If she, whose prohibition is greater, transgressed the prohibition in error, is not forbidden even to the one permitted to her, he, whose prohibition is less, if he transgressed the prohibition in error, is it not logical that he should not be forbidden even to the one permitted to him? That works for an error. From where if intentional: The verse says “with her;” her sleeping prohibits her, the sleeping of another woman does not prohibit her.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 11:5

It is written: “If a man takes a woman and her mother, it is taboo.” Everywhere is written “lying with” but here is written “taking”, to teach you that he cannot be guilty for the second [woman] unless the first one is prepared for him. Or maybe only by marriage? We already said that there is no incestuous marriage. But is it not written: “Nobody may marry his father’s wife, and he should not uncover his father’s garment’s corner”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before his father married her. But is it not written: “If a man take his brother’s wife, it is despicable”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before his brother married her. This is confirmed by levirate. But is it not written: “You should not take a woman in addition to her sister to make her a co-wife”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before he married her sister. This is confirmed after her sister’s death. But is it not written: “A man who would take his sister, his father’s daughter or his mother’s daughter; he sees her genitals and she sees his genitals, it is ḥesed.” Rebbi Avin said, that you should not say that Kain married his sister, Abel married his sister, “it is charitable”, I was charitable with the first generations so the world could be inhabited; “I said, the world was built on ḥesed.” But is it not written: “Widow, divorcee, and desecrated, these he shall not take”? This comes to tell you that if he became betrothed to her that the betrothal is valid.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:1

MISHNAH: The House of Shammai say, one makes only betrothed girls repudiate. The House of Hillel say, betrothed or married. The House of Shammai say, the husband, but the House of Hillel say, the husband or the levir. The House of Shammai say, in his presence, but the House of Hillel say, in his presence or in his absence. The House of Shammai say, in a court of law, but the House of Hillel say, in a court or outside a court. The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: An underage girl may repudiate even four or five times. The House of Shammai said to them: The daughters of Israel are not abandoned property! But she repudiates, waits until she is of age, or repudiates and is married.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:1

MISHNAH: The House of Shammai say, one makes only betrothed girls repudiate. The House of Hillel say, betrothed or married. The House of Shammai say, the husband, but the House of Hillel say, the husband or the levir. The House of Shammai say, in his presence, but the House of Hillel say, in his presence or in his absence. The House of Shammai say, in a court of law, but the House of Hillel say, in a court or outside a court. The House of Hillel said to the House of Shammai: An underage girl may repudiate even four or five times. The House of Shammai said to them: The daughters of Israel are not abandoned property! But she repudiates, waits until she is of age, or repudiates and is married.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:2

HALAKHAH: “The House of Shammai say, one permits repudiation,” etc. There, we have stated: “Rebbi Jehudah bar Abba testified to five statements: That one makes underage girls repudiate, … ” Does one disagree with testimony? One disagrees about the essence of the testimony. So was the essence of the testimony: “The House of Shammai say, one makes only betrothed girls repudiate, but the House of Hillel say, betrothed or married”. It is difficult following the House of Hillel! Her marriage permitted her, he has the right to what she finds and earns, to dissolve her vows, and she is his wife in every respect. And you say so? They gave you of your own. By right, her marriage should not be a marriage. They said that her marriage is a marriage and they said that she may repudiate him and leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:2

HALAKHAH: “The House of Shammai say, one permits repudiation,” etc. There, we have stated: “Rebbi Jehudah bar Abba testified to five statements: That one makes underage girls repudiate, … ” Does one disagree with testimony? One disagrees about the essence of the testimony. So was the essence of the testimony: “The House of Shammai say, one makes only betrothed girls repudiate, but the House of Hillel say, betrothed or married”. It is difficult following the House of Hillel! Her marriage permitted her, he has the right to what she finds and earns, to dissolve her vows, and she is his wife in every respect. And you say so? They gave you of your own. By right, her marriage should not be a marriage. They said that her marriage is a marriage and they said that she may repudiate him and leave.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:3

What is the reason of the House of Shammai? If you say so, you make all intercourse he had with her intercourse of harlotry. Rebbi Abin said, it turns out that the House of Shammai hold with Rebbi Eleazar as Rebbi Eleazar said, intercourse of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman not with the intent of marriage is intercourse of harlotry. That means, for the House of Shammai her repudiation is nothing if she transgressed and repudiated after marriage. If she entered the bridal chamber but had no intercourse yet, what is her status? As betrothed or as married? If she is betrothed in Judea where he is familiar with her, what is her status? As betrothed or as married?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:3

What is the reason of the House of Shammai? If you say so, you make all intercourse he had with her intercourse of harlotry. Rebbi Abin said, it turns out that the House of Shammai hold with Rebbi Eleazar as Rebbi Eleazar said, intercourse of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman not with the intent of marriage is intercourse of harlotry. That means, for the House of Shammai her repudiation is nothing if she transgressed and repudiated after marriage. If she entered the bridal chamber but had no intercourse yet, what is her status? As betrothed or as married? If she is betrothed in Judea where he is familiar with her, what is her status? As betrothed or as married?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:3

What is the reason of the House of Shammai? If you say so, you make all intercourse he had with her intercourse of harlotry. Rebbi Abin said, it turns out that the House of Shammai hold with Rebbi Eleazar as Rebbi Eleazar said, intercourse of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman not with the intent of marriage is intercourse of harlotry. That means, for the House of Shammai her repudiation is nothing if she transgressed and repudiated after marriage. If she entered the bridal chamber but had no intercourse yet, what is her status? As betrothed or as married? If she is betrothed in Judea where he is familiar with her, what is her status? As betrothed or as married?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:13

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: It happened that a girl went to wash at the river when they said to her, your betrothed is passing by. She said, let my mother go and marry him! When the case came before the Sages, they said that there is no repudiation stronger than that. Rebbi Ḥanina said, It happened that a girl went to buy flax from the flax dealer when they said to her, your betrothed is passing by. She said, let my mother go and marry him! When the case came before the Sages, they said that there is no repudiation stronger than that. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah: “Even if she went to buy something at the store and said, I cannot endure my husband X, there is no repudiation stronger than this.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:13

Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi: It happened that a girl went to wash at the river when they said to her, your betrothed is passing by. She said, let my mother go and marry him! When the case came before the Sages, they said that there is no repudiation stronger than that. Rebbi Ḥanina said, It happened that a girl went to buy flax from the flax dealer when they said to her, your betrothed is passing by. She said, let my mother go and marry him! When the case came before the Sages, they said that there is no repudiation stronger than that. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Jehudah: “Even if she went to buy something at the store and said, I cannot endure my husband X, there is no repudiation stronger than this.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:15

So is the Mishnah: Or she should repudiate him and marry. Therefore, she cannot get herself betrothed. That means, if she transgresses and repudiated after marriage, the House of Shammai recognize her act of repudiation. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya: A rumor spreads for a married woman but not for a betrothed one. A woman might hide herself and say, I was not betrothed, but she will not be able to hide herself and say, I did not marry.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:15

So is the Mishnah: Or she should repudiate him and marry. Therefore, she cannot get herself betrothed. That means, if she transgresses and repudiated after marriage, the House of Shammai recognize her act of repudiation. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya: A rumor spreads for a married woman but not for a betrothed one. A woman might hide herself and say, I was not betrothed, but she will not be able to hide herself and say, I did not marry.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:15

So is the Mishnah: Or she should repudiate him and marry. Therefore, she cannot get herself betrothed. That means, if she transgresses and repudiated after marriage, the House of Shammai recognize her act of repudiation. Rebbi Abba in the name of Rebbi Tanḥum bar Ḥiyya: A rumor spreads for a married woman but not for a betrothed one. A woman might hide herself and say, I was not betrothed, but she will not be able to hide herself and say, I did not marry.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:34

“Two brothers are married,” etc. Rebbi Yudan: One may ask what one asked there. Should he not perform ḥalîṣah for the acquired aspect in her and free her co-wife? So here, should he not perform ḥalîṣah for the acquired aspect in the underage girl and free her (co-wife) [sister]? Before you find Rebbi Eleazar difficult, you might find Rebbi Eliezer difficult! You cannot find this difficult for Rebbi Eliezer, since Rebbi Eliezer is a Shammaite and the House of Shammai say, one lets only the betrothed [women] repudiate?

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 13:37

So is the Mishnah: The underage girl should wait until she grows up, reaches puberty, and is being married. Rebbi Eleazar said, there is no “being married” here, only “being betrothed.” Rebbi Joḥanban said, these are the words of Rabban Gamliel: If somebody gave qiddušin to his sister-in-law’s sister, his sister-in-law was freed from ḥalîṣah and levirate. It follows that what we had stated there, “if somebody gave qiddušin to the sister of a woman waiting for her levir” does not follow Rabban Gamliel.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 14:3

The Mishnah applies if he became betrothed to her by money. But if he became betrothed to her by copulation, his betrothal is an action but his divorce is not an action.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 14:3

The Mishnah applies if he became betrothed to her by money. But if he became betrothed to her by copulation, his betrothal is an action but his divorce is not an action.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:12

The House of Shammai insist on interpretation of the ketubah. As the House of Shammai explain, we can infer that from the text of her ketubah document in which he writes: “If you would be married to another man you shall take the amount I wrote for you.” The House of Hillel reversed themselves and taught following the House of Shammai. The House of Hillel insist on interpretation of the ketubah. Hillel the Elder explained it, using the vernacular. In Alexandria they were writing that a man there became betrothed to a woman. Another man abducted her from a public place. When this came before the Sages, they intended to declare [the children] as bastards. Hillel the Elder told them, bring your mothers’ ketubah. They brough their mothers’ ketubah. They found written there: “When you enter my house you shall be my wife according to the laws of Moses and the Jews.”

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:32

HALAKHAH: “If he was betrothed to one.” Should she not be trusted to say “my father-in-law died”? Did we not hold that just as they are not trusted about her so she is not trusted about them? Rebbi Ḥanina said, explain it if her father-in-law was there and she described the circumstances.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:33

MISHNAH: If he became betrothed to one of five women but it cannot be ascertained to which of them he became betrothed, and each one says he became betrothed to me, he gives a bill of divorce to each of them, puts up the amount of one ketubah between them and removes himself, the words of Rebbi Tarphon. Rebbi Aqiba says, in this way one does not remove him from sin unless he gives a bill of divorce and pays the ketubah to each of them. He robbed one of five people, it is not known which of them he robbed and each one says “I was robbed”, he puts up the amount of the robbery between them and removes himself, the words of Rebbi Tarphon. Rebbi Aqiba says, in this way one does not remove him from sin unless he pays the amount of the robbery to each of them.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:33

MISHNAH: If he became betrothed to one of five women but it cannot be ascertained to which of them he became betrothed, and each one says he became betrothed to me, he gives a bill of divorce to each of them, puts up the amount of one ketubah between them and removes himself, the words of Rebbi Tarphon. Rebbi Aqiba says, in this way one does not remove him from sin unless he gives a bill of divorce and pays the ketubah to each of them. He robbed one of five people, it is not known which of them he robbed and each one says “I was robbed”, he puts up the amount of the robbery between them and removes himself, the words of Rebbi Tarphon. Rebbi Aqiba says, in this way one does not remove him from sin unless he pays the amount of the robbery to each of them.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:33

MISHNAH: If he became betrothed to one of five women but it cannot be ascertained to which of them he became betrothed, and each one says he became betrothed to me, he gives a bill of divorce to each of them, puts up the amount of one ketubah between them and removes himself, the words of Rebbi Tarphon. Rebbi Aqiba says, in this way one does not remove him from sin unless he gives a bill of divorce and pays the ketubah to each of them. He robbed one of five people, it is not known which of them he robbed and each one says “I was robbed”, he puts up the amount of the robbery between them and removes himself, the words of Rebbi Tarphon. Rebbi Aqiba says, in this way one does not remove him from sin unless he pays the amount of the robbery to each of them.

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:34

HALAKHAH: [(He robbed one of five people). Rebbi Abun said, the Mishnah deals with the case that she was betrothed by a document. But if he was betrothed by money, everybody agrees that he gives a bill of divorce and pays the ketubah to each of them.]

Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot 15:34

HALAKHAH: [(He robbed one of five people). Rebbi Abun said, the Mishnah deals with the case that she was betrothed by a document. But if he was betrothed by money, everybody agrees that he gives a bill of divorce and pays the ketubah to each of them.]

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 8:26

MISHNAH: “ Who is the man who became betrothed to a woman and did not take her,” etc. Not only one betrothed to a virgin, even one betrothed to a widow, even to one who waits for her brother-in-law. Even if he heard that his brother had died in the war he then returns and leaves. All those who listen to the Cohen in the front lines return and provide food and water and improve the roads.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 8:26

MISHNAH: “ Who is the man who became betrothed to a woman and did not take her,” etc. Not only one betrothed to a virgin, even one betrothed to a widow, even to one who waits for her brother-in-law. Even if he heard that his brother had died in the war he then returns and leaves. All those who listen to the Cohen in the front lines return and provide food and water and improve the roads.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 8:26

MISHNAH: “ Who is the man who became betrothed to a woman and did not take her,” etc. Not only one betrothed to a virgin, even one betrothed to a widow, even to one who waits for her brother-in-law. Even if he heard that his brother had died in the war he then returns and leaves. All those who listen to the Cohen in the front lines return and provide food and water and improve the roads.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 8:27

HALAKHAH: “Who became betrothed”. Not only a young man who married a young woman. From where even a young man who married a widow, a widower who married a young woman, a widower who married a widow? From where? The verse says, “a woman”, of any kind. Why does the verse say, “new”? That excludes him who remarries his divorcee. Rebbi Yose said, this implies that one who marries a sheram does not return since he has no religious obligation to live with her.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:11

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:11

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:11

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:11

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:11

Rebbi Joḥanan said, it was stated thus: “Two [witnesses] say he died, [later] two witnesses say, he did not die. She shall not remarry, but if she has remarried she should not leave. Two [witnesses] say she was divorced, [later] two witnesses say, she was not divorced. She shall not remarry; if she has remarried she must leave.” There, they say, it makes no difference; whether about death or divorce she should not leave. In the opinion of the rabbis there it is understandable, there is no difference between death and divorce. In the opinion of the rabbis here, what is the difference between death and divorce? Rebbi Ze‘ira said it without attribution, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: It is reasonable to decide in the case of witnesses of death that if he returns he contradicts them. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, the rabbis there stick to their opinion since the rabbis there say, when the [first] testimony was accepted, it was accepted as certain. So the rabbis here say, at the moment of her remarriage, she remarried based on certified testimony. Rebbi Yose said, it is reasonable that the rabbis there did not change their argument. Do the rabbis there not agree if two [witnesses] say, his father died while in possession, [and two say his father died while not in possession,] that the field is in Reuben’s possession? Therefore, if two say, she was divorced and remarried, and two say she was not divorced, rightly she should not leave. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was preliminarily married, and two are saying, she was not preliminarily married, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, Rebbi Joḥanan may explain it as follows: “If two are saying, she was divorced, and two are saying, she was not divorced, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” What is the difference between this and the first case? There, she was considered a married woman in everybody’s opinion. Here, she is considered a married woman only for two people. If two others came and identified the man who was betrothed to her. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “If two are saying, she was kidnapped but is pure, and two are saying, she was kidnapped and is impure, she should not get married, but if she married she should not leave.” Rebbi Yose said, since these say, she is pure, and those say, she is impure, it is as if two said, she was kidnapped, and two said, she was not kidnapped, and we depend on what she says. If two are saying, she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed. Rebbi Jonah compares that to fat. If two said, X ate fat, and two said, X did not eat fat, did he not have to bring a “hung” reparation sacrifice because of the doubt? Here, he should give a bill of divorce because of the doubt. Rebbi Yose said to him, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice. A baraita disagrees with Rebbi Yose: If two are saying she had been betrothed and two are saying she had not been betrothed, she should not get married. The end disagrees with Rebbi Jonah: If she married she must leave. Rebbi Mana said, Rebbi Yose did not say that she may marry, nor did Rebbi Jonah say if she married she must leave, he said only, do not compare this to fat, because even if he says my conscience bothers me, he brings a “hung” reparation sacrifice.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:39

The House of Hillel insist on interpretation of the ketubah. Hillel the Elder explained it, using the vernacular. In Alexandria they were writing that a man there became betrothed to a woman. Another man abducted her from a public place. When this came before the Sages, they intended to declare [the children] as bastards. Hillel the Elder told them, bring your mothers’ ketubah. They brough their mothers’ ketubah. They found written there: “When you enter my house you shall be my wife according to the laws of Moses and the Jews.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:3

Rebbi Phineas asked before Rebbi Yose, why did we not state it with the leniencies of the House of Shammai and the stringencies of the House of Hillel? He said to him, the Mishnaiot apply only to circumstances that are either stringent on both sides or lenient on both sides. But here it is a stringency on one side and a leniency on the other side. But did we not state: “The House of Shammai say, property abandoned to the poor [is abandoned]?” Is this not lenient for the poor and stringent for the householder, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the poor and not stringent for the householder, since he intentionally abandoned it. He said to him, did we not state: “If the sheaf that was near a closure, a stack, cattle, or vessels was forgotten,” is this not lenient for the householder and stringent for the poor, and it was stated! He said to him, it is lenient for the householder but not stringent for the poor, because they did not acquire it yet. You may also say here, it is lenient for the woman and not stringent for the husband since he did not yet acquire property rights to it. He said to him, since he became betrothed to her, the inheritance fell to both of them.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:27

Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rav Hamnuna said: A betrothed woman who died does not have a ketubah since she was not permitted to marry outside. That you should not say [the case] should be considered as if he divorced her and she should have a ketubah; therefore it was necessary to say that she does not have a ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:10

So far for Israel. For the Gentiles? Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: It is written “you shall die because of the woman whom you took, since she is having marital relations with a husband.” They are guilty for those having marital relations; they are not guilty for the betrothed. The words of Rebbi Eleazar imply, only if he had intention of acquiring her; the words of Samuel imply, even if he had no intention of acquiring her; since Rebbi Jonah said in the name of Samuel: “A prostitute stands in a window. Two men sleep with her. The first one is not killed, the second one is killed because of him.” But did the first one intend to acquire her?

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:11

“A man.” Why does the verse say, “any man”? To include that Gentiles who committed adultery or incest by Gentile rules should be judged by Gentile law, but if they committed adultery with a Jewishwoman, one judges them by Jewish law. Rebbi Eleazar said, of all of them there is only the Jewish betrothed, for if he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty, with a betrothed Gentile woman he cannot be prosecuted. If he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty. How is he found to be guilty? By their rules or by Jewish rules? If you say by Jewish rules, by two witnesses, 23 judges, after warning, and by stoning. If you say by their rules, by one witness, one judge, without warning, and by the sword.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:11

“A man.” Why does the verse say, “any man”? To include that Gentiles who committed adultery or incest by Gentile rules should be judged by Gentile law, but if they committed adultery with a Jewishwoman, one judges them by Jewish law. Rebbi Eleazar said, of all of them there is only the Jewish betrothed, for if he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty, with a betrothed Gentile woman he cannot be prosecuted. If he had intercourse with a Jewish preliminarily married woman he is guilty. How is he found to be guilty? By their rules or by Jewish rules? If you say by Jewish rules, by two witnesses, 23 judges, after warning, and by stoning. If you say by their rules, by one witness, one judge, without warning, and by the sword.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:21

“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:21

“Even though the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel disagreed about co-wives, and sisters, and an old bill of divorce, and a woman doubtfully married, and someone who gives qiddushin in the value of a peruṭa, and someone who divorces his wife and spends the night with her in a hostelry, and a woman who receives qiddushin for at least a denar or the value of a denar, the House of Shammai did not refrain from marrying women from the House of Hillel or the House of Hillel from the House of Shammai but they behave truthfully and in peace, as it is said: ‘Love truth and peace.’ ” Bastardy is between them and you say so? How is that? If a first man gives her qiddushin for a peruṭa and a second [gives her afterwards)] for a denar, in the opinion of the House of Shammai she is betrothed to the second and her child by the first is a bastard. In the opinion of the House of Hillel she is betrothed to the first and her child by the second is a bastard. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The House of Shammai concede to the House of Hillel as a restriction. In that case, the House of Shammai should marry women from the House of Hillel since they concede to them. But the House of Hillel should not marry women from the House of Shammai since they do not concede to them. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: They all followed the same practice. If they followed the same practice, in this case we stated: “The House of Shammai sent and diminished it, since the House of Shammai say unless most of it is missing?” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, the House of Shammai acted before the question came before the House of Hillel. After a question came before the House of Hillel, the House of Shammai were not touching it. Rebbi Abba Mari said, that is correct. Did we not state: “They declared impure all purities from before”, but not in the future. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, Rav and Samuel disagreed. One said both acted according to valid practice; the other said, each party followed their own practice. Bastardy is between them and you say so? The Omnipresent watched and no case ever happened.

Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin 1:30

Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh says, “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the argument of Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh? “And take her as a wife for himself”, the same expression is used as for the preliminary marriage of a woman. Just as preliminary marriage acquires completely, so “bespeaking” acquires a sister-in-law completely. What is the formula for “bespeaking” a sister-in-law? “You are betrothed to me by money or money’s worth.”