2819 occurrences across the corpus

The Jerusalem Talmud

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 3:34

Rebbi Yose said, Rebbi accepted the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon and taught accordingly. Rebbi Abba bar Cohen asked before Rebbi Yose: Why Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon? Even following his father, Rebbi Simeon! He said to him, “eating” is on the altar, “burning” is not on the altar. Rebbi Ḥanina objected before Rebbi Mana: Did not Rebbi Ḥiyya disagree: “It cannot be burned completely because of the wife’s part; it cannot be eaten because of the husband’s part.” He said to him, Rebbi accepted the opinion of Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon, the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya accepted the opinion of the latter’s father Rebbi Simeon.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 3:38

“A Cohen’s daughter may defile herself for the dead.” Rebbi Dosa from Malḥiyya, Rebbi Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: A Cohen’s daughter is permitted to leave the Land. What is the reason? “Say to the Cohanim.” Not to the daughters of Cohanim. If it were not so, what would he say? Because she is included in the decree, she cannot leave. Why should she not be included in the decree and be forbidden to leave? If you say so, you push aside the paragraph on impurities.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 3:42

“A man can make his son a nazir,” and “a man can shave”. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Meїr: In twenty-four matters are the House of Shammai lenient while the House of Hillel are restrictive and that is one of them: The House of Shammai say, a man cannot make his son a nazir, but the House of Hillel say, a man can make his son a nazir.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 3:44

“A man is stoned naked, no woman is stoned naked.” For it is written, “you shall stone him,” not his garment. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked before Rebbi Yose: Is it not written: “You shall stone them with stones,” does that mean “them but not their garments”? How is that? A man is not greatly degraded by this, so he is stoned naked, but a woman who would be greatly degraded by it cannot be stoned naked.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 4:3

Does our Mishnah follow the House of Shammai, since the House of Shammai say, “she takes her ketubah but does not drink”? Rebbi Yose said, there the reason of the House of Shammai is that she may say, bring me my husband, then I shall drink. But here, she knew that the preliminarily married cannot drink; why did she bring herself into that great doubt? In order to disqualify herself from receiving her ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 4:4

Rebbi Jehudah asked: As you say, “and he declared his jealousy to his wife,” “and he declared his jealousy to his wife,” even if she is only partially his wife, similarly, “under your husband,” even if he is only partially your husband. How is that? If he declared his jealousy to her while she was preliminarily married, then he wed her, and she went to a secluded place, he makes her drink on the basis of his declaration of jealousy. If he declared his jealousy to her while she was waiting for her brother-in-law, then he wed her, and she went to a secluded place, he makes her drink on the basis of his declaration of jealousy. If he declared his jealousy to her while she was preliminarily married, then he took her in, she went to a secluded place, and after that he had sex with her, she has to leave with her ketubah; otherwise she has to leave without ketubah. [If he declared his jealousy to her while she was waiting for her brother-in-law, then he took her in, she went to a secluded place, and after that he had sex with her, she has to leave with her ketubah; otherwise without ketubah.] If her husband declared his jealousy and died, she became destined for her brother-in-law who married her, then she went to a secluded place, he makes her drink on the basis of [the first husband’s] declaration of jealousy. If her husband did not declare his jealousy and died, she became destined for her brother-in-law who declared his jealousy but did not manage to take her in before he died and she became destined for his brother, the latter cannot make her drink since she became destined for him only because of the first brother. But if her brother-in-law declared his jealousy, took her in, and died, then she became destined for a brother-in-law who took her in, when she went to a secluded place he makes her drink on the basis of his declaration of jealousy.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 4:6

MISHNAH: The following cannot drink or collect their ketubah: One who says, I am impure for you, or one for whom came witnesses declaring her to be impure; one who says “I will not drink”. But one whose husband refuses to make her drink, or whose husband copulated with her on the road, collects her ketubah but does not drink. About those whose husbands died before she would drink, the House of Shammai say, they collect the ketubah but do not drink, but the House of Hillel say, they neither drink not collect the ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 4:7

HALAKHAH: “The following cannot drink or collect their ketubah: One who says, I am impure for you,” etc. Rebbi Joshia said, Ze‘ira told me in the name of the people of Jerusalem: In three cases, if they want to forgive, they may forgive. These are: The suspect wife, the rebellious son, and the rebellious Elder, etc.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 4:8

MISHNAH: A woman pregnant by another man or nursing another man’s [child] may neither drink nor collect her ketubah, the words of Rebbi Meïr, but the Sages say, he may separate from her and take her back later. A she-ram, an old woman, or a sterile one, neither drinks nor collects her ketubah; Rebbi Eleazar says, he may marry another wife and be fruitful and multiply with her. All other women either drink or cannot collect their ketubah.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 5:15

It was stated: “Rebbi Yose said, from where that the fourth degree is disabled in sanctified food? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation is not disabled for heave but disabled for sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which is disabled for heave should disable for sanctified food. That means, we learned third degree from a verse and fourth degree from an argument de minore ad majus.” Rebbi Joḥanan objected: Food that was touched by a ṭevul yom is a counterexample, because it is disabled in the case of heave but not disabled in the case of sanctified food. Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi Yose argues the method of his teacher Rebbi Aqiba. Just as Rebbi Aqiba says “it will be impure”, it makes impure by the words of the Torah, so Rebbi Yose says “it will be impure”, it makes impure by the words of the Torah. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Yose bar Ḥanina: Rebbi Yose does not need that argument de minore ad majus. Rebbi Yose explains the verse: “Any meat which would touch”, that is second degree food because it touched primary impurity; “anything impure”, that is third degree food because it touched second degree impurity; “shall not be eaten”, the endstage of impurity cannot be eaten.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 5:16

So far about solid food that became impure in the air space of a clay vessel which had become impure by a reptile. What about solid food that became impure directly from a reptile? Is that not an argument? Since vessels, which cannot become impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food, [is it not logical that solid food, which becomes impure in the air space of a clay vessel that became impure by a reptile, should become impure by contact with a reptile to defile solid food.] So far, following Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? Rebbi Ismael stated: “Any meat which would touch anything impure”, that is first degree food which touched any impurity, “shall not be eaten”, to add a second degree of impurity. The third degree from where? It is an argument. Since a ṭevul yom who is not disabled for profane food disables heave, it is only logical that a person secondarily impure, who disables profane food should disable heave. The fourth degree for sacrifices from where? It is an argument. Since one who lacks expiation who does not disable heave disables sanctified food, it is only logical that third degree [impurity] which disables heave should disable sanctified food. That means, we learned first and second degrees from a verse, the third from an argument and the fourth from an argument de minore ad majus. Can one pile argument on argument? Everything is subject to practice, i. e., that third degree disables heave and fourth degree disables sacrifices.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 6:8

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If her mother-in-law said “I saw her when she became impure”, [you say that she did not drink. If then somebody else came and said, “I saw her when she became impure”], about what does he testify? If to make her drink, it was clear beforehand that she does not drink. He would come only to deny her ketubah to her, but one cannot make a person lose money on the testimony of one witness! Rebbi Yose asked: If he heard from a bird flying by: “I saw her when she became impure”, you say that she did not drink. If then somebody came and said, “I saw her when she became impure”, about what does he testify? If to make her drink, it was clear beforehand that she does not drink. He would come only to deny her ketubah to her, but one cannot make a person lose money on the testimony of one witness!

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 6:8

Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked: If her mother-in-law said “I saw her when she became impure”, [you say that she did not drink. If then somebody else came and said, “I saw her when she became impure”], about what does he testify? If to make her drink, it was clear beforehand that she does not drink. He would come only to deny her ketubah to her, but one cannot make a person lose money on the testimony of one witness! Rebbi Yose asked: If he heard from a bird flying by: “I saw her when she became impure”, you say that she did not drink. If then somebody came and said, “I saw her when she became impure”, about what does he testify? If to make her drink, it was clear beforehand that she does not drink. He would come only to deny her ketubah to her, but one cannot make a person lose money on the testimony of one witness!

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 7:28

It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah bar Ilai says: Abba Ḥalaphta, Rebbi Eleazar ben Mattia, and Ḥanina bar Ḥakhinai stood on those stones and estimated that each one on them was a load of 40 seah. From here you can estimate how big was the bunch of grapes. It is written: “Each one should lift a stone on his shoulder.” One cannot compare one who lifts from the ground to his shoulder to one who lifts first from the ground to his knee and then from his knee to his shoulder. One cannot compare one who lifts first from the ground to his knee and then from his knee to his shoulder to one onto whom others hang [the load]. One cannot compare one onto whom others hang [the load] to [a load] carried by two. It is written: “One man per tribe.” In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba who says these are expressions of additions, there were 24, sixteen for the grape bunch and eight for figs, pomegranates, and their belongings. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, who says there are double expressions, there were twelve, eight for the grape bunch and four for figs, pomegranates, and their belongings. In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael a beam; in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba a beam and beams of beams.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 7:28

It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah bar Ilai says: Abba Ḥalaphta, Rebbi Eleazar ben Mattia, and Ḥanina bar Ḥakhinai stood on those stones and estimated that each one on them was a load of 40 seah. From here you can estimate how big was the bunch of grapes. It is written: “Each one should lift a stone on his shoulder.” One cannot compare one who lifts from the ground to his shoulder to one who lifts first from the ground to his knee and then from his knee to his shoulder. One cannot compare one who lifts first from the ground to his knee and then from his knee to his shoulder to one onto whom others hang [the load]. One cannot compare one onto whom others hang [the load] to [a load] carried by two. It is written: “One man per tribe.” In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba who says these are expressions of additions, there were 24, sixteen for the grape bunch and eight for figs, pomegranates, and their belongings. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, who says there are double expressions, there were twelve, eight for the grape bunch and four for figs, pomegranates, and their belongings. In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael a beam; in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba a beam and beams of beams.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 7:28

It was stated: Rebbi Jehudah bar Ilai says: Abba Ḥalaphta, Rebbi Eleazar ben Mattia, and Ḥanina bar Ḥakhinai stood on those stones and estimated that each one on them was a load of 40 seah. From here you can estimate how big was the bunch of grapes. It is written: “Each one should lift a stone on his shoulder.” One cannot compare one who lifts from the ground to his shoulder to one who lifts first from the ground to his knee and then from his knee to his shoulder. One cannot compare one who lifts first from the ground to his knee and then from his knee to his shoulder to one onto whom others hang [the load]. One cannot compare one onto whom others hang [the load] to [a load] carried by two. It is written: “One man per tribe.” In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba who says these are expressions of additions, there were 24, sixteen for the grape bunch and eight for figs, pomegranates, and their belongings. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon, who says there are double expressions, there were twelve, eight for the grape bunch and four for figs, pomegranates, and their belongings. In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael a beam; in the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba a beam and beams of beams.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 7:35

MISHNAH: How does the reading of the king proceed? At the end of the last day of Tabernacles, on the eighth, at the end of the Sabbatical year, one makes a wooden platform for him and he sits on it, as it is said: “At the end of seven years, at the assembly of the Sabbatical years at the festival of Tabernacles, when all of Israel appears.” The organizer of the synagogue takes a Torah scroll and gives it to the president of the synagogue; the president of the synagogue gives it to the Second; the Second gives it to the High Priest, the High Priest gives it to the king. The king stands to receive it, he reads sitting down. King Agrippas stood to receive, he read while standing, and the Sages praised him. When he reached “you cannot put over yourselves a strange man who is not your brother”, tears flowed from his eyes. They said to him, do not fear Agrippas, you are our brother, you are our brother.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 8:3

Would it not be reasonable that “the commanders should take charge at the head of the people” and then “the Cohen shall come close”? He who directs them should inform them! The text is not in the correct order. At the border, you say that the policeman hears from the Cohen the text and communicates it to the people in any language. But at the battle order (they provide water and food and repair the roads). Rebbi Ḥaggai asked, since at the border the policeman hears from the Cohen the text and communicates it to the people in any language, should it not be the same with the battle order? Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Ada objected, is it reasonable that “when the policemen finished talking to the people,” after that “the Cohen shall come close and speak to the people”? He said to him, since you say, the text is not in the correct order, you cannot infer anything.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 8:19

HALAKHAH: “Who built a house”, not only who built; if he bought, inherited, or it was given to him as a gift, from where? The verse says, “the man,” “who is the man”. From where he who builds a barn, a cow-shed, a wood-shed, a storage facility, from where? The verse says, “who builds”. I could think that one who builds a portico, a covered walkway, and a verandah would return; the verse says “house”; the house is distinguished by the fact that it can be used as a dwelling. This excludes those items which cannot be dwellings. It also excludes a house which does not enclose four by four cubits. As it was stated: A house which does not enclose four by four cubits is free from the obligation of a parapet, or a mezuzah, or an erub. It also does not induce ṭevel for tithes and one does not give it four cubits in front of its door, and it is not counted as a connection to the town, and one who forswears any use of a house is permitted to sit in it, and it does not remain with the buyer in the Jubilee year, and it cannot become impure by disease, and its owner does not become exempt from the war because of it.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 8:19

HALAKHAH: “Who built a house”, not only who built; if he bought, inherited, or it was given to him as a gift, from where? The verse says, “the man,” “who is the man”. From where he who builds a barn, a cow-shed, a wood-shed, a storage facility, from where? The verse says, “who builds”. I could think that one who builds a portico, a covered walkway, and a verandah would return; the verse says “house”; the house is distinguished by the fact that it can be used as a dwelling. This excludes those items which cannot be dwellings. It also excludes a house which does not enclose four by four cubits. As it was stated: A house which does not enclose four by four cubits is free from the obligation of a parapet, or a mezuzah, or an erub. It also does not induce ṭevel for tithes and one does not give it four cubits in front of its door, and it is not counted as a connection to the town, and one who forswears any use of a house is permitted to sit in it, and it does not remain with the buyer in the Jubilee year, and it cannot become impure by disease, and its owner does not become exempt from the war because of it.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 8:34

MISHNAH: “The policemen shall add and say to the people: ‘Who is the man fearful and faint-hearted, let him go and return to his house. Rebbi Aqiba says, “fearful and faint-hearted” in its simple meaning, that he cannot stand in military engagements and see a drawn sword. Rebbi Yose the Galilean says, “fearful and faint-hearted” is one who is fearful because of his sins; therefore the Torah appended him to all of these that he should return because of them. Rebbi Yose said, a widow for the High Priest, a divorcee or one having received ḥalîṣah for an ordinary Cohen, a bastard or Gibeonite girl for an Israel, a Jewish girl for a bastard or a Gibeonite, that is the “fearful and faint-hearted”.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 8:36

Also, it was stated: They all have to bring proof except from this one whose witnesses are with him. This follows him who said that he cannot stand in military engagements and see a drawn sword. But following him who says that he is one who is fearful because of his sins, he has to bring proof. Therefore the Torah appended him to all of these that he should return because of them, not to publicize the sinners. This comes as Rebbi Levi said in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “At the place where the elevation offering is being slaughtered, the purification offering is being slaughtered before the Eternal,” not to publicize the sinners.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 9:12

Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun stated in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: “If he was found standing on his bed and the knife was sticking in his heart, one did not break its neck. Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated, one did break its neck.” But that of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai is of those which are so-and-so. As Rebbi Joḥanan said, all those [statements] of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai which are so-and-so are isolated opinions and one cannot rely on them.

Jerusalem Talmud Sotah 9:30

“The meaning of etan is “hard”, “Hard is your seat, make your nest in the rock.” “Even if it is not hard it is qualified.” Similarly, if there is no brook? Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai stated, “they shall bring down, and they shall bring down,” even if there is no brook. But that of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai is of those which are so-and-so. As Rebbi Joḥanan said, all those [statements] of Rebbi Simeon ben Ioḥai which are so-and-so are isolated opinions and one cannot rely on them.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:4

Rebbi Eleazar explains the reason given in the Mishnah, that if he has a complaint about virginity he can quickly go to court. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Since the time of danger they used to marry on Tuesdays and the Sages did not object; about Monday one does not listen to him, but if it was because of a danger it is permitted. What is “because of a danger”? because of sorcery. What is the difference between Monday and Tuesday? One who waits one day cannot be compared to one who waits two days. Why not let him wait two days? That his acquisition should not be sweet for him. Why should his acquisition not be sweet for him? One cannot tolerate it, since Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. Could we not suspect that she was raped? A rape is public knowledge. And even if you suspect that she was raped, there is no other doubt. There is a doubt whether she was raped or whether she was [willingly] opened. From the words of the Torah one has to be stringent. Rebbi Yose said, if you suspect that she was raped, there are two doubts. There is a doubt whether she was raped or whether she was [willingly] opened; there is a doubt whether it happened after she was preliminarily married or before. From the words of the Torah, with two doubts one has to be lenient.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:4

Rebbi Eleazar explains the reason given in the Mishnah, that if he has a complaint about virginity he can quickly go to court. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Since the time of danger they used to marry on Tuesdays and the Sages did not object; about Monday one does not listen to him, but if it was because of a danger it is permitted. What is “because of a danger”? because of sorcery. What is the difference between Monday and Tuesday? One who waits one day cannot be compared to one who waits two days. Why not let him wait two days? That his acquisition should not be sweet for him. Why should his acquisition not be sweet for him? One cannot tolerate it, since Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. Could we not suspect that she was raped? A rape is public knowledge. And even if you suspect that she was raped, there is no other doubt. There is a doubt whether she was raped or whether she was [willingly] opened. From the words of the Torah one has to be stringent. Rebbi Yose said, if you suspect that she was raped, there are two doubts. There is a doubt whether she was raped or whether she was [willingly] opened; there is a doubt whether it happened after she was preliminarily married or before. From the words of the Torah, with two doubts one has to be lenient.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:9

Rebbi Jonah in the name of Rebbi Crispus: An adult woman is like an open amphora. That means, not to let her lose her ketubah. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what Rebbi Ḥanina said, since Rebbi Ḥanina said: It happened that a woman was found without virginity and the case came before Rebbi. He said to her, where is it? She said, the stairs in my father’s house were high and it was rubbed off. Rebbi believed her. That means, not to let her lose her ketubah. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated there: “The ketubah sum of a virgin who is a widow, or a divorcee, or one who had received ḥalîṣah, after a preliminary marriage is 200 [zuz], and they are subject to complaints about virginity.” That means, referring to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated there: “One who eats unchaperoned at his father-in-law’s in Judea cannot go to court about virginity since he was alone with her.” That means, referring to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated: “If somebody married a woman and found her not to be a virgin. She says, I was raped after the preliminary marriage and your field was flooded, but he says, no, it was before the preliminary marriage and my acquisition was in error,” that refers to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. This also applies to what we stated: “She says, I was injured by a piece of wood, but he says no, you were trampled on by a man,” that refers to a ketubah sum of a mina or 200 [zuz]. But he is not permitted to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. All these cases are based on what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:32

Rebbi Eleazar asked, what about a male who sleeps with a manumitted slave girl? Let us hear from the following: I could think that a male who sleeps with a Gentile slave has to pay; the verse says: “He shall take her as wife by the bride price.” If he can marry her. This excludes the [gentile] slave (or any) whom he cannot marry. Only because he cannot marry her! Therefore, if he can marry her, she collects the fine, and any who collects the fine has a ketubah. Rebbi Yudan said, does that depend on a fine? Look, the adult collects no fine but her ketubah is 200, the virgin after marriage collects a fine but her ketubah is a mina! Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, explain it if she was converted or freed before she reached three years and one day. He said to him, any woman who was converted or manumitted before she reached three years and one day is like an Israel.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:32

Rebbi Eleazar asked, what about a male who sleeps with a manumitted slave girl? Let us hear from the following: I could think that a male who sleeps with a Gentile slave has to pay; the verse says: “He shall take her as wife by the bride price.” If he can marry her. This excludes the [gentile] slave (or any) whom he cannot marry. Only because he cannot marry her! Therefore, if he can marry her, she collects the fine, and any who collects the fine has a ketubah. Rebbi Yudan said, does that depend on a fine? Look, the adult collects no fine but her ketubah is 200, the virgin after marriage collects a fine but her ketubah is a mina! Rebbi Ze‘ira said before Rebbi Mana, explain it if she was converted or freed before she reached three years and one day. He said to him, any woman who was converted or manumitted before she reached three years and one day is like an Israel.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:35

MISHNAH: If somebody eats at his father-in-law’s in Judea without chaperones cannot claim missing virginity since he is alone with her. Both for an Israel widow as a Cohanim widow the ketubah is a mina. The court of priests collected 400 zuz for a virgin, to which the Sages did not object.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:39

HALAKHAH: “Somebody married a woman and found that she was no virgin”, etc. Rebbi Jeremiah asked: Does this mean that a claim of missing virginity is impossible following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, only following Rebbi Joshua? He turned around and said, a claim of missing virginity is possible following Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer, if she remains silent. And even if you say that she talks, if she said that he found her a virgin and destroyed the evidence. Why should she not be believed? One cannot tolerate it, since Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Eleazar, if he found the door open, he is forbidden to keep her because she might have been unfaithful. Here you say, she is believed. There, you say that she is not believed. In this case, both agree that the door was open.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 1:45

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joshia: Practice follows Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer since two form a majority against one. Rebbi Yose asked: If it is practice, why two? And if two, why practice? Would that mean if Rebbi Joḥanan would hold with Rebbi Joshua that practice would not follow Rabban Gamliel and Rebbi Eliezer but Rebbi Joshua? What about it? It is a testimony for which a woman in empowered. They wanted to say, when does Rebbi Joshua disagree with these rabbis? At a place where most are disabling, but at a place where most are qualified, even Rebbi Joshua will agree. There came Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan, Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Eleazar: There is disagreement even at a place where most are qualified. Does Rebbi Joshua think that immorality runs after the disabling? Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita stated that even qualified people whore, as it was stated: Even the most pious man cannot be appointed guardian for illicit sex.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:21

Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market place cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. How is that? If one identified his own signature and that of his colleague, but that second witness’s signature was not known to anybody except his colleague, may that colleague together with somebody from the market place testify on that signature? That is what Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, said in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. Another case where there are no two persons: The signature of one is known by everybody, but that second witness’s signature is not known to anybody except his colleague. Can that colleague testify on his signature as if he were someone from the market place? If you say so, the entire testimony is confirmed by one witness. Rebbi Yudan said, that is correct. If two people come from a town that is mostly Gentile, like Hippos. One is known by everybody as a Jew, but the other is not known by anybody except his companion. Can the latter be considered one from the market place to testify about him? If you say so, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness! And in the prior case, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:21

Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market place cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. How is that? If one identified his own signature and that of his colleague, but that second witness’s signature was not known to anybody except his colleague, may that colleague together with somebody from the market place testify on that signature? That is what Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Ḥuna, said in the name of Rav: One witness and someone from the market cannot together certify the signature of the second witness. Another case where there are no two persons: The signature of one is known by everybody, but that second witness’s signature is not known to anybody except his colleague. Can that colleague testify on his signature as if he were someone from the market place? If you say so, the entire testimony is confirmed by one witness. Rebbi Yudan said, that is correct. If two people come from a town that is mostly Gentile, like Hippos. One is known by everybody as a Jew, but the other is not known by anybody except his companion. Can the latter be considered one from the market place to testify about him? If you say so, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness! And in the prior case, the entire testimony would be confirmed by one witness.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:31

MISHNAH: Two women who were kidnapped and each one of them says I am pure, are not trustworthy. But if they testify one for the other they can be trusted. Similarly, if of two men each one says that he is a Cohen, the cannot be trusted. But if they testify for one another, they can be trusted.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 2:45

Should one not worry that he might be a slave? This supports what Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina: It is forbidden for a man to teach Torah to his slave. But did not Rebbi Ze‘ira say in the name of Rav Jeremiah: A slave is counted as one of the seven readers; wayedabber is counted as one of three verses! Explain it, if he learned it by himself or his master taught him like Tebi. Should one not worry that he might be a slave? This supports what Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Women and slaves cannot share in the distribution on the threshing floor, but one gives them the gifts of priesthood and levitic status from the house.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “The following adolescent girls,” etc. It is written: “She should be his wife,” one who can be his wife. Can the bastard girl be his wife? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “he should weigh silver appropriate for the bride-price of virgins”, that added many virgins. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if it had said “virgin’s brides-prices”; but it says only “appropriate for the bride-price of virgins”; the verse added them only for the bride-price. But where was this said? As Ḥizqiah stated: “If refusing her father should refuse,” not only if her father refuses; from where even if from Heaven they refuse? The verse says “refusing should refuse”, in any case. But then a man who has intercourse with a slave girl should pay the fine! This is impossible, as it was stated: I could think that one who has intercourse with a Gentile slave-girl should be obligated, the verse says, “by bride-money he should take her as a wife to himself.” Only one whom he can marry; this excludes the Gentile slave whom he cannot marry. But he cannot marry his sister and he pays the fine! There is a difference since she can be married to others. But his daughter can be married to others and he does not pay the fine! There is a difference since it is a capital crime and nobody who commits a capital crime pays money.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:2

HALAKHAH: “The following adolescent girls,” etc. It is written: “She should be his wife,” one who can be his wife. Can the bastard girl be his wife? Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, “he should weigh silver appropriate for the bride-price of virgins”, that added many virgins. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, if it had said “virgin’s brides-prices”; but it says only “appropriate for the bride-price of virgins”; the verse added them only for the bride-price. But where was this said? As Ḥizqiah stated: “If refusing her father should refuse,” not only if her father refuses; from where even if from Heaven they refuse? The verse says “refusing should refuse”, in any case. But then a man who has intercourse with a slave girl should pay the fine! This is impossible, as it was stated: I could think that one who has intercourse with a Gentile slave-girl should be obligated, the verse says, “by bride-money he should take her as a wife to himself.” Only one whom he can marry; this excludes the Gentile slave whom he cannot marry. But he cannot marry his sister and he pays the fine! There is a difference since she can be married to others. But his daughter can be married to others and he does not pay the fine! There is a difference since it is a capital crime and nobody who commits a capital crime pays money.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:7

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was not cautioned should he not pay since when cautioned he would be flogged? A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If somebody eats heave in error, he pays principal and fifth,” but if he was cautioned, will he not be flogged? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr said, he is flogged and pays. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as we have stated: “The following adolescent girls can claim a fine,” but if he was cautioned, will he not be flogged? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr said, he is flogged and pays. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Rebbi Meïr learned from the calumniator. (Deut. 22:18) “They shall punish him,” flogging; (Deut. 22:19) “and they shall fine him”, money. But the rabbis say, [the law of] the calumniator is separate because of its novelty; one cannot learn from a novelty! Because nowhere else will a person become guilty by speech, but here he becomes guilty by speech; therefore, nothing can be inferred. Another explanation: one cannot transfer the rules of either payment or flogging. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he [eats] fat in error but is intentional about the sacrifice, if he was cautioned he will be flogged and has to bring a sacrifice? So here, he is flogged and he pays. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” If two possibilities are given to the court, one chooses one of them. This excludes matters in the power of Heaven.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:7

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even if he was not cautioned should he not pay since when cautioned he would be flogged? A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: “If somebody eats heave in error, he pays principal and fifth,” but if he was cautioned, will he not be flogged? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr said, he is flogged and pays. A Mishnah disagrees with Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, as we have stated: “The following adolescent girls can claim a fine,” but if he was cautioned, will he not be flogged? He explains it following Rebbi Meïr since Rebbi Meïr said, he is flogged and pays. Rebbi Abbahu in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Rebbi Meïr learned from the calumniator. (Deut. 22:18) “They shall punish him,” flogging; (Deut. 22:19) “and they shall fine him”, money. But the rabbis say, [the law of] the calumniator is separate because of its novelty; one cannot learn from a novelty! Because nowhere else will a person become guilty by speech, but here he becomes guilty by speech; therefore, nothing can be inferred. Another explanation: one cannot transfer the rules of either payment or flogging. Did not Rebbi Abbahu say in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: If he [eats] fat in error but is intentional about the sacrifice, if he was cautioned he will be flogged and has to bring a sacrifice? So here, he is flogged and he pays. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Samuel bar Rav Isaac said, (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” If two possibilities are given to the court, one chooses one of them. This excludes matters in the power of Heaven.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:10

Nathan bar Hoshiah said, one speaks about an adolescent girl, the other about an adult woman. The adolescent has a fine but nobody is flogged for her; for the adult he is flogged but pays no fine, she cannot be sold; she has no claim for shame and blemish. The rabbis of Caesarea said, explain it that she seduced him or remitted [the fine] for him. Nathan bar Hoshaiah thinks that in a case of flogging and payment he pays but is not flogged. Why should he not be flogged and have to pay? (Deut. 25:2) “Because of his guilt.” You sentence him for one offence but you may not sentence him for two offences. From perjured witnesses. Just as you say there, perjured witnesses pay but are not flogged, here also he pays and is not flogged. Rebbi Jonah said, the reason of Rebbi Nathan bar Hoshaiah: (Deut. 25:2): “For his evil deed.” It refers to one whose flogging frees him from his guilt, excluding one who is told: get up and pay.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:14

Rebbi Mana said before Rebbi Yose: If it is so, he who sleeps with his minor sister should be flogged and have to pay since if he sleeps with his adult sister he is flogged. He reversed himself and said, there death and payment fall on him simultaneously. But here, when he muzzled he is subject to flogging but only later for payment. Rebbi Ze‘ira objected before Rebbi Mana: He who sets fire to his neighbor’s grain stack on the Sabbath is subject to capital punishment from the first ear but only later for payment! One cannot say that because for every single ear there is cautioning for the death penalty. Here also, for every moment of muzzling there is cautioning for flogging. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, two Amoraïm. One said, if he muzzled for heave which is Temple property. The other one said, if he muzzled through an agent. Then the agent is flogged and he is free (Lev. 17:4): “As a blood guilt it will be charged on this man,” not on his employers.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:18

According to Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, what is between these Tannaïm and those rabbis? Prohibitions without extirpation. Rebbi Judan said, he who sleeps with a bastard girl is between them. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, he who puts fire to the grain stack of his neighbor on a holiday is between them. These Tannaïm think, since there is no extirpation, he pays. Those rabbis think, since there is flogging he does not pay. But then “these are the adolescent girls who can claim a fine” cannot follow the rabbis! Rebbi Mattaniah said, explain it according to everybody if it refers to a bastard male who sleeps with a bastard girl.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:20

MISHNAH: The following cannot claim a fine: One who comes to a proselyte woman, a kidnap victim, or a slave girl who was redeemed, converted, or freed, at more than three years and one day of age. Rebbi Jehudah says, the redeemed kidnap victim is in her holiness even if she is an adult.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:21

HALAKHAH: “The following cannot claim a fine,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan said, Rebbi Jehudah excepted the kidnap victim only for the fine. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: Also for the ketubah of a mina or 200 [zuz]. Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, even to let her eat heave. In the opinion of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish, Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Dosa both said the same, as we have stated there: The kidnap victim eats heave, the words of Rebbi Dosa. Rebbi Ḥanina came in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Practice follows Rebbi Dosa.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:25

MISHNAH: If an adolescent girl had been preliminarily married but was divorced, Rebbi Yose the Galilean says she cannot collect the fine; Rebbi Aqiba says, she can collect the fine and it belongs to her.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:30

HALAKHAH: “The seducer pays three,” etc. This does not follow Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon freed the rapist from paying for suffering. To what can you compare this? To one who cuts somebody’s wart when that one would have cut it himself in the future. To what can you compare this? To one who cuts somebody’s trees when that one would have cut them himself in the future. They said to him, you cannot compare one who is deflowered by rape to one who is deflowered by consent; you cannot compare one who is deflowered on a dungheap to one who is deflowered in the bridal chamber! How does Rebbi Simeon interpret ’’because he mistreated her”? They said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, explain it that he raped her on thorns.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:30

HALAKHAH: “The seducer pays three,” etc. This does not follow Rebbi Simeon, since Rebbi Simeon freed the rapist from paying for suffering. To what can you compare this? To one who cuts somebody’s wart when that one would have cut it himself in the future. To what can you compare this? To one who cuts somebody’s trees when that one would have cut them himself in the future. They said to him, you cannot compare one who is deflowered by rape to one who is deflowered by consent; you cannot compare one who is deflowered on a dungheap to one who is deflowered in the bridal chamber! How does Rebbi Simeon interpret ’’because he mistreated her”? They said in the name of Rav Ḥisda, explain it that he raped her on thorns.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 3:39

HALAKHAH: “How much is shame worth? Everything depends on the offender and the offended,” etc. One cannot compare one who is offended by a person of high standing to one offended by a person of low standing. The shame for a person of high standing is great but the injury he incurs is small. The shame for a person of low standing is small but the injury he incurs is great.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:13

HALAKHAH: “If a proselyte woman converted,” etc. It is written: “For he calumniated a virgin of Israel”. That excludes this one who is not from Israel. “For he calumniated a virgin,” to include the proselyte whose conception was not in holiness but her birth was in holiness, that she should be stoned. Why does one not add her for the fine? You cannot do that; as Ḥizqiah stated: We understand that it was said “they shall stone her,” does that not imply that she dies? Why does the verse say, “and she shall die”? But there must be another one who is stoned but (she) [he] is free; who is that? That is the proselyte whose conception was not in holiness but who was born in holiness.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:22

Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Hamnuna in the name of Rav Ada bar Aḥawa: She cannot be executed unless she is an adolescent at the time of the execution. What is the reason? “They shall execute the adolescent at her father’s door.” But did not Rebbi Ḥiyya state: If she whored in her father’s house and [the husband] calumniated her after she became an adult, he is not flogged nor does he pay 100 tetradrachmas but either she or the witnesses are executed by stoning. A Mishnah disagrees with Rav Ada bar Aḥawa: “If he escaped after being sentenced and then his pubic hair grew fully.” There, you can say “they shall execute the adolescent” who whored; can you say here “they shall execute him”, the son?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:24

MISHNAH: The father has the benefit to give his daughter in preliminary marriage by money, contract, or intercourse; he has the right to what she finds and to her earnings, to dissolve her vows, and to receive her bill of divorce, but cannot eat usufruct in her lifetime. If she is definitively married, the husband in addition eats usufruct in her lifetime but is required to pay for her upkeep, her ransom, and her burial. Rebbi Jehudah says, even the poorest in Israel should not provide for her less than two flutes and one wailing woman.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:28

“And her burial.” It was stated: If the husband refused to bury her, the father buries her and recovers his expenses in court. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, the father. Therefore, a third party cannot recover. Rebbi Yose says, both the father and also a third party can recover. There is a parallel disagreement, as we have stated there: “He is required to pay for her upkeep, her ransom, and her burial.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, a third party. Therefore, the father can recover. Rebbi Yose says, neither the father nor a third party can recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥaggai, both for burial and for upkeep the father can recover, a third party cannot recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, for burial both the father and also a third party can recover because it is unthinkable that his wife should be thrown to the dogs. It was stated: At a place where it is customary to eulogize, one eulogizes.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:28

“And her burial.” It was stated: If the husband refused to bury her, the father buries her and recovers his expenses in court. Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, the father. Therefore, a third party cannot recover. Rebbi Yose says, both the father and also a third party can recover. There is a parallel disagreement, as we have stated there: “He is required to pay for her upkeep, her ransom, and her burial.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, they said only, a third party. Therefore, the father can recover. Rebbi Yose says, neither the father nor a third party can recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Ḥaggai, both for burial and for upkeep the father can recover, a third party cannot recover. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose, for burial both the father and also a third party can recover because it is unthinkable that his wife should be thrown to the dogs. It was stated: At a place where it is customary to eulogize, one eulogizes.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:47

HALAKHAH: “If he did not write her a ketubah,” etc. The Mishnah is Rebbi Meïr’s, since Rebbi Meïr said: “Anybody who writes for a virgin less that 200 [zuz] or a mina for a widow engages in immoral intercourse.” Who needs it? Rebbi Meïr! Even though Rebbi Meïr says that any contract which does not contain an alienation clause cannot be foreclosed, here he agrees that it can be foreclosed.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 4:54

There, we have stated: “Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa says, if he speaks about somebody who is a legal heir, his statements are valid, but about somebody who is not a legal heir, his statements are invalid.” Rebbi Joḥanan said, Ben Beroqa spoke only about a son among sons or a (daughter) son among daughters, not about a daughter and brother or a brother among daughters. Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: There was a case and Rebbi decided following Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rebbi Yasa in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: Rebbi asked Nathan the Babylonian, why did they say that practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa? Rebbi Abba, Rebbi Ḥiyya in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: What is the reason? He asked Nathan the Babylonian, why did the Sages say that practice follows Rebbi Joḥanan ben Beroqa? Are you not the one who stated “shall inherit”? (He said to him, you stated “shall take”; he came to him). He said to him, there is no “shall inherit” but “shall take”. When he came to his father, he said to him: you disadvantaged Nathan the Bablylonian; there is no “shall take” but “shall inherit”. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is what he told him: I made an error in what I taught you; there is no “shall take” but “shall inherit”. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, this is one of the leniencies of the ketubah stipulations. In general, a person can transfer rights only by a document; here even verbally. In general, a person cannot transfer rights to somebody not yet existing; here to the non-existing. Rebbi Jeremiah said before Rebbi Ze‘ira: I am wondering how the rabbis can compare ketubah to inheritance, for inheritance is a biblical law but ketubah is from their words; how can one argue this? Even if you say that ketubah is a biblical law, do they not agree that the stipulations of the ketubah are from their words?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:3

It was stated: Just as the husband decides, so the father decides; only that the husband transfers rights in writing but the father only by speech, restricted to those things that can be acquired by speech. What is that? Gidul in the name of Rav: How much are you giving to your son? Such and such. And how much are you giving to your daughter? Such and such. When he preliminarily married her, the daughter acquired among the daughters. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Joseph said, Gidul found something large and said something small! But it is as follows: How much are you giving to your son? Such and such. How much are you giving to your daughter? Such and such. When he preliminarily married her, the daughter acquired among the daughters and the son among the sons. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, is that something small? Does he not acquire a wife on top of movables with one peruṭa’s worth? But nobody can acquire two wives with one peruṭa’s worth! But cannot a person acquire real estate and several movables with one peruṭa’s worth? For a person can acquire two pieces of real estate with one peruṭa’s worth, but nobody can acquire two wives with one peruṭa’s worth.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:14

MISHNAH: The levir does not cause her to eat heave. If she spent six months for her husband and six months for the levir, or even all the time for the husband except for one day for the levir, or all the time for the levir except for one day for the husband, she cannot eat heave. That is the earlier Mishnah. The court in later times said that no woman eats heave unless she had been entering the bridal chamber.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:16

“If she spent six months for her husband and six months for the levir, she cannot eat heave. Not only six months for the levir but even all the time for the levir except for one day, she cannot eat heave.” The Mishna follows neither the earliest not the last Mishnah, but the intermediate development. As it was stated: First, they were saying that a preliminarily married woman, daughter of an Israel, could eat heave, for they were explaining: “If a Cohen acquires a person, acquistion by money;” for what would be the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? They changed, to say: after twelve months, when he becomes responsible for her upkeep. The court of the later ones said: A woman never eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber. ”Already Rebbi Joḥanan ben Bagbag sent to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis: They say in your name that the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel eats heave. He sent back the following: I had been convinced that you are knowledgeable in the secrets of the Torah, but you do not even know the rules de minore ad majus! Since money can acquire a Gentile slave girl to permit her to eat heave, but she cannot be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, whereas a wife can be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, it is only logical that money can acquire a wife to permit her to eat heave! But what can I do? They said that no woman eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber,” and they supported it by the verse: “Every pure person in your household shall eat it.” Rebbi Yudan said, that is an argument de minore ad majus that can be reversed! Because he could say to him, since a Gentile slave girl can be acquired by active possession to permit her to eat heave, what can you say about a wife who cannot be acquired by active possession? If an argument de minore ad majus can be reversed, the argument is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:16

“If she spent six months for her husband and six months for the levir, she cannot eat heave. Not only six months for the levir but even all the time for the levir except for one day, she cannot eat heave.” The Mishna follows neither the earliest not the last Mishnah, but the intermediate development. As it was stated: First, they were saying that a preliminarily married woman, daughter of an Israel, could eat heave, for they were explaining: “If a Cohen acquires a person, acquistion by money;” for what would be the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? They changed, to say: after twelve months, when he becomes responsible for her upkeep. The court of the later ones said: A woman never eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber. ”Already Rebbi Joḥanan ben Bagbag sent to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis: They say in your name that the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel eats heave. He sent back the following: I had been convinced that you are knowledgeable in the secrets of the Torah, but you do not even know the rules de minore ad majus! Since money can acquire a Gentile slave girl to permit her to eat heave, but she cannot be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, whereas a wife can be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, it is only logical that money can acquire a wife to permit her to eat heave! But what can I do? They said that no woman eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber,” and they supported it by the verse: “Every pure person in your household shall eat it.” Rebbi Yudan said, that is an argument de minore ad majus that can be reversed! Because he could say to him, since a Gentile slave girl can be acquired by active possession to permit her to eat heave, what can you say about a wife who cannot be acquired by active possession? If an argument de minore ad majus can be reversed, the argument is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:16

“If she spent six months for her husband and six months for the levir, she cannot eat heave. Not only six months for the levir but even all the time for the levir except for one day, she cannot eat heave.” The Mishna follows neither the earliest not the last Mishnah, but the intermediate development. As it was stated: First, they were saying that a preliminarily married woman, daughter of an Israel, could eat heave, for they were explaining: “If a Cohen acquires a person, acquistion by money;” for what would be the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? They changed, to say: after twelve months, when he becomes responsible for her upkeep. The court of the later ones said: A woman never eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber. ”Already Rebbi Joḥanan ben Bagbag sent to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis: They say in your name that the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel eats heave. He sent back the following: I had been convinced that you are knowledgeable in the secrets of the Torah, but you do not even know the rules de minore ad majus! Since money can acquire a Gentile slave girl to permit her to eat heave, but she cannot be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, whereas a wife can be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, it is only logical that money can acquire a wife to permit her to eat heave! But what can I do? They said that no woman eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber,” and they supported it by the verse: “Every pure person in your household shall eat it.” Rebbi Yudan said, that is an argument de minore ad majus that can be reversed! Because he could say to him, since a Gentile slave girl can be acquired by active possession to permit her to eat heave, what can you say about a wife who cannot be acquired by active possession? If an argument de minore ad majus can be reversed, the argument is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:16

“If she spent six months for her husband and six months for the levir, she cannot eat heave. Not only six months for the levir but even all the time for the levir except for one day, she cannot eat heave.” The Mishna follows neither the earliest not the last Mishnah, but the intermediate development. As it was stated: First, they were saying that a preliminarily married woman, daughter of an Israel, could eat heave, for they were explaining: “If a Cohen acquires a person, acquistion by money;” for what would be the difference between one who acquires a wife and one who acquires a slave girl? They changed, to say: after twelve months, when he becomes responsible for her upkeep. The court of the later ones said: A woman never eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber. ”Already Rebbi Joḥanan ben Bagbag sent to Rebbi Jehudah ben Bathyra at Nisibis: They say in your name that the preliminarily married daughter of an Israel eats heave. He sent back the following: I had been convinced that you are knowledgeable in the secrets of the Torah, but you do not even know the rules de minore ad majus! Since money can acquire a Gentile slave girl to permit her to eat heave, but she cannot be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, whereas a wife can be acquired by sexual relations to permit her to eat heave, it is only logical that money can acquire a wife to permit her to eat heave! But what can I do? They said that no woman eats heave before she enters the bridal chamber,” and they supported it by the verse: “Every pure person in your household shall eat it.” Rebbi Yudan said, that is an argument de minore ad majus that can be reversed! Because he could say to him, since a Gentile slave girl can be acquired by active possession to permit her to eat heave, what can you say about a wife who cannot be acquired by active possession? If an argument de minore ad majus can be reversed, the argument is invalid.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:23

“She nurses her baby.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, is says only “her baby,” therefore not twins. Why does it say “her baby”? As it was stated: “A man cannot force his wife to nurse another man’s child, nor can a woman force her husband to let her nurse another woman’s child. If she made a vow not to nurse her baby, the House of Shammai say that one removes the breast nipple from his mouth, but the House of Hillel say, one forces her. If she was divorced, one cannot force her if [the baby] is not used to her, but if he is used to her one forces her and pays her wages to nurse her baby.” How old is the baby if he can be presumed to know her? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Three months. But Rebbi Ze‘ira was staring at him. He asked him, why are you staring at me? Should I say to you following Samuel, since Samuel said, three days? Samuel follows his opinion, since Samuel said, I recognized the midwives who delivered me. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, I recognized the circumciser who circumcised me. Rebbi Joḥanan said, I recognized the women who kept my mother company.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:23

“She nurses her baby.” Rebbi Ḥaggai said, is says only “her baby,” therefore not twins. Why does it say “her baby”? As it was stated: “A man cannot force his wife to nurse another man’s child, nor can a woman force her husband to let her nurse another woman’s child. If she made a vow not to nurse her baby, the House of Shammai say that one removes the breast nipple from his mouth, but the House of Hillel say, one forces her. If she was divorced, one cannot force her if [the baby] is not used to her, but if he is used to her one forces her and pays her wages to nurse her baby.” How old is the baby if he can be presumed to know her? Rebbi Jeremiah in the name of Rav: Three months. But Rebbi Ze‘ira was staring at him. He asked him, why are you staring at me? Should I say to you following Samuel, since Samuel said, three days? Samuel follows his opinion, since Samuel said, I recognized the midwives who delivered me. Rebbi Joshua ben Levi said, I recognized the circumciser who circumcised me. Rebbi Joḥanan said, I recognized the women who kept my mother company.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 5:39

MISHNAH: If somebody provides for his wife through a third party, he cannot give her less that two qab of wheat or four qab of barley. Rebbi Yose said, only Rebbi Ismael assigned her barley, becaused he lived in proximity of Idumea.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:3

For whom is it needed? For Rebbi Meïr! Even though for Rebbi Meïr the hand of the slave is his master’s hand and if the wife acquired title the husband should have acquired it; he agrees that his rights over it are restricted to the use of the yield. There, we have stated: “The finds of his underage son and daughter or of his Canaanite slave or slave-girl as well as his wife’s find belong to him,” for he can direct them to do other work. Why do we say: “The finds of his adult son and daughter or of his Hebrew slave or slave-girl belong to them,” because he cannot direct them to do other work. But his wife he cannot direct to do other work and you say that her find belongs to him! Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is another reason for his wife. What is the other reason for his wife? Rebbi Ḥaggai says, because of quarrel. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but that she should not smuggle away any of her husband’s property and say, I found it. Think of it, if another person gave it to her as a gift! A gift is public knowledge, a find is not public knowledge. Think of it, if she found it in the presence of witnesses! This because of that. Rebbi Yoḥanan said, if they are not dependent on their father. But if they are dependent on their father, their finds belong to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:3

For whom is it needed? For Rebbi Meïr! Even though for Rebbi Meïr the hand of the slave is his master’s hand and if the wife acquired title the husband should have acquired it; he agrees that his rights over it are restricted to the use of the yield. There, we have stated: “The finds of his underage son and daughter or of his Canaanite slave or slave-girl as well as his wife’s find belong to him,” for he can direct them to do other work. Why do we say: “The finds of his adult son and daughter or of his Hebrew slave or slave-girl belong to them,” because he cannot direct them to do other work. But his wife he cannot direct to do other work and you say that her find belongs to him! Rebbi Joḥanan said, there is another reason for his wife. What is the other reason for his wife? Rebbi Ḥaggai says, because of quarrel. Rebbi Yose does not say so, but that she should not smuggle away any of her husband’s property and say, I found it. Think of it, if another person gave it to her as a gift! A gift is public knowledge, a find is not public knowledge. Think of it, if she found it in the presence of witnesses! This because of that. Rebbi Yoḥanan said, if they are not dependent on their father. But if they are dependent on their father, their finds belong to him.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:12

HALAKHAH: “If she decided to bring him money,” etc. “If she decided to bring him 500 denars by appraisal, he makes it 400. If he did not do that but made it 1’000; if she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, he deducts five denars for each tetradrachma, but he cannot touch the addition. If she decided to bring him 500 denars in coin, he makes it 750. If he did not do that but made them 1’000; if she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, he deducts six denars for each tetradrachma, but he cannot touch the addition. If she decided to bring him 1’000 zuz, he must turn them into fifteen minas. If he did not do that but wrote over to her a field worth 12 minas in place of the 1’000 zuz. If she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, one does not decrease for a virgin to less than 200 and for a widow to less than a mina.” Here, you say, he deducts. But there, you say, he does not deduct. Here, if she invalidated part of it, there if she did not invalidate part of it. Here, you say, he touches the addition but there, you say, he does not touch the addition. Here, he added but did not subtract; there, he subtracted but did not add. It was stated: Both for appraisal and for coin. Why for appraisal? Corresponding to what he subtracts, corresponding to what what he adds, corresponding to what she brings.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:12

HALAKHAH: “If she decided to bring him money,” etc. “If she decided to bring him 500 denars by appraisal, he makes it 400. If he did not do that but made it 1’000; if she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, he deducts five denars for each tetradrachma, but he cannot touch the addition. If she decided to bring him 500 denars in coin, he makes it 750. If he did not do that but made them 1’000; if she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, he deducts six denars for each tetradrachma, but he cannot touch the addition. If she decided to bring him 1’000 zuz, he must turn them into fifteen minas. If he did not do that but wrote over to her a field worth 12 minas in place of the 1’000 zuz. If she made an agreement, she collects everything; if not, one does not decrease for a virgin to less than 200 and for a widow to less than a mina.” Here, you say, he deducts. But there, you say, he does not deduct. Here, if she invalidated part of it, there if she did not invalidate part of it. Here, you say, he touches the addition but there, you say, he does not touch the addition. Here, he added but did not subtract; there, he subtracted but did not add. It was stated: Both for appraisal and for coin. Why for appraisal? Corresponding to what he subtracts, corresponding to what what he adds, corresponding to what she brings.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 6:23

”If somebody says, give my sons one šeqel per week and they need a tetradrachma, one gives them a tetradrachma. Do not give them more than one šeqel per week, one gives them a šeqel. But for the support of the wife and the daughters, whether he says give or do not give, one gives them a šeqel. It was stated: Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, Meïr used to say, if somebody says, give my sons one šeqel per week and they need a tetradrachma, one gives them a šeqel, and for the remainder they should be provided for by charity. But the Sages say, one takes continuously until the property is used up and after that they should be provided by charity.” Rebbi Yose said, that gives a simple example for Ḥilfai’s question. He said, I shall sit on the river bank and if I cannot extract the teachings of the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya from the Mishnah, throw me into the river. What could he say? “The trustee should execute what he was entrusted with.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:19

“She feeds him what is not tithed, or makes him sleep with her when she is menstruating, or does not cut ḥallah, or makes vows which she does not keep.” We understand all these because he is involved. “She makes vows which she does not keep,” what is his interest in this? He can say, I cannot live with a vowing wife because she buries her children. It was stated in the name of Rebbi Yudan: Children die for the sin of vows, as it is written: “For vain [vows] I smote your children.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:32

MISHNAH: The following one forces to divorce: Those smitten with boils, the one afflicted with a polyp, the dung collector, the brass refiner, and the tanner, whether they were in this before they married or they came to it after they married. For all of these says Rebbi Meïr that, even if he contracted with her, she can say “I thought that I could stand it, now I cannot stand it.” But the Sages say, she is forced to stand it except for the one smitten with boils because she causes him consumption. It happened in Sidon that a tanner died who had a brother tanner; there the Sages said, she can say: “I could stand that in your brother, I cannot stand it in you.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 7:32

MISHNAH: The following one forces to divorce: Those smitten with boils, the one afflicted with a polyp, the dung collector, the brass refiner, and the tanner, whether they were in this before they married or they came to it after they married. For all of these says Rebbi Meïr that, even if he contracted with her, she can say “I thought that I could stand it, now I cannot stand it.” But the Sages say, she is forced to stand it except for the one smitten with boils because she causes him consumption. It happened in Sidon that a tanner died who had a brother tanner; there the Sages said, she can say: “I could stand that in your brother, I cannot stand it in you.”

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 8:6

HALAKHAH: “If she inherited after she was definitively married,” etc. We did state: She may sell or give away and it is valid. Rebbi Ḥiyya stated: She should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid. ”Rebbi Ḥanina ben Aqiba said, that is not what Rabban Gamliel gave as answer, but the following was his argument: No, if you have an argument about a preliminarily married one, where he has rights neither to what she finds, nor to her handiwork, nor to dissolve her vows, what can you say about a definitively married one where he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows? Let the proof be the case of one who [inherited] before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, in which case he has rights to what she finds, to her handiwork, and to dissolve her vows, and you admit to us that she should not sell or give away. He said to them, I agree that she should not sell or give away, but if she sold or gave away it is valid..” There came a case before Rebbi Immi. He said, is not Rabban Gamliel’s an isolated opinion? One cannot rely on it. A baraita supports him and disagrees with him: ”Our teachers took up the case again, voted, and instructed about property which she inherited before the definitive marriage and then was definitively married, that she should not sell or give away, and if she sold or gave away it is invalid.” It disagrees that the sale is invalid. It agrees that our teachers took up the case again, instructed, and voted. Before they voted, they did not disagree with him.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:2

HALAKHAH: “If somebody writes to his wife: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties,” etc. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If he did not take her in. But if he took her in, nobody can lose his rights by these expressions. Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, this is the word of Rebbi Ḥiyya: He who says that “my hands are removed from this field, my feet are removed from this field,” did not say anything. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Does a Mishnah imply that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions? Did we not state there: “If somebody was married to two wives when he sold a field and the first one wrote for the buyer: I have no claims on you, the second one can take it away from the buyer’s hands,” this implies, not the first one. He said to him, that text itself implies that nobody can lose his rights by these expressions, but here the second wife cannot take anything away from the first, and why can the first one not take it away from the buyer’s hands? For she writes to him: For any complaint I shall have regarding this field, I shall have nothing against you.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:5

If she sold produce connected to the ground: Rav Aḥa said, as if she sold harvested [produce]; Rebbi Yose said, as if she sold a tenth of the ground. Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, she cannot sell the produce. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Rebbi Immi asked: If another person had written [real estate] over to her, would he not receive the revenue? If he himself wrote, not so much more! He said only “wrote over”, but not “sold”. What is the difference between one who writes and one who sells? He tried to find a reason to hide food from the wife.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:6

It is reasonable according to Rebbi Jehudah, if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and the revenues,” that he cannot take the revenues. Even if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he cannot eat its yield. It is reasonable according to the rabbis; if he wrote: “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” can he eat its yield? Even if he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and its yields,” can he eat its yield? Let us hear from the following, as Rebbi Ze‘ira, Rav Jehudah said in the name of Rav: If somebody writes a field over to his wife, he has no right to its yield. Rebbi Ze‘ira said, a baraita says so “What are revenues derived from revenues? He sells the produce, buys real estate, and eats its revenue.” Since he wrote, “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their yields,” is that not as if he wrote a field over to his wife, and you say, he has neither revenue nor revenue from revenue! That means, there is no difference in the opinion of Rebbi Jehudah whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” he cannot take any revenue. Similarly, for the rabbis it makes no difference whether he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with your properties and their revenues,” or he wrote “I shall have nothing to do with this field and its yield,” he can take its yield.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:12

Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:12

Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:12

Rebbi Hillel bar Pazi asked before Rebbi Yose: If he sold and then she died? He said to him, his sale is invalid; it is as if a son sold during his father’s lifetime and then the father died. If she sold and then he died? He said to him, her sale is valid; it is as if a father sold during his son’s lifetime and then the son died. Rebbi Ḥiyya bar Marius asked before Rebbi Jonah: What is the situation if she sold to her husband? He said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi Judah, this implies that her sale is a sale. It was stated: “If somebody says, my property should be given to X, if X died to Y, [if Y died to Z]. If the first one died the properties should be given to the second, if the second died they should be given to the third. If the second one died during the first’s lifetime; since the second never acquired them, the third cannot acquire them.” He said to him, so did Rebbi Hoshaia, the father of the Mishnah, explain: After him to X, after him to Y; it is as if stated: if the third died during the second’s lifetime, since the second one did not acquire his heirs cannot acquire, one really could say: After him to X, after him to Y. It was stated: “Rebbi says, the first one may sell the real estate and buy movables. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, he has only the usufruct.” Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi. Rebbi Mana said, since Ḥizqiah said, practice follows Rebbi, that implies that he cannot dispose of it by a death-bed will. So said Rebbi Mana before Rebbi Yose: Since this woman’s upkeep is her husband’s responsibility, is it not like a gift of sick persons? He said to him, her upkeep is what is necessary for her: food, oil, and salt. But she wants to sell and buy chickens. This means that if the first one wanted to sell and buy chickens, he may sell. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, her burial is equal to her upkeep. Since you said there, he may sell real estate and buy food, so he may sell real estate and buy a burial.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:23

MISHNAH: If he wrote to her: “I have no vow or oath against you,” he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates. “I have no oath against you, or your heirs, or your business associates,” he cannot ask an oath from her, or her heirs, or her business associates, but the heirs can ask an oath from her, or her heirs, or her business associates.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:23

MISHNAH: If he wrote to her: “I have no vow or oath against you,” he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates. “I have no oath against you, or your heirs, or your business associates,” he cannot ask an oath from her, or her heirs, or her business associates, but the heirs can ask an oath from her, or her heirs, or her business associates.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:25

There, we have stated: “If somebody leases a cow from another person and lends it to a third party; if it died naturally, the lessee has to swear that it died naturally and the borrower has to pay to the lessee.” Rebbi Hila in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. Also Rebbi Ḥiyya stated thus: “The borrower cannot lend, nor the lessee lease, nor the borrower lease, nor the lessee lend, nor the trustee give to another unless they received permission from the owners. And all who changed the titles without the owners’ knowledge are liable. But the borrower is liable even if he did not change.” But it is because we stated: “An unpaid watchman can stipulate to be exempt from an oath and the borrower may stipulate that he not have to pay.” This means that even if he stipulated to be exempt that he is obligated. What if he wanted to let the borrower swear? Let us hear from the following: “If he wrote to her: ‘I have no vow or oath against you,’ he cannot make her swear, but he can ask an oath from the heirs or her business associates.” This implies that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The first case teaches about the second and the second about the first. The first case teaches about the second, that if he wanted to make the borrower swear, he can force him to swear. The second case teaches about the first, that if he wants to force the wife to swear, that he can make her swear. Rebbi Ḥanina said, it is not necessary to derive the first case from the second, and what does one learn for the second case from the first? Following what Rebbi Hila said in the name of Rebbi Yannai: Only if he gave permission to lend to others. And here, only if he gave permission to let her sons be stewards. Rebbi Yose said, he has to pay the lease all the time it is leased to him. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked Rebbi Abuna: If the owners borrowed it and it died? He said to him, in that case we say, they ate it. Rebbi Yose bar Abun said, if they ate it, they ate their own property. Rebbi Ze‘ira asked before Rebbi Yasa: How does one act? He said to him, there are two against four; one does not act following the argument. He said to him, they are two against two! Rebbi Eleazar is the elder Rebbi Ḥiyya’s student; Rebbi Joḥanan is Rebbi Yannai’s student.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:26

MISHNAH: “I have no vow or oath against you, neither I, nor my heirs, nor my business associates, against you, or your heirs, or your business associates,” he cannot ask an oath from her, neither he, nor the heirs, nor the business associates, from her, or her heirs, or her business associates. If she went from her husband’s grave to her family, or she remained in her in-law’s family but was not appointed as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. But if she was appointed as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:26

MISHNAH: “I have no vow or oath against you, neither I, nor my heirs, nor my business associates, against you, or your heirs, or your business associates,” he cannot ask an oath from her, neither he, nor the heirs, nor the business associates, from her, or her heirs, or her business associates. If she went from her husband’s grave to her family, or she remained in her in-law’s family but was not appointed as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. But if she was appointed as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:26

MISHNAH: “I have no vow or oath against you, neither I, nor my heirs, nor my business associates, against you, or your heirs, or your business associates,” he cannot ask an oath from her, neither he, nor the heirs, nor the business associates, from her, or her heirs, or her business associates. If she went from her husband’s grave to her family, or she remained in her in-law’s family but was not appointed as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. But if she was appointed as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:27

HALAKHAH: ““I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah said, only if she was made a steward during her husband’s lifetime. But if she was appointed as a steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can(not) make her swear. That is the Mishnah: if she was not appointed a steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If she was appointed a steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past. What is “about the past”? From the time of death to the time of burial. And Rebbi Yose said, even if he appointed her as steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can make her swear. But did we not state: “If he did not appoint her as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If he appointed her as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future but cannot make her swear for the past.” He explains it about the first case. But if it is about the first case, Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about property over which she had control during her husband’s lifetime but even about property over which she acquired control after her husband’s death the heirs cannot make her swear. Explain it, from the time of death to the time of burial. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The heirs cannot make her swear from the time of death to the time of burial. Bar Qappara stated: That she should not abandon him and leave for her family.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:27

HALAKHAH: ““I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah said, only if she was made a steward during her husband’s lifetime. But if she was appointed as a steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can(not) make her swear. That is the Mishnah: if she was not appointed a steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If she was appointed a steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past. What is “about the past”? From the time of death to the time of burial. And Rebbi Yose said, even if he appointed her as steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can make her swear. But did we not state: “If he did not appoint her as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If he appointed her as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future but cannot make her swear for the past.” He explains it about the first case. But if it is about the first case, Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about property over which she had control during her husband’s lifetime but even about property over which she acquired control after her husband’s death the heirs cannot make her swear. Explain it, from the time of death to the time of burial. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The heirs cannot make her swear from the time of death to the time of burial. Bar Qappara stated: That she should not abandon him and leave for her family.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:27

HALAKHAH: ““I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah said, only if she was made a steward during her husband’s lifetime. But if she was appointed as a steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can(not) make her swear. That is the Mishnah: if she was not appointed a steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If she was appointed a steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past. What is “about the past”? From the time of death to the time of burial. And Rebbi Yose said, even if he appointed her as steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can make her swear. But did we not state: “If he did not appoint her as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If he appointed her as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future but cannot make her swear for the past.” He explains it about the first case. But if it is about the first case, Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about property over which she had control during her husband’s lifetime but even about property over which she acquired control after her husband’s death the heirs cannot make her swear. Explain it, from the time of death to the time of burial. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The heirs cannot make her swear from the time of death to the time of burial. Bar Qappara stated: That she should not abandon him and leave for her family.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:27

HALAKHAH: ““I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah said, only if she was made a steward during her husband’s lifetime. But if she was appointed as a steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can(not) make her swear. That is the Mishnah: if she was not appointed a steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If she was appointed a steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past. What is “about the past”? From the time of death to the time of burial. And Rebbi Yose said, even if he appointed her as steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can make her swear. But did we not state: “If he did not appoint her as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If he appointed her as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future but cannot make her swear for the past.” He explains it about the first case. But if it is about the first case, Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about property over which she had control during her husband’s lifetime but even about property over which she acquired control after her husband’s death the heirs cannot make her swear. Explain it, from the time of death to the time of burial. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The heirs cannot make her swear from the time of death to the time of burial. Bar Qappara stated: That she should not abandon him and leave for her family.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:27

HALAKHAH: ““I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah said, only if she was made a steward during her husband’s lifetime. But if she was appointed as a steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can(not) make her swear. That is the Mishnah: if she was not appointed a steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If she was appointed a steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past. What is “about the past”? From the time of death to the time of burial. And Rebbi Yose said, even if he appointed her as steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can make her swear. But did we not state: “If he did not appoint her as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If he appointed her as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future but cannot make her swear for the past.” He explains it about the first case. But if it is about the first case, Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about property over which she had control during her husband’s lifetime but even about property over which she acquired control after her husband’s death the heirs cannot make her swear. Explain it, from the time of death to the time of burial. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The heirs cannot make her swear from the time of death to the time of burial. Bar Qappara stated: That she should not abandon him and leave for her family.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:27

HALAKHAH: ““I have no vow or oath against you,” etc. Rebbi Jonah said, only if she was made a steward during her husband’s lifetime. But if she was appointed as a steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can(not) make her swear. That is the Mishnah: if she was not appointed a steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If she was appointed a steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future, but they cannot make her swear about the past. What is “about the past”? From the time of death to the time of burial. And Rebbi Yose said, even if he appointed her as steward after her husband’s death, the heirs can make her swear. But did we not state: “If he did not appoint her as steward, the heirs cannot make her swear. If he appointed her as steward, the heirs can make her swear for the future but cannot make her swear for the past.” He explains it about the first case. But if it is about the first case, Rebbi Jonah and Rebbi Yose both say, not only about property over which she had control during her husband’s lifetime but even about property over which she acquired control after her husband’s death the heirs cannot make her swear. Explain it, from the time of death to the time of burial. For Rebbi Abbahu said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: The heirs cannot make her swear from the time of death to the time of burial. Bar Qappara stated: That she should not abandon him and leave for her family.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:29

HALAKHAH: “If she went from her husband’s grave to her family,” etc. Rebbi Ze‘ura said, this came down in the manner of a biblical oath. The ketubah is acknowledged in her hand for collection; it is as if collected. But since with the document of 200 there is an acknowledment of payment and she says, one mina [is due to her], she cannot be paid without an oath.

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:33

If a father became obligated to swear in court and died, his son cannot collect. If it were otherwise, what could we say? Can a man let his son inherit an obligation to swear? Rebbi Avin said, you mean, if a man compromised his document in court, his son cannot collect. Rav Ḥisda asked: Because he walked those two steps, he loses? If he compromised it outside the court, he collects. Because he compromised it in court, he cannot collect?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:33

If a father became obligated to swear in court and died, his son cannot collect. If it were otherwise, what could we say? Can a man let his son inherit an obligation to swear? Rebbi Avin said, you mean, if a man compromised his document in court, his son cannot collect. Rav Ḥisda asked: Because he walked those two steps, he loses? If he compromised it outside the court, he collects. Because he compromised it in court, he cannot collect?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:33

If a father became obligated to swear in court and died, his son cannot collect. If it were otherwise, what could we say? Can a man let his son inherit an obligation to swear? Rebbi Avin said, you mean, if a man compromised his document in court, his son cannot collect. Rav Ḥisda asked: Because he walked those two steps, he loses? If he compromised it outside the court, he collects. Because he compromised it in court, he cannot collect?

Jerusalem Talmud Ketubot 9:35

MISHNAH: If she had compromised her ketubah, how is that? If her ketubah was 1‘000 zuz and he said to her, you received your ketubah, but she says, I received only one mina, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. If one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was paid, how is that? If her ketubah was 1‘000 zuz and he said to her, you received your ketubah, but she says, I received nothing, and one witness testifies that [the ketubah] was paid, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. From encumbered property, how is that? If he sold his real estate to others and she collects from the buyers, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. From orphans’ property, how is that? If he died and left his estate to the orphans, if she is paid out by the orphans she shall not be able to collect without an oath. Not in his presence, how is that? If he went overseas and she collects in his absence, she shall not be able to collect without an oath. Rebbi Simeon says, any time she asks for her ketubah, the heirs can require an oath from her. If she does not ask for her ketubah, the heirs cannot require an oath from her.