brother
2623 occurrences across the corpus
The Jerusalem Talmud
MISHNAH: If somebody marries his sister-in-law but she turned out to have been pregnant and gave birth. If the child is alive, [the levir] has to divorce her and they must bring a sacrifice. If the child is not alive, he may keep her. If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated to bring a reparation offering for an uncertain case.
Rav said, in any case where the true fact can never be established, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. How is that? If there were before him two olive-sized pieces, one of suet and one of fat, he ate one of them, and then a raven ate the other. Since he cannot ascertain the true fact, one does not have to bring a reparation offering for this doubt. But if the raven ate first and then he ate, since he could have ascertained the true fact, one has to bring a reparation offering for the doubt. But did not Rav say, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet? Even though Rav said, only if he made sure that it certainly was suet, he agrees here that he could have ascertained the true fact. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “As Rebbi Eleazar says, one must bring a reparation offering for the doubt of suet.” What does Rav do with that? They disagree with the words of Rebbi Eleazar. A baraita disagrees with Rav: “If there were both a piece of profane [meat] and a piece of sacrificial [meat], he ate one of them and it is not known which one, he brings a reparation offering for the doubt. If he [then] ate the second piece, he brings a reparation offering for a certain transgression. If he ate the first piece and another person came and ate the second, each one brings a reparation offering for the doubt.” One understands that the first brings a reparation offering for the doubt. Why the second? Rebbi Yose said, explain it that the piece was large, he ate half of it and left the other half. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month child of the first [brother] or a seven-month of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt.” Here it is impossible to ascertain the true fact and they are obligated for a reparation offering for the doubt! Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba; Rebbi Ḥizqiah, Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: Rebbi Ze‘ira explained it before us. Since he could just have touched her and then separated, he could have known whether it is his or the other’s, it is as if he could have ascertained the true fact!
How do we hold? If he came to her immediately after her husband’s death, and the fetus was recognized after two months, one should have stated: A nine-month child of either one of them or a seven-month of either one of them! But it may be that he came to her after two months and the fetus was recognized after three months, one should have stated: The sister-in-law should not perform ḥalîṣah or be married in levirate until after five months! But it must be that he came to her after 40 days and the fetus was recognized after 50 days. That would be complete months for [a child of] the first [brother] and incomplete ones for the second. This implies that a woman may give birth after full months. This implies that there are two creations. This implies that a woman may give birth after incomplete months. This implies that a woman may become pregnant repeatedly. This implies that a woman cannot become pregnant simultaneously from two men. And it disagrees with the sermonizing rabbis, since the sermonizing rabbis say “the middleman” “from the orders of the Philistines”, from 100 prepuces of Philistines, that 100 prepuces of Philistines touched her. Rebbi Mattaniah said, there is no disagreement. As long as the semen is not spoiled, a woman can become pregnant from several men simultaneously. After the semen is spoiled, a woman cannot become pregnant from several men simultaneously.
If the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s [inheritance]. one says to him, the other one is your father. If the levir comes to take his part in his brother’s [inheritance], one says to him, that one is his son. How is that? They compromise between themselves and split the property of the deceased. One finds, compromise with his brother is loss to the brothers; competition between the brothers is catastrophy for the brothers. If the old man dies, one finds that certain sons and an uncertain grandson come. If the uncertain [son] dies there exists a certain son of his father’s brother and an uncertain mother. If one of the brothers dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain son of a brother. If the mother of the uncertain [son] dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain husband. If first the uncertain [son] dies and after that his mother, a son of the mother’s brother is certain but the husband uncertain. If the levir dies and the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s inheritance, if the first one was poor, they tell him, that one is your father. If he was rich, the tell him, we all are brothers, sons of his brother. Come and let us inherit our father’s part and the part of our father’s brother.
If the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s [inheritance]. one says to him, the other one is your father. If the levir comes to take his part in his brother’s [inheritance], one says to him, that one is his son. How is that? They compromise between themselves and split the property of the deceased. One finds, compromise with his brother is loss to the brothers; competition between the brothers is catastrophy for the brothers. If the old man dies, one finds that certain sons and an uncertain grandson come. If the uncertain [son] dies there exists a certain son of his father’s brother and an uncertain mother. If one of the brothers dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain son of a brother. If the mother of the uncertain [son] dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain husband. If first the uncertain [son] dies and after that his mother, a son of the mother’s brother is certain but the husband uncertain. If the levir dies and the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s inheritance, if the first one was poor, they tell him, that one is your father. If he was rich, the tell him, we all are brothers, sons of his brother. Come and let us inherit our father’s part and the part of our father’s brother.
If the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s [inheritance]. one says to him, the other one is your father. If the levir comes to take his part in his brother’s [inheritance], one says to him, that one is his son. How is that? They compromise between themselves and split the property of the deceased. One finds, compromise with his brother is loss to the brothers; competition between the brothers is catastrophy for the brothers. If the old man dies, one finds that certain sons and an uncertain grandson come. If the uncertain [son] dies there exists a certain son of his father’s brother and an uncertain mother. If one of the brothers dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain son of a brother. If the mother of the uncertain [son] dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain husband. If first the uncertain [son] dies and after that his mother, a son of the mother’s brother is certain but the husband uncertain. If the levir dies and the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s inheritance, if the first one was poor, they tell him, that one is your father. If he was rich, the tell him, we all are brothers, sons of his brother. Come and let us inherit our father’s part and the part of our father’s brother.
If the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s [inheritance]. one says to him, the other one is your father. If the levir comes to take his part in his brother’s [inheritance], one says to him, that one is his son. How is that? They compromise between themselves and split the property of the deceased. One finds, compromise with his brother is loss to the brothers; competition between the brothers is catastrophy for the brothers. If the old man dies, one finds that certain sons and an uncertain grandson come. If the uncertain [son] dies there exists a certain son of his father’s brother and an uncertain mother. If one of the brothers dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain son of a brother. If the mother of the uncertain [son] dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain husband. If first the uncertain [son] dies and after that his mother, a son of the mother’s brother is certain but the husband uncertain. If the levir dies and the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s inheritance, if the first one was poor, they tell him, that one is your father. If he was rich, the tell him, we all are brothers, sons of his brother. Come and let us inherit our father’s part and the part of our father’s brother.
If the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s [inheritance]. one says to him, the other one is your father. If the levir comes to take his part in his brother’s [inheritance], one says to him, that one is his son. How is that? They compromise between themselves and split the property of the deceased. One finds, compromise with his brother is loss to the brothers; competition between the brothers is catastrophy for the brothers. If the old man dies, one finds that certain sons and an uncertain grandson come. If the uncertain [son] dies there exists a certain son of his father’s brother and an uncertain mother. If one of the brothers dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain son of a brother. If the mother of the uncertain [son] dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain husband. If first the uncertain [son] dies and after that his mother, a son of the mother’s brother is certain but the husband uncertain. If the levir dies and the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s inheritance, if the first one was poor, they tell him, that one is your father. If he was rich, the tell him, we all are brothers, sons of his brother. Come and let us inherit our father’s part and the part of our father’s brother.
If the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s [inheritance]. one says to him, the other one is your father. If the levir comes to take his part in his brother’s [inheritance], one says to him, that one is his son. How is that? They compromise between themselves and split the property of the deceased. One finds, compromise with his brother is loss to the brothers; competition between the brothers is catastrophy for the brothers. If the old man dies, one finds that certain sons and an uncertain grandson come. If the uncertain [son] dies there exists a certain son of his father’s brother and an uncertain mother. If one of the brothers dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain son of a brother. If the mother of the uncertain [son] dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain husband. If first the uncertain [son] dies and after that his mother, a son of the mother’s brother is certain but the husband uncertain. If the levir dies and the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s inheritance, if the first one was poor, they tell him, that one is your father. If he was rich, the tell him, we all are brothers, sons of his brother. Come and let us inherit our father’s part and the part of our father’s brother.
If the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s [inheritance]. one says to him, the other one is your father. If the levir comes to take his part in his brother’s [inheritance], one says to him, that one is his son. How is that? They compromise between themselves and split the property of the deceased. One finds, compromise with his brother is loss to the brothers; competition between the brothers is catastrophy for the brothers. If the old man dies, one finds that certain sons and an uncertain grandson come. If the uncertain [son] dies there exists a certain son of his father’s brother and an uncertain mother. If one of the brothers dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain son of a brother. If the mother of the uncertain [son] dies, there is a certain son and an uncertain husband. If first the uncertain [son] dies and after that his mother, a son of the mother’s brother is certain but the husband uncertain. If the levir dies and the uncertain [son] comes to take his part in his father’s inheritance, if the first one was poor, they tell him, that one is your father. If he was rich, the tell him, we all are brothers, sons of his brother. Come and let us inherit our father’s part and the part of our father’s brother.
HALAKHAH: “If property came to a woman waiting for her levir,” etc. Here, you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid. If she dies, what does one do with her ketubah?” And you also say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs!” Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, when do you say “she may sell or give away and it is valid”? If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir. When do you say “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs”? If they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. If they came to her before she became a woman waiting for her levir and produced revenue after she became a woman waiting for her levir, [that revenue is as if] they came to her after she became a woman waiting for her levir. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, the levir in this situation is a problem for the House of Shammai. If he is a husband, he inherits everything. If he is not a husband, he inherits nothing. Because of the doubt, “the husband’s heirs should split with her father’s heirs.” For the House of Hillel it is obvious that he is a husband and inherits everything. For even his brother had only the usufruct.
MISHNAH: The obligation of levirate is on the oldest [brother]. If he refuses, one goes to all the other brothers. If they refuse, one returns to the oldest and tells him, the obligation is yours, either give ḥalîṣah or marry in levirate.
MISHNAH: If he made it dependent on a minor until he grows up, or on the oldest when he returns from overseas, or on a deaf-mute or on an insane [brother], one does not listen to him but tells him, the obligation is yours, either give ḥalîṣah or marry in levirate.
MISHNAH: He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance and, if there is a father, the property goes to the father. He who marries his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property. Rebbi Jehudah says, in any case if there is a father, the property goes to the father.
HALAKHAH: “He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance,” etc. That one should not say, ḥalîṣah is freeing, intercourse is freeing; just as you say, “he who marries his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property,” so he who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property. Therefore, it is necessary to say “he is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance”.
HALAKHAH: “He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance,” etc. That one should not say, ḥalîṣah is freeing, intercourse is freeing; just as you say, “he who marries his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property,” so he who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law acquires his brother’s property. Therefore, it is necessary to say “he is like any of the other brothers for the inheritance”.
Rav Jehudah said in the name of Samuel: He who “bespeaks” his sister-in-law does not acquire his brother’s property. Even the House of Shammai agree to that; even Rebbi Simeon agrees to that, but not Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh. As Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh said, “bespeaking” acquires the sister-in-law totally. If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one and came to the other. As you take it, either by “bespeaking” he acquires or by intercourse he acquires. Rebbi Yose said, since he cannot keep either one, he did not acquire his brother’s property.
Rav Jehudah said in the name of Samuel: He who “bespeaks” his sister-in-law does not acquire his brother’s property. Even the House of Shammai agree to that; even Rebbi Simeon agrees to that, but not Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh. As Rebbi Eleazar ben Arakh said, “bespeaking” acquires the sister-in-law totally. If there were two sisters-in-law, he “bespoke” one and came to the other. As you take it, either by “bespeaking” he acquires or by intercourse he acquires. Rebbi Yose said, since he cannot keep either one, he did not acquire his brother’s property.
MISHNAH: He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law is forbidden her relatives and his relatives are forbidden to her. Forbidden to him are her mother and her mother’s mother, her father’s mother, her daughter, her daughter’s daughter and her son’s daughter, and her sister as long as she is alive. The brothers are permitted. Forbidden to her are his father, his father’s father, his son and his son’s son, his brother and his brother’s son. The relative of a co-wife of a person who had ḥalîṣah with him is permitted to him, but the co-wife of a relative of a person who had ḥalîṣah with him is forbidden.
MISHNAH: He who performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law is forbidden her relatives and his relatives are forbidden to her. Forbidden to him are her mother and her mother’s mother, her father’s mother, her daughter, her daughter’s daughter and her son’s daughter, and her sister as long as she is alive. The brothers are permitted. Forbidden to her are his father, his father’s father, his son and his son’s son, his brother and his brother’s son. The relative of a co-wife of a person who had ḥalîṣah with him is permitted to him, but the co-wife of a relative of a person who had ḥalîṣah with him is forbidden.
“Forbidden to her are his father, his father’s father, his son and his son’s son, his brother and his brother’s son.” Does this imply that secondary prohibitions are imposed on the one performing ḥalîṣah? That says it, “his son and his son’s son, his brother and his brother’s son.” That implies that secondary prohibitions are imposed on the one performing ḥalîṣah.
“Forbidden to her are his father, his father’s father, his son and his son’s son, his brother and his brother’s son.” Does this imply that secondary prohibitions are imposed on the one performing ḥalîṣah? That says it, “his son and his son’s son, his brother and his brother’s son.” That implies that secondary prohibitions are imposed on the one performing ḥalîṣah.
“Forbidden to her are his father, his father’s father, his son and his son’s son, his brother and his brother’s son.” Does this imply that secondary prohibitions are imposed on the one performing ḥalîṣah? That says it, “his son and his son’s son, his brother and his brother’s son.” That implies that secondary prohibitions are imposed on the one performing ḥalîṣah.
“Forbidden to her are his father, his father’s father, his son and his son’s son, his brother and his brother’s son.” Does this imply that secondary prohibitions are imposed on the one performing ḥalîṣah? That says it, “his son and his son’s son, his brother and his brother’s son.” That implies that secondary prohibitions are imposed on the one performing ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law while his brother had married her sister and then died, she must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Similarly, if somebody divorces his wife while his brother had married her sister and then died, she is free.
MISHNAH: If somebody performs ḥalîṣah with his sister-in-law while his brother had married her sister and then died, she must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Similarly, if somebody divorces his wife while his brother had married her sister and then died, she is free.
MISHNAH: If a brother gave qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him wait until your older brother has acted. If [one of the] brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry. If the levir died, he has to remove himself from his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: If a brother gave qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him wait until your older brother has acted. If [one of the] brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry. If the levir died, he has to remove himself from his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: If a brother gave qiddushin to the sister of a woman waiting for the levir, they said in the name of Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra: One says to him wait until your older brother has acted. If [one of the] brothers performed ḥalîṣah or married her, he may marry his wife. If the sister-in-law died, he may marry. If the levir died, he has to remove himself from his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s widow by ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: If four brothers were married to four women and died, if their oldest [brother] wants to marry all of them in levirate, he is permitted to do so. If somebody was married to two women and he died, intercourse or ḥalîṣah with one of them frees the co-wife. If one was acceptable and the other blemished, if he performs ḥalîṣah, he performs it with the blemished; if he takes in levirate, he takes the acceptable one.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon to say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire? And here, against Rebbi Simeon that a bill of divorce frees or does not free? Let us hear from the following: “Rabban Gamliel agrees with the Sages that there may be a bill of divorce after ‘bespeaking’ and ‘bespeaking’ after a bill of divorce, a bill of divorce after intercourse and ‘bespeaking’, and ‘bespeaking’ after intercourse and a bill of divorce.” How can there be a bill of divorce after intercourse and “bespeaking”? There were three sisters-in-law. He “bespoke” one, had intercourse with another, and gave a bill of divorce to the third. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. If you would say that “bespeaking” either acquires or does not acquire then, as you take it, if “bespeaking” acquired, there can be nothing after that. If “bespeaking” did not acquire, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that “bespeaking” acquires partially. How can there be “bespeaking” after intercourse and a bill of divorce? If there were three sisters-in-law. He gave a bill of divorce to one, had intercourse with another, and “bespoke” the third. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. If you would say that a bill of divorce either frees or does not free then, as you take it, if a bill of divorce frees, there can be nothing after that. If a bill of divorce does not free, intercourse should acquire and there should be nothing after that. This implies that a bill of divorce frees partially. Does Rabban Gamliel follow Rebbi Simeon? There is no “bespeaking” after “bespeaking” a sister-in-law following Rebbi Simeon. But the argument of one is different from the argument of the other. The argument of Rabban Gamliel: any part which a “bespeaking” of the the second could acquire in the future, the first already had acquired. Any part which a bill of divorce from the second [brother] could free in the future, the bill of divorce of the first already had freed. The reasoning of Rebbi Simeon: If the first [brother] acquired, so did the second. If the first [brother] did not acquire, neither did the second. If the first [bill of divorce] did not free, neither did the second.
“He acquired her and there is no difference between intercourse and intercourse.” What did he acquire? Samuel said, he acquired only the things spelled out in the paragraph: To inherit the deceased’s property, (to be betrothed by a brother), and to permit her co-wife to the outside. Rebbi Joḥanan said, he acquired everything. Rebbi Isaac ben Eleazar said, when do they disagree? If he touched her. But if he completed the intercourse, everybody agrees that he acquired everything. Rebbi Mattaniah said, when do they disagree? If he had intercourse with her still in her father’s house. But if he had intercourse with her still in her husband’s house, everybody agrees that he acquired everything. Rebbi Yose said, the Mishnah said: If he married her, she is his wife in every respect.
MISHNAH: The High Priest shall not marry a widow, whether a widow from betrothal or a widow from marriage. He shall not marry an adult; Rebbi Eleazar and Rebbi Simeon enable the adult. He shall not marry one injured by a piece of wood. If he gave qiddushin and afterwards was elected High Priest, he shall marry her; it happened that Joshua ben Gamla had given qiddushin to Martha bat Boetos when the king appointed him as High Priest and he married her. If a woman was waiting for her Cohen levir when he was elected High Priest, even though he “bespoke” her, he may not marry her. If the brother of a High Priest died, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.
“If a brother of the High Priest dies, he performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” This supports him who says that ḥalîṣah is freeing. But according to him who says, ḥalîṣah is acquisiton, does one say to him, transgress the words of the Torah?
MISHNAH: The fetus, the levir, the betrothal, the deaf-and-dumb, and the male nine years and one day old disable but do not enable to eat. If there was a doubt whether or not he had reached nine years and one dayt; whether or not he had grown two pubic hairs; when the house fell on him and his brother’s daughter and it is not known who of them died first, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.
“When the house fell on him and his brother’s daughter and it is not known who of them died first, her co-wife performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate.” Why do we come here to state doubts? Since we had stated [the rules for] co-wives, we now state for doubts concerning co-wives.
There, we have stated: “If it is doubtful whether [the child is] a nine-month’s child of the first [brother] or a seven-month’s of the second, he has to divorce her, the child is legitimate, and they are obligated for a reparation offering for a possible sin.” It was stated: “The first son could be High Priest, any second son possibly is a bastard. Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob said, there is no such thing as a possible bastard.” Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob agrees in cases of doubt of Samaritans and desecrated persons. This refers to what we have stated there: “Ten classes returned from Babylonia.” In the opinion of Rebbi Eliezer ben Jacob, eight. In the opinion of Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, nine. In the opinion of the rabbis, ten.
MISHNAH: There exist women permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their levirs, permitted to their levirs but forbidden to their husbands, permitted to both of them, or forbidden to both. The following are permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their levirs: If a simple priest was betrothed to a widow and has a brother who is High Priest, or a qualified man married a qualified woman and has a disqualified brother, or an Israel married an Israelite woman and has a bastard brother, or a bastard married a bastard woman and has an Israel brother, [the women] are permitted to their husbands and forbidden for their levirs.
MISHNAH: There exist women permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their levirs, permitted to their levirs but forbidden to their husbands, permitted to both of them, or forbidden to both. The following are permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their levirs: If a simple priest was betrothed to a widow and has a brother who is High Priest, or a qualified man married a qualified woman and has a disqualified brother, or an Israel married an Israelite woman and has a bastard brother, or a bastard married a bastard woman and has an Israel brother, [the women] are permitted to their husbands and forbidden for their levirs.
MISHNAH: There exist women permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their levirs, permitted to their levirs but forbidden to their husbands, permitted to both of them, or forbidden to both. The following are permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their levirs: If a simple priest was betrothed to a widow and has a brother who is High Priest, or a qualified man married a qualified woman and has a disqualified brother, or an Israel married an Israelite woman and has a bastard brother, or a bastard married a bastard woman and has an Israel brother, [the women] are permitted to their husbands and forbidden for their levirs.
MISHNAH: There exist women permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their levirs, permitted to their levirs but forbidden to their husbands, permitted to both of them, or forbidden to both. The following are permitted to their husbands but forbidden to their levirs: If a simple priest was betrothed to a widow and has a brother who is High Priest, or a qualified man married a qualified woman and has a disqualified brother, or an Israel married an Israelite woman and has a bastard brother, or a bastard married a bastard woman and has an Israel brother, [the women] are permitted to their husbands and forbidden for their levirs.
HALAKHAH: “There exist women permitted to their husbands,” etc. Rebbi Niḥa bar Sava asked before Rebbi Jonah: Why “married”? Even “betrothed”! Why a widow? even a virgin! Are these all? She and her co-wife. I also have others: The co-wife of one suspected of adultery is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. If his brother had slept with the sister of one who had performed ḥalîṣah with him, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. This supports Rebbi Jonah, since Rebbi Jonah said, the groupings of Rebbi are not exhaustive.
HALAKHAH: “There exist women permitted to their husbands,” etc. Rebbi Niḥa bar Sava asked before Rebbi Jonah: Why “married”? Even “betrothed”! Why a widow? even a virgin! Are these all? She and her co-wife. I also have others: The co-wife of one suspected of adultery is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. If his brother had slept with the sister of one who had performed ḥalîṣah with him, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir. This supports Rebbi Jonah, since Rebbi Jonah said, the groupings of Rebbi are not exhaustive.
“If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir.” Did not Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun say in the name of Rav that a proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]? So is the Mishnah: If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav: A proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]. What is the reason? Qualified men are warned against disqualified women and disqualified men against qualified women but not disqualified women against qualified men nor qualified women against disqualified men. Did we not state: “they should not take, should not take”, which teaches that the woman is warned through the man? They wanted to say, qualified women against disqualified women but it is only disqualified women against qualified women. “If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir.” Did not Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun say that a proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]? So is the Mishnah: If a desecrated [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a qualified brother. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav: A proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]. What is the reason? Qualified men are warned against disqualified women but not disqualified women against qualified men nor qualified women against disqualified men. Did we not state: “they should not take, should not take”, which teaches that the woman is warned through the man? They wanted to say, qualified women against disqualified men but it is only disqualified women against qualified men.
“If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir.” Did not Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun say in the name of Rav that a proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]? So is the Mishnah: If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav: A proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]. What is the reason? Qualified men are warned against disqualified women and disqualified men against qualified women but not disqualified women against qualified men nor qualified women against disqualified men. Did we not state: “they should not take, should not take”, which teaches that the woman is warned through the man? They wanted to say, qualified women against disqualified women but it is only disqualified women against qualified women. “If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir.” Did not Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun say that a proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]? So is the Mishnah: If a desecrated [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a qualified brother. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav: A proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]. What is the reason? Qualified men are warned against disqualified women but not disqualified women against qualified men nor qualified women against disqualified men. Did we not state: “they should not take, should not take”, which teaches that the woman is warned through the man? They wanted to say, qualified women against disqualified men but it is only disqualified women against qualified men.
“If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir.” Did not Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun say in the name of Rav that a proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]? So is the Mishnah: If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav: A proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]. What is the reason? Qualified men are warned against disqualified women and disqualified men against qualified women but not disqualified women against qualified men nor qualified women against disqualified men. Did we not state: “they should not take, should not take”, which teaches that the woman is warned through the man? They wanted to say, qualified women against disqualified women but it is only disqualified women against qualified women. “If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir.” Did not Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun say that a proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]? So is the Mishnah: If a desecrated [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a qualified brother. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav: A proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]. What is the reason? Qualified men are warned against disqualified women but not disqualified women against qualified men nor qualified women against disqualified men. Did we not state: “they should not take, should not take”, which teaches that the woman is warned through the man? They wanted to say, qualified women against disqualified men but it is only disqualified women against qualified men.
“If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir.” Did not Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun say in the name of Rav that a proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]? So is the Mishnah: If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav: A proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]. What is the reason? Qualified men are warned against disqualified women and disqualified men against qualified women but not disqualified women against qualified men nor qualified women against disqualified men. Did we not state: “they should not take, should not take”, which teaches that the woman is warned through the man? They wanted to say, qualified women against disqualified women but it is only disqualified women against qualified women. “If a qualified [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a desecrated brother, she is permitted to her husband and forbidden to her levir.” Did not Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun say that a proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]? So is the Mishnah: If a desecrated [priest], married to a woman qualified for the priesthood, has a qualified brother. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said in the name of Rav: A proselyte, a freedman, and a disqualified priest are permitted priestly [wives]. What is the reason? Qualified men are warned against disqualified women but not disqualified women against qualified men nor qualified women against disqualified men. Did we not state: “they should not take, should not take”, which teaches that the woman is warned through the man? They wanted to say, qualified women against disqualified men but it is only disqualified women against qualified men.
MISHNAH: These are permitted to their levirs and forbidden to their husbands: If a High Priest was betrothed to a widow and has a brother who is a simple priest, or qualified [priest] married a disqualified woman and has a disqualified brother, or an Israel married a bastard woman and has a bastard brother, or a bastard who married an Israel woman and has an Israel brother; [the women] are permitted to their levirs and forbidden to their husbands.
MISHNAH: These are permitted to their levirs and forbidden to their husbands: If a High Priest was betrothed to a widow and has a brother who is a simple priest, or qualified [priest] married a disqualified woman and has a disqualified brother, or an Israel married a bastard woman and has a bastard brother, or a bastard who married an Israel woman and has an Israel brother; [the women] are permitted to their levirs and forbidden to their husbands.
MISHNAH: These are permitted to their levirs and forbidden to their husbands: If a High Priest was betrothed to a widow and has a brother who is a simple priest, or qualified [priest] married a disqualified woman and has a disqualified brother, or an Israel married a bastard woman and has a bastard brother, or a bastard who married an Israel woman and has an Israel brother; [the women] are permitted to their levirs and forbidden to their husbands.
MISHNAH: These are permitted to their levirs and forbidden to their husbands: If a High Priest was betrothed to a widow and has a brother who is a simple priest, or qualified [priest] married a disqualified woman and has a disqualified brother, or an Israel married a bastard woman and has a bastard brother, or a bastard who married an Israel woman and has an Israel brother; [the women] are permitted to their levirs and forbidden to their husbands.
MISHNAH: Forbidden to both of them: If a High Priest married a widow and has a brother who is a High Priest or a simple priest, or a qualified [priest] married a disqualified woman and has a qualified brother, or an Israel married a bastard woman and has an Israel brother, or a bastard married an Israel woman and has a bastard brother; these [women] are forbidden to both of them and all other women are permitted to their husbands and their levirs.
MISHNAH: Forbidden to both of them: If a High Priest married a widow and has a brother who is a High Priest or a simple priest, or a qualified [priest] married a disqualified woman and has a qualified brother, or an Israel married a bastard woman and has an Israel brother, or a bastard married an Israel woman and has a bastard brother; these [women] are forbidden to both of them and all other women are permitted to their husbands and their levirs.
MISHNAH: Forbidden to both of them: If a High Priest married a widow and has a brother who is a High Priest or a simple priest, or a qualified [priest] married a disqualified woman and has a qualified brother, or an Israel married a bastard woman and has an Israel brother, or a bastard married an Israel woman and has a bastard brother; these [women] are forbidden to both of them and all other women are permitted to their husbands and their levirs.
MISHNAH: Forbidden to both of them: If a High Priest married a widow and has a brother who is a High Priest or a simple priest, or a qualified [priest] married a disqualified woman and has a qualified brother, or an Israel married a bastard woman and has an Israel brother, or a bastard married an Israel woman and has a bastard brother; these [women] are forbidden to both of them and all other women are permitted to their husbands and their levirs.
HALAKHAH: Are these all? There are others: A woman suspected of adultery is forbidden to both of them. The widow after ḥalîṣah is forbidden to both of them. If a man with injured testicles married a qualified woman and has a brother with injured testicles, she is forbidden to both of them. This supports Rebbi Jonah, since Rebbi Jonah said, the groupings of Rebbi are not exhaustive.
So far if she knows that she is a married woman. What if she did not know that she was a married woman? Let us hear from the following: An underage girl who was married off by her father. She was divorced and went and married on her own. About this Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife. Is there a difference? There, whether she knows or does not know, here also whether she knows or does not know.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
Just as the woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband, so she is forbidden to her paramour. Just as she is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she is forbidden to her paramour’s brother. I might think that just as the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden to her husband’s brother, so she should be forbidden to her paramour’s brother. Let us hear from the following: “A woman’s husband went overseas; they came and told her that her husband had died, and she had a levir here; he married her in levirate and died. Then her husband returned. She is forbidden to him but her co-widow is permitted to him; she is forbidden to him but his brother’s wife is permitted to him.” Is his brother’s wife not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That means that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother. Rebbi Judan said, this follows the rabbis there, as Rebbi Hila said, one states there, for incestuous relationships no divorce is needed except for a married woman; Rebbi Aqiba says also from his wife’s sister and his brother’s wife (not like the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity? That implies that the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is permitted to her paramour’s brother.) But following the rabbis here? Rebbi Ḥiyya said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, everybody agrees that his brother’s wife needs a bill of divorce from him because of the rule of a married wife. He married a person forbidden by the incest rules, and an incest-prohibited woman frees her co-wife. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it is accepted even according to the rabbis here. They fined her but not her heirs. Rebbi Ḥananiah, the son of Rebbi Hillel, said, according to the rabbis there, she should be permitted to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity is forbidden, the co-wife of a divorcee is permitted. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: All co-wives are permitted except the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity. Samuel said, the divorcee herself is permitted in her house. Does he disagree? Since they were discussing co-wives they did not mention divorcees. Why is the co-wife of a woman accused of infidelity forbidden? Rebbi Joḥanan said, they touched this case because it looks like adultery. Rav said, because impurity is written there parallel to incest prohibitions.
MISHNAH: Rebbi Yose says, her ketubah is from the property of her first husband. Rebbi Eleazar says, the first [husband] is entitled to what she finds and earns and may annul her vows. Rebbi Simeon says, copulation with her or ḥaliṣah with her by a brother of the first [husband] frees her co-wives and a child from him is not a bastard; if she was married without permission she is permitted to return to him. If she married by a decision of the court, she must leave but is free from the sacrifice; without a decision of the court, she must leave but must bring the sacrifice. The power of the court frees her from the sacrifice. If the court instructed her to marry but she misbehaved, she must bring a sacrifice since they permitted her only to marry.
“How is that? [A male] nine years and one day old.” “If he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to the brothers. He should be able to allot her to the brothers by an argument de minore ad majus! If he may allot her to his son who may not take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate, should it not be logical that he may allot her to his brother who may take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her [to his son] but may not allot her to the brothers. No. If you would accept the son since he will take [the father’s] place in a field of inheritance, what can you say about his brother who will not take his place in a field of inheritance? Would it be reasonable that he may allot her to him? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to the brothers.
“How is that? [A male] nine years and one day old.” “If he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to the brothers. He should be able to allot her to the brothers by an argument de minore ad majus! If he may allot her to his son who may not take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate, should it not be logical that he may allot her to his brother who may take his place for ḥalîṣah and levirate? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her [to his son] but may not allot her to the brothers. No. If you would accept the son since he will take [the father’s] place in a field of inheritance, what can you say about his brother who will not take his place in a field of inheritance? Would it be reasonable that he may allot her to him? The verse says, “if he allots her to his son.” He allots her to his son but may not allot her to the brothers.
“If he allots her to his son;” he allots her to his son but he may not allot her to his grandson. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: In matters of inheritance you take the grandson like the son but here you do not take the grandson like the son? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if anybody explains this matter, I shall pour him spiced wine. Rebbi Tanḥum answered: In matters of inheritance where the brother can take the place of the son and all others can take the place of the son, the grandson takes the place of the son. The rabbis of Caesarea answered: In matters of impurity you consider the brother like the son and all [near] relatives like the son but not the grandson like the son. He said, there went the spiced wine.
“If he allots her to his son;” he allots her to his son but he may not allot her to his grandson. Samuel bar Abba asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: In matters of inheritance you take the grandson like the son but here you do not take the grandson like the son? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if anybody explains this matter, I shall pour him spiced wine. Rebbi Tanḥum answered: In matters of inheritance where the brother can take the place of the son and all others can take the place of the son, the grandson takes the place of the son. The rabbis of Caesarea answered: In matters of impurity you consider the brother like the son and all [near] relatives like the son but not the grandson like the son. He said, there went the spiced wine.
MISHNAH: If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after that his brother, who [also] was nine years and one day old, copulated with her, [the brother] disabled her for [the first levir]. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law, and after that he copulated with her co-wife, he disabled her for himself. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and died, she performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he married a woman and died, she is free. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Rebbi Simeon says, he takes in levirate the one he likes and performs ḥalîṣah with the other. It makes no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twenty years old, as long as he did not grow two pubic hairs.
MISHNAH: If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after that his brother, who [also] was nine years and one day old, copulated with her, [the brother] disabled her for [the first levir]. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law, and after that he copulated with her co-wife, he disabled her for himself. Rebbi Simeon says, he did not disable. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and died, she performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. If he married a woman and died, she is free. If [a male] nine years and one day old copulated with his sister-in-law and after he became an adult married another woman and died, if he never had intercourse with the first after he became an adult, the second [wife] either performs ḥalîṣah or levirate, the first performs ḥalîṣah but not levirate. Rebbi Simeon says, he takes in levirate the one he likes and performs ḥalîṣah with the other. It makes no difference whether he is nine years and one day or twenty years old, as long as he did not grow two pubic hairs.
It is written: “If a man takes a woman and her mother, it is taboo.” Everywhere is written “lying with” but here is written “taking”, to teach you that he cannot be guilty for the second [woman] unless the first one is prepared for him. Or maybe only by marriage? We already said that there is no incestuous marriage. But is it not written: “Nobody may marry his father’s wife, and he should not uncover his father’s garment’s corner”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before his father married her. But is it not written: “If a man take his brother’s wife, it is despicable”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before his brother married her. This is confirmed by levirate. But is it not written: “You should not take a woman in addition to her sister to make her a co-wife”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before he married her sister. This is confirmed after her sister’s death. But is it not written: “A man who would take his sister, his father’s daughter or his mother’s daughter; he sees her genitals and she sees his genitals, it is ḥesed.” Rebbi Avin said, that you should not say that Kain married his sister, Abel married his sister, “it is charitable”, I was charitable with the first generations so the world could be inhabited; “I said, the world was built on ḥesed.” But is it not written: “Widow, divorcee, and desecrated, these he shall not take”? This comes to tell you that if he became betrothed to her that the betrothal is valid.
It is written: “If a man takes a woman and her mother, it is taboo.” Everywhere is written “lying with” but here is written “taking”, to teach you that he cannot be guilty for the second [woman] unless the first one is prepared for him. Or maybe only by marriage? We already said that there is no incestuous marriage. But is it not written: “Nobody may marry his father’s wife, and he should not uncover his father’s garment’s corner”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before his father married her. But is it not written: “If a man take his brother’s wife, it is despicable”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before his brother married her. This is confirmed by levirate. But is it not written: “You should not take a woman in addition to her sister to make her a co-wife”? This comes to tell you that she was permitted to him before he married her sister. This is confirmed after her sister’s death. But is it not written: “A man who would take his sister, his father’s daughter or his mother’s daughter; he sees her genitals and she sees his genitals, it is ḥesed.” Rebbi Avin said, that you should not say that Kain married his sister, Abel married his sister, “it is charitable”, I was charitable with the first generations so the world could be inhabited; “I said, the world was built on ḥesed.” But is it not written: “Widow, divorcee, and desecrated, these he shall not take”? This comes to tell you that if he became betrothed to her that the betrothal is valid.
Rebbi Yasa went to Ḥomṣ. People came and asked him about the family of Ashtin who were converts, might they marry in levirate? He said to them, so says Rebbi Joḥanan: It is prohibited. They wanted to say, if a woman has children. But if the woman has no children, what can you say? He married his brother’s wife in levirate. If she is not his brother’s wife, should he not be considered as marrying a wife from outside? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa came in the name of Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman: Even so it is forbidden, that people should not say, we saw the commandment of levirate among converts. When has this been said? When he lived with her after he converted. But if he did not live with her after he converted, everybody agrees that it is as if he married a woman from outside.
Rebbi Yasa went to Ḥomṣ. People came and asked him about the family of Ashtin who were converts, might they marry in levirate? He said to them, so says Rebbi Joḥanan: It is prohibited. They wanted to say, if a woman has children. But if the woman has no children, what can you say? He married his brother’s wife in levirate. If she is not his brother’s wife, should he not be considered as marrying a wife from outside? Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa came in the name of Rebbi Isaac bar Naḥman: Even so it is forbidden, that people should not say, we saw the commandment of levirate among converts. When has this been said? When he lived with her after he converted. But if he did not live with her after he converted, everybody agrees that it is as if he married a woman from outside.
MISHNAH: If a woman’s child was mixed up with her daughter-in-law’s child, the mixed-up children became adults, married wives, and died. The other sons of the daughter-in-law must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate since for them it is doubtful whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But the sons of the old woman may either perform ḥalîṣah or levirate since for them she was either a brother’s wife or a nephew’s wife. If one of the identified ones died, the mixed-up ones must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate for a son of the old woman since there is a doubt whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But for the sons of the daughter-in-law, one performs ḥalîṣah; the other may marry in levirate.
MISHNAH: If a woman’s child was mixed up with her daughter-in-law’s child, the mixed-up children became adults, married wives, and died. The other sons of the daughter-in-law must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate since for them it is doubtful whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But the sons of the old woman may either perform ḥalîṣah or levirate since for them she was either a brother’s wife or a nephew’s wife. If one of the identified ones died, the mixed-up ones must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate for a son of the old woman since there is a doubt whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But for the sons of the daughter-in-law, one performs ḥalîṣah; the other may marry in levirate.
MISHNAH: If a woman’s child was mixed up with her daughter-in-law’s child, the mixed-up children became adults, married wives, and died. The other sons of the daughter-in-law must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate since for them it is doubtful whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But the sons of the old woman may either perform ḥalîṣah or levirate since for them she was either a brother’s wife or a nephew’s wife. If one of the identified ones died, the mixed-up ones must perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate for a son of the old woman since there is a doubt whether [the widow was] a brother’s wife or an uncle’s wife. But for the sons of the daughter-in-law, one performs ḥalîṣah; the other may marry in levirate.
MISHNAH: The commandment of ḥalîṣah: He and his sister-in-law come to the court of law and they give him appropriate counsel, as it is said: “The Elders of his city shall call him and speak to him”. She says: “My levir refuses to erect a name in Israel for his brother, my levir does not want;” and he says: “I do not desire to take her.” They have to speak in the holy language. “His sister-in-law comes to him before the Elders’ eyes, strips his shoe from his foot, and spits out before him,” spittle that is visible to the judges. She has to declare and say: “So should be done to a man who would not build his brother’s house.” Up to this sentence they were reading to them but when it was read for Rebbi Hyrkanos under the oak tree in Kefar Abus he finished the paragraph; they established to finish the entire paragraph, “his house shall be called in Israel the house of the one stripped of shoe.” The obligation is on the judges, not on the students. Rebbi Jehudah said, everyone present has the obligation to say,” the one stripped of shoe, the one stripped of shoe”.
MISHNAH: The commandment of ḥalîṣah: He and his sister-in-law come to the court of law and they give him appropriate counsel, as it is said: “The Elders of his city shall call him and speak to him”. She says: “My levir refuses to erect a name in Israel for his brother, my levir does not want;” and he says: “I do not desire to take her.” They have to speak in the holy language. “His sister-in-law comes to him before the Elders’ eyes, strips his shoe from his foot, and spits out before him,” spittle that is visible to the judges. She has to declare and say: “So should be done to a man who would not build his brother’s house.” Up to this sentence they were reading to them but when it was read for Rebbi Hyrkanos under the oak tree in Kefar Abus he finished the paragraph; they established to finish the entire paragraph, “his house shall be called in Israel the house of the one stripped of shoe.” The obligation is on the judges, not on the students. Rebbi Jehudah said, everyone present has the obligation to say,” the one stripped of shoe, the one stripped of shoe”.
Does the recitation prevent [validity]? Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, for anybody able to recite, the recitation does not prevent [validity] but for anybody unable to recite, the recitation does prevent. Rebbi Mana said, even though Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, the recitation does not prevent [validity], he agrees that if one recites, he recites in due order; in particular that it should not be said: “My levir refuses to erect, my levir does not want;” “I do not desire to take her”, but “my levir refuses to erect a name in Israel for his brother, my levir does not want;” “I do not desire to take her.”
There, they say: “She came before us, stripped his shoe from his right foot, spat before us spittle that was visible on the ground, and said: ‘So should be done to a man who would not build his brother’s house.’ ” Rebbi Abbahu said, since the spittle was visible when it left her mouth it is valid, even if the wind dissipated it. If she spat blood? Rebbi Abba in the name of Rav Jehudah, Rebbi Zeriqan turned to it, Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Abba bar Abba, Rebbi Ze‘ira turned to it in the name of Samuel: If it contains some liquid spittle, it is valid. How does the handless [woman] perform ḥalîṣah? With her teeth.
What is the reason of the House of Shammai? The husband she may repudiate since she married him with her consent. The levir to whom she was given by an act of God she cannot repudiate. What is the reason of the House of Hillel? If she can repudiate the principal, so much more the levir! Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. If she says, I can stand marriage with you but not with your brother? Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.
What is the reason of the House of Shammai? The husband she may repudiate since she married him with her consent. The levir to whom she was given by an act of God she cannot repudiate. What is the reason of the House of Hillel? If she can repudiate the principal, so much more the levir! Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. If she says, I can stand marriage with you but not with your brother? Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.
What is the reason of the House of Shammai? The husband she may repudiate since she married him with her consent. The levir to whom she was given by an act of God she cannot repudiate. What is the reason of the House of Hillel? If she can repudiate the principal, so much more the levir! Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. If she says, I can stand marriage with you but not with your brother? Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.
What is the reason of the House of Shammai? The husband she may repudiate since she married him with her consent. The levir to whom she was given by an act of God she cannot repudiate. What is the reason of the House of Hillel? If she can repudiate the principal, so much more the levir! Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. If she says, I can stand marriage with you but not with your brother? Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.
What is the reason of the House of Shammai? The husband she may repudiate since she married him with her consent. The levir to whom she was given by an act of God she cannot repudiate. What is the reason of the House of Hillel? If she can repudiate the principal, so much more the levir! Rebbi Joḥanan said, she may repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she may not repudiate the levir to invalidate the claim of the dead brother and to permit the co-wife to her father and the daughter-in-law to her father-in-law. Do Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish follow the house of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say “the husband”? Where do we hold? If she says, I can stand neither the marriage with your brother nor with you, everybody agrees that she invalidates. If she says, I can stand marriage with you but not with your brother? Rav and Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish both say, she says I cannot stand marriage with you but marriage with your brother I want. The Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Joḥanan: “And all of these, if they died, or repudiated, or were divorced, or found to be she-rams, their co-wives are permitted.” Was she not divorced from him? Similarly, she repudiated him. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: If they repudiated or were divorced in the husband’s lifetime, their co-wives are permitted. After the husband’s death their co-wives perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.
Rav Hamnuna in the name of Assi: The Mishnah speaks about a sister-in-law who has two levirs. If one of them “bespoke” her, she may repudiate his “bespeaking” and marry on the market place. Why can she not repudiate his “bespeaking” and marry his brother? Explain it, if she says, I cannot stand you. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Yosina in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: The Mishnah speaks about a sister-in-law who has five levirs. If one of them “bespoke” her, she may repudiate his “bespeaking” and marry his brother. Why can she not repudiate his “bespeaking” and marry on the market place? Explain it if her father had married her off, this was a marriage by biblical standards.
Rav Hamnuna in the name of Assi: The Mishnah speaks about a sister-in-law who has two levirs. If one of them “bespoke” her, she may repudiate his “bespeaking” and marry on the market place. Why can she not repudiate his “bespeaking” and marry his brother? Explain it, if she says, I cannot stand you. Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Yosina in the name of Rebbi Hoshaia: The Mishnah speaks about a sister-in-law who has five levirs. If one of them “bespoke” her, she may repudiate his “bespeaking” and marry his brother. Why can she not repudiate his “bespeaking” and marry on the market place? Explain it if her father had married her off, this was a marriage by biblical standards.
MISHNAH: Two brothers are married to two underage orphan [sisters]. If the husband of one of them dies, the other one has to leave as wife’s sister. And so for two deaf-mute [sisters]. If one is adult and the other underage, if the husband of the underage girl died, she has to leave as wife’s sister. If the husband of the adult one died, Rebbi Eliezer said, one teaches the underage one to repudiate him. Rabban Gamliel says, if she repudiated, she repudiated; otherwise she should wait until she becomes of age and the other one has to leave as wife’s sister. Rebbi Joshua says, woe to him for his wife, woe to him for his brother’s wife! He has to send away his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s wife by ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: Two brothers are married to two underage orphan [sisters]. If the husband of one of them dies, the other one has to leave as wife’s sister. And so for two deaf-mute [sisters]. If one is adult and the other underage, if the husband of the underage girl died, she has to leave as wife’s sister. If the husband of the adult one died, Rebbi Eliezer said, one teaches the underage one to repudiate him. Rabban Gamliel says, if she repudiated, she repudiated; otherwise she should wait until she becomes of age and the other one has to leave as wife’s sister. Rebbi Joshua says, woe to him for his wife, woe to him for his brother’s wife! He has to send away his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s wife by ḥalîṣah.
Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Ze‘ira, Menaḥem in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rebbi Eliezer, if she repudiated, she repudiated. Rebbi Eliezer said, one teaches the underage one to repudiate him, and you say so? Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rebbi Joshua, if she repudiated, she repudiated. Rebbi Joshua says, woe to him for his wife, woe to him for his brother’s wife! And you say so? Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rabban Gamliel. Rebbi Joshua agrees with Rabban Gamliel, if she repudiated, she repudiated; otherwise she should wait until she becomes of age. If not, he has to send away his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s wife by ḥalîṣah.
Rebbi Ḥaggai said before Rebbi Ze‘ira, Menaḥem in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rebbi Eliezer, if she repudiated, she repudiated. Rebbi Eliezer said, one teaches the underage one to repudiate him, and you say so? Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Ḥiyya, in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rebbi Joshua, if she repudiated, she repudiated. Rebbi Joshua says, woe to him for his wife, woe to him for his brother’s wife! And you say so? Rebbi Hila, Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Practice follows Rabban Gamliel. Rebbi Joshua agrees with Rabban Gamliel, if she repudiated, she repudiated; otherwise she should wait until she becomes of age. If not, he has to send away his wife by a bill of divorce and his brother’s wife by ḥalîṣah.
MISHNAH: Somebody was married to two underage orphan girls and died. If the levir had intercourse with the first one and then had intercourse with the second, or his brother had intercourse with the second, the first one was not disabled. The same holds for two deaf-mutes. An underage girl and a deaf-mute. If the levir had intercourse with the underage girl and then had intercourse with the deaf-mute, or his brother had intercourse with the deaf-mute, the underage girl was not disabled. If the levir had intercourse with the deaf-mute and then had intercourse with the underage girl, or his brother had intercourse with the underage girl, the deaf-mute was disabled.
MISHNAH: Somebody was married to two underage orphan girls and died. If the levir had intercourse with the first one and then had intercourse with the second, or his brother had intercourse with the second, the first one was not disabled. The same holds for two deaf-mutes. An underage girl and a deaf-mute. If the levir had intercourse with the underage girl and then had intercourse with the deaf-mute, or his brother had intercourse with the deaf-mute, the underage girl was not disabled. If the levir had intercourse with the deaf-mute and then had intercourse with the underage girl, or his brother had intercourse with the underage girl, the deaf-mute was disabled.