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4530 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
New paragraph. “Properties not subject to the laws of misappropriation of sancta.” As it was stated: “These properties are acquired together with properties subject to the laws of misappropriation of sancta.” Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel: This follows Rebbi Yose the Galilean, as it was stated: “ ‘He commits larceny before the Eternal,’ Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, this includes simple sancta. Ben Azzai says, this includes well-being sacrifices. Abba Yose ben Dosai says, Ben Azzai said this only for the firstling.” What is between them? He who says well-being sacrifices certainly include tithes. But he who says tithes excludes the firstling. “Rebbi Simeon says, both most holy and simple sancta; about any sancta for which he is responsible if alienated, I am reading ‘against his neighbor and he lied’; but about any sancta for which he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading ‘against the Eternal and he lied’ ”. Rav Huna said, both qualified and disqualified sancta, if he is responsible if alienated, even if they are for the Eternal, I am reading “against his fellow and he denied”, but if he is not responsible if alienated, I am reading “against the Eternal and he lied” but not “against his fellow and he lied”.
New paragraph. “Properties of people of the Covenant,” excluding cattle of a Jew which gored cattle of a Gentile. “Private property,” excluding ownerless property. “Except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” who cannot be sued. “But [the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage.” Rebbi Jeremiah said, if it were stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage” and had stopped, I would have said that [responsibility applies] both to a common courtyard and to a courtyard belonging to neither party. Why did it state: “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? [To indicate] that it applies to the unpaid trustee, the borrower, the paid trustee, and the renter. Rebbi Yose said, since it stated “except for property belonging solely to the person responsible for the damage”, would we not know that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? Why was it stated that “[the rules] apply to property common to the person suffering the damage and the person responsible for the damage”? To exclude a courtyard belonging to neither of them. Some Tannaїm state: A condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free. Some Tannaїm state: Even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated. He who says, a condominium courtyard is obligated, a courtyard belonging to neither of them is free, for it is written: “the best of his fields.” But he who says, even a courtyard belonging to neither of them is obligated, for it is written: “It ravages another person’s field.”
Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: A condominium courtyard is obligated. Rebbi Yasa said: and I deduced that from what Rebbi Hoshaia stated: Four principles about damages Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar enunciated in Rebbi Meїr’s name: Any place which is permitted to both the person who sustained the damage and the person who caused it, such as a hostelry or a condominium courtyard and similar situations, he is not liable for tooth and foot; for goring, and hitting, and biting, and wallowing, and kicking, and pushing by a tame animal he pays half the damages, for a notorious one he pays full damages from [real estate] of the best quality. [Permitted] to the person who sustained the damage but not the person who caused it, he pays everyting. [Permitted] to the person who caused the damage but not the person who sustained it, he is free from everything. And everybody agrees that if neither of them had access, as a valley or public property and similar situations, he is not liable for tooth and foot; for goring, and hitting, and biting, and wallowing, and kicking, and pushing from a tame animal he pays half the damages, for a notorious one he pays full damages from his storage room.
MISHNAH: Estimation and determination of money’s worth is by a court based on testimony of free persons of the Covenant. Women are under the rule of torts and sometimes both the person who causes and the one who suffers the damage pay.
HALAKHAH: “Estimation and determination of money’s worth,” etc. One does not say that a cow be compensated for by a stole, but one appraises all property in court. “Money’s worth,” this teaches that the court only appraises mortgageable property. But if the person suffering damage appropriated movables, one appraises those. “By a court”, this teaches that one only appraises in court. “Based on testimony”, for one only appraises by testimony. “Of free persons of the Covenant”, this excludes Gentiles, and slaves, and persons disqualified for testimony. “Women are under the rule of torts”; since the verse speaks only of men, it is necessary to include women: Rebbi Ismael stated, “these are the laws which you shall put before them” “And sometimes both the person who causes and the one who suffers the damage pay”; they pay half the damage. From here, that one splits the damage; each one loses half the value of the damage.
Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Meïr for the tame animal and Rebbi Jehudah for testimony, as we have stated: “A bull which gored three times on the same day is not notorious. Why does the verse say ‘from yesterday and the day before’? For if it mended its ways for three days one after the other it is judged to be tame.” We were thinking to say that practice follows Rav Huna who said following both of them. This is confirmed by Rav Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Practice follows Rebbi Meïr for the tame [bull] and Rebbi Jehudah for testimony.
HALAKHAH: “A human is always notorious,” etc. Rebbi Isaac said: The Mishnah if both of them were sleeping. But if one was sleeping and another one came to sleep near him, the one who came to sleep near him is notorious.
HALAKHAH: “If his jar was broken in the public domain,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, they disagree at the moment of the accident. But after the accident everybody agrees that he must pay. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the disagreement is both at the moment of the accident and afterwards. Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Eleazar: If he does not have to pay at the moment of the accident, is it not an inference de minore ad majus afterwards? Why should he be free at the moment of the accident? For a person declares his damaged property in the public domain as ownerless. A baraita supports both of them, as it was stated: “The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah that somebody who puts down his stone or his load in the public domain does not have to pay if another person stumbled over it, for on this condition did Joshua distribute the Land.” Therefore, if Joshua had not distributed the Land on this condition, he would have to pay. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he intended use of the potsherds. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, if he intended to cause damage. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi La both say that Rebbi Jehudah agrees with the Sages that one has to pay if he declares his bull who gored in the public domain ownerless. Stationary damage cannot be compared to walking damage.
HALAKHAH: “If his jar was broken in the public domain,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, they disagree at the moment of the accident. But after the accident everybody agrees that he must pay. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the disagreement is both at the moment of the accident and afterwards. Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Eleazar: If he does not have to pay at the moment of the accident, is it not an inference de minore ad majus afterwards? Why should he be free at the moment of the accident? For a person declares his damaged property in the public domain as ownerless. A baraita supports both of them, as it was stated: “The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah that somebody who puts down his stone or his load in the public domain does not have to pay if another person stumbled over it, for on this condition did Joshua distribute the Land.” Therefore, if Joshua had not distributed the Land on this condition, he would have to pay. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he intended use of the potsherds. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, if he intended to cause damage. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi La both say that Rebbi Jehudah agrees with the Sages that one has to pay if he declares his bull who gored in the public domain ownerless. Stationary damage cannot be compared to walking damage.
HALAKHAH: “If his jar was broken in the public domain,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, they disagree at the moment of the accident. But after the accident everybody agrees that he must pay. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the disagreement is both at the moment of the accident and afterwards. Rebbi Joḥanan objected to Rebbi Eleazar: If he does not have to pay at the moment of the accident, is it not an inference de minore ad majus afterwards? Why should he be free at the moment of the accident? For a person declares his damaged property in the public domain as ownerless. A baraita supports both of them, as it was stated: “The Sages agree with Rebbi Jehudah that somebody who puts down his stone or his load in the public domain does not have to pay if another person stumbled over it, for on this condition did Joshua distribute the Land.” Therefore, if Joshua had not distributed the Land on this condition, he would have to pay. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan, if he intended use of the potsherds. In the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar, if he intended to cause damage. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi La both say that Rebbi Jehudah agrees with the Sages that one has to pay if he declares his bull who gored in the public domain ownerless. Stationary damage cannot be compared to walking damage.
Rebbi Aḥa said, would that not be obvious from the reasoning of the rabbis? Is the rebellious son liable for double restitution for his first theft? Or since he is warned of a capital offense should he be freed? Let us hear from the following: If somebody steals another’s wallet and removes it on the Sabbath he is liable since he already is liable for the theft of the wallet before he comes in conflict with the holiness of the Sabbath. Is he not forewarned of a capital offense and you say, he is liable! Here also, even though he is forewarned of a capital offense, you say that he has to be liable. Rebbi Yannai bar Ismael said, Rebbi Hoshaia follows his own opinion, as we have stated: He who takes out is guilty even if he did not put down. Similarly, he who takes out is guilty even if he did not take up with the intent to take out, for warning is possible only at the moment of his taking out. It was stated: If he was dragging it until he left, he is free since the obligations of capital crime and restitution falls on him simultaneously. Therefore, if both obligations do not fall on him simultaneously, he is liable. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it with large pouches which usually are dragged; one cannot infer anything from this.
HALAKHAH: “Two potters were walking one behind the other,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Does one give time to the first to get up? Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Joḥanan to give time to the first to stand up. But it is reasonable otherwise from the second one onwards, does one give time to the second to stand up? Let us hear from the following: “Potters were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. They are liable for damage to humans but not liable for damage to vessels. But if they (damaged) [warned] one another, none are liable. Donkey drivers were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. Donkeys were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell: even 100, all are liable.” Some Tannaïm state, none are liable. Rebbi La said, he who says ‘liable’, if their owner let them lie down. He who says ‘not liable’, if they fell, since animals are not responsible for accidents. “If the feet of a donkey were bad, one is not allowed to step over him. [ ]” What does it mean, ‘to step over him?’ They step on his body and pass by. “If one was free, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the free one. One unloaded, the other one loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were loaded or both unloaded, let them agree between themselves. Two carriages or two ships, one empty, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were unloaded or loaded, let them agree between themselves.” “The person entering the bath house gives precedence to the person leaving; the person leaving the toilet gives precedence to the person entering.”
HALAKHAH: “Two potters were walking one behind the other,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Does one give time to the first to get up? Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Joḥanan to give time to the first to stand up. But it is reasonable otherwise from the second one onwards, does one give time to the second to stand up? Let us hear from the following: “Potters were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. They are liable for damage to humans but not liable for damage to vessels. But if they (damaged) [warned] one another, none are liable. Donkey drivers were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. Donkeys were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell: even 100, all are liable.” Some Tannaïm state, none are liable. Rebbi La said, he who says ‘liable’, if their owner let them lie down. He who says ‘not liable’, if they fell, since animals are not responsible for accidents. “If the feet of a donkey were bad, one is not allowed to step over him. [ ]” What does it mean, ‘to step over him?’ They step on his body and pass by. “If one was free, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the free one. One unloaded, the other one loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were loaded or both unloaded, let them agree between themselves. Two carriages or two ships, one empty, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were unloaded or loaded, let them agree between themselves.” “The person entering the bath house gives precedence to the person leaving; the person leaving the toilet gives precedence to the person entering.”
HALAKHAH: “Two potters were walking one behind the other,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan asked: Does one give time to the first to get up? Rebbi Yose said, it is obvious for Rebbi Joḥanan to give time to the first to stand up. But it is reasonable otherwise from the second one onwards, does one give time to the second to stand up? Let us hear from the following: “Potters were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. They are liable for damage to humans but not liable for damage to vessels. But if they (damaged) [warned] one another, none are liable. Donkey drivers were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell. The first one pays to the second, and the second to the third. But if all fell because of the first, he pays for all of them. Donkeys were walking one behind the other. The first stumbled and fell, the next one stumbled and fell: even 100, all are liable.” Some Tannaïm state, none are liable. Rebbi La said, he who says ‘liable’, if their owner let them lie down. He who says ‘not liable’, if they fell, since animals are not responsible for accidents. “If the feet of a donkey were bad, one is not allowed to step over him. [ ]” What does it mean, ‘to step over him?’ They step on his body and pass by. “If one was free, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the free one. One unloaded, the other one loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were loaded or both unloaded, let them agree between themselves. Two carriages or two ships, one empty, the other loaded, the loaded one has the right of way before the unloaded one. If both were unloaded or loaded, let them agree between themselves.” “The person entering the bath house gives precedence to the person leaving; the person leaving the toilet gives precedence to the person entering.”
MISHNAH: Two were walking in the public domain, or one was running and one was walking, or both were running. If they caused damage one to the other, neither of them is liable.
MISHNAH: Two tame bulls which injured one another; one pays half for the excess damage. If both are notorious, one pays in full for the excess damage. One tame and one notorious; the notorious over the tame pays in full for the excess damage; the tame over the notorious pays half for the excess damage. Similarly, two people who injured one another pay in full for the excess damage. A human and a notorious animal, or a notorious animal and a human, one pays in full for the excess damage. A human and a tame animal; the human over the tame pays in full for the excess damage; the tame over the human pays half for the excess damage. Rebbi Akiba says, also a tame animal which injured a human pays the excess damage in full. A bull worth a mina which gored a bull worth 200 and the cadaver is not worth anything; he takes the bull. A bull worth 200 which gored a bull worth 200 and the cadaver is not worth anything; Rebbi Meïr said, about this case it was said: “They shall sell the living bull and split the proceeds.” Rebbi Jehudah said to him, you upheld “they shall sell the living bull and split the proceeds,” but you did not uphold “and also the cadaver they shall split.” What is this? That is a bull worth 200 which gored a bull worth 200 and the cadaver is worth 50 zuz, in which case each owner takes half of the living bull and half from the cadaver.
MISHNAH: If a bull was pursuing another bull which was damaged. This one says, your bull did the damage, but the other one says, it was hurt by a rock; the burden of proof is on the claimant. If two [bulls] were pursuing another [bull]; each of them says: your bull did the damage; neither of them is liable. But if they belonged to one owner, he is liable for both of them. If one was large, the other small. The person sustaining the damage says that the large one did the damage but the person causing the damage says that the small one did the damage, the burden of proof is on the claimant. If two were damaged, one large and one small, and the [bulls] doing the damage were two, one large and one small. The person sustaining the damage says that the large one damaged the large one and the small one the small; but the person causing the damage says that the small one did damage the large one and the large one the small. [Or] one tame and one notorious, the person sustaining the damage says that the notorious one damaged the large one and the tame one the small; but the person causing the damage says that the tame one did damage the large one and the notorious one the small. The burden of proof is on the claimant.
HALAKHAH: “A person may be liable for the action of his bull,” etc. Rebbi Yudan asked: How is the court trial? Let us hear from the following: “Two persons threw two pebbles and broke two jugs, one full of wine and one full of oil. Each of them said, I broke the one full of wine. Both of them pay for the wine. One empty and one full; each of them said, I broke the empty one. Both of them pay for the empty one. If they broke one amphora. Each of them said, you broke it. Neither of them is liable.
HALAKHAH: “A person may be liable for the action of his bull,” etc. Rebbi Yudan asked: How is the court trial? Let us hear from the following: “Two persons threw two pebbles and broke two jugs, one full of wine and one full of oil. Each of them said, I broke the one full of wine. Both of them pay for the wine. One empty and one full; each of them said, I broke the empty one. Both of them pay for the empty one. If they broke one amphora. Each of them said, you broke it. Neither of them is liable.
What is between them? Rebbi Joḥanan said, dedication is between them. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the first [owner] may dedicate. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, [only] both together may dedicate it. If it went up in price. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, it increased for the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, it increased for the second. If it was rented out, in Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the rent belongs to the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, [the rent] belongs to both of them. If it improved, in Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the improvement belongs to the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the improvement belongs to both of them.
What is between them? Rebbi Joḥanan said, dedication is between them. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the first [owner] may dedicate. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, [only] both together may dedicate it. If it went up in price. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, it increased for the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, it increased for the second. If it was rented out, in Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the rent belongs to the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, [the rent] belongs to both of them. If it improved, in Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the improvement belongs to the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the improvement belongs to both of them.
What is between them? Rebbi Joḥanan said, dedication is between them. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the first [owner] may dedicate. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, [only] both together may dedicate it. If it went up in price. In Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, it increased for the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, it increased for the second. If it was rented out, in Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the rent belongs to the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, [the rent] belongs to both of them. If it improved, in Rebbi Jehudah’s opinion, the improvement belongs to the first. In Rebbi Meïr’s opinion, the improvement belongs to both of them.
MISHNAH: A bull which gored a human who then died, if it is notorious [the owner] pays weregilt, if tame he is not liable for weregilt; in both cases they have to be killed. The same holds for a son or a daughter. It it gored a male or female slave, [the owner] pays 30 tetradrachmas, whether he was worth a mina or was worth only a gold denar.
Rebbi Yasa said, I heard something from Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac in this matter, but I do not remember what it was. Rebbi Ze‘ira told him, maybe it was the following: At the start the discussion refers to the tame animal. It added weregilt for the notorious. Then it added damages for both of them. I could think that as it added damages, it added the payment for the slave; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Rebbi La said, everywhere you are more restrictive for a slave than anything else since even if he is scabbed one pays thirty tetradrachmas; I would have said also (for his father and his mother) the same; the verse says “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for fetuses. Everywhere you are more restrictive for a notorious than for a tame one, would you be more restrictive here for a tame one than for a notorious? But it must be so: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. Another Tanna stated: “But the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “If people quarrel”, people but not bulls. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, so is the baraita: Men who act unintentionally are liable; bulls who act unintentionally are not liable. Does this mean that if they acted intentionally, they were liable? The verse says, “but the owner of the bull is free;” free from paying for a slave. But is it not written: “When they quarrel,” “when they brawl”. Is not quarrel the same as brawl? Since there the act was intentional, so here the act was intentional; or since here the act was unintentional, so here the act was unintentional. What about this? As Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, at the start it treats the tame animal, etc.
HALAKHAH: “One who digs a pit in the public domain,” etc. It is written: “If a man open a pit” and “if a man dig a pit.” One pit for damages, the other pit for death. Rebbi Isaac said, both the pit of death and the pit of damages were added from the same verse, but when it comes to the pit of death you say he is not liable for vessels, but when it comes to the pit of damages you say he is liable for vessels! This is not only if he dug, from where if he bought, inherited, or it was given to him as a gift? The verse says, “if a man acquire a pit.” Has one the right to abandon his damages in the public domain? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it following Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah who said, three [handbreadths] close to a domain are like that domain.
HALAKHAH: “A pit dug by two partners,” etc. How is a pit of two partners possible? Rebbi Yannai said, explain it if they both together put in the last stone. And why did they not explain that each of them dug ten handbreadths? Because he wants to explain it for a pit ten handbreadths deep of two partners.
“If an ox and its equipment fell in and broke, a donkey and its equipment and was torn, he is liable for the animal but not liable for the equipment.” Samuel said, when it became disoriented because of the air, but if it hit the ground he is liable. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, even if it hit the ground, he is not liable: The Torah absolved from liability when it fell down. “An ox or a donkey fell in there;” “an ox” and not an ox and its equipment; “a donkey” and not a donkey and its equipment. Since it looked logical: If a pit of damages, where one is not liable for death, one is liable for vessels; would it not be logical that for a pit ten handbreadths deep, for which one is liable for death, should one not be liable for vessels? The verse says, “an ox or a donkey fell in there;” “an ox” and not an ox and its equipment; “a donkey” and not a donkey and its equipment.
HALAKHAH: It was stated: “If a shepherd handed his flock over to another shepherd, the first is liable, the second is not liable.” Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both said, since he handed it over to a responsible person, he is not liable.
“If it entered in due course, he pays for what it damaged.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina said, on that field itself he is not liable, but for another field he is liable. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both said, even if it grazed on that entire field he is not liable; he only is liable if it left the field for the public domain and from the public domain entered another field. But what is the rule if it fell into a garden and then entered another garden? In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina who said, on that field itself he is not liable, here he will be liable. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who both said, even if it grazed on that entire field he is not liable; he only is liable if it left the field for the public domain and from the public domain entered another field. But if it fell into a place which it could have entered, or it entered a place into which it could have fallen? Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, that is the Mishnah; it fell into a place into which it only could have fallen. But if it fell into a place which it could have entered? Each case is problematic for one of them. One needs the first case, that he pays what it profited; the other needs the other case, that he pays what it damaged.
“If it entered in due course, he pays for what it damaged.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina said, on that field itself he is not liable, but for another field he is liable. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both said, even if it grazed on that entire field he is not liable; he only is liable if it left the field for the public domain and from the public domain entered another field. But what is the rule if it fell into a garden and then entered another garden? In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina who said, on that field itself he is not liable, here he will be liable. In the opinion of Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish who both said, even if it grazed on that entire field he is not liable; he only is liable if it left the field for the public domain and from the public domain entered another field. But if it fell into a place which it could have entered, or it entered a place into which it could have fallen? Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina said, that is the Mishnah; it fell into a place into which it only could have fallen. But if it fell into a place which it could have entered? Each case is problematic for one of them. One needs the first case, that he pays what it profited; the other needs the other case, that he pays what it damaged.
There, they say, the Mishnah speaks of a catastrophic wind, but in case of normal wind he is liable. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, even in case of normal wind he is not liable; for sometimes it blows, sometimes it does not blow.
MISHNAH: The obligation to make double restitution is more frequent than that of paying quadruple or quintuple restitution since the obligation to make double restitution applies both to living things and to inanimate objects; but the obligation of paying quadruple or quintuple restitution only applies to oxen and sheep, as it is said: “If a man steal an ox or a sheep,” etc. He who steals from a thief does not pay double restitution, nor does the one who slaughters or sells after a thief pay quadruple or quintuple restitution.
It was stated: “It was stolen from the man’s house”, but not from the woman’s house? Is not “his neighbor” only written in respect of the borrower? But one has to say that “he who steals from a thief does not pay [double restitution, nor does the one who slaughters or sells after a thief pay] quadruple or quintuple restitution. If something was stolen which then was stolen from him; [when in the end the stolen object was found, to whom does he pay? To the first owner, to the second, to both of them? If something was stolen which then was stolen from him]; the owners apprehended the second thief who swore to them. If you say that one takes it away from the second, he has to bring a sacrifice for the oath. If you say that one does not take it away from the second, he does not have to bring a sacrifice for his oath. If something was stolen which then was stolen from him and the second thief decides to return it, if you say that he has to return it to the owners, they might not inform the first thief. If you say that he has to return it to the first thief, that one might not inform the owners. What does he have to do? He returns it to the owners in the presence of the thief.
It is written: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” At another place, He says: “Do not be softhearted.” One refers to inadvertent acts, the other to intentional ones. He could mention the inadvertent but not mention the intentional. But if the inadvertent had been mentioned but not the intentional, I would have said that for the inadvertent act he shall pay money, for the intentional [have his hand cut off. Therefore it was necessary to mention the intentional. Or if the intentional had been mentioned but not the inadvertent, I would have said that for the intentional act he shall pay money, for the inadvertent] he should not pay at all. Therefore it was necessary to mention both inadvertent and intentional. And if he blinded a blind man or cut off the arm of an amputee, how could one fulfill: “Do to him as he intended to do to his brother”? This indicates that he only pays money.
HALAKHAH: “This is more severe regarding a human than an ox,” etc. “A person who hits his father or mother,” etc. It was stated: If the witnesses said, we testify that X blinded both of his eyes simultanously, or that he knocked out two of his teeth simultaneously, he does not have to pay anything. One after the other, he gains his freedom by the first and he pays him damages for the second. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: This implies that one estimates embarrassment for slaves. Rebbi La in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If a person dedicates his earnings, he dedicates everything. If he dedicates the earnings of his slave, he can take from there his upkeep and the remainder is dedicated. Here you say, the remainder is dedicated, but there you say, everything is holy. Rebbi Aḥa said, Jews are more obligated to support free people than slaves. But did not Rebbi Joḥanan say: If somebody cuts off the hands of somebody else’s slave, his master collects damages, suffering, medical costs, loss of earnings, and embarrassment, and that one should be supported by welfare. Rebbi Aḥa said, Jews are more obligated to support amputated slaves than unimpaired ones. But did not Rebbi Joḥanan also give to his slave when he ate meat? Give also to his slave when he drank wine? And recited for himself the verse: “Did not His maker make me in the womb”? They said, there a rule of law, here a rule of mercy.
“One who robbed a beam and built it into a large building. The House of Shammai say, he has to tear down the entire building and return it. But the House of Hillel say, he has to pay its worth to support the penitents. If he went into another person’s ruined building and rebuilt it without permission, one estimates for him and his hand is disadvantaged. If he rebuilt it with permission, one estimates for him and his hand is advantaged. If he wanted to take his wood and stones, one does not listen to him.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Because of the settlement in the Land of Israel. Rav Naḥman bar Isaac asked: If somebody temporarily entered another person’s ruin to put down his bundle, when he wanted to take it up again does one not listen to him? When he heard what Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa had said, because of the settlement in the Land of Israel, he said: That is a statement. But if he built at a place unfit for building, or planted trees at a place unfit for planting, Rav said one estimates for him but one tricks him to permit entry both in summer and in winter. One said to him: Was that not already stated: “One estimates for him and his hand is disadvantaged?”
It was stated: One gives money to another to buy wheat for him, but the man bought barley. If it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for him. We stated otherwise: “If it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for both of them.” [He who said if it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for him, is Rebbi Meïr. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? Because the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the buyer. But he who said, if it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for both of them, is Rebbi Jehudah.] What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? Because the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the owner of the money. Why does he (not) split with him? Because it is forbidden to take advantage of another person. Then even if one gave him money to buy wheat and he bought wheat? [Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he had given money to buy wheat and he bought wheat,] the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the owner of the money. If he had given money to buy wheat and he bought barley, the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the buyer, who is stuck with what he has on his hands. Rebbi Nasa said, if he was true to his agency, did the seller not intend to transfer ownership to the owner of the money? If he was not true to his agency, he intended to transfer ownership to the buyer. Then why does he split with him? He said, because he realizes a profit by means of the other man’s money, he splits with him.
It was stated: One gives money to another to buy wheat for him, but the man bought barley. If it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for him. We stated otherwise: “If it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for both of them.” [He who said if it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for him, is Rebbi Meïr. What is Rebbi Meïr’s reason? Because the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the buyer. But he who said, if it went down in price, it went down in price for him; if it rose in price, it rose for both of them, is Rebbi Jehudah.] What is Rebbi Jehudah’s reason? Because the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the owner of the money. Why does he (not) split with him? Because it is forbidden to take advantage of another person. Then even if one gave him money to buy wheat and he bought wheat? [Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he had given money to buy wheat and he bought wheat,] the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the owner of the money. If he had given money to buy wheat and he bought barley, the seller intended to transfer ownership only to the buyer, who is stuck with what he has on his hands. Rebbi Nasa said, if he was true to his agency, did the seller not intend to transfer ownership to the owner of the money? If he was not true to his agency, he intended to transfer ownership to the buyer. Then why does he split with him? He said, because he realizes a profit by means of the other man’s money, he splits with him.
Rebbi Samuel bar Abba objected before Rebbi Joḥanan. Did we not state: “Both the person who dedicates and the one who vows his own valuation exclude their wives’ and children’s clothing.” He answered, nobody thought to include their wives’ and children’s clothing. But did we not state: “My valuation on myself”; at the moment when he said, my valuation on myself, he only obligated himself for fifty tetradrachmas. If he says, my valuation on myself on condition not to pledge what is worn by my wife and children? Rebbi Nasa in the name of Samuel bar Abba: One who says, my valuation on myself on condition not to pledge a particular thing, one cannot use that particular thing as a pledge. Rav Hoshaia in the name of Samuel bar Abba: This implies that one does not foreclose valuations from movables by biblical decree but only from the rabbis.
MISHNAH: He who robbed at least a peruṭa’s worth from a fellow man and swore to him should deliver it to him even in Media. He should deliver neither to [the victim’s] son nor to his agent, but he may deliver to an agent of the court, and if [the victim] had died, he has to make restitution to his heirs. If he had returned the capital but not the fifth, or [the victim] had forgiven him the capital but not the fifth or had forgiven him both except for less than a peruṭa’s worth of the capital, he need not follow him. If he had returned the fifth but not the capital, or [the victim] had forgiven him the fifth but not the capital or had forgiven him both except for a peruṭa’s worth of the capital, he has to follow him. If he paid the capital but swore on the fifth, he pays a fifth for the fifth until the capital becomes less than a peruṭa’s worth. And so “for a deposit, or a partnership, or robbery, or if he oppressed his neighbor, or found lost property and denied it, and swore falsely,” has to pay the capital, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.
MISHNAH: He who robbed at least a peruṭa’s worth from a fellow man and swore to him should deliver it to him even in Media. He should deliver neither to [the victim’s] son nor to his agent, but he may deliver to an agent of the court, and if [the victim] had died, he has to make restitution to his heirs. If he had returned the capital but not the fifth, or [the victim] had forgiven him the capital but not the fifth or had forgiven him both except for less than a peruṭa’s worth of the capital, he need not follow him. If he had returned the fifth but not the capital, or [the victim] had forgiven him the fifth but not the capital or had forgiven him both except for a peruṭa’s worth of the capital, he has to follow him. If he paid the capital but swore on the fifth, he pays a fifth for the fifth until the capital becomes less than a peruṭa’s worth. And so “for a deposit, or a partnership, or robbery, or if he oppressed his neighbor, or found lost property and denied it, and swore falsely,” has to pay the capital, and a fifth, and a reparation sacrifice.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody says to his son: A qônām that you cannot enjoy anything from me,” etc. Rebbi Jeremiah said, look what we did state here: “If somebody says to his son, ‘a qônām that you can not enjoy anything from me,’ if he dies, the son inherits; ‘during my lifetime and after my death,’ if he dies, he cannot inherit.” Did we not state, ‘during my lifetime’, he inherits; ‘after my death’, he inherits, ‘during my lifetime and after my death’, he cannot inherit? What is the difference between the one who says it one by one and the one who says it by twos? Rav Jeremiah and Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina both say, ‘a qônām that I shall not enter this house during my lifetime and after my death’, since he said “this house”, he forbade it on himself during lifetime and after death. Rebbi Yose said, we have stated in Neziqin what we did not state in Nedarim: ‘A qônām that I cannot enjoy these my properties during my lifetime and after my death,’ from the moment he said “these” he forbade them to himself during his lifetime and after his death.
It was stated: “If somebody robbed to feed his children, whether adult or underage, they are not liable to pay. If they inherited from him, both adult and underage are liable to pay. Symmachos says, the adults are liable, the underaged are not liable. If they said, we do not know whether our father accounted for it at the end, they are not liable.” Rebbi Abba bar Mamal objected: Think of it, if they inherited real estate, they are not able to say, we do not know whether our father accounted for it at the end. Rav Hamnuna objected: Think of it, if it was a notorious robbery; they are not able to say, we do not know whether our father accounted for it at the end. Rav Sheshet objected: For the underaged the court will argue. What can you say? Rebbi Mana said, explain it if they argue, we do not know, etc., we know that our father was in dispute with you on this account, but we do not know how it was resolved.
MISHNAH: If one stole a lamb from the flock and returned it, if it died or was stolen he is liable. If the owners were unaware both of the theft and the return, he is no longer liable after they counted the flock and found it complete.
HALAKHAH: “If two persons were riding on an animal,” etc. Rebbi Ḥuna said: It was stated there: “A woman comes riding on an animal and two men lead her. She says: these are my slaves; the donkey and the load are mine. Each of them says: this is my wife, the other is my slave, and the donkey and the load are mine. She needs a bill of divorce from both of them and has to manumit both of them. They have to manumit one another. In the donkey and the load they are equal co-owners.
HALAKHAH: “If two persons were riding on an animal,” etc. Rebbi Ḥuna said: It was stated there: “A woman comes riding on an animal and two men lead her. She says: these are my slaves; the donkey and the load are mine. Each of them says: this is my wife, the other is my slave, and the donkey and the load are mine. She needs a bill of divorce from both of them and has to manumit both of them. They have to manumit one another. In the donkey and the load they are equal co-owners.
HALAKHAH: “One who found documents of indebtedness,” etc. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Meïr: Both based on a document containing an alienation clause or a document containing no alienation clause, he collects from unincumbered property. Following this opinion of Rebbi Meïr, to what purpose does he return it? To cover the mouth of his pitcher. Rav said, an heir is like the holder of encumbered property. Just as a loan executed before witnesses cannot be collected from encumbered property, so it cannot be collected from heirs. Samuel said, what was received cannot be foreclosed on mortgaged property, but on free property it can be foreclosed. Here you say, it can be collected, but there you say, it cannot be collected. There is no comparison between one who agreed to a small lien and one who never agreed to a lien.
Alexander the Macedonian went to the king of Cassia. He saw that he had much gold, much silver. He told him, I do not need your gold nor your silver; I came only so see your practice, how you are dealing, how you are judging. While he was still discussing with him, there came a man having a dispute with another, for he bought (a plot, entered it) [a garbage heap, dug in it] and found a treasure trove of denars. The buyer said, I bought a garbage heap, I did not buy a treasure. The seller said, I sold a garbage heap and all it contains. While they still were arguing with one another, the king asked one of them, do you have a male son? He answered, yes. He asked the other one, do you have a female daughter? He answered, yes. He told them, marry them to each other and the treasure should belong to both. He started to laugh. He asked him, why are you laughing? Did I not judge correctly? He asked him, if the case came before you, how would you have judged? He told him, one kills both of them and the treasure falls to the king. He told him, do you love gold so much? He made him a meal and brought before him golden meat, golden chicken. He asked him, can I eat gold? He told him, the spirit of this person should be wiped out. You cannot eat gold, why do you love gold so much? He asked him, does the sun shine upon you? He answered, yes. Does rain fall on you? He answered, yes. He asked him, do you have small animals? He answered, yes. The spirit of this person should be wiped out; you live only by the merit of the small animals, as it is written: “Man and animal You are saving, o Eternal!”
Alexander the Macedonian went to the king of Cassia. He saw that he had much gold, much silver. He told him, I do not need your gold nor your silver; I came only so see your practice, how you are dealing, how you are judging. While he was still discussing with him, there came a man having a dispute with another, for he bought (a plot, entered it) [a garbage heap, dug in it] and found a treasure trove of denars. The buyer said, I bought a garbage heap, I did not buy a treasure. The seller said, I sold a garbage heap and all it contains. While they still were arguing with one another, the king asked one of them, do you have a male son? He answered, yes. He asked the other one, do you have a female daughter? He answered, yes. He told them, marry them to each other and the treasure should belong to both. He started to laugh. He asked him, why are you laughing? Did I not judge correctly? He asked him, if the case came before you, how would you have judged? He told him, one kills both of them and the treasure falls to the king. He told him, do you love gold so much? He made him a meal and brought before him golden meat, golden chicken. He asked him, can I eat gold? He told him, the spirit of this person should be wiped out. You cannot eat gold, why do you love gold so much? He asked him, does the sun shine upon you? He answered, yes. Does rain fall on you? He answered, yes. He asked him, do you have small animals? He answered, yes. The spirit of this person should be wiped out; you live only by the merit of the small animals, as it is written: “Man and animal You are saving, o Eternal!”
HALAKHAH: “What is a lost animal,” etc. “If one found it in the cowshed, he has no obligation; in the public domain he is obligated. Between graves, he may not defile himself. If his father told him to defile himself, or told him not to return it, he should not listen to him.” Everywhere you say that a positive commandment has precedence over a prohibition, but here, you say that a positive commandment does not have precedence over a prohibition? There is a difference since both he and his father are required to honor the Omnipresent.
If he said, I am paying, one may suspect that possibly he took it for himself. If he said, I am swearing, but then he saw that other oaths were added and he said, I am paying, one is suspicious. Rebbi Yose said, the Torah did not impose an oath on him to restrict him but to ease for him; for if he wants to pay, he shall pay, and if he wants to swear, he shall swear. If he had witnesses that it was forcibly stolen, to that case refers what Rebbi Eleazar said: If somebody sells his claims of fines to someone else, he did not do anything. If he had witnesses that it was stolen because of negligence, he comes under the category of “he shall pay”. If afterwards the stolen object was found, to whom does [the thief] pay? To the first, or to the second, or to both of them?
HALAKHAH: “Silver acquires gold,” etc. This is a summary of the matter: Anything worth less that the other acquires the other. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said, who stated this? Rebbi Simeon ben Rebbi. His father told him, change your opinion and state the following: “Gold acquires silver.” He told him, I do not change my opinion since when your faculties were unimpaired, you instructed me to state: “Silver acquires gold.” The word of Rebbi implies that gold is like produce. The Mishnah implies that silver is like produce. [Rebbi Ḥiyya’s baraita implies that gold is like produce, but his word implies that silver is like produce, as in the following:] The elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s daughter lent denars to Rav. She came and asked her father, who told her: Take from him good and full weight denars. Do we learn from Rebbi Ḥiyya’s daughter? Rebbi Idi said, also Abba, Samuel’s father, asked before Rebbi: May one lend denars against denars? He answered him, it is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, also Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both instruct: It is permitted to lend denars against denars. Qerat against qerat is permitted, lekan against lekan is forbidden.
“A Jew had borrowed money from a Gentile or a Gentile from a Jew when he converted. Whether the loan was finalized before or after his conversion, he can collect the principal but not the interest. But if a Gentile had borrowed money from a Jew and converted, if the loan was finalized before he converted, he can collect principal and interest; after he converted, he can collect principal but not interest. Bar Qappara said, he can collect both principal and interest.” Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, Bar Qappara’s reason is that if you exempt him from interest he is turned into an insincere proselyte.
“If he was the first to harvest, he may contract for the stack of sheaves,” etc. Rav said, if one processing stage was missing, one may contract; if several processing stages were missing, one may not contract. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, even if several processing stages were missing, one may contract. But the Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If he was the first to harvest,” etc.
Rebbi Eleazar invested a denar with a person and told him, what it earns between now and Ḥanukkah is mine [and yours], afterwards I do not have any part with you, whether they earn or lose it is yours. He wanted to give to him after Ḥanukkah but he did not accept. Rebbi Eleazar had misgivings because of “close to gain and far from loss,” as it was stated: “Close to gain and far from loss is the way of the wicked. Close to loss and far from gain is the way of the just. Close and far equally to both is the way of everybody.” Rebbi Isaac invested denars with a person. He wanted to stipulate as did Rebbi Eleazar but the other did not accept. Cahana invested 40 denars with a person to buy flax for him. Flax went up in price. He went to ask Rav, who told him to go and collect 40 large kor.
Rebbi wanted to permit the ocean’s absorption but Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose did not admit it; some say that Rebbi Ismael ben Rebbi Yose wanted to permit but Rebbi did not admit it. What is the ocean’s absorption? A person gave 100 denars to another. [He tells him, my yield is 20 denars. If it is less, it is on your account, if it is more, it is for your account. If it is lost, it is of both. Rebbi Ḥuna said,] for instance those who give merchandise to those who depart overseas to the stadia for two or three xestes. That is not interest but property.
HALAKHAH: “If somebody hired tradesmen,” etc. Rav said, “because the Children of Israel are My servants,” Jews cannot buy one another. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this was stated about a Hebrew slave. In Rav’s opinion, both a worker and an employer can back out; in Rebbi Joḥanan’s opinion the worker can back out but not the employer.
MISHNAH: Somebody who rented a donkey to lead it on the mountain but led it in the valley, in the valley but led it on the mountain, even if both ways were ten mil, if it died he has to pay. If he rented a donkey and it developed eye trouble or it was taken to government service, he tells him, here is your property before you. If it died or broke a limb, he has to provide him with another donkey. Somebody rented a donkey to lead it on the mountain but led it in the valley; if it slipped, he is not liable; if it suffered a heat stroke, he is liable. In the valley, but he led it on the mountain; if it slipped, he is liable; if it suffered a heat stroke, he is not liable but if it happened because of the ascent, he is liable. Somebody rented a cow to plough on the mountain but ploughed in the valley, if the plough’s peg broke, he is not liable. In the valley but he ploughed on the mountain, if the plough’s peg broke, he is liable. To thresh legumes but he threshed grain, he is not liable; to thresh grain but he threshed legumes, he is liable, for legumes make [the floor] slippery.
MISHNAH: One who transports an amphora from place to place and it breaks shall swear, whether unpaid or paid trustee. Rebbi Eliezer said, both shall swear, but I am wondering whether any of them be able to swear.
In Tiberias one does not work early or late. In Bet Ma‘on one works early and late. People from Tiberias who climb up to be hired in Bet Ma‘on are hired on the terms of Bet Maon. People from Bet Ma‘on who descend to Tiberias are hired on the terms of Tiberias. But an employer from Tiberias who climbs up to hire workers in Bet Maon can tell them, you should not think that I could not find workers to hire in Tiberias but came up because I heard that you start early and work late. At a place where there is no common usage, Jehudah ben Buni, Rebbi Immi, Rav Jehudah: It is a stipulation of the court that the early part of morning belong to the workers and the late part of evening to the employer. What is the reason? “You make darkness, there is night; the young lions roar for prey; You give to them, they are collecting; the sun shines, they return; man leaves for his work.” (In the evening) [Fridays] both early rising and late going is at the employer’s expense. How much? That he may fill an amphora of water, fry himself a fish, and light the candle.
MISHNAH: Somebody borrowed a cow; he borrowed it for half a day and leased it for half a day, or borrowed it for one day and leased it for the next, or borrowed for one and leased for one. The lessee says, the borrowed one died, or it died on the day it was borrowed, or it died during the time it was borrowed, and the other one says “I do not know”, he is liable. The lessor says, the leased one died, or it died on the day it was leased, or it died during the time it was leased, and the other one says “I do not know”, he is not liable. One says the borrowed and the other one says the leased; let the lessee swear that the leased one died. If both say “I do not know” they shall split.
MISHNAH: Somebody exchanged a cow for a donkey and it gave birth, or he sold his slave girl and she gave birth. If one said, [it happened] before I sold, the other said, after I bought, they shall split. If he had two slaves, one adult and one young, or two fields, one large and one small. The buyer says, I bought the large one, and the seller says, I do not know: he acquired the large one. The seller says, I sold the small and the other party says, I do not know: he has only the small one. If one says the large one and the other says the small, let the seller swear that he sold the small one. If both say, I do not know, they shall split.
HALAKHAH: “If he said to him, lend me,” etc. “Somebody exchanged a cow,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this contradicts Symmachos who says that in all cases of doubt one splits evenly. Rebbi La said, explain it if both of them say, I am certain. Rebbi Yose explained, if both of them say, I am certain, that is what Rebbi Joḥanan refered to when he said, this contradicts Symmachos’s words.
HALAKHAH: “If he said to him, lend me,” etc. “Somebody exchanged a cow,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, this contradicts Symmachos who says that in all cases of doubt one splits evenly. Rebbi La said, explain it if both of them say, I am certain. Rebbi Yose explained, if both of them say, I am certain, that is what Rebbi Joḥanan refered to when he said, this contradicts Symmachos’s words.
MISHNAH: He who leases a dwelling to another person and it collapsed has to provide him with a dwelling. If it was small he may not make it large, large he may not make it small. One room he shall not make into two, two he may not make into one. He may not reduce the number of windows nor add to them except with the agreement of both parties.
HALAKHAH: “He who leases a dwelling to another person,” etc. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he puts him into it. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he told him, a dwelling like this I shall lease to you. But if a person leasing a house wants to sell it? Rebbi Immi said, nobody thinks that this one should die of hunger. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, while certainly it is acquired by him, he has to tell him, let him dwell there until the time of his recall. There came a case before Rebbi Nisi and he did not accept this. Does he disagree? They said, his daughter was given as a pledge to a Roman [and he did not have the wherewhithal to redeem her and Rebbi Assi instructed to sell;] therefore he instructed following Rebbi Immi.
MISHNAH: One who contracts with another for a field, at a place where one usually cuts, he has to cut, to uproot, he has to uproot, to plough after harvest, he has to plough, everything according to local usage. Just as they divide the grain, so they divide straw and chaff. Just as they divide the wine, so they divide the vine tendrils and the props; they both provide the props together.
HALAKHAH: “One who contracts with another for a field,” etc. “One who contracts with another for a field,” etc. How much is “enough to make a pile”? Rebbi Jacob bar Idi in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: that the winnowing shovel can stand upright in it. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina: only that its handle be on top. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said: in addition to his expenses. Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said: in addition to the expenses of both of them. Rebbi Abbahu said: “for spreading”, to recover the seed grain which was spread on it.
HALAKHAH: “One who contracts with another for a field,” etc. It was stated: “One who contracts with another for a field tithes and delivers to him, the words of Rebbi Meïr. But the Sages say, both for the same kind and for the same field he lifts heave and delivers to him. But from another field or another kind he tithes and delivers to him. Rebbi Meïr says, only for the same kind and for the same field he lifts heave and delivers to him. But from another field or another kind he does (not) tithe and deliver to him.”
Those bearing columns. Rebbi Ze‘ira: He tells the bottom dweller, you are obliged to support me. Rebbi La: He tells the dweller in the upper floor, the builders say that both have to build the foundations. The following supports the builders: “If his ruined building was close to the wall of his neighbor’s courtyard, he should not tell him: I am contributing to the foundations of your wall where it comes up, but he has to contribute to the foundations from the bottom and up. If it was built on top of ditches or caves, he is not obligated for anything.” Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, explain it, for example those inhabitants of Bet Shean where the bottom dweller cannot build unless the builder of the upper floor builds.
“Rebbi Yose says, the lower one contributes the roofing and the upper one the roof covering,” etc. Rebbi Justus in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish:: The bottom dweller contributes the logs and the planks; the dweller on the upper floor contributes the roof covering. Which kind of roof covering? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: heavy roof covering. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: medium roof covering, since they only spoke about rinsing cups. But if he wanted to wash clothing, also Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Eleazar will agree that the roof covering has to be heavy. Rebbi Ḥanina instructed those of Sepphoris that both of them should contribute the logs and the plates since they expect to bring up there their wine and their produce.
MISHNAH: Two vegetable gardens, one on top of the other and vegetables growing between them. Rebbi Meїr says, it is the upper’s. Rebbi Jehudah says, it is the lower’s. Said Rebbi Meїr: If the upper’s owner wanted to remove his earth, there would be no vegetables. Said Rebbi Jehudah: If the lower’s wanted to fill up his vegetable garden with earth, there would be no vegetables. Said Rebbi Meїr: Since both of them may object to one another one looks from where these vegetables grow. Rebbi Simeon says, any which the upper’s may take by stretching out his hand are his; the remainder is the lower’s.
A wall between two partitions which was breached. Rav and Samuel, one said, half belongs to one party, the other half to the other party. The other said, both own it entirely. What is the difference between them? If one found a find. For him who said that half belongs to one party, the other half to the other party, if it was on one side it belongs to this party, one the other side it belongs to the other party. For him who said that both own it entirely, the finder acquired it.
A wall between two partitions which was breached. Rav and Samuel, one said, half belongs to one party, the other half to the other party. The other said, both own it entirely. What is the difference between them? If one found a find. For him who said that half belongs to one party, the other half to the other party, if it was on one side it belongs to this party, one the other side it belongs to the other party. For him who said that both own it entirely, the finder acquired it.
MISHNAH: Condominium owners who want to make a separation in the courtyard build the wall in the middle. At a place where commonly one builds with unhewn stones, or hewn stones, or half-bricks, or bricks, everything follows local custom. For unhewn stones, each partner gives three handbreadths. For hewn stones, each gives two and one half handbreadths. For half-bricks, each gives two handbreadths. For bricks, each gives one and a half handbreadths. Therefore, if the wall collapsed the place and the stones belong to both of them.
HALAKHAH: “Condominium owners who want to make a separation,” etc. As we have stated there: “One does not subdivide a courtyard unless each party has four cubits.” They said, there if the two parties do not agree. But here if both parties agree. And you may even say, here if the two parties do not agree. If this one wishes, one forces the other; if the other one wishes, one forces this one. Rebbi Joḥanan said, one forces for courtyards; one does not force for roofs. Rebbi Nasa wanted to say, in case of a courtyard which is higher than the roof. But in case of a roof which is higher than the courtyard, one forces. Rebbi Joḥanan wanted to say, in case of a courtyard which is higher than the roof one forces. But in case of a roof which is higher than the courtyard, one does not force.
MISHNAH: Similarly for a vegetable garden; a place which customarily is fenced in, he must fence in. But in an agricultural area, a place which customarily is not fenced in, one does not obligate him. But if he wishes, he builds inside his land and makes a façade to the outside; therefore if the wall collapses both land and stones are his. But if they did it with mutual agreement they build the wall in the middle and make façades on both sides; therefore if the wall collapses both land and stones belong to both of them.
MISHNAH: Similarly for a vegetable garden; a place which customarily is fenced in, he must fence in. But in an agricultural area, a place which customarily is not fenced in, one does not obligate him. But if he wishes, he builds inside his land and makes a façade to the outside; therefore if the wall collapses both land and stones are his. But if they did it with mutual agreement they build the wall in the middle and make façades on both sides; therefore if the wall collapses both land and stones belong to both of them.
MISHNAH: Similarly for a vegetable garden; a place which customarily is fenced in, he must fence in. But in an agricultural area, a place which customarily is not fenced in, one does not obligate him. But if he wishes, he builds inside his land and makes a façade to the outside; therefore if the wall collapses both land and stones are his. But if they did it with mutual agreement they build the wall in the middle and make façades on both sides; therefore if the wall collapses both land and stones belong to both of them.
MISHNAH: Similarly for a vegetable garden; a place which customarily is fenced in, he must fence in. But in an agricultural area, a place which customarily is not fenced in, one does not obligate him. But if he wishes, he builds inside his land and makes a façade to the outside; therefore if the wall collapses both land and stones are his. But if they did it with mutual agreement they build the wall in the middle and make façades on both sides; therefore if the wall collapses both land and stones belong to both of them.
HALAKHAH: “One forces him to build,” etc. Rebbi La said: So it is; the way of a provident person is to build himself a wall, as it is said: “The wealth of the rich is the fortification of his might, etc.” It was stated: “If he stayed there for thirty days he is like the townspeople for the charity chest, for clothing six months, for assessments and penalties twelve months.” After all these, was twelve months said only for assessments and penalties? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said for Passover wheat, both to take and to give.
MISHNAH: One does not divide the courtyard unless there be four cubits for each one, nor the field unless there be nine qab for each one; Rebbi Jehudah says, nine half qabbim for each one. Not the vegetable garden unless there be half a qab for each one; Rebbi Aqiba says, the area of a quarter [qab]. Not the dining hall, nor the storage room, nor the dovecote, nor the stole, nor the bathhouse, nor the olive press unless there is one for each of them. This is the principle: Anything which is divided and retains its name one divides, otherwise one does not divide. When is that? If the two of them do not agree. However, if both of them want it, they may divide even if it is less. But Holy Scripture they should not divide even if both of them want it.
MISHNAH: One does not divide the courtyard unless there be four cubits for each one, nor the field unless there be nine qab for each one; Rebbi Jehudah says, nine half qabbim for each one. Not the vegetable garden unless there be half a qab for each one; Rebbi Aqiba says, the area of a quarter [qab]. Not the dining hall, nor the storage room, nor the dovecote, nor the stole, nor the bathhouse, nor the olive press unless there is one for each of them. This is the principle: Anything which is divided and retains its name one divides, otherwise one does not divide. When is that? If the two of them do not agree. However, if both of them want it, they may divide even if it is less. But Holy Scripture they should not divide even if both of them want it.
“But Holy Scripture they should not divide even if both of them want it.” Rebbi Hoshaia said, for example, Psalms and Chronicles. But Psalms and Psalms one may divide. Rebbi Uqba said, even Psalms and Psalms one may not divide. Since one may not divide, each of them comes and reads in the other’s [book].
This means, about grindstones there, but for our grindstones three from the pine cone which is four from the enclosure. “And the oven three from the base which are four from its rim.” Rebbi Yudan bar Pazi said, from the outer rim inwards; but the rabbis say, from the inner rim outwards. If if was built like a dovecote, what [are the rules]? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah said, unless there be under it insulating material three handbreadths and for a stove one handbreadth.” Is a stove not build like a dovecote, and you say both above and below a handbreadth? Also here, both above and below a handbreadth.
This means, about grindstones there, but for our grindstones three from the pine cone which is four from the enclosure. “And the oven three from the base which are four from its rim.” Rebbi Yudan bar Pazi said, from the outer rim inwards; but the rabbis say, from the inner rim outwards. If if was built like a dovecote, what [are the rules]? Let us hear from the following: “Rebbi Jehudah said, unless there be under it insulating material three handbreadths and for a stove one handbreadth.” Is a stove not build like a dovecote, and you say both above and below a handbreadth? Also here, both above and below a handbreadth.
MISHNAH: A pigeon chick which is found within 50 cubits belongs to the owner of the dovecote; farther away than 50 cubits it belongs to its finder. If it was found between two dovecotes, if it is closer to one of them, it belongs to it; in the middle, both [owners] shall split evenly.
HALAKHAH: “If a tree overhangs another’s field,” etc. “If a tree overhangs the public domain,,” etc. Rebbi Jonathan was careful in judging; there was a Roman there who was his neighbor both in the field and the house. Rebbi Jonathan had a tree overhanging the Roman’s property. A similar case came before him. He told them, go and return next morning. This Roman said, because of me he did not decide the case. Tomorrow I will abandon my work and see how the judgment goes. If he judges all people and does not judge himself, he is not human. At nightfall, Rebbi Jonathan sent for his carpenter and told him, go and cut everything that overhangs the Roman’s. In the morning, the parties appeared before him. He told him, go and cut what overhangs into his property. The Roman said to him, what is with yours? He told him, go and see; what was done with mine do with yours. He went out and looked. He said, praised be the Jews’ God.
“Sharecroppers.” Rav Huna said, a permanent sharecropper, but a temporary sharecropper has a claim of undisturbed possession. Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both teach that even a temporary sharecropper has no claim of undisturbed possession, for we may say that he is satisfied with him and let him have it. There, they say that a sharecropper has no claim of undisturbed possession but a sharecropper’s son has a claim of undisturbed possession; Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish say, neither a sharecropper nor a sharecropper’s son have a claim of undisturbed possession, for we may say that he was satisfied with his father and let the son have it. As Rebbi Joḥanan said, a sharecropper who engaged another sharecropper has no claim of undisturbed possession since it is common for sharecroppers to engage sub-sharecroppers.
HALAKHAH: “The following count for a claim of undisturbed possession,” etc. Rebbi Eleazar said, co-owners usually permit chickens to one another. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says otherwise: “Both of them are forbidden to put up there a grindstone or an oven, or to raise chickens there.” Rebbi Eleazar said, if somebody raised chickens in a courtyard which is not his, it is taking in possession. Rebbi Yose said, this is correct. As you take it, if he has permission to raise chickens there, he raises them. If he does not have permission to raise, it would be legally taking in possession.
HALAKHAH: “He who sells a bathhouse,” etc. It was stated: “He who sells a bathhouse sold the inner and the outer rooms, the basilica, the heating chamber, and the storekeeper’s chamber, but not the chests nor the boiler. Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said, the place of the bath attendant is sold; the place of the storekeeper is not sold. But if he said to him, ‘it and all it contains’? Even if he said to him, ‘it and all it contains’. In neither case did he sell the water ponds which he uses both in summer and in winter or the room in which wood is stored. But if he said to him, ‘it and all its appurtenances,’ all these are sold.”
HALAKHAH: “Somebody sent his son to a grocer,” etc. Rebbi Abba bar Mamal said, for the tenths he has to let bend down a handbreadth. It is written: “Fair scales, fair weights.” From here the Sages said that any commandment whose reward is noted, the court is not warned about. “You shall have,” appoint market overseers over this. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya said, so is the baraita: Any commandment whose reward is noted the court is not punished about. Rav was appointed market overseer by the Head of the Diaspora; he intervened about measuring vessels but not prices. The Head of the Diaspora jailed him. Rav Qarna went to see him and said, the market overseer about whom they spoke was for measures but not prices. He answered, but you had stated: the market overseer is for both measures and prices. He said to him, go out and tell them, the market overseer is for measures but not prices. He went out and said to them, a person who teaches hidden things they send to jail!
HALAKHAH: “Some inherit and bequeath,” etc. It is written: “If a man die without a son, you shall transfer his estate to his daughter.” Rebbi Ismael stated: The verse distinguished this inheritance from all other inheritances mentioned in the Torah, since for all of them it is written “you shall give,” but here is written: “you shall transfer.” It is an extension of the law that the daughter shall inherit. The Gentile Sages say, son and daughter are equal, for they explain “if he have no son;” therefore, if he has one both are equal. One objected, is it not written “if he have no daughter;” therefore, if he has one are both equal? And you agree, if there is no child, here also, if there is no son. The Sadducees say, the son’s daughter and the daughter are equal, for they explain: Since my son’s daughter who comes by force of her father does inherit from me, would it not be logical that my daughter who comes by force of myself should inherit from me? One told them, no. If you mention the son’s daughter who only inherits by the power of the brothers, what could you say about the daughter who only inherits by the power of the old man? The verse says, “any daughter who is an heiress of the tribes.” How is it possible for a daughter to inherit from two tribes? But explain it if her father was from one tribe and her mother from another.
HALAKHAH: “Some inherit and bequeath,” etc. It is written: “If a man die without a son, you shall transfer his estate to his daughter.” Rebbi Ismael stated: The verse distinguished this inheritance from all other inheritances mentioned in the Torah, since for all of them it is written “you shall give,” but here is written: “you shall transfer.” It is an extension of the law that the daughter shall inherit. The Gentile Sages say, son and daughter are equal, for they explain “if he have no son;” therefore, if he has one both are equal. One objected, is it not written “if he have no daughter;” therefore, if he has one are both equal? And you agree, if there is no child, here also, if there is no son. The Sadducees say, the son’s daughter and the daughter are equal, for they explain: Since my son’s daughter who comes by force of her father does inherit from me, would it not be logical that my daughter who comes by force of myself should inherit from me? One told them, no. If you mention the son’s daughter who only inherits by the power of the brothers, what could you say about the daughter who only inherits by the power of the old man? The verse says, “any daughter who is an heiress of the tribes.” How is it possible for a daughter to inherit from two tribes? But explain it if her father was from one tribe and her mother from another.
So far a daughter. A son? Since the daughter, whose power is diminished regarding the father’s property, has her power increased regarding the mother’s property, should the son’s power not be increased regarding the mother’s property, since his power is increased regarding the father’s property? It turns out that for the daughter one infers from the verse and for the son from an argument de minore ad majus. Does the son precede the daughter? Rebbi Simeon ben Eleazar said in the name of Rebbi Zachariah the butcher’s son: So did Rebbi Simeon ben Jehudah say in the name of Rebbi Simeon: Both son and daughter are equal for the mother’s tribe Rebbi Mallukh in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Practice follows Rebbi Zachariah. Rebbi Yannai the Kappadokian had a case; the judges were Rav Huna, Rebbi Jehudah ben Pazi, and Rebbi Aḥa. Rebbi Aḥa told them: Our brothers outside the Land are unqualified and err in practice; in particular they rely on Rebbi Mallukh in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi, but it is not so. Rebbi Simon in the name of Rebbi Joshua ben Levi: Practice does not follow Rebbi Zachariah. Rebbi Abba the son of Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice does not follow Rebbi Zachariah. Rebbi Eleazar the father of Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman in the name of Rebbi Hoshaiah: Practice does not follow Rebbi Zachariah. Rebbi Yannai and Rebbi Joḥanan were sitting when Rebbi Yudan the Prince came and asked concerning: “Any daughter who is an heiress of the tribes,” what is the rule? He said to him, it binds the father’s tribe together with the mother’s tribe. Since from the father’s tribe there is nothing for the daughter when there is a son, so also from the mother’s tribe there is nothing for the daughter when there is a son. Or is it the other way around? Since from the mother’s tribe there is something for the daughter when there is a son, so also from the father’s tribe is there something for the daughter when there is a son? Rebbi Joḥanan said to him, let us leave; that man does not want to listen to words of instruction.
Rebbi Joshiah said, the Land was distributed to those who left Egypt, as it is written: “By the names of the fathers’ tribes they shall inherit.” Then why does the verse say: “To those”? Only because of women and because of children. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the Land was distributed to those who entered the Land, as it was said, “to those it shall be distributed.” Then why does the verse say: “By the names of the fathers’ tribes”? This inheritance was different from all other inheritances in the world. For in all other inheritances in the world the living inherit from the dead but here the dead from the living. It was stated: Rebbi Joshua ben Qorha said, the Land was distributed to those who left Egypt and to those who stood in the plains of Moab. How is that? If one was both of those who left Egypt and those who stood in the plains of Moab, he took two parts. Of those who left Egypt but not of those who stood in the plains of Moab, or of those who stood in the plains of Moab but not of those who left Egypt, he took one part. The daughters of Zelophehad took five parts: their part with those who left Egypt and their part with those who stood in the plains of Moab. And because he was a firstborn they took two parts. And their father’s part among his brothers. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah says otherwise. But “giving you shall give them inheritance among their father’s brothers.” That is what is written: “Ten measures fell to Manasseh”.
MISHNAH: Both son and daughter are equal for the rules of inheritance, except that the son take a double portion of the father’s property but no double portion of the mother’s property. And the daughters can claim sustenance from the father’s property but not from the mother’s property.
HALAKHAH: “Both son and daughter are equal for the rules of inheritance,” etc. It is written: “Of anything which will be found with him,” etc. How could he inherit the expectancy like existing property? How? If his father died during his father’s father’s lifetime, he takes a double portion of his father’s estate but not a double portion of his grandfather’s estate. But if his father was a firstborn, just as he takes from his father’s estate so he takes from his grandfather’s estate. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish in the name of Abba [Cohen] bar Delaiah: It was said “a rule of law” in the matter of a double portion just as it was said “a rule of law” in the matter of a single portion. Since for a single portion one considers the son as if he were alive to take his father’s single portion so for a double portion one considers the son as if he were alive to take his father’s double portion.
Samuel asked Rav Huna: if one wrote a gift in the language of a sale? He answered, he made it ride on two racing horses; Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, they only said that one brings two white horses and makes it ride on both. One goes in one direction and the other in another; it turns out that he caught nothing.
It was stated: “Rebbi Simeon ben Gamiel says: A will invalidates a will, a gift does not invalidate a gift.” Rebbi Abba bar Ḥana: Rebbi Joḥanan and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both are saying that in any case where he can invalidate his will if he recuperates, he also can repeal his gift. As the following: Rebbi Onias’s sister wrote her property over to Rebbi Onias. She needed money and sold it to her husband. After she died, he came to protest against him. He asked him, why did you not claim it during her lifetime? He answered, I did not want to cause her pain. Nevertheless, Rebbi Immi removed it.